U. S. S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Care Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

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0103

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OCT 15 1950

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Chief of Naval Operations

Via :

(1) Commander Carrier Division CNE (2) Commander Carrier Division THREE

(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

(4) Commander Maval Forces Far Bast (5) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 4 August through 6 September 1950

(a) CHO res ltr Op-34aa serial 1197P34 of 3 August 1950 Rof:

Encl: (1) Track Chart for subject period ?

(2) Comments by CVG-11 on ordnance performance ("

(3) Comments on Intelligence personnel and material e. 14

(4) Supply Department Report (1)

(5) Damage Inflicted (146

1. This Action Report for the subject poriod is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

Part I - Composition of Own Forces and Mission

The FILLIPPINE SEA along with the VALLEY FORGE made up Task Group 77.4. This Task Group in company with other Task Groups of Task Force 77, departed Buckmer Bay, Okinawa on A August 1950 for Korean Waters. For the period 4 August through 23 August, the units operated under ConSEVELTHFlt Op Order 13-50 dated 3 August 1950, with ComCarDiv HREE as OTC; and from 24 August through September 1950, it operated under ComSEVERTERIX Op Order 14-50 dated 24 August 1950, with ComCarDivOIL as OTC. The mission was to conduct air operations against North Korean targets and render air support in order to support United Mations Forces in Korea.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events

- (a) Period 4 August to 14 August
 - (1) At 1721K, 4 August 1950, the PHELAPPINE SEA sortied from Buckner Bay, Okinawa. The remainder of this day and the first half of the following day were spent enroute to Korean Waters where strike operations were conducted against the North Koreans.

The initial operations by this force were to be conducted from the Heat Coast of Korea. Offensive air operations commenced at 1212K, 5 August with the launching of a strike group which had as its mission, the destruction of a railway bridge and two highway bridges near the town of IRI, Korea. The remainder of this day and the next two days were passed in striking bridges, warehouses, railwards and moving vehicles from 36°H to the front line positions, anchored near TAEGU, MASAH and PCHANG. Airfields were swept and attempts were made to provide close support. The close support missions were a failure due to overloaded communications circuits and inadequate planning for the use of naval aircraft. One pilot, EIS J.F. KAIL, 296819/1310, USH, was lost in a mid-air collision during this three day operation.

- (2) The 8th of August was spent in fueling. Combat operations were resumed on 9 August with strikes in the INCHON - SECUL area. At SECUL, anti-aircraft, moderate in intensity, was encountered for the first time. The next day, flight operations were conducted south of 370N. Again, attempts were made to provide close support for our ground forces. Only one division succeeded in establishing good communications with a controller. This division obtained good results. The 11th was spent in refueling; and strike operations began on the 12th with attacks on the marshalling yards in SEOUL. The jet planes were used to sweeping airfields and lines of communication. On 13 August aircraft from this vessel hit targets north of 380N for the first time. FYOHGYANG, CHINNAMPO, HAEJU and various towns in between were hit. In this day's work, transportation suffered greatly. Four locomotives were destroyed, two were probably destroyed and nine were damaged. This was not the sum total by any consideration but is used as an illustration of what was done to one component of the transportation system. On the 14th, the Task Force proceeded to and moored at Sasebo, Japan.
- (b) Period 15 August to 21 August
 - (1) Task Force 77 departed from Sasebo at 1742K, 15 August. This time the route taken was for the east coast of Korea. The next two days were spent off the east coast with operations the first day south of 38°N and the second day north of 38°N. In the south, bridges and supply dumps were hit; in the north, industrial targets, rail facilities and coastal shipping were attacked. The ship fueled again on 18 August and took station off the west

coast for operations on 19 August. For this day's operations, the most important target was the railroad bridge at SECUL. The bridge was knocked out but at a heavy price. GDR R.W. VOGEL, Commander Air Group RIEVEN was killed leading the attack. Again on the 20th, the scene of action moved to the north-west where rail facilities and warehouses were attacked from SIMANJU to PYCNGYANG to MADSCLG. The third pilot of the operation, ENS C.L. SHITH, USN, was lost this day. On the 21st, the Task Force again moored in SASEBO to replenish.

