

9. MAR 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1  
(2) Commander Task Force 95  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 15 February through 26 February 1953

Ref: (a) Article 0705 U.S. Navy Regulations  
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4  
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A  
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period 15 February through 26 February 1953, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORNBY, 61175/1310, USN, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, began her third Far Eastern tour operating as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100L, 15 February to 2100L, 25 February 1953. At this time the command of the Task Unit shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY; CTU 95.1.2 in HMS NEWCASTLE assumed OTC West Coast of Korea. During this reporting period, TU 95.1.1 consisted of the USS BATAAN (CVL 29) and a maximum of five (5) United Nations' escort vessels.

3. During this operating period, ships of TU 95.1.1 operated in the Korean Coastal Area "N" in the vicinity of Lat. 37°-30'N and 124°-30'E. Refueling of the screen was normally accomplished by detaching one destroyer in the early afternoon for rendezvous with a tanker located at Lat. 37°-40'N and 125°-41'E. Ships returned to the Task Unit late in the evening of the same day.

4. Enemy surface forces or action  
No enemy surface forces were encountered by this Task Unit, therefore, no surface action is related.

5. During this operating period, VMA aircraft (FlU) flew Combat Air Patrol, Target Combat Air Patrol, Armed Reconnaissance, Pre-Briefed Strikes, ResCap and Air Spot for naval gun firing missions as illustrated by a typical schedule, enclosure (1). Flight operations conducted during the ten (10) day period totaled 343

combat sorties. Forty-three (43) flights were cancelled due to weather; five (5) were cancelled due to non-availability of aircraft. Four (4) flights aborted. The following averages are listed: A total of 723.0 combat hours were flown for a daily average of 72.3 hours. The average number of sorties per day was thirty-four (34) and the length of sortie was 2.1 hours. The number of pilots assigned was thirty-four (34) and the number of pilots on board was thirty-one (31). The number of pilots available on board was thirty (30). The squadron had an average of twenty-three (23) aircraft assigned with a daily availability of seventeen (17). The percent aircraft availability was 76.3. Two hundred forty-two (242) offensive and one hundred-one (101) defensive sorties were flown.

6. The mission of the Task Unit was to assist in enforcing the United Nations' blockade in the defense of the friendly islands off the West Coast of Korea. The assigned tasks were:

- a. Provide TARGAP aircraft for one event each day for TU 95.1.4.
- b. Provide TARGAP for Task Units of TG 95.1 when inshore operations so required it.
- c. Provide air spotting services as requested by naval units of TG 95.1
- d. Provide Combat Air Patrol for TU 95.1.1 and friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
- e. Provide air strikes as requested by units of TG 95.1, guerilla organizations and JOC Korea.
- f. Provide close air support upon request.
- g. Provide daily armed reconnaissance of the coastal area between the Han River and Taedong Estuary, and on alternate days, the coast north of the Taedong Estuary up to Hanchon.
- h. Provide convoy cover as requested by CTF 90.
- i. Provide armed reconnaissance strikes and interdiction throughout the assigned area.
- j. Render SAR assistance.
- k. Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

7. Shortly after the commencement of operations in Area NAN, it became apparent that some action should be taken to avoid unnecessary contact reports made by screening vessels in accordance with CINCPACFLT Instruction 003360.2A. Due to unusual sonar conditions in the area, numerous contacts were made on sunken wrecks and other bottom objects such as ridges, etc. To prevent those unnecessary reports and in view of the fact that it was unlikely that all units of a five (5) ship force could be sunk prior to getting off an evaluated report, the following message was sent to all screening ships of TU 95.1.1:

"PRESENT PHENOMENAL SONAR CONDITIONS HAVE LED TO MANY PREMATURE REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CINCPACFLT INST 003360.2A AND A CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF UNNECESSARY ALERTS X. WHILE PRESENT CONDITIONS EXIST UNITS OF THIS FORCE WILL HOLD REPORT UNTIL PROPER EVALUATION IS MADE BY UNIT COMDR X THIS IN NO WAY MODIFIES ACTION TO BE TAKEN OTHER THAN REPORTING".

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

15 February 1953 -

Enroute to operating area "N" from Sasebo, Japan. in

accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 140245Z of February 1953 in company with HMCS CRUSADER (DDE 228).

At 1036I scheduled gunnery exercises commenced on a towed sleeve in Area Goerge. How and Uncle type runs were made, with marked improvement shown over all previous exercises conducted.

At 2100I Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1310, USN, Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) assumed Command of Task Unit 95.1.1 and OTC West Coast of Korea.

