U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
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ORIGINAL
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CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
To : Chief of Naval Operations
Via : Commander, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
Commander, Naval Forces, FAR EAST
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 31 May 1951 through 28 July 1951

Ref : (a) OPNAV Instruction 338.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 18 August 1951 [illegible]

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 31 May through 28 July 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Complying with ComAirPac confidential dispatch 072330Z of May 1951, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), CAPTAIN CECIL B. GILL Commanding, departed San Diego Harbor, California with Carrier Air Group 102, for Hawaiian waters. After a brief period of training, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD left Pearl Harbor T.H. 21 May for Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with ComNavFe dispatch 200035Z of May 1951. While enroute, the ship was directed by Com7thFlt dispatch 220002Z to proceed to the action area and relieve the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. It rendezvoused with the USS O'BRIEN (DD 725) and the USS WALKE (DD 723) in the Korean Straits on 29 May 1951.

On 30 May the ship joined other units of Task Force 77 in the action area close to the 38th parallel. The task force was commanded by RADM W.G. TOMLINSON aboard the USS BOXER (CV 21), and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Plan 1-51 dated 2 February 1951 and 22-51 dated 1 July 1951. It was composed of the USS SPERRY (DD 755), USS CUNNINGHAM (DD 760) USS BRADFORD (DD 545), USS ROYAL (DD 872), USS ZELLARS (DD 777), USS BRUSH (DD 745), USS USS TOLEDO (CA 133), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 37), and USS BOXER (CV 21).

After seventeen days of operations, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD proceeded to the port of Sasebo, Japan on 17 June for a period of maintenance and upkeep. By order of CTF 77 dispatch 300732Z of June, the BON HOMME RICHARD with Carrier Air Group 102 aboard, returned to the operating area in company with USS EPPERSON (DDE 719) and the USS NICHOLAS (DDE 449), and rejoined TF-77 consisting of the USS PRINCETON (CV 37), USS BOXER (CV 21) and other units, on 1 July 1951. After campaigning for 27 days, the ship returned to port again, this time to Yokosuka, Japan, leaving the operation area on 28 July 1951.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the east coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H.N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 30 May 1951:

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF 781	32	24 F9F-2B
VF 783	25	16 F4U-4
VF 874	26	16 F4U-4
VA 923	27	16 AD-3 2 AD4Q
VC 3	6	4 F4U-5NL
VC 11	6	2 AD4Q
VC 35	6	3 AD-4N
VC 61	4	3 F9F-2P
HU 1	2	1 Ho3S-1

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

5/30/51: The ship rendezvoused with TF-77 in the early morning to replenish. We received 818,000 gallons of fuel oil, 105,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 16.9 tons of ammunition.

5/31/51: The ship launched close air support, armed reconnaissance and naval gunfire spotting over northeastern Korea with 26 sorties for the day. A supply dump was damaged, 2 trucks and 2 oxcarts were destroyed.

6/1/51: Anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks were conducted. 1 tank, 76 boxcars, 7 trucks, 1 track section, 1 car, 1 barracks, 1 house, 4 highway bridges, 15 buildings, 2 warehouses and 1 oxcart were damaged. 2 boxcars, 2 warehouses and 2 houses were destroyed. Excellent results were reported on close air support and 5 troops were killed and 20 wounded. 105 sorties were flown for the day.

6/2/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol were flown, 11 railroad cars, 1 railroad yard, 1 tank, 1 car, 1 highway bridge, 4 buildings, 1 house and 7 trucks were damaged. 2 highway bridges, 3 houses, 1 tank, 3 trucks, 1 car and 7 oxcarts were destroyed. Results were reported excellent for close air support with 20 troops killed. 96 sorties were flown.

6/3/51: Bridge strikes, close air support and armed reconnaissance were conducted. 1 highway bridge, 2 houses, 1 tank, 3 trucks, and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 65 boxcars, 1 railroad bridge, 9 buildings, 1 barracks and 3 warehouses were damaged. There were 87 troops killed. 63 sorties were flown. We rendezvoused with the replenishment group and received 268,156 gallons of fuel oil, 119,400 gallons of aviation gasoline and 360 tons of ammunition. Close air support had 96% coverage.