- (c) Period 22 August through 10 September
 - (1) Although the four day stay in SASEEC was supposed to be for upkeep and repair, most of the time was devoted to replanishment. On 23 August 1950, the Chief of Maval Operations. Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commander Haval Forces Far East and Commander SEVELTH Fleet came aboard this ship to make official calls. At 1315K, 25 August, the ship left SASEBO with Task Group Command (77.4) being shifted from ComCarDivWHREE to ComCarDivOld ombarked in this vessel. RADIC.C. MAN, ComCarDiv CIE, also became Commander Tash Force 77 in lieu of VADA A.D. STRUBIE, USH. August 26 and 27 were spent off the east coast of Morea conducting strikes and sweeps from 410H to the bombline near PONANG. Again air support was attempted but still remained ineffective due to the lack of adequate communications facilities and the absence of radio discipline. The Task Force fueled on 25 August and operated off the west coast of Hores on 29 August and 30 August. Dailroad bridges and airfields were the principal targets the first day. On the second day the water works in CHIRMAIPC and PYCHGYANG were attacked with bombs and then inflammable targets were hit with Mapalm. The last day of the month was passed in fueling.
 - (2) It was originally planned to spend the next 4 days attacking targets from MANSCHO to PYCHOYANG to SIMANJU to CHIMMANPO. After the second strike landed at 1101K, 1 September an emergency call was received from 5th Air Force Advanced Headquarters at PUSAN, requesting all available aircraft for close support. On the 1st, results were poor due to communication difficulties, but the second day was very successful. The success on the 2nd day was achieved through a liaison visit by CDR MEXICUTH CAG-11 to JCC PUSAN. The 3rd of September was fueling day, but the non-flying status was changed at 1646K with the launching of a close support group in answer to an emergency request from 5th

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Air Force Advanced Headquarters. This flight had good communications but their effectiveness was hampered by bad weather. The last day of combat operations for this period was 4 September when again our aircraft proceeded to the PYONDYANG - CHIMMAPO area. There were no combat operations on 5 September and the sixth again found the entire Task Force moored in SASEBO HARBOR. The ship was at Sasebo for the remainder of the reported period.

Part III - Crdnance Expenditures and Performance

- (a) Ferformance of ordnance material and equipment. See enclosure (2).
- (b) The following complete rounds were expended during subject period:

<u>BCLES</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
100# GP 250# GP 500# GP 1000# GP 2000# SAP 1000# SAP 1000# SAP 220# FTAG 260# STAG 250# ADD 100# Inc. Cluster	2/,3 1/,5 924 459 34 43 72 465 350 60 273	
<u>Rogenes</u>		
3.5" solid head with 3.25" motor 5.0" Mr 6 head with 5.0" motor (IMAN) 5.0" Mr 2 head with 5.0" motor	100 4,095 39	
Hapalm Type 1	975	lbs.
AIDOPAPT IMOHUE GUI		
20137 a/c	351,690	(ratio of 1-1-1)

Fart IV - Battle Damage

- (a) Ship None
- (b) Own Aircraft

	: 74U	: 40	: T9F	TOTAL	: F4U	aD.	: F9F :	TCTAL
Lest	: : 3	: : -	: 1 : : 1 :	4	: 1 :	:	: : : 2 : : :	3
Damaged	: : 5	: : 14 :	: 1 : 2 : :	21		_	: : : : : :	_
TOTAL	; 8	: 14	: 3	25	: 1	-	2 :	3

(c) Damaged inflicted on onerry. See enclosure (5).

Part V - Personnel performance and casualties

(a) Porformance

- (1) The health and performance of the crew has been excellent during this period. However, personnel, especially flight deck, hangar deck and gumery personnel have been required to spend 16 to 20 hours daily on the job and evidence of fatigue has been noticeable.
- (2) Certain shortages have existed and will continue to exist until the ship's increased personnel allowance is filled.
- (3) The shortage in ordnance rates for both the ship and squadron has been serious. It is felt that in particular, the allowance of ordnancemen for Va-115 is short by 20 rates.

