

3 March 1952

DOWNGRADED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED
INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 25 January 1952 through
22 February 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4 as modified by
OPNAV Instruction 3480.5

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN conf
Ser 04 of 3 March 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 25 January 1952 through 22 February 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA arrived at Yokosuka at 1540I on 20 January 1952. The period 20 to 23 January was spent at anchor in Yokosuka Harbor and was devoted to voyage repairs, restricted availability, and conferences with personnel from the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). At 0900I on 23 January 1952, the USS PHILIPPINE SEA in company with USS MC KENZIE (DD-836) got underway for training area "K" in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 231326Z of January 1952. Training exercises were conducted in area "K" and enroute to the operating area from 26 January until 3 February. The ship joined the Task Force on 1805I, 3 February in the operating area off the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by RADM F.W. MC MAHON, USN, on the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. The Task Force was composed of USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ANTIETAK (CV-36), USS ST. PAUL (CA-73) and units of DesDiv 31, 92 and ComDiv 11. Air Group ELEVEN was embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. After a period of 25 days of operations, the ship departed for Yokosuka for a period of maintenance and upkeep as a unit of Task Unit 77.08.2 by authority of Task Force 77 message 160244Z in company with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and elements of DesDiv 122.

The mission of Task Force 77 was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed; in order to support UN forces in Korea, and support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

- 25 January Moored to Buoy Number 11, Truman Bay, Yokosuka Japan. 0900I - underway for Yokosuka Training Area "K", authority: CTF-77 dispatch 231326Z of January 1952. Conducted AA firing on towed sleeve.
- 26 January Conducted flight familiarization practice.
- 27 January Conducted flight familiarization practice. Ship replenished.

DECLASSIFIED INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 28 January Conducted flight familiarization practice. Streamed target sled for aviation gunnery drill. 0930I 1 F4U BUNO 97073, Pilot LT M.A. ANDERSON, crashed into sea. Position 34°32'N, 139°51.1E. Plane's empennage was knocked off by water bomb from following plane while on bombing run. 0932I - Helicopter reported body sighted. 0940I - USS MC KENZIE (DD-836) designated to assist in search. 1000I - Search unsuccessful. Enroute to Korean Operating Area.
- 29 January Task Force replenished.
- 30 January Conducted AA firing on towed sleeve.
- 31 January Conducted day and night Air Operations in company with USS MC KENZIE (DD-836). Pursuant to orders of Commander Fleet Air Jacksonville, Florida, authority: BuPers dispatch 071942 of December 1951, CAPT A. SMITH, JR., USN, reported on board for duty.
- 1 February Conducted day and night Air Operations.
- 2 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 3 February Ship replenished and joined the Task Force at 1805I.
- 4 February Conducted Air Operations with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS ST. PAUL (CA-73) and units of DesDiv 31, 92 and CortDiv 11. CAPT I.E. HOBBS, USN, was relieved of duty as Commanding Officer this vessel, having been relieved by CAPT A. SMITH, JR., USN, who assumed all duties as Commanding Officer of this vessel.
- 5 February Task Force replenished.
- 6 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 7 February Conducted Air Operations. 1353I - Received report that one (1) AD, BUNO 127867, Pilot ENS J.D. WOLFE, USN, 507907, was shot down at approximately latitude 39°23'N, Longitude 126°15'E. Pilot not recovered.
- 8 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 9 February Task Force replenished.
- 10 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 11 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 12 February Conducted ASP. Rest of schedule cancelled due to weather.
- 13 February Task Force replenished.
- 14 February Conducted Air Operations. 0945I - Fire on flight deck aft of Number 3 elevator. Sounded fire quarters. 0945I - Fire reported out. Flooding of F4U engine caused fire.

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 15 February Flight schedule cancelled due to weather.
- 16 February Flight schedule cancelled due to weather.
- 17 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 18 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 19 February Conducted Air Operations. Pilot LT J.G. KNOX, USN, 497658, was lost in action, cause unknown, approximate position, Latitude 38°50'N, Longitude 128°00'E. Extensive search produced negative results.
- 20-21 February Replenished Task Force. Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan as a unit of Task Unit 77.08.2 by authority of Task Force 77 message 160244Z in company with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and elements of DesDiv 122.
- 22 February Moored to Bouy Number 11, Truman Bay, Yokosuka, Japan at 1245I for a period of upkeep, availability and rest and recreation for the crew.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

a. GENERAL

1. Rocket Launchers Mk-5 Mod 4

(a) Latch Assembly S/N R94-FEC-H7220 breakage has been excessive, resulting in depletion of spares. Approximately 300 latch assemblies have been replaced since commencement of operation due to broken Pawls S/N R94-FEC-H7230. Mk-5 Adapters for 100 pound bombs S/N R94-A-110300 were received for installation. The Adapter Channel Assembly S/N R94-CW-K1-681-1049 could not be installed over the forward Pylon Post, part number 4-7917-2 and Shoe, part number 4-7916-6, manufactured by the Rohr Aircraft Company. Due to the Pylon Post and Shoe Assembly being larger than the adapter channel housing section that is installed over the forward Pylon Post. Mk-5 Rocket Launchers manufactured by the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, were found to have the correct size Pylon Post Assemblies for installing Mk-5 Adapters. Approximately 40 per cent of installed Mk-5 Rocket Launchers were of the type manufactured by the Rohr Aircraft Company, therefore adapters have not been used.

(b) It is anticipated that all F4U-4 type aircraft will have Aero 14 A bomb and rocket launchers installed, during forthcoming yard availability period.

2. Bomb Racks

(a) A hoisting post that screws in the Mk-55 Bomb Rack, with a section cut from the outer end for attachment of a Mk-8 Bomb Hoist was designed. 500 lb. bombs can now be easily installed on F9F type aircraft by use of the Hoisting Post and a Mk-8 Bomb Hoist, without spreading wings on F9F type aircraft. A detailed report will follow.

3. 20MM Ammunition

(a) Numerous failures of 20MM HEI type ammunition, identified by lot number KOP-31-164 November 1944, to fire after receiving sufficient firing pin imprints occurred. All ammunition of this lot was removed from issue rooms and is to be offloaded. VP-112 RUDAOE of 12 February 1952 refers.

SECURITY INFORMATION

4. Hung Ordnance

Munition	4-19 February 1952	Bomb Rack
1000#GP	2	Mk-51
500#GP	2	Mk-51
250#GP	6	Mk-51(2)AERO
		14A(4)
5" HVAR	40	Mk-5(39) Mk-9(1)
5" ATAR	4	Mk-5

b. Ammunition Expended

Munitions	25 Jan - 19 Feb.
2000#GP	9
1000#GP	315
500#GP	309
260#Frag	14
250#GP	1,072
5" HVAR	1,069
5" ATAR	68
Napalm	*4672
Flares Mk-6	76
Flares Mk-8	36
20MM Ammo.	68,738
50 Cal. Ammo.	115,630
Napalm Tanks	145

*Indicates pounds of napalm.

