

ORIGINAL

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/02-ces
A4-3
Ser

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

0136

19 MAY 1952

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 10 March through 2 May 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 04 dtd 2 May 1952; Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (10 March 1952 - 2 May 1952)

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 10 March through 2 May 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission

a. Composition

(1) In accordance with Commander Fleet Air Hawaii confidential dispatch 290038Z of February, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, departed Pearl Harbor, T.H., 1 March 1952. Staff, Commander Carrier Division THREE was embarked as passengers. The ship proceeded to Yokosuka, Japan, arriving 10 March 1952, and reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The period 10 March to 29 March 1952 was devoted to operational training and to such repair and replenishment as were practicable while anchored in Truman Bay, Yokosuka. The ship was granted an upkeep period from 10 to 14 March. During the period 14 March to 28 March the BOXER was the ready carrier. Operational training was conducted in the vicinity of Honshu from 16 to 18 March and 24 to 25 March.

(2) In compliance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN confidential dispatch 250532Z of March the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked, got underway on the morning of 29 March 1952 and proceeded from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area and rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 31 March 1952. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), and various heavy support and screening ships.

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(3) The OTC was RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE was second in Command and embarked in the U.S.S. PHILIP-PINE SEA (CV-47).

b. Mission

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 22-51.

(2) The mission of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was as follows:

(a) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea, to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy route of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(b) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(c) Protect the force against air, surface and sub-surface attacks.

(d) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(e) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(f) Coordinate air operations with the Fifth Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(g) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

PART II Chronological Order of Events

1 March 1952 -

Enroute Pearl Harbor, T. H., to Yokosuka, Japan.

10 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy in Trumen Bay, Yokosuka, performing necessary upkeep and repair.

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16 March - 18 March 1952 -

Underway operational training.

19 March - 23 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy in Truman Bay as Ready Carrier. Necessary upkeep, repair and replenishment was effected.

24 March - 26 March 1952 -

Underway operational training period. Flight operations curtailed by adverse weather.

27 March - 28 March 1952 -

Moored at buoy, Truman Bay, Yokosuka, for necessary upkeep, repairs and replenishment.

29 March 1952 -

At 0600 the BOXER departed Yokosuka, Japan, to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan.

At 0755 the BOXER rendezvoused with the U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870).

30 March 1952 -

Air defense and anti-aircraft firing exercise were conducted during the afternoon. A total of 65 operational training flights were launched.

31 March 1952 -

At 1057, the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), in company with U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870), rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. At 1400 the first combat sorties were launched. A total of thirty-two (32) sorties were flown to familiarize the pilots with recco routes, terrain features, and CTF-77 operational techniques.

1 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. A total of sixty-one sorties were launched. These missions included Armed Recco, rail interdiction and photo coverage.

2 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

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3 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Commencing at 0445 with Early Morning Hecklers a total of eighty-eight (88) sorties were launched. Four trucks, five ox carts, three warehouses, twelve buildings and five fuel dumps were destroyed, thirty-seven rail cuts made and other damage inflicted.

4 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. LT Nicholas REDEYE, VA-65, made the 51,000th landing aboard the BOXER. Two ADs and one F4U-4 sustained minor damage due to flak.

5 April 1952 -

A total of ninety-two (92) sorties were launched. The Morning Hecklers aggressively and successfully attacked a freight train in North Korea. CTF-77 dispatched as follows:

"PAT ON BACK (HIGH UP) TO YOUR MORNING HECKLERS TODAY"
Two F9F-2 sustained minor damage due to flak.

6 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. Air defense and anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

7 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Seventy-nine (79) sorties were launched with effective results. One locomotive and tender were destroyed as well as six trucks and several boats.

8 April 1952 -

No air operations due to fog and adverse weather over the force and target area.

9 April 1952 -

No air operations due to fog and inclement weather over force and target area.

10 April 1952 -

With favorable weather, air operations were resumed. Primary targets for the day were gun positions in the Wonsan area which were successfully attacked.

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11 April 1952 -

Air operations were discontinued at approximately 1200 due to overcast and adverse weather. The Task Force retired to the replenishment area.

12 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

13 April 1952 -

Group strikes were launched against Chongjin in extreme Northeast Korea. A total of one hundred thirty-two (132) sorties were launched with excellent results. One F4U, one F9F and one AD sustained minor damage due to flak.

14 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Thirty one (31) rail cuts were made, two rail bridges destroyed and thirty four camouflaged trucks attacked.