(b) Casualties

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(1) The following personnel casualties were suffered during the period of this report:

(a) Combat Casualties

CDR Raymond W. VCCEL, 077151, USH, CAG-11 - Killed in action.
ENS Curtis L. SHITH, 480985, USH, VF-112 - Killed in action
ENS John F. KAIL, 496819, USH, VF-113 - Killed in action

(b) Operational Casualties

BAKER, Russell Arthur, 250 82 80, ARAH, USH - 1 September 1950. Killed when hit by a propeller of an aircraft while working on the flight deck.

GILERY, Charles Augustus, 992 82 42, AE3, USH - 30 August 1950. Compound comminuted fracture of the arm with extensive avulsion of the overlying skin and muscles when a 2011 cannon was accidently fired on the flight deck while unloading.

MINK, Marold Byrd, 361 26 35, AM, USH - 7 August 1950. Fractured lower leg when hit by the breech of a 201M cannon.

Part VI - Conclusions

(a) Operations

(1) The operations of the ship has been satisfactory; however there are certain matters regarding combat air operations which warrent study: ordnance selection, close support, and operational reports.

(a) Ordnance Selection

(1) Special care should be given to select the ordnance and fusing after the target has been selected. Similarly, in changing targets, consideration must be given to the

loading of the aircraft and the time required to effect the armment change. If the aircraft are not properly loaded for the new target, then they should be reloaded and/or refused, or the new target should be deleted. One case in point is the use of 500 lb. bombs against concrete bridges and SAP's against steel truss bridges. Both loadings have been used and found ineffective against these targets. Mothing is more disheartening to a pilot than to obtain a hit and do no damage.

(b) Close Support

- (1) This operation should prove the necessity for a standardized doctrine for providing close air support for ground forces. Until the following are adopted it is believed that the effectiveness of close support with the Army and Air Force will be limited:
 - (a) The adoption of a common grid system.
 - (b) The preparation and distribution of aeronautical charts scale 1:50,000, 1:250,000 with the above grid imprinted.
 - (c) The use of ten channel VIN for all air units and air controllers engaged in close support.
 - (d) The establishment of joint procedures for controlling adversit and for conducting close support.

(c) Reports

- (1) As the number of reports continues to increase, ship and squadron operating personnel become deeply involved in administrative matters, when the greater effort should be spent in the conduct of combat operations.
- (2) In some cases the same underial is submitted in two or three different reports. For example, the following reports are required; all of which furnish the same narrative information on Combat Air Operations:

(a) Dr ship

- (1) Flash Report after each event
- (2) Preliminary Action Report daily
- (3) Mar Diary
- (4) Part II of Action Report

(b) By squadron

- (1) Mar Diary
- (2) Air Attack Report

(b) Engineering

- (1) The nearly continuous operations with the high and varying speeds required for jet operations, demanded a high performance from engineering personnel and machinery. Full boiler power was required for a large part of the time, preventing underway maintenance. The brickwork was renewed in the decks of four boilers, four plastic fronts were renewed, and considerable patchwork was performed on all boilers, either during, or immediately following the operations. Performance of men and machinery was generally excellent.
- (c) Supply
 - (1) See enclosure (4)
- (d) Intelligence personnel and material
 - (1) See enclosure (3)

Part VII - Recommendations

- (a) Operations
 - (1) All commands engaged in planning air operations select targets before determining ordnance loading and fusing.
 - (2) Close air support procedures and doctrines be standardized for all three services.
 - (3) The entire present system of combat reports be reviewed, the number of reports reduced, and as an interim measure that the following action be taken:
 - (a) Cancel requirements for Mar Diary submittal by shipboard carrier squadrons.
 - (b) Cancel requirement for Freliminary Action Report.
 - (4) An allowance of intelligence material be established and filled prior to the departure of ships for the Western Facific. Enclosure (3) includes a recommended allowance for both material and personnel.

