USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
Care Fleet Post Office
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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

ORIGINAL

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 7 August 1952 through 18 August 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951
(b) CinCPacFlt INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 7 August 1952 through 18 August 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

While enroute to Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, for a scheduled period of upkeep, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD received COMSEVENTHFLT Confidential dispatch 061326Z August and CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 061920Z August which directed the transfer of COMCARDIV 1, Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, USN, to the USS PRINCETON upon arrival at Yokosuka and the USS BON HOMME RICHARD to proceed immediately to rejoin Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE about 091100I August. The BHR was to relieve the USS BOXER, which had been seriously damaged by fire.

The USS BON HOMME RICHARD entered Yokosuka Harbor at 0640I, 7 August 1952, and anchored at 0720I. COMCARDIV 1 and staff transferred to the USS PRINCETON in the morning, and at 1215I, in accordance with the dispatches cited, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, with Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the combat area via Van Dieman Straits. General Drills were held and anti-aircraft firing conducted enroute.

At 0808I, 9 August 1952 the BHR joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in TARE area in the sea of Japan. The Task Force was commanded by COMCARDIV 3, Rear Admiral A. Soucek, USN, embarked in the USS ESSEX. In addition to the ESSEX the Task Force was composed of the BON HOMME RICHARD and various heavy support and screening ships.

The mission of the ship was derived from Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order No. 22-51. During this period, the BON HOMME RICHARD devoted

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its major efforts to strikes on coastal gun emplacements on Hodo Pando Peninsula, the coastal rail system northeast of Hungnam, large scale attacks on troop and supply areas south of Wonsan, at Kilchu and Pukchong and Close Air Support missions near the bombline.

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

UNIT	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 8/9	OPERATIONAL A/C 8/18	PILOTS 8/9	PILOTS 8/18
COMCVG-7 CDR G. B. Brown				6*	6
VF-71 CDR J. S. Hill	16 F9F-2	14	16	24	24
VF-72 LCDR A. W. Curtis	16 F9F-2	15	16	24	24
VF-74 CDR C. D. Fonvielle Jr.	16 F4U-4	16	15	24	23
VA-75 CDR H. K. Evans	16 AD-4	15	16	24	24
VC-4 Det 41 LCDR E. S. Ogle OinC	4 F4U-5N	4	4	5	5
VC-12 Det 41 LCDR C. H. Blanchard OinC	3 AD-4W	3	3	6	6
VC-33 Det 41 LCDR R. Hoffmeister OinC	4 AD-4NL	5	5	6	6
	1 AD-3Q	0	0		
VC-61 Det Nan LT G. H. Yeagle OinC	3 F9F-2P	3	3	4	5

* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons. Two each are assigned to VF-71 and VF-72 and 4 are assigned to VA-75. CAG and Staff Operations Officers fly both AD's and F9F's.

In accordance with CTF Confidential dispatch 181305I, August 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed from the combat area and proceeded via Tsugaru Straits to arrive at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan at 0600I, 20 August 1952.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/9/52: The ship replenished. Gunnery exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

8/10/52: The Air Group commenced operations with an attack on pre-selected targets in Hamhung. Preceded by flak suppressing jets, AD's and

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F4U's attacked and further damaged RR By-Pass Bridges on the Songchon River and then, in quick succession, heavily damaged or destroyed a series of warehouses, barracks buildings and a billeting area creating many secondary explosions and fires. Simultaneously, other jets struck the Sindok Lead and Zinc Mines inflicting further damage on the already battered factory area. In other attacks, jets and F4U's destroyed trucks, a supply storage tent, a gun position, inflicted 12 rail cuts and damaged 8 boxcars in the Dog Victor Sector. The principal event of the day was a coordinated jet-prop strike against warehouses, barracks buildings and an ammunition dump at Pukchong. Bombing was reportedly accurate and secondary explosions rocked the area. Large fires, started at nine distinct points, were visible hours later. In addition jet photo planes flew within a few miles of the North Korean border to secure valuable photography.

