CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 November 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 September 1952 to 5 November 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the Action Report for the period 30 September 1952 to 5 November 1952 is submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Upon arrival in Yokosuka at 0903I on 30 September 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD entered a period of upkeep and repair.

In accordance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 091310Z of October 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), Captain Paul W. Watson, USN, Commanding, with COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral Herbert E. Regan, USN, and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area via Van Dieman Straits at 0614I on 10 October 1952.

At 1015I 12 October 1952, the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area TARE. The Task Force was then commanded by COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. Hickey, USN, aboard the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33). In addition to the USS KEARSARGE, the Force was composed of the USS ESSEX (CVA-9), the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37), the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) and various heavy support and screening ships.

COMCARDIV ONE, Rear Admiral H.E. Regan, USN, assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 1344I, 18 October 1952, and shortly thereafter, the USS KEARSARGE with COMCARDIV FIVE embarked departed the Force.

At 1731I, On 1 November 1952 the USS KEARSARGE rejoined the force and the command of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN passed to COMCARDIV FIVE, Rear Admiral Robert F. Hickey, USN, aboard the USS KEARSARGE.

The mission of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN was in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) and CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52 except during the period 12-16 October 1952 when the Force operated in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 25A-52.

The composition of Carrier Air Group SEVEN during this period was as follows:

UNIT & C.O.	ALLOW. & TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/4	OPERATIONAL A/C 9/28	PILOTS 9/4	PILOTS 9/28
COMCVG-7 CDR G.B. Brown				5*	5
VF 71 CDR. J.S. Hill	16 F9F-2	16	16	24	24
VF-72 LCDR A.W. Curtis	16 F9F-2	16	15	24	23

[redacted]
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UNIT & C.O.	TYPE A/C	9/4	9/28	9/4	9/28
VF-74 CDR. C.D. Fonvielle Jr.	16 F4U-4	16	16	23	23
VA-75 CDR. H.K. Evans	16 AD-4	16	16	24	24
VC-4 Det 41 LCDR E.S. Ogle OinC	4 F4U-5N	4	4	4	4
VC-12 Det 41 LCDR C.H. Blanchard OinC	3 AD-4W	3	3	6	6
VC-33 Det 41 LCDR R. Hoffmeister OinC	4 AD-4NL 1 AD-3Q	4 *	4 0	4	4
VC-61 Det Nan LT B.R. Smith OinC	3 F9F-2P	3	3	4	4

* Staff pilots fly with CVG-7 squadrons.

In accordance with CTF SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential dispatch 040710Z, the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 2103I 4 November 1952 for Yokosuka via Tsugaru Straits. In the meanwhile, Typhoon Agnes which originated approximately 300 miles northwest of Guam changed course to parallel the East Coast of Japan. To obviate encountering this storm CTF SEVENTY SEVEN by Confidential dispatch 050010Z directed the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD to proceed via Van Dieman Straits vice Tsugaru and to arrive Yokosuka, Japan, 8 November 1952 for a period of upkeep and repair.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

9/90/52 to 10/9/52: The ship was moored to Piedmont Pier, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan for a period of upkeep and repair. The F2H-2P's of VC-61 Photo Unit Nan were offloaded for ultimate transfer to the USS ORISKANY. Pilots of VC-61 Unit Nan operated from NAS Atsugi accepting and flying familiarization hops in 3 F9F-2P aircraft.

10/10/52: Enroute to the combat area. General Drills were conducted.

10/11/52: Enroute to the combat area. Gunnery and anti-aircraft exercises were conducted.

10/12/52: The BON HOMME RICHARD launched early morning pilot proficiency flights and joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN north of the Thirty-Eighth parallel at 1015I. In the afternoon, both prop and jet strikes were launched against bridges southwest and west of Wonsan. Corsairs and Skyraiders knocked two spans out of a railroad bridge and silenced two anti-aircraft positions. Meanwhile, a twelve plane jet strike was having one of the most successful jet missions of recent months. Attacking a total of five highway bridges, the pilots destroyed two, damaged two, and obstructed the last by causing a landslide. One Corsair received minor flak damage. In the final strike of the day, night hecklers destroyed at least nine trucks and damaged seven or more. The results of attacks on thirty-one other trucks were unobserved. In addition, one road bridge was damaged.

10/13/52: This was D minus 2 day for the landings at Kojo, and BHR aircraft spent the day softening up the enemy along the front lines in the vicinity of Kojo, and on the transportation lines leading to the objective area. Jets attacking southwest of Wonsan damaged two highway bridges and pounded a supply area, destroying or damaging thirteen buildings. Later in the day the jets hit another supply concentration in the same general area and started large fires.

targets from Wonsan to Chongjin. They destroyed at least four trucks, battered

Corsairs and Skyraiders on the afternoon strike in the vicinity of Kojo hit supply dumps and billeting areas, destroying at least twenty-three buildings and starting many large fires. One Skyraider received serious flak damage but was able to reach Yodo Island (Briscoe Field) in Wonsan Bay and effect a successful landing. Hecklers wound up the day by destroying three or more trucks and damaging at least ten others. Many additional trucks were attacked but darkness prevented damage assessment.

10/14/52: The BON HOMME RICHARD was host to Admiral McGregor, First Lord of the British Admiralty, Vice Admiral CLARK, and Rear Admiral HICKEY, who came aboard while the flagship KEARSARGE was replenishing. In the morning, Corsairs and Skyraiders struck at supply targets in the vicinity of Kojo, destroying nearly thirty-five buildings, starting ten large fires, and setting off two violent secondary explosions. Throughout the day jets attacking in the rear areas damaged or destroyed a total of seven bridges. In addition, they knocked out two automatic weapons. Hecklers scored one of the most damaging blows of the day when they exploded a truck as it moved into a fuel dump. The resulting fires spread over an area the size of a square block. An hour later it was still burning furiously and was visible for more than twenty miles. The hecklers also destroyed eight or more trucks and damaged over twenty.

