29 September 1952

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 20 August through 28 September 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 20 August through 28 September 1952 is submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Upon arrival in Yokosuka at 0600I on 20 August 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD entered a period of upkeep and repair. During this period pilots of VC-61 Detachment NAN field qualified in the newly acquired F2H2P's.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 290502 of August 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), Captain Paul W. WATSON, USN, Commanding, with COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral Herbert E. REGAN, USN, and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area via Van Dieman Straits at 0702I on 2 September 1952.

At 0500 on 4 September 1952, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE. Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was then commanded by COMCARDIV THREE, Rear Admiral A. SOUCEK, USN, aboard the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9). In addition to the U.S.S. ESSEX, the Task Force was composed of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral H.E. REGAN, USN, assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 1542I, 4 September 1952, and shortly thereafter the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) and the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) with COMCARDIV THREE embarked departed the force.

At 1827I, 21 September 1952 the command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN passed to COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. HICKEY, USN.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

UNIT & C.O.	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/4	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/28	PILOTS 9/4	PILOTS 9/28
COMCVG-7 CDR G. B. Brown				6*	6
VF-71 CDR J. S. Hill	16 F9F-2	16	15	24	24
[redacted]					

UNIT & C.O.	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/4	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/28	PILOTS 9/4	PILOTS 9/28
VF-72 LCDR A. W. Curtis	16 F9F-2	16	16	24	24
VF-74 CDR C. D. Fonvielle Jr.	16 F4U-4	16	15	23	23
VA-75 CDR H. K. Evans	16 AD-4	16	16	24	24
VC-4 Det 41 LCDR E. S. Ogle OinC	4 F4U-5N	4	3	5	5
VC-12 Det 41 LCDR C. H. Blanchard OinC	3 AD-4W	3	2	6	6
VC-33 Det 41 LCDR R. Hoffmeister OinC	4 AD-4NL	5	4	6	6
	1 AD-3Q	0	0		
VC-61 Det Nan LT G. H. Yeagle OinC **	3 F2H-2P	3	2	5	4

* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons. Two each are assigned to VF-71 and VF-72 and 4 are assigned to VA-75. CAG and Staff Operations Officers fly both AD's and F9F's.** LT. B.R. SMITH now in charge.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 271002Z the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 1332I on 28 September 1952 to arrive at Yokosuka 30 September 1952 for a period of upkeep and repair.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/20/52 to 9/1/52: On 21 August 1952 VC-61's Photo Unit Nan was temporarily based ashore at NAS Atsugi, for a ten day period for transition of pilots from F9F-2P's to F2H-2P's. As the Banshee was completely new to all but Unit Nan's OinC, LT C. H. Yeagle, two F2H-2 experienced maintenance men were loaned to that unit by VF-71 and work was begun immediately after the reciprocal transfer of aircraft with Fasron 11.

Flight operations were delayed for three days while 120 hour checks and de-preservations were accomplished and the first aircraft reached an "up" status on 24 August. As each plane was readied for flight it remained airborne almost continuously from sunrise to sunset on such varied missions as familiarization, cruise control, photo and FCLP; combining, when conditions permitted, as many mission combinations as possible between take off and final landing.

On 30 August, the three Banshees were flown to Kisarazu for loading onto barges and subsequent transfer to the Bon Homme Richard. The following day Photo Unit Nan returned aboard with all five pilots field-carrier qualified and an average of thirteen hours each in the Banshee.

9/2/52: Enroute to the combat area. General Drills were conducted.

9/3/52: Enroute to the combat area. Anti-aircraft firing was conducted.

9/4/52: The ship rejoined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE at 0500I. The scheduled replenishment was deferred because of rough seas.

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9/5/52: Most of the forenoon was devoted to replenishment. At 1230I aircraft were launched to strike at rail targets between Wonsan and Kowon. The mission was completed and the Corsairs and Skyraiders made twenty-eight rail cuts, knocked out two rail bridges, and damaged at least three rail cars.