16 February 1953 -

At 0218I the USS McCORD (DD 534) joined the formation.

At 0500I the USS BATAAN in company with HMCS CRUSADER and the USS McCORD arrived in operating area "N".

At 0545I HMAS ANZAC (DD 37) joined the formation.

At 0750I the first flight was launched and the BATAAN began her third operating tour off the West Coast of Korea.

At 0817I the USS HANNA (DE 449) joined the formation.

Thirty-three (33) sorties were flown, of which twenty-three (23) were offensive and ten (10) defensive. Flight operations were restricted due to low aircraft availability, causing cancellation of five (5) missions.

Damage to the enemy included twenty-three (23) buildings destroyed and two (2) road cuts made.

In other damage inflicted, one (1) road bridge was damaged and seven (7) revetted buildings were destroyed.

At 1159I HMCS CRUSADER made an urgent Hodge Hog attack on a sonar contact later evaluated as definitely non-submarine.

At 1325I the USS McCORD investigated a sonar contact which was later evaluated as non-submarine.

17 February 1953 -

Sudden and heavy snow showers with visibility less than one (1) mile at sea forced cancellation of the morning Han River Reconnaissance flight. Ten aircraft airborne at this time were diverted to K-6 for landing. With clearing weather, the final flight of the day involved five (5) F4U's with six (6) MIG's in an exchange of head-on firing runs. No hits were observed for either side.

A total of twenty-eight (28) sorties were flown, twenty (20) offensive and eight (8) defensive. One naval gun spotting flight was flown. Primary targets included six (6) buildings damaged, one gun position damaged and three (3) road cuts made.

At 1500I HMCS CRUSADER was detached for refueling.

At 1646I the USS McCORD held a sonar contact 093<sup>0</sup>, seven (7) miles from the BATAAN.

At 1700I the USS McCORD returned to her screening station having evaluated the contact as non-submarine.

18 February 1953 -

At 0002I the USS HANNA was detached to proceed to Sasebo, Japan, on mission assigned.

At 0028I HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation.

At 0506I the USS McCORD was detached for refueling.

Flight operations continued in good weather over the target area with thirty-nine (39) flights launched. Pilots reported "warning" fires were burning upon entering the area south of Hanchon. Corsair pilots left four (4) buildings burning in a parking area and destroyed one (1) gas stowage area. One build-up area was heavily damaged. Other scores for the day included sixteen (16) buildings destroyed and eight (8) damaged. Two (2) road cuts were made and one (1) barracks area was hit heavily.

At 1711I the USS McCORD rejoined the formation.

At 1934I the USS McCORD held sonar contact 3000 yards from the USS BATAAN.

At 1947I contact was reported as doubtful; the USS McCORD made two (2) depth charge attacks.

At 1949I contact was evaluated as non-submarine and the McCORD rejoined the formation.

19 February 1953 -

Under excellent flying conditions pilots of VMA-312 flew thirty (30) offensive and ten (10) defensive missions. A total of nine (9) road cuts were reported and two (2) road bridges were destroyed; seven (7) bridges were damaged. Five (5) large brick buildings were destroyed in a possible stowage area. Pilots returned with several good photographs which proved valuable in assessing damage to these targets.

At 0730I Gunnery Exercise "AA Roger" was conducted.

At 1100I Air Defense Exercise, "Warning Magenta" was conducted, returning planes simulating surprise attacks. An emergency landing due to an oil leak, was made by Major Grover R. BETZER, USMC, 013728/7304, Bureau Number 63005, and curtailed the "Warning Magenta" air defense exercise.

At 1531I Captain GUTFLEISCH, USMC, made the 27,000th landing aboard the BATAAN, which was celebrated with the traditional cake.

At 1557I HMAS ANZAC was detached for refueling.

At 1659I the USS McCORD had a sonar contact evaluated as a possible mine.

At 1742I the contact was identified visually as a dropped "bolly" tank and was sunk by HMCS CRUSADER, the assisting ship.

At 1745I the USS McCORD and HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation.

At 2308I HMAS ANZAC rejoined the formation.

20 February 1953 -

A series of mechanical failures were the cause of the following mishaps to VMA-312 pilots today; One (1) aircraft "limped" into K-14 with an oil leak, which caused an engine change. Another F4U suffered extensive damage in a wheels-up landing at Paengyong-Do; engine failure was again the cause. In a touch and go situation at the ship, one plane was landed aboard with a badly smoking engine. All personnel involved in this emergency displayed excellent teamwork. There were no injuries to personnel in any of these incidents. All aircraft were given a thorough check and no causes other than routine wear and tear could be determined. Ten (10) defensive and thirty (30) offensive flights

were flown. Two (2) flights aborted. A total of thirty-seven (37) buildings were hit in today's strikes; figures showed twenty-nine (29) reported destroyed and eight (8) as damaged. Two (2) rail cuts were made at either end of a tunnel and two (2) railroad bridges were damaged. Pilots reported one (1) supply area severely burned.

