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U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 21 June through 27 June 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group SEVEN letter dated 28 June 1952

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 21 June through 27 June is hereby submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) CAPTAIN PAUL W. WATSON commanding, with ComCarDivONE, Rear Admiral HERBERT E. REGAN and Carrier Air Group SEVEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area on 21 June 1952.

On 23 June 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN off the eastern coast of Korea near the Thirty Eight Parallel. The Task Force was commanded by Rear Admiral A. SOUCEK, ComCarDivTHREE, aboard the USS BOXER (CV 21) and operating under Task Force Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of the USS BOXER (CV 21), USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV 47), USS PRINCETON (CV 37) and various heavy support and screening ships.

On 26 June 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Task Force 77 in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 250240Z and arrived in Sasebo, Japan on 27 June 1952 for duty as ready carrier.

The mission of Task Force 77 is in accordance with CTF 77's Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision).

Carrier Air Group SEVEN is commanded by Commander G.B. BROWN, USN, and consisted of the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 21 June 1952:

<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>NO. OF PILOTS</u>	<u>NO. AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</u>
VF-71	25	16 F9F-2
VF-72	24	16 F9F-2
VF-74	25	16 F4U-4
VA-75	25	16 AD-4
VC-4	4	4 F4U-5N
VC-12	6	3 AD-4W
VC-33	7	4 AD-4NL 1 AD-3Q
VC-61	4	3 F9F-2P
HU-1	2 (Assigned to Ship)	1 HO3S-1

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

6/21/52: Departed Yokosuka, Japan for the Operating Area, Underway Operational Training flights were conducted off the eastern coast of Japan.

6/22/52: Enroute to Operating Area.

6/23/52: At 0528I the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN, marking the return of this carrier to the Korean Theater of Operations after an absence of nearly seven months. The first strike of the day, launched at 1415I, saw 13 AD's, 13 F4U's, and 19 F9F-2's strike the power plants and electrical installations of previously restricted areas in North Korea. The strike, coordinated with the United States Air Force through JOC, Korea, was a spectacular success, resulting in total destruction of the transformer and power house of Fusen # 2 Hydro-Electric Plant, 80% destruction to the transformer yard and turbine building of Kyosen # 2 hydro-electric plant, rendering both plants, exclusive targets of BHR planes, permanently non-operational.

6/24/52: Continuing the offensive operations of the previous day, this ship launched a total of 42 offensive sorties in one event against Kyosen #4 hydro-electric power plant, a target that had been attacked by the planes of another carrier the preceeding day, but which photographic interpretation indicated was not severely damaged and might be operatable. According to the P.I. Report following the BHR attack, the following damage was inflicted: Power House destroyed, fuel storage tank and transformer yard completely demolished. Overall damage - plant and facilities 75% destroyed. In addition to the power plant attack, two bridges were destroyed and one heavily damaged on a rail strike mission.

6/25/52: Unfavorable weather over most of North Korea hindered the BHR planes this date. Coordinated jet-prop strikes were made on troop concentrations, supply storage areas and truck parks in the CT sector south of Wonsan. The first casualty of this tour was inflicted upon a VF 74 pilot, Ensign Ronald EATON, USNR, whose F4U-4 was believed to have been hit by flak immediately before the pilot parachuted over enemy territory in the target area. A helicopter picked up the downed pilot, but was itself struck by enemy fire and crashed. It is believed at this time the BHR pilot was captured and is a prisoner of war. Other sorties for the day included 22 CAP and 4 ASP.

6/26/52: No flights were conducted. The efforts of the Bon Homme Richard were directed to replenishment activities.

6/27/52: The Bon Homme Richard arrived at Sasebo, Japan at 0800I for duty as ready carrier.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Material

(a) Performance of ordnance material was satisfactory and without casualty.

(b) Lower stage bomb elevator B-1-A at Frame 65 parted its cable when electric switches failed to operate and allowed elevator to over-run. Repairs are being effected by ship's force.

2. Training

(a) An intensive training program was conducted with emphasis on recognition, battle telephone procedure, and on station instruction of gun and control crews.