9/6/52: Interdiction was the principal mission of the day. Dawn hecklers struck tragets in the coastal area northeast of Hungnam. They were followed by jet reccos and a prop strike in the same general area. When the smoke and dust cleared, results were assessed as one bridge destroyed by five direct hits, two bridges damaged, fourteen rail cars damaged and one destroyed, rails cut in seven places and several trucks shot up. Four Tarcaps were flown over salvage ships attending the sunken tug SARSI, off of Hungnam. These also hit targets of opportunity. Among the results claimed were two buildings, one gun position, six sampans, eight rail cars and two bridges damaged or destroyed. An afternoon Close Air Support mission attacked troops and installations opposite the U.S. X Corps front, destroying ten bunkers, four mortars, and 175 yards of trenches in addition to causing several secondary explosions. The approval of the ground forces was evident in the following dispatch, received later in the day:

"FOR INFORMATION X BRIGGEN SWEANY ARTY COMDR 10 CORPS ADVISES HE OBSERVED 1230I STRIKE OF TRUSTFUND 52 and 53 X PARTICULARLY FINE STRIKE AND VERY EFFECTIVE X ALSO A VERY GOOD JOB OF CONTROL AND IDENTIFICATION BY MOSQUITO PALOMINO"

During the afternoon photo pilots flew qualification hops in the Banshees.

9/7/52: In attacks from Wonsan to Chongjin, dawn hecklers damaged eleven buildings, one gun emplacement, one truck and one bridge approach. In addition, highways were cratered in several places. During the day jet reccos and strikes ranged up and down the East Coast supply routes, damaging thirty-eight boxcars, six trucks and eight buildings. The early prop strike hit an important rail bridge, inflicting serious damage, and went on to cut rails in eight places. Later, Corsairs and Skyraiders blasted the Sinpo boatyard, where they damaged at least five buildings, scattered lumber, and started one fire. In addition, props destroyed eight buildings and damaged four in a supply area. They also damaged eight boxcars. Eight props on Close Air Support in the I Corps area on the western sector killed 8 troops and wounded 33, destroyed 1 and damaged 1 bunker, destroyed 1 and damaged 1 mortar and destroyed 140 yards of trenches. For the first time pilots of VC-61 Detachment NAN flew photo missions in the F2H-2P's.

9/8/52: The Task Force replenished and no flights were launched. Drills were conducted in the afternoon.

9/9/52: One of the most effective missions flown from the BHR on this tour was the jet and prop strike on industrial targets at Puryong. The importance of the target may be inferred from the fact that the activity within the target area was so classified that it was not divulged to the pilots. The strike was a big success with the principal building being leveled and destroyed, and six of eight smaller buildings destroyed and 2 badly damaged. Moving over to a nearby carbide plant, the pilots of Air Group SEVEN gutted the main building and demolished or badly damaged all but one of the other buildings in the target area. In other flights, a morning NGF vectored fire from the CLAA JUNEAU so effectively the ship called their spotting "the best we've had since we've been out here." Jet reccos and strikes during the day claimed a total of thirty-two buildings damaged and three destroyed, twelve rail cars damaged and one destroyed, five rail cuts, one bridge destroyed and one damaged, one railroad crane damaged and one truck destroyed. Two Close Air Support flights lent assistance to the II ROK Corps and both achieved good results. Night hecklers completed the day's operations by destroying four trucks damaging four, and probably damaging several others.

9/10/52: In the first event of the day, jets on recco northwest and northeast of Hamhung destroyed five boxcars and twelve oxcarts causing a secondary explosion. They also destroyed two bridges and damaged two. In a coordinated strike of Panthers, Corsairs and Skyraiders, Kyosen hydro-electric plant number 1 received heavy damage. The large number of anti-aircraft guns present plus the repair activity underway attested to the importance of the plant, but reconstruction was set back months when three direct ATAR hits

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and several bomb hits by the props demolished one-third of the powerhouse and caused probable severe internal damage. The flak was effectively suppressed by the Panthers. Meanwhile an NGF flight at Wonsan achieved the day's most spectacular effect when, in destroying three buildings, it set off a huge explosion which the pilots said mushroomed and billowed like a minor atomic explosion. In the afternoon props and jets teamed up to inflict heavy damage to the locomotive and several cars of a train which had previously been stopped by PRINCETON planes north of Wonsan. At the same time, the main prop effort was being directed at supply areas and a factory near Kowon. Thirteen buildings were destroyed in the supply areas and four others were damaged. The factory was partially demolished and seven other buildings at that locatio were damaged or destroyed.