8/11/52: A total of 52 jets and props struck troop concentrations and supply areas in the heavily defended Wonsan Valley throughout the day. Results were difficult to determine because of the undergrowth, but at least three gun positions were silenced, twenty two fires started and one large secondary explosion caused. Jets also struck in the vicinity of Pochonpyong destroying one lumber mill, damaging another mill and three buildings. Continuing with the interdiction program, jets and props accounted for seven rail cuts and damage to a RR tunnel. NGF planes heavily damaged a large factory building and 2 other buildings at Chongjin. Two F4U-5NL hecklers destroyed a large shore battery on the Hodo Pando Peninsula which had reportedly been bombarding friendly ships in the area. Six photographic sorties obtained good coverage of assigned areas.

8/12/52: Attacks against Hodo Pando Peninsula continued and 4 coastal guns were destroyed. In the forenoon, jets on armed recco heavily strafed 50 vehicles, damaged 6 supply buildings, 3 boxcars, 2 large warehouses, 8 barracks buildings and a steam shovel. AD's and F4U's effectively saturated large supply areas in the vicinity of Kamiong-Dong south of Wonsan. On interdiction, BHR planes made 20 rail cuts, destroyed a highway bridge and a RR bridge and also blew 1000 yards of track and repair sheds down the hillside at Package 2. Other flights accounted for the destruction of 9 buildings and damage to 14 vehicles. An estimated 31 troops were killed by strafing and fragmentation bombs.

8/13/52: At sea; the task force replenished. The night hecklers, which had been launched the night before, operated from friendly fields in Korea throughout the day spotting for "Monte Carlo" in Wonsan Harbor and surveying the rail lines along the main coastal route. Foul weather hampered scheduled operations but the hecklers succeeded in damaging 2 warehouses and another building, cratering a highway and damaging the approach to a railroad bridge. They also bombed the Wonsan Airfield.

8/14/52: Jets were off at a early hour to attack supply centers far to the north. 2 warehouses were destroyed and 1 heavily damaged; 3 other buildings and 4 trucks were damaged. AD's and F4U's attacked troop billeting areas and supply buildings at Kilchu. 11 buildings and 2 repair quarters were destroyed, 2 buildings were heavily damaged and left in flames, 3 boxcars were damaged. On a Close Air Support mission, AD's and F4U's, greeted with the words of controller River Rat Willy, "We'll get some action now, here comes the Navy", destroyed 2 gun positions which had been harassing units of the 1st ROK Corps in the Eastern Sector of Korea. On another close air support mission BHR planes blasted and destroyed 3 gun positions and 6 bunkers in the Tenth U. S. Corps Sector. Large fires followed the attack and secondary explosions shook the area. In the afternoon AD's again assisted "Monte Carlo and destroyed another coastal gun at a cave entrance on the Hodo Pando Peninsula. After the attack "Monte Carlo" said "Anyone in that cave will have to be carried out".

8/15/52: Weather over the target areas hampered operations and the majority of strikes were cancelled. A Close Air Support mission again provided support to the 1st ROK Corps in the Eastern Sector and the controller reported 90% coverage. Results of other missions consisted of 5 rail cuts, 1 highway bridge and 1 building destroyed; 3 buildings, 1 factory, 2 boxcars and 1 highway bridge damaged.

8/16/52: Foul weather precluded air operations over the target areas. Sorties were limited to combat air and anti-submarine patrols, weather reccos and ferry hops.

8/17/52: Major efforts were devoted to replenishment. Gunnery exercises were conducted in the afternoon.

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8/18/52: Typhoon "Karen" which had been slowly moving north from Okinawa reached the southern tip of Korea, and weather over North Korea was non-operational. A scheduled strike by the Bon Homme Richard, the Princeton and the Essex against the Chosen hydro-electric complex was cancelled. General drills and Gunnery exercises were conducted.