3. Deck Evolutions

(a) During this period, fuel, aviation gasoline, ammunition and personnel were transferred without casualty to personnel or equipment.

4. Ammunition Expended

(a) Aviation Ordnance

(1)	2000 lb G.P. Bombs	27
(2)	1000 lb G.P. Bombs	141
(3)	500 lb G.P. Bombs	58
(4)	250 lb G.P. Bombs	283
(5)	100 lb Inc. AN-M12	89
(6)	20 MM Ammunition	16,379
(7)	50 Cal. Ammunition	21,664

(b) Ship's Ammunition

None

PART IV

OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None

B. Damage to Aircraft

<u>No. of Planes</u>	<u>Types</u>	<u>Cause</u>
1	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire
1	AD-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire
1	AD-4	Bomb Blast

C. Loss of Aircraft

<u>Date</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Su. No.</u>	<u>Causes</u>
6/25/52	VF-74	F4U-4	81002	Lost over Korea (probably due to enemy anti-aircraft fire)

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
<u>KYOSEN Hydro-Electric Plant No. 4</u>		
Power House	1	
Penstocks	2	
Fuel Storage Tank	1	
Transformer Yard	1	
<u>KYOSEN Hydro-Electric Plant # 2</u>		
Power House		1
Transformer Yard		1
Penstocks	2	
Control House		1
Surge Tank		1
Fuel Storage Tank	1	
<u>FUSEN Hydro-Electric Plant # 2</u>		
Power House	1	
Transformer Yard	1	
Penstocks	1	
RR Bridges	2	2
Supply Dump		1
Gun Positions		8
Rail Cuts	7	

E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target or in those instances when the pilots could assess the damage to a definite total or felt that damage had been inflicted were used in these tables. In many attacks weather, flak, or shortage of fuel prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafings, fires and bombings obviously may never be known.

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

Although severely handicapped by the transfer of many experienced key personnel, both officer and enlisted, after its return to the United States in December, the ship, through a well organized training program, coupled with two months operations in the California area, attained a degree of efficiency not ordinarily expected at such an early date. This was made possible by the excellent performance turned in by the Air Group (CVG 7). On the second day of the operation the following dispatch was received from the Task Group Commander.

"YOUR SHIP AND NEW AIR TEAM ARE PERFORMING IN MID SEASON FORM X WISH YOU CONTINUED SUCCESS X" CTF 77 SENDS

This dispatch was received at a most appropriate time and was greatly appreciated as it was a big boost to the morale of the group as well as the ship.

During this brief period of operations, many dispatches commenting upon the excellent performance of Task Force 77 were received. Among these were:

"MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL STRIKES ON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER COMPLEX X THEY DEMONSTRATE WHAT DETERMINED AND WELL TRAINED SQUADRONS CAN DO IN A COORDINATED INTERSERVICE EFFORT . . . WELL DONE". CINCPACFLT SENDS.

"IT IS WITH GREAT PRIDE THAT I READ THE DISPATCH AND NEWS REPORT OF THE MAGNIFICENT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF YOUR FORCES IN THE SUPERATTACKS UPON THE NORTH KOREAN POWER INSTALLATIONS X THE EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AND HIGH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS DEMONSTRATED BY YOUR FORCES AND PARTICULARLY THE PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL COMBAT ARE DESERVING OF THE HIGHEST PRAISE X AN INSPIRATION TO OUR OWN PEOPLE AND A WARNING TO THE ENEMY OF HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT X WELL DONE" CNO SENDS TO CTF 77

B. Casualties

ENSIGN RONALD D. EATON, 543824/1325 On 25 June, while flying an F4U-4 on a strike mission over North Korea, Ensign EATON's wingman reported anti-aircraft fire in the form of large black burst at 10,000 feet. Shortly thereafter EATON reported that his plane was losing oil pressure rapidly. Unable to reach the water, EATON bailed out, made a normal descent and reached the ground apparently uninjured. A RESCAP was immediately formed from members of his flight, and a nearby helicopter was dispatched to the position. The helicopter effected a rescue but was then shot down, presumably by the intense small arms fire in the area. The Air Force RESCAP, who relieved the Navy fliers, reported one or more survivors from the helicopter. It appeared that any survivors were immediately captured by the enemy, who rushed to the crashed helicopter. Ens. EATON is listed as mission in action.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Intelligence

a. Materiel and Operating Data

With the exception of Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) the collection of Operations and Intelligence Data and the procurement of material presented no problems. Several copies of the current Task Force operation order and revisions thereto are necessary for the indoctrination

of pilots in procedures etc. while enroute to the combat zone. It is strongly recommended that these be provided to every carrier prior to deployment from the United States.