9/11/52: Due to inclement weather, operations for the day were cancelled, and the Task Force replenished. No flights were launched.

9/12/52: Dawn hecklers hit the Sindok lead and zinc mining facilities destroying two buildings and damaging three, and then went on to damage a four story factory and four other buildings northwest of Wonsan. In addition they scored three rail cuts and damaged a large boat. An early jet recco attacked a transformer yard near the Pujon Reservoir, causing the equipment to arc wildly for over five minutes. The yard was left billowing smoke. The same flight hit another jackpot a few minutes later when they surprised a large number of troops loading seven boxcars. When the shooting stopped, all seven cars were damaged and an estimated fifty casualties lay on the groun In the morning prop strike, one large and two smaller buildings were destroyed at the Taegumi factory near Kowon. With their remaining ordnance the pilots sought out the train stopped on 10 September. Although the enemy had camouflaged it, it was detected and further damaged. In other morning flights, jets attacked lumber mills and a variety of targets with good results. The props turned to soft spots in the enemy coastal rail system on the afternoon strike, and 100 feet of track were buried and a tunnel entrance damaged near Pukchong. South of Songjin, another 100 yards of track were ripped up. Three additional cuts were made and twelve boxcars damaged.

9/13/52: The BON HOMME RICHARD teamed up with the PRINCETON to strike with full strength at military installations, supply areas, transportation facilities, and industrial targets at Hoeryong near the Manchurian border. Both morning and afternoon strikes caught the enemy by complete surprise, and BHR planes hurled over 700 bombs down on pre-selected targets. A partial assessment of damage inflicted by BHR planes included a supply area and vehicle park demolished, three barrack areas heavily mauled, a marshalling yard cratered, two supply areas heavily hit, a large warehouse badly damaged, and fires started throughout the city. Near Hoeryong, a loaded troop train was stopped by morning flights and the locomotive, railcars and passengers were heavily strafed, causing severe damage to the locomotive and cars and an undeterminable number of casualties. The afternoon strike returned to the same train and inflicted further damage with bombs and machine gun fire. Some uneasiness was caused among the pilots on both strikes when the U.S.S. HELENA reported many bogies orbiting fifty miles to the east of the target. These planes were presumably a Soviet local defense force. At the conclusion of operations CTF 77 sent the following dispatch:

"IN THE FACE OF TODAYS DIFFICULT AND EXACTING SCHEDULE THE PERFORMANCE OF BOTH SHIPS AND AIR GROUPS WAS OUTSTANDING X A HEARTY WELL DONE TO ALL HANDS"

9/14/52: Corsairs and Skyraiders took off at dawn to work over a busily operating electro-metallurgy plant at Sungjibaegam in a mountainous mining area inland from Kilchu. Evincing a high degree of bombing skill, the flyers leveled the factory and wrecked six nearby storage buildings. With the remaining ordnance, they cratered tracks in the adjacent marshalling yard in twelve places, hit a stack of supplies which blew up with a violent explosion, and knocked out a turntable. During their return to the ship the pilots riddled a switch engine and shot up twenty sampans. A jet recco made the biggest news of the day when it caught a 130 foot naval-type vessel in the vicinity of Wonsan. After serious damage had been inflicted by rockets and 20 millimeters, three near misses broke the hull and the ship settled to the bottom. Jets and props struck the Kojo number 3 hydro plant and damaged the power house and penstocks. The same strike destroyed 25 rail cars in the vicinity of Wonsan.

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9/15/52: The Task Force replenished and no flights were launched. General drills were held in the afternoon.