Because of the likelihood of bad weather for several days, the Bon Homme Richard was detached during the afternoon from Task Force 77, instead of on 20 August 1952 as scheduled, to return to Yokosuka for a belated period of rest, recreation and upkeep.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Expended

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	77 Rounds
40 MM	1500 Rounds

AIRCRAFT

Bombs		Rockets	
24	2000# G.P.	4	3.5 Solid
121	1000# G.P.	482	6.5 ATAR
236	500# G.P.		
260	250# G.P.	Gun Ammo	
343	100# G.P.		
477	260# Frag	74,625	20 MM
120	100# Incend.	71,375	.50 Cal.
18	MK 78-0		

2. Deck Evolutions

During this period, the BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside six (6) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies and received eight (8) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers and freight. All transfers were accomplished expeditiously and without casualty. The cooperative spirit and teamwork displayed by replenishing vessels is considered commendable.

3. Hung Ordnance

Of 409 rockets expended by F9F type aircraft, the following malfunctions are listed. This is exclusive of 2 dropped on the catapult and 2 dropped during arrested landings:

Broken electrical leads	6
Rockets becoming unplugged	4
Dud rockets	16
Total Casualties	26

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The following malfunctions are listed from the expenditure of 36 rockets by F4U type craft:

Broken electrical leads	3
Rockets becoming unplugged	0
Dud rockets	2
Total Casualties	5

Malfunctions on rockets expended by AD's are as follows:

Broken electrical leads	0
Rockets becoming unplugged	0
Dud rockets	2
Total Casualties	2

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Damage to Ship

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

Date	Type	Plane No.	E	Cause		Damage
10 August	AD-4	128949	ITI	AA	D-3	Flak, vertical fin.
10 August	F4U-4	97082	ITI	B	D-3	Empty brass hit leading edge, port wing.
10 August	F9F-2	123419	ITI	AA	D-3	37MM direct hit on starboard wing and droop snoot.
11 August	F4U-4	80795	ITI	AA	D-3	Flak, port aileron.
12 August	F4U-4	97370	ITI	AA	D-3	Flak, both wings.
12 August	F4U-4	81006	ITI	AA	D-3	Minor flak, starboard elevator.
12 August	F9F-2	123416	ITI	AA	D-3	Flak, starboard wing, tip tank, fuselage.
14 August	F4U-4	81985	IS2	AA	D-3	One 30 cal. bullet hole port aileron.
14 August	AD-4	129008	ITI	AA	D-3	One 50 cal. bullet hole starboard wing.
14 August	F9F-2	123484	ITI	B	D-3	Two rockets, fired simultaneously, collided ahead of plane and detonated. Fragment entered tip tank.

3. Operational Damage

Date	Type	Time	Buno	E	F	G	H	Remarks
10 August	F9F-2	1815	127123	ITI	A	L	D-3	Port landing gear folded on landing.

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4. Loss of Aircraft

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu. No.	Cause
8/14/52	VF-74	F4U	97372	Crashed during diving attack over Korea. Presumed to be hit by flak.

5. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Buildings	22	31
Factory Buildings	0	1
Factory Areas	0	1
Barracks Buildings	3	15
Barracks Areas	1	2
Vehicles	19	12
Cranes	1	0
Steam Shovel	0	1
Railroad Cars	3	24
Railroad Bridges	2	3
Highway Bridges	2	9
Gun Positions	12	2
Blockhouses	0	1
Observation Post	0	1
Warehouses	4	9
Supply Dumps	1	9
Lumber Mills	1	1
Ammunition Dumps	1	0
Supply Tent	1	0
Fuel Storage Facilities	0	1
Bunkers	6	0
Airfields	0	1
Repair Crew Quarters	2	0
Power Plants	0	1
Tunnels	0	4
Smoke Stacks	0	1
Sampans	0	1
Animals (killed)	8	
Troops (killed)	33	
Rail Cuts	49	
Craters to Highway and Bridge Approaches	3	

6. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, flak or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance

Although the anticipation of the scheduled in-port activities was dampened by the directive to turn around at Yokosuka and proceed immediately to the line, the officers and men of the Bon Homme Richard were exceptionaly sympathetic to the need to relieve the Boxer and accepted the additional

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period of combat operations involved in splendid spirit. A large delivery of mail at Yokosuka bolstered morale considerably.