At 1148I Commodore L. George DURLACHER, RCM, Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Far Eastern Services, arrived on board by C-54 aircraft on a tour of the West Coast operating area.

At 1128I HMS NEWCASTLE joined the formation to receive Commodore L. George DURLACHER, RCM, by helicopter.

At 1150I the transfer was completed and HMS NEWCASTLE departed.

21 February 1953 -

At 0730I conducted gunnery exercise "Saint Barbara", readiness firing of anti-aircraft batteries.

At 0700I the first flight was launched in excellent flying weather which extended over the target areas. Forty (40) sorties were flown; twenty-eight (28) offensive and twelve (12) defensive. One mechanical failure resulted in a deferred emergency aboard the USS BATAAN. The prize target of the day was a communist artillery field piece which the Checkerboard marine pilots destroyed with 500 pounders and napalms. In a troop housing area, twenty-seven (27) buildings were destroyed and twenty-five (25) damaged. One (1) supply building was damaged and eight (8) road cuts were made.

At 1522I HMCS CREUSADER was detached for refueling.

At 1645I HMAS ANZAC was detached to proceed on mission assigned.

At 1650I HMS COCKADE (DD 34) joined the formation as relief for the ANZAC.

At 2300I HMCS CREUSADER rejoined the formation.

22 February 1953 -

At 0730I CTU 95.1.1, OCE, conducted gunnery exercise "AA Roger".

The ship's chaplain made two helicopter trips to ships in the screen for the purpose of holding divine services.

The marine pilots of VMA-312 took advantage of perfect flying weather by holding "field day" on the communist troops with destruction of fifty-nine (59) buildings in a troop housing area. One Corsair pilot, Captain Malcolm A. HILL, had a near fatal hit when communist small arms fire passed under the pilot seat and emerged from the right side of the cockpit.

In an attack on a railway line south of Sariwon, six (6) railroad cars were damaged and one (1) secondary explosion was observed. One (1) gun position was reported damaged. Excellent photographs were obtained on this mission by a BATAAN "jury rigged" F-56 camera, using a surveyed Flu "belly tank" as a camera pod. From the photographs taken several new targets were found in the area.

At 1536I the USS McCOYD was detached for refueling.

At 2355I the USS McCOYD rejoined the formation.

23 February 1953 -

At 0748I HMCS HAIDA (DD 215) joined the formation as relief for HMCS CRUSADER.

At 0825I CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY, RCN, and two staff members landed aboard from HMCS HAIDA by helicopter. The admiral, on a visit to the West Coast Operational Area, observed carrier landings and was given a tour of the ship by the Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN, Captain H. R. HORNEY, USN.

At 0915I the USS HANSON (DDR 832) joined the formation.

At 1054I CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY and staff members were transferred to HMCS CRUSADER by helicopter.

At 1127I HMCS CRUSADER departed on mission assigned, flying the flag of CNS Vice Admiral E. R. MAINGUY.

At 2337I HMS COCKADE rejoined the formation.

Today's flying activity was climaxed by brilliant teamwork in an air spotting flight with HMCS CRUSADER acting as controlling ship. Coached by marine pilots, four (4) direct hits were reported made by the CRUSADER on enemy troops and coastal gun positions. Later these same pilots destroyed buildings in a village nearby. A total of thirty-nine (39) sorties were flown during the day against troops housed in revetted buildings and in villages. Thirty (30) buildings were reported destroyed and ten (10) damaged. One supply dump was burned and two (2) road bridges were hit.

24 February 1953 -

At 0628I the USS HANSON (DDR 832) was detached to rendezvous with CTU 95.1.2 for the purpose of conducting passive electronic countermeasures and the surveillance of two areas to be designated by CTU 95.1.2.

At 1459I HMCS HAIDA was detached for refueling. Marginal weather which lowered ceilings to 400 feet in rain and snow caused the cancellation of twelve (12) afternoon sorties.