15 April 1952 -

A total of sixty-six (66) offensive and defensive combat sorties were launched. Carrying forty eight tons of ordnance, two package targets were seriously damaged and 15 rail cuts made.

16 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

17 April 1952 -

Adverse weather delayed air operations until 1500. A total of fifty-four (54) combat sorties were launched during the late afternoon. These effected twenty rail cuts, destruction of two boxcars and unassessed damage on troops, buildings and flak positions.

18 April 1952 -

Air operations commenced at 1845 and continued until 2150. A total of eighty eight sorties were launched. An AD, piloted by LCDR W. P. NEEL, VA-65, crashed twenty miles north-east of Wonsan, when the port wing sheared off at the fuselage apparently as a result of a hit by anti-aircraft fire. LCDR NEEL was not seen to leave the plane prior to the crash. Three locomotives and fifteen boxcars in the Hankymyong Marshalling

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Yards were destroyed.

19 April 1952 -

Air operations were curtailed by adverse weather. A total of fifty four (54) sorties were launched. They accomplished rail cuts, destruction of four trucks, and damage or destruction to numerous buildings. One F4U was slightly damaged by flak.

20 April 1952 -

One hundred (100) sorties were launched throughout the day, terminating with the Night Hecklers who landed at 2145. Three hundred (300) feet of rail track were destroyed, fifty three rail cuts made, a package target effectively damaged and other damage or destruction inflicted.

21 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

22 April 1952 -

A total of ninety-two (92) sorties were launched throughout the day. ENS S. W. HENDERSON, VF-64, piloting an F4U, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of Hungnam. ENS HENDERSON made a successful water landing in Hungnam Bay and was picked up by the destroyer, U.S.S. RUPERTUS. The pilot was wounded about the face and neck but his condition is not considered to be serious. It is anticipated that this pilot will return to flight status during the next operational period.

ENS Ralph A. WALLIN of VF-24, piloting an F9F, made the 52,000th landing on the BOXER upon his return from a strike in North Korea.

23 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. RADM JOHN PERRY relieved RADM F. W. McMAHON and assumed command of CTF-77 and Commander Carrier Division FIVE.

24 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Morning Hecklers destroyed four and damaged twenty six boxcars and two trucks.

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25 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished. CTE 92.11 sent the following dispatch:

"WISH TO REPORT A WELL DONE BY BOXER REARMING FROM RAINIER X MAINTAINED AVERAGE RATE OF 203.4 TONS PER HOUR WHICH MAY BE NEW RECORD"

CTF-77 dispatched the following:

"CTE-92.11 HAS INFORMED ME THAT AVERAGE RATE TRANSFER BETWEEN RAINIER AND BOXER DURING REARMING TODAY WAS 203.4 TONS PER HOUR X INSOFAR AS RECORDS AVAILABLE TO ME ARE CONCERNED THIS MAY BE A NEW RECORD X WELL DONE"

Anti-aircraft firing was conducted during the afternoon.

26 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. Inclement weather delayed morning operations until 1130 hours. A total of seventy-one (71) offensive and defensive sorties were launched during the remainder of the day and evening.

ENS Herman RADTKE, VF-24, in an F9F, piloted the 12,000th plane to be catapulted from the BOXER. This cat-shot was made from the port catapult and established a new fleet record.

27 April 1952 -

Air operations consisted of ninety-five strike, recco, photo and defensive missions. Twenty-two rail cars were destroyed and five hundred feet of rail track northwest of Wonsan was thoroughly cut.

28 April 1952 -

Inclement weather, fog and rain over the Task Force and target area forced cancellation of air operations at approximately 1300. During the afternoon the Task Force replenished aviation gasoline and fuel oil supplies.

29 April 1952 -

Air operations continued. LTJG F. A. RICE, VF-63, bailed out over Wonsan Harbor when a cockpit fire developed in his corsair (F4U). LTJG RICE was picked up by helicopter

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from LST 1077 and taken aboard the destroyer U.S.S. CUNNINGHAM. His injuries were confined to burns about the hands and face.

30 April 1952 -

The Task Force replenished.

The U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) joined the Task Force.

At 1321 the BOXER, in company with the U.S.S. BUCK (DD-761), the U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759) and U.S.S. J. W. THOMASON (DD-760), departed from the Task Force enroute to Yokosuka via Van Dieman Straits for a period of repair, upkeep and rest and recreation.

The BOXER and the accompanying destroyers comprised TE-77.04, OTC being ComDesDiv-7 aboard the U.S.S. LOFBERG (DD-759).