b. Equipment

During periods of operations, with the noises and interference caused by telephones, squawk boxes and planes landing and taking off on the flight deck, it is almost impossible to lecture to or brief flight crews properly; and, it is obvious that some type of voice amplifier is needed in each ready room for the proper dissemination of essential information. Requests for some type of amplifying equipment have been repeatedly turned down despite the fact that the MC 28 system is standard equipment for most CV type carriers. It is again recommended that loud speakers be provided for the ready rooms of the USS Bon Homme Richard.

c. Indoctrination of Personnel

In accordance with CinCPacFlt Instruction Number 1560.1 dated 19 February 1951 a 26 page brochure entitled "The Bon Homme Richard Returns" was prepared and distributed to every officer and man aboard prior to the entrance of the ship to Pearl Harbor. This pamphlet was intended as a method of acquainting the crew with the geography, resources and features of Hawaii, Japan and Korea; the customs, traditions and usages of Japan, Japanese politics and the Japanese peace treaty. The importance of respect for other people overseas and the all-important reason of being in the Korean Area to halt aggression and contain communism was stressed throughout.

The major part of the material was drawn from a variety of publications and the printing and art work were done by ship's personnel. Much appreciation has been expressed for this pamphlet, especially by those going overseas for the first time. Unfortunately limitations on works of this nature are imposed by the lack of sufficient printing facilities aboard ship. It is recommended, therefore, that a similar work be prepared by commands ashore and distributed to every person deploying to the forward area.

d. Intelligence Lectures

A special lecture on the military and political situation in the Far East was given for the Commanding Officer and approximately thirty additional officers of the ship and Air Group at CinCPac Headquarters prior to departure of the ship for the forward area.

Enroute to the combat area a series of comprehensive lectures as listed in below paragraph was delivered to the Air Group by the ship's and Air Group Intelligence Officers. The lectures were well received as they provided background and current information for the pilots on practically all phases of Korean Operations. Each lecture was repeated in each ready room so as to facilitate questions, answers and discussion of the various topics on the agenda.

1. Korean Operational Intelligence
2. Maps, Charts, Grids and Folding Methods
3. Military Geography of Korea
4. Geopolitical Importance of Korea.
5. Flak
6. Evasion and Escape
7. Photography and Photographic Interpretation
8. Camouflage
9. Communications and Procedures
10. Radar and Electronic Countermeasures.

On arrival in Yokosuka the Evasion and Escape Team sponsored by ComNavFe boarded the ship and briefed all pilots on evasion and escape techniques in the Korean Area.

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The importance of the aforementioned type briefings and lectures cannot be emphasized too strongly and are suggested to all ships and air groups deploying to the forward area.

e. Maps, Charts, Grids and Templates

The Air Navigation Offices located at North Island and NAS Atsugi did an excellent job in providing maps, charts and grids to this ship. The production unit of CinCPac furnished maps and charts not procurable from ANO. Among these the 14" x 8" UTM Grid prepared by CinCPac intelligence numbers 51-224 and the 16" x 10½" airfields Chart No. 52-86 were found very useful by the Air Group and it is recommended that these be made available in quantity to ships deploying to the Korean Theater.

Radar Charts of the East Coast of Korea seemingly are not available from any source. Such charts would be invaluable to personnel engaged on flights during periods of darkness for navigation with radar and pinpointing positions on ECM missions. At least two Guppy units are known to have photographed the East Coast of Korea for this purpose and it is recommended that charts be now provided on the basis of this photography.