At 1015I Major David (n) CLEELAND, 016576I, USMC, on his onehundred-one (101) mission, was knocked down by enemy ground fire ten (10) miles north of Haeju and crash-landed on the frozen Anyong reservoir. Many communist troops were in the area, but Major CLEELAND's flight held them off by effective strafing runs. The RESCAP also bombed and napalmed the hill from which the enemy was firing on the downed pilot. At 1035I the USS BATAAN launched six (6) planes as relief for the RESCAP over the downed aircraft and moved quickly northward to close the distance. This proved to be very timely action since several of the aircraft returned with as little as fifteen (15) gallons of fuel. At 1055I these aircraft arrived on the scene at the precise moment the RESCAP was out of ammunition. The pilot was rescued by the timely and courageous action of the helicopter pilot flying from K-14 after having been under fire from ground troops for nearly an hour. The plane was partially destroyed with rockets and dropped through the ice.

Checkerboard pilots observed a large secondary explosion following their attack on a shipyard, the primary target for the day. Four (4) road bridges were damaged and one (1) destroyed.

25 February 1953 -

At 0105I HMCS HAIDA, rejoined the formation. Flight

operations today were limited to eighteen (18) sorties by an overcast with a cloud base variable from 100 to 600 feet in the morning, becoming broken to scattered in the afternoon. Twenty-two (22) flights were cancelled due to weather. Pilots reported twenty-two (22) buildings and one (1) warehouse destroyed in a strike thirteen (13) miles southwest of Haeju. On the last flight of the day five (5) F4U's departed the target area for K-3 to receive maintenance and compass corrections.

At 2100I the Commanding Officer of HMS GLORY assumed duties as CTU 95.1.1. The Commanding Officer of HMS NEWCASTLE assumed duties OTC West Coast Korea at 2100I.

At 2336I the USS McCORD and HMCS HAIDA were detached to join HMS GLORY, CTU 95.1.1

26 February 1953 -

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan, from operating area "N" in company with HMS COCKADE.

At 1200I conducted gunnery exercises on a towed sleeve. George, How, and Uncle type runs were made. Firing was extremely accurate.

At 1639I the USS BATAAN moored to buoy eighteen (18) in Sasebo harbor.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. The expenditure and performance of air ordnance for Marine Squadron VMA-312 during this reporting period was as follows:

1. Expenditure:

| DATE  | 1000#<br>GP | 500#<br>SAP | 500#<br>GP | 260#<br>Frag | 250#<br>GP | 100#<br>GP | HVAR<br>Rocket | W. P.<br>Rocket | Napalm | 20mm<br>rds. | 50 cal<br>rds. |
|-------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|--------|--------------|----------------|
| 2/16  |             |             | 11         |              |            | 53         |                | 89              | 13     | 1000         | 5000           |
| 2/17  |             |             | 10         |              |            | 57         |                | 75              | 11     | 800          | 3800           |
| 2/18  |             |             | 16         |              |            | 96         |                | 77              | 11     | 3800         | 12200          |
| 2/19  |             |             | 26         |              | 40         | 95         |                | 15              | 2      | 1700         | 5600           |
| 2/20  | 9           |             | 15         |              | 50         | 42         |                | 58              | 8      | 3300         | 6200           |
| 2/21  |             |             | 19         | 36           |            | 60         |                | 68              | 9      | 4100         | 7800           |
| 2/22  |             |             | 19         |              |            | 92         | 27             | 52              | 7      | 7600         | 6300           |
| 2/23  |             |             | 21         |              | 10         | 28         | 158            |                 | 8      | 2900         | 8000           |
| 2/24  | 2           | 2           | 10         |              |            | 8          | 129            |                 | 5      | 2300         | 9000           |
| 2/25  |             |             | 5          |              |            |            | 58             | 22              | .7     | 600          | 1000           |
| TOTAL | 11          | 2           | 152        | 36           | 100        | 531        | 372            | 456             | 81     | 28100        | 64900          |

BOMB  
TOTAL 83.05  
TONS

2. Performance

No unusual difficulties were experienced in the handling or performance of ordnance material or equipment.

a. Guns

(1) 20 MM Guns

Of the thirty-two (32) cases of malfunctioning which occurred, 34% was due to telescoped rounds.

- 11 Telescoped rounds
- 4 Faulty chargers
- 4 Link chute stoppages
- 5 Ammunition link separation
- 2 Broken cannon plug
- 1 Broken front mount
- 2 Feeder stoppages
- 1 Charger lug override
- 1 Broken driving spring retainer
- 1 Broken rear bullet guide, 20mm feeder mechanism

(2) 50 Caliber Guns

Electrical failure caused 40% of the malfunctioning.

- 3 Link stoppage
- 1 Broken firing pin
- 1 Faulty driving spring
- 3 Time and headspace
- 6 Electrical failure
- 1 Frozen firing pin extension spring

b. Hung Rockets

(1) 5" HVAR

There were thirty-four (34) 5" hung rockets.