PART IV - DAMAGE

a. OWN.

- (1) Ship - None.
- (2) Aircraft - See enclosure (1).
- (3) Damage inflicted on the enemy - See enclosure (1).

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES.

a. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE OF THE CREW

1. Efficient and smooth teamwork was quickly developed in spite of the fact that a large percentage of the personnel aboard had had no previous combat operational experience. The weather during this period was very cold, but good food, adequate clothing, and operational consideration for personnel contributed to the establishment and maintenance of good morale.

2. The number of personnel on the sick list averaged between .6 and .7 percent of the total on-board complement, and about half of this number were carried with the diagnosis of Common Cold or Influenza. The length of time per patient on the sick list averaged 4.7 days.

3. The above figures do not include patients with venereal disease who were admitted to the sick list for record purposes only. During the period covered by this report there were a total of 48 such admissions of which 38 were from the ship's company and 10 from the air group. The average duration of treatment and observation was 28 days per man.

4. Twenty one-man days were lost due to operational injuries. Two men were hurt when a tow bar fell from the flight deck into #3 elevator, which was lowered, and one suffered an injury to his foot while handling bombs.

5. Twenty one pilots were grounded for an average of 4.80 days each. Thirteen had common colds, one influenza, four injuries (athletic), and three other medical reasons. One pilot was grounded twice. The following is a table showing PILOT/PLANE RATIO with and without the grounded pilots.

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Pilots Grounded</u>	<u>No. days grounded</u>	<u>Ratio without groundings</u>	<u>Ratio with groundings</u>
VA-115	9	49	1.92	1.81
VF-114	2	7	1.47	1.45
VF-113	3	19	1.58	1.55
VF-112	4	20	1.47	1.43
VC-35	1	3	1.75	1.55
VC-61	1	1	1.33	1.33
VC-11	0	0	1.33	1.33
VC-3	1	7	1.25	1.19
	<u>21</u>	<u>106</u>		

b. Casualties

1. On 28 January 1952, Lieutenant Morris A. ANDERSON, 278222, USN was killed when the F4U which he was flying crashed into the sea when it was struck by water-filled bombs which had been released by an AD making a run on a towed target sled. His body was not recovered.

2. On 7 February 1952, Ensign Jerry "D" WOLFE, 507907, USN, was killed when his AD-4 airplane was apparently hit by ground fire over Korea. He failed to pull out of his dive, and the plane was seen to crash and explode when it struck a mountain ridge. Recovery of his remains was considered impossible.

3. On 19 February 1952, LTJG Boyd Dale KNOX, 497648, USNR, was presumed to be missing in action when he failed to return from an operational flight over Korea.

PART VI - GENERAL COMMENTS

a. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Safety

(a) Each Air Department Safety Order was reviewed and revised, to cover any foreseen eventuality, during the previous tour of duty in the Combat Area. Copies of these Safety Orders were distributed to the Air Group Commander and Squadrons after embarkation. Orders covering Aviation Ordnance Safety were posted in each Squadron Armory and Gun Cleaning Room. Each Squadron Ordnanceman was required to read and initial these Safety Orders. During training exercises and since the commencement of Combat Operations, Violations of good Safety Practices have occurred, which required additions and revisions to existing Safety Orders covering the following:

(1) Providing safety riders on fork lifts during all operations of these vehicles.

5 March 1952
(2) Requiring Ordnance crews to carry all machine gun ammunition in containers, NOT in belts across the shoulders.

(3) Prohibited Ordnance fuzing crews from carrying fuzes in clothing or pockets.

(4) Issue of machine gun ammunition, whereby Squadron Ordnancemen draw and fill empty ammunition containers between flights. Meet aircraft after spotting completed, remove empty containers, install full containers and return empty containers to issue rooms for refilling.

(5) Disposal of used engine oil into drains located on the Hangar Deck, covering security responsibility and inspection of used oil prior to disposal.

(b) An active program of plane handling safety was carried out. An informal investigation of each plane handling accident was conducted by the division officer and then written up in a rough "accident log." Analysis of this log over a period of time has resulted in the following measures being taken:

- (1) Demotion of accident prone directors.
- (2) Making minor modifications to certain obstructions that provided too small a clearance for aircraft movement.
- (3) Painting other obstructions with yellow and black stripping.
- (4) Using as many as three plane directors in certain tight maneuvering spots.

A report is published periodically listing the accidents and damaged parts. Included in this report is a list of the parts and their cost to the Navy.

2. Napalm

(a) Tanks of napalm were mixed for training and combat operations, under mild and adverse climatic conditions with excellent jelling results. This ship utilizes two heating units; each unit consists of an insulated 50 gallon drum, containing three spiral columns of copper tubing, with common manifolds on the top and bottom. Units are first filled with water, which is heated to a temperature of approximately 120°F. by steam through a steam jet installed inside the drum and located below the copper coils. Gasoline is heated as it is pumped through the coils and flows on through a section of insulated hose to the MK-1 Mixer. Each heating unit is a separate installation, located in the port gun tub, forward of number 2 Deck Edge Elevator. With both units operating, two Jap Type 51 tanks can be filled every three minutes. There has been no requirement for using KYLENOL thickener to obtain good jelling results.

3. VT-Fuzes

(a) Ordnance fuzing crews were briefed on the installation of VT-fuzes in accordance with the Bureau of Ordnance Instructions contained in OP.1444 Change 1 and Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN'S Current Operations Order. Each fuzing operation was closely supervised by Squadron Leading Petty Officers and the Air Gunner or Aircraft Service Officer.

(b) In cases where VT-fuzes were removed from bombs, mostly due to flight cancellations, these fuzes were disposed of over the side.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

(c) Authorization is requested to re-use any VT-fuze that has been removed from its container, but has not actually been tightened by a fuze wrench into a bomb, providing such fuzes are returned to original containers and stored in Ready Fuze Lockers for the first available issue.

4. Catapults

(a) Catapults functioned satisfactorily during this period.

(b) Three hundred fifty seven (357) aircraft were launched off the catapults with no malfunctions. Broken down into types there were 259 F9F's, 40 AD's, 53 F4U's and 5 TBM's. F9F's were launched satisfactorily with 34 knots, 3500 psi, and either with 2 - 500#GP's or 4 - 250#GP's.