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- (5) Enlisted personnel be trained as intelligence clerks and intelligence specialists.
- (b) Personnel
 - (1) Full wartime allowance be provided.
- (c) Engineering
 - (1) Uplicep period be at least four full days in order that machinery can cool down sufficiently for inspection and maintenance work.

W.K. GOODLEY

Copy to: CHC (Advanced) CinCPacFlt (Advanced) ComAirPac Valley Forge Boxer Leyto



COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ORDNANCE PERFORMANCE


CVG-11

- 1. VA-115 squadron is seriously short-handed in ordnancemen. Recommend additional ordnancemen on allowance. Present occupational needs are 20 ordnancemen.
- 2. Loading AD with wings folded (wing racks rockets or bombs) is very difficult, especially at night. In loading 8 rockets, it takes as long to lay two on the wing rack as it does to put the first one on the inboard racks. No method has been devised to load 220 or 260 pound bombs on the wing racks with wings folded. The aircraft must be moved and wings spread which delays arming quite seriously.
- 3. 260 pound bombs have been carried on the 6 inboard stations. 220 pound bombs have been carried on all stations but it seems undesirable to carry this weight on the four outer stations.
- 4. Trouble was experienced in loading the 100: pound incendary cluster, AN MK12, due to suspension lugs. Lugs needed adapters. These clusters should also be redesigned for better drag characteristics if they are to be externally mounted.

VF-114

- 1. Use of napalm assigned in area of heavy anti-aircraft is deemed useless and ill advised.
- 2. 1000 pound bombs G.P. should be loaded on F4U rather than 500's. 500's are not effective on bridges.
- 3. Frag bombs should be used exclusively for anti-personnel work.
- 4. Use of the HVAR has been extensive and is considered as one of the best weapons for targets of opportunity. Excellent for vehicles, trains and tanks (ability to knock out any type tank encountered to date).





5. The 20MM cannon has improved in effectiveness due to the added experience of personnel in maintaining this weapon. Gun failures in flight have decreased from 30% to 15% since combat began. It is folt that it would be a mistake to bring back the .50 caliber.


VF-113

- 1. Load communication interdiction flights with 8 HVAR's not 4.
- 2. Use MK 12 tanks for napalm rather than water fillables. Their damage is greater and trajectory more true.
- 3. Install a metal flange inside the 20MM ammunition cans at the top exit side to prevent more than one round being fed out of the can at one time. This has been the cause of many belt breakages.
- 4. Load F4U's with wings spread, when possible, to prevent ammunition belt tang-
- 5. Rig ladders to fit into ejection chutes so that rockets can be more easily mounted with wings folded.
- 6. Alert ship's ordnance crews in time to assure that all bombs and rockets are available and loaded on each flight.
- 7. Insure an ample supply of MK 55 bomb racks, MK 51 bomb racks, and MK 9 rocket launchers on board ship as replacements for each station on each aircraft.
- 8. Smoke rockets are not considered satisfactory loading. HVAR are just as good for marking and do more damage.
- 9. Investigate cause of rocket firing damage to MK 9 Mod 3 launchers. 225 launchers were damaged in last 2 months (This separate speedletter to ComAirPac).
- 10. Use frag bembs when troops are encountered.
- 11. Always sond aircraft off with maximum load possible.
- 12. The performance of the 20MM cannon is rapidly surpassing the .50 calibor as personnel become more experienced in 20MM upkeep. The gun throws a greater ENCLOSURE (2)

weight/sec and its type of ammunition is vastly superior to .50 caliber types.

13. An additional safety precaution on reloading the M-3 20MM gum with T-9

(Kidde Co.) or Aero-6A type charges is to insure that bolts are actually home before winding in a new belt. A noise check or hydraulic piston check when easing belts home is not sufficient. The ordinancemen must make a visual check of the bolt by looking up the ejection chutes on the underside of the wing.



INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND NATERIAL

1. The intelligence section aboard ship was rapidly expanded to meet the nood of combat operations. Although the ship's allowance called for one ENS ACI Officer, or LCDR and 2 LTJG's were assigned duties as Air Intelligence Officers. The ACI Office was used as the Operations Office aboard the PHILIFPINE SEA and the files were main! for East Coast and Mediterranean work. The lack of enlisted personnel trained as intelligence specialists or trained as intelligence clerks has resulted in a loss in efficiency.

