

3. Material.

a. There is need for better insurance that procurement of the proper types and quantities of photo interpretation equipment and supplies of photo interpretation equipment and supplies required for operations in the combat zone is effected by LANTFLT carriers prior to their departure from CONUS.

(1) It was the experience of the LAKE CHAMPLAIN that sufficiently detailed information concerning combat photo interpretation requirements was not available in time to initiate and complete procurement of necessary material. Estimated requirements were derived from review of action reports, conferences with personnel at the Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, D. C. and Air Intelligence personnel at COMAIRLANT, and evaluation of available photographic and air intelligence materials for probable application in photo interpretation work.

(2) To preclude recurrence of such a situation, it is recommended that the following action be taken in regard to LANTFLT carriers scheduled for deployment to WESTPAC:

(a) Earliest possible distribution of information on material requirements such as COMAIRPAC INSTRUCTIONS 03840.1B and 05601.1A be made to the ship.

(b) The photo interpretation officer(s) to be assigned to the ship either be fully briefed on the material and operational field requirements or have had an indoctrination period aboard a carrier on the line. The officer(s) should report aboard as much as possible in advance of the ship's departure in order that adequate supervision of the outfitting and organization of photo interpretation can be effected.

4. Personnel.

a. At present, the only qualified photo interpretation personnel aboard are two officers; one attached to the ship and one attached to the photographic squadron detachment. The potential (and probable) interpretation workload incident to maximum aerial reconnaissance for extended periods require at least two additional enlisted photo readers. It is noted that this requirement is consistent with the experience of other carriers on the line. A specific request for such additional personnel will be the subject of separate correspondence. In order that such shortages of personnel can be readily filled, it is recommended that either:

(1) Command maintain a pool of qualified enlisted photo interpreters to be available for TAD assignment to carriers as required.

(2) Detachments from photo squadrons include two officers and two enlisted personnel for photo interpretation work.

b. The practice of having photo interpretation personnel undergo a period of indoctrination in the field prior to reporting aboard for duty is considered excellent. The availability of one officer so trained was of material benefit in enabling the LAKE CHAMPLAIN to meet its photo interpretation requirements without delay upon arriving on the line.

AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Organization.

a. The intelligence organization consists of the Air Intelligence Officer, Assistant Air Intelligence Officer, the CVG Air Intelligence Officer, and the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers. The first three mentioned are located in the ship's Air Intelligence Office; each is familiar with every phase of ship-level activity. The complement of the ship's office also includes three enlisted men.

b. Responsibility for reports is divided among the officers on the basis of ease of obtaining information. The first duty of the ship's AIO is coordination.

2. Operations.

a. Because of involved mail delivery schedules caused by the long voyage to Japan, intelligence materials on order long before our departure, arrived haphazardly and incompletely along the way.

b. Due to the quick turnaround before departing for Korean waters, insufficient time was available for briefing and for procurement of all the proper intelligence materials.

c. During the period of this report the AI Office has functioned on a 24-hour basis. Current intelligence is posted in the office each day for briefing purposes.

d. The generous cooperation of the Staff intelligence officers has been a valuable contribution to the smoothness of daily operations.

a. Due to limited space for stowage of air intelligence materials, it is recommended that only short-term needs be filed in the office, replenishment being made from storage.

b. Stowage for the vast quantities of classified matter such as target dossiers and air objective folders presents a difficult problem not yet entirely solved.

4. Charts.

a. Each pilot was issued AF1:1,000,000 charts covering Korea and AF1:250,000 charts for the area north of the 36th parallel. AMS L552 1:250,000 charts have been popular and have been issued upon request. AMS L751 1:50,000 charts are issued for strike, close air support, and naval gunfire spot targets; these charts are collected again after each mission.