9/16/52: Two strikes of Corsairs and Skyraiders virtually leveled the ore processing plant at Chonghak-tong, ten miles inland from Songjin. Attacking both morning and afternoon, the props scored several hits on the main plant and then went on to destroy eleven barracks or supply buildings and damaged ten to fifteen others. Another strike was directed against the fishing industry at Chaho in an effort to cut off a source of food supplies for enemy troops. The entire area was thoroughly worked over, and several large buildings plus an uncountable number of small buildings were demolished. When the planes departed, seventeen fires were observed burning in the area. An unestimable number of troops were undoubtedly killed or injured. In other flights throughout the day, dawn hecklers carried out marauding attacks from Yangdok to Songjin, shooting up trucks, bombing bridges and warehouses, blowing up oil storage tanks, and cutting rails. Jet reccos picked up where the hecklers left off and were particularly tough on oxcarts. Their final score was twenty-one destroyed. They also made sixteen or more rail cuts, damaged twenty boxcars, and destroyed or damaged four trucks and six buildings.

9/17/52: Pilots of the BON HOMME RICHARD teamed up with those from the newly arrived KEARSARGE in another of the concentrated attacks which began with the raids on the power plants in June. This day the mission was against pre-selected targets in the city of Tanchon. Attacking behind a wave of flak suppressing Panthers, the Skyraiders and Corsairs smashed at supply buildings, headquarters buildings, repair shops and other installations. Excellent coverage of the assigned areas was achieved, and several large fires were started. At nightfall the target areas were still smouldering. Later in the day, railroad repair shops in Hamjiwon were the targets for a prop strike. The two main buildings at that site were utterly demolished, and two other buildings were damaged. Ten to twelve small buildings at Chaho were also battered. Meanwhile, other porps destroyed a bridge at Wonsan and scored several rail cuts. Jets and night hecklers found good hunting on the highways. Panthers destroyed a total of twenty-two oxcarts and hecklers shot up twenty-five or more trucks, among other damage.

9/18/52: In the morning, props smashed at machinery repair shops and fishing facilities at Sinpo as a continuation of the effort to cut off supplies of fish to enemy ground forces. In an attack which severely battered buildings and installations throughout the area, Corsairs and Skyraiders completely destroyed the repair shops and eight nearby buildings, damaged or destroyed numerous buildings in the waterfront area, and started twelve fires. Later in the day, props hit a mining area about twenty miles east of Pukchong. In a highly successful attack, the pilots destroyed a dozen or more buildings and obliterated wide sections of the target area.

9/19/52: The Task Force replenished and no operations were conducted. General drills and anti-aircraft practice were conducted in the afternoon.

9/20/52: In the principal event of the morning, props and jets attacked a large supply area in the vicinity of the Changjin Reservoir. While Panthers worked over flak positions, the props blanketed the target with bombs. At least seventy percent of their ordnance fell in the area, and a majority were effective. Several secondary explosions were touched off, and two large fires were started. An afternoon jet recco north of Chongjin found lucrative targets along the rail lines. Attacking rail targets, repair shops, barracks and storage buildings, the jet pilots knocked out five to ten boxcars, made nine rail cuts and destroyed or damaged three or more buildings. The late prop strike destroyed over twenty buildings in an iron mining area twenty-five miles northwest of Tanchon. In addition, a large fire was started in an oil storage dump.

9/21/52: Corsairs and Skyraiders, diverted by weather from their primary target, struck at an iron mining area northwest of Tanchon, destroying nine and damaging two buildings. Secondary explosions followed the attack and clouds of black smoke billowed into the air. An afternoon prop strike hit the hydro-electric plant at Kyosen 1 once again. The plant had been damaged by previous strikes but was believed capable of being repaired. The capability was markedly reduced when the pilots blasted a large part of the

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powerhouse, cut a penstock, and smashed the transformer yard. Flames from burning oil leaped high into the sky, and a small building near the powerhouse was turned into an inferno. In spite of efforts to suppress flak in the area, the planes were harried by intense automatic weapons fire. No damages were suffered. At the same time, props hit a supply area just south of the border town of Hoeryong. Five buildings were destroyed, another was left burning and one was damaged. Three rail cuts were made. During the day jet reccos made three rail cuts, damaged a highway bridge, seven buildings, two boxcars and destroyed four trucks.