2. Personnel

No attempt will be made to determine the duties of the various individuals in the intelligence section. Based on the thirty five days of operations, it appears that the following constitutes a desirable personnel allowance:

- (a) For Ship
 - (1) 1 LT Air Intelligence Officer
 - (2) 1 LTJG Reports and Statistics Officer
 - (3) 2 Photo Interpreters (1 Officer and 1 enlisted)
 - (4) 1 Yooman
 - (5) 1 Draftsman Quartermaster
- (b) Intelligence personnel for squadron
 - (1) 1 LTJG Air Intelligence Officer

3. Material

- (a) Suggested Intelligence Material for ship coming to this area:
 - (1) WAC = 1:1,000,000 (150 copies each)
 289, 290, 380, 381, 386, 387, 492, 498, 499, 613, 614,
 615, 616, 617, 618, 837, 738, 739, 740.
 - (2) USAF Approach Charts 1:500,000 (150 copies each) A, B, C, and D of above series.
- ENCLOSURE (3)

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- (3) WAC 1:1,000,000 (10 copies each)
 281, 282, 291, 292, 378, 388, 389, 491, 500,
 620, 734, 735, 741, 742, 799, 859, 860,
- (4) 10 copies USAF Pilot's Handbook Far East.
- (5) USN V-30 Series
 - (a) 17 (25 copies)
 - (b) 28 (25 copies)
 - (c) 8, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 55, 56, 57, 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, (4 copies each)
- (b) Targot dossiers with appropriate illustrations
 - (1) 2 Copies each
 290, 291, 380, 386, 387, 492, 498, 499, 613, 614, 615, 616, 618,
- (c) Blood Chits, Cloth Survival Charts, Pointic Talkies (Korean and Chinese).
 (150 copies each)
- (d) City Plan Maps on: (50 copies each).
 - (1) All Koroan cities available
 - (2) Chinese cities within 300 miles of the coast.
- (e) Map Pins: Four boxes all colors available.
- (f) Tracing Paper
 2 36* rolls
- (g) Cellulose Acetate
 2 36* rells
- (h) 75 reams of "Manifold White" paper
- (i) 4 sheets of 1/8" x 36" ploxiglass
- (j) Three hand stereoscopes
- (k) Two complete PI Kits.
 ENCLOSURE (3)


- (1) Mounting boards should be placed completely around ACI Office except where file cabinets or safes are located.
- (m) Storeroom should be completely fitted with shelves for stowing charts and target illustrations.
- (n) Ships allowance for slide projectors and baloptican is adequate.
- (o) Slides are no up-to-date in all cases. Additional recognition slides should be manufactured. This ships photo lab has made some slides.
- (p) Material listed ComAirPac Air Intelligence Manual should also be procured
- (q) Two rells each of colored rubber tape (all colors available) should be procured.
- (r) Colored pencils (grease) are available in GSK. All colors are required.
- (s) Forms
 - (1) Air Attack Report
 20 pads (100 cach)
 - (2) Vulnorability
 3 pads (100 each)
 - (3) Aircraft and Grow Survival3 pads (100 each)
 - (4) Aircraraft Mission Log6 pads (100 each)
 - (5) Aircraft Availability Report2 Pads (100 each)

We are printing the above forms for forwarding after they have been filled out.

4. Although intelligence material and information were received, there appeared to be duplication of effort with the resulting emission of certain important phases. It is felt that closer limison should be maintained between our carriers, ComNavFE and 5th Air Force. Through very close limison and the assignment of an intelligence expeditor, all interested units could be kept informed on the requirements and availability of intelligence from other sources.

5. Appexdix I and Appendix II to this enclosure are briefing and debriofing forms respectively which has been found useful on this vessel and are submitted for information only.