5. Escape and Evasion.

a. Commander Naval Forces Far East made an officer available to the LAKE CHAMPLAIN for planning and a brief lecture on escape and evasion. The lecture presented was of definite value.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

AVIATION STORES

1. During the operating period 11 June through 25 June 1953 requests for 1137 line items were processed. A total of 1090 line items were issued from stock, 27 items were NIS and 20 items requested were not included in the allowance lists. The total value of material issued was \$190,895.00.
2. A total of 10 J34-WE-34 engines were issued. Class C maintenance was completed on 3 and returned to RFI stock, 3 are now in process and 4 were preserved for transfer to overhaul. No R-3350 or R-2800 engines were issued.
3. No aircraft have missed scheduled operations due to lack of spare parts; one F3D was temporarily grounded for an AN-925-SD cross fitting (not included in Section A or B allowance). Temporary repairs were completed by use of a combination of two tee fittings; the required cross fitting was obtained later from the U.S.S. BOXER. The HO3S was temporarily grounded for a generator housing assembly, R82SKY-S10-35-1003-3. This item was requested during the 200 hour check on the ship's helicopter and at the time

the fleet spare was aboard so that no interruption of operations occurred. This item was obtained from the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA.

4. An unexpected number of F2H2 tip tanks was issued during this period. A stock of 34 tanks was on hand at the time of deployment from Norfolk and 6 tanks were salvaged from 3 dud aircraft. Five tanks were used while in transit to the Western Pacific and 33 were used between 11 June and 25 June. ✓

a. The air group has instituted an inspection and check procedure which should materially reduce the necessity of jettisoning these tanks due to the inability of one or both of them to transfer or jettison fuel after the aircraft becomes airborne.

GENERAL STORES

1. The first tour on the line began after having received replenishment from ComServRon 3 vessels, 9-11 June 1953, during a 38 hour period at Yokosuka, Japan. This was the first replenishment received since 10-12 April 1953 at Norfolk Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia.

2. Requisitions for general stores, ships spares and electronic spares were processed by ServRon 3 vessels at Yokosuka as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>REQNS</u>	<u>LINE ITEMS REQUESTED</u>	<u>FURNISHED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
USS POLLUX (AKS4)	69	453	251	55
USS CHIMON (AKS31)	41	75	12	16
USS PROTON (AKS28)	35	393	257	65

3. It was discovered that the following items, not carried in stock by CVA39, were in short supply in operating area but were requisitioned from ComServRon 3.

G53-P-12975	Duplicating Paper, white
G53-P-12983-25	Duplicating Paper, yellow
G53-P-12973-975	Duplicating Paper, pink
G51-D-437	Duplicating Ink Fluid

SHIP'S STORE AND CLOTHING AND SMALL STORES

1. Ship's store stock was purposely raised to peak level upon departure from Norfolk and was well balanced. Emphasis was also placed upon a well-rounded stock of luxury items which constituted a high percentage of sales.

Replenishment at Yokosuka was completed at 2100 hours. No provisions of any consequence in ship store stock has been expended.

2. Clothing and small store stock was loaded on board to maximum capacity prior to departure from Norfolk. The sale of white uniforms and towels was much greater than anticipated and was attributed to the long period of extremely hot weather. The percentage of requisitions filled at Yokosuka was 75% with small sizes of shorts and various sizes of shoes constituting the greater shortage.

COMMISSARY

1. On 17 June 1953 the LAKE CHAMPLAIN went alongside the USS PICTOR (AF54) 2035 for replenishment of fresh, frozen and dry provisions. The first load arrived on deck at 2050 and the last load arrived at 2125. The amount of provisions received was 54 s/tons, at a transfer rate of 60 tons per hour. The percentage of requisitions filled was 83%. The following items were not available at this replenishment:

Frozen eggs
Sweet potatoes, fresh
Pears
Swiss Cheese
Whole wheat flour
Plantain
Cinnamon
Split peas, dry
Barley

2. In anticipation of the long hours necessary to maintain a constant state of readiness on the line, an instruction for administering night rations was promulgated which provides for nightly servings of three types.

a. Night Rations. Consisting of sandwiches and coffee served from 2230 to 2400 for mid-watch standers, special crews, late or night workers. (Average number served per night - 450).

b. Special Meals. Consisting of a full or limited menu as circumstances permit served when directed by the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer to personnel involved in all night operations or all night details. (Average number served per night - 320).

c. Special Rations. Consisting of hot soup and crackers, hot cocoa or hot coffee served to personnel exposed to inclement weather. (Weather conditions were not such as to require use of this type rations). Actual operation has demonstrated that the rations are entirely adequate and that control has been satisfactorily administered.

1. Fires.

a. A Class "B" fire occurred in aircraft on the flight deck on 13 June 1953. High Capacity Fog Foam Stations were manned at the time the fire occurred. A total of 535 gallons of liquid foam was expended. The ship's structure was not damaged. The foam generating system functioned very well, producing a large volume of foam of excellent quality.