9/22/52: The featured strike of the morning attacked pre-selected targets at Taedok-tong near Hoeryong, destroying a transformer and switching station and damaging or destroying several other buildings in the area. A large fire and secondary explosion followed the attack. Meanwhile, the first close air support mission in several days smashed two gun positions and fifteen bunkers in an attack on enemy installations opposite the IX U.S. Corps. One secondary explosion was caused. Coverage and effectiveness were rated at ninety percent, and the controller gave the performance a grade of excellent. A NGF flight working with the British destroyer OLDFIELD in the vicinity of Tanchon destroyed seven buildings and left three burning. Later in the day the principal afternoon prop strike divided its attentions between railroad repair facilities about twenty-five miles north of Hamhung and a factory area at Chuuronjang. Five buildings were destroyed at the former target, while at Chuuronjang a foundry and eight other buildings were damaged or destroyed. Huge explosions were set off, and clouds of orange smoke swirled to 3000 feet. While photographing flak positions south of Wonsan, a Banshee piloted by LT C. H. Yeagle, Officer-in-Charge of VC-61 Detachment NAN, suffered a direct 37 millimeter hit. The projectile penetrated the aircraft and exploded in the vicinity of the cockpit, causing a compound fracture of the pilot's right elbow and wounding him with shrapnel. The plane's electrical, radio, and landing gear actuating systems were knocked out, but LT Yeagle was able to pilot it to the closest friendly field and affect a wheels-up landing. The pilot was later reported to be in good condition. Night hecklers capped an active day by shooting up traffic on the highways. One of the pilots caught a stream of ammunition trucks crossing a bridge at Hamhung, and his expert attack resulted in an even dozen violent explosions in rapid succession.

9/23/52: The Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted. Drills were held in the afternoon.

9/24/52: The scheduled departure for port was cancelled. The BHR remained on the line to permit the ESSEX to go to Sasebo for catapult repairs. With General Mark Clark, Commander in Chief United Nations Forces and Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, USN, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, witnessing operations from the deck of the KEARSARGE, Corsairs and Skyraiders of the BHR took off at dawn to hit a highway bridge and a supply dump in "Death Valley" south of Wonsan. Attacking without benefit of flak suppression by jets, the planes were met in their dives by an eruption of fire from over twenty multiple automatic weapons positions and at least ten heavy guns. At one time smoke from 350 to 400 terminal bursts hung in the air. The violent evasive maneuvers necessary to avoid serious losses prevented accuracy in bombing and in flak suppression; consequently after the initial run the flight was diverted to interdiction work. Two skyraiders suffered flak damage in the attack but were able to return to the Task Force and land aboard. Dawn hecklers and jets took turns in working over a locomotive and twelve boxcars which had been stopped during the night near Songjin. Rails were cut fore and aft, several cars were heavily damaged, and the engine was badly shot up, when finally one of the jet pilots scored a direct rocket hit on the locomotive, causing serious damage. A later jet flight added to the destruction. At the end of the day the following dispatch was received:

"THE PERFORMANCE OF TF 77 DURING THE VISIT OF CINC UNITED NATIONS WAS MOST GRATIFYING X THE BOMBARDMENT BY IOWA WAS FINE EXAMPLE IN PRECISION WORK X THE CARRIER AIR CRAFT PERFORMANCE WAS MOST EFFICIENT AND EXCELLENT X GENERAL CLARK PRAISED THE WORK OF ALL HANDS X WELL DONE X VICE ADMIRAL CLARK"

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9/25/52: Bad weather prevented the conduct of flight operations.

9/26/52: BHR pilots returned to action in spite of marginal weather in many localities. Hecklers started the day by attacks on targets of opportunity along the highways and rail lines. Two bypass bridges were cut, twelve buildings damaged or destroyed and highways cratered in several places. In a busy day of operations, Corsairs and Skyraiders virtually demolished a supply area near Chongjin during the morning, and in the afternoon delivered a severe battering to an important and active tungsten mine at Kiju, southwest of Wonsan. An afternoon jet recco scored a direct hit on a powerhouse in the reservoir district and went on to rocket three buildings at a saw mill, shoot up an estimated thirty fishing boats, and demolish two oxcarts.

