ORIGINAL

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U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
Commander, Naval Forces, FAR EAST
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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Subj: Action Report for the period 10 August 1951 through 5 September 1951

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instructions 338.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 6 September 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 10 August 1951 through 5 September 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

After ten days of repairs and upkeep, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD departed Yokosuka, Japan 8 August 1951 and rejoined Task Force 77 in the action area 10 August 1951 by order of CTF-77 Confidential dispatch 041944Z. This area was near the coast of Korea close to the 38th parallel. The Task Force was commanded by RADM W. G. TOMLINSON aboard the USS BOXER (CV-21), and operated under Task Force Operation Plan 22-51 dated 1 July 1951. It was comprised of the USS BOXER (CV-21), USS PRINCETON (CV-37) and other units composing a submarine radar screen. Aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was Carrier Air Group 102. After 27 days of operations, the ship departed for port in Yokosuka, Japan for another period of maintenance and upkeep, leaving the action area on 5 September 1951.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

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The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H. N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 10 August 1951:

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. & TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
VF-781	32	18 F9F-2B
VF-783	23	16 F4U-4
VF-874	23	14 F4U-4
VA-923	25	16 AD-3 & AD-4Q
VC-3	4	5 F4U-5NL
VC-11	6	4 AD-4W
VC-35	6	2 AD-4N
VC-61	4	3 F9F-2P
CAG-102	2	1 AD-4Q
HU-1	2 (attached to ship)	1 HO3S

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

8/10/51: The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) reached the combat area for her third tour of duty in the Sea of Japan with air operations conducted from near the coast of Central Korea. 69 sorties were flown consisting of 19 defensive and 50 offensive missions. Combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, anti-sub patrol, photographic and naval gunfire spotting made up the day's missions. 1 oxcart, 2 bridges, 40 buildings, 18 railroad cars and 1 truck were destroyed. 22 buildings, 3 vehicles, 4 oxcarts and 27 railroad cars were damaged. Close air support had 80% coverage, and 6 troops were killed. Due to bad weather, a few of the originally scheduled sorties were diverted to reconnaissance as weather alternate targets.

8/11/51: 90 sorties were flown on this day with 22 defensive and 68 offensive missions. The missions consisted of night heckler attacks, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photographic flights. 36 buildings, 4 trucks , 9 boxcars, 13 oxcarts and 1 gun position were destroyed. 46 boxcars, 1 locomotive, 6 lumber piles, 12 buildings, 14 trucks, 5 vehicles, 13 bridges, 3 boxcars and 1 tunnel were damaged. 35 troops were killed. No estimate of close air support results was given. Two planes and pilots were lost in combat over enemy territory. Again weather obscured many targets.

8/12/51: This day was devoted to replenishment activities. The ship received 439,840 gallons of fuel oil from the USS PLATTE AO-24 in 1 hour and 14 minutes.

8/13/51: 69 sorties were flown; 12 defensive and 57 offensive. 4 buildings, 1 gun position and 9 trucks were destroyed. 7 boxcars, 23 trucks and 1 bridge were damaged. On events 15 and 16 consisting of 4 defensive and 18 offensive sorties, all ordnance was necessarily jettisoned as weather prevented carrying out the assigned missions. The missions consisted of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photographic, strikes and naval gunfire spotting.

8/14/51: This was one of those perfect days for CAG-102's pilots. All events ran off on schedule with 104 sorties launched, 24 defensive and 80 offensive. 34 trucks, 8 vehicles, 5 boxcars, 11 gun positions, 17 oxcarts, 1 block house, 1 gas storage tank, 3 boats and 1 building were destroyed. 1 railroad car, 5 buildings, 40 trucks, 4 oxcarts, 31 boxcars, 8 bridges, 1 railroad platform, 8 boats and 1 vehicle were damaged. 90 to 100% coverage was reported on close air support with 74 troops killed. On several events, estimates of damage could not be made as weather prevented observation of results. Combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photographic hops, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting were the missions flown.

8/15/51: This was another fruitful day with 102 sorties flown consisting of 21 defensive and 81 offensive missions. 3 trucks, 1 gun position, 12 buildings, 2 gondolas, 3 railroad cars, 7 oxcarts, 1 boat, 1 bridge, and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 2 gun positions, 8 buildings, 1 car, 13 bridges, 29 railroad cars, 1 oxcart, 1 boat, 4 vehicles and 3 tunnels were damaged. Close air support reported 90 to 100% coverage with 50 troops killed. The day included many raids on troops' living quarters with an untold toll of lives being taken. Weather hindered plane activities but combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photo hops, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting made up the day's missions.

8/16/51: This day was devoted to replenishment activities. The ship received 195,709 gallons of fuel oil from the USS CACAPON AO-52 in 1 hour 7 minutes.

8/17/51: 62 sorties were flown with 40 offensive and 22 defensive missions. Hecklers, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance and bridge strikes were flown. 1 gun position, 3 trucks, 17 railroad cars, 1 car, 6 buildings, 4 boats, 10 oxcarts, 1 vehicle and 9 bridges were damaged. 10 troops were killed. No close air support was flown.

8/18/51: 90 sorties were flown with 17 defensive and 73 offensive missions. 32 trucks, 20 railroad cars, 32 buildings, 6 vehicles, 5 oxcarts, 3 bridges, and 1 gun position were destroyed. 4 boats, 23 buildings, 47 railroad cars, 5 bridges, 4 oxcarts, 2 tanks and 2 vehicles were damaged. No close air support was flown.

8/19/51: This was devoted to replenishment activities. These activities were undertaken early due to typhoon dangers. The typhoon was forming in the Sea of Japan and moving north. 158,998 gallons of fuel oil were received from the USS PLATTE AO-24 in 1 hour 1 minute.