10/15/52: This was to have been D-Day, but at the time the landings were scheduled to take place heavy rain and low visibility made flight operations impossible. H-Hour was therefore postponed until 1400I, and in spite of high winds and heavy seas support flights were launched shortly afternoon. Both props and jets smashed at the beaches and their approaches in anticipation of a landing. In addition to pummelling strong points, the flyers destroyed twelve buildings, blew up an ammunition dump, and caused a large secondary explosion in a fortified area. Meanwhile, the landing craft headed for the beach, but upon reaching a point about one thousand yards out they turned and retired. Shortly afterwards, the operation was officially termed an exercise. One Skyraider received a direct hit in the wing from medium flak but was able to ditch safely. The pilot, Lt(jg) Walter Alt, was picked up in good condition by the helicopter of the USS IOWA.

10/16/52: Continuing operations in the former objective area around Kojo, props and jets attacked supply dumps, troop billeting areas, and camouflaged installations. They destroyed a total of twenty buildings, started twelve fires, caused several large secondary explosions, and closed the mouth of a supply storage tunnel. An afternoon jet recco attacked interdiction targets west of Wonsan and near Kowan, damaging two highway bridges, making four rail cuts, and shooting up five boxcars. One Panther was hit by flak at Kowan and ditched in Wonsan harbor. The pilot, Lt(jg) W. G. Moore, was picked up suffering from a compound fracture of one ankle and multiple lacerations of the face. His condition was later reported to be satisfactory.

10/17/52: The ship received avgas in the morning and was able to resume flight operations at noon. Once again the major effort was directed against targets in the former objective area. Some flights were hampered by threats of enemy air attack over the target areas and by the necessity for flying reseap for a downed ESSEX pilot, but at least twenty-eight buildings were destroyed or damaged, ten rail cuts were made, four highway bridges were damaged, three oxcarts were blown up, and five trucks were destroyed or damaged. One F4U4 received serious flak damage and was forced to land at Yodo.

10/18/52: The Task Force replenished.

10/19/52: The day was marked by attacks on small, scattered, camouflaged supply dumps in the Wonsan area which were not only difficult to see and to hit, but upon which it was almost impossible to assess damage inflicted. In addition to these attacks, the prop aircraft damaged seven bridges. An afternoon jet recco, vectored to the port of Najin to investigate unidentified ships, was unable to locate anything but friendlies, but while scouting the area close to the Soviet border the pilots discovered a large radar station on a nearby North Korean island. Making an attack they scored ten hits with eleven bombs and caused considerable damage.

10/20/52: Dawn hecklers lead off the day with attacks on a variety of targets from Wonsan to Chongjin. They destroyed at least four trucks, battered

five bridges, smashed eight buildings, and cut a power line. The morning prop strike hit storage areas at Wonsan, destroying at least thirteen buildings and and damaging six others. Several fires were started and two secondary explosions were set off. On this mission flak suppressing jet aircraft blew up one building and stopped an armored car. Later in the day, in an attack on supply dumps about forty miles northwest of Wonsan, the props and their jet escort smashed more than twenty-six buildings, scattered and probably destroyed many stacks of supplies, and started three fires.

10/21/52: Bad weather over the beach held the force to a half day of offensive operations, but unusually successful morning strikes helped to make up for the shortened work day. Dawn hecklers struck back at the MIG's indirectly when they heavily damaged a radar station north of Wonsan. In other attacks, the hecklers destroyed or damaged eighteen buildings near Kilchu. The first jet recco also landed heavy blows when it smashed a total of fourteen buildings near Hungnam. The primary target for the main strike was weathered in but successful attacks were made on targets of opportunity in the general area of Songjin. Fourteen buildings were destroyed and ten damaged, rails were cut in twelve places, two rail bridges were damaged, and thirteen boxcars were wrecked. To this total the jet escort added nine boxcars damaged, two rail cuts, and a dozen boats shot up. Meanwhile, props pounded at enemy frontline positions opposite the X Corps. Their controller reported a very effective attack and credit for ripping up 300 yards of trenches, destroying six mortar positions, four artillery positions, and destroying six and damaging twelve bunkers.

10/22/52: Scheduled replenishment was postponed because of heavy seas. General Drills were conducted.

10/23/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted. Gunnery and Anti-aircraft exercises were conducted.

10/24/52: On the principle morning strike, BHR pilots returned to the task of attacking strategic targets in the rear of the enemy front lines. The objectives were pre-selected transportation, industrial installations, and government buildings in the Yalu River town of Hyesanjin. In the attack, Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers heavily damaged one large railroad repair building, and leveled twelve smaller structures. A turntable was damaged by a direct hit. In addition, two large government or headquarters buildings were heavily damaged and fourteen other buildings of various types were destroyed or damaged. A total of three secondary explosions were caused. In the afternoon the major effort was directed to close air support of the US IX Corps. Assisted by flak suppressing jets, the prop aircraft achieved 100 percent coverage of the assigned area and atarted many fires. Shortly after the attack, an ammunition dump went up in a violent explosion. Meanwhile, a large jet recco ranging west and north of Wonsan damaged three bridges, hit three buildings, made three rail cuts, silenced an AA position, and shot up sixteen oxcarts. Night hecklers damaged or destroyed nineteen trucks.

10/25/52: The principle morning strike attacked Yongp'yong-ni, a heavily defended rail center about forty miles west of Wonsan. Although the strike was hampered by the large number of aircraft making simultaneous runs on the target area, the Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers effectively suppressed flak and heavily damaged a turntable, coal loading facilities, supply buildings, and billeting areas. The afternoon prop strikes destroyed an important rail bridge near Yonghung, damaged another bridge at Wonsan, and smashed repair facilities northwest of Songjin. Night hecklers destroyed or damaged more than twenty-nine trucks, many of which exploded, and in addition, heavily damaged five buildings.

10/26/52: The Task Force replenished and no operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

10/27/52: Dawn hecklers found good hunting on the East Coast highways. They destroyed eighteen trucks and damaged seventeen trucks. The efforts of both jets and props were devoted almost exclusively to attacks on both sides of the bombline extending entirely across Korea. In making one-run attacks on troop concentrations, gun positions, supply dumps, and vehicle shelters, the pilots blanketed the targets with bombs, but damage assessment was impossible to make

due to dense clouds of dust and to the nature of the targets, The level of effectiveness, however, is estimated to be considerably below that normally achieved by ordinary close air support.