9/27/52: Air Group SEVEN and the BHR finished the period of operations with prop strikes on two more mining areas. At an iron mine near Chaho, Corsairs and Skyraiders demolished at least 12 buildings and damaged 17. Numerous other hits were observed but damage could not be assessed because of smoke, dust and shadows from the mountainous terrain. Later in the day the props, aided by flak suppressing panthers, struck at the Sindok lead and zinc mining facilities northwest of Songjin, destroying at least 10 buildings and causing violent secondary explosions. Other damage at the target was obscured by smoke. On the return to the carrier one of the planes scored a direct hit on a railroad bridge dropping 1 span.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Material

Numerous casualties occurred to 40MM power drive equipment and sound powered telephone circuits. Casualties were attributed in most cases to insulation breakdown in electrical cable. All casualties were corrected by the Ship's Force.

The MK1A Computer #2 was out of commission for four days during the operating period for the purpose of eliminating large generated bearing rate errors.

Fifteen cases of unserviceable tail fuzes AN-M 102A1 were received from replenishment ships. These fuzes had been repacked by McAllister N.A.D., January 1952 without arming vanes and shipped to the forward area.

2. Ordnance Expended

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	96 Rounds
40MM	677 Rounds

AIRCRAFT

Bombs		Rockets	
150	2000# G.P.	20	3.5" Solid
564	1000# G.P.	1746	5" & 6.5" ATAR
709	500# G.P.		
2591	250# G.P.	Gun Ammo	
1068	100# G.P.		
614	260# Frag	291,212	20MM
67	100# Incend.	208,320	.50 Cal.
24	Napalm Fire Bombs		
		Parachute Flares	
		339	MK5 & MK6

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3. Deck Evolutions

During this period, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside fifteen (15) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies, and received twenty-nine (29) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers and freight. All transfers were accomplished expeditiously and without casualty. The need for a station to station phone circuit has been noted when replenishing from an AF.

4. Training

Three A.A. practices were conducted with satisfactory results.

A continuous program of training including on the job training has been followed. This training has been accelerated in an attempt to remedy the critical shortage of First and Second Class Petty Officers.

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Damage to Ship

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

21 planes were hit and damaged by flak during this period. Three planes were damaged by bomb blast.

3. Loss of Aircraft

None

4. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Buildings	217	556
Pulp Mill	0	1
Lumber Mills	1	2
Grainery	0	1
Railroad Station	0	1
Railroad Repair Buildings	4	0
Observation Post	0	1
Powerhouses	0	6
Turntable	1	0
Bunkers	30	5
Gun Positions	18	5
Transformer Yards	2	5
Switch Yards	2	0
Penstocks	0	2
Piers	1	1
Transformers	0	2
Boats	32	351
Patrol Ship	1	0
Vehicles	50	79
Oxcarts	89	12
Supply Tanks	0	3
Coke Ovens	0	2
Log Dam	0	1
Ore Stations	0	2
Mortars	8	1
Tunnels	0	3
Locomotives	1	8
Railroad Cars	28	244
Highway Bridges	3	27
Railroad Bridges	0	21
Railroad Bypass	0	1
Railroad Repair Car	0	1

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Highway Cuts	9
Rail Cuts	194
Troops Killed (Probable)	59
Troops Killed (Confirmed)	18
Troops Wounded In Action(Confirmed)	33

5. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, flak or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage, but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

The overall performance of personnel during this period was excellent and gave promise of even further improvement. In spite of the serious shortage of rated personnel and the continual discharge or replacement of trained men by raw recruits, the level of efficiency was very high. The total absence of serious operational accidents, the high percentage of availability, the expeditious conduct of deck operations, the high level of maintenance and the small number of malfunctions of ordnance are clear indications of the outstanding performances by the maintenance, flight deck, and ordnance crews, as well as of the pilots themselves.

The steady improvement of personnel performance from the mediocre level, in the pre-deployment period, to its present high state is largely to be attributed to the intensive training program instituted at the time of departure for the forward area.

Air Group SEVEN continued and even improved the quality of its operations. This is evinced not only by the impressive amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy but to the low number of casualties and plane losses from all causes.