(c) One near accident occurred when the port catapult was fired prior to execution of the fire signal by the Catapult Officer as the starboard catapult was launching its F9F. Recommend strongly that F9F pilots bear to port or starboard depending on which catapult fires them as they leave the bow. Catapult Panel Operators have been instructed to keep both hands visible on the deck upon receiving ready from the Catapult Officer. This procedure will prevent anticipation of firing signal from the Catapult Officer.

(d) A total of 2 F9F, 1 AD, and 1 TBM bridles were lost overboard on launching runs. A total of 8 F9F bridles were surveyed after protracted use.

5. Arresting Gear

(a) Arresting Gear functioned satisfactorily during this period.

(b) A total of 743 arrested landings were made. Types include 259 F9F's, 265 F4U-4's, 32 F4U-5's, 180 AD's and 7 TBM's.

(c) F9F #211 engaged pendants #1 and 2 simultaneously on 4 February 1952 and there was no damage to aircraft or arresting gear.

(d) Numerous off-center landings with aircraft bearing to port caused purchase cable to slip around sheaves causing slackness in #2 deck pendant. To counteract this result, it was necessary to pull out pendant #5 to reposition purchase cable and thus tighten #2 pendant.

(e) One barricade webbing was used throughout this period. Deck traffic as a result of the landings, re-spotting, tractors running over the webbing, bomb skids being pulled over the webbing, inclement weather and catching of extended webbing by towbars, or skids on F9F's caused frequent replacement of engaging strap hold down bungees, and lower loading strap anchor straps intact. During entire operation average height of barricade during jet landings was 9'8" under all wind conditions. We used shear pin NAF 217133-1 with excellent results. Believe breaking of this shear pin on other carriers using this pin is caused by added tension of engaging straps being hauled up too tight. Recommend engaging straps be let out to bitter end at D-ring and engaged to hold down bungees.

(f) Pendants #1, 4 and #5 were changes once, pendants #2 and 3 twice.

6. Aircraft Maintenance

(a) In the short period of time that the Mk III Anti-exposure Suit has been used by the pilots operating from this vessel numerous repairs have been made to maintain them in proper readiness. Tears in the cuffs and collars have been frequent, with an average of five a day. These tears have been caused by snags when pilot enters or leaves the cockpit as well as by improper stowage. It has been necessary to repair these tears with an inner and outer patch applied with three coats of rubber cement to each surface as per instructions. An experimental gauntlet has been made which consists of a conical piece of heavy rubber cemented to the wrist end. Fitting of this gauntlet is accomplished in the same manner as that used on the initial Mk III Anti-exposure Suit fabrication. It may be noted that $8\frac{1}{2}$ man hours were required to fit and fabricate each Mk III Anti-exposure Suit. Fabrication commenced on this vessel's departure from Hawaiian waters and continued until 30 January 1952.

(b) During the past two weeks, one incident has been noted where a portion of the parachute in the ADSK-1 Droppable Survival Kit was pulled through the aperture in the top of the container adjacent to the releasing mechanism which holds the parachute within the container. It is possible that a considerable amount of the parachute can be pulled through this opening, which is only $\frac{1}{4}$ " wide at one point and could possibly cause fouling of the parachute on its ejection from the container. To eliminate, a cap of red cotton bunting $13\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter with a rim width of 2 inches was made to fit over the chute. Because of the bulkiness of the bunting, it is now impossible for any of the parachute material to be exposed.

(c) In the Engine Build-up Section, eight engines have been built up as QEC's and three have been installed in aircraft. Engines installed were one (1) R-2800-18W and two (2) R-3350-26WA. As we depart the operating area, four (4) AD type aircraft await engine changes; one (1) for high time, the remaining three (3) because of metal particles found in rear oil sump. (Refer to Phil Sea Dispatch 190530Z of Feb. and CTF Dispatch 182320Z of Feb.) Large amounts of silver particles and teeth found in sump, presumably from multiple clutch plates and disc's of impeller drive.

7. Barricade Net

(a) A small cargo net 14' x 8' with 8" squares was made up and installed over barricade at approximate location, where aircraft tail wheels pass over nylon webbing, during deck launches. This net holds the barricade nylon webbing flat on the deck, so that aircraft tail wheels will pass over the webbing without being hooked by a loose strap. The net is rigged off-center to port, frame 105. Unrigging time 30 seconds for ready deck.

8. Gasoline System

(a) During the first operating period issues were:

- (1) 318,470 gallons 115/145 Av/Gasoline
- (2) 2,228 gallons symbol 1100 Av/Lube Oil
- (3) 18 gallons alcohol

3 March 1952

(b) The operation of the forward and after ingas producer engine became faulty after only 102 hours running time since overhaul. The exhaust and intake valves became sticky and leaked due to excessive carbon deposits. Some facility to carry unleaded fuel for the operation of the ingas producers is recommended to remedy this condition.

(c) Salt water erosion was experienced in the gravity tank float valve pistons installed in the salt water gravity tanks in the forward and after pump rooms. These were recently overhauled, during this ship's last yard period, July thru October 1951. Erosion occurred in the pressure escape drilled passages within the piston. It is recommended that two (2) spare gravity tank float valve pistons be added to the S-15 Gasoline Allowance List, and that future valve pistons be manufactured from non-corrosive metal harder than brass. Recommendations to this effect will be forwarded to Bureau of Ships.

(d) The new type "John Crane" S-1500 type 1½" Bellows Shaft Seal installed in the Buffalo Gasoline Electric Pumps at the last yard period is proving very satisfactory after some doubt due to excessive leakage upon initial installation.

(e) Only small amounts of water were found in the gasoline filters which were drained daily for inspection.

(f) A running inspection of gasoline filter elements was maintained. Very moderate amounts of dust, rust and gasoline valve lubricant were deposited on subject filter elements.

(g) Aviation Gasoline received from fleet tankers was sampled and inspected frequently during replenishment operations and appearance of gasoline in general was satisfactory.

(h) Difficulty was experienced in lubricating the two 4" gasoline plug valves on the starboard outboard line, second deck level, frames #58 and 61. The ¼" lubricating line installed at the last yard period has proven much too small in diameter to allow congealed gasoline valve lubricant to pass thru. A larger plug valve lubricating line, minimum ½" diameter is recommended in future installations. Recommendations to this effect will be forwarded to Bureau of Ships.

(i) Installation of waste gasoline lines on hangar and flight deck bay #1 and 3 is highly recommended to facilitate disposition of contaminated gasoline at sea. These could run overboard below the water-line and provisions could be made to lock-up these lines during in-port periods.

(j) This ship has experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining allowable spares on chemicals for operation of the Hays Orsat Analyzer, reference BuShips Allowance S-15, page 15, line 28. Requisition number CV-47/8452-52 dated 7 November 1951, submitted to NSC Oakland still remains unfilled and urgently needed.