Outlined below, by components, is the overall Supply Department operation during the period 4 August through 6 September 1950. With but a few exceptions, the supply picture has remained in clear focus despite extreme forward area conditions. Credit deservedly goes to our mobile logistic forces, without which we could not operate.

Primarily, difficulties oncountered occurred in the aviation stores section -because of the varied nature of the material itself and the excessive and continue
combat conditions that aircraft were forced to undergo. These are enumerated
below. Minor shipboard and local replenishment problems also arose -- they were
expected, endured, and, it is hoped, overcome.

With a basic 120 day supply of dry provisions, 90 days frozon, 40 days frosh, 180 day essential GSK items and an almost complete 180 day section "BAKER" allowance, the ship arrived in the forward area "logistically ready" for the task that eventually was assigned it. For this, the supplying activities on the West Coast, notably NAS and NSD San Diego and the Naval Supply Center, Poarl Harbor should assuredly be given praise for such an all out as well as all-night spirit of co-operation in supplying the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for literally whatever was asked.

1. Commissary Section

(a) Logistic support excellent. "Get it when you can, where you can" is
the only sensible thumb rule to follow. Always the quantity and quality
was available for replenishment periods. Fresh products were the except
ion to the rule, being rationed equitably throughout the fleet. No
exceptional difficulty in keep under ration allowance. However, avitaion maintenance work, respotting aircraft and rearming of aircraft generally were conducted at night. Hot meals had to be provided and were

served to crew members performing these tasks. In effect, during periods of operation, this amounted to about 3.5 feedings every 24 hours. If operation periods at sea increase in duration, this could seriously effect present ration allowance

2. General Stores Material

- (a) Logistic support good. The basic 180 day stateside load of considered essential items has cuased little or no concern. Isolated engineering or electronic spare parts failures in excess of expectant life has resulted in Priority ABLE or BAKER requests to CONLUS. Due to the understandable necessity for watertight integrity while operating in the forward area, the problem of issuing material from storerooms at or below the waterline must be met with tact and logic. Each individual has his own definete regard for the dispatch with which his particular request should be handled. When damage control regulations prevent such issues, the only recourse is more tact. Emergency items are issued without delay.
- (b) Stereroom ventilating conditions especially during the period of this report were at best, very poor. Storeroom operators, as well as the galley crew, should be encouraged to spend some time each day topside.

3. Ship's Store Stock

(a) Logistic support fair. Standard items (toiletries, soap powder, cigarettes, cigars, candy) in good supply. Luxury items (watches, jewelry, etc.) should be obtained prior to departure from the states. It is recommended that Supply Officers of ship departed CONLUS, obtain authority from commanding officers to at least triple normal Ship's Store stock. Cost of operations items (bleach, soap sour, press padding and covering) has been difficult to obtain in this area and should

therefore be heavily stocked in advance of reporting.

(b) For laundry personnel, three shifts of eight hours each is considered desirable. This has not been accomplished. With a foresceable increase in complement it is hoped that such a work shift in the laundry will be inaugurated.

4. Clothing and Small Stores

(a) Logistic support good. Due to the extreme tropical operating conditions items such as dungarous, white socks, drawers and shirts were temporarily rationed. However, the last replenishment period afforded opportunity to heavily re-stock these items and all rationing controls have been presently suspended. With the addition of brown shoes, a bulky C&SS ite storage space was drastically reduced. The tailor issue room B-425-AL afforded additional storage space and has been unilized in that capacity It is strongly recommended that items mentioned above and khaki trousers and shirts be heavily loaded with at least six menth stock whenever possible.