8/20/51: No flights were made due to typhoon danger. The typhoon moved at 45 knots past the southern tip of Korea and moved northwest. It made the weather over Korea unconducive to flight.

8/21/51: No flight activities were attempted due to typhoon danger. The typhoon slowly moved northwest, but North Korea was still covered with bad weather preventing air operations.

8/22/51: The weather over North Korea was still bad for flying with only night hecklers flying 4 offensive sorties. 1 truck was destroyed, and 2 buildings and one warehouse were observed to be damaged. It was too dark to make further assessment. 16 defensive sorties flew combat air patrol, weather reconnaissance and anti-sub patrol.

8/23/51: A tropical storm moved northeast between the 37th and 38th parallels and near longitude 129 East. This made the seas and skies too difficult for operations, and all flights were cancelled.

8/24/51: Despite some bad weather the BON HOMME RICHARD returned to normal flight activity with 22 defensive and 80 offensive sorties. 9 boxcars, 2 gun positions, 1 ammo dump, 20 buildings, 7 trucks, 1 tank, 7 oxcarts, 1 locomotive, 4 lumber piles, 1 lumber mill, 5 mortar positions, 8 railroad cars and 3 boats were destroyed. 23 boxcars, 7 bridges, 12 trucks, 1 warehouse, 4 oxcarts, 12 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 1 factory building and 4 vehicles were damaged. Two planes were lost, one on take off and one was ditched; both pilots were recovered.

8/25/51: Rain and low ceilings hampered all activities; nevertheless, 72 sorties were launched, 30 defensive and 42 offensive. Combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, bridge strikes and photo reconnaissance were attempted with varying results. The weather made assessments almost impossible but pilots noted 2 locomotives, 8 boxcars, 2 warehouses, 71 buildings and 1 pile of railroad ties destroyed, and 16 bridges, 3 boxcars, and 1 radio tower damaged. One village housing enemy troops was strafed with unassessed results.

The Task Force had no close air support missions because it had moved north to aid the Air Force to bomb in North Korea at points in Rashin and Najin out of range of Air Force escort planes. However, BON HOMME RICHARD pilots flew mostly bridge strikes north of Chongjin. This was one of the important days of the conflict for the BON HOMME RICHARD and CTF-77.

8/26/51: The BON HOMME RICHARD returned to the normal full schedule of the day with combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, close air support, naval gunfire spotting and bridge strikes. 100 sorties were flown, only 19 of which were defensive. 19 boxcars, 2 gun positions, 1 ammo dump, 2 bridges, 6 buildings, 1 truck, 2 oxcarts and 10 vehicles were destroyed. 48 boxcars, 10 bridges, 3 buildings, 1 tank, 1 motorcycle, 1 tunnel and 5 vehicles were damaged. 80 to 85% coverage was reported on close air support.

8/27/51: This was a much needed replenishment day, and no flights were made. The ship received 396,048 gallons of fuel oil from the USS CHEMING AO-30 in 2 hours and 23 minutes.

8/28/51: A warm front moved from the northwest of Korea toward the southeast. The ship and mainland were densely covered with precipitation, and only two sorties were made from the BON HOMME RICHARD. These were armed weather reconnaissance missions, but they did destroy 15 buildings.

8/29/51: Nine separate events saw planes leave to fly 111 sorties. Missions consisted of heckler attacks, anti-sub patrol, reconnaissance, combat air patrol, bridge strikes and close air support. Special missions over Purple Beach were flown. Total destruction for the day included 1 factory, 26 railroad cars, 1 truck, 20 buildings, 6 bridges, 1 locomotive, 4 oxcarts, 3 ammo dumps and 3 artillery pieces. 1 railroad turn table, 59 railroad cars, 6 bridges, 2 gun positions, 5 locomotives, 1 truck, 1 warehouse and 1 tank were damaged. Close air support reported 100 troops killed and 65% coverage. 29 sorties were defensive and 82 were offensive.

8/30/51: There were 107 sorties for the day including 31 defensive and 76 offensive. The missions were composed of heckler attacks, anti-sub patrol, escort, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, close air support, bridge strikes, photo reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting. 169 troops were killed in close air support with 100% coverage reported. 27 buildings, 3 gun positions, 14 railroad cars, 9 vehicles, 25 trucks, 1 ammo dump, 1 supply dump and 7 oxcarts were destroyed. 1 building, 23 vehicles, 99 railroad cars, 12 trucks, and 3 gun positions were damaged. Some 2000 troops were attacked on close air support with 90% coverage estimated. At least 70 troops were killed.

8/31/51: 103 sorties left the deck of the BON HOMME RICHARD. There were 30 defensive and 73 offensive. Missions were made up of hecklers, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, reconnaissance, bridge strikes, close air support, and naval gunfire spotting. 90% coverage was reported on close air support with 150 troops killed. 12 trucks, 3 gun positions, 34 railroad cars, 22 buildings, 9 oxcarts, 1 ammo dump, 3 boats and 3 bridges were destroyed. 12 trucks, 97 railroad cars, 1 tunnel, 10 buildings, 11 bridges, 1 gun position, 2 warehouses, 1 tank, 5 oxcarts and 2 gondolas were damaged. Special activity continued with Navy planes bombing Purple Beach.

9/1/51: This was again replenishment day. The ship received 365,045 gallons of fuel oil from the USS NAVASOTA AO-106 in 2 hours and 16 minutes.

9/2/51: 90 sorties were sent out on missions of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photography, close air support, bridge strikes and naval gunfire spotting. There were 16 defensive and 74 offensive. 5 jeeps, 4 vehicles, 21 buildings, 27 trucks, 39 railroad cars, 1 bridge, 1 ammo dump, 1 fuel dump, 15 artillery pieces, 2 gun positions, 6 oxcarts and 1 trailer were destroyed. 5 jeeps, 46 railroad cars, 5 bridges, 4 warehouses, 3 trucks, 1 vehicle, 2 AA positions and 10 oxcarts were damaged. 200 troops were strafed with good coverage in one close air support mission and 100% coverage on another. 242 troops were killed, 30 on close air support and 212 on reconnaissance.