6/4/51: The ship launched close air support, armed reconnaissance, bridge strikes, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and photo missions. 9 buildings, 11 houses, 1 highway bridge, 1 tank, 1 barracks, 2 trucks, and 6 oxcarts were destroyed. 48 boxcars, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 18 buildings, 8 cars, 3 houses, 2 railroad yards, 2 supply dumps, 7 trucks, 1 railroad track section, 2 factories, 1 gun position, 2 villages and 1 tank were damaged

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Excellent close air support was reported. 156 troops were killed. There were 94 sorties flown.

6/5/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, naval gun fire spotting and photo missions were conducted. These missions destroyed 1 railroad bridge, 30 buildings, 1 cart, 1 locomotive, 1 supply dump and 3 gun emplacements; damaged 1 railroad bridge, 1 truck, 3 buildings, 20 houses, 1 village and 1 supply dump. There were 101 sorties flown. Excellent close air support was reported.

6/6/51: The ship launched close air support, combat air patrol, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance, and photo missions. 10 railroad cars, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 19 buildings, 2 trucks and 14 oxcarts were destroyed. 72 railroad cars, 2 railroad bridges, 2 railroad yards, 1 railroad track section, 1 warehouse, 11 trucks, 2 barracks, 2 villages were damaged. 1 ox and 20 troops were killed. There were 91 sorties flown.

6/7/51: The ship rendezvoused with the replenishment group and received 256,710 gallons of fuel oil, 212,300 gallons of aviation gasoline, 209 tons of ammunition and 11½ tons of provisions.

6/8/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, and naval gunfire were conducted today. 1 railroad bridge, 1 car, 14 tanks, and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 27 boxcars and 1 barracks were damaged. 20 troops were killed. There were 82 sorties.

6/9/51: The ship launched combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, close air support and night hecklers. These missions destroyed 10 boxcars, 12 buildings, 2 trucks and damaged 2 locomotives, 1 tank, 27 boxcars, 1 railroad yard, 1 tunnel, 1 railroad bridge, 3 highway bridges, 4 buildings, and 4 trucks. 10 troops were killed and 20 wounded. 105 sorties were flown.

6/10/51: Due to poor weather only a few flights were made. These were weathered in and no damage was done.

6/11/51: Combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, close air support, and night hecklers were launched. 16 buildings and 1 oxcart were destroyed. 3 tunnels, 1 factory, 8 houses, 1 warehouse, 1 supply dump and 3 villages were damaged. 69 sorties were flown.

6/12/51: Our planes flew close air support, anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol and night heckler missions; 6 houses, 1 mortar emplacement, 2 highway bridges, 2 railroad cars, 1 village, 1 factory and 1 building were damaged. 1 oxcart, 3 railroad cars and 4 barracks were destroyed. There were 54 sorties flown.

6/13/51: Close air support, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and night heckler missions were conducted. 14 factory buildings and 26 trucks were destroyed. 1 factory, 1 warehouse, 2 buildings, 24 trucks and 1 village were damaged. 25 troops were killed. There were 99 sorties flown. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

6/14/51: This day's operations consisted of combat air patrol, close air support, strikes and photo missions. 7 boxcars were destroyed. 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bbidge and 1 factory were damaged. 32 sorties were flown. Replenishment activities prevented all but afternoon sorties. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

6/15/51: The ship launched night hecklers, combat air patrol, close air support, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, and anti-sub patrol. 1 railroad yard, 2 vehicles and 3 buildings were damaged. 52 sorties were flown. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.

6/16/51: We conducted close air support, armed reconnaissance, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols. 4 gun emplacements were destroyed and 90 troops killed. 42 sorties were flown. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.

6/17/51: The ship was underway from the operating area to Sasebo Japan and anchored in Sasebo Harbor for maintenance and upkeep.

6/30/51 Left Sasebo, Japan and proceeded to the operating area.

7/1/51: The ship rendeavoused with TF-77, and met with the replenishment group. We took on board 94,501 gallons of fuel oil and 28,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The ship conducted flight operations in the afternoon and launched close air support, strikes, armed reconnaissance, anti-sub patrol and combat air patrol. Pilots were forced to return before contact due to bad weather.

7/2/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort comprised our flight activities for the day with 84 sorties flown. 5 boxcars, 1 highway bridge, 11 houses, 7 buildings, 10 trucks and 10 oxcarts were destroyed. 8 boxcars, 2 railroad yards, 1 track section, 2 highway bridges, 6 supply dumps, 8 trucks, and 3 oxcarts were damaged. 30 troops were killed and 2 villages damaged. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

7/3/51: Activity consisted of anti-sub patrol and combat air patrol with a total of 6 sorties flown.