(k) Much delay is also being experienced in procuring a replacement autolite starter submitted on requisition CV-47/8549-52 dated 8 December 1951 to MSD Clearfield, Utah. MSD Clearfield advised on dispatch 282200Z, December 1951, that material would be available 1/1/52. Subject engine starter was ordered for the Forward Ingas Producer, Hercules Engine Model Z X A.

9. Bomb Elevators.

(a) Numerous malfunctions of bomb elevator operation continued to occur during rearming periods. Normally, rearming of aircraft can only occur between recoveries of aircraft. Positive elevator operation is required to rearm aircraft in sufficient time to meet scheduled operations. Elevator malfunctions were as follows

<u>ELEVATOR</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>TIME OUT</u>
#1 Upper Stage	Slack cable (2) contact sticking	20 minutes 30 minutes
#3 Upper Stage	Down Relay Aux. in- operative. Slack cable (4)	4 hours 1 hour
#4 Lower stage	Slack cable (6) Over travel (5)	1 hour 40 minutes
#5 Lower stage	Slack cable (3) Over travel (5)	45 minutes 1 hour
#6 lower stage	Slack cable (1)	20 minutes

Recommendation for improved elevator operation is being prepared for submission to COMAIRPAC.

10. Personnel

(a) The Air Department has an assigned complement of 460 enlisted personnel. Although the overall total has averaged 460, there has been a shortage of Petty Officers in Aviation Boatswain Mate, Aviation Ordnance, and Yeoman ratings. A breakdown of these ratings are:

<u>RATE</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
ABC	4	5
AB1	10	6
AB2	16	12
AB3	21	32
AOC	4	8
A01	10	6
A02	18	10
A03	25	13
YN1	1	0
YN3	1	0

(b) It is recommended that additional First and Second Class Petty Officers of the above listed ratings be assigned to fill authorized allowance.

b. AEROLOGY

1. Weather Summary

(a) Operating period began 25 January in the operating area outside Tokyo Bay. The weather was good for flying but the persistence of a long low swell from northern lows caused considerable pitching. No flying days were lost for reasons of weather or sea, however.

(b) Proceeding from the Yokosuka OPAREA to the OPAREA southwest of Sasebo the PHILIPPINE SEA found increasing cloudiness and rain-showers, but not to such an extent as to restrict air operation. The first undesirable operating weather was encountered on 2 Feb. when pilots reported Ullung Do and the practice target area covered by clouds which went down to the sea surface. This proved to be a quasi-stationary squall line and extended NW-SE slightly north of Ullung Do, and roughly conformed to the East Coast of Korea. The air was more than 20°F colder than the sea in the squall area and the squall line contained snow-showers and considerable steam fog.

3 March 1952

(c) On February 3 the PHILIPPINE SEA joined TF 77 and experienced good weather as long as the Task Force kept clear of the squall line.

(d) The next bad weather was caused by a low which moved south over the Western Yellow Sea and curved eastward south of Korea, and was followed two days later by another identical system. The ensuing easterly flow brought poor flying conditions in both the operating and target areas from February 12 through 16.

(e) In the evening of February 16, the wind backed through North, to West North West and weather rapidly cleared in the target area and was followed by clearing several hours later in the operating area.

2. Weather Statistics

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITIONS	VISIBILITY	SURFACE WINDS			SEA CONDITIONS
				DIR	AVG	MAX	
Jan 25	Mostly Clear	Scattered low and middle clouds	(1) 4 miles Haze 10 Miles	W'ly	31	44	Slight to rough 50 to 65°F
Jan 26	Partly Cloudy	Clear to scattered to low (5) broken	10 miles	N'ly	20	30	Moderate to rough 57 to 65
Jan 27	Partly Cloudy	Scattered to overcast low, scattered middle, (1) overcast high	10 miles	W'ly Var	12	21	Slight 57 to 66
Jan 28	Partly cloudy Occasional Rain showers, (1) Distant lightning	Overcast to scattered low, middle and high clouds	10 miles	W'ly	17	38	Slight to moderate 57 to 64
Jan 29	Cloudy, Rain and Fog	Scattered to overcast low, broken to overcast middle and high clouds	1 mile in rain and fog. 5 to 10 in rain.	N'ly	18	28	Moderate to rough 59 to 70
Jan 30	Overcast, rain	Broken to overcast low and middle clouds	10 miles reduced to 5 in rain	N'ly	20	32	Moderate 59 to 70
Jan 31	Cloudy	Broken to overcast low and middle clouds	10 Miles	NNE	16	22	Slight 61 to 64
Feb 1	Partly cloudy rain showers	Broken to overcast low becoming scattered. Broken to overcast high	10 Miles	NW'ly	19	33	Slight 53 to 64
Feb 2	Partly cloudy Snow-showers	Broken to overcast low, Scattered to broken high	10 Miles reduced to 1/2 in snow-showers	NW'ly	16	21	Moderate to rough 50 to 54

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITIONS	VISIBILITY	SURFACE WINDS			SEA CONDITIONS
				DIR	AVG	MAX	
Feb 3	Partly cloudy Snow & Snow- showers	Clear to broken and over- cast low, (1)overcast high	10 miles reduced to 1/2 in snow	NW'ly	19	26	Moderate 36 to 52
Feb 4	Partly Cloudy Snow-showers	Scattered to overcast low clouds (3) Broken mid clouds	10 miles reduced to 1/2 in snow- showers	NW'ly	21	28	Moderate 40 to 51
Feb 5	Partly cloudy Snow-showers	Scattered to overcast low clouds	10 miles reduced to 1/2 in snow- showers	NW'ly	15	30	Moderate 36 to 51
Feb 6	Cloudy with rain- showers and snow- showers	Scattered to overcast low, middle and high clouds	10 miles	SE	11	20	Moderate 35 to 50
Feb 7	Mostly clear	Overcast middle clouds becoming scattered to clear	10 miles	NW	9	14	Slight 34 to 41
Feb 8	Mostly clear	Scattered low clouds becoming scattered to overcast middle clouds	10 Miles	NW	16	22	Slight to mod- erate 32 to 50
Feb 9	Mostly clear	Clear to scattered to broken low clouds, (1) broken high	10 Miles	WNW	19	27	Moderate 35 to 50
Feb 10	Mostly clear	Clear becoming scattered low and middle clouds	10 Miles	WNW	23	30	Rough 32 to 42
Feb 11	Cloudy, rain	Scattered to overcast low and middle clouds. Broken to overcast high clouds	10 miles reduced to 8 in rain	WNW VAR	13	25	Slight to mod- erate 36 to 50
Feb 12	Overcast, Snow- showers, Snow- Grains, and Rain	Scattered to overcast low and middle clouds	10 Miles reduced to 6 miles in rain	NE	20	24	Moderate 35 to 52

