U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA39/12/wit
A9
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 11 July through 27 July 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FOUR Action Report - P. 24

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Action Report of the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) and Carrier Air Group FOUR for the period 11 July through 27 July 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES

The U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39), commanded by CAPT G. T. MUNDORFF, USN, with Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, and Carrier Air Group FOUR less VF-44 plus VF-111 embarked, sortied from Yokosuka, Japan at 0659I, 11 July 1953 and at 2330I, 13 July 1953 joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area SUGAR, Japan Sea. Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN and Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, was embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA 37).

Those units of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN present when joined by the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39), were the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA 21), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA 37), and various ships of the screening force.

Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, embarked in the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39), assumed duties as Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN on 14 July 1953. At 0600 on 17 July 1953, the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47) joined the Task Force.

MISSION

The mission of this force as set forth in CTF-77 Operation Order 2-52 is to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in order to support U.N. Forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

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PART II

CHRONOLOGY

11 July 1953: Underway for Korean operating area from Yokosuka, Japan at 0659 in accordance with instructions contained in CTF-77 dispatch 080604Z of July 1953, with Commander Carrier Division ONE and Carrier Air Group FOUR embarked. Conducted air operations for training purposes with 92 sorties flown.

12 July 1953: Enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to join Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. Rendezvoused with the U.S.S. SMALLEY (DD 565) at 0427. Air operations consisted of 36 sorties for training purposes. Operational Suitability Test No. 711 was conducted.

13 July 1953: Conducted AA Exercises on sleeve target. Refueled U.S.S. SMALLEY (DD 565), alongside from 1522 to 1632. At 2330 joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. Ships present when joined by the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) were: U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA 37), U.S.S. BOXER (CVA 21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN embarked, and units of the screening force as follows: USS O'BANNON (DD 450) U.S.S. BRUSH (DD 745), U.S.S. SMALLEY (DD 565), U.S.S. BRONSON (DD 668), U.S.S. CARPENTER (DD 825), U.S.S. FLETCHER (DDE 445), and U.S.S. MOORE (DD 747).

14 July 1953: Air operations were limited to 31 sorties due to weather. At 1606 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE, relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE, as OTC and Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN.

15 July 1953: Adverse weather conditions held the day's flight operations to 35 sorties. Refueled from the U.S.S. PASSUMPSIC (AO 107) from 2109 to 0037.

16 July 1953: Conducted limited air operations due inclement weather; 89 sorties flown.

17 July 1953: Conducted air operations with 110 sorties flown. At approximately 0600 the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47) accompanied by the U.S.S. FLETCHER (DD 445) joined the formation. From 1931 to 0007 the ship rearmed from the U.S.S. MT KATMAI (AE 16).

18 July 1953: Low visibility continued to hamper flight operations. 25 sorties were flown. From 1400 until 1600 the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB 63) was present in the formation. From 1906 to 2241 the ship refueled from the U.S.S. CALIENTE (AO 53).

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19 July 1953: Air operations were restricted to 75 sorties flown, due to weather. From 1032 to 1045 the U.S.S. BRUSH (DD 745) came alongside for transfer of personnel. The ship reprovisioned from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF 29) from 2139 to 2249.

20 July 1953: Conducted air operations with 29 sorties flown. Fog and low ceilings seriously limited flight operations.

21 July 1953: Cancelled air operations due to weather. From 0705 to 1120 the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB 63) and the U.S.S. BOALE (DD 755) were present in the formation. From 1536 to 1655, the ship rearmed from the U.S.S. MT KATMAI (AE 16) followed by refueling from the U.S.S. CALIENTE (AO 53) from 1730 to 1950.

22 July 1953: Limited air operations conducted due to inclement weather. 60 sorties were flown. From 1020 to 1923 the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL 62) accompanied by the U.S.S. RADFORD (DDE 446) joined the formation. During the morning flight operations, LT D. C. JOINES, 430230, USNR, of VF-62 bailed out of his F2H2 aircraft over water and was recovered by a helicopter from the U.S.S. BREMERTON (CA 130). At 1726, KILLGROVE, R. W., SN, 340 52 80, USN, received serious injuries when struck by an aircraft arresting gear cable which broke during landing operations.

23 July 1953: Conducted air operations consisting of 133 sorties. At 0908 ENS H. K. WALLACE, 551862, USNR, of VF-22 piloting an F2H2 crashed in water from starboard catapult caused by loss of port tip-tank and was not recovered. At 1300, CAPT G. T. MUNDORFF, USN, was relieved as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) by CAPT L. B. SOUTHERLAND, USN, during a brief ceremony on the bridge. From 2142 to 2400 the ship refueled from the U.S.S. CALIENTE (AO 53).

24 July 1953: Conducted air operations with 152 sorties flown. At approximately 1745 the ship's helicopter, BUNO 122710 crashed into water while hovering over the U.S.S. BLUE (DD 744) on a routine guard mail trip. The pilot, ENS R. L. TEEL, 554652, USNR, and crewman H. E. MORTENSEN, AD2, 318 53 36, USN, sustained minor injuries and were recovered by the helicopter from the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA 21). From 2033 to 2318 the ship rearmed from the U.S.S. MT VESUVIUS (AE 15).