2. Cargo Winches.

a. Numerous minor casualties occurred to the transfer at sea cargo winches. As usual such failures occurred during a period of heavy use. The major cause of trouble was generally caused by splitting of small rigid standard pipe connections in the hydraulic system. Replacement, where possible, has been made by installing flexible copper tubing which has apparently corrected some of the trouble. A separate letter report, (CO LAKE CHAMPLAIN ltr ser 1371 dtd 23 June 1953 to Chief, BuShips) has been made on the performance of these winches.

3. High Pressure Air Compressors.

a. Some difficulty has been experienced with H.P. Air Compressors due to excessive use of the equipment caused by the heavy demand for air in catapult and O₂-N₂ plant operation. Present approved plans for the installation of additional air compressors will correct this difficulty.

4. Bomb Elevators.

a. A source of minor difficulty occurred in the operation of the bomb elevators. The trouble consisted mainly of overtravel of the cars. This difficulty, when traced, revealed that improper installation of UR relay caused excessive burning and pitting of electrical contacts. Proper re-installation of the relays and more frequent tests and inspections have corrected this difficulty.

5. Jet Starting System.

a. The following difficulties were encountered with the jet starting system:

- (1) Short circuits in the portable cables resulting from:

(a) Cable stowage racks in exposed locations and plug ends open to weather: Recommend fabrication of suitable covers for cables and plugs to eliminate this situation.

(b) Cables left lying on wet decks, especially in vicinity of catapult launching area when steel protection plates are being cooled by fire hoses. It is considered that this difficulty can be remedied by more thorough indoctrination of the personnel concerned and close supervision.

(2) Two cases of damage to airplanes due to applying reverse polarity to the airplane's wiring system caused by the connector plugs being so constructed that it is possible to insert the plug in a reverse position. It is recommended that these plugs be redesigned so as to allow insertion in only one position. As a temporary measure, satisfactory only in day light, the plugs have been painted a distinctive color on one side and a matching stripe painted on each of the installed connection boxes. It is also recommended that the redesigned connector plug be made replaceable as it is now evident that the plugs will become unusable from use long before the remainder of the portable cable.

6. Steering Gear. One steering casualty occurred to the steering unit while fueling. The helmsman reported he could over-apply left rudder and could not apply right. Units were shifted and starboard control unit was disassembled and inspected. No apparent reason for failure of the unit was discovered. Unit was re-assembled, tested and found to operate within manufacturer's specifications. It is noted that the control piston guide bushing was not loose and there was no indication that it had moved. It was pressed out and cut off sufficiently to permit peening over of the edges of the hole in the housing only as a preventative measure to preclude the possibility of future trouble being caused by its working loose.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. General Health.

a. During the period covered by this report, the general health and morale of the command have been very good. The incidence of Urethritis, Acute, Non-Gonococic has been high, the result of mechanically unprotected exposures in Manila and Yokosuka. In nearly every case, oral penicillin was taken. Otherwise there has been no unusual incidence of disease.

2. Statistical Summary.

Admissions to sick list.....76
(Includes 26 admitted for record only)

Percentage sick days (out of total man days for period).....0.36%

Admissions by classes

Venereal Disease	
Urethritis Acute, due to Gonorrhea.....	5
Syphilis.....	0
Chancroid.....	7
Urethritis Acute, Non-Gonococcic.....	25
Infections, Digestive Tract.....	2
Infections, Respiratory Tract.....	15
Other Infectious Diseases.....	3
Diseases, Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat.....	1
Other Diseases, Respiratory Tract.....	1
Diseases, Circulatory System.....	0
Diseases, Digestive System.....	5
Diseases, Genito-Urinary System.....	3
Mental or Personality Disorders.....	0
Injuries, non-battle, aircraft.....	0
Injuries, non-battle, other.....	8
Injuries, battle aircraft.....	1
Injuries, battle other.....	0

Total Sick Call visits.....	1057
Patients received from other ships.....	1
Patients transferred to hospital.....	0
Deaths due to injury.....	2
Deaths due to disease.....	0
Missing in action.....	0