10/28/52: In response to a rush call from the HMS CRUSADER which had stopped a train near Songjin, the morning Corsair hecklers diverted from their primary sector to damage twelve boxcars, six of which they blasted from the rails. In addition, they plowed up sixty yards of track and damaged a nearby tunnel mouth. Both props and jets of the morning strike smashed at electric power facilities, factories, and supply buildings at Chuuronjang. A transformer station was attacked, causing a large secondary explosion, and a thermal powerhouse was damaged. In addition, the pilots destroyed ten factory and supply buildings. In the afternoon, Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Panthers resumed the program of massive attacks on enemy frontline positions with a strike on targets opposite the US IX Corps. As on previous attacks, the targets were difficult to see and to hit, and though all bombs landed in the immediate area results were impossible to assess.

10/29/52: The main strike of the morning smashed at supply areas and factory building at Pukchong, destroying one large factory building and fifteen smaller supply buildings. Two additional factory buildings were damaged, thirteen fires were started, and three secondary explosions were caused. In a nearby area, a long rail bypass bridge was cut in four places. In the afternoon, the strike effort was divided between three separate target areas. A large radio or radar station near Chongjin was knocked out when Corsairs and Skyraiders leveled five buildings housing equipment, generators, supplies, and personnel. In a second attack near Songjin, the props destroyed a rail bridge, ripped up the tracks in three places, and damaged a tunnel mouth. The third strike group worked over a rail bridge northwest of Wonsan, cutting the bridge in three places and plowing up one approach.

10/30/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

10/31/52: In a morning hampered by bad weather over the beach, the main strike hammered Tanchon. Although good targets were sparse, the props and jets damaged or destroyed at least eight large buildings, started one large fire, and set off a secondary explosion. Other areas were blanketed but no assessment of damage was possible. Corsairs on another flight made one bridge cut and damaged a radar station. Meanwhile, a jet recco destroyed or damaged fifteen buildings, made three rail cuts, and shot up fourteen boats. Another recco started a brisk fire in a supply area and hit a boxcar loaded with ammunition which blew up violently.

11/1/52: Heavy seas prevented flight operations.

11/2/52: BHR aircraft led planes of the newly-arrived ORISKANY into action in two massive attacks against enemy frontline positions. In the morning, the objective area was near Pyonggang, apex of the Iron Triangle, where the XV CCF Corps opposes the 7th US Infantry Division. The attack was carried out against determined AA resistance and four AD's received minor damage. The planes pounded the enemy positions with telling effect, causing at least one secondary explosion. On the same event, a joint BHR-ORISKANY ECM flight blasted a large and important radar station near Chongjin. The afternoon strike saw jets hitting a collection of buildings west of Pyonggang while props attacked supply targets a few miles to the east. Both targets were severely battered. Night hecklers finished the day with one of the most successful missions of the entire cruise when they destroyed or damaged fifty to sixty trucks. About forty of these were hit when 125 trucks were discovered north of Wonsan lined up almost bumper to bumper with their lights on. Other targets hit included a radar station, five buildings, and a gun position. Rear Admiral W. D. JOHNSON relieved Rear Admiral H. E. REGAN as Commander Carrier Division ONE at 0100Z this date.

11/3/52: The Task Force replenished and no flight operations were conducted. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were held.

11/4/52: The morning strike blasted supply dumps and personnel shelters southwest of Wonsan. The area of the target was well covered and two violent secondary explosions were set off and two large fires started. Four supply

buildings were smashed. In Wonsan proper a large warehouse was heavily damaged. Later in the day, a jet strike hit the Wonsan area again. In this attack at least six buildings were completely leveled, two revetments sustained direct hits, four fires were started, and two secondary explosions were set off. At the same time another jet flight jumped a T-34 tank near the Changjin Reservoir. One 250 pound bomb hit was scored and the tank was severly damaged. Four separate close air support missions were flown in the afternoon and all achieved worthwhile results. A partial assessment of damage includes sixteen bunkers, eighteen personnel shelters, and over sixty yards of trenches destroyed. Night hecklers finished the day, and the operating period, by destroying or damaging over nineteen trucks.

At 2103I in compliance with CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 040710Z the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD left the operating area.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Ordnance Material

All ordnance and fire control material casualties during this period were minor in nature and were well within capacity of ships force to repair. Insulation breakdown in electrical cable continues to be the major source of trouble.

Of thirteen bomb handling one-ton chain falls tested during the last in port period in Yokosuka, six failed to pass the test and are recommended for survey.

2. Ordnance Expended

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	306 Rounds
40MM	2669 Rounds

AIRCRAFT

Bombs		Rockets	
16	2000# G.P.	88	HVAR
554	1000# G.P.	736	5" & 6.5" ATAR
842	500# G.P.		
3238	250# G.P.	Gun Ammo	
1499	100# G.P.		
1432	260# Frag	269,542	20MM
12	Napalm Fire Bombs	99,270	.50 Cal.

Parachute Flares

394	MK6

3. Deck Evolutions

During this period the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was alongside fifteen (15) replenishing ships for fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies, and received thirty-one (31) destroyers alongside for refueling, guard mail, passengers, patients and light freight. All transfers were effected without personnel injury or material casualty.

None

2. Damage to Aircraft

25 planes received minor damage by flak and bomb bursts.

3. Loss of Aircraft

Date	Squadron	Type	BuNo	Cause
10/15/52	VA 75	AD4	127875	Enemy Anti-Aircraft fire
10/16/52	VF 72	F9F2	123423	Enemy Anti-Aircraft fire

4. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

Targets	Destroyed	Damaged	Other
Buildings	268	176	
Warehouses	3	3	
Powerhouses	0	2	
Factories	1	6	
Locomotive	0	1	
Railroad Cars	17	39	
Boats	11	65	
Bridges (HWY)	5	41	
Bridges (RR)	0	12	
Oxcarts	27	19	
Vehicles	91	198	
Tunnels	0	3	
Gun Positions	12	3	
Fuel Storage Facilities	1	0	
Ammo Storage Facilities	1	0	
Transformer Stations	1	1	
Observation Posts	0	5	
Round House	0	1	
RR Turntables	0	2	
Radar Stations and/or Radio Stations	1	2	
Hangars	0	2	
Lumber Mills	1	1	
Radar Antenna	1	0	
Lighthouse	0	1	
Coal Loading Facilities	0	1	
Tank	0	1	
Underground Storage Facilities	0	1	
Bunkers	22	12	
Personnel Shelters	18	0	
Fish Traps	2	0	
Rail Cuts			87
Road Cuts			12
Trenches Destroyed			360 yards
Rail Tracks Destroyed			60 yards

5. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, smoke, flak or time prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Close Air Support missions are generally not specific as to results of damage, but measured only in the percentage of coverage of a certain target area. Results of Bombline missions, numerous strafings, fires, explosions and the destruction of the contents of buildings may never be known.