25 July 1953: Conducted air operations with 148 sorties flown. At 1420, HAMRICK, A. K., AN, 428 15 50, USN, received minor injuries when he was caught by jet suction and carried into a jet intake. From 2057 to 0122 the ship refueled from the U.S.S. CHIKASKIA, (AO 54).

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26 July 1953: At 0258, General Quarters was sounded when radar contact was made with several unidentified air targets. At 0449, General Quarters was secured; scheduled air operations were commenced at 0505. The LAKE CHAMPLAIN set it's own record today with 166 sorties flown. At 1226, an AD4B BUNO 127868 piloted by LTJG R. E. BRUMBACH, 505000, USNR, ditched alongside the ship. LTJG BRUMBACH was recovered by the helicopter uninjured. At 2025 the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB 63) joined the formation. The ship rearmed from the U.S.S. MT VESUVIUS (AE 15) from 2040 to 2300. At 1655, WOOD, L. (n)., AN, 631 52 57, USN, received serious injury when thrown by a jet blast into a tractor while directing aircraft during air operations. ENS E. N. BROYLES, 551849, USNR, was listed as missing in action when he failed to rendezvous after a bombing run over North Korea.

27 July 1953: Conducted air operations with 128 sorties flown. At 1012 received word that the Korean truce had been signed as of 1001 with a cease-fire to follow 12 hours later. From 1911 to 2255 the ship refueled from the U.S.S. NAVASOTA (AO 106). At 2200 the cease-fire became effective and all offensive operations ceased.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES, REPLENISHMENT OPERATIONS

1. Ammunition Expenditure.

a. Gun Ammunition

3"/50 cal. VTNF	544 rounds
5"/38 cal. AAC	51 rounds
5"/48 cal. VTNF	70 rounds

b. Aviation Ammunition

2000 lb. G.P. bombs	179
1000 lb. G.P. bombs	392
500 lb. G.P. bombs	171
250 lb. G.P. bombs	2796
100 lb. G.P. bombs	2062
350 lb. D.B.	6
220/260 lb. Frag. bombs	12
3."5 Solid Rockets complete	103
5" HVAR Rockets complete	408
5" ATAR Rockets complete	32
Cluster Adapter M16AI with leaflets	26
A/C Parachute Flare MK 6 MOD 3	24
20 MM rounds	202, 269

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2. Gunnery Exercises.

a. On 12 July 1953 the ship conducted OST 711.

b. On 13 July 1953 while enroute to the operating area through AA Training Area GEORGE, conducted gunnery exercise Z-5-G, AA GEORGE, and Z-7-G, AA UNCLE for a period of about 2 hours.

3. Material Conditions of Gunnery Department Equipment.

a. Plotting room: Stable element No. 1; the bottom gyro wheel bearing burned out and the stable element was placed out of commission. A new bearing was requested, received and installed in 7 days.

b. 3"/50 cal. RF twin mounts: Mount 32; the train amplydine motor generator MK 6 MOD 0 failed because of shorted armature windings and commutator bars. This unit was replaced by an in-exeess spare generator and the mount restored to operating conditions in less than one day. Frequent failures of this equipment since recommissioning are the subject of a letter to the Bureau of Ordnance (LAKE CHAMPLAIN ltr S74 Serial 1620 of 19 July 1953).

d. 5"/38 cal. Single Mount: Mount 57; an open circuit developed in the fine synchro 5 SB MOD 2 of the Train Receiver Regulator MK 50-13. This is a special type synchro motor, no spares are aboard nor allowed and no comparable synchro can be used. In order to place the mount in operation the synchro was opened and the open circuit found in one of the lead-in wires to the rotor. The open circuit was repaired and the mount restored to operating condition. Investigation is continuing with the object of recommending a change in allowance to the Bureau of Ordnance.

4. Replenishment Operations.

a. The ship rearmed four times as follows:

DATE	DELIVERY SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
7-17-53	USS MT KATMAI (AE 16)	330 tons	76.44 tons per hour
7-21-53	USS MT KATMAI (AE 16)	144 tons	125.21 tons per hour
7-24-53	USS VESUVIUS (AE 15)	283 tons	124.85 tons per hour
7-26-53	USS VESUVIUS (AE 15)	280 tons	133.33 tons per hour

b. The ship reprovisioned one time as follows:

DATE	DELIVERY SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
7-19-53	USS GRAFFIAS (AF 29)	79 S/T	67.8 S/T per hour

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c. The ship refueled six times as follows:

DATE	DELIVERY SHIP	QUANTITY AVGAS	QUANTITY NSFO	ALONGSIDE TIME
7-13-53	*USS SMALLEY (DD 565)		63,864	1:10
7-15-53	USS PASSUMPSIC (AO 107)	133,800	400,764	3:37
7-18-53	USS CALIENTE (AO 53)	210,300	371,330	3.35
7-21-53	USS CALIENTE (AO 53)	92,200	196,657	1:19
7-23-53	USS CALIENTE (AO 53)	148,600	244,704	2:18
7-25-53	USS CHIKASKIA (AO 54)	238,300	173,513	4:25
7-27-53	USS NAVASOTA (AO 106)	215,200	192,696	3:44