Ninety-three calendar days have passed since the Bon Homme Richard departed from the states. Of these, there were only 16 days on which liberty could be granted. The average number of times for liberty, taking into account restrictions as ready carrier at Sasebo and the normal liberty schedule, would not exceed seven.

The Bon Homme Richard has now been at sea for 50 consecutive calendar days. Thus, this is the longest period of sustanined operations since its recommissioning in January 1951.

Definite indications of chronic fatigue have been noted among the crew and especially ordnance and flight deck personnel. All hands are naturally looking forward to rest and relaxation in port.

On arrival in the combat area 9 August 1952, the ship was greeted with the following dispatch from CTF 77:

"YOU ARE A FRIEND INDEED X QUICK TRIP OUT HERE AND YOUR READY STATUS MOST CREDITABLE"

The following dispatch was received from CTF 77 as the ship departed the combat area on 18 August 1952:

"YOUR PERFORMANCE AS RELIEF PITCHER WAS GREAT X FOR INNING COMING UP TAKE TWO AND HIT TO LEFT"

Needless to say, the foregoing dispatches were greatly appreciated by the Officers and Men of the Bon Homme Richard.

2. Casualties

On 15 August 1952 while on a strike mission, Ensign Donald E. ADAMS, USN, 505123 went into a dive from 8000 feet at a 30 degree angle and descended toward the target. The plane continued on down to the ground, crashed and exploded. The pilot was presumed to be killed.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. NAVIGATION DEPARTMENT

During the summer months when the weather is hot and humid and the typhoon season is at hand, it is recommended that ships proceeding to and from the Task Force and Yokosuka be routed via Tsugaru Kaikyo, the strait between the Japanese Islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. This route is consid-

erably cooler and one or two hundred miles shorter (depending on departure or arrival point in area "Sugar"). There are less restricted waters, fewer fishing fleets to encounter, and the route requires the service of an escort for a shorter period of time. It also offers a change of scenery from the Van Dieman route and trains and indoctrinates CIC and bridge personnel in the available navigational aids and geography of an additional part of Japan.

B. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Air Intelligence

a. General

During this period, two photographic reconnaissance pilots of the Fifth Air Force were aboard for indoctrination in Carrier Operations. From them, it was learned that the Charlie Uncle and Charlie Tare Sectors of North Korea are photo-mapped weekly by the Air Force and mosaic maps of these areas are made for photographic interpretation purposes. Such material would be of inestimable value to the ships and air groups for briefing, orientation, photo comparison and planning purposes. It is therefore suggested that arrangements be made with the Fifth Air Force for the distribution of copies of these mosaics to the operating carriers.

2. Combat Information Center

a. Intercept Control

CIC had control of either strikes or CAP daily during this period. This provided good training for the newer Air Controllers in conducting air intercepts. Either a section or division of CAP was used against friendly strike units returning to the force. Permission to do this was generally granted by the Flag CIC Officer. This was not only good training for the Air Controllers but also for the pilots as it helped to familiarize them with air intercept technique and standard voice procedure. The pilots on CAP missions prefer exercise of this kind rather then spend the entire airborne period orbiting over a fixed area.

b. Talkers

CIC, on this ship is located on the number 7 deck which isolates it from the bridge, air plot and primary fly. This situation has made it imperative that CIC have properly trained talkers on sound-powered telephones and this presents a continuing training task. Every effort is made to pass and receive the major part of information within the ship via the sound-powered telephones

and to use the MC circuits for emergencies or as little as possible in order to keep the noise level low so as not to impair the operating efficiency of CIC.

3. Aerology

During the period covered, there were two and one half non-operational days. A cold front oriented EAST-WEST stagnated over North Korea at about latitude 40°N causing multiple overcast over most of the target areas.