[redacted]

Reliability of communications has markedly increased since discontinuing

1. Performance

The performance of personnel of both air group and ship's company remained at a very high level. Only one serious accident occurred during this period, (discussed under Operational Casualties below), and it has not been established that this accident was caused by avoidable personnel errors.

VC-61, Photo Unit NAN, VC-4, Detachment 41, and VC-33, Detachment 41, should be singled out for special comment. Photo Unit NAN has shown from the earliest days of the cruise a high degree of proficiency in spite of two changes of aircraft type. It has successfully carried out photographic missions over the most dangerous flak areas in East Korea, making repeated runs at constant altitude, course, and speed, and the quality of their performance is responsible to no small degree for the successful operations of the Air Group and Task Force in general.

Both night heckler detachments have again and again demonstrated that their efforts can be as productive as many full-scale daylight strikes, even in the adverse conditions under which they operate. This is indicative not only of the effectiveness of the type of operation, but also of the skill and accuracy of the pilots.

2. Casualties

a. Combat

LTJG William Glenn MOORE, Jr., 487129/1310, USN (Attached to VF-72 USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) at approximately 1325I, 16 October 1952, was flying a F9F-2 jet aircraft on a routine combat mission. While pulling out from a dive, his plane was struck presumably by a 37mm shell which penetrated the floor of the cockpit between the rudder pedals. At this time he received a compound comminuted fracture of the left fibula. Due to rapid loss of blood he elected to ditch in Wonsan Harbor instead of proceeding to an emergency landing field. During the ditching he sustained the following wounds: lacerated right hand, chin, and forehead; contusion, eyes bilateral, with subconjunctival hemorrhage, and concussion of the brain. He was immediately recovered from the water by DE 535 and transferred to the USS TOLEDO (CA-133) for treatment and further transfer to USNH, #3923.

b. Operational

LT. Richard E. LUEHRS, 472014, USN (Attached to CAG-7 USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)) was on duty on the flight deck during landing operations. An F9F-2 in landing engaged two wires and the tail hook failed. The aircraft crashed through the barriers and into the after end of the island structure. During the crash one 20mm gun fired. One shell penetrated Repair Station Eight. A fragment of this shell struck Dr. LUEHRS lacerating his right forehead and eye lid and causing contusion of the right orbit. RINEHARD, David E., 373 14 72, AT3 USN was struck on the right buttock by a small fragment causing superficial abrasion. He was treated and returned to duty.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Intelligence

a. Kojo Operation

Having no indication whatsoever that the projected "landing" was not genuine, the BON HOMME RICHARD and Air Group SEVEN spared no effort to make the Kojo Operation a success. Consequently, when the real nature of the operation was disclosed, many of those concerned felt let down.

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Reliability of communications has markedly increased since discontinuing

An important consideration in this connection is the distinction in safety factors and policies between an exercise and a real landing. The critical role of air power in an actual amphibious operation places accomplishment of mission far above the element of pilot safety, and pilots are often caused to expose themselves to greater risks than in ordinary attack missions and far greater risks than in exercises. It is strongly recommended that in future exercises of this type Air Intelligence Officers and pilots be informed of the bogus nature of the proceedings or that clear and forceful instructions be issued to the effect that all customary precautions and safety measures continue to be observed.

"Fireball", a map-booklet, containing 57 9 X 9 inch 1:50,000 maps of the objective area, was issued for use in the Kojo Operation. This booklet also included a title page and two pages of annotated reproductions to be used as an index to the maps. Pilots found this booklet to be impractical. The small ground area covered by each individual page made proper orientation difficult. After the first day of operations, holes were punched and rings were used to replace the staple-type binding of the booklet. This alteration was made to facilitate turning of pages as desired. For future operations of this type a loose leaf arrangement should be used and the charts be doubled in size. If the area of operations is small enough, that is, if the area can be covered by less than eight maps, uncut 1:50,000 maps should be used with an annotated 1:250,000 chart provided as an index.

2. Photographic Interpretation

a. General

Due to the reversion from the Banshee to F9F-2P aircraft the photo pilots were again required to fly at hazardously low altitudes over mountainous Korean terrain. This was necessary due to the fact that the F9F-2P is limited to a maximum focal length of 12 inches and in order to produce the required scale photography suitable for photo interpretation.

The entire Kojo invasion area was mapped at 5,000 feet and completely analyzed by photo interpreters for all guns, trenches, firing positions, barbed wire, mine fields, vehicles, bunkers, storage, troops and other installations. Photo coverage at a scale of 1:5000 of the rail routes Hazel and Helen which lie in the heart of Wonsan Valley, was also requested and flown at 5000 feet.

These missions are well-known to be very hazardous in straight and level flight. When aircraft which can carry a camera of greater focal length than 12 inches are available in the area, it is recommended that they be assigned to these heavy flak areas in lieu of F9F-2P aircraft.

b. Locating Radar Stations

One enemy radar station has been definitely verified by photo interpretation on the basis of previous electronic search of the area. Photo coverage on two other enemy radar stations on the basis of previous ECM intelligence revealed pairs of low frequency type radio masts and nearby buildings. Later investigations showed that at one of these stations pilots sighted, visually and unmistakably, bedspring type radar antennae perched atop radio masts. Photo coverage in this case was done under poor atmospheric conditions, and therefore, no radar antennaes were revealed.

A number of other attempts were made to locate radar installations by mapping areas suspected to contain such installations. Since no radar was located in these instances, it is believed that either the radar installations were not located in the suspected area, the installations were too small to see on 1:5000 scale photography, or the radar is extremely well camouflaged. It is felt that better results might be obtained with longer focal length cameras.