7/4/51: A total of 42 sorties on anti-sub patrol, combat air patrol, sweeps and strikes, were sent forth. Weather over the target area was bad. The results of the sweeps and strikes were unobserved.

7/5/51: No flying was done, as it was replenishment day.

7/6/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols comprised the day's activity. 45 buildings, 1 factory, 2 tanks, 1 gun emplacement and 1 power installation were destroyed. 1 small boat, 2 tanks, 2 warehouses, 7 buildings, 6 villages and 3 houses were damaged. 135 sorties were flown.

7/7/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, and escort duty was conducted. There were 86 sorties flown. 1 bridge, 9 boxcars, 1 warehouse, 4 buildings were destroyed; 3 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 6 boxcars, 1 railroad yard, 3 buildings, 1 supply dump, 2 track sections, 1 factory and 1 warehouse were damaged. 50 troops were killed. Close air support was reported very good.

7/8/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol, and escort duty was conducted. 5 boxcars, 3 warehouses, 1 house, 3 trucks, 14 oxcarts, 1 bunker and 3 gun emplacements were damaged. 91 sorties were flown. Close air support was reported 75% coverage.

7/9/51: No flying was done due to replenishment activities.

7/10/51: No flying was done due to bad weather.

7/11/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort of photo planes comprised the days' activity with 93 sorties being launched. 1 locomotive 1 railroad bridge, 42 boxcars, 11 buildings, 10 trucks, 4 barracks, 12 oxcarts, and 5 horses were destroyed. 3 railroad yards, 24 boxcars, 2 railroad bridges 5 buildings, 3 warehouses, 3 barracks, 16 trucks, 2 villages and 4 oxcarts were damaged. 30 troops were killed. 75% coverage was reported on close air suppott

7/12/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort duty comprised the days' duty with 101 sorties flown. 2 gun positions, 2 tanks, 1 barracks, 2 oxcarts, 8 buildings, 29 boxcars and 17 trucks were destroyed. 7 tanks, 1 gun position, 1 oxcart, 1 factory, 6 buildings, 4 warehouses, 57 boxcars, 3 houses, 4 barracks, 15 trucks, 3 cars, 1 railroad yard, 1 track section and 2 railroad bridges were damaged. 333 troops were killed.

7/13/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, night heckler attacks, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, anti-sub patrol and escort duty comprised the routine for this day with 102 sorties being sent out. 11 trucks, 10 oxcarts, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 3 buildings, and 13 gun positions were destroyed. 3 tanks, 13 trucks, 1 railroad bridge, 2 tunnels and 2 villages were damaged. 270 troops were killed. Close air support was reported to be excellent.

7/14/51: No planes were launched due to replenishment activities.

7/15/51: Combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, weather reconnaissance close air support, anti-sub patrol and photo escort comprised the days' missions with 57 sorties being flown. 3 warehouses, 8 railroad cars, 3 buildings, 2 oxcarts, 1 truck were destroyed; 2 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 2 buildings, 2 tunnels, 1 ammunition dump, 1 warehouse, 1 gun position, 4 railroad bridges, 5 houses, 2 highway bridges, 2 railroad yards, and 1 track section damaged.

7/16/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort duty comprised the day's activities with 95 sorties being launched. 1 truck, 5 boxcars, 1 building, 29 houses, 8 oxcarts and 1 ox were destroyed. 1 locomotive 18 boxcars, 3 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 1 track section, 2 railroad yards, 1 factory, 5 trucks, 4 oxcarts, 2 houses, 1 village and 1 tunnel were damaged.

7/17/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol, anti-sub patrol and escort duty were performed with 95 sorties being released. 1 truck, 7 oxcarts, 3 buildings, 1 railroad yard, 1 ox, 3 boxcars, and 1 house were destroyed. 11 railroad cars, 1 oxcart, 5 villages, 3 gun positions, 1 highway bridge and 6 tanks were damaged. 100% coverage on close air support was performed.

7/19/51: No activity was conducted due to replenishment activities.

7/20/51: Bad weather prevented all but combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol. 8 sorties were released.