Killed in action.....	1
Wounded in action.....	0
Surgical Procedures, Major.....	3
Surgical procedures, Minor.....	12
Plane lost, enemy action, pilot killed.....	1
Plane lost, enemy action, pilot missing.....	0
Plane lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, major injuries.....	0
Plane lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, minor injuries.....	0
Plane lost, operational, pilot killed.....	0
Plane lost, operational, pilot recovered, major injuries.....	0
Plane lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries.....	1
Plane lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured.....	0
Plane damaged, enemy action, pilot injured.....	0
Planes damaged, enemy action, crewman injured.....	0
Pilots temporarily grounded, medical reasons.....	1
Pilots grounded, pending BuMed action.....	0
Crewman grounded, medical reasons.....	1
Average number days, pilots grounded.....	2

3. Supplies and Equipment.

a. Stock levels of supplies and equipment were brought up to stock-age objective plus order and shipping time prior to departure from the continental United States. Supplies have been adequate in quantity and variety. The only problem in supply has arisen from the fact that squadrons are not being adequately provided with first aid kits and survival equipment prior to departure. It is recommended that squadrons be issued sufficient First Aid Kits, Aviator, Camouflaged, Stock No. 9-197-675 and PSK 1 Survival Kits for all flight personnel prior to departure from the continental limits of the United States.

1. During the period of this report the Air Department rapidly to meet the problem of handling an around-the-clock work load, and in systemizing launch, recovery, respot, refuel and rearm evolutions with the 90 minute cycle.

2. At the end of flight operations the first day on the line one F2H-2 discharged 3 or 4 rounds of 20MM ammunition into two F2H-2's parked ahead of it, which set off a fire on the flight deck. 2 F2H-2's sustained major damage as a result of the fire. Details of this incident have been covered by a Board of Investigation.

3. At about 0300 on 19 June an F3D was spotted to launch from the starboard catapult. By reason of material failure the bridle disengaged resulting in a runaway shot. The starboard catapult was immobilized by distortion of the retracting cylinder. There was no damage to the aircraft or injuries to personnel.

4. At about 0245 on 25 June an AD4N was catapulted from the port catapult and a runaway shot ensued immobilizing the port catapult. Damage to catapult centered in equalizer and cables. Aircraft crashed, pilot and crew were recovered by USS MOALE (DD 693) in 14 minutes.

5. In both cases wherein a runaway shot occurred, the bridle hookup had been personally checked by the catapult officer. In both cases the hold back ring or bar was broken and the bridle, after runaway shot, appeared to be normal in all respects. NAMC has been directed to investigate the matter to determine the cause of malfunctions.

6. At about 0530 on 15 June an F3D landed fast and two-blocked number 3 arresting gear engine. Number 4 and 6 wires were inoperative for about 48 hours while ship's force effected repairs.

7. After the second catapult casualty involving the F3D-2, the VC-4N unit was sent ashore to operate until the cause of failure can be determined. This unit was ordered to operate with CTF 91 from K-6 airfield.

8. Recommendations:

a. That prior to entering the war zone the carrier operate extensively using TF 77 air operation schedules so that the flight deck and ordnance crews can become thoroughly indoctrinated in the type of operational schedule which is utilized in the Korean operating area.

b. That the F3D night fighters on the LAKE CHAMPLAIN be replaced by F2H type night fighters. This recommendation is based on the following factors:

problems, thereby increasing aircraft availability and easing spotting

(2) If F2H types are embarked, 6 or 7 planes may be embarked in place of the 4 F3D's, thereby increasing number of aircraft embarked.

(3) Supply problems would be reduced because there would be one less type of aircraft and engine to provide for.

(4) Speed deck operations.

c. That efforts be made to expedite delivery of aircraft service changes, catapult and A.G. bulletins to fleet units. //

NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT

1. The operating area is conveniently located for navigation by Loran. The coastline and off-lying island often provided good and, at times, excellent radar fixes.

2. The operations insofar as ship control is concerned required proficiency in typical fast carrier task force operations with considerable emphasis upon replenishment both day and night. The U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) was fortunate in having been exposed to similar operations with the CINCNELM relief ships under Commander Carrier Division SIX just prior to and during the Atlantic crossing. The ship also operated with 4 destroyers during the remainder of the voyage to the West Pacific.