*Refueled escort DD

d. Thirteen destroyers were received alongside for transfer, via highline, of mail, guard mail, light freight and personnel. A total of twenty-six personnel transfers were made between this ship and other ships alongside. One destroyer was refueled on 13 July 1953.

e. Experience has indicated that the modified housefall station at frame 72 starboard is highly desirable. The fittings at this station were installed in accordance with a VALLEY FORGE development. Although this station is highly desirable in its present form, the following items, if corrected, would greatly enhance the desirability. The landing area is greatly restricted because of a ready service bomb fuze locker and a fire main riser. Accurate station keeping is required to prevent the housefall wire from fouling an outboard platform and life float stowage on the O1 level. The fire main riser is protected at present by heavy timbers and planks to prevent lifts from damaging the pipe and valves. A recommendation has been submitted to Bureau of Ships to relocate the ready service locker, fire main riser and life float stowage in 27A converted ships. (LAKE CHAMPLAIN ltr L9-3 ser 1417 of 26 July 1953)

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Summary. The ship was not attacked during the period of this action report, and sustained no battle damage. Damage inflicted on North Korean and Communist Forces by Air Group FOUR and vice-versa is compiled and described in enclosure (1).

PART VI

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Casualties. There were no combat personnel casualties of Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported by the air group in enclosure (1).

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2. Performance. During the period of this report the morale and performance of personnel were excellent. The average on board count was as follows:

	Flag	Ship's Company	TAD	CVG-4	Marines	Total
Officers:	33	112	9	119	2	275
Enlisted:	65	2070	0	654	63	2852

At 1300 on 23 July 1953, CAPT E. B. SOUTHERLAND, USN, relieved CAPT G. T. MUNDORFF, USN, as Commanding Officer.

a. Although a total of 49 men have been transferred since the last period on the line, the number of personnel on board is considered adequate to fulfill the assigned mission. During this period five (5) men were on annual leave in the Philippine Islands and one (1) man was on temporary additional duty.

b. There were nine (9) mast cases during this period. No Courts-Martial were awarded.

2. Training and Education. The training room was used for divisional training classes, group study, tests, lectures and Church services. The information and education program continued effective, as indicated by the number of correspondence courses administered:

	Courses Ordered or Issued	Courses Completed
USAFI Correspondence Courses	28	
U.S. Navy Training Courses (Correspondence)	117	73
U.S. Navy Training Courses (Texts)	175	
USAFI GED Tests Administered		98
Enrollment in College Extension Courses	14	

3. Morale.

a. Morale remained excellent throughout the period of this report. Operations were sustained at the maximum, and included round the clock evolutions. Full scale flight operations were conducted every flyable day commencing in the pre-dawn hours and lasting until dark. Thereafter during the height of the action the ship replenished at night. All hands performed their duties in a most outstanding and gratifying manner. During the last three (3) full days of operations prior to the date of the truce signing the ship broke all of its previous sortie records, and contributed her full quota to Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in breaking all previous force records.

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b. Religious Activities. Divine services were held as follows:

Protestant Devine Services each Sunday.

Catholic Mass at 0610 daily and at 0630, 0930 and 1645 on Sunday.

Protestant Bible Glasses twice weekly.

Rosary devotions each evening.

Religious Instruction Classes 0230 Mondays and Fridays.

4. Welfare and Recreation.

a. The following activities were conducted for the welfare and recreation of officers and enlisted personnel during the period of this report:

Issue of a daily radio press summary.

Weekly issue of the ship's newspaper - "The Champ."

Ship's RBO broadcast daily of ship's information, news and recorded music.

Band concerts were held daily and during all replenishments.

Weekly bingo party.

The library was open daily and a total of 1,000 books were issued during this period.

Movies were shown in the mess halls in the morning and afternoon to personnel unable to attend the regular performances. Two were shown each evening.

Hobby Shop was open daily and continued to be well patronized.

Frequent broadcasts by the Captain giving the entire crew authentic information concerning current and prospective operations.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

CIC

1. Personnel. Pursuant to a published change in the Standard Shipboard Organization the OL Division was eliminated, as such, and the lookouts were made an integral part of the OI Division.

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2. Radar Performance. Overall performance for subject period was considered excellent. Trapping was prevalent on two or three occasions resulting in exceptionally long ranges on both air and surface search. Fire control radars were used to assist in low visibility approaches to replenishment ships. Mark 10 IFF was consistantly held at ranges exceeding 200 miles.

3. Communications.

a. Difficulty was experienced in maintaining communication on primary CI net using UHF frequencies due to dead spots created by the location of antennas. Two receivers on separate antennas were used but still left weak areas of reception when maneuvering during flight operations.

b. On the afternoon of 27 July interference and jamming similar to noise modulation was encountered on 350.6 and 302.6 mcs.

c. Feed-over between AN/ARC frequencies was still prevalent. Air control functions were distributed among ships to eliminate interference.

