

hold each Sunday at 0830, and a study class was held weekly for the Latter Day Saints. Christian Science services were held each Sunday at 1000. Protestant choir met twice weekly. Catholic Mass was offered at 0630 and 0900. Confessions were held before and after each Mass. The two Chaplains on board alternated in delivering a prayer over the announcing system each evening.

f. Recreational Activities

Movies were shown nightly in the Wardroom CPO lounge, first class mess, training room, and the mess decks. Whenever possible, the hangar deck was used for movies, with two performances on that evening. During this period 58 different programs were shown a total of 342 times. A late night movie was held in the training room for those personnel unable to attend the regular showings, and on replenishment days movies were shown morning and afternoon in the Training Room and on the Mess Decks to the Air Group and Air Department personnel who were unable to see the regular showings. Each evening at 2030 snacks were served for the crew on the Mess Deck. Bingo games were held on the Mess Decks, in the Wardroom and CPO lounge. Merchandise was given as prizes with the profits being given to Navy Relief. The Library was open from 0900 to 2100 daily. Library books were available and adequately distributed. A total of 2,200 books were drawn from the library. 100 books were received and 700 pocket books were received and distributed. 384 magazines were received and distributed to the Wardroom, Warrant Officers' lounge, CPO lounge, first class mess, crew's library, each division, and the squadrons embarked. Hobby Shop materials were offered for sale through the Hobby Shop and the demand for such materials has been and still remains high. The Photo Hobby Shop was open from 1800 until taps Monday through Friday of each week. An exercise room for physical conditioning of officers and men was placed in service and was well patronized.

PART VI Comments

a. General Comments

(1) Operational Problems with F9F-5 Aircraft

(a) Limited F9F-5 operations with H4B catapults. The ordnance load capabilities of the F9F-5's are seldom fully utilized during low wind conditions which normally exist off Korea in the summer months. Last minute reduction in ordnance loads is the rule rather than the exception. On occasion it has been necessary to abort an entire F9F-5 strike flight because of insufficient wind across the deck. Aborted flights create an immediate respotting problem which often carries over into succeeding events.

(b) Heavy aircraft handling.

The design weight limitations on number two elevator precludes handling of bomb loaded F9F-5 aircraft on number two elevator.

This limitation tends to slow the process of striking below loaded aircraft that are "downed", and does not permit emergency loading of F9F-5 aircraft on the hangar dock.

(c) Flight characteristics and performance

Except for F2H2P photo escort missions, for which F9F-5's only are used, the F9F-5's and F9F-2's perform the same missions. However, the differences in flight characteristics precludes the interchange of pilots between squadrons, and the dissimilarity of engine performance prevents mixing of the two types on a single mission. It is therefore considered highly desirable that the jet fighter aircraft squadrons assigned any air group be all of the same type.

(2) Flight Schedules

(a) Air Plan Differences

During the tour two different air plan systems were used. One system required periodic recovery of all airborne aircraft which necessitated a dead spot aft on launches. The second system maintained a number of aircraft airborne at all times which eliminated any dead spot on launches and facilitated rapid rearming and respot. This system scheduled a greater number of sorties, but was more easily executed.

(b) Rescheduling, Delayed Air Operations

When scheduled air operations are delayed until further notice or are to commence with a later event, it is strongly recommended that the ordnance load, then on the aircraft, be utilized on the original target or on a new target calling for the same ordnance load. The morale and efficiency of ordnance handling and loading crews is adversely affected by repeated changes to ordnance loads during a delayed schedule situation.

(3) Air Controller Experience

The control of aircraft returning to the Task Force in adverse weather conditions should be assigned to ships with experienced air controllers. On several occasions inexperienced air controllers directed returning aircraft to shift to their parent ship land launch frequency when the aircraft were (a) on top of the overcast, (b) could not see the Task Force, and (c) were directly over their parent ship in the ship's radar blind spot. To regain control of the aircraft it was necessary to shift the aircraft back to an air control frequency, vector the aircraft out of the blind spot for radar contact and identification, and control the lot down until the aircraft could give a "see you" before shifting them back to the land launch frequency. Low

state aircraft caught in the above situation imposed an additional problem in that critically low state aircraft had to be individually worked into the pattern to expedite recovery.