Typhoon "Karen" moving slowly northward was off the southwest tip of Korea on the 17th of August. The Task Force took evasive maneuvers by steaming 300 miles to the east of the Operating Area. The typhoon then accelerated and made a quick passage of the Korean Peninsula. In doing so, the intensity of the storm was reduced from 80 to 50 knot winds. After the period of this report the storm diminished in intensity and moved rapidly north-east across the Sea of Japan.

4. Photography

Photo missions were flown on four days with an average of five sorties per day consisting mostly of target search and photo mapping missions. The work load was greatly increased over normal and "around the clock" operations in the photo lab were necessary to satisfy requirements. The maximum production for one day was 11,349 8 x 10 inch prints. During the period, a total of 32,143 8 x 10 inch prints were produced. This number is more than half of the total production during the month of July.

It should be pointed out that this production took place during an unscheduled tour on the line. Consequently, there was an unexpected drain on inventories and supplies.

Moreover, Budget planning was based on the normal schedule periods of operation. Photographic requirements have been increased over the budget planning base and this factor plus the unplanned expenditures during the additional tour will probably require an increase in budgetary allowances.

C. ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. In scheduling operational periods and upkeep availabilities it is recommended that due consideration be given to the probable Engineering Department preventative maintenance work load, the necessity to complete a great number of mandatory ship's force repair items prior to further operation,

and the great and urgent need for Engineering Department personnel to receive adequate rest and relaxation. It is considered that personnel fatigue in this department is considerably greater than in other departments for the following reasons:

a. A greater percentage of personnel are standing watches on a relentless one in three in oppressively hot spaces.

b. A greater percentage are standing watches on a one in two (watch and watch) basis to permit one section to work on urgent machinery repair.

c. Shortage of petty officers causes a critical strain on rated personnel who must stand watches, supervise repairs, and conduct a vigorous training program.

d. Mandatory in-port repairs requires the same key personnel to forego much needed liberty and recreation to which they are entitled.

2. The following paragraphs supply supporting data for this recommendation:

a. From the departure of the ship from San Diego on 20 May until arrival in Yokosuka 20 August 1952 the ship has operated at sea 80 days out of a total of 93. During the 13 days in port the engineering department (ship) has been on 12 hours sailing notice.

b. In order to continue sustained operations, maintenance had to be accomplished on replenishment days and at night when less than full boiler power was required. Some repairs, however, could not be completed while the ship was underway. Continued use and wear on equipment causes rapid multiplication of the number of repairs required, and an increase in the manpower required for night work, eventually reaching a status where a routine night maintenance crew was employed.

c. This department maintains a complete Projected Ship's Force Work List by divisions, for all outstanding repairs, and an account of man-days expended for the week past. Following is the summary for the past two weeks; based on a 7-hour day, 6-day week:

SUMMARY OF MAN-DAYS EXPENDED FOR WEEK ENDING FRIDAY, 8 AUGUST 1952

DIV	AVAILABLE M/D	EXPENDED M/D	OVERTIME M/D
A	471.0	547.8	76.8
B	936.0	1356.0	420.0
E	522.0	682.0	160.0
M	570.0	739.0	169.0
R	516.0	612.0	96.0
ER	234.0	296.5	62.5
Totals	3249.0	4233.3	984.3

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SUMMARY OF MAN-DAYS EXPENDED FOR WEEK ENDING FRIDAY, 15 AUGUST 1952

DIV	AVAILABLE M/D	EXPENDED M/D	OVERTIME M/D
A	494.0	558.8	64.8
B	984.0	1512.0	528.0
E	576.0	643.0	67.0
M	600.0	906.0	306.0
R	252.0	358.5	106.5
ER	540.0	639.0	99.0
Totals	3446.0	4647.3	1171.3

d. The estimate of man-days to complete all outstanding repair and work items listed to date is as follows:

DIV	ESTIMATED M/D REQUIRED	AVAILABLE NEXT UPKEEP (20 AUG - 2 SEPT)
A	700.0	979.0
B	2038.0	2046.0
E	796.0	756.0
M	1031.0	1155.0
R	435.0	1001.0
ER	782.0	484.0
Totals	5782.0	6421.0

e. The above man-day avaiability is based on eleven (11) days times the number of men (total) in the division, and does not subtract compartment cleaners, mess cooks etc. Also, leave and liberty has not been cosidered. It is obvious that the granting of leave and liberty in the Engineering Department must be at the expense of uncompleted repairs. Repair items requested for completion by a tender or the Ship Repair Facility, are not included in the above. Therefore, items disapproved for completion by these facilities will increase the ship's force work load.