1 May 1952 -

BOXER enroute to Yokosuka. Anti-aircraft firing and air defense drills were conducted during the afternoon.

2 May 1952 -

At 1556 the BOXER moored at Piedmont Pier, Truman Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan, for a period of in-port availability and rest and recreation.

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

APRIL 1952

DATE	REMARKS FIRST LAST LAUNCH RECOV.	OFFENSIVE			DEFENSIVE			MISC		TOTAL
		DAY		NIGHT	DAY		NIGHT			
		PROP	JET	PROP	PROP	JET	PROP	PROP	JET	
29 Mar	ENROUTE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
30 Mar	1200 - 1630	--	--	--	--	--	--	49	16	65 (Training enroute,
31 Mar	1400 - 1800	24	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	32
1 Apr	1000 - 1730	40	18	--	2	--	--	--	--	60
2 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
3 Apr	0445 - 1830	40	16	2	4	16	2	--	--	80
4 Apr	0430 - 1830	46	12	6	6	16	3	--	--	89
5 Apr	0430 - 1630	47	22	6	6	8	2	--	--	91
6 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
7 Apr	0900 - 1900	37	30	--	12	--	--	--	--	79
8 Apr		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
9 Apr		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
10 Apr	0900 - 2100	48	24	5	2	8	2	--	--	89
11 Apr	0900 - 1200	14	8	--	--	2	--	--	--	24
12 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
13 Apr	0430 - 1600	84	28	--	18	--	--	2*	--	132
14 Apr	0430 - 1630	53	22	5	6	8	2	--	--	96
15 Apr	0730 - 1630	36	18	--	6	6	--	--	--	66
16 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
17 Apr	1500 - 1930	32	6	--	4	12	--	--	--	54
18 Apr	0845 - 2150	48	16	4	6	12	2	--	--	88
19 Apr	0845 - 2115	34	--	3	4	12	2	--	--	55
20 Apr	0845 - 2150	50	16	5	8	16	3	--	--	98
21 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
22 Apr	0415 - 1745	46	16	5	4	17	2	2	--	92
23 Apr	0415 - 1745	45	16	5	4	16	2	3	--	91
24 Apr	0415 - 1745	45	12	2	4	20	2	3	--	88
25 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
26 Apr	1130 - 2200	37	14	5	6	12	3	--	--	77
27 Apr	0830 - 2200	50	16	4	6	16	3	--	--	95
28 Apr	0830 - 1300	18	6	--	6	4	--	--	--	34
29 Apr	0830 - 1900	42	20	--	7	16	--	--	--	85
30 Apr	REPLENISHMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 May	ENR. YOKOSUKA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2 May	ENR. YOKOSUKA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL --		916	344	57	121	217	30	59	16	1760

OFFENSIVE SORTIES:

Prop.....976

Jet.....344

Total....1320

DEFENSIVE SORTIES

Prop.....151

Jet.....217

Total....368

MISC. SORTIES

Prop.....59

Jet.....16

Total...75

TOTAL SORTIES.....1,763

(*) Indicates WEATHER RECCO.

[REDACTED]

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties suffered by Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported in enclosure (1) of this report.

b. Performance:

(1) Personnel performance and morale have been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on-board count of personnel was 1965, which number was satisfactory. The total losses of various reasons were eighty-one (81); this was offset by 168 gains.

(2) The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the EM, IC, BT, MM, RM, QM, and SK rates. Every effort is being made to prosecute a vigorous on-board training program to train personnel of lower ratings to qualify for performing duty assignments in higher ratings.

(3) The recent inauguration of an orientation and indoctrination program for non-rated personnel newly received aboard the BOXER has proved to be beneficial to this command as well as to the men concerned. Each department has had an opportunity to explain to the men its functions and responsibilities aboard ship. Upon completion of the program, the personnel officer has interviewed each man and assigned him his permanent billet, taking into consideration his personal preferences and the overall needs of the ship.

c. Recreation:

(1) The following activities were initiated for the welfare and recreation of officers and enlisted men during the period of this report:

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- (a) Issue of daily news sheet.
 - (b) Daily newscast over P.A. system.
 - (c) Radio broadcasts and recordings.
 - (d) Hobby Shop opened for issue of material one hour on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays.
 - (e) Exercise room for physical conditioning of officers.
 - (f) Divine Services were held as follows: Catholic Mass daily; Protestant Worship every Sunday; Latter Day Saints services every week; Christian Science services every week; Jewish services every week.
 - (g) Ship's Library was open at regular hours for all hands.
 - (h) Sightseeing tours were conducted in Japan.
 - (i) Glee Club formed by members of Ship's Company and embarked Air Group.
- (2) Movies were shown daily. During the operation, eighty-five (85) different programs were shown a total of two hundred eighty-seven (287) times. A late night program was shown in the Training Room for personnel unable to attend regular showings.
- (3) The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Craft supplies were leather, plastic, models and paints. The space occupied by the shop is quite small and no work is actually done there. The space is used only for the sale of materials. It is estimated that approximately ten (10) percent of the crew were engaged in hobby craft work.

PART VI Comments

a. Operations

(1) CIC

(a) Although task force operations were new to a large percentage of assigned personnel, the degree of training was such that no difficulties were experienced upon our joining Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. On 16 April, fourteen (14) seamen were rated as Radarmen Third Class. The on-board count of both

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rated and non-rated personnel is still below authorized allowances; the personnel problem is serious but not critical.

(b) All functions of CIC were performed with the exception of radar countermeasures. Due to present antennae installation, the only signal which can be intercepted is that of our own SPS-6B radar. Since the SPS-6B is in continuous operation, no RADCM is possible.

(c) The SX radar was the most reliable system for air search and air control. The reliable detection range for jet aircraft was thirty-five miles, and for prop aircraft was seventy miles. The system has been in operation continuously and no major discrepancies occurred. Although the SPS-6B provides a greater detection range for jet aircraft, the blind sector, from 060° relative to 130° relative, greatly reduces its use for air search. A study is now being made upon which to base recommendations for the relocation of the SPS-6B antennae to eliminate this blind sector.

(2) Photo Interpretation

(a) The BOXER Photo Interpretation Officer reported aboard at Pearl Harbor. After visits to other carriers in the forward area while in Yokosuka, the extent of the present P.I. work load was realized and enlisted personnel and temporary space were acquired prior to the ship's joining the Task Force. At present the Flag Intelligence Office space is being utilized for this work but arrangements for a permanent space location must be made before the next period of operation as this space will be returned to the staff. It is recommended a space sufficient to lay out mosaics ten feet long should be permanently assigned to ship's Photo Interpretation in addition to the assigned Air Intelligence spaces. Also, to assure the necessary assistance of enlisted personnel trained in photo interpretation, it is recommended that two qualified men be assigned to the ship on TAD from VC-61 at the time the Photo Interpretation Officer receives his orders.

(3) Air Intelligence

(a) The transfer of intelligence materials and photo files from the ESSEX (carrier relieved) was made with insufficient time to properly check classified materials signed for by the BOXER Intelligence Officer. It is recommended in the event the two carriers will not be in contact for at least four hours these materials be off loaded and placed in a guard mail status ashore prior to the arrival of the relieving carrier.

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(b) Chart service to the BOXER was very good at all Air Navigation Offices contacted and despite the large number of 1:50,000 charts required for rail strikes no deficiencies occurred. On the 1:250,000 charts GEOREF grid coordinates were received in place of UTM on four chart series and a reorder was necessary. The initial issue of charts was covered with frisket paper which has made replacements due to wear and misuse negligible.

(c) Within the barter kits received for issue to pilots, the small plastic compass in twenty-five kits were broken open and the ball point pens in all kits were defective.

(4) Communications

(a) Message Reduction.

This command has had good results in reducing outgoing traffic by using the letter "R" in the appropriate space on smooth write-up copies, to denote the Releasing Officer of each outgoing dispatch.

It is recommended that the originator of the daily bomb-line message (JOC Korea) use a plaindress heading. This would eliminate about one hundred groups of each such message.

(b) Jet Homing

It is recommended that an automatic homing signal device (Trout) for jets be installed. Present manual keying of the Trout keeps one man continuously on watch. An automatic device would free this man for other duties.

(c) UHF RATT

Considerable difficulty prevailed with UHF communications, voice and RATT, primarily caused by material difficulties.

(d) Personnel Shortage

While not critical during this period, the loss of qualified Radiomen and Quartermasters (Signalmen) during the next three (3) months will reduce the rated personnel to such a point that efficient operations will be extremely difficult. Intensive training of strikers is being conducted with good results, but a striker of two to six months experience will not likely fill the billet of a First or Second Class Petty Officer with any degree of success. By 1 August, unless replacements

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are received, this command will have seven rated Radiomen of twenty-one allowed, and two rated Quartermasters (Signalmen) of twelve allowed.