7/21/51: Bad weather prevented all but combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol. 18 sorties were released.

7/22/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, photo escort, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol comprised the days activity with 80 sorties being sent out. 15 buildings, 1 house, 1 factory, 2 trucks and 5 oxcarts were destroyed. 1 locomotive, 16 boxcars, 4 railroad bridges, 1 highway bridge, 2 railroad yards, 10 gun positions and 3 villages were damaged. 100% coverage was reported on close air support.

7/23/51: Close air support, armed reconnaissance, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes, photo escort, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol were conducted with 90 sorties sent from the carrier. 1 boxcar, 19 buildings, 1 warehouse, 5 houses, and 12 trucks destroyed: 2 locomotives, 17 boxcars, 3 railroad bridges, 13 buildings, 2 warehouses, 1 supply dump, and 20 trucks damaged. 60 troops were killed. 100% coverage on close air support.

7/24/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrol comprised the day's activity. 96 sorties were sent out. 6 tanks, 6 trucks, 1 locomotive, 1 oxcart, 1 highway bridge, 4 tunnels, 24 railroad cars, 1 warehouse, 6 houses, 18 buildings, 1 gun emplacement, 3 villages were damaged, 2 tanks, 3 trucks 14 railroad cars and 2 buildings destroyed. Excellent coverage was reported on close air support.

7/25/51: This was a replenishment day. No sorties were flown.

7/26/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols comprised the day's activity. 93 sorties were flown. 18 tanks, 2 locomotives, 18 carts, 6 railroad bridges, 1 railroad yard, 1 tunnel, 15 railroad cars, 3 gun positions, 2 mortars, 2 villages and 2 vehicles were damaged, 15 oxcarts; 18 railroad cars, 1 ammunition dump, 8 buildings, and 191 troops destroyed, 100% coverage reported on close air support.

7/27/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting photo missions, combat air patrol and anti-sub patrols comprised the day's activity. 1 truck, 3 locomotives, 1 oxcart, 1 railroad bridge, 1 highway bridge, 1 railroad section, 3 tunnels, 1 railroad car, 2 supply dumps, 1 factory, 6 warehouses, 6 barracks, 6 houses, and 1 bunker were damaged. 10 trucks, 3 oxcarts, 2 railroad cars, 7 houses, 20 buildings, 1 gun emplacement, 1 ox and 30 troops were destroyed. 89 sorties were flown.

7/28/51: 42 sorties were flown with close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and combat air patrol as the missions. 2 gun positions, 2 buildings, 7 trucks, 6 railroad cars, 9 oxcarts, and 1 warehouse were destroyed. 1 village, 2 buildings, 2 trucks, 5 railroad bridges, 36 railroad cars and 1 ware house were damaged.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ordnance Maintenance and Repair

1. A steady program of maintenance and adjustment was required to keep ordnance equipment in optimum operating efficiency. Repairs required were mainly of a routine nature and not considered excessive in view of the extensive use of equipment.

B. Deck Evolutions

1. Deck evolutions (i.e. fueling, ammunition, replenishing, etc.) during the period of this report were considered satisfactory condidering the fact that this was the first operation of this kind, except during UTE, for the ship and crew. All evolutions were executed with a minimum amount of difficulty and there were only minor material failures except for # 1 winch at the forward replenishing station.

2. There are two winches at the forward replenishing station: one steam and 1 electric. The electric winch is considered satisfactory in all respects. The steam winch is considered altogether too slow and during excessive use tends to overheat which causes numerous delays during replenishment. The ship's force is continually trying to repair and eliminate this difficulty.

C. Ammunition Expended.

2,000# G.P. Bombs	42	Fuzes AN-M100A2	7539
1,000# G.P. Bombs	853	Fuzes AN-M101A2	1837
500# G.P. Bombs	865	Fuzes AN-M102A2	794
250# G.P. Bombs	1039	Fuzes AN-M103A1	652
100# G.P. Bombs	5012	Fuzes M139A	3345
260# Frag AN-M81	2557	Fuzes VT-T91	4701
350# D.P. AN MK 54	21	Fuzes, Rocket Mk. 149	1093
5" HVAR Rocket bodies	1093	.50 Cal. Ammunition	687895
5" HVAR Rocket motors	2270	20MM Ammunition	236668