9/3/51: Close air support missions stole the show on this day. One controller reported that the close air support was the best that he had ever seen and he gave it 100% coverage. One mission had 90% coverage and another had "very good". A concrete gun emplacement was attacked later with 100% coverage again being reported. 125 troops were killed. The days' missions consisted of combat air patrol, reconnaissance, photography, close air support, bridge strikes, and naval gunfire spotting. 3 gun positions, 13 trucks, 14 buildings, 24 railroad cars, 2 bridges, 8 oxcarts, 2 locomotives, 1 bunker and 2 vehicles were destroyed. 1 gun position, 33 buildings, 55 railroad cars, 4 bridges, 2 vehicles, 3 jeeps, 7 oxcarts, 2 tunnels and 2 tanks were damaged.

9/4/51: 94 sorties were launched of which 21 were defensive and 73 offensive. Combat Air Patrol, reconnaissance, photo, close air support and bridge strikes composed the missions. 11 buildings, 1 bunker, 17 vehicles, 1 motorcycle, 1 tank, 12 oxcarts, 1 gun position, 2 bridges, 8 railroad cars, 4 warehouses, 8 trucks, 1 van were destroyed. 9 buildings, 30 railroad cars, 1 locomotive 9 bridges, 1 gun position, 8 trucks, 3 vehicles, 1 oxcart, 1 tunnel and 1 wagon were damaged. Close air support had 90 to 100 percent coverage. A total of 105 troops killed. One plane was lost on takeoff, and another was shot down in close air support. The pilot in the first plane was rescued, but the second pilot apparently did not escape his plane.

9/5/51: The ship replenished and departed from the action area for Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. General

1. No serious material casualties occurred during the period of this report. Results of practices were considered satisfactory.

B. Ammunition Expended

2,000# G.P. Bombs	23	Fuzes AN-M100A2	4816
1,000# G.P. Bombs	360	Fuzes AN-M101A2	560
500# G.P. Bombs	564	Fuzes AN-M102A2	437
250# G.P. Bombs	1911	Fuzes AN-M103A1	1593
100# G.P. Bombs	2051	Fuzes AN-M139A1	2966
260# G.P. Bombs	1109	Fuzes T-91	229
350# Depth Bombs	11	Fuzes T-50E4	1099
5" HVAR Rockets	672	20MM Ammunition	165588
6.5" ATAR Rockets	440	.50 Cal. Ammunition	455610

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship

None.

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B. Damage to Aircraft

No. of Planes	Types	Causes
44	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
34	AD-3	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
9	F9F-2B	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
3	AD-4N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	F4U-5NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
8-11	VF-874	F4U-4	81988	Lost in combat over Korea.
8-11	VF-874	F4U-4	96793	Lost in combat over Korea.
8-24	VF-874	F4U-4	97187	Lost at sea.
8-24	VF-781	F9F-2B	123667	Lost at sea (out of fuel).
8-26	VF-783	F4U-4	97325	Forced down over Korea.
8-29	VA-923	AD-3	122740	Crash landing in Korea.
8-30	VF-783	F4U-4	81585	Shot down over Korea.
9-2	VA-923	AD-3	122758	Lost at sea.
9-2	VF-874	F4U-4	97170	Shot down over Korea.
9-4	VF-783	F4U-4	80977	Lost at sea (burned after take-off).
9-4	VF-874	F4U-4	81924	Crashed (exploded in Korea).

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

Targets	Damaged	Destroyed
Buildings	130	352
Warehouses	23	33
Factories	3	3
Chemical Plant	1	0
Supply, Fuel and Ammo. Dumps	11	20
Vehicles	242	352
Tanks	10	7
Locomotives	8	6
Railroad Cars	724	282
Bridges	142	25
Tunnels and Caves	11	0
Gun Positions	11	43
Artillery Pieces	0	18
Boats	4	20
Command Posts	0	1
Villages	3	0
Lumber Mills	0	1
Radio Tower	1	0
Piers	2	0
Railroad Platforms	3	0
Railroad Turntables	1	0
Troops Killed - 1109 Confirmed		

E. The foregoing represents a conservative, factual estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilot could assess the damage to a definite total were used in these tables. Probable damage or results are not included. The major portion of close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, delayed action bombing, or seeding obviously may never be known.

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PERSONNEL

A. Performance

This action period brought the crew and Air Group to the peak of efficiency.

Toward the end of the tour, signs of stepped up activity in the Korean campaign brought traces of battle fatigue especially amongst the pilots and gave warning that the next action period will probably gain in difficulties. However, the crew of the Bon Homme Richard has given every indication that it is capable of surmounting any obstacles that might arise.

B. Casualties

11 August 1951 - LT James J. VENES, USNR, 429311/1315 while piloting a F4U-4 was killed making a dive on a bridge target over North Korea at 5000 feet. The aircraft exploded and disintegrated in mid air. The cause of the explosion is unknown. The pilot failed to bail out.

11 August 1951 - LTJG Fred L. KOCH, USNR, 453370/1315 was killed while piloting an F4U-4 on the same bridge strike. The aircraft had just started to level off after a dive when the plane exploded and the port wing came off. The cause of the explosion is unknown and the pilot was not seen to bail out.

24 August 1951 - LT Thomas F. ALLARD, USNR, 240383/1315, after takeoff, was forced to make a water landing due to the engine not developing full power. Possible cause was attributed to foul plugs, as the aircraft had not been flown for several days. The pilot suffered multiple contusions and abrasions. He was recovered from the sea within 5 minutes by helicopter.