(5) Photographic Laboratory

(a) The BOXER, operating with CTF-77 for the third time, still lacks sufficient space to carry out, efficiently, all phases of operational photography required by present operations. It was necessary to place a new Matte Dryer in dead storage in order to make space available for a copy camera. Also, although the allowance of A10-A film dryers is three, this ship has only one because of lack of space to install the dryers. Consequently the film and paper drying process has been slowed down considerably.

(b) K-17 Reconnaissance Photography

K-17 Reconnaissance Photography still comprises the main work load in operational photography, and there is need for a more rapid method of annotating the negatives. The present method of annotation requires a minimum of three hours for each roll of film of two hundred exposures. This is the largest factor in the total time required to deliver completely annotated sortie photographs. The first flash print is delivered, unannotated, to the Photo Interpretation Office in approximately one hour and forty five minutes after the photo plane has been recovered. The remaining prints for distribution, as directed, are ready for mailing at the beginning of regular working hours on the following day, unless a particular sortie is required sooner for operational planning.

(c) Allocation of Funds for Photography.

It is recommended that an allowance be established for the purpose of replenishment of photo supplies as needed during any operating period. The present policy is to make application to ComAirPac requesting additional funds to cover cost of major replenishments, and not to make allowances for fluctuation in the type of photography most in demand at that time. By establishing an operating allowance for Photo Laboratories, it would eliminate the draining of the regular operations allotment, which is insufficient to support a Photo Lab operating at peak production during cruises in an operating area.

From 1 January 1951 to 31 March 1952 the Photographic Laboratory expenditures for both NSA and APA supplies

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totalled \$119,965.89. Total expenditures for NSA alone has been \$80,556.61 or an average quarterly expenditure of \$16,111.32. The quarterly allotment for the entire Operations Department is 1,500 dollars.

(6) Aerology

(a) Although the prevailing wind direction was southerly, suggesting the establishment of the summer monsoon, the Korean weather during the operating period was largely of a transitional nature between winter and summer conditions. Cyclonic storm centers for the most part passed well to the north, with their associated frontal zones causing little or no adverse weather in the operating area. Waves forming to the south on the polar front usually remained stable, and passed south of the Japanese mainland. Notable exceptions occurred when a low that formed on the Arctic Front to the north coincided with a developing wave on the polar front to the south and caused warm moist Maritime Tropical air to be transported over the relatively colder water of the Sea of Japan. This unique combination caused the operating area to be blanketed with fog and forced suspension of flight operations on the 8th and 9th of April. As previously stated, waves that formed to the south of the area usually remained stable and moved rapidly up the Polar Front south of Japan. However, on 11 and 17 April, lows that had formed on the Polar Front in the East China Sea moved across Korea and made it necessary to suspend operations. In both cases, however, sky conditions and visibility improved rapidly after frontal passages and flight operations were suspended just half a day. One more half day was lost due to weather when an active polar trough associated with a deep low to the north passed through the operating area on 28 April. This too passed rapidly and was followed by clearing skies. In all only three and one half days were lost during the month due to inclement weather.

(b) Maximum wind velocity of thirty-four knots from the west northwest was encountered on 18 April when a rapidly moving high pressure ridge, following a deep low system, caused a tight pressure gradient over the operating area. Flight operations were not adversely affected.

AEROLOGICAL STATISTICS FOR APRIL 1952

TEMPERATURE

Average	50.5 Degrees
Average Maximum	54.8 Degrees
Average Minimum	46.1 Degrees
Absolute Maximum	64 Degrees
Absolute Minimum	41 Degrees

SURFACE WINDS

<u>PREVAILING DIRECTION</u>	<u>DAYS</u>
N.....	1
NN.....	1
NE.....	
ENE.....	1
E.....	20
ESE.....	2
SE.....	3
SSE.....	2
S.....	6
SSW.....	3
SW.....	1
WSW.....	2
W.....	3
WNW.....	1
NW.....	1
NNW.....	1

<u>SKY CONDITIONS</u>	<u>% TOTAL TIME</u>
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Overcast	42.1%
Cloudy	9.3%
Partly Cloudy	13.8%
Mostly Clear	34.8%
Hours of Precipitation	32
Average Relative Humidity	77.5%
Hours of Fog	52