6.5" Rocket heads	1237	Drop tanks F51	724
Napalm Thickner	48220	Butterfly clusters	
3.25" Rocket Motors Mk 7 and		with fuzes AN-M146	76
3.5" bodies Mk 8	88	40MM Ammo	5115
5"/38 Projectile & Cartridge	123		

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship:

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of planes	Types	Causes
49	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
34	AD-3	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
15	F9F-2B	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
7	F4U-5NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
4	AD4N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
3	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	AD4Q-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
5-31	VF 781	F9F-2B	123670	Lost at sea (cat. shot)
6-3	VF 783	F4U-4	80947	Lost at sea (Launch)
6-16	VF 874	F4U-4	97292	Lost at sea (Engine-Launch)
7-3	VF 781	F9F-2B	123677	Lost at sea (Fuel exhausted)
7-4	VF 783	F4U-4	97239	Lost at sea (spin on approach)
7-6	VA 923	AD-3	122746	Blew up on landing at K-18
7-7	VC 35	AD-3	122768	Lost at sea (engine trouble)
7-11	VF 874	F4U-4	81962	Lost to enemy fire over Korea.
7-12	VC 35	AD-4N	124137	Lost at sea (cat. shot)
7-17	VF 874	F4U-4	97034	Lost to enemy fire over Korea.
7-18	VA 923	AD-3	122760	Lost to enemy fire over Korea.
7-27	VF 781	F9F-2B	123700	Lost at sea (cat. shot)

D. Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

Targets	Damaged	Destroyed
Tanks	26	16
Trucks	168	119
Cars	13	2
Locomotives	14	2
Oxcarts	53	123
Highway bridges	31	8
Supply dumps	16	1
Ammo dump	0	1
Factories	15	2
Warehouses	33	9
Barracks and other Bldgs.	230	326
Gun emplacements	24	25
Mortar emplacements	0	2
Lumber piles	1	0
Horses	0	6
Oxen	0	4
Villages	34	0
Boats	7	4
Power Installatikns	2	1
Bunkers	4	0
RR Yards	26	1
RR Tracks split	12	0
RR tunnels	15	0

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Targets	Damaged	Destroyed
RR cars	544	172
RR bridges	45	7

Troops killed - 1475 confirmed.

E. The foregoing represents a conservative, factual estima te of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilot could assess the damage to a definite total were used in these tables. Probable damage or results a re not included. The major po rtion of close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. 38 missions of this type were flown without any report of damage inflicted. As many as 3000 troops have been attacked in northeastern Korea without assessment of losses. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, delayed action bombing, or seeding obviously may never be known.

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Despite the fact that the major portion of the crew was inexperienced, and the ship had only a brief training period, the performance of ship and men was excellent. It was necessary at times to move men from one department to another in order to meet operational requirements. The men so assigned adapted themselves to the task and performed remarkably well.

What is believed to be a record in loading ordnance was performed at Bangor prior to our departure for the forward areas. This is the best evidence of the spirit, enthusiasm, and performance of the men aboard this ship.

In commenting on the performance of this ship, the Commanding Officer of the USS PRINCETON said in a dispatch 130658Z of July:

> My sincere congratulations on the way the Bon Homme Richard has come in here cold and learned the business so quickly and well. Your air operations are at least as good as ours and we have had eight months practice. We know from experience in steaming in formation with TRUSTFUND that it will never put itself in position to menace other ships in the force. To you and your crew and air group, a sincere well done.

On our last day of operations in this period, Commander, Task Force 77 in dispatch 272330Z of July said it has been a personal pleasure to observe the outstanding performance of duty of the Bon Homme Richard and attached squadrons during this tour in the operating area. The combination of Bon Homme Richard and Air Group 102 is one which does credit to naval aviation.

B. Casualties:

Lt. Eugene Daniel Redmond, 250615, USNR 3 June 1951

At Lat. 37° - 44.0' N Long. 129° - 34.5' E, LT REDMOND was lost on take-off on combat operations. The plane stalled and spun into the sea approximately 300 feet off the bow. Every effort was made for rescue, but the body was not recovered.

LTJG Arthur Dixon, 453354, USNR 4 July 1951

At Lat. 39° - 21.1' N Long 128° - 47.5' E the F4U-4 aircraft of which Lt. Dixon was pilot was on the base leg of landing approach to the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) at approximately 150 feet altitude, when the plane appeared to stall and go onto a spin. The pilot was unable to recover and the plane crashed into the sea. There was no visible indication that the pilot managed to escape. Every effort was made for a rescue, but the body wa not recovered.