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITIONS	VISIBILITY	DIR	AVG	MAX	SEA CONDITIONS
Feb 13	Overcast, Rain- Showers Rain, Snow, Snow-grains	Scattered to overcast low clouds (11) over- cast middle clouds	8 to 10 miles	NE	14	25	Moderate 40 to 52
Feb 14	Overcast, Snow & Fog	Overcast to broken low clouds, overcast middle clouds	10 miles reduced to as low as 1/2 in snow and fog.	ENE	20	23	Moderate 34 to 42
Feb 15	Overcast, Snow & Fog	Overcast to broken low clouds, overcast middle clouds	10 miles reduced to as low as 1/2 in snow and fog.	ENE	21	23	Moderate to rough 36 to 50
Feb 16	Partly cloudy	Overcast to scattered low clouds, (3) over- cast high clouds	10 miles reduced to 1/2 in snow	NE	16	23	Moderate to rough 35 to 40
Feb 17	Mostly clear	Scattered low and middle becoming clear	10 miles	NW	11	17	Slight 34 to 36
Feb 18	Mostly clear	Scattered low clouds, (2) overcast to broken low clouds	10 miles	WNW	15	19	Slight to moderate 39 to 46
Feb 19	Mostly Clear	Scattered to overcast low clouds	10 miles	WNW	15	21	Slight 39 to 50

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITIONS	VISIBILITY	DIR	AVG	MAX	SEA CONDITIONS
Feb 13	Overcast, Rain- Showers Rain, Snow, Snow-grains	Scattered to overcast low clouds (11) over- cast middle clouds	8 to 10 miles	NE	14	25	Moderate 40 to 52
Feb 14	Overcast, Snow & Fog	Overcast to broken low clouds, overcast middle clouds	10 miles reduced to as low as 1/2 in snow and fog.	ENE	20	23	Moderate 34 to 42
Feb 15	Overcast, Snow & Fog	Overcast to broken low clouds, overcast middle clouds	10 miles reduced to as low as 1/2 in snow and fog.	ENE	21	23	Moderate to rough 36 to 50
Feb 16	Partly cloudy	Overcast to scattered low clouds, (3) over- cast high clouds	10 miles reduced to 1/2 in snow	NE	16	23	Moderate to rough 35 to 40
Feb 17	Mostly clear	Scattered low and middle becoming clear	10 miles	NW	11	17	Slight 34 to 36
Feb 18	Mostly clear	Scattered low clouds, (2) overcast to broken low clouds	10 miles	WNW	15	19	Slight to moderate 39 to 46
Feb 19	Mostly Clear	Scattered to overcast low clouds	10 miles	WNW	15	21	Slight 39 to 50

DATE	TEMPERATURE		CEILING	IFR	REASON IFR
	MAX	MIN			
Jan 25	55	41	3 hrs at 3000 feet	No	
Jan 26	53	44	5 hrs at 3000 feet	No	
Jan 27	56	45	12 hrs 3500 to 4000 feet	No	
Jan 28	61	51	10 hrs 2500 to 3000 feet	No	
Jan 29	67	55	22 hrs 2500 to 7000 feet	2 hrs 55 min	Low visibility
Jan 30	55	41	24 hrs 800 to 6500 feet	1 hr	Low ceiling
Jan 31	59	46	19 hrs 1800 to 6500 feet	No	
Feb 1	55	29	10 hrs 1800 to 3000 feet	No	
Feb 2	40	26	24 hrs 200 to 2500 feet	1 hr	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 3	37	22	15 hrs 800 to 2000 feet	20 min	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 4	33	20	15 hrs 700 to 1500 feet	1 hr	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 5	33	25	14 hrs 900 to 4000 feet	2 hrs	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 6	42	29	16 hrs 1500 to 7000 feet	No	
Feb 7	44	33	3 hrs 6000 to 6500 feet	No	
Feb 8	49	34	CAVU	No	
Feb 9	47	32	2 hrs 2500 to 3000 feet	No	
Feb 10	40	33	CAVU	No	
Feb 11	48	32	12 hrs 2000 to 4000 feet	No	
Feb 12	44	27	24 hrs 2000 to 6000 feet	No	
Feb 13	45	35	24 hrs 1500 to 7000 feet	No	
Feb 14	35	29	24 hrs 500 to 1500 feet	1 hr 10 min	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 15	38	26	24 hrs 500 to 1000 feet	14 hrs	Low ceiling & visibility
Feb 16	27	23	22 hrs 1000 to 3500 feet	6 hrs	Low visibility
Feb 17	32	24	CAVU	No	
Feb 18	34	26	2 hrs 2000 feet	No	
Feb 19	38	27	2 hrs 2000 feet	No	

c. Air Intelligence

(1) It is believed that the PHILIPPINE SEA was the most adequately supplied ship with intelligence material to have thus far embarked to the Far East. The only shortage occurred in Target Dossiers and a few miscellaneous maps. The Target Dossiers were received at CinCPac since they were not included in CinCPac Instruction 3840.1 at the time the ship obtained its intelligence material. The miscellaneous maps were placed on back order and were picked up from Air Navigation Office while in Yokosuka, Japan. This smoothly functioning office of ComAirPac deserves much credit for a job well done.

(2) Sliding panels have been installed. This has greatly increased the display surface of the Air Intelligence Office. The fluorescent lights used on the sliding panels have increased tremendously the lighting of the whole office.

(3) Upon the ship's arrival in Pearl Harbor one Air Group and one ship's Air Intelligence Officer were sent ahead to report to CTF 77 for advance intelligence briefing. These officers spent several days in the operating area aboard the USS ANTIETAM and USS ESSEX working with intelligence personnel. Information was collected on organization, briefing, debriefing, reports, intelligence material, ordnance, communications, etc.

(4) The following is a list of pertinent subjects of which up to date information was brought back and acted upon:

- (a) Mk 51 and 55 bomb racks.
- (b) Current cold weather maintenance of 20MM guns.
- (c) Current overlays of recco and rail routes.
- (d) Current K field facilities.
- (e) Current flak information.
- (f) Current Evasion and Escape material.
- (g) Current SAR procedures.
- (h) Current squadron doctrines.
- (i) Current CAG 15 and CAG 5 tactics.
- (j) Current flak analysis touraids.

(5) A large part of the detailed information that was immediately applicable was not readily available from other sources. The net result was a smooth functioning intelligence department with a clearer concept of the current situation. The Intelligence Officers were better qualified to cope with the problems later encountered.

(6) This information in addition to that received from the USS VALLEY FORGE contributed toward the combat readiness of the ship and air group. Much of this operational intelligence is not available at ComAirPac, CinCPac, and ComNavFR.