5. Aviation

(a) The ship left San Diego on 5 July 1950 with the following aircraft with approximately 180 days Section "BAKER" spare parts on board:

Plane Types	Percentange of Spares on Board
32 F9F	84%
28 F4U-4B	95%
16 AD-4	90%
4 F4U-5N	92%
4 AD-4N	90%
2 F4U-4P	
•	95%

Plane Types

Percentage of Spares on Board

4 AD-3W

70%

1 H03S


DE%

4 AD-4Q

90%

95 Total aircraft to support

- (b) The ship operated approximately 8 days for qualifications off Pearl
 Harbor and approximately 45 days combat operations during which time
 27% overall spares have been consumed 5% of which were issued during
 qualifications period off Pearl Harbor prior to 1 August 1950.
- (c) Replacements of Section "ABLE" and "BAKER" have been taking approximately 30 days via air trusportation direct from date of requisitions, surface transportation approximately 45 days. Considering present conditions, replenishment has been satisfactory. Strengly recommend air Parcel Post service for small items of a priority A or B nature.
- (d) During the period of combat operations there have been about 10 technical ACG's but none actual. ACG's have been nil due to lack of spares, although some of the spares which were not available we re replaced from dud aircraft through unauthorized but necessary cannibalization.
- (e) The shortage of spare parts has been due to high usage over the section "BAKER" allowance. This data has been submitted to ComFairJap representatives and a separate report is being forwarded to ComMirPac.
- (f) Hangar dock, catapult and arresting goar spares have been sufficient with the exception of "L" stands to build up engines as required. These are on order.
- (g) Co-operation with the Air Squadrons has been satisfactory. Aviation Supply has 13 mon who are attached to ship's company, and 6 squadron men on TAD. Aviation Supply issues are made on a 24 hour a day basis (COURT (4))



with approximately 150 issues per day out of various storerooms throughout the ship. Under present conditions, it is only permitted to open three spaces in one area on the ship at one time. It is therefore very difficult to furnish spares to keep the air group with 100% availability. This fact should be given wide dissemination - for misunderstanding of watertight integrity regulations could cause local friction between issuing and receiving parties concerned.

(h) Disposal of prospective class 265 mate ial FFT to nearest activity could create a major problem because of space limitation if periods at sea were of a longer duration. Fortunately, this has not been the case so far. Large bulky items (props, wheel assembly, etc.) have been pallatized, strapped, and properly maked for off-leading. These then can be crated at shore facilities. Small items should be packaged aboard ship prior to off-leading.

6. Allotments

- (a) The NSA and APA Allotments are definitely inadequate for ships operating under the Far East Command.
- (b) During the First Quarter 1950, the NSL expenditures for this veszel averaged \$1000.00 daily. However, these average expenditures included the (above normal) expenditures incurred prior to leaving the U.S. for the combat zone.
- (c) Taking this fact into consideration, the average expenditures for the following quarter should be slightly loss.
- (d) The average APA expenditure totaled #350.00 daily. The APA allotment was primarily used for the requisitioning of spare parts prior to leaving the U.S. for the combat zone, and should also average slightly loss in the following quarters.



7. Disbursing

- (a) Before leaving the states, the Disbursing Officer drew \$1,000,000,000 in U.S. currency. Pay days vary from \$90,000,00 on the 15th to \$150,000.00 on the 30th. About 90% of this money is returned to the Disbursing Office through the Ship's Stores, Money Orders and sale of Yen. Actually, there is about \$700,000.00 in treasury packages that are still unbroken.
- (b) In Japan, Military Payment Certificates and Jananese You are the only forms of currency allowed ashore. In Okinawa, Military Payment Certificates are used. Both Military Payment Certificates and Yen are obtained by transfer of funds. The Disbursing Officer ashore will not accept U.S. currency in exchange for these moneys as he lacks storage space in his safes. Military Paymont Cortificates are on a par with U.S. currency; Jananese Yen are on a ratio of 360/1. In Japan, while in port, the Disbursing Officer sold \$50,000.00 worth of You in a total of 12 days The first few days in port the daily requirement is \$7,000.00 per day in Yen. The demand tapers off towards the end of an in-ort period. As Yon is very bulky, storage is a problem as excess U.S. currency takes up most of the space in the Disbursing Officer's safes, Yom comes in packages of one thousand bills totalling 1,000,000.00 Yen in 1,000 Yen notes and 100,000.00 Yen in 100 Yen notes. Exchange lines are a problem because of the odd value of these notes (1,000 Yen equal \$2,777 and 100 You equal .277). The best system is the bundle Yen in value of \$5.00 (1800 Yon), \$10.00 (3.600 Yon), \$15.00 (5.400 Yon), \$20.00 (7.200 Yon), and \$25.00 (9.000 Yan). This expedites sale of Yon and climinates most of the change problems. Yen may be returned ashore as a Transfer of Funds, but must be in new bills and consecutive serial numbers. Disbursing Officers are not allowed to purchase Yen from personnel for U.S.



chrrency or Military Paymont Cortificates.