- 15 Faulty rockets AERO 11A launchers
- 11 Faulty rockets MK 9 launchers
- 5 Broken igniters MK 9 launchers
- 2 Electrical failures MK 9

(2) 3.25" W.P.

There were twenty-two (22) (3.25" W.P.) hung rockets.

- 8 Faulty rockets 11A launchers
- 2 Faulty rockets MK 9
- 12 Separated pig tails

c. Hung Bombs

Sixteen (16) hung bomb incidents were reported; 25% of which were attributed to pilot error.



(1) 100# GP

- 1 Faulty MK 55 rack
- 6 Circuit breaker out AERO 14A
- 4 Pilot error
- 1 Faulty wiring MK 55

(2) 250# GP

- 2 Hung bombs reported (MK 55 racks), cause undetermined.

(3) 260# Frag.

- 1 Sway braces too tight

d. Dud Bombs

Only one dud bomb (500# GP) was reported during this period; this was caused by failure of the solenoid to arm.

B. Expenditure of ship's ordnance for AA practice.

1. 40mm cartridge (AA)

A total of 2,973 rounds were fired for gunnery exercises.

C. Performance of ship's ordnance and material.

1. The performance of the ship's ordnance is considered excellent. No major material casualties occurred during this period.

2. During exercises "St. Barbara" and "Warning Magenta" all ordnance equipment and crews functioned excellently. Gunnery exercises on towed sleeves showed marked improvement. Direct hits carried the sleeve away on one firing run.

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own battle damage

1. Surface

None of the ships of the Task Unit were attacked or damaged.

2. Air

For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report submitted for this period.

B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy

1. Surface

Ships of the Task Unit inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as a part of TU 95.1.1 during this period.

2. Air

For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this

Task Unit, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report for the period covered by this report. A summary of reported damage is as follows:

| <u>TARGETS</u>           | <u>DESTROYED</u> | <u>DAMAGED</u> |
|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Boxcars                  |                  | 8              |
| Buildings                | 119              | 85             |
| Houses                   | 72               | 23             |
| Gun Positions            | 3                | 2              |
| Revettted Buildings      | 26               | 22             |
| Road Bridge              | 8                | 16             |
| Road Cuts                |                  | 35             |
| Transformer              |                  | 1              |
| Jeep                     | 1                |                |
| Gas Stowage Area         | 1                |                |
| Warehouse                | 3                | 2              |
| Rice Stowage Area        | 2                |                |
| Supply Area              |                  | 5              |
| Rail Cuts                |                  | 6              |
| Trench Areas             | 1                | 2              |
| Railroad Bridge          |                  | 2              |
| Sluice Gate              |                  | 2              |
| Refuel Stops             | 5                |                |
| Transformer Shed         | 1                |                |
| Power Transmission Tower |                  | 1              |
| Truck                    | 1                | 1              |
| Field Artillery Piece    | 1                |                |
| Guns                     |                  | 1              |
| Troop Shelters           |                  | 1              |
| WIA                      |                  | 5              |
| KIA                      | 4                |                |
| Shipyards                |                  | 1              |

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. An outstanding example of teamwork and high morale was shown in the handling of several emergency landings. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 986. The total number of squadron (VMA-312) personnel, officers and men, was 148. There were thirty-two (32) enlisted men received and eleven (11) transferred.

2. A general shortage of personnel in the higher ratings exists, however, the situation is not critical. The current shortages are in MM, FN, FA, SD, AN and AA rates. A vigorous on board training program to train personnel of lower ratings to fill these higher ratings is in effect and working successfully.

3. The X-2 Division provides a five (5) day orientation, training and indoctrination period which helps in assigning men to billets by consideration

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of their personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

B. Recreation

1. The following activities for welfare and recreation were available during this period.

a. A daily newspaper, the Bataan News, was distributed to all ships in the formation on all helicopter guard mail trips.

b. Radio broadcasts were piped to RBO's throughout the ship.

c. The Bataan Broadcasting Company (BBC) provided daily newscasts and recordings.

d. The crew's library was open each evening until taps.

e. Sightseeing tours were conducted to points of interest in the Sasebo area during the in-port period.

f. Three movies were shown daily in addition to one in the wardroom and one in the CPO Mess.

g. A monthly birthday party was held in the wardroom, for all officers having a birthday during the month, featuring a special dinner and music by the Bataan "Hill-Billy" Band.

h. A total of sixty-seven (67) persons went on R&R during the in-port period.