24 August 1951 - LT Robert Gene HUGHES, USNR, 403090/1315, while piloting an F9F-2B as escort on a photo hop, was forced to make a water landing after running out of fuel. The aircraft had been hit by enemy ground fire causing fuel exhaustion. The pilot was rescued by the DD Hopewell after being in the water for five hours. He sustained a compound fracture of the right leg.

31 August 1951 - LT Franklin (n) PILTZ, USNR, 414311/1315, was injured by enemy fire while on a recco mission. His F4U was at 800 feet; having just pulled out of a strafing run, when an explosive shell entered the right wing. A small piece of shrapnel from the shell passed completely through his foot. The oil line was punctured causing a slow loss of oil pressure. LT PILTZ was able to return safely to the ship and land without further mishap.

3 September 1951 - LT Robert J. BELL, USNR, 419888/1315, bailed out of his F4U-4 when it was hit with anti-aircraft fire on a close air support mission over the battle lines. The plane caught fire and he was forced to parachute. On landing, he was protected from the enemy by U.S. Marines and brought back by them to friendly territory. He suffered second degree burns on the face and leg.

4 September 1951 - LTJG William H. MERO, USNR, 506072/1315, was shot down while on a close air support mission. His F4U-4 was hit by 20MM fire while making a run on a ridge of entrenched troops from an altitude of 4500 feet. The shells were seen to hit in the engine and canopy. The plane continued in its dive and exploded on hitting the ground. Observers maintained that it was impossible for the pilot to survive.

PART I

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Safety

A concentrated effort has been made to stress safety in flight deck operations. The relatively low accident rate attests to the effectiveness of the safety program. About once per month (usually just prior to the beginning of a new operating period), the Air Officer addresses a letter to each Division Officer and the Air Group Squadron Commanders. In this letter certain laxities in safety precautions are discussed. Specific happenings are examined. The last paragraph of the letter directs the Division Officers to bring the contents of the letter to the attention of their personnel, review all existing safety precautions and endorse the letter stating that the intent of the letter has been carried out. From time to time a dope sheet entitled "The Hot Gavot" is published and distributed to the personnel on the flight deck. The intent of this dope sheet is primarily to stress safety; however, in order to make it readable, an attempt at humor is made. It is similar to the "Sense Pamphlets" in tone. A typical entry was one in which an attempt was made to prevent personnel from crowding too close to the edge of number two aircraft elevator when going to and from the flight deck at mealtimes. It was entitled "How to Amputate a Leg" and reads as follows:

"Get on number 2 elevator when there is a large group of people going down to get in the chow line. Stand as near the edge as possible. (This is important.) As the elevator starts down, have one of your anxious and hungry friends accidentally jostle you from behind (or slightly lose your balance and fall forward as the ship rolls). To keep from falling on your face, you jump to the hangar deck which is just a few feet away. You land easily enough, but the deck is slightly wet, or you hit an oil spot, and one leg slips from under you and goes under the rail and into the path of the down-coming elevator BINGO! Your leg is amputated as cleanly as if by a surgeon's knife, but much faster and without necessity of anesthetic. Result - you lose your place in the chow line. Your friends do too - They're not hungry anyhow."

Needless to say, personnel now riding the elevator stand a respectable distance from the edge of the elevator.

2. Napalm Thickener - Type 1

Considerable difficulty has been experienced during this operating period in getting napalm thickener that was satisfactory for use. Out of 12000# received from the U.S.S. PARACUTIN (AE-18) on 16 August, about 50% was unfit for use. This napalm thickener was of early 1945 manufacture, some by the Ferro Enamel Corporation and some by the Chicago Pulverizer Co. The packing drums were seemingly in good condition but on being opened the powder was in large lumps and in some cases very wet. The latest powder received was packed in 100# drums of 1950 manufacture and in excellent condition. It is recommended that napalm thickener of old manufacture be screened prior to issue to carriers for unusable drums.

3. VT Bomb Fuzes

During the operating period two (2) F4U-4 aircraft attached to the ship exploded in mid air while diving at an enemy target. The 100# GP wing bombs on these planes were VT fuzed; some with T50E4 and some T91 (AN-M168). No definite evidence exists as to the cause of these planes exploding. The T91 fuzes were installed in accordance with the instructions in OP-1444 (1st Rev.). The T50E4 fuzes had only the one arming wire. However, after the explosions of the 2 F4U's, the T50E4 fuzes had in addition to the regular arming wire, another arming wire affixed to the plane's structure and led through the arming safety plate and through the second hole in the single jump out pin.

This eliminated the possibility of arming the fuze while the bomb was still on the plane. However, the use of T50E4 fuzes has been discontinued recently by order of CTF-77 due to lack of positive check on safe position of detonator holder by a booster safety pin.

(a) First check is made by the ordnance chief of the squadron concerned.

(b) Second check is by the bomb disposal officer.

(c) Third and final check just prior to turn-up is made by the Air Ordnance Officer.

It is believed that this system eliminates the possibility of aircraft taking off with any improperly fuzed ordnance or other possible dangerous conditions.

4. Catapult

The installation of additional vents on the gravity tanks, as discussed in the last Battle Action Report, has proven very satisfactory in preventing excessive overflow of oil during quick changes of pressure while firing.

Considerable trouble has developed from foreign matter in the oil. As far as can be determined, it is the preservative that was used on all internal parts of the machinery during inactivation.

It is recommended that a complete cleaning and flushing of all parts and lines be accomplished when being reactivated. As this preservative was supposed to dissolve in oil, a thorough check should be made to determine whether or not it will dissolve.

Aircraft change 231 on the AD4W has proven very satisfactory during catapulting. There have been no cases of the bridle slipping from the towing hooks during firing.

5. Aircraft Maintenance

During this operational period the ship has been called upon to furnish two tires and tubes for C.O.D. TBM aircraft. Due to the foresight of aviation supply this requirement was fulfilled but our supply is now exhausted. It is suggested that a limited number of tires and tubes be furnished operational carriers to accomodate Codfish aircraft.