2. Casualties

An exceptional display of fine airmanship and cool courage was displayed on 22 September when Lt. Carl H. Yeagle, Officer-in-Charge of the VC-61 Photo Unit NAN aboard the Bon Homme Richard, received a direct hit on his plane from an automatic gun position south of Wonsan along the heavily defended rail route.

The shell exploded in the cockpit's right console, demolishing all electrical connections in Lt. Yeagle's Banshee and scattering shrapnel throughout the cockpit. The canopy glass was blasted out with the shattered pieces cutting his face. Shrapnel buried in his right arm fracturing his right elbow and causing profuse bleeding. Part of the control cables were sheared by the blast and only limited control of the aircraft was possible. His parachute was shredded in several places.

Displaying admirable coolness and a determined will to stay conscious, Lt Yeagle piloted his crippled Banshee south towards the front line U.N. Strip at K-18. Since his radio gear was only a mass of twisted metal he had no way of communicating his difficulty to his escort or to ground emergency facilities. However, his alert escort, Lt Frank Cronin of VF-72, flying an F9F-2 Panther, quickly realized the situation and after closely observing the plane and Lt. Yeagle in the cockpit, went into immediate action. Lt. Cronin alerted the rescue stations and crash facilities at K-18 and closely escorted Lt. Yeagle to the strip. Because of Lt. Yeagle's condition

Lt. Cronin refused to land first on the single strip field although he knew the crash landing of the photo plane might prevent a clear runway for his aircraft.

Upon arrival at K-18, Lt. Yeagle weakened by loss of blood and suffering from pain from his broken arm, exhausted all means to lower his landing gear and flaps. Bracing his useless right arm between the stick and his stomach he brought his plane in for a necessarily fast, wheels up, no flaps approach. With precision he brought his crippled Banshee over the strip, flying it into a smooth emergency landing. Sliding down the Marston matting, he displayed cool headwork to the very end by skidding his aircraft off the left side of the runway surface to allow his escort, dangerously low on fuel, a clear strip for landing.

The entire incident was a sterling example of combat flying at its best, graphically illustrating the teamwork, precision, and courage that has made carrier Naval Aviation what it is today.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Intelligence

a. General

(1) The early shift of emphasis from the see-saw battle of interdiction, which had a strong tendency to engender an attitude of futility among pilots, to the apparently more effective - and certainly more interesting - program of wrecking the industrial potential of North Korea, has had a noticeably profound effect on the morale of pilots. The feeling of accomplishment, so seldom present in former operations, is now ever present.

Credit for this is due in no small measure to Commander Carrier Division ONE and his staff in obtaining and effectively utilizing all sources of intelligence, especially that obtained from photographic missions. With few exceptions, all missions were well planned and coordinated, resulting in stinging blows to the enemy.

(2) It is noteworthy that no pilots or planes were lost during the period. This is especially gratifying in view of the number of missions flown and the large number of anti-aircraft weapons in use by the enemy. Success in the avoidance of losses may be attributed to careful briefing and planning of missions, to the high quality of leadership and pilot performance, to effective flak suppression and evasion tactics, and to rigid adherence to the rules of safety which have been developed and tested both in World War II and in the present war in Korea.

b. Photographic Interpretation

During this period, target photos and mosaics were provided to every pilot on every strike mission. A comparatively large quantity of mapping was done of cities, power plants, and industrial areas. The use of 9 X 18 inch photography proved very beneficial in that prints containing more coverage with less runs and a larger scale were obtained.

Through photo interpretation, numerous lucrative targets were located and later successfully attacked by Task Force aircraft. Among these were a suspected underground storage area which was photographed at an exceptionally large scale and targeted. Later, this target was hit by aircraft of the U.S.S. ESSEX and resulted in secondary explosions with flames rising to 4000 feet. Another such target was a storage building at the Carbide factory at Puryong which, when hit by a single rocket, caused a tremendous secondary explosion that completely demolished and eliminated any trace of the building. At least two underground factories were detected and later attacked.

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Numerous unknown targets were located by assigning photo pilots to photograph any suspicious or promising areas. Mines, transformer stations, factories and storage areas were located in this manner and many of them later successfully attacked.