(7) It is recommended that all carriers and air groups being deployed to WestPac take action to insure that they are adequately supplied with accurate information from the operating Task Force prior to reporting for duty.

(8) Photo Interpretation

(a) In photo interpretation the emphasis has been on rail status, target search and flak analysis. Other than routine count rail cuts, there has been little strike damage assessment. The total number of sorties flown was not great (twenty six), due to inclement weather and material failure.

SECURITY INFORMATION

(b) It was found that one photo interpreter could not do all the work which was to be done, and the recent addition of another photo interpreter and one enlisted assistant has alleviated the situation a great deal. It is anticipated putting on another assistant if the load should get greater.

(c) The ozalid room being used also as the photo interpretation room, is much too small for this purpose, a large room will be secured, if possible.

(d) K-25 strike photos havenot been successful for damage assessment up to present. The frequent freezing up and other material failure of the cameras has resulted in less than 50% of the K-25 cameras getting pictures. However this situation improved considerably towards the end of the operating period. The pictures obtained have been taken too early in the run and at too great an altitude to be of much value in damage assessment.

d. CIC

1. General

(a) Since returning to COLUSA upon completion of the last cruise in Korean waters this ship's CIC has undergone approximately a 95% turnover in personnel, both officer and enlisted. The physical layout in CIC also was subjected to a complete face lifting in the shipyard at Hunters Point. This consisted of the addition of two RCA Communication consoles, the addition of the SG-6 and SPS-6B radars in place of the SU and SK radars, the replacement of the VG repeater with the VG-2 repeater, and other major changes in the communication system. Thus, the ship put to sea with an essentially new and inexperienced crew and a new and untried CIC.

(b) After continuous training of the CIC team, and daily trouble shooting by the technicians on the new radio and electron equipment, CIC had become a moderately well trained and efficient unit by the time the ship joined Task Force 77.

(c) The present complement in CIC consists of eighty-four (84) enlisted personnel including one Chief Radarman. This includes the lookout personnel, as the present Ship's Organization calls for the activation of an O-L Division only under wartime conditions. Approximately seventy percent of this complement is inexperienced seamen strikers.

(d) There are seven qualified CIC watch officers, two of whom are qualified All Weather Air Controllers, (one LCDR, five LT and one RDC). The term "qualified" is used herein in the broad sense of the word as only three of the aforementioned officers have had any previous experience in CIC. In addition, there are three assistant CIC watch officers, (three ensigns) whose main function is to act in the capacity of Surface Control Officers.

(e) The organization of the watch is in accordance with the Ship's Battle Bill and that recommended by ComAirPac and includes two watch officers and one air controller on each watch during Condition Three. During night watches, when air operations are not being conducted, the air controller is secured to an "on call" basis. The three officers of each watch section are rotated within the watch, as practicable, from Surface Control, to Air Control, to Watch Officer duties in an endeavor to thoroughly train and qualify all officers in all phases of the watch. The assigned CIC watch officer, however, retains the responsibility for the conduct of the watch. The watches are of six hours duration each with the individual officers being required to spend two additional hours each day in CIC practicing air control.

(f) During Condition One watches all stations are manned in accordance with the Ship's Battle Bill. This includes the Operations Officer as Evaluator, the CIC Officer, the Surface Control Officer, with one assistant, three Air Controllers, a Radar Control Officer, Radar Countermeasures Officer, CCA Officer and a Lookout Officer stationed in Air Defense Forward. The Gunnery Department furnishes one Liaison Officer during Condition Three watches and two officers in CIC during Condition One watches.

(g) Enlisted stations are manned in accordance with standard CIC doctrine. In addition, however, it has been found advantageous to man the following stations:

(1) VJ Plotter - The VJ Plotter maintains a surface summary plot keeping the Surface Control Officer advised of the current situation within the force and assisting the VF operator in station keeping.

(2) Strike Talkers - During air operations when this ship is assigned strike control a strike talker is stationed beside the Strike Controller at the SX console, and a second strike talker is assigned to plot behind the vertical plot alongside the regular plotter. These talkers are in direct communication with the watch officer stationed at the communications console on sound power, the 24 JS circuit usually being used. Thus, the watch officer is aware of the air picture at all times and the vertical plot indicates the status of strikes, outbound and returning, at all times.

2. Radar Performance

(a) The SU and SK radars were replaced by the SG-6B and the SPS-6B radars during the last yard overhaul period. The ship now has two excellent surface search radars with the SG-6B and the SG-7 which has been piped from CCA into the radar switchboard, thus making it available in the CIC. For air search and air control the SX and SPS-6B radars have proven very satisfactory. The electronics technicians have done an excellent job of maintaining the radar equipment in working order and, as a consequence, none of the equipment has been out of operation for periods other than those required for routine maintenance.

(b) The SX radar is reliable for long range surface and air search. However, results of the SX in tracking jet aircraft without the aid of the Mark V / Mark X IFF have not been reliable. The SPS-6B radar has been found to be far more satisfactory for tracking and controlling jets consistently to a range of sixty miles. The present electronics system on this ship allows the Mark V / Mark X IFF to be piped independently into the air search radars, either the SX or the SPS-6B. It is to be emphasized that without the aid of the Mark V / Mark X IFF the SX is, for all practical purposes, useless for tracking and controlling jet aircraft with any degree of reliability.

(c) Although to date the PO equipment has not been utilized extensively, excellent results have been obtained on occasion. With the AEW aircraft flying at two thousand feet, presentations have been obtained in CIC giving a clear picture of the entire eastern coast of Korea extending northward well into Manchuria. On one occasion a series of pictures was taken with the 35mm camera installed in the PO gear with very satisfactory results.

(d) The GCA equipment on this ship is not in operating condition at present. Requests for the removal of this equipment have been forwarded with no action having been taken as yet. Also, a request for repair of equipment was submitted to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet, but was not considered feasible considering cost of such repair. The equipment in its present state can be put into operating order for temporary use at any time. However, due to the physical location of the equipment on the fantail the vibration of the ship at high speeds causes immediate failure of the gear and its use is, therefore, not practicable.

(3) Air Control.

(a) No major difficulties in Air Control have been experienced to date. One limiting factor of a minor nature has been the lack of qualified Air Controllers. Although a number of the watch officers are capable, to a degree, of controlling aircraft, only two are qualified All Weather Controllers, and two additional are qualified as Day Controllers. This has worked somewhat of a hardship on those qualified controllers in carrying out the daily assignments of strike and CAP control. This situation is gradually being alleviated, however, by constant on the job training. It is anticipated that all watch officers will be qualified air controllers in the near future.

(b) The URD/DF has proved to be invaluable in obtaining bearings and furnishing steers to aircraft flying beyond radar range. This equipment has proved its worth many times in assisting aircraft either lost or experiencing an emergency at some distance from the force.