It is recommended that control of aircraft in adverse weather conditions not be assigned to new arrivals on the line until their air controllers have an opportunity to gain experience by controlling multiple aircraft in VFR conditions.

(4) Personnel Fatigue

Continuous day air operations sustained by night replenishment resulted in a general fatigue condition in both pilots and ship's company personnel. Indications of this were the dark circles under the eyes, the dull listless conversations and greater tendencies toward temper flare ups. Landing patterns were sloppy, pilots were slow in answering Landing Signal Officer's signals, and landings were rough.

During the day personnel with an opportunity to sleep were disturbed by air operations, catapults, bomb hoists, elevators, and air attack drills. At night, sleep was interrupted during replenishment by noise of hoists, winches, and handling of heavy materials on the hangar deck. The fact that personnel did not know when they could expect a rest appeared to aggravate the condition.

It is recommended that in a three or four carrier Task Force a periodic respite for part of a day would help correct the fatigue problem and would also provide an opportunity for aircraft maintenance.

(5) Spare Parts Procurement after Protracted Operations


(a) Aircraft spares.

There were eleven (11) aircraft AOG during this operating period. Parts for seven (7) of those were received in an average of four and one half (4½) days via air from the aviation stores ship in the area. Four (4) aircraft required parts available only at ASD Oakland, delivery of which averaged eighteen (18) days.

(b) Electronic Spares

This ship deployed from CONUS with approximately eighty percent (80%) of its allowance of electronic spares although one hundred percent (100%) had been requisitioned. The shortage of spare parts has made it impossible to maintain required electronic equipment in an operating status.




b. Operations

(1) Air Operations

Three officers and nine enlisted personnel were assigned to Air Operations. The Air Operations Watch consisted of one officer and three enlisted men during early morning and night operations. Two officers and five enlisted personnel during daylight operations. Two enlisted personnel were on duty during such periods when the ship had night ready deck, or aircraft in a readiness condition.

During early morning and night air operations the 2-JG sound power phones were not manned. Launch and recovery data was sent to the ready rooms over the MC circuit.

The X-JA sound power circuit was manned during all air operations. One station was manned in Air Plot and the other on the bridge. The bridge watch maintained a status board by means of grease pencil. The board was mounted in the window frame just aft of the Captain's chair. This board was made of plexiglass and had sections ruled off to show the number of aircraft scheduled for each event by type with the launch and recovery times. The number of aircraft by type, the number of aircraft with hung ordnance by side number, the critical fuel state by type aircraft figured on the distance to the nearest landing field, the bearing and distance to the nearest landing field, any unusual circumstances such as aircraft in the lane duck circle, etc, the Task Force ready deck schedule, and the latest Korean weather.

Air Operations maintained a manifest in Air Plot of all passengers embarking and debarking by helicopter and COD. Helicopter and COD flights were met on the flight deck by Air Operations personnel. Embarking COD passengers were taken to Air Plot where the Mess Treasurer assigned quarters and the Ship's Writer checked orders. Debarking passengers reported to Air Plot 45 minutes prior to scheduled take-off time for aircraft assignment. COD arrivals and departures were announced over the ship's loud speaker system, airlines style, upon arrival and 45 minutes prior to departure.

(2) CIC

A three section watch bill was employed for both officers and men during the operating period. Two officers and fifteen men comprised the normal watch. Additional men were employed from the oncoming watch section as required until ComCarDiv ONE shifted his flag to the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN on 5 June 1953.

Air Search and air control functions were conducted primarily with SPS-6B radar. Despite a "blind spot" caused by stack and superstructure interference in a 40-degree sector from 020 to 060 degrees relative, this equipment proved to be the most reliable. Mark X IFF is available only through the SPS-6B and is presented in


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GIC at SX Console #1 and a VK repeater between the communication consoles. The master Mark X IFF control installation is located in the SPS-6B radar room.