Average Velocity.....	12.5 Kts.
Average Maximum Velocity.....	20.5 Kts.
Average Minimum Velocity.....	4 Kts.
Absolute Maximum Velocity.....	34 Kts.
Absolute Minimum Velocity.....	Calm

<u>CEILINGS</u>	<u>TOTAL TIME</u>	<u>VISIBILITY</u>	<u>% TOTAL TIME</u>
Below 1,000 Ft.....	4.0%	Under 1 Mile.....	4.2%
1,000 - 5,000 Ft.....	18.7%	1 to 3 Miles.....	3.6%
5,000 - 10,000 Ft.....	12.2%	3 to 6 Miles.....	9.2%
Above 10,000 Ft.....	65.1%	Over 6 Miles.....	83.0%

FAVORABLE FLYING CONTIONS (Ceiling 1,000 ft., or higher visibility three miles or more) 89.6%

b. Supply Department

(1) Aviation Stores.

(a) The consumption of the following structural assemblies, surfaces and propellers has been excessive for the period of this report:

Elevators (F4U-4).....	8	
Elevators (46-5).....	4	
Housing Assembly Tail (F4U-4).....	3	
Propellers (AD).....	10	
Propellers (F4U-4).....	6	
Rudders (AD).....	9	
Stabilizers (F9F).....	4	
Tip Tank (F9F).....	10	
Wings (AD).....	2	
Wings (F4U-4).....	7	(Plus one
Wings (F4U-5).....	2	current AOG)
Yoke Assembly Tail Wheel (F4U-4).....	4	

(b) A highly successful "at sea" replenishment of aviation stores and general fleet freight was made with the U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8) on 16 April. Thirty tons of material were transferred in the same number of minutes alongside. Many items delivered were in the "urgently" required category.

(2) Ship Store.

(a) Sales for the month of April were in the amount of \$54,774.74. This sales total was the highest for any one month in the history of the U.S.S. BOXER.

c. Engineering Department

(1) On 8 April 1952, failure of a relay in the control panel for #2 lower, 5,500 lb., Bomb Elevator allowed the elevator car to hit the upper stops. As a result, the hoisting cable drum shaft was badly bent, placing the elevator out of commission until repairs can be made at the Naval Repair Facilities, Yokosuka, Japan.

[REDACTED]

(2) Initial cause of the failure was the breaking of a leaf spring in the motor slow-speed contactor, General Electric 50 ampere alternating current contactor, type CR5181-2. Breakage of the spring allowed the solenoid to jam in the open position permitting the elevator car to hit the up-stop at a relatively high speed, bending the hoisting cable drum shaft.

(3) Repairs were made to the contactor by placing a screw in its frame in such a position as to provide a positive stop in case of future spring failure.

d. Gunnery Department

(1) Fueling at Sea by Elokomín Method:

(a) The old method of fueling at sea, also called "Cruiser-Destroyer Method" was used during fueling operations conducted with the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27) on 2 April 1952, the U.S.S. CACAPON (AO-52) on 6 April 1952, and also with the U.S.S. NAVASOTA (AO-106) on 28 April and 30 April 1952. The operations were at first conducted with some difficulty until a wire pendant was rigged from a pad eye on the ship's side to the hook attached to the hose about twelve (12) feet from the discharge end. A quick release pelican hook in the center of the pendant facilitates rapid action in casting off. With the new pendant tending at a 45° angle the strain is taken by the pendant and eliminates the necessity for extensive hold-down lines formerly used. The Elwood Method is the preferred fueling-at-sea method and is more easily accomplished by ships of this class; however, this ship is prepared to fuel by either method.

(2) Rearming at Sea by Burtoning Method:

(a) Methods used for rearming have improved steadily since returning to the operating area. The two items worthy of mention being the use of the ammunition ship highline as Station #3 in addition #1 and #2 Burtoning whips:

(b) The wire used allows heavier loads to be received at this station plus eliminating highline personnel on the receiving ship. The ammo ship controlling the inhaul by their power winches.

(c) A triple swivel is being used by the ammunition ship on the Burtoning hooks which eliminates to a great extent the twisting of the wire formerly experienced and allows loads to be spotted quickly and accurately. The above improvements

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

were used by the U.S.S. RAINIER (AE-5) when her spirited crew joined with that of the BOXER to set a new unofficial ammunition loading record of 203.4 tons per hour on 25 April 1952.