3. Communications

a. General

Reliability of communications has markedly increased since discontinuing

the use of speed keys on most circuits. Overall speed of clearing traffic has risen from approximately 4.5 wpm to approximately 10 wpm on manual circuits.

The decrease in speed of transmission on the Guam Fleet Broadcast from 28 wpm to 20 wpm since the last tour of duty in this area has been of great assistance, considering the shortage of qualified strikers copying this circuit.

4. Photography

a. General

The number of K-25 strike photographs taken this period increased considerably. About three additional rolls per day were taken with excellent results. The best photographs were of targets which were not heavily defended by AA and permitted lower flying. An urgent requirement exists for a camera with a longer focal length, such as a K-25 camera modified for a 15 inch lens, which would permit larger scale photography at higher altitudes.

During the mock invasion at Kojo, exposed and unexposed aerial film was packed in ATAR cans with Kapok life jackets attached and successfully dropped by a Skyraider in the water alongside the U.S.S. MT. MCKINLEY in the invasion beach area. The photo planes landed on board at 1610 from their mission and the film, in the ATAR cans, was loaded on the bomb racks of an AD and ready to go at 1630.

In recent tests of Model "Q" Eyemo camera mounted in a X-C4AZ motion picture camera capsule and attached to the bomb racks of AD and F4U aircraft, it was found the pilots were reluctant to carry the capsule in lieu of large bombs. Due to the relative lack of experienced pilots in photography it is considered desirable that photo planes be modified to carry, interchangeably, forward firing cameras such as a K-25 15 inch and a 35mm motion picture camera. This could be used, when permissable, for combat recording of invasions and large strikes.

The use of a K-17 24 inch camera, mounted in a modified 1000 lb water filled bomb pod and carried on the bomb racks of AD aircraft, was discontinued during this period, since no satisfactory method has been found to eliminate camera vibration sufficiently.

5. Combat Information Center

a. General

CIC faced its greatest challenge during the first few days of this period. The large amphibious landing feint held at that time involved more ships and aircraft than this unit has ever before operated with. It was a considerable task to keep an accurate account of the additional aircraft during the time when this ship was strike control carrier and it was equally difficult to maintain an up to the minute, comprehensive picture of the location and identification of all the various surface units scattered in groups within our radar range.

b. Personnel

The loss of two officer air controllers and eleven enlisted personnel during the previous in-port period was felt for the first two weeks. Enlisted replacements have been obtained and are undergoing intensive training.

c. Training

A training program is underway to indoctrinate all CIC watch officers in the duties of the OOD underway. They are particularly to observe capabilities and limitations of the bridge radar equipment and the necessity for close cooperation between the bridge and CIC.

d. Operations

Pilots on several Combat Air Patrol missions from this ship have complained

of the controllers inability to provide CAP with accurate altitude information while conducting air intercepts on bogies. The bogies in nearly all cases were identified as returning strike groups. The complaints have not only been made aginst this ship's controllers but against all the controllers in the force at one time or another. The SM radar is the only means available to this ship to obtain altitude on an aircraft. The maximum accuracy varies from plus 1000 feet to minus 1000 feet of the target's actual altitude. This accuracy can only be attained out to a range of 35 miles. For the controller to effect a successful intercept, closer accuracy is always required on bogie altitude but is rarely available with the present installation.

B. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Forged eye pendants

a. Days of low surface wind conditions again required the use of the forged eye pendants for F9F launches. The bungee arrester, as modified by ship's force, continued to give satisfactory service. (CO, BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) to Chief Bureau of Aeronautics ltr ser 2626 of 25 October 1952) One arrester has been used for 136 shots of which 90 were during this operating period. However, two broken bungee strands were replaced on the arrester during this time.

b. Of the ten pendants originally received, five have been lost over the bow prior to the modification of the bungee arrester, four have been damaged beyond use, evidently by being struck by the tail skag of the F9F, and one is still in use.

2. Barricades

a. During landing operations an F9F crashed into the island structure and the starboard barricade stanchion after its tail hook failed from a double pendant engagement. Damage to the stanchion required its replacement. Damage to the actuating equipment caused by the barricade shear pins failing to shear was extensive. The piston rod, cylinder support bushings, bumper pad bracket, piston rod terminal and pin required replacement by locally manufactured parts. Other damaged parts were repaired as required. The adjoining deck, bulkhead and cylinder support base were sprung out of alignment and will require shipyard repairs. To correct for this misalignment, the piston rod terminal and pin were modified to permit free movement of the cylinder lever and piston rod linkage. It is felt that had the stanchion shear pins sheared, the damage sustained by the actuating equipment would have been negligible. Actual damage to the shear pins was negligible. A RUDM is being submitted.

3. Bomb and rocket barrier

a. In an attempt to minimize the danger to equipment and personnel, due to hung bombs and rockets jarring loose during landings, a bomb barrier has been developed and installed for trial. It is constructed of old barricade nylon webbing and rigged between number two and three barriers. The webbing consists of six horizonal nylon straps seventy-five feet long to which are sewn vertical straps three feet long. This webbing net is supported at the top and bottom by two $\frac{1}{4}$ inch steel cables which are secured at each end to two four foot high stanchions constructed of angle iron. The stanchions are hinged at the bottom and can be locked in the down position. They are raised manually and are held in the up position by the wind across the deck. The bomb barrier lies flat on deck during launches and recoveries and can be raised expeditiously when required. It is considered that the barrier is of sufficient strength to stop or slow down appreciably any bomb up to and including a 250 lb. G.P. and 260 lb. Frag. No engagements were made during this reporting period. In two instances when the bomb barrier was rigged, hung ordnance became detached on landing. In one, a 250 lb. G.P. bounced over

the barrier and in the other an ATAR skidded under the barrier. A report on the effectiveness of this bomb barrier will be made at a later date when evaluation is more complete.

C. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

During this period there were only two aircraft AOG for lack of parts. These parts were coded P1 and are not allowed to be carried; therefore it is considered that this lack of material is beyond the control of the Ship's Supply Department. This fine showing is partially due to the excellent supply support afforded by the COD method of delivery of Priority Able and Baker requisitions.