A fire in the amplidyne transformer on 24 May 1953 rendered the RHI system of the SX radar inoperative except for emergency use. Use of the equipment was curtailed pending further investigation of the trouble during an in-port availability. Two similar failures have occurred in the past five months. The SX search system performed satisfactorily for most of the operating but the lack of IFF information with the equipment precluded its use for air control purposes except as a standby installation.

To improve IFF presentation and derive maximum benefit from the SX search system a request has been initiated for authorization to re-install a slaved antenna on the SX platform, or as an alternate, to incorporate Field Change 10 to the SX radar and thus provide the Mark X presentation. Reliable 360 degree IFF coverage would then be more likely attainable.

(3) Photo Interpretation

During this period the primary efforts of the Photo Interpretation office were directed toward the production of a large quantity of target mosaics. A record of 75 target mosaics, illustrating major enemy buildup in the near vicinity of the bomb-line, were produced in the last four operating days of this period.

The assigned complement of 2 enlisted men and 1 officer was supplemented by a third enlisted man and the P.I. working space was shifted from the ozalid room to the flag spaces in this operating period. Both of these factors contributed to the productivity and efficiency of this office.

(4) Air Intelligence

During this first line period of the BOXER's current cruise, the Air Intelligence Office evolved into a functional team operating to serve the intelligence needs of both ship and air group.

The intelligence office complement consists of 3 officers and 4 enlisted men. This number is felt to be adequate for the job. A routine work schedule was evolved with 2 officers and 3 enlisted working during the day; 1 officer and 1 enlisted man comprised the night 'crew'.

Various techniques developed to aid in disseminating information include the following:

(a) A running air schedule board was maintained to record launch and land information. Made of plexiglass, this board aids in keeping accurate information for use in the strike flash report and the daily air summary.

[REDACTED]

(b) A plexiglass air summary board was maintained on an event basis which indicated the information used to make up the daily air summary. Use of this board made it possible to send out the summary well within the time limits imposed.

(c) The display of available target coverage on a 1:250,000 map proved most useful as a means of selecting possible target areas for armed recon and heckler missions and as a means of target orientation. Each target area was identified by a small square together with the target mosaic number making it possible to quickly determine targets available in any area.

(d) The special Hydrographic Office texoprint charts (plastic surfaced) HO 15642-1.2 are in use by 2 squadrons for evaluation purposes. Thus far the pilot's reaction to the use of these charts has been quite favorable.

(e) Each day the Air Intelligence Office originates a shipwide broadcast summary of air operations news designed to give the officers and men a better understanding of the ship's part in the war effort.

(5) Communications

Several days prior to joining the task force this ship with ComCarDiv ONE embarked reported in on nets guarded by CTF-77 and commenced intercepting traffic to or originated by CTF-77. This procedure proved to be of considerable value in that cognizant staff and ship officers were given an opportunity to become familiar with the type of traffic to be expected when operating with the task force. Radio operators received a short intensive period of training on heavily loaded circuits, communication watch officers, radio supervisors and clerical personnel became accustomed to handling a high volume of traffic and new members of the crypto-board were rapidly qualified. There was no disruption of communication services incident to the relieving of the Task Force Commander. Considerable delays occurred in processing some encrypted traffic that was being held for correction or repetition.