2. Athletics

a. The operating schedule does not permit participation while at sea, however, during the in-port periods the BATAAN has intramural tournaments in basketball when facilities are available. A bowling tournament was organized for the in-port period.

3. Hobbies: The BATAAN has no official hobby shop but keen interest exists in model airplane building and leather working. The ship's "Hill-Billy" band continues to provide entertainment on all special occasions.

C. Legal

1. There was no court-martial cases held during the period of this report.

D. Education and training

1. Advancement in rating examinations were held during this period for 1st and 2nd Class Petty Officers. Eighteen (18) men took the test for 1st Class and sixty-eight (68) for 2nd Class. Adding these to the number trying for 3rd Class (207) and 209 (18) earlier in the month results in a total of three hundred-eleven (311) or nearly one-third of the crew.

2. Special emphasis has been placed on enlisted correspondence courses recently with good results. Those men who felt they would fall below standards on the rating examinations have been encouraged to enroll, to insure doing better next fall. Some courses are not available at present due to revision, but several of the relatively new ones are being requested.

E. Divine Services

1. Daily Mass was held during the week at 1600. The Rosary was recited each day just before and after each mass. A bible discussion class was held each Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday evening at 0830 in the crew's library.

2. On Sunday, 15 February, three (3) services were held on the BATAAN, two Catholic Masses and one general divine service. The Church of Christ also held services under the direction of a lay leader. Ash Wednesday ashes were blessed and distributed.

3. On Sunday, 22 February, divine services were held aboard two (2) of the screening ships by the BATAAN's chaplain who was transported by helicopter. Catholic Masses and general divine services were also held aboard the BATAAN.

F. Casualties

See PART VI paragraph (F)(7) of Medical Report

PART VI - COMMENTS

A. Air Department

1. Flight Deck

Only two mild snow storms affected flight deck operations. In each instance, the snow immediately turned to slush negating the use of snow removal equipment. No flight deck icing occurred.

2. Catapults

The H-2 catapult was out of commission for 1 launch, due to failure of an electrical solenoid controlling No. 2 oil gear pump. No serious difficulties occurred during this reporting period.

3. Arresting Gear

There was no damage to the arresting gear during this period and all equipment worked satisfactorily.

4. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

| DATE | TOTAL SORTIES | NAVAL GUN SPOT | ARMED RECCO | TARCAP | CAP | RESCAP | PRE-BRIEFED STRIKE |
|------|---------------|----------------|-------------|--------|-----|--------|--------------------|
| 2/16 | 33            |                | 11          | 4      | 10  |        | 8                  |
| 2/17 | 28            | 4              |             | 4      | 8   |        | 12                 |
| 2/18 | 39            |                | 12          | 4      | 10  |        | 13                 |
| 2/19 | 40            |                | 8           | 4      | 10  |        | 18                 |

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS  
(continued)

| DATE         | TOTAL SORTIES | NAVAL GUN SPOT | ARMED RECCO | TARCAP    | CAP       | RESCAP   | PRE-BRIEFED STRIKE |
|--------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|----------|--------------------|
| 2/20         | 40            |                | 3           | 4         | 9         |          | 24                 |
| 2/21         | 40            |                | 4           | 4         | 12        |          | 20                 |
| 2/22         | 39            |                | 8           | 3         | 12        |          | 16                 |
| 2/23         | 39            | 4              | 4           | 4         | 12        |          | 15                 |
| 2/24         | 27            |                | 4           |           | 8         | 4        | 11                 |
| 2/25         | 18            |                |             |           | 6         |          | 12                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>343</b>    | <b>8</b>       | <b>54</b>   | <b>31</b> | <b>97</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>149</b>         |

No. Carrier Landings 340  
 No. Catapult Shots 344  
 No. Barrier Crashes 0

B. Engineering Department

1. Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment

a. There were no engineering casualties to the Main Propulsion Plant, Auxiliaries or electrical equipment during the operation. Minor repairs and upkeep were accomplished in a routine manner.

2. Electronics

a. Operation of electronics equipment was generally good. Two major electronic failures occurred during the operation.

(1) AN/UFX-1 (MK 10 IFF)

On 16 February, the MK 10 IFF pulse transformer (T-101) failed and resistor (R-137) was found to be open. Since no replacement for (T-101) could be made from spare parts on board an attempt to use (T-102) was made, but this could not be accomplished due to an open winding on (T-102). The transformer (T-101) was then rewound but proved unsuccessful; good indications were received on mode 2 but modes 1 and 3 were inoperative. The equipment was still inoperative on return to port.