The maintenance division had to preserve 2 J-42, 3 R-3350 and 2 R-2800 engines this cruise. No pre-oiler and preservation unit is available. This unit is urgently required in the Korean area carriers.

Due largely to gun explosions the F4U wing spares have been inadequate and we were two wings short this time out.

The establishment of the tractor pool by ComFairJapan will relieve many problems for this ship. Three of our Ford-Ferguson tractors are completely inoperative. It was found necessary to remove the governors from all tractors in order to expedite respotting. The establishment of a fork-lift pool would be helpful inasmuch as these units have components such as hydraulic cylinders which require repairs beyond the normal capacity of an operating carrier.

6. Aviation Electronics

In the initial action report covering the period from 31 May to 28 July 1951, the method of handling the shop was not outlined. Since the ship does not have an Electronics Officer in the Air Department the supervision has been turned over to the Air Group Staff Electronics Officer. He has directed supervision insofar as the work is concerned of both ship and Air Group personnel assigned to the shop for upkeep and maintenance of electronics equipment.

A chief from the ship and one from the Air Group Staff supervise the day and night check crews. This arrangement has proven very satisfactory and has provided excellent results in clearing troubles and maintaining equipment. All reports required, as to performance, troubles, material usage are made up by the Air Group and forwarded to the proper departments.

Difficulty is still being experienced in obtaining certain repair parts for electronic equipment. The QR Section Allowance has proven inadequate under fleet operations in numerous instances. Examples are the allowances for 1N23B crystal tubes used in APS-19A equipment, APN-1 antennas, pulse forming networks and parasitic dipoles for APS-19A equipment, electrolytic condensers for the power supply of ARR-2, numerous types of tubes especially 6AK5, 723A, 2J55 and 2K28. Some of the shortages which existed before the ship left the States still remain.

During this period repairs were made by the shop on the ARC-1 equipment used on several of the destroyers in TF-77. It was found that in all instances the Technical Order 67-50 modifying the guard channel for 121.50 megacycles, operation had not been performed. It was recommended by this carrier that a check be made of the number of sets still requiring modification in the area. However, no modifications can be made by this command since spare kits are not carried in stock. It might be advisable to permit each carrier to carry in stock at least 12 of these kits to enable modification of any ARC-1 units serviced for the destroyers or those that might be received unmodified when replacement aircraft are received from the Supply Center. It is also felt that improvement in communications between destroyers and carriers using ARC-1 equipment could be improved by establishing a method of routining, the units aboard the carriers where adequate facilities for the purpose are available.

B. AEROLOGY

1. Aerological Summary

The most significant weather for this period was the typhoon "Marge". This typhoon had its origin south of Guam on the 11th of August. It moved slowly to the northwest and into the Yellow Sea, finally arriving in the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Wonsan at 231200Z. Evasion tactics used by CTF-77 took the force over to within 100 miles of the west coast of Japan, where the ship sat out the storm and encountered little associated weather. (See chart on back cover.)

On the night of 28 August, a sudden storm hit the force while it was steaming about 130 miles southeast of Wonsan. The barometer had been falling for the previous 22 hours, but it was slow and steady, with the total drop being 12.7 millibars, only 3 millibars in the last 6 hours. The normal Diurnal fall was thought to have caused a good part of the last 6 hour fall, so nothing was thought of this movement. At approximately 2145K high wind struck the force with velocities up to 38 knots, and gusts to 60 knots. Accompanying this wind were high choppy seas, such that the force had to be maneuvered to protect the destroyer screen which was reporting rolls up to 40 degrees. These winds lasted for 2 hours, at which time they subsided almost as quickly as they had started. The winds for the previous 6 hours had been south-southeast 18 to 20 knots. At the time the higher winds started, the direction backed to east-northeast for the next 17 hours. During the time of the high winds, the barometer was 1001.3, and afterwards rose to 1011.2 at 1100K the next day.

It is felt that the cause of the winds was a very rapidly forming low pressure area to the east of Wonsan. This type of circulation has formed before when a cold, or an occluded front, had hung up in the mountains behind Wonsan, and along the east coast of North Korea, and then with a sudden push from the upper air, dropped to the surface, and immediately formed a low pressure cell.

It is interesting to note that during the time of the high winds, and before, there were no winds over 8 knots reported among the 4 widely dispersed reporting stations along the east coast. Nor were there any rapid falls of pressure before 2200K, nor any sharp rises afterwards, reported from these stations.

2. Aerological Statistics

The summarization presented below includes observations taken while in an area of the Sea of Japan boundaried by the 37th and 41st Parallels on the south and north and the 131st meridian and the Korean Coast on the east and west. The period covered includes the 10th through the 18th and the 22nd thru the 31st of August.

Winds: Prevailing wind direction southwest 18% of the total time with south and south-southwest 17% and 15% respectfully. No periods of calm winds were observed, however, two periods of 44 and 60 hours with winds 10 knots or less occurred. The overall average velocity was 11 knots with an average of 10 knots from the southwest. Strongest velocity observed was from the east-northeast at 38 knots with gusts estimated up to 50 knots. This high wind lasted 4 hours with winds of 15 knots or less preceding and following. 10 and 22 hour periods of winds over 20 knots were observed.

Air Temperature: The average for the month was 75 degrees, with highest and lowest daily average at 79 and 69 degrees. Maximum temperature average was 78 degrees with high and low daily maximums of 85 and 73 degrees. Minimum temperature average was 72 degrees with high and low daily minimum of 76 and 67 degrees. Sea temperature average for the month was 75 degrees, with an average maximum of 79 degrees, and an average minimum of 71 degrees. The highest and lowest sea temperature observed during the month were 83 and 65 degrees.