To adequately support the communication plan, this ship with the Task Force Commander embarked, would have required almost 100% continuous availability of transmitters installed. Outages of major transmitters necessitated assignment and reassignment of communication guards to other ships. It was noted that other ships having a similar transmitter installation were unable to cover certain circuits due to outages of equipment. After the Task Force Commander transferred to a converted carrier, BOXER was able, in spite of about 60% availability of transmitters, to adequately cover all the assigned communication guards. The types TCS

and TCZ transmitters proved to be of doubtful value for the communications required. The URT-4 transmitter, installed for evaluation, continues to prove totally unreliable and represents a maintenance problem wholly out of proportion to its value. This has been made the subject of an evaluation report. The following tabulation of major transmitters has been prepared to show the urgent need that existed for standby equipment as well as an adequate number of qualified electronics technicians to service the equipment and perform technical maintenance. Radio strikers are used to set up and make adjustments to the low, medium, and high frequency transmitters and perform operators' maintenance within their capabilities to transmitting and receiving equipment. The ship has the following major communication transmitters installed: 2 TEM, 4 TCK, 4 TCZ:

<u>TRANSMITTER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>*TOTAL OUTAGE TIME</u>	<u>INCLUSIVE DATES</u>
TEM	RDO II	514 hours	17 May-19 June
TEM	RDO III	46 hours	22 May-15 June
TCK #2	RDO II	768 hours	19 May-19 June
TCK #1	RDO III	78 hours	1 June-9 June
TCZ #1	RDO II	77 hours	16 May-19 June
TCZ #2	RDO II	240 hours	6 June-16 June
TCZ #1	RDO III	456 hours	16 June-16 June

*Transmitters were considered "out" when they were not fully operational for the purpose of this summary.

In order to process traffic and maintain the required guards an experienced supervisor, assistant supervisor, two "call break-down" men, five experienced CW operators, one voice operator, two teletype operators and two utility men and messengers were required for each of three watch sections. The flag Chief Radioman, the ship's Chief Radioman and Radioman First Class divided their time in such a way that at least one was present in Radio central at all times to check traffic, monitor watches on the various circuits, instruct personnel and to handle unusual or emergency situations. Early in the period, the Radioman First Class was transferred without relief and it became necessary for the Chief Radiomen to spend from 12 to 16 hours daily in Radio Central. Due to the high volume of traffic handled and the necessity for rapidly processing this traffic, operators and supervisory personnel received training which would take months to achieve under ordinary circumstances. It was noted that on some circuits, particularly the Task Force Common, that many operators were at slow speeds. On other circuits it was noted that traffic moved at high speeds and all operators were alert and efficient. On these circuits the NCS operator was invariably an accomplished speed key operator and the other operators were either good bugmen or hand-key operators able to receive through interference. The ship to shore RATT circuit to Radio Yokosuka was the principle means of relaying traffic outbound from

[REDACTED]

the task force. Frequent outages on this circuit due to a combination of equipment failures and poor signals somewhat delayed traffic. The UHF RATT circuit between the carriers was frequently overloaded when more than two carriers were present and reception was less than excellent. Late in the period this ship put up an additional UHF RATT circuit with the Task Force Commander and traffic was expeditiously handled.

Two experienced members of the crypto-board were detached before the ship arrived in the Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN operating area. Three additional experienced members were detached before the tour was half finished. To offset the continuing loss of experienced crypto-board members, three junior officers from the Supply Department, two Ship's Clerks and the Administrative Officer were assigned to stand watches in the cryptocenter while the ship was on the line. The loss of personnel had been anticipated and these Supply and Administrative section officers had been qualified as cryptographers during the time the ship was enroute to this area from the United States. To adequately process traffic through the cryptocenter, a continuous watch of three qualified cryptographers was required. A fourth officer was continuously available to assist with handling of classified traffic during peak periods. Several rated telomen had been cleared for processing classified traffic, but because of the urgent need of their service in Radio Central and the Communications Office, could not be spared for the cryptocenter watches.

A continuous watch of an experienced Communication Watch Officer, two write up men, a ditto operator, a classified traffic messenger, and two other messengers was required to process and deliver messages internally. In addition to this the Flag and the ship each furnished a communications office supervisor. These supervisors were not assigned regular watches. Their principle duties were to insure that messages were processed in a timely manner, routing accomplished as indicated by the CWO and that messages were properly filed.