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LTJG James E. Savage, 403195, USNR 6 July 1951

Mr. Savage had a hung bomb that was supposedly armed on his plane after he had made his attacks. He was unable to release it and was ordered to land at K-18. Upon landing at K-18, the plane exploded killing the pilot instantly. His body was recovered.

LT Thomas F. Allard, 240383, USNR 11 July 1951

Mr. Allard sustained head injuries on being rescued by helicopter after being shot down over enemy territory.

LT Orville M. Cook, 301489, USNR 19 July 1951

LT Cook was seen going in on an attack on a bridge target in North Korea and failed to appear at the point of rendezvous with the remainder of the flight. It is believed that he was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. No remains of the wreckage were seen and LT Cook was listed as missing in action. Results of searches were negative.

LTJG Beaxton G. Harrell, 403072, USNR 27 July 1951

Mr. Harrell was injured in the face by anti-aircraft fire over North Korea.

LTJG Hugh C. Ingle, 453365, USNR 28 July 1951

Mr. Ingle was injured in the arm by anti-aircraft fire over North Korea.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. General

Two of the four squadrons in the Air Group assigned to this ship are F4U squadrons. An effort was made at the commencement of this WesPac tour to schedule pilots only in the aircraft assigned to their squadron. This plan so complicated the spotting of aircraft that it was abondoned within a few days. Now the policy is any F4U pilot in any F4U.

The present type flight deck shoe is considered quite unsatisfactory. The shoe offers no support to the arch, is not waterproof and wears out too soon. The field shoe is much better suited to flight deck work despite the fact that it is heavier.

2. Aircraft Handling

(a) Flight Deck

Throughout this reporting period the flight deck was normally spotted with a "split spot" consisting of two AD's and two F4U's across the deck. The split spot forward put the AD's on the port side and the F4U's on the starboard side. The split spot aft placed the AD's on the starboard side and the F4U's on the port side.

During periods of little or no wind the split spot degenerated into spotting the F4U's across the deck aft and the AD's in front, inasmuch as the AD's need less wind across the deck for take-off.

The installation of the Aero-14A rocket launchers on F4U's has resulted in a 2-1 echelon spot thus allowing a spot of 2 AD and 3 F4U on the split spot aft.

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The F9F jet spot employed for catapulting is considered the ultimate in handling of duds and still expediting the launch. After two jets are spotted on the catapult, the next plane is headed with its nose toward the tail of the plane on the starboard catapult. The next jet is pointed to port with its nose at a 90 degree angle to the plane in front of it. The remainder of the spot is a staggered spot (with jets facing fore and aft) keeping each successive plane clear of the tail pipe of the plane ahead. On large jet launches the last jets are tailed out over the port side aft of the #2 elevator. The standby jet is kept on the elevator.

It was found that the present type of equipment available for loading 250# and 260# bombs on AD's with wings folded was inadequate. On landing, the AD's are spotted forward with the wings spread. With a competent loading crew the average time of loading, fuzing, and folding wings took approximately five (5) minutes per plane. Upon completion of loading the spot forward is immediately tightened up.

The use of expanded metal hose racks has resulted in a more expeditious handling of hoses. It is recommended that where convenient the standard type of hose stowages be replaced by the above type rack.

The taxiing and spotting of jets on the catapults is greatly facilitated by the use of jet tiller bars with skids manufactured to specifications by this ship. It is recommended that they be manufactured and a BuAer allowance be established for all CV types having jets aboard.

It is recommended that a spare parts allowance be established, as the wear and tear on these bars is excessive due to present type of operations.

(b) Hangar Deck

Bay #1 is used for the housing and maintenance of jet aircraft. For housing only seventeen (17) jets can be stored. For maintenance and loading ammo 14 planes can be handled forward of the fire curtain.

The jets are moved from hangar deck to the flight deck via the #2 elevator. #1 elevator is not used at all. By securing this elevator we gain parking space for 2 extra jets.

Bay #2 starboard side is used to park the photo jets so that they can be accessable at short notice and close to the photo lab for expediting loadihg and maintenance of camera equipment. The center line of bay #2 is used to park the F4U5 night fighters. In this manner they are all together and can be moved to the flight deck easily on either #2 or #3 elevator. (These Planes are usually handled during the time the ship is blacked out.) The port side of bay #2 is used to park F4U-4's. They can be moved to the flight deck by either #2 or #3 elevator.