Ceiling:

Greater than 9950 feet	72%
Greater than 4950 but less than 10000 feet	9%
Greater than 2450 but less than 5000 feet	9%
Greater than 950 but less than 2500 feet	7%
Less than 1000 feet	3%

Visibility:

Over 6 miles	90%
3 to 6 miles inclusive	7%
1 to 2½ miles inclusive	2%
Less than 1 mile	1%

Precipitation occurred on 8 days of the month with the longest period of continuous rain lasting 17 hours and 20 minutes. Total time of rainfall during the month was 50 hours and 30 minutes.

C. AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Debriefing

As mentioned in a previous report, debriefing is done by the Squadron AI's and coordinated by the ship's Intelligence Officer.

Debriefing has been found to be the most difficult and challenging duty of the AI. Pilots of one squadron may be briefed with those of another for the same mission without difficulty, but the debriefing of pilots from different squadrons in one place by one AI presents a problem which is complicated by space limitations, crowded ready rooms and the general lack of knowledge of the personality and traits of pilots other than those in one's own unit. Moreover, it has been found almost essential that AI's secure sufficient information at the time of debriefing not only for the flash report but for the Air Attack and other reports required by the Combat Reporting Manual, the preparation of which are the responsibility of the individual Squadron AI.

A debriefing form was developed for the purpose of uniform reporting and the preparation of an informative flash report. It was discovered early in this action, however, that pilots on the same flight did not agree on the results of attacks and had widely varying concepts of locations. Hence, it was necessary for the ship's Intelligence Officer to reconcile these differences with the Squadron AI's before a flash report could be prepared. Our concerted attention and effort was, therefore, directed to the debriefing process on this tour.

The problem involved in securing accurate and complete data had to be approached from many angles, the more important being to impress on pilots the importance of making observations, estimating damage and reporting the correct locations of their activities, and to discipline them to the debriefing process and develop a technique on the part of AI's of orderly interrogation on the successive stages of each mission.

As a result of efforts for improvements, debriefing has constantly improved and it is believed to be as good as possible under existing circumstances. Despite lack of training in this phase of operational intelligence, AI's have done a commendable job under trying conditions, but they necessarily had to learn the hard way.

Debriefing is of continuing importance in this conflict. Good targets are scarce and future success depends largely on our own reconnaissance and observations. The observations made in recent days have paid substantial dividends. Proper interrogation in several instances, with expert assistance, has produced invaluable information on the use of enemy radar.

Pilots must be trained on the reporting of accurate and complete information. The major effort in training them, almost invariably falls on the Squadron AI's. Obviously, adequate training cannot be accomplished unless AI's are trained in the techniques themselves. This phase of intelligence is therefore commended to all those concerned with the training of Air Intelligence Officers, as it is a very important one that warrants more attention.

2. Air Attack Report

During this tour, a representative of the evaluation group of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations visited the ship in relation to Air Intelligence matters and aviation ordnance utilization. A round table discussion was arranged on the "Air Attack Report". While not questioning the use or value of portions of the report, AI's aboard this ship have felt from the beginning of operations that this report in its present form is not suited to the Korean type of operations. The task of preparing the report has, for the most part, fallen directly on already overburdened Squadron AI's.

It has always been felt that these officers should be unshackled from the monotonous routine of duplicating reports so that more effort could be devoted to more constructive intelligence endeavors such as careful analysis of the intense flak that confronts every mission and study of photographs for strike briefings and results.

It was emphasized, therefore, that if the need for such a report exists, that the form at least be tailored to conform to Korean Operations; that if possible the appraently unusable portions of the report be eliminated; that the features of a standard debriefing form and Air Attack Report be combined to make debriefing of pilots a reasonable procedure; that the distribution be cut down to reduce clerical work. Every AI aboard had an opportunity to air his views frankly and fully. After a thorough discussion, it was agreed that these recommendations would be made the subject of a separate letter. If an improvement is made in the reporting requirements, it will be regarded that the visit was well worth while.

3. Radar Mapping

Early in the operations the need was evident for radar photographs of the Eastern Coast of Korea for the briefing of night fighter and attack teams who must depend on radar navigation along unfamiliar coast lines to reach assigned targets. To fulfill this need, a radar mapping mission was undertaken by AEW Team Eleven during this operational period. Radar photo mapping was commenced bearing 090 degrees 28 miles from Kilchu. The flight followed the coast line to a position south of Wonsan and a second flight started at a point 18 miles southeast of Chongjin and proceeded southward. This flight was conducted in a heavy rainstorm with visibility reduced to zero, yet the results obtained were excellent.

These flights:

(a) Provided the ship with a radar photographic file of a portion of the Eastern Coast of Korea that will be of great value, if, due to weather conditions, it is necessary to use the AD-4W type aircraft to position a strike group over targets along the coast or to return a flight from North Korea to the Task Force in marginal weather.

(b) Demonstrated the ability of the AD-4W type aircraft to bring back to the force photographic evidence of the movement of surface forces along the coast or in enemy held ports under conditions of reduced visibility or during periods of darkness.

(c) Provided excellent briefing material for new night fighters and night attack teams that are deployed to this theater.

(d) Provided a picture of the coast line more exact than any type of map available of this area since the coast line changes with time. Moreover errors in maps or enlargements of rivers, the merging or disappearance of small islands or alluvial changes can now be detected by comparison of the radar maps with those produced by survey and partial aerial photographs.

4. Training of Enlisted Personnel for Air Intelligence Duties

It was noted, from ComAirPac's Intelligence Report Number 4-51 that an Air Intelligence course for enlisted personnel is expected to be initiated at Alameda in the near future. In the first two periods of operations this ship necessarily had to depend to a large extent on untrained enlisted personnel to fulfill its air intelligence functions. These men performed exceptionally well after a brief period of training. It is felt that all personnel connected with Air Intelligence should be trained and ready for combat on departure for the forward areas. "On the job" training during periods of combat operations should never be necessary. ComAirPac's plan, therefore, has strong endorsement of this command. It is recommended that the course be basically an elementary one in air intelligence with due consideration given to the limitation of responsibilities of enlisted personnel. It is believed that the course should emphasize maps and map reading, plotting, intelligence procedure and forms, filing and the handling of dispatches and classified material.