4. Hecklers. On 26 July, about 0230, the ASP (P2V) reported small single engine aircraft making passes on him. Small bogies began to appear on the ship's radar between 20 and 40 miles. Approximately 25 indications were present at one time, but none of them could be held long enough to establish a course and speed. The ASP reported visual contact five times and the ship's lookouts reported two visuals prior to daybreak. Night fighters and jets were launched at 0345 just as the last bogies faded from the screen. No attacks were made and it is believed a few bogies on a heckler mission employed mechanical decoys.

5. Recommendations. None.

AEROLOGY

1. General. From July 13th through the 21st the Task Force was plagued by low stratus cloudiness with ceilings generally below 800 feet and by fog with visibilities frequently below 1 mile. The coastal or inland "KING" fields provided satisfactory weather alternates but there always was a threat of rapid deterioration of local weather to near zero conditions. With a weak warm front passage the threat of fog and low cloudiness ended; but showers and scattered thunderstorms then developed over the mainland. Bombline targets became marginal to non-operational. The cloud bases obscured mountain ridges. Targets were not visible from above the clouds and the flights under the clouds were hazardous. The Northern and Northeastern parts of the Korean peninsula were generally operational.

2. Communications.

a. Radio teletype transmissions were frequently garbled, and map analyses were incomplete. The receipt of the hourly and half-hourly weather from Korean reporting stations was very irregular. At times CW transmissions were the only source of information. Ship's radiosondes, rawins, and pireps provided the main forecast tools. Facsimile was generally good but transmissions lacked sufficient "raw data" to make up for faulty RATT reception.

b. Poor RATT reception was due primarily to weak signals, as reported in CTF 77 dispatch 090732Z, although local interference and atmospherics contributed, to a lesser extent, to poor reception. Static level appeared to be high, resulting in over-riding crashes at half-scale gain settings. Equipment was known to be in good condition and antennas adequate. Radiation from own ship's transmitters, as well as spark radiation from flight deck vehicles, contributed to the generally high noise level in HF receivers. All flight deck vehicles were equipped with spark suppressors late in the operating period, resulting in some reduction in noise level. Radio IX and radio XI transmitting antennas, situated in the island structure adjacent to receiving antennas, contributed most of the interference from own ship's transmitters.

3. Recommendations. None.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Traffic Volume.

a. During the period 11 July to 27 July an average of 1127 messages were processed each day by communication personnel. On 15 July over 1300 messages were handled; this represents the greatest volume of traffic for a single day. 11 July was the only day in the period on which less than 1000 messages were processed. On this day the total was approximatley 936.

b. The traffic volume for the period is shown by the following statistics:

Radio Central Traffic (number of messages handled)

GEORGE Broadcast		3668
NDT RATT Broadcast		3432
Ship-Shore RATT	(incoming)	121
	(outgoing)	1873
CW	(incoming)	3147
	(outgoing)	878

Ship-Ship RATT	(incoming)	912
	(outgoing)	1016
Voice	(incoming)	589
	(outgoing)	271

TOTAL MESSAGES HANDLED - 15907

During the same period approximately 200 outgoing messages and 440 incoming messages were handled by flashing light and NANCY.

Approximately 65% of this total was CTF 77 traffic. Included in the above total is the number of messages relayed through the ship's facilities in accordance with CTF 77 order that all TF 77 ship-to-shore traffic shall be relayed through CTF 77.

c. Cryptocenter Traffic.

Total Messages	(incoming)	1373
Ship's Messages	(outgoing)	48
	(groups)	5425
Flag Messages	(outgoing)	287
	(groups)	47710
Total Messages	(incoming & outgoing)	1708
Total Groups		53135

d. During the period covered by this report it was evident that the communication spaces are not designed to handle such a large volume of traffic in the most efficient and expeditious manner. This was overcome to some extent in Main Communications and the Crypto Room by the installation of several shelves and tables. In Radio Central there is no space available for filing traffic or stowing traffic once it is filed.

2. Post Office. Postal business during this period is tabulated as follows:

Money Orders		$28,954.33
Stamps		$ 954.00
Mail	(outgoing)	154 bags
Mail	(incoming)	180 bags

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PART VI

PHOTOGRAPHY

1. Personnel. Personnel totals were the same for this period as during the last action report period; 10 in ship's company and 8 on TAD from the air group. This number of personnel is insufficient for a carrier to accomplish both the aerial reconnaissance and general ground photography required during combat operations. It is estimated that the daily committments of the photographic laboratory during peak workload periods can be met with the following personnel and effort:

JOB DESCRIPTION	PERSONNEL AIR GROUP	PERSONNEL SHIP	DAILY MAN HOURS
a. Processing and administration (day and night laboratory crews).	0	13	155
b. General photography and camera maintenance.	0	3	40
c. Flight Quarters and general photography.	2	1	35
d. Gun camera and general motion picture processing and editing.	2	1	40
e. Photo plane servicing, maintenance, and assistance on aerial film processing.	3	0	40
f. Photo interpretation, plotting, and titling.	2	1	30
TOTALS:	9	19	340

The on-board complement of personnel should be sufficient to sustain the above indicated effort when necessary, particularly in view of the early deadlines which often apply to several concurrent job orders. Such a complement will also allow distribution of the work load during routine operations so that time will be available for training, maintenance of equipment, housekeeping, and accomplishment of special projects. The indicated personnel requirements are consistent with revised allowances of carrier photographic personnel recommended in current correspondence, with prevailing complements aboard other WESTPAC carriers, and with the number of photographic personnel generally available in an embarked air group.