D. AIR DEPARTMENT

a. Operations Ashore

On 12 August, the day prior to a scheduled replenishment day, the VFN's and VAN's of VC-4 and VC-33 respectively were launched for a flight to K-18. The purpose of this flight was to put planes over the target while the task force replenished and provide NGF for "Monte Carlo" at Hodo Pando. The advantage of having planes over the target during nights prior to and after replenishment day, and during the day is unquestioned; however, operating carrier planes from fields ashore for brief periods of time presents many problems.

The lack of ordnance at K-18 necessitated loading the aircraft prior to the launch from the ship. Subsequent ordnance loading required a flight to K-6 a distance of 100 miles from K-18. In both cases a landing with an

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ordnance load had to be made at K-18, a strip made of Marston Matting, and, therefore, somewhat rough. The lighting facilities at this strip are at a bare minimum for night operations in that no taxi lights are provided.

Communications between CTF 77 and the aircraft were handled by dispatches via JOC Korea. The lack of adequate communications facilities at K-18 made communications between the task force and the VC planes unacceptably slow, and in some instances it failed altogether. It is recommended that CTF 77 employ an MHF circuit with K-18 for expeditious instructions.

The gasoline at K-18 is suspected of contamination because of the poor stowage and handling facilities. The carburetor of one aircraft had to be changed upon return to the ship due to impurities found in the gasoline.

The lack of parts, ordnance handling equipment, and qualified maintenance and ordnance personnel is not condusive to safe and efficient operations.

There is no briefing data available including weather, maps, and authentication tables.

The living accomodations at K-18 are not adequate. Flying with the task force on operational days and from a base ashore on replenishment days does not afford the VC pilots and crewman the rest gained by other pilots of the Air Group.

When the VC planes are absent from the ship, while based ashore, the ship has actually lost control of them. A weakness in protection to the task force has been brought about because of the non-availability of VFN aircraft for the setting of conditions of readiness for launching during hours of darkness.

It is believed that until such time as better facilities and trained and adequate personnel can be established ashore, the advantages of basing VC aircraft ashore during replenishment periods is offset by the many disadvantages now existing.

E. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Operations

a. Close Air Support

Small scale charts are considered highly desirable if frequent close air support operations are to be conducted. At present, 1:50,000 charts are the smallest scale available.

Considerable trouble has been experienced on close air support missions in establishing communications with mosquito planes on assigned channels. Initial contacts have been made with TACP without trouble. It is recommended that all commands engaged in this type of operations check the accuracy of crystal frequencies before flying these missions.

b. Use of Yodo Island

During the reporting period one AD-4 landed at Yodo Island after losing power, and immediately after the landing the engine froze. However, the aircraft was not damaged except for requiring an engine change.

2. Ordnance

a. Rockets

There have been several instances of 6.5" ATAR MK 2 and 5.0" ATAR MK 25 rockets making erratic flights:

(1) Rockets streaming a mass of sparks in their wakes.

(2) Rockets suddenly deviating from their line of flight.

(3) Rockets or rocket motors exploding ahead of the aircraft at approximately three or four hundred yards.

(4) On one occasion, rockets when fired in pairs, collided and exploded ahead of the aircraft, and in some instances metal fragments have struck the launching aircraft with sufficient force to enter fuel tanks or to pierce the skin of the aircraft.