5. Photo Interpretation

(a) Strike Photographs

A strike target photo is prepared for each strike pilot annotated as follows:

(1) Six coordinate position
(2) North arrow
(3) Target elevation (if greater than 500')
(4) Brief target description
(5) AA positions and other hazards to aircraft

All target photos are delivered to the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers at least one hour prior to each briefing. Photos are returned to the photo interpretor by the Squadron AIO after the strike groups return. This latter procedure saves extra work in the photo laboratory when the same targets are reassigned.

The best pictorial view of the target is selected for copying. This photo may not necessarily be the latest photo available; however, any new information which may be on the latest photo is transferred to the copy print in addition to annotations listed in paragraph 1.

(b) Copying of Photographic Prints

A very useful time-saving method of copying photographic prints (one to one) for target photos has been devised. This copy method is not claimed as a new discovery, but is very effective and is being used daily aboard this ship. The method of contact copying as described herein is much more practical than the copy camera method.

An ordinary Eastman Professional contact printer is used to make the contact copies. A sheet of blotting paper is placed over the dodging glass to reduce the intensity of the 300 watt light source in order to control the exposure. The emulsion side of the print is placed up on the printer and the emulsion of the film is turned down (emulsion to emulsion as in ordinary contact printing). The film is then backed up by a sheet of black paper. A sheet of film separation paper prevents film impressions from showing on the film. A negative needs about a five (5) second exposure if the print is on resisto rapid waterproof paper, however, the exposure may be varied as necessitated by the density of the copy to two (2) part water for about two (2) minutes. A red safelight (series 2) is used until three-fourths of the developing time has elapsed, then the film is viewed through the base side by the use of an OA safelight. Contrast can be controlled to some extent by exposure and development. Commercial film is used for most ordinary continuous tone work; however, the film can be determined by the type of print to be copied.

(c) Strike Photography

K-25 cameras are carried in camera pods on at least one AD or F4U type aircraft in each strike group. The best photos are obtained when exposures are made as close to the target as practicable in order to get large, clear images. Fine results have been accomplished by each pilot who has used the camera a number of times. Sometimes a few rolls of film are expended before satisfactory results are obtained; however, errors in technique were pointed out to each pilot, examples of the desired quality were displayed, and it may now be said that the effort is highly profitable. This is considered the best method of obtaining immediate damage assessment at the present time. This photography also presents an excellent opportunity to study the effects of various bomb loadings and fuzings due to the ease of obtaining first hand information.

D. CIC

1. General

CIC functions were generally the same as those covered in the last battle report, i.e., reporting to the flagship as prescribed, air control, and covering radar guards as assigned. The following radar guards were assigned to this ship during the period; Long range and short range air search, altitude determination and identification. In addition, the ship was assigned the homing guards of Trout, Racon and YE.

2. Radar Performance

The radars in operation were; SG/1B, used primarily for station keeping, SM for altitude determination, and SPS/6B for air controlling and air search. The SG was in continual use and required little maintenance and performed well. The SM worked much better than before and was in operation about 25% of the time but is still very difficult to maintain. The information from the SM has proved to be fairly accurate. The SPS/6B preformed as before with very good results on the port side and with mediocre results on the starboard side due to the antenna location. The antenna for the SK was left in port during this period for overhaul and the SPS/6B was the only air search gear available. Jets have been tracked out on the SPS/6B at ranges exceeding 70 miles at 15,000 feet, but the reliable range on jets has been from 25 to 30 miles. On prop flights the reliable range is 50 to 55 miles with a maximum a little over 100 miles. The latter was on a flight consisting of 6 VF and 4 VA at 9,000 feet.

3. Air Control

Air Control assignments were handled in an exceptional manner in both JETCAP and Strike control. The JETCAP made numerous intercepts, however, no enemy aircraft was sighted. While handling Strike control, returning flights were usually identified before they reached 40 miles from the force and the Strike Controllers were given many "Well Dones" by the flag for the efficient manner in which they carried out their duties.

4. Communications

Communication difficulties cleared up somewhat during this period but still much remains to be done to keep feed back from blocking vital circuits. The AN/ARC in Air Plot is the worst offender and it effectively cuts in to all Air and Strike control channels rendering them all but useless during the Land/Launch period. This is due more to the proximity of the gear rather than the frequencies. It was found that the TDQ's were far better, when properly maintained and were preferred by the Air Controllers over the AN/ARC due to greater range and a lower noise level. The preformance of the TDQ's and RCK's has been exceptional.

The difficulties between Air Plot and CIC due to location and communications have been greatly reduced. This is due primarily to more experience, by the use of the 2JG, a greater use of the Teletype, and using the 1JG to get the Land/Launch information directly from the flight deck rather than having it filtered through Air Plot. The MC circuit was used only for emergencies.

5. Lookouts

Lookouts have been on the job now for about four months and consequently know what is expected of them. They have performed well because of their experience and training. During Condition III surface lookout stations are manned forward and aft as well as the bow lookout from half an hour before dawn to half an hour after sunset. Night lookouts are on the two surface stations only. During Condition I, sky lookout stations forward and aft, port and starboard are manned. Recognition classes are conducted for all lookouts. Use is made of movies, slides, posters, magazines and models.