2. Production.

a. Pertinent statistics on delivered photography of an intelligence type are as follow:

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Days on which aerial photographic reconnaissance missions were performed: 7

Photo sorties schedule/flown/completed: 81/43/23

Rolls aerial film, 400'/200': 20/8

9x18 aerial negatives, K-38, 36": 2,945

9x9 aerial negatives, K-17, 12": 81

9x9 aerial negatives, K-17, 6": 84

Rolls sonne paper: 46

9x18 prints, K-34, 36": 8,835

9x9 prints, K-17, 12": 168

9x9 prints, K-17, 6": 46

8x10 negatives (target and plot charts): 63

8x10 prints (target and plot charts): 126

Gun camera film, magazines/footage: 402/18,390

b. Receipt of a studio copy camera greatly facilitated the copying of plot charts and target mosaics. Original copy material too large to be mounted on the camera copy board was mounted on the bulkhead and the camera readily placed normal thereto by means of the roller stand. No significant number of instances occurred when vibration of the ship affected the sharpness of the negatives. This practice is considered preferable to that of using the print shop camera since no material difference in negative quality results and possible conflict between photo lab and print shop schedules is avoided.

c. Production and delivery of intelligence photography settled into a smooth routine during the period of this report. Administrative and technical procedures were streamlined so that each day's completed photography for NAS Atsugi could be delivered to the transfer office not later than 0500 the following morning. Smooth prints for local retention by the staff and ship's photo interpreters were delivered generally by 0300 in the morning. All photos required for the strike pilots were delivered on time as a result of the excellent forehandedness of the Air Intelligence personnel in advising the photo lab of production requirements.

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d. An abnormally large amount of public information type photography was accomplished incident to the maximum effort operations and the signing of the armistice. Many of these photo missions had to be taken on short notice, at close range, and in exposed positions on the flight deck. It was apparent that such missions could be completed more efficiently and effectively with 35 mm or 70 mm type cameras and light weight electronic flash units rather than with the conventional Speed Graphic and flash bulbs. In view of their compactness, ease and economy of operation, short focal lengths, and adequacy of picture quality for the purposes used, it is believed that the use of cameras smaller than the 4x5 size is preferable for routine public information work.

3. Material. No failures of major importance occurred in any of the laboratory equipment or cameras. Minor repairs and part replacements were effected with simple tools and the use of on-hand spare parts.

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

1. Operations. When weather permitted, daily photo coverage of airfields was obtained. The photo interpretation and surveillance of these fields was of primary consideration. Frequent target searches and flak studies were made. Mosaics of important areas were prepared for target assignment by CTF-77 and mosaics of less important areas were forwarded to squadron air intelligence officers as targets of opportunity.

2. Spaces. The photo interpretation office is located in the Ozalid Room, Print Shop No. 2. In view of the already crowded conditions aboard ship, this room is also used by the photo pilots for flight planning and for plotting of photos. It is noted that the Ozalid Room, located on the second deck of the LAKE CHAMPLAIN, is smaller and less suitably arranged and fitted for photo interpretation than the equivalent space on an unconverted ESSEX class carrier. As a permanent space, the Ozalid Room is considered entirely inadequate. An investigation is now underway to determine what space other than the one currently used can be converted with minimum effort for use in photo interpretation, photo flight planning, plotting and indexing of photographs. It has been the experience of this ship that the photo pilots and the photo interpreters should work as closely together as possible. A recommendation based on the results of this investigation will be submitted as soon as it is completed.

3. Personnel. There are 3 qualified photo interpretation officers aboard; 2 assigned to the ship and 1 attached to the photo detachment. No enlisted photo readers are presently assigned.

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AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Organization.

a. The intelligence section consists of the Air Intelligence Officer, Assistant Air Intelligence Officer, the CVG Air Intelligence Officer and the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers. The first three mentioned are located in the ship's AI Office. The complement of this office also includes three enlisted men. This organization of the section, in effect at the time of reporting to Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN, has been wholly satisfactory.

b. Responsibility for reports is divided among the officers on the basis of ease of obtaining information. Each of the officers in the ship's office is familiar with every phase of ship-level activity. The first duty of the ship's AIO continues to be that of coordination.

2. Operations. While operating with the Task Force the AI Office has functioned on a 24-hour basis. Current intelligence is posted in the office each day for briefing purposes. A uniform system of posting schedule and debrief data on acetate boards has greatly facilitiated the handling of reports.