- (c) U.S. change is also a peoblem. The Dashwoing Officer left the U.S. with \$1,600.00 worth of enange and latter purchased \$1,600.00 more from the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). Following amounts are recommended: \$1,000.00 in 50¢, \$1,000.00 in 25¢, \$1,000.00 in 10¢, \$500.00 in 5¢, and \$200.00 in 1¢. While this change is not spent ashere, it is needed for operation of Ship's Stores, Post Office and exchange lines. Most of the change remains in the custody of individuals.
- (d) So far there has been no difficulty with allotments being returned because of late submissions. As the mail is slow in reaching the U.S., all allotments are in the mail by the 13th and forwarded by air mail. However, to be safe it is strongly recommended to register as many allotments as possible in the U.S. and before leaving Pearl Harbor.
- (c) Treasury Form 6599 and Treasury Form 1231 had to be procured from shore activities. The Disbursing Officer had 600 checks on hand and requested 1000 more. So far, he averages about 75 check a pay day, but the number is increasing every pay day. It is recommended that Disbursing Officer stock up on Money Orders. Before the new allotments took effect the Pos Office sold \$55,000.00 worth of money orders in one day. There should be at least an initial stock of 40 books; more can be obtained by mail as the demand necessitates. The largest sale of stamps has been in \$1.00, 25¢, 20¢, and 6¢ air nail. Denomination of 1¢, 2¢ and 3¢ are selden used, but a small amount is required. The following amounts show be on hand:

.01 \$ 50.00

.02 100.00

.03 600.00

ENCLOSURE (4)

Down San Earline


•04`	\$100.00
•05	100,00
•10	300,00
•20	500,00
•25	2000,00
•50	1000,00
1.00	1000.00
•06	4200,00 Airmail

This approximates the \$10,000.00 stock allowance. Actually, in this area, more air mail and .25 stamps, are required than stock limits permit.



D. NAGE INFLICTED

TARGET	iesekov ed	professia Digungw ed	DAMAGED
Anti-Aircraft Positions	3	. 3	11
aircraft	1	. 1	2
AK or AO			1
armorod car	1		
Bargos			,
Bridges	6	<i>(*,</i> 7	25
Busas	1	1	
Carts	2	3	20
Chemical Plant			1 ·
Command Cars		2	
Corvettes	1		. 2
DE	1		
Factorics			15
Hangar (aircraft)	1	1	2
Hoadquarters Building		1	
Iron Works			2
Joeps		4	9
Junks	7	5	27
Locomotivos	23	6	30
Motorcyclos	2		
Oil Tanks - Oil Storage	3		
P.C. Type			3
Power Boats	19	3	26
ENCLOSURE (5)			



Damago Inflicted: (Contid)

0.1001000	neemd aven	PROBABLY Programme	D amag e D
CARGET	DESTROYED	Deri icked	
Power Plant	1		2
1.R. Cars (Box)	64	15	129
R.R. Cars (Flat)			4
R.R. Cars (Passenger)		2	8
R.R. Cars (Tank)	4		12
RIKEN MET IL WORKS			1
Sanpans	4		49
Supply Dumps	6		. 5
Tanks	11	3	19
Transformers	3	J.	6
Troops		(Undetosiinca)	
Troop Bivouses			25
Trucks	55	15	73
Tug Boat	1		·
Tunnels			2
Vehicles (Type unknown)	6	9	2
Viaduct			1
Warehouses	49	37	127
Water Works		1	2
Switch Engines			2
Village		ı	1
Water Tank			1
Barracks			4
Fishing Boats		2	. 8
Refts ENCLOSURE (5)		['] 2	6