A template of the Korean Operating area was prepared by the ship, reproduced by the ship's photo lab and distributed to each pilot using the Mark III A plotting board. It is recommended that templates of this kind be produced in quantity and distributed to each ship deploying to the Korean and forward areas.

f. Personnel

On May 15, 1952 the USS BON HOMME RICHARD had aboard four Intelligence officers. Immediately prior to departure of the ship one Ensign was detached, not on his own request, for training in CIC. One Lt. had already submitted a request for release to inactive duty and will be discharged sometime in August. The third, an Ensign, recently received orders and will be detached in July. Replacements are required for these three officers.

2. Photographic Interpretation

Oblique coverage obtained by the Photo Planes of the Bon Homme Richard were distorted on the lower portion of the negative because of interference caused by the plexiglass window. Installation of a new type port in the F9F-2P would eliminate this distortion.

3. Photography

A new system has been adopted for the accounting of photographic materials. A sample part of the new weekly report follows:

Week Ending _____					
<u>WEEKLY REPORT OF PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLIES</u>					
<u>Item</u>	<u>BuAer Allow</u>	<u>Ship's Allow</u>	<u>Quant & By Whom Used</u>	<u>Tot. Exp Last Week</u>	<u>Amt On Bd.</u>
Film 8x10		30 boxes	1 ship, 1 Squad	2	28
Film 5 1/4x20	20 rolls		1 ship	1	19

Considerable effort was expended in the original compilation of this report. However, since it has been set up, it has been a simple matter to keep it accurate and up to date.

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4. Aerologya. Typhoon Dinah

(1) On the 22nd of June typhoon Dinah was over Ishigaki Shima on a north-northeast course which caused some concern over the ability to carry out operations during this operating period. On the 23rd it was off the southern coast of Kyushu and had by this time increased 20 to 25 knots. It then veered to a northeast course and proceeded up the southern coast of Japan. This movement caused polar air to be drawn in over the operating area from a northwest direction. A high was formed to the west of the storm and over the area. As a result the weather remained operational throughout the period except for short periods due to fog and low stratus along the northeast coast of Korea.

b. Aerological Data

(1) The summary presented below includes observations taken while in the Sea of Japan bounded by the 37th and 40th parallels on the south and north and the 132 meridian and the Korean coast on the east and west. The period covered is from the 23rd to the 25th of June 1952 inclusive.

(a) Winds: The prevailing wind direction was ESE 25% of the time with winds from the SE 17% of the time. The average wind velocity was 8 knots, with the strongest wind of 17 knots from the ENE recorded on the 23rd.

(b) Air Temperature: The average air temperature for the period was 66.7 degrees, with an average maximum and minimum of 68.9 and 65.8 respectively. Maximum temperature for the period was 70.0 degrees, and minimum was 65.5 degrees.

(c) Sea Temperature: Sea water temperature average for the period was 71 degrees with an average maximum temperature of 73 degrees and average minimum temperature of 69 degrees. The maximum and minimum sea water temperature recorded was 74 degrees and 68 degrees respectively.

(d) Ceiling:

Greater than 9950 feet	- 33%
Greater than 4950 feet but less than 10,000	- 11%
Greater than 2450 feet but less than 5,000	- 56%
Greater than 950 feet but less than 2,500	- 0%
Less than 1000 feet	- 0%

(e) Visibility:

Over 6 miles	- 100%
Between 3 and 6 miles	- 0%
Less than 3 miles	- 0%

5. Communications

a. General: With the embarking of ComCarDiv ONE on this vessel, the communications load has more than tripled. The volume of communications traffic is excessive for the available working space. Only close cooperation between ship and flag personnel, both undercomplemented, has made it possible to handle and process the heavy volume of traffic.

b. Personnel: The shortage of qualified personnel is critical and will be further intensified by additional losses during the next six months. Unless qualified rated personnel losses are met with replacement, communication functions will be affected adversely. In spite of the constant improvement of strikers, both radiomen and quartermaster, as a result of on the job training, the ship is still short due to transfer of those of higher rating.

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To meet circuit commitments during this period of operations, it was necessary to utilize strikers to man operational circuits which in order to be manned properly should be manned by experienced rated radiomen. The circuit is only as fast as its slowest operator and the overall speed of traffic handling has dropped to below 14 words per minute.