3. Charts. Each pilot was issued AF 1:1,000,000 charts covering Korea and AF 1:250,000 charts for the area north of the 36th parallel. AMS L552 1:250,000 charts have been extremely popular and have been issued upon request. Topography definition is excellent on these charts. If they have any shortcoming it is that coordinates are less easy to read than on the AF charts. AMS L751 1:50,000 charts are issued for strike, close air support, and naval gunfire spot targets. These charts are collected again after each mission.

4. Photos. A large file of target photos is maintained in the office. The ship's photographic laboratory has rendered prompt and efficient reproduction upon short notice. The Staff Intelligence Officers have assisted materially by making available large target mosaics for briefing purposes.

5. Recommendations. None.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Stores.

a. The transfer of VF-44 F4U's to the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA 21) and receipt of VF-111 F9F-5's necessitated a complete transfer and receipt of spare parts, special tools, and ground handling equipment for each type aircraft. Initial outfitting of F9F-5 spares for the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) consisted of material left at NSD Yokosuka by the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA 45) upon completion of her tour of duty. 79% of the line items listed in Section

[redacted]

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B Allowance List, NAVAER 00-35QB-124 were received from this source; however, only 59% of these items were received in the quantities specified by COMAIRPAC dispatch 192107Z January for outfitting for deployment to WesPac. Requisitions for shortages were presented to NSD Yokosuka and 43% of the items requested were furnished. Requisitions for the remaining shortages were forwarded to the U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS 8); however, this replenishment was not received until 28 July. Considerable assistance was required of and received from other carriers of CTF-77. Nonavailable items which grounded aircraft and action taken on each are as follows:

1 ea. R45-4-266-50	Elbow Coupling	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R8-B-2175	Body Valve	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R82-GR-140957-1R	Cap Assy	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R82-GR-140957-1L	Cap Assy	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R82-GR-144515-14	Antenna	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R82-GR-140911-1	Elevator Assy	Rec'd from PRINCETON
1 ea. R82-GR-140911-1	Elevator Assy	Rec'd from PHIL SEA
1 ea. R82-GR-132860R	Tank, Wing Tip	Rec'd from PHIL SEA
1 ea. R82-GR-140800-11	Flap	Rec'd from PHIL SEA
1 ea. R82-GR-140800-12	Flap	Rec'd from PHIL SEA
3 ea. R83-AP-25400-20	Valve	Rec'd from BOXER
1 ea. R82-GR-10034	Spoiler Assy	Rec'd from BOXER
1 ea. R85-MDA-15-11367-2	Fuel Control	Ordered from JUPITER
1 ea. R82-GR-141026	Beam	Ordered from JUPITER
1 ea. R16-TRPR-1460-30	Switch	Ordered from JUPITER

b. In addition to the items required for ACOG F9F-5 aircraft, 1 ea. R82-SKY-S515000-1 Tail Rotor was received from the PHIL SEA for an AGOG HO3S and 1 ea. R82-MDA-15-11367-2 Link Assy is being furnished by ComFairJap for an ACOG F2H-2.

c. Usage of F2H-2 wing tip tanks continued in excess of allowance. In addition to the outfitting stock of 34 tanks, 6 were salvaged from dud aircraft, 6 were received from the JUPITER, 4 from the BOXER, and 1 from NSD Yokosuka. When the cease fire order was received 2 were available for issue. On 28 July the JUPITER transferred 6 tanks removed from shore based aircraft as directed by ComFairJap. Aviation Supply Office dispatch 231803Z directed BAR St Louis to ship 18 tip tanks from McDonnell Aircraft Corp. DDD 25 July 1953.

d. A total of 11 J34-WE-34 engine issues were made. Class C maintenance was completed on 2 and returned to RFI stock, 5 are now in process and 4 were preserved for transfer to overhaul. One J45-P6 engine was issued, no R3350 engines were changed.

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e. The U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) operated from 27 April until cease fire on 27 July without actually joining up with its major source of aviation supply, the U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS 8). It has been clearly demonstrated that four carriers cannot support each other indefinitely and that a pool of critical spares such as tip tanks, fuel controls, aileron boost motors, actuators, gun chargers, etc. must be maintained in order to provide acceptable availability.

2. General Stores.

a. Requisitions for general stores, ships spares and electronic spares were processed by Service Force Vessels at Yokosuka as follows:

SHIP	REQNS	LINE ITEMS REQUESTED	FURNISHED	PERCEN
U.S.S. CASTOR (AKS 1)	95	314	223	71
U.S.S. LEAGUE ISLAND (AKS 30)	116	304	73	24
U.S.S. PROTON (AKS 28)	23	241	155	64

b. On 27 July 1953 110 line items were received from NSC Oakland by Fleet Freight via U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8), which were requisitioned during deployment from East Coast to West Coast. Requisitions were mailed to NSC Oakland on 10 May 1953.

3. Ship's Store and Clothing and Small Stores.

a. A complete replenishment of stock was made prior to return to the combat area on 11 July 1953. No serious shortage of material developed during the period. Several transfers were made to other vessels operating in the area.