Not all important freight was forwarded so expeditiously. Special launching pendants were down to two on board when a shipment of 30 arrived at Sasebo from CONUS; however instead of being forwarded directly to this vessel via Fleet Freight or COD, material was back-hauled by rail to Yokosuka for delivery next in-port period. While lack of this material did not prove serious, it could very easily have adversely affected jet operations. Action taken by the cognizant activities is not fully understood in view of the long back-haul involved. It is recommended that freight which arrives in Sasebo, usually after months of waiting, be delivered direct to vessels on the line.

A series of dispatches has been sent between ComFairJap, CTF-77, ComSeron3, and Divisions and units of TF-77 in an attempt to arrive at the best method of requisitioning and receiving aviation materials from the CHOURRE (ARV-1). This command has recommended to CTF-77 that the following procedure be used:

a. Base the CHOURRE at Sasebo.

b. Submit routine requisitions to CHOURRE via vessels of the replenishment force (CTE-92.11)

c. CHOURRE provide required routine material either by replenishment on the line or by sending it via the replenishment force.

d. Submit emergency requisitions to CHOURRE via dispatch.

e. CHOURRE fill emergency requisitions by COD shipment where practicable, otherwise via the replenishment force.

f. Vessels in the port of Yokosuka fill their requirements direct from ASB, NSD Yokosuka with a copy to CHOURRE for inventory control purposes.

It is the considered opinion of this command that the above method of supplying aviation requirements would be furthering the principle of mobile support as enunciated by CNO and CinCPacFlt. It would also considerably improve supply availability for the following reasons:

a. Routine requisitions would reach CHOURRE in less time than at present.

b. Requisitions could be filled with a minimum of transportation delay by basing CHOURRE at the base nearest to the Task Force.

c. A steady workload would be presented to CHOURRE rather than a peak load during inport period of requiring vessels.

d. Requirements would be filled on the line, where and when they are needed, rather than in port after the immediate need has passed.

e. CHOURRE and carriers would receive valuable mobile-support training.

f. Difficulties incident to mobile support would be discovered, allowing such corrective action as necessary to be taken.

g. Items which the CHOURRE cannot fill would be passed sooner, resulting in earlier shipment from CONUS.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

2. Commissary

a. On 9 October 1952, 3,000 gallons of reconstituted milk were received from Camp Yokohama Ration Distribution Center via covered van, kept under refrigeration by flaked ice. This milk was placed in the refrigerator spaces in less than one hour after being received.

b. Reconstituted milk was used for the first time during this operating period. An average of 150 gallons was consumed by the General Mess each day, and on 26 October the last was used.

c. Recommended life expectancy is considered to be 28 days, however, the milk used on the 16th day was considered "good". During this period all milk was kept at 38-40 degrees. It is not recommended that reconstituted milk be carried beyond a 16 day period due to a slight difference in flavor.

d. This milk provided a welcome addition to the menu and brought forth many favorable comments from the crew. It is recommended that this item be placed on the list of items available from the reefers during replenishment on the line.

3. General Stores

a. A considerable number of requisitions have been returned to this ship marked "Cancelled-NIS" or "Cancelled-NC". This despite the fact that such requisitions were inscribed "If NIS or NC procure." ComServPac Instruction 4220.2A states in part:

"5g. Ship's Requisitions

(1) Ship's requisitions will contain instructions regarding the action to be taken by the supply activity, if requisitioned items are not in stock, as follows:

(a) 'If NIS or NC, procure and ship' or

(b) 'If NIS or NC, cancel unless delivery can be accomplished prior to (date).'"

The same instruction also reads:

"5f. Screening

(1) General

(a) Requests for material will be submitted to the activity indicated in enclosures (2), (3), and (4). The activity receiving such requisitions will issue the desired material if available, or, if not available, will;

1. Substitute, if appropriate, or

2. Obligate against stock due, or

3. Pass or forward to PRCO, or other appropriate activity, for action."

b. Despite these provisions, which require supplying activities either to obligate against stock due or pass for action NIS or NC requisitions, supplying activities continue to cancel them in disregard of these instructions. Such action not only delays ultimate receipt of the material by requiring vessels, but also makes for considerable unnecessary work, not only by the requiring vessel who must reorder, but also by the supplying vessel who must reprocess the reorder. The final result is often a re-repetition of this cycle. This undesirable situation is most commonly met in the case of priority "C" requisitions. The ultimate result is that as the need becomes more and more critical due to non-receipt of the material the priority must be raised to "A" or "B". This results in the use of emergency methods of supply and the use of premium transportation, and negates the foresightedness of the ordering activity which originally placed the priority "C" requisition in sufficient time to enable it to be filled by routine supply action and by routine non-premium transportation methods. The number of priority "A" and "B" requisitions could be materially

reduced if supplying activities would comply with the requirements of C[redacted] Instruction 4220.2A partially quoted above.

D. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Religious Services

Twenty-two services were held each week during the operating period. Protestant and Catholic services were held in the Wardroom while Jewish, Christian Science, and Latter Day Saints' services were held in the library or the training room. Attendance at services continued to be excellent. Opportunity was again given to contribute to an orphanage in Japan. A total of $727.70 was donated.

2. Welfare and Recreation

Preparation of material for the cruise book was completed and forwarded to the printing company in Tokyo. The work of printing and binding will be completed in December.

There was an enthusiastic response to an "Ugly Man Contest." Votes, at 5¢ each, are being sold to raise a fund to be given to a suitable charity upon the return of the ship to the United States.

A request for 332 rest hotel reservations was made and 315 were obtained. On a percentage basis, this is the largest number of reservations the ship has received. As has been true during previous operating periods, movies and reading were the main forms of recreation. The disc jockey program was increased to four hours a day. The additional two hours consists of the playing of radio program transcriptions. A weekly football contest in the ship's paper has proven popular, averaging 150 entries each week.

E. Medical Department

1. Admissions to the Sick List during Operating Period

a. 228 patients admitted to the sick list.

b. Total of 382 sick days out of a possible 55,560 work days.

c. .006% of possible work days lost to sick days.

d. One pilot was admitted to the sick list.

Diagnosis: Fracture Compound, Comminuted, right Fibula, with artery and nerve involvement. (8010) KL "C" SL "R"

e. There were 7 patients admitted to the sick list from other vessels with a total loss of 42 sick days.