3. The bridge organization was modeled closely after the recommendations made by the USS CRISKANY (CVA 34), based upon her experience in the operating area. Four teams of 3 officers each were permanently assigned bridge watches as a primary duty. One officer of each team acted as conning officer and was fully responsible for all the duties regularly assigned to the Officer-of-the-Deck by pertinent directives. A second officer was in actuality a tactical signal officer, his duties being to guard the primary and secondary tactical circuits, and to interpret and formulate tactical signals. A third officer was primarily responsible for maneuvering board solutions and for administration of the watch. The ship control team thus comprised of an OOD and 2 JOOD's proved itself capable of coping with almost any tempo in operations.

4. Conning for replenishment was normally performed by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer, or the Navigator. In anticipation of this requirement the latter three had been trained to perform this evolution prior to reaching the operating area. The thorough qualification or re-qualification of senior experienced officers to assist the Captain in this matter is of vital importance for ships operating in this theater. The Captain cannot be expected to endure the long hours necessary to conn twenty-four hours a day during flight operations, formation maneuvering, and replenishing for the three or four week operating period which is the normal schedule for carriers operating on the line with Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN.

5. Experience thus far indicates that when operating jet aircraft in this area speeds of 25 knots and above are required more often than lesser speeds. Hazards to plane handling while making high speed turns recommends the 2000 yard turning circle in preference to the 1500 yard turning circle prescribed as standard by ATP-1. The fact that less speed is lost in the wider and more comfortable turn together with the fact that little or no additional time is required to complete the turn further recommends the 2000 yard turning circle. It is suggested that consideration be given to making the 2000 yard turning circle standard. This arrangement would preclude the necessity of so frequently signalling the 2000 yard turning circle as a modification from standard.

6. Unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise or an emergency exists it is recommended that immediate execute signals not be utilized. Normally sufficient time is available to permit the use of the "execute to follow" procedure. Allowing time for a double check by bridge and CIC personnel on any given signal insures that it will be properly understood and safely executed.

7. Although the following applies primarily to CIC it is listed in this section because of its relationship to the performance and training of OOD's. Generally, it is noted that enough difference exists between Atlantic and Pacific Fleet operating procedures to require considerable adjustment when changing from one command to the other. Specifically, citing one example, CTF 77 OpOrder 2-52 directs deck conditions as follows:

"This is _____ Launch Affirm, Event One, Six Victor Able Cherokee Strike Two, Four Victor Fox Charlie Able Peter Two, Three Jet Graphic Two, out"

meaning "I have launched 6 VA for Cherokee strike number two, four VF for cap two and three jet photo planes for photo mission number two."

The same data would be disseminated under Atlantic Fleet procedure (USF-4, Rad 6) by:

Charlie three Jet graphic break, Condition Jig one, out.

EMCON Orders. CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03510.1A dtd 11 May 1953.

"_____ this is _____, assume radar guard One Four Baker One Two Three"

meaning: Assume Radar Guard Baker (short range Air Search), emissions authorized in sector 14 (300-060) and in frequency band 123 (2800-3050 mcs)

No prearranged brevity code is provided for transmission of the above data by Atlantic Fleet Instructions, USF-15 or ATP-1. By use of shackle code and plain language it could be put out.

Other similar operating doctrine and procedural differences make it advisable to recommend that a study be made and that these matters be reconciled for both fleets.

PART VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. An index to all of the recommendations contained in this and Commander Air Group FOUR's Action Report (enclosure (1)) is contained at the end of this combined report.


G. T. MUNDORFF

CNO (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group	1
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COMSEVENTHFLT (advance)	1
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COMAIRPAC	1
COMSERVPAC	5
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1
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COFAIRBETUPAC	2
VC 12	1
VC 33	1
VC 4	1
VC 62	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA 9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA 33)	1
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA 34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA 40)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA 37)	1
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA 18)	2
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA 10)	1
CO, USS BOXER (CVA 21)	1
CO, USS BENNINGTON (CVA 20)	1
CO, USS RANDOLPH (CVA 15)	1
NLO JOC Korea	1
COMCARDIV ONE	1
COMCARDIV THREE	1
COMCARDIV FIVE	1
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1
CVG-4	2
VF-22	5
VF-44	5
VF-62	5
VA-45	5
COMFAIRHAWAII	1
COMFAIRJAX	1
COMAIRLANT	3
COMCARDIV SIX	2