4. Commissary.

a. Reprovisioning accomplished 7-20-53 from U.S.S. GRAFFIAS (AF 29). Tonnage requested was 110 S/T, tonnage received was 79 S/T. Items requested 42 - items received 29. Following items have not been available in Pacific Area since arrival of CVA39:

Frozen Whole Eggs	Swiss Cheese
Hominy Grits	Meringue Powder
Fresh Pears	Regular Frozen Pork Loin

b. Following items have been available in limited quantity:

Fresh Tomatoes	Blackeye Beans
Celery	Syrup
Lettuce	Fresh Frozen Brussel Sprouts
Brown Sugar	Lemons

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c. Night rations and night feeding consumes from 10% to 14% of food used during "on the line" carrier operations and menu planning must allow for this daily consumption. Although no allowance is made for night rations, nor are they computed in figuring over and under issue on the basis of rations actually fed; they are a required part of carrier feeding and must be taken into consideration when loading and provisioning.

5. Recommendations. None.

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. Performance.

Total hours underway: 402 hours

Total distance: 7,369.9 engine miles

Total fuel used: 1,432,150 gallons

Average speed: 18.3 knots

2. Casualties - Damage Control and Engineering.

a. Some difficulty has been experienced in the cracking of the hull in the vicinity of a sea chest in compartment A-51-V. This occurred during the first cruise on the line and was repaired upon return to Yokosuka. Another crack has appeared in the same area. Both cracks are a result of flexing of the hull which occurs at this points. Further investigation and repair will be undertaken at next availability.

b. At about 1730 on 11 July 1953 an unusual noise was noted in No. 3 main reduction gear. The unit was stopped and locked. A thorough examination was made and no abnormal conditions were noted. Observing usual safety precautions, the shaft was unlocked and slowly worked up to speed and has operated at full power many times since then. It is believed that the apparent noise was a result of back lash in the gear during a speed change and course change that occurred about the time of the noise.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. General Health.

a. During the period covered by this report, the general health of the command has been good except for a very high incidence of Urethritis Acute, Non-Gonnoccic. While the ship was in Yokosuka, Japan, from 29 June to 11 July, a total of 5950 penicillin tablets were dispensed to personnel exposed in venery. The majority of personnel who contracted disease as a result of

sexual exposure failed to use mechanical prophylaxis. The venereal disease educational program has been vigorous and comprehensive, including lectures, movies, pamphlets, mimeographed handouts and posters. Even though 101 of 103 cases of venereal disease were admitted for record only, with no sick days, a considerable loss of man hours resulted. It is estimated that the average patient with urethritis loses eight to ten man hours attending sick call. The incidence of injuries contributed significantly to lost man days. Most injuries could be attributed to fatigue incident to long hours of maximum effort or to lack of regard of inexperienced personnel for personal safety. Total sick call visits were excessive, due principally to the high incidence of sexual exposure.

b. The pilot of an F2H2 was killed following catapult launch during which the port tip tank broke free. Immediately upon becoming airborne, the plane rolled to the right and crashed into the sea in an inverted position. The plane sank immediately and the pilot was not recovered. Another pilot of an F2H2 bailed out over water at 6000 feet using the ejection seat after his plane had been struck by flak. He was picked up after 8 minutes in the water by a helicopter from the BREMERTON. He sustained no injuries. The pilot and crewman of the helicopter sustained minor injuries following possible power failure while hovering over a destroyer. The helicopter settled to the deck of the destroyer and tipped over into the water sinking immediately. Injuries resulted from rotor blade fragments and lack of shoulder harness.

2. Statistical Summary.

Admissions to sick list (Includes 101 admitted for record only)	175
Noneffective Rate (percentage of sick days out of total man days)	0.75%
Admissions by classes	
Venereal Disease	
Urethritis Acute, due to Gonococcus	6
Syphilis	0
Chancroid	5
Urethritis Acute, Non-gonococcic	90
Lymphogranuloma Venereum	2
Infections, Digestive Tract	4
Infections, Respiratory Tract	19
Other infectious Diseases	0
Diseases Skin	6
Diseases, Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat	3
Diseases, Dental	1
Other Diseases Respiratory Tract	0
Diseases Circulatory System	1
Diseases, Digestive System	9
Diseases, Genito-Urinary System	7

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Mental or Personality Disorders	2
Injuries, non-battle, aircraft	2
Injuries, non-battle, other	17
Injuries, battle, aircraft	1
Injuries, battle, other	0
Total Sick Call visits	2015
Patients received from other ships	3
Patients transferred to hospital	0
Deaths due to injury	1
Deaths due to disease	0
Missing in Action	1
Killed in Action	0
Wounded in Action	0
Surgical procedures, Major	5
Surgical procedures, Minor	19
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed	0
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing	1
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, major injuries	0
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, minor injuries	0
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, uninjured	1
Planes lost, operational, pilot killed	1
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, major injuries	0
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries	1
Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered, minor injuries	1
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured	1
Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured	0
Pilots temporarily grounded, medical reasons	3
Pilots grounded, pending BuMed action	0
Crewmen grounded, medical reasons	1
Average number days, pilots grounded	2
Average number days, crewmen grounded	6