(2) YE-1

On 24 February, rotation of the YE-1 antenna became erratic and jumpy, indicating faulty contacts. Repairs were not attempted since it would require securing other essential equipments on the mast before sending men aloft. YE guard was assumed by the USS McCORD for operations 25 February. After detachment of the McCORD, the YE antenna was again started and used until completion of operations. Operation of the antenna was somewhat erratic but proved satisfactory. A complete check of the equipment was started on return to port.

SECURITY INFORMATION

(3) TBS

Minor difficulties were experienced with TBS transceivers. The primary circuit 72.9 MC presented a garbled cutting out effect when receiving. Examination of both TBS-1 transceivers revealed no trouble in the equipment. It is believed most troubles were caused by improper tuning, volume control settings and feed back.

C. Gunnery

1. During the period of this report no abnormal difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition.

D. Operations Department

1. Communications

a. Radio

Communications were much better than during the previous tour in the third and fourth quarters of 1952. It is believed that the use of separate CW and voice circuits between JOC, Korea and the West Coast Carrier Unit has contributed much toward the improvement. Classified and total traffic volume remains heavy but is slightly less than that during the BATAAN's last report.

b. Personnel

Training of circuit operators has continued and is necessary in order to maintain the required number of qualified operators to man the circuits.

c. Post Office Transactions

|                                   | <u>RECEIVED</u> | <u>DISPATCHED</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Air Mail and First Class Pouches  | 15              | 4                 |
| Air Mail and First Class Letters  | 9600            | 6338              |
| Parcel Post Bags                  | 46              | 1                 |
| Packages (parcel post & air mail) | 255             | 9                 |
| Flats (air mail & parcel post)    | 125             | 33                |
| Newspapers                        | 445             | 0                 |

Stamp Sales - - - - - \$138.23  
Stamp Purchases - - - - - \$290.00  
Money Orders - - - - - 275 issued - - for a total of \$9359.34

2. C.I.C.

a. Radio Nets

(1) A new 5th Air Force Radar Warning Net is a great tactical improvement over previous methods of air warning and surveillance reporting. It is subject to the usual CW static, and general noise of most MHF circuits. It is also being subjected to an ever-increasing amount of administrative traffic.

Recommendation:

That administrative and all other traffic except radar reporting and emergency messages be kept off this net.

(2) A Gunnery and Administrative net appears to be a waste of one transmitter/receiver. It is used less than 5% of the time, (dawn alert - U.S. Carriers only), and most destroyers must secure some other net to come up on it.

Recommendation:

That this net be abolished - substituting the C.I. Net.

(3) No helicopter - Ship common VHF channel is designated in CTG 95.1 Communication Plan 2-52. The frequent drops of mail and personnel to vessels of the screen and other vessels joining indicates the need for a common frequency during helicopter operations. a

Recommendations:

That one common VHF channel from existing aircraft channelization be designated, preferably button (8) (T).

#### b. Material

(1) Spare parts for MK X IFF. The transformer which burned out pointed up the serious need for a spare parts program for Mark X. As yet none exists. Hand winding of the transformer was not successful where tolerances in micro seconds were involved.

#### c. Electronics Counter Measures

(1) While operating in area NAN as CTU 95.1.1 during the period 18-25 February 1953, the USS BATAAN conducted passive ECM intercepts each night between 2100 and 0500I. An Electronic Emission Control Plan with intermittent operating plan was promulgated by CTU 95.1.1 and used satisfactorily by the Task Unit.

(2) From the great number of intercepts made and the difficulty in evaluation, it became apparent that the requirements of paragraph 2(b) of ComNavFE Instruction 003521.1, dated 7 July 1951, would be impractical.

Recommendation:

That the above Instruction be modified to require dispatch reports of only those signals positively identified as enemy. All other unidentified signals could then be reported by letter.

(3) Evaluation of the diversity of signals received was difficult because of the lack of a current table of friendly U.N. radars in the area. CNO serial 0020, 15 P 32 of 15 August 1950 is the most recent publication of all nation's radars held.