(c) The VG-2 repeater has not been found to be completely satisfactory for maintaining a surface summary plot mainly because of its inability to retain the presentation on the face of the scope for an adequate period of time. This CIC is still in the process of experimentation with this repeater, however, in the hope that it can be utilized to full advantage.

(4) Communications

(a) Considerable communications difficulties have been experienced to date with cross talk and feed back. These difficulties are gradually being corrected by the technicians. Much of the trouble mentioned above is believed to have been due to antenna location. The ARC-1s are used primarily for air control with duplicate frequencies set up on the TDQ's as standbys. However, the TDQ/RCK's are not thoroughly reliable at present.

(b) Considerable corrective maintenance on the communication consoles has been necessary due to faulty workmanship in the shipyard. This consisted mainly of reconnecting a great number of the leads in the consoles. Certain difficulties in the operation of the communication consoles still exist, however it is believed that these can be corrected by the ship's force in the near future.

(5) Lookouts

(a) The lookouts are included as an integral part of the O-I Division with provisions for activating an O-L Division as a separate unit should conditions so dictate. An assistant CIC Watch Officer is assigned as Lookout Officer, and, as such is in charge of training, assignment of watches, and general supervision. Personnel are rotated to lookout duty within the O-I division, thus affording all personnel an opportunity to learn all phases of the CIC including lookout duties.

(6) Comments

(a) As a result of this ship's observations during operation to date, the following comments and recommendations are hereby submitted:

(1) It is believed that the use of strike talkers as outlined above is worthy of consideration by other CIC's not using such a system. The employment of personnel as strike talkers has proved invaluable in maintaining an up to date vertical plot as well as insuring that the watch officer is cognizant of the current situation at all times. Although this ship uses sound power for communication between the strike talkers and the watch officer, the intercom system may also be used satisfactorily by the talker assigned to the SX Console.

(2) It is also believed that the addition of a VJ Plotter to the regular watch, as outlined earlier in this report, is deserving of mention. This serves as an added check to the VF Operator and avails the watch officer of all information pertinent to the formation and station keeping. It is also a valuable addition to the watch when entering or leaving port, or wherever CIC is assisting the bridge in navigation.

(3) It is further believed that the addition of two or more ARC-1's to the Combat Information Center would contribute immeasurably to the efficiency of CIC. At present the RCK's are not entirely satisfactory and reliable communications with aircraft are usually dependent upon the ARC-1's of which there are now only two.

e. Communications

(1) General

(a) Communications on the whole have shown continued improvement. Much remains to be desired however, in the matter of circuit discipline and procedure. This problem is still causing considerable confusion, unnecessary transmissions, non-deliveries and delaying of high precedence and oftentimes vital traffic. All methods of transmissions including CW, Voice and RATT circuits are involved.

(b) It is recommended that circuits be monitored periodically, errors pointed out to units concerned and that all circuits be more conscientiously supervised.

(c) This ship ~~Upon~~ reporting to the Task Force was not provided with all effective directives and operating instructions. This was particularly true in the case of dispatches, notices and changes.

(d) It is further recommended that all originators frequently distribute a complete master index of all effective directives, instructions, notices and changes they have issued in order that units joining can take action to insure a complete file.

(2) NDT RATT FOX

(a) Reception on this circuit has been almost "solid" since the activation of the new low frequency channel. It is believed that a study of reception conditions would result in the justification of single transmissions during certain periods of operation. When employing double transmission of messages, the second transmission should be made at least thirty minutes after the first transmission.

(b) It is recommended that "spaced" transmissions be made when double transmission is employed on NDT RATT FOX.

(3) UHF RATT - Intra Task Force

(a) The UHF RATT Circuit remains the ideal method of handling vital and high speed traffic. This circuit is vulnerable to interception by any radioteletype equipped unit within range, but the installation of RATT off-line cryptographic equipment would completely eliminate this security risk and in addition, reduce the number of cryptographic personnel required.

(b) It is recommended that top priority be assigned for the installation of RATT off-line cryptographic equipment to Task Force flagships and carriers in combat areas.

(4) Personnel

(a) The Communications personnel for this operation has been adequate. That statement will probably not appear in future reports for some time to come. Over one-fourth of the rated communication personnel on board are scheduled for immediate transfer. Unless replacements are provided, the next combat operation will be conducted with less than sixty percent of the authorized allowance of rated radiomen and telemen. With the strong possibility of a Flag embarking prior to the next operation, the personnel situation will be even more critical. An intensive training program is in effect but personnel can not be adequately trained as fast as losses occur.

f. Photography

(1) Upon leaving Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area, approximately three days were devoted to underway training for the Photo Pilots and personnel of the Photographic Laboratory.

(2) Under actual combat conditions the following work was performed:

- (a) Photo missions were flown on nine days.
- (b) A total of 36 rolls of aerial K-17 film was exposed.
- (c) Twenty-six (26) sorties were flown.
- (d) A total 3,233 9½ x 9½ inch usable negatives were made
- (e) The total number of 10 x 10 inch prints made from these negatives was 44,518.
- (f) 256 rolls of Sonne paper were used.
- (g) K-25 and K-20 cameras on flight deck and from the ADs exposed 26 rolls of film.
- (h) Routine RUDMs and ships work coupled with a limited amount of Public Information type of pictures was done on a deferred basis due to the priority of photo reconnaissance work.

(3) The work performed in the onemonth period, while the PHILIPPINE SEA was in the operating area, revealed that the estimate for six months supplies (which was based on 100% increase over six periods of last years Korean cruise) is entirely inadequate. A specific example of this is the following: Of the 300 rolls of Sonne Paper in stock 256 rolls were expended in the one months operating period.

(4) To prevent such under estimates on supplies, it is strongly recommended that each carrier returning from the Korean operating area send a representative to a conference, with AirPac and Carrier Photo Officers entering the area, for the latest information on what is needed and expected of them.

g. Supply

(1) Aviation Supply

(a) The material support rendered the Air Group can best analyzed by listing the number of aircraft AOGs resulting from non-availability of material together with the reason for the material being aboard. The following chart gives this information.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AOG FROM NON-AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL

	H	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	T
	0	4	4	9	9	D-	D-	D-	0
	3-	U-	U-	F-	F-	4	4	4	T
	S	4	5NL	2	2P		W	NL	A
									L
Original Allowance									
not received.....				2					2
Fleet controlled.....				1					1
Allowance depleted.....									
Not on any allowance.....							2	2	
Parts peculiar to BuNr									
Not on orig outfitting.....		1			2	1			4
Coded M,MI or Pl.....			1			1			2
Total.....	0	1	0	4	0	3	1	2	11

██████████
 SECURITY INFORMATION

It is at once evident that the chief source of trouble has been on non-allowance list items and items peculiar to a new BUNR series. The resupply of allowance list items was most adequate and did not result in an AOG. The fact that CVG 11 had very late BUNR aircraft led to a considerable amount of trouble since allowance lists were outdated and frequently the original outfitting spares would not fit the aircraft. Both COMFAIRJAP and COMAIRPAC are currently reviewing deficiencies resulting from this cause.