3. Oxygen, Parachutes and Survival

a. Oxygen

On the unmodified ESSEX type aircraft carriers oxygen replenishment is accomplished by use of the Walter Spen oxygen cart. This process has proven to be slow and wasteful because of the clumsiness and size of the cart, movement of which around the ship, whether by tractor or manually, is difficult due to the limited space between parked aircraft. Waste of oxygen occurs due to the fact that it is virtually impossible to drain the pressure in the cart cylinders below 900 PSI.

b. Parachutes

Parachute packing space aboard this type CV is inadequate for anything other than repacking one chute at a time. Very limited storage space is available and no provisions are made for repairs to survival equipment such as MK 3 exposure suits. Only one sewing machine is available, thus requiring parachute riggers to work in relays in order to accomplish the minimum sewing required.

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c. Survival

Adequate space for hanging of MK 3 exposure suits during periods of warm weather is lacking on this type ship, and efforts should be made to obtain stowage spaces. Suitable hangers for these suits have been improvised from 3/4" plyboard. These hangers provide the necessary strength and shape required for repair for neck seals, while at the same time present no rough or sharp edges which might tear the seals.

The CRC-7 radio, while still the best available rescue radio that the Navy has, is inadequate. Many failures have occurred during the first period of operating on the line.

The ADSK-1 droppable survival kits has required much work and modification. This kit is designed only for cold weather survival. In order to adapt it to summer survival some items have been removed and other items added. The entire contents of the kits have been placed in a canvas container to facilitate removal when dropped to a downed airman.

Items Removed	Items Added
Winter Helmet	Additional Rations
Winter Boots	Mosquito Headnet
Winter Pants	Four extra MK 13 Modo Flares
Winter Coat	One Qt. Canteen of water
	CRC-7 Radio
	A/C Type First Aid Kit
	One roll of toilet paper

The ADSK-1 has been carried exclusively by AD's in this Air Group, and during the first operating period, due to malfunctions in the ordnance wiring, five kits were dropped involuntarily. This situation has been remedied by connecting wing station #12 directly to a switch located on the starboard cockpit console and disconnecting it from the outer-station cockpit selector. Since this modification, no ADSK-1's have been lost due to inadvertant releases. The ADSK-1 is carried only on station #12 of those aircraft that have been modified in the above manner.

3. Personnel

a. One photographic rating in VA-75 is not sufficient to handle the work required. More and more AD aircraft are doing photo work, and at least one and possibly two trained AFAN's should be assigned to handle the work load.

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F. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. Admissions to the Sick List during 9 day Operating Period

a. 19 patients admitted to the sick list.
b. Total of 66 sick days out of a possible 23,712 work days.
c. .2% of possible work days lost to sick days.
d. Three pilots were admitted to the sick list.

Diagnosis: (1) Cyst, pilonidal - 3 days
(2) Redundant Prepuce - 1 day
(3) Injuries, Multiple, Extreme - 0 days

e. There was one patient admitted to the sick list from another vessel and three were carried forward on the sick list from other vessels with a total loss of 30 sick days.

2. Treatments Accomplished - Non-Admission

a. Medical ———————— 293
b. Surgical ———————— 170
c. Veneral Disease ———— 2
(1) Gonorrhea ———— 2

3. Pilot and Crewman Status

a. Killed in Action

(1) Pilots ———— 1

b. Grounded Personnel

	Physical		Post Accident Psychological		Disp. Board	
	No.	Days	No.	Days.	No.	Days
Crewman	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pilots	11	31	0	0	0	0

Total Pilot days possible ———— 1,080
Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding ———— 31
.3% pilot days lost to sick days and grounding.

4. Accidents involving plane loss, injury or death

a. Combat

(1) The sole loss during this period occurred on 15 August 1952 when ENS Donald E. ADAMS, VF-74, in an F4U-4, continued on down in an attack dive crashing, exploding and burning upon impact. Survival was not considered possible.

5. Condition of the Crew

The continuous and rapid rate of operations has resulted in an increased strain on personnel to the extent that an increase in minor accidents was noticeable. It is again recommended that three weeks be the maximum for operations of this type.

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G. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

1. **Training**

During this period, the department, in its continuous training and improvement program, stressed time and motion factors, technical procedures and economy maintenance. Definite progress in training has been made.