(3) Anti-aircraft Firing Exercises:

(a) During the period of this report, six (6) anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted. Emphasis was placed on GEORGE and BAKER type runs. A very noticeable improvement has been observed in the accuracy of fire of the 5"/38 batteries in spite of the drastically reduced training allowance and the majority of personnel being previously inexperienced. Training ammunition expended this period: 5"/38 = 122 rounds; 40 MM = 488 rounds.

e. Air Department

(1) Aircraft Handling

(a) During this period the aircraft on board consisted of one jet squadron (F9Fs), two Corsair squadrons, one AD squadron and the normal number of specially configured aircraft. A split spot consisting of two AD types and two or three F4U types was used for the launching arrangement. It is considered that this arrangement of aircraft utilizes the available flight deck space with the maximum efficiency and allows the versatility required in scheduling. F9F types were spotted tailed outboard on both the port and starboard sides in an arrangement that allows the deck edge elevator to be used for handling duds.

(b) To facilitate rearming of returning aircraft, immediately after each recovery (except the last recovery of the day), the wings of AD type aircraft were spread and the planes loaded forward while holding a ready deck. AD wings were then folded and the planes tightened in the forward spot to prepare for the next recovery.

(c) Normally, the forward spot prior to the jet recovery consisted of either four F4U or three AD type aircraft spotted to starboard allowing for a single row of F9F types to be spotted along the port side during the recovery.

(d) A casualty to the deck edge elevator, resulting from sheared linkage between motors and pumps, hampered the movement of planes between the hangar and the flight deck for a period of seven hours during scheduled flight operations. However, operations were conducted on schedule through use of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the remaining elevators. The repair of the deck edge elevator required the manufacture and installation of new parts.

(e) On 14 April an AD aircraft crashed through the barriers and hit the electrical panels of the LeTourneau crane. As a consequence, the crane was out of commission for seven days since spare parts were not available. As an emergency measure, it was planned that in the event of a flight deck crash, blocks and tackle rigged on the seven ton Hyster fork lift would be used to clear the deck. Although there were no flight deck crashes during the period of time that the crane was out of commission, it is believed that the alternate system of rigging noted above is capable of successful crash handling when time is not the major consideration. To date, the crane has not been completely repaired. However, by using switches available, a temporary control panel has been installed that will cause all moving parts to function except the boom tilting mechanism.

(f) For test purposes, under the authority of Com-AirPac letter serial 70/20332 of 23 November 1951, and BuShips letter serial 533-3036 of 9 November 1951, the Naval Shipyard San Francisco, during the ship's last availability, applied a mixture of neoprene and cement to a small jet turn up area forward of the barriers as a deck covering. It was used also to fill holes in the landing area that resulted from flight deck crashes. Indications are that the mixture will prove satisfactory as a deck covering. Also it can be used as a temporary "fix" to fill holes in the landing area if four or more days are allowed for setting and drying. It is recommended that a study be made with the view toward application of the material in lieu of marine glue between the flight deck planking and as a deck covering from number one barrier to the two hundred foot mark near the catapults. It is believed that a covering of this type will not only protect and preserve the planking but will provide the necessary traction for stopping aircraft, particularly jets, as they come out of the gear.

(2) Catapults

(a) On 27 April the 12,000th catapult shot was recorded with a perfect record of "cold shots".

(b) Maintenance problems mainly consisted of liners breaking from fair-lead sheaves and temporary hydraulic pump failures. Four towing and one retracting sheave were replaced. Electrical trouble accounted for pump failure on two occasions and a malfunctioning oil gear pump relief valve was responsible in a third instance.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(c) This ship had catapult change #33 incorporated on the starboard catapult. The pressure available for launching as a result of this change cannot, however, be utilized for launching loaded jets during low wind conditions since launching bridles of sufficient capacity to withstand the greater load imposed, are not as yet available in this area. When low wind conditions exist it becomes necessary to reduce the bomb load in the interest of flight safety.

(d) The basic weight of an AD-4 aircraft, including four 20MM guns, armor plating, full ammo, full gasoline and oil, and pilot is about 16,350 pounds. BuAer Technical Order 15-52 of 4 February 1952 limits the maximum catapult weight of AD-4 aircraft to 20,500 pounds. Therefore, in effect, an AD-4 aircraft cannot be catapulted with a load greater than 4,150 pounds. The standard load in this area is 5,000 pounds of bombs. Since space considerations preclude a safe take-off run for heavily loaded planes during low wind conditions and AD-4 aircraft cannot be catapulted at the weight imposed, a reduction in load becomes mandatory and accordingly, maximum effectiveness is lost.