During the period 15 May through 19 June a grand total of 27,795 messages were handled by CTF-77 and BOXER. A breakdown of traffic handled over the principle radio circuits follows:

CKT	SENT	RECEIVED
B32	-	8164
B5		9472
C16	225	308
C4.3(c)	357	2952
D188	333	676
A4.7	2121	85
T6	863	1070
2340 kcs.	259	436
A8(b)	177	51
D189	125	106

A daily average of 350 messages were handled in the communications office as being addressed to or originated by CTF-77 or BOXER. Approximately 35 percent of these messages were classified. Serially numbered General messages were received in all cases and the ship departed the area with complete up to date files of those messages.

Visual communications consisted almost exclusively of sending and receiving administrative type messages. The Task Force was not maneuvered by flaghoist. Full use of Nancy equipment was made during darken ship periods. On replenishment days almost the entire signal force was required to be on watch to handle the visual traffic.

The incoming mail service, except for one brief period, was considered to be excellent during the entire tour on the line. The several changes in the employment orders for this ship caused the mail to be delayed during that period. The ship's stamp credit of \$15,000 is considered adequate. 82 pouches of air mail and 78 pouches of parcel post were received while the ship was on the line. During this period 2,133 money orders valued at \$90,127.70 were sold. During pay days money orders were sold in the wardroom, the chief petty officers' mess and the post office and these facilities were made available until hands had been served.

The communication section officer personnel allowance, augmented by cryptographers from other departments, is considered adequate for the type of operations just completed. The allowance of rated radiomen and telmen is considered adequate provided it is filled to near 100%. The ship operated successfully with less than 23% of the allowance of rated radiomen. That this was possible is attributed to the excellent leadership and the untiring efforts of the petty officers and the willingness and enthusiasm of the non-rated men.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That CVA's acting as flag ships for force commanders be supplied with enough reliable medium and high frequency transmitters so that standby equipment may be readily available on important circuits and that routine maintenance may be carried out without having to resort to guard ship arrangements.
2. That enough rated radiomen be assigned to enable the ship to carry out its mission and at the same time pursue a realistic training program for non-rated men.
3. That incentives be provided to encourage radiomen to become qualified speed key operators.
4. That visual communications with yard arm blinkers

[REDACTED]

and 8 inch adaptor equipped lights be permitted during hours of darkness when no conditions of radio silence are in effect.

5. That the allowance for a hand operated ditto machine be changed to an electrically operated machine.

6. That a standard Ditto-mat message form for CVA's in AirPac be adopted.

7. That the requirement for originators of messages to use the abbreviation "NOTAL" where required be rigidly enforced.

8. That all junior officers ordered to CVA's and not scheduled to fill a particular billet be further ordered to a course of instruction in cryptography prior to reporting aboard.

(6) Photography

Upon departure of the ship from Yokosuka to the line, personnel within the photographic laboratory were divided into two shifts; each shift of 12 hours duration and changing at 0700 and 1900. This arrangement was very good for maintaining a smooth flow of work throughout the operating period. No troubles were experienced within the laboratory and camera failures were at a minimum. Except for the drastic drain on 8x10 copy film, all supplies ordered prior to departure from San Diego were adequate. The high expenditure of copy film was due to flag requirements for duplicate negatives of target studies. In this connection it is recommended that the present allowance of copy film be substantially increased for carriers operating with flag embarked.

The reduction of some print distribution by carriers on the line as established by ComCarDiv ONE has eased the workload in the photographic laboratory considerably. At the present time one flash print and only two annotated prints are being made from the aerial film. With this arrangement it is possible to devote more attention to quality and also maintain a fast turnover for other types of work within the laboratory.

Excellent results have been obtained with the F56-20" aerial camera installation in the AD aircraft. The damage assessment photographs obtained with this camera are far superior to those previously made with the K-17-24" and K25-6 3/8" cameras.

Ozolid reproductions have not been as high as originally anticipated; however, much of the material that has been reproduced could not have been accomplished otherwise because of size and type reproductions desired.