3. Supplies and Equipment. Medical supplies and equipment have been adequate. Replenishment has not been a problem.

AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Catapult Performance.

a. During the period of this action report 506 shots were fired by the port catapult and 473 shots were fired by the starboard catapult.

b. On 25 June 1953 an AD aircraft was involved when a runaway shot occurred on the port catapult. Investigation revealed that the AD catapult hook design may have been a contributing factor in this accident. In view of the fact that a runaway shot on the H-8 catapult necessitates navy yard availability in order to effect repair CTF-77 directed that AD's be catapulted on the H-8 catapult only in emergencies. Therefore, during the

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period of this report AD's were not catapulted. No difficulties were encountered in the launching of F2H and F9F types except that the usual number of high pressure leaks were in evidence. One F2H on being shot from the starboard catapult lost its port tip tank during the initial portion of its take-off run and crashed. Catapult malfunction was not a factor.

2. Arresting Gear Performance.

a. 1332 arrested landings were made during this reporting period.

b. On 22 July a battle-damaged F9F landed with half flap and hit the deck at about 150 knots. The plane caught and broke the number 3 wire, and engaged the first Davis barrier successfully.

3. Helicopter Operations. During the period covered by this report there were an average of 23 helicopter evolutions per day. On 27 July there were 43 evolutions scattered among the 166 sorties launched. Excessive helicopter operations are a definite source of concern to the ship while respot is in progress. As was mentioned earlier in this report, the ship's helicopter lost lift while hovering over the stern of the U.S.S. BLUE (DD 744) and crashed and was lost at sea on 24 July. Both crew members were rescued by the BOXER helicopter. An investigation of this accident is being conducted.

4. F2H vs F9F. Just prior to deploying on the tour which is covered by this action report, VF-[redacted] was embarked with 15 F9F-5s. This addition to the aircraft complement of the LAKE CHAMPLAIN pointed up the following observations as pertains to a comparison between the BANSHEE and the PANTHER:

a. On the F2H the wings cannot be folded with tip-tanks fueled. This results in serious space and respot problems.

b. The F2H is limited to 1400 pounds of bombs or rockets whereas the F9F can carry 2000 pounds when an H-8 catapult is available.

c. The F9F is short legged as compared to the F2H. During this period of comparative operations it was learned that 800 pounds is not a low state, and that it is acceptable to wave off an F9F in its approach with 450 pounds if the plane following has only 250 pounds. Generally, for the F9F, it was found that the margin of time is very slim when working a 90 minute schedule. The F2H proved to have a much more comfortable margin.

5. Arming. For the period of this report the fuse assembly area was moved from the flight deck forward of the island to the starboard side of the hangar deck in the area normally used as the quarter deck in port. In making this change it is considered that the following advantages were gained:

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a. Better protection for fuzes and personnel from the jet blast and weather.

b. No interference with flight deck operations.

c. Lights were available for night use.

d. Fuze containers easily disposed of by throwing over the side.

e. Safety- fuzes can be expeditiously jettisoned in an emergency.

6. Logistics.

a. During the final three (3) day record-breaking period of operations 464 sorties were launched. These operations consumed 381,000 gallons of aviation gas, 346 tons of bombs, and 90,000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition.

b. With the assignment of 3 jet squadrons to a carrier it has been necessary to take gasoline aboard every second day if full flight operations were conducted.

c. On 18 July 1953 this ship broke its own refueling record when it received 210,300 gallons of AvGas from the U.S.S. CALIENTE (AO 53) in 2 hours and 30 minutes of pumping time. Average pumping rate per hour was 85,000 gallons. Tank top pressures were well below safe limits during this operation, and it is estimated that the pumping rate could have been increased to 90,000 GPH if additional pumps were available on the tanker.

7. Recommendation. That tankers be equipped with four (4) 675 GPM pumps for transferring gasoline. Gas pumping rates on present tankers are inadequate for transferring gasoline to aircraft carriers equipped with the high capacity gasoline system.

L. B. SOUTHERLAND

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CVA39/12/wit
A9
Serial: 0290

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group	1
COMNAVFE (advance)	1
COMNAVFE Evaluation Group	1
COMSEVENTHFLT (advance)	1
COMAIRPAC	5
COMSERVPAC	5
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAP	1
Naval War College	1
COFAIRBETUPAC	2
VC-12	1
VC-33	1
VC-4	1
VC-62	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA 9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA 33)	1
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA 34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA 40)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA 37)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA 18)	1
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA 10)	1
CO, USS BOXER (CVA 21)	1
CO, USS BENNINGTON (CVA 20)	1
CO, USS RANDOLPH (CVA 15)	1
NLO JOC Korea	1
COMCARDIV 3	1
COMCARDIV 5	1
COMCARDIV 15	1
COMCARDIV 17	1
COMFAIRHAWAII	1
COMFAIRJAX	1
COMAIRLANT	3
COMCARDIV 6	1
CVG-4	2
VF-22	3
VF-62	3
VF-111	3
VA-45	3
CTF-92	2
COMNOTS INYOKERN	1

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