E. PHOTOGRAPHY

1. General

On departing from the states the ship drew it's allotment of three (3) Bell and Howell Filmo, magazine load, 16mm movie cameras from NSD, Oakland. These were supposedly reconditioned and ready for any action. After two months of operations one of the cameras jammed. Upon taking the camera apart for inspection, it was found that the camera was dry, and what little oil was found in it was so old that it was hardened. A program of preventive maintenance was immediately instigated, whereby one of each camera type was stripped down. It was found that approximately 25% of all the cameras aboard needed to be re-oiled.

During operations, 2 movie cameras have been stationed in easily attained spots on the ship; also there are several 3 K-20 or K-25 cameras. Because of a heavy schedule crowded into a period of two months, most of the cameras were used for an extended time without overhauling.

2. Dryers

The ship has two (2) Pake dryers, one (1) Feritype, and one (1) Matt and three (3) Smith Automatic Film dryers, Model J. From 8 to 12 rolls of aerial film are passed through the lab on an average day. An increased allowance of aerial film dryers is urgently needed due to the increased load of aerial work we are called on to handle. It is impossible to use the same film dryer for drying the film and the sonne paper. These dryers are chain driven with fiber gears which break down continually. With the increased speed of the film advance on the K-17 cameras and the advent of newer, faster, and larger photo coverage with the F2H-2P Banshee, it is recommended that the Navy look into the purchase of faster aerial film dryers. The present day film dryer is the main handicap to the expedient processing of aerial film.

F. SUPPLY

1. Aviation Supply

Through this action period, support in Aviation Supply has been fairly satisfactory.

Cooperation between vessels supporting aircraft in making critical material quickly available has been responsible for keeping high priority requests at a minimum. Air and surface transportation for critical spares is quickly provided and the system of delivery by CODFISH has in many cases prevented AOG requests.

Although many items necessary to the support of aircraft still are not available in the operational area, closer support between vessels and shore activities is very noticeable, namely the USS JUPITER, NAS, Agana, Guam and ComFltActs, Yokosuka.

In closely following the progress of priority requests for material originated during the middle of the week it seems apparent that in some cases no action is taken during weekends at activities within the continental limits. In most cases this has resulted in the delay of from 24 to 48 hours in the receipt of highly critical material, and it is suggested that this situation be corrected.

2. GSK

The Yokosuka area has a fairly good variety of GSK material, and requisitions are filled promptly. Priced invoices for material received from the USS POLLUX and FltActs Yokosuka have not been received at this date. FltActs Yokosuka were very cooperative in the handling of urgent items needed before sailing date.

In view of the fact that most GSK material must be drawn from the USS POLLUX and similar supply ships while in port, it is felt that these vessels should be moored alongside the docks, rather than in the stream. This would eliminate the duplicate handling of materials as is the case at the present time, whereby they are loaded into boats, brought alongside, and off-loaded on board.

3. Disbursing

During this period the disbursing office engaged in "G" day, during which all series 472 MPC was exchanged for 481. Transition and auditing of all pay records was completed, along with normal operations.

4. Ship's Service

If available, when ships have vending machines aboard, a coin counter and wrapper would be of great help. Have plenty of coin tubular wrappers, primarily nickle and quarter. In the hot summer months this ship averaged using 450 to 700 gallons of coca cola syrup per month in five vending machines. Root beer syrup was used in one machine, and was greatly enjoyed by everyone.

There are few cap frames available in this area.

Ships destined for the forward areas should have sufficient spares for the cobbler shop and laundry.

Large varieties of Japanese goods, i.e., trinkets, chests, linen, silver etc. are plentiful in the area.

5. Clothing and Small Stores

Rating badges, distinguishing marks, striker's badges, and service stripes are at a minimum.

6. Commissary

Ships which operate between Japan and the Task Force have very fine service although a very limited variety and supply of items. Invoice procedure is rather slow. When the ship was in Yokosuka, we found service very poor concerning small boats to transport supplies from the supply ships to us. A great amount of our fresh items ordered were not filled. In one instance we submitted a requisition to FltActs where we were told they could not supply us the items ordered, but could substitute for them, to which we were agreeable, but when trying to draw their substitutions we were informed they too were not-in-stock- items.

It is further noted that fresh items are being handled too frequently, causing them to be received in condition ready for survey. If AF's could come directly to ships, there would be a great savings of provisions.

G. WELFARE AND RECREATION

1. At Sea

Lack of adequate space for recreation for the crew continues to be a problem, particularly while at sea. One small compartment is provided which must serve as Library, Crew's Lounge, Chaplains' Offices, and a meeting place for small religious services, choir rehearsals, committee meetings and the USAFI examination room. A locker has been built which partially alleviates the lack of storage space for recreational and religious gear but additional space is needed to provide for stowage of the large quantity of paper back books, Bibles, and other materials which must be kept in stock in the forward area.

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Seating space in the Library is adequate for 20 men although it is possible to crowd in 35 after working hours. Enlargement of the Library, provision of a Crew's Lounge in a separate compartment, and assignment of a storeroom to the Chaplains would help greatly to improve morale while at sea for long periods. A disc jockey program over the RBO system each afternoon has proved to be very popular.

2. Ashore

The ship had been in Yokosuka before the start of this operating period for the first time. Seven hundred applications had been made for rest hotels but only 296 reservations could be secured. Reports on the rest hotels were enthusiastic, as is shown by the fact that 1400 applications were received for the coming stay in port. Other facilities for rest and recreation provided in Yokosuka, Yokohama and Tokyo proved very popular. Information on these facilities was given to the crew in a booklet published on board and by other publicity media.

While in port seven beach parties for various groups were held and an intra-mural program in softball, basketball and volleyball was started. This program was very successful and will be enlarged in the future.

Cecil B. Gill

CECIL B. GILL

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ComCarAirGru TWO (1)
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ComCarAirGru NINETEEN (1)
ComCarAirGru ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
ComCarAirGru ONE HUNDRED TWO (14)
ComCarAirGru (ATU) ONE (1)

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