2. General

405 patients were treated during the period with a total of 544 tooth restorations. This figure is inclusive of two emergency cases from the USS Mount Baker.

3. Radiological Film Badges

In accordance with the Radiological Defense Bill of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD, the Dental Officer is responsible for the Photodosimetry Laboratory, the issuing of film badges, and the keeping of records of personnel exposure. These badges are to be issued to all personnel aboard ship which now totals 3,042. This collateral duty was undertaken on this tour. The technique and details concerning the badges as developed by Glen Penrose Moffat, DN are included herein as they may prove beneficial to other units.

The badge is plastic 2 x 3 inches and of .02 thickness and waterproof. A card insert containing the name, rate and serial number of the holder is 1½ x 2 inches. The film is 1 5/8 x 1¼ inches (X-ray standard dental X-ray periapical). The foil is 2" long.

The badges are produced as follows: Two pieces of plastic are laminated on three sides with the identification card therein. One side is left open for insertion of the X-ray film. The plastic with card enclosed is then heated for 30 seconds and cooled for 120 seconds. The film is then inserted in the packet with the foil wrapped over one end. The top side of the packet is then sealed by acetone and a grommet is inserted in the top for added strength and for a means of attachment.

The estimated time for the production of 3,042 badges is broken down as follows:

Cutting of plastic	6 hours
Cutting of cards	6 hours
Cutting of tabs	4 hours
Lamination	120 hours
Typing of cards	30 hours
Insert of films and foils	8 hours
Total	172 hours

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PART VII

OPERATING STATISTICS

A. SUMMARY OF MISSIONS

Type Mission	F9F	F4U	F4U5N	AD	ADN	ADW	Totals
Strike/Recco	102	68	-	94	-	-	264
CAP	99	-	-	-	-	-	99
Photo/Photo Escort	43	-	-	-	-	-	43
ECM Recco	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
TarCap	4	15	-	1	-	-	20
ResCap	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CAS	-	6	-	5	-	-	11
NGF Spot	-	8	2	2	4	-	16
Hecklers	-	-	8		10	-	18
ASP/AEW	-	-	-	-	-	18	18
Gator	-	9	-	4	5	-	18
WX Recco	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
Misc Slow Time Ferry Abort etc	10	-	10	1	19	4	44
	258	106	24	107	40	22	557
						Aborts -	5
			Total Sorties Flown -				552

Total Sorties Scheduled	553
Total Sorties Flown	552
% Total Scheduled Sorties Flown	99.8%
Total Hours Flown	1198.1
Days of Operations	7
Average Hours per Operating day	171.2

B. ANALYSIS OF FLAK DAMAGE

Type	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
Sorties	149	111	116	376
Hits (heavy/AW)	2	3	1	6
Hits per 100 sorties	1.34%	2.7%	.86%	1.6%
Hits (SA)	0	2*	1	3
Hits (SA) per 100 sorties	0	1.8%	.86%	.8%
Total Hits	2	5	2	9
Total Hits/100 sorties	1.34%	4.2%	1.7%	2.4%
Aircraft Lost	0	1*	0	1
Aircraft Lost/100 Sorties	0	.9%	0	.2

* Aircraft lost over enemy territory. Loss is believed due to flak.

P. W. Watson
P. W. WATSON

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ORIGINAL

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Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, USS ANTIETAM (CV 36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV 21) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV 9) (1)
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CV 33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CV 34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47) (1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV 37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV 45) (1)
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE 116) (1)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE 115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119) (1)
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE 114) (1)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE 118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) (1)
CO, VF-73 NAS, QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
COMAIRLANT (1)
COMCARAIRGRU TWO (1)
COMCARAIRGRU FIVE (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ELEVEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU FIFTEEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU NINETEEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
COMCARAIRGRU SEVEN (25) (For Squadron and parent VC Units)
COMCARAIRGRU (ATU) ONE (1)
COMFAIRQUONSET (1)
COMSERVPAC (1)

[redacted]