2. Treatments Accomplished Non-Admission

a.	Medical	3585
b.	Surgical	8
c.	Veneral Disease Cases	61

3. Pilot and Crewman Status

a. Killed in Action

None

b. Missing in Action

None

c. Wounded in Action

One (1)

d. Grounded Personnel

Physical No. Days	Post Accident Psychological No. Days	Disp. Board No. Days
9	0	0

e. Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding . . . 14

4. Accidents involving plane loss, injury or death

(Please refer to Casulaties Part V, paragraph 2)

5. Condition of the crew

a. The general physical condition and morale of the ships company and air group continues to be excellent. The accident rate for this action period has been much lower than for any previous operating period. The venereal disease rate has shown a decrease of 44.5% over the previous period.

F. DENTAL DEPARTMENT

1. General

During this period the Dental Department carried on the normal work.load plus the treatment of four emergency dental patients transferred from destroyers by highline. Treatment involved filling of 18 teeth, and the removal of three teeth. Among the patients was an Ensign of the Republic of Korea Navy.

G. AIR GROUP COMMENTS

1. Operating

a. With the advent of the one hour and fifteen minute flights, jet flak suppression launches must be very closely coordinated with the prop launches. The following table is a suggested guide:

FLAK SUPPRESSION FLIGHTS

Coordinate on Launch Times

Miles to target	(3 miles per min.) Time for Props	(6 miles per min.) Time for Jets	Between last prop & 1st Jet - min Launch time diff.
100 miles	33 min.	18 min.	15 min.
125 miles	40 min.	20 min.	20 min.
150 miles	50 min.	25 min.	25 min.
175 miles	59 min.	29 min.	30 min.

b. In the current operating period, the abuse of the emergency VHF channel (guard) has increased considerably. The emergency frequency should be left clear of all traffic other than bona fide emergencies. Aviators are not the only offenders. Both ship and shore stations have used the channel for various extraneous transmissions.

2. Ordnance

a. Douglas Bomb Ejector

From October 12th to the 31st, 6 bomb ejector foot assemblies R84-DG-4218337 and six piston assemblies R94-DG-4218338 were fired from Douglas Bomb Ejectors, due to the failure of the retaining keys R92-DG-2252531 and the clamp assembly R94-DG-4256913 to retain the bomb ejector foot when the bomb ejector cartridge Mark 1 Mod 2 was fired to release bombs over targets. While the losses of the assemblies have been covered in RUDM's, their replacement remains a critical problem as parts for the Douglas Bomb Ejector are not stocked by the ship's Supply Department. A new bomb ejector must be requisitioned and the needed assemblies removed and installed in the ejector mounted in the aircraft as the ejector suffers little damage due to the loss of the foot and/or piston assemblies. To replace an entire ejector with a new one would require from three to four hours, depending on the difficulties encountered, compared to three or four minutes to install one of the missing assemblies. In view of the above it is recommended that spare foot, piston

key and clamp assemblies be made available and furnished to applicable Departments on a ratio of one of each of the assemblies per four Douglas Bomb Ejectors carried in stock.

b. Gun Barrels

Various attempts have been made to explain the sudden bursting of 20MM, and sometimes a .50 Cal, gun barrel during aerial firing runs. The most popular explanation offered is prolonged firing bursts. Recently a 20MM mounted on an AD aircraft shredded its barrel approximately a foot from the muzzle. At first it was assumed that the pilot had been firing prolonged bursts. However the pilot estimated that he had fired about thirty rounds when the accident occurred. Later a pilot of an F9F reported an explosion in the nose section of his aircraft. An inspection of the guns of his aircraft disclosed that a 20MM round was fired in one of the guns while the breech block was not entirely locked forward in the firing position. The resulting explosion caused the block to be blown to the rear and as the cartridge case was withdrawn from the supporting walls of the firing chamber it burst upward, rupturing and exploding the new cartridge held in the feed mechanism. When the barrel of the gun was examined the projectile of the first cartridge was found in the barrel 14 inches from the firing chamber where it had been forced by the gasses of the exploding cartridge case. Had the cartridge case of the first cartridge not exploded the cartridge in the feed mechanism, it is conceivable that it would have been fed into the chamber and fired with the next return of the breech block. It is believed that such an occurrence would cause the barrel to rupture at the position the first projectile occupied whether the second projectile was explosive, ball, incendiary, or armor piercing.

3. Ordnance Statistics

Of a total of 7,114 bombs expended during this period on the line (exclusive of incendiaries and napalm) the following expenditures are listed by month together with the malfunctions which occurred each month:

	Cotober	November
Expenditures	6,319	795
Dropped on Catapult launch	2	0
Dropped when aircraft landed on board	1	1
Hung bombs	4	0

Break-down is as follows:

1 occurred on a Aero 14A rack. Electrical lead to solonoid broken.
5 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 0 rack. All malfunctions electrical in nature.
1 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 0 rack with a 250 GP bomb when its sea braces loosened and allowed the bomb to rotate and bind the rack release mechanism.
1 occurred on the Mark 55 Mod 1 bomb rack. The rack failed to release its 250 lb G.P. bomb due to a bound release solenoid. This rack was one of 60 Mark 55 Mod 1 racks issued to the USS BON HOMME RICHARD just prior to leaving Yokosuka.

The low number of bomb rack malfunctions for the number of bombs carried is a tribute to the perseverance, initiative and hard work on the part of the Air Group ordnancemen who by constant and meticulous maintenance were able to eliminate any but the unusual malfunctions.

Of a total of 844 rockets expended during this period on the line, the following expenditures are listed by month, together with the malfunctions which occurred each month:

	October	November
Expenditures	822	22
Duds	25	0
Pigtails becoming unplugged	1	0
Broken pigtails	5	0
Aircraft circuit	2	0
Totals	33	0

The following expenditures of 20MM and 50 Caliber ammunition were made during this period on the line:

50 Cal.
Total 99,270

20 MM
Total 209,942

All 50 caliber machine guns are equipped with stillite lined barrels. The performance of these barrels, under combat conditions, has been excellent.