(3) Jet Blast Deflectors

(a) The new jet blast deflectors installed by the San Francisco, Naval Shipyard, have proved to be highly satisfactory. Since their installation the jet blast deflectors have been used for over 800 jet turn-ups. No cracking of the vanes has been detected.

(4) Arresting Gear

(a) Almost 22,000 engagements have been recorded on the number one arresting gear engine. However, no excessive wear is apparent.

(5) Barricade

(a) There have been no complete engagements of the barricade during this period.

(b) Extra bungee is used to hold the straps to the deck in order to prevent prop tailwheels from catching the nylon engaging straps of the barricade during deck launches.

(6) Maintenance

(a) The Aircraft Shops Division acted in support of the embarked squadrons by rendering assistance to the VF squadrons using F4U-4 aircraft in the installation of Ordnance Change #432 and by turning out complete engine changes.

[REDACTED]

(7) Ordnance

(a) A casualty to the number two lower bomb elevator necessitated the use of emergency ammunition handling equipment for a protracted period. One hundred pound and 250 pound bombs were hoisted through A-321-T from A-528-M and A-527-M for a period of three weeks without hampering operations. It is doubtful however, that the large volume of bombs necessary for current usage could have been handled had there been a further casualty in the remaining lower stage elevators.

(b) On several occasions F9F aircraft with Mark 55 bomb racks installed have returned with hung 250 pound GP bombs. In most cases the hung bomb was dropped during landing upon engagement of the tail hook. In one instance a 250 pound bomb with a .01 nose and tail fuse, armed after about 500 feet of travel up the deck. It came to rest only after striking an aircraft near the forward aircraft elevator, but did not explode.

(c) Excellent napalm was obtained in ambient temperatures in the 40° - 50°F range using 50 pounds of powder and three pints of sylenol per 100 gallons of gasoline.

(8) Gasoline

(a) Casualties to the gasoline system include the following: (1) The sylphon bellows and the neoprene diaphragm in the forward starboard automatic valve were ruptured by unknown causes; (2) The eductor discharge 4 inch gate valve in number one gasoline pump room froze in the closed position. However, these casualties were repaired and operations were not hampered.

(b) In accordance with Carrier Division FIVE Standing Order, the last two rows of aircraft on the flight deck must be degassed prior to night recoveries and in preparation for a night ready deck. Since the degassing valve of AD type aircraft usually will not properly reseal after it has been opened, valves must be replaced if this type aircraft is degassed. Therefore, F4U type aircraft are spotted in the last two rows for degassing. An RU DM is being submitted by VA-65.

(c) The ship was replenished with aviation gasoline as follows:

2 April - U.S.S. KASKASKIA - received 57,850 gal.
6 April - U.S.S. CACAPON - received 107,600 gal.
12 April - U.S.S. MISPELLION - received 98,000 gal.
16 April - U.S.S. MISPELLION - received 125,000 gal.
21 April - U.S.S. MANATEE - received 124,000 gal.
25 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 127,000 gal.
28 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 42,000 gal.
30 April - U.S.S. NAVASOTA - received 69,000 gal.

(9) Personnel

(a) The Air Department commenced the period with many new and inexperienced men and few experienced petty officers. A training program featuring prescribed training exercises and BOXER techniques was vigorously pursued and many of the rough spots have been smoothed out. It is difficult to present a true loading problem to the ordnance crews without the expenditure of much ammunition and many bombs. During the training period, order to avoid wasteful expenditure of heavy bombs, it is recommended that one complete day be devoted to spotting, rearming, respotting and dearming to truly simulate a TF-77 operations schedule. In order to more accurately simulate the condition, the number of planes aboard should approximate the number and type aboard an operating carrier when some planes are airborne. The planes aboard could be armed forward, respotted aft for launch, dearmed, taxied forward to simulate a launch and recovery, armed forward, and the process repeated as schedule training events throughout the operating day.

(b) When the rotation of certain key Air Department Officers is to be effected, orders should be issued in sufficient time that the relieving officer can report on board and observe at least two weeks of actual operations on the line prior to the detachment of the relieved officer. If rotation is to be effected while the ship is in a continental U.S. port, it is considered desirable to send relieving officers to an operating carrier on the line for a period of about two weeks to observe actual operating conditions prior to their reporting for duty. Among the key officers are the Air Officer, the Air Ordnance Officer and the Aircraft Handling Officer.

(c) It is believed that valuable information could be exchanged for the improvement of operating procedures through visits on operating days by key Air Department officers to other carriers on the line.

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