Bay #3 starboard side and center line is utilized for the parking and maintenance of AD-3's, AD-4W's and AD-4N's. The port side is used for the parking and maintenance of F4U-4's. The after part of bay #3 is used for engine changes as required.

(c) General Comments on Aircraft Handling

Chain falls should be located where they can be used to the best advantage, and not interfere too much with the movement of the other planes during operations. The ones in bay #1 should not be located in the middle of the deck. This prohibits passing other planes around during operation and does not allow ample time for the completion of work between hops. The low overhead of Bay #2 prohibits use of chain falls. In bay #3 chain falls should be located on the center line and in the high bays so that planes can be drop checked right in the parking line. This will help to elimainate exeess movement of aircraft.

3. Catapults

During catapulting of F9F's on the H4B catapult it has been determined that an F9F with full main fuel cell, full tip tanks, full ammo, and six (6) rockets should not be launched with less than thirty-three (33) knots of wind over the deck.

10

[redacted]

For every knot of wind under thirty-three (33) knots, two rockets are removed. Using this yardstick with a wind of thirty (30) knots, the jets do not carry rockets. If the wind falls below thirty (30) knots, jets are not launched until such wind is reached.

It was also observed that when catapulting a mixed group of planes (jets and conventional) there was a large amount of foaming in the gravity tank. This resulted in oil being discharged throughout gravity tank vents and flooding the deck of the catapult machinery room. To counteract this, more anti-foam agent was mixed with the oil, and canvas tubes were manufactured to lead from the vents into G.I. cans. Two (2) additional vents were installed on the top of the gravity tank, but as it was accomplished during the last "in port" period, there has been no chance to make an evaluation of this change.

It is recommended that a close check be kept on the towing cables of the catapult. This ship experienced the difficulty of having both towing cables on the port catapult stretched an excessive amount on one shot. This resulted in kinking both cables which required replacement. At that time there was only one (1) cable in the area of sufficient length to use as a replacement. The other cable had to be sent from the U.S. It is understood that there are a number of cables now in the area.

Two minor accidents occured when the bridle slipped from the launching hook of AD-4W aircraft at time of firing, resulting in runaway shots. There was no damage to either planes or catapults. The AD-4W's did not have service change No. 231 installed. This change is now installed. It is recommended that AD-4W's listed in the change not be catapulted until the change is made. If they are, a very close inspection should be made to insure a positive hook-up.

Since this carrier does not have the articulating shuttle, the old type bridle catcher is being used. This catcher is not sufficient strength to properly retrieve a 7/8" bridle. We are experiencing great difficulty in keeping the bridle catchers repaired. It is understood that a larger and stronger bridle catcher is being manufactured.

Difficulty has been experienced in that the launching pendant for the F9F has repeatedly dented the inboard flaps at the end of the launching run. When the pendant is released, it rebounds from the deck into the flaps. To correct for this, a longer webbing is being installed at the shuttle. It is believed that this will allow the pendant to remain on the deck for a greater length of time thereby allowing the aircraft to pass over the pendant before the pendant is retrieved by the bungee. The bungee catcher is very satisfactory in that few pendants are lost.

Pilot technique is a major factor in catapulting the F9F. If the nose is allowed to drop when the plane leaves the deck, the plane will settle quite a number of feet before the pilot can stop it. There were a number of "close calls" before this situation was corrected. If the plane is held in about the same position as it is in when it leaves the deck, very little settling is experienced. The elevator trim tab is also set at 2 degrees nose up. This relieves most of the pressure on the stick.

4. Arresting Gear

Very little trouble is being experienced as far as arresting gear machinery is concerned. The machinery itself is capable of stopping any type of plane operating in this area without too much strain. Having the first three engines revved 12:1 has taken a tremendous load off these engines. The greatest difficulty is in keeping the first three wires in good condition. They are good for only 15 to 20 jet landings apiece, before changing. One of the first three wires is changed approximately every day.

The Davis barriers have not had enough engagements to be evaluated. The only engagements experienced since the ship has been in the operating area was caused by an intentional no-hook landing. Excellent pilot technique was employed and only the #2 and #4 barriers were engaged.