4. Survival

a. There have been numerous complaints about the awkward fit of the parachute harness. For some pilots the sling is very tight, even with the straps let out all the way. It is recommended that an extra large harness be available in the combat area because of the extra personal survival gear worn. Many pilots have voiced a need for a back pad that rides low enough to give support to the small of the back. Something on the order of the old kidney shape pad would be ideal.

b. A recommendation has been submitted to the Bureau of Aeronautics that consideration be given to the design of winter flight clothing suitable for overland, cold weather survival. This clothing should be comfortable either with or without the Mark III or Mark IV exposure suit (VA-75 ltr ser 417 dtd 27 October 1952).

c. There is an obvious need for additional pockets on flight gear, and it is recommended that a study be made of the subject. At the present time pockets of all shapes, sizes and material are sewn on the outside of the flight suit which are used for additional flares, blood chits, emergency survival items, sheath knives, etc. While answering the need for a place to stow these additional items, the big question in both the aviator's and the parachute rigger's minds is, "will the pockets stay on, and will the equipment stay in during an emergency parachute descent?"

If additional pockets are approved after study, it is further recommended that a ready made standard pocket about three sizes, of the same material as the flight suit, be made available through the supply system. Mass production methods of manufacture would be a saving in material and time.

In addition there is a need for a standard cartridge holder long enough to hold either twelve or eighteen rounds of ammunition. The holster that has been issued for the Naval aviator for the .38 caliber pistol has been without a means of carrying extra ammunition. The holder could be of the type where loops are sewn directly on the leather, or the type where loops are sewn on a canvas holder that can be slipped onto the leather shoulder strap.

d. The Air Group has used an inventory sheet when checking the ADSK-1 because of the many items involved. Included on the sheet are extra items, carbine number, local identification number of kit, check date, and check date of radio. Thus if missing items are noted, the items can be ordered and when the items are received they can be placed in proper kits.

e. Rubber strips have been cemented on the inside of the ADSK lid to form a lip. This has been done on an experimental basis to keep the pilot chute and mainsail from being exposed to the elements, and to prevent a possible premature release.

f. To enable pilots to slip in and out of their anti-exposure suits a few of our riggers have hit upon the idea of using old "avoset" bottles, cleaning them up and punching holes in the lid. The bottles are then filled with talc or soapstone.

g. It has been noted that Mark III Anti-Exposure suits by Willis and Geiger, Inc. have more circumference in the leg at the point of boot attachment than the suits made by International Latex Corporation. If this is not taken into account when first cementing on the boots, time will be lost due to having to put on additional coats of cement. This in no way makes the suit unusable but it does waste a lot of time.

h. It is recommended that the face curtain of the ejection seat be stocked aboard ship in limited quantities. The effect of the elements on fabrics is the basis for this recommendation.

i. After T.O. 105-52 was received by this Air Group a check was made on all parachutes using the Go-No-Go gauge. It was found that all parachutes met the required width. All parachutes had been packed using the old packing methods.

It is believed that the extra material spread on the outside of the Pack frame will result in nothing more than a weakened container. Regardless of the general shape of the seat type parachute container when leaving the loft, it will conform to the general configuration of the bucket seat after being put into use.

5. Electronic Countermeasures

The comments on electronic countermeasures for this period have been classified "SECRET" and are being distributed as a supplement to this report under separate cover, on a need to know basis.

PART VII

1. Summary of sorties 12 through 31 October

MISSION	F9F	F4U4	F4U5N	AD	ADN	ADW	TOTAL
Strike/Recco	381	249		259			889
CAP	160						160
Photo/Escort	104						104
CAS		4		4			8
NGF		20	4				24
[redacted]		4			12		16
HECKLER			38		35		73
ASP						38	38
GATOR		2	1	22	17		42
ASW						4	4
RESCAP			4				4
Miscellaneous	17	16	4	21	17	1	76
Totals	662	295	51	306	81	43	1438

Total Sorties Scheduled	1462
Total Sorties Flown	1438
Percent of Schedule Flown	98.3%
Total Hours	3,173.1
Days of Operation	15
Average Hours per day of Operation	211.5

2. Summary of sorties 2 and 4 November

MISSION	F9F	F4U4	F4U5N	AD	ADN	ADW	TOTAL
Strike/Recco	58	24		24			106
CAP	14						14
Photo	13						13
RESCAP							0
CAS		7		8			15
NGF		2					2

MISSION	F9F	F4U4	F4U5N	AD	ADN	ADW	TOTAL
ECM		4		4	4		12
HECKLER			7		7		14
AEW				1	1	2	4
ASP						5	5
GATOR				4	1		5
Miscelaneous							0
Totals	85	37	7	41	13	7	190
						Aborts	3
							193

Total Sorties Scheduled	198
Total Sorties Flown	190
Percent Scheduled Sorties Flown	95.99%
Total Hours Flown	430.9
Days of Operation	2
Average Hours Per Day	215.5

Average Hours per pilot for entire tour including November flight time 31.6 Hours

3. Flak Damage Analysis (12 October to 4 November)

	F9F	F4U/F4U-5N	AD/AD-4NL	TOTAL
Sorties	556	367	368	1291
Hits (Heavy/Medium)	2	3	7	12
Hits (%/100 sorties)	.36%	.82%	1.9%	.93%
Hits (Small Arms)	3	4	2	9
Hits (%/100 sorties)	.54%	1.1%	.54%	.7%
Total Hits (All types)	5	7	9	21
Total Hits (%/100 sorties)	.9%	1.9%	2.4%	1.6%
A/C Lost	1	0	1	2
A/C Lost (%/100 sorties)	.18%	0	.27%	.15%

P. W. WATSON

Copy To:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, USS ANTIETAM (CVA 36) (1)
CO, USS BOXER (CVA 21) (1)
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA 9) (1)
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA 33) (1)
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA 34) (1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47) (1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA 37) (1)
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA 45) (1)
CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE 116) (1)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE 115) (1)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119) (1)
CO, USS RENDOVA (CVE 114) (1)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE 118) (1)
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) (1)
CO, VF-73, NAS QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
COMAIRLANT (1)
COMCARAIRGRU TWO (1)
COMCARAIRGRU FIVE (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ELEVEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU FIFTEEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU NINETEEN (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
COMCARAIRGRU SEVEN (25) (for Squadron and parent VC Units)
COMCARAIRGRU (ATU) ONE (1)
COMFAIRQUONSET (1)
COMSERPAC (1)
NLO JOC KOREA (1)