(b) In order to insure that all AOG's receive constant attention, a daily AOG report and action summary was submitted to the Supply Officer. The Air Group also submitted an AOG report, and the two reports were compared and verified to insure that no items were overlooked.

(c) Several instances were noted where outside packing copies of material had been removed prior to delivery of the stores on board. If there is no inside packing copy, it is difficult to identify and properly handle the stores. It is recommended that transshipping activities be reminded of the importance of packing copies to the ultimate consignee.

(d) Non-receipt of the Aero 14-A rocket launchers and change kits resulted in a number of ordnance problems. While the 100 lb. bomb adapter would fit on the Mk 5 Mod 4 rocket launchers originally installed on the planes, it would not fit the Mk 5 Mod 4 rocket launchers carried as spares, thus appreciably limiting the loading flexibility of the planes with replaced rocket launchers. In addition, a high rate of breakage of rocket launcher latches as well as posts was experienced since 5 inch rather than 3 inch rockets were used. Spare latches were quickly consumed and before more could be obtained, it was necessary to remove latches from spare launchers in stock in order to maintain maximum striking power.

(2) GSK

(a) There were no critical shortages of material encountered in General Stores, Machinery, Ordnance, or Electronics Repair Parts. The problem of gaining access to storerooms due to damage control requirements while in the operating area was largely overcome by establishing scheduled hours for issue, where feasible, in the various sections of the ship. The annual inventory program for general stores and repair parts will be seriously hampered, however, while this vessel is at sea. It is planned to place additional emphasis on the taking of inventories during the in-port periods, and the greater percentage of all categories of material should be completed by the target date of 30 June 1952.

(3) Disbursing

(a) The operation of the disbursing office was temporarily curtailed by a casualty in which the disbursing officer was incapacitated by a broken toe. Fortunately, a well-qualified officer designated as a deputy to the disbursing officer was available to assume the disbursing functions. This incident pointed up the value of having a relief officer trained in all phases of disbursing and designated as a deputy.

3 March 1952

(b) \$275,000 in MPC were drawn as a 60 days supply for regular disbursements. The average Military Pay Roll was expected to be \$110,000. The February 1st pay roll totalled \$100,900 and the February 15th pay roll \$156,514. Through the sales of money orders and collections from the Ship's Stores approximately \$126,198 were returned from the pay roll disbursements.

(4) Commissary

(a) During the period of this report, reprovisioning was accomplished only once but very successfully. Sixty-four (64) tons of fresh and frozen provisions were received in sixty-five (6) minutes from the USS ALSTEDE (AF-48). No dry provisions were made available and none were required.

(b) During the reprovisioning, the Commissary Officer went aboard the reefer ship via high-line to make "on the spot" substitutions for NIS items requisitioned. This proved a worthwhile innovation as a number of substitutions were accomplished.

(c) New items available in the forward area are frozen grapes and melon balls, which add variety and color to the crew's menu. Fresh frozen vegetables and fruit remain scarce in the forward area, and it is felt that greater emphasis should be placed on having a larger stock of those items available for issue to the fleet. Fresh frozen fruits and vegetables will last indefinitely, take up less storage space and result in a considerable savings in the general mess, as compared to either fresh or canned vegetables and fruit.

(d) A considerable amount of fresh provisions received were ready for survey when received on board. Cabbage, eggs, celery, etc. were overage or unfit for use due to rough handling prior to receipt on board.

h. Gunnery

(1) The following AA practices were fired:

Z-5-G	25 January
Z-7-G	30 January and 21 February
Z-9-G	25 and 30 January

The above practices were fired with good results and no significant casualties. 116 rounds AAC MTF and 2060 rounds 40MM HET - HEIT were expended.

(2) The routine maintenance program was carried out although handicapped by personnel shortage and condition watches. There were 14 casualties to ordnance and fire control equipment. Repairs were made within 1 to 24 hours in all instances.

(3) Deck evolutions:

(a) A total of 18 destroyers were refueled and 12 were alongside for transfer of mail, personnel or freight.

(b) The ship fueled from AOs five times.

(c) The ship re-armed five times taking a total of 677 tons of ammunition.

(d) One replenishment was held. 63 tons of fresh provisions were brought aboard.

(e) There were no casualties to any equipment during the above operations.

SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy to: (Cont'd)

CTF 77 (2 advance)
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARDIV THREE
USS ESSEX (CV-9)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)
USS PRINCETON (CV-37)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
USS BOXER (CV-21)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 102
ATG 1
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (2)
COMFAIRJAP
COMSERVPAC
USS KEARSARGE (CV-33)

SECURITY INFORMATION

The choke was heated in the electrical insulation oven and the case refilled with asphalt-based tar. The choke was then mounted upside down to prevent the filler from running out the broken base, and all leads extended as necessary to connections on the top of the choke. Operation after repairs is good, although the noise figure is down somewhat. New components will be installed as soon as received.

(d) During the first few days of flight operations, VHF crosstalk seriously hampered the performance of CIC and Air Operations. In every instance, investigation disclosed that the crosstalk was due solely to RF energy feeding over from an adjacent antenna. Feedover occurred on adjacent frequencies, image frequencies, and even on frequencies that theoretically should not interact. However, disconnecting the antenna of the affected receiver cut crosstalk in each case, isolating the trouble to RF input at the antenna. By judicious selection of antennae and frequencies, this crosstalk was progressively reduced to an acceptable level in the latter part of the cruise. Investigation is continuing and the possibilities of band-pass and rejection filters is being studied.

j. Welfare and Recreation

(1) At Sea

(a) Recreational facilities at sea were limited by the nature of the operations. Motion pictures provided the main form of recreation. Movies were shown twice daily in six different locations. The movies were, in general, excellent. Record players for each living space have proved popular. Every Sunday evening a live show entitled "We the Peons Present" is conducted in the after messing compartment and broadcast throughout the ship. Divisional basketball games were played on the hangar deck when space was available.

(2) In Port

(a) The Recreational program at sea is continued when the ship is in port. More news papers are available. Divisional parties are being held ashore.

(b) Recommendation: More than one movie should be allowed a ship this size while in port. On one occasion rough water stopped liberty and boats, producing the situation wherein the movie operator was ashore getting movies and the entire crew was aboard with no liberty and no movies.


ALLEN SMITH, JR.

Copy to:
CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (5 advance)
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CINCPAC EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)