### 3. Air Operations and Intelligence

a. In January, prior to completion of H/K exercises, four (4) officers from the Operations Department were given TAD orders to permit an Indoctrination and Familiarization Tour of our forthcoming operation as a unit of CTG 95.1. This tour carried the four (4) officers to various units of TF 95 as well as to the Joint Operation Center in Seoul, Korea. The tour soon proved to be invaluable, for the BATAAN was given a very short "turn-over" period when relieving the USS BADOENG STRAIT as the American carrier operating on the West Coast of Korea. When carriers are to be assigned to duty on the West Coast of Korea, such

a trip is highly recommended for members of the Operations Department, particularly the Operations Officer, Air Operations Officer and the Air Intelligence Officer.

b. Photographic intelligence was limited during the major portion of the cruise due to the lack of a trained photo interpreter and cameras capable of vertical photography. However, this condition has been partially remedied by the skillful rigging of an F-56 camera in a surveyed "belly tank" and the return of an enlisted man from TAD to the Photo Readers and Air Intelligence Schools at N.A.S. Alameda. The K-25 cameras fitted in pods for wing mounting were of dubious value since this permitted only oblique photography. Photo coverage requested from the 5th Air Force over a relatively large area was delivered with excellent service.

c. There is reason to believe that AF Control Points are not designated by the same letter as Navy. It is recommended that NLO, JOC, Korea promulgate a cross index of all control points.

d. In the case of downed pilots the arrangement whereby one pilot stays at altitude to relay information to the ship has again proved to be a good procedure. Preferably the radio should be kept on the "Both" position.

#### 4. Aerology:

a. Weather in the area was, in general, average or better for flying, being dominated by a high pressure cell moving slowly southeastward across the Yellow Sea and Korea. Snow showers accompanying a polar trough passage reduced visibility at sea to less than one mile on the morning of the 17th. Light and variable winds marked the passage of the center of the high pressure cell on the afternoon of the 22nd, while the southerly winds on the west side of the high plus a marked warm frontal passage on the morning of the 25th resulted in undesirable flying weather, in the form of overcast low clouds with bases less than 1000 feet, and considerable fog during the afternoon of the 24th and morning of the 25th.

#### E. Supply

##### 1. Priority "A" Material Requests

Dispatch requisitions were submitted as follows for material urgently needed for ships operations during the period 15-25 February, 1953 inclusive:

a. February 161345Z TO CHOURRE INFO EMIRAP/NSD YOKOSUKA CVL29/511-53, PRIORITY "A" ACOG BUNO 96785 FLU-4 DDD 2/19/53, INDICATOR, R88-1-2664-010-000.

b. February 190013Z TO CTG 92.1 INFO CTG 92.5 CVL29/3960-53-3 PRIORITY "A" DDD IMMEDIATE, MODULATION PULSER TRANSFORMER FOR INOPERATIVE MARK 10 IFF - AIR SHIPMENT REQUESTED.

As of the date of completion of operations, delivery of the above material had not been made, although in the latter case the invoice covering issue of the material was received via regular mail.

##### Recommendation:

That measures be taken to coordinate urgent line operation material



requests with COD operations.

2. Disbursing

Concur with the recommendation contained in USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) Action Report, 6 December 1952 through 8 January 1953, concerning facilities for the exchange of YEN and MPC at Pearl Harbor, T.H. for ships on duty in the Far East.

F. Medical Department

1. There has been no shortage of medical supplies over the period covered by this report.

2. There were two men of the medical department carried on temporary additional duty during the last operational period, one to U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, for treatment and one on emergency leave.

3. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's officers and men

a. The morale of the Air Group and of Ship's officers and men was at a high level during the last operational period.

b. There were no epidemics or unnecessary illnesses. One pilot was grounded for medical reasons and nine patients were admitted to the sick list.

4. Medical statistics summary, Air Group and Ship's company

- a. Admitted to the sick list 9
- b. Total sick days out of 25,300 possible work days 24
- c. Officers admitted to the sick list 0
- d. Total patients' visits to sick call 264
- e. Total medical treatments 297
- f. Patients transferred to the hospital 0
- g. Number of minor injuries treated 18
- h. Minor surgery procedure 1
- i. Venereal disease cases and non-specific urethritis: Total: 2  
 (1) GC 1 (2) Chancroid 1  
 (3) Non-specific urethritis following sexual exposure 0

5. One plane was lost due to enemy action. The pilot was recovered by helicopter and taken to a base hospital in Korea.

6. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons 1  
 Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation 0  
 Pilot availability 99.0045%

7. There was one aircraft casualty - Major David (n) CLEELAND, 016576, USMC, flying a Corsair, Bureau number 97120, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire while on a mission over enemy territory. He was rescued by helicopter from a

shore based activity. He received a gunshot wound in the left leg. Major CLEVELAND is now hospitalized at the U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

*H. R. Horney*  
H. R. HORNEY

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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CINCPACFLT (advance) (2)  
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USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)  
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)  
USS SICILY (CVE-118)  
USS POINT CHUZ (CVE-119)  
CO, VMA-312  
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)