An example of the efficiency of photographic interpretation was displayed after attacks on selected targets at Hoeryong, on the Manchurian border. Photographs were taken after the first morning strike, developed and analyzed one and one half hours after the photo plane returned. These clearly showed that damage was not so great as the pilots had reported. As a result, a second strike was launched and the job was completed.

Because the Communists have recently fortified the power plants, mines, and storage centers with many new flak positions, the peripheral areas of intended targets have been photographed, as well as the targets themselves, so that flak suppression could be successfully utilized in coordination with the strikes.

c. Flak

ComCarDiv ONE has developed a method of distributing flak information which graphically shows the general flak situation in Korea. All confirmed gun positions, 37 MM or larger, are plotted on a 1:250,000 scale chart. This chart is then photographed and 8 by 10 inch reproductions are distributed to all ship's intelligence offices. Although it is impossible to pinpoint gun positions on a chart of this scale, the plot can be used advantageously by squadron AI's in briefing Recco Missions and in showing heavy flak concentrations to be avoided. An Index giving a complete list of the coordinates of all gun positions shown on the flak map is also provided. Flak is also listed by rail and recco routes. This Index makes it possible to plot the positions on a 1:50,000 scale chart for use in briefing pilots on flak suppression and strikes. It is felt that ComCarDiv ONE has taken a definite step toward the solution of the problem of flak distribution with this method.

2. Combat Information Center

a. Radar

During this period all radar and IFF equipment operated satisfactorily except for three minor interruptions that were quickly rectified by the technicians and caused no serious effects on the normal functioning of CIC. The ET's have consistently done an excellent job of preventive maintenance on all electronic gear and are largely responsible for the very few periods that any of these units have been out of service.

The SM Radar that has been totally unreliable for the past year has finally reached a stage of reliability. The radar technicians have finally solved the mysteries of this ancient piece of equipment and during the last 24 days of operations with TF-77 the SM has been in operation 95% of the time.

b. Training

A syllabus has been arranged for the indoctrination training of CIC personnel exchanged from other types of ships in accordance with ComAirPac Instruction 3560.1. To date there have been 3 officers and 4 enlisted men from destroyers in the Task Force who have been aboard and familiarized with the operating procedures and equipment in this ship's CIC. Upon completion of 3 or 4 days TAD in witnessing a CV type CIC and actual flight operations, these personnel gain considerable knowledge and insight of Carrier CIC operations. A similar indoctrination program has been in effect during the past two months for all JOOD's aboard this ship. Such training will provide a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of CIC to deck watch officers.

Personnel, both officer and enlisted, are being rotated between CIC and Air Operations (Air Plot) in order to widen the scope of their training and make them available for watch standing in either CIC or Air Operations.

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a. General

The period of this report embraces the transitional period from the southern to the northern monsoon seasons. As a result weather conditions became more condusive to flying with only three non-operational days for the entire period.

On September 6, about forty eight (48) hours after the passage of typhoon Mary across the Sea of Japan, streaks of sea fog were encountered. It is believed that winds from the storm caused upwelling of cold water which resulted in the formation of fog and marginal flying conditions in the operating area.

Two other non-operational days were experienced with the passage of frontal systems across the Sea of Japan.

b. Aerological Data

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Winds

Prevailing Direction and Percent of Period

South	20%
Southwest	17%
West	16%
North	11%
Northeast	13%
East	9%
Southeast	9%
Northwest	5%

Average wind velocity 12 knots

Calm winds	8 hours
Wind over 30 knots	10 hours
Wind over 20 knots	33 hours

Strongest wind north northeast 35 knots

Air Temperature

Average for period	69° F
Average Daily Max.	71° F
Average Daily Min.	67° F
Max. for period	77° F
Min. for period	55° F

Sea Temperature

Average for period	75° F
Max. for period	86° F
Min. for period	70° F

Ceiling

Unlimited	46%
10,000 or higher	24%
Below 10,000	30%

Percent of Ceiling Below 10,000 Feet

5,000 to 10,000	22%
2,500 to 5,000	35%
1,000 to 2,500	30%
Under 1,000	13%

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