6. CIC

a. Radars:

(1) SG-1 was satisfactory in station keeping and surface search. It's present useful range is 34,000 yards. This gear remained in operation constantly except for brief periods required for tuning.

(2) SPS-6B operated exceptionally well on long range surface and on air search. CAP and ASP were handled by the air controllers using this unit, with pistons being held up to 70 miles. No height information was available from this ship's radars and this information was provided on all bogeys by other ships in the force. The MK-10 IFF is a valuable aid in tracking jets. On two occasions contacts were held 195 miles from the ship by using MK-10 IFF. The SPS-6B remained in operation the entire period except when secured for tuning and during a period when radar silence was ordered.

(3) SK radar was in operation during the entire period but was seldom used due to the fact that its performance in detection of air contacts is far below that of the SPS-6B. It was used only as a standby.

(4) SM radar was inoperative the whole period. This unit is one of the few left in active service and there seems to be an insufficient familiarity and lack of technical information on the equipment by the technicians aboard. Added to this is the lack of sufficient spare parts aboard to keep the gear operating.

b. Communications:

(1) Rendezvous with TF-77 was accomplished without any voice communication difficulties. A short time later the CI receiver failed but was restored to normal service within two hours. The ship experienced a considerable amount of feed-over on the CI net from the Screen Common and Primary Tactical Nets. This condition is being looked into and is probably due to the location of this transmitting equipment. It is expected this discrepancy will be rectified during the period in port.

(2) The CI secondary has exceptionally good range and power as was proved during the SAR exercise conducted for a downed pilot from the ship. The ship was able to render assistance by relaying information from other ships in the force to rescue units off the beach when those ships could not seem to communicate this distance.

The FAD equipment also has good range and readability. The ship is extremely short of radio technicians and the maintenance requirements on radio equipment used by CIC seem enormous. Possibly this is due to the remote location of CIC and the extra wiring required between RFU's and transmitters.

(3) CIC interprets all signals coming in on the Primary Tactical and Screen Common and sends their interpretations to the bridge via JS sound powered phones as an aid and check for the Officer of the Deck.

c. General

The ship has lost many experienced enlisted personnel through release from active duty and is conducting an active training program for the newer non-rated personnel. Time in port will be used to good advantage in carrying out a concentrated training course to insure getting more men qualified as quickly as possible.

7. Air Operations

a. Electronics Equipment: At this time it is difficult to give a fair evaluation of the electronics equipment assigned for use by Air Plot due in main to the short period of operation. It is, however worthy of note that in this three day period that difficulty was experienced in maintaining the YE gear in an operational status; approximately three (3) man hours labor per day were expended on this equipment to keep it in air operational status. It is anticipated that this figure will be materially decreased upon completion of maintenance presently planned for the period of the ship's next stay in port.

b. Operating statistics for the battle operating period 23 June through 25 June 1952:

Original missions assigned	451
Missions aborted	22
Missions cancelled by CTF 77	129
Dud aircraft/maintenance	20
Final missions assigned/completed	280
Final tally of missions assigned	322
Percentage completed	87%
Average daily hours flown	196.73
Total days of battle operations	3

Sorties by type

VF 71	VF 72	VC 70	VF 74	VA 75
61	63	23	69	64

c. During this operating period one F4U-4 was lost over Korea presumably to enemy ground fire; there were no operational losses for the same period. This period accounted for the BON HOMME RICHARD's 22,000th carrier landing.

B- AIR DEPARTMENT1. Aircraft Handling

a. During the period of this report, a special spot was used in launching deck load strikes. With 35 jets from two jet squadrons and one photo detachment on board, 24 jets were parked in Bays 1 and 2 of the hangar deck. The remaining 11 jets were dead-packed all the way aft on the flight deck. The 16 AD-4's scheduled were spotted across the flight deck forward of the jets, while 16 F4U-4's were spotted forward of the AD's. As marginal wind conditions were experienced during the three days of this report, and aircraft had maximum commensurate loading, all the F4U's and some AD-4's were catapulted. Upon the conclusion of the prop launch, 24 to 28 jets were respotted and catapulting commenced 30 minutes after the commencement of the prop launch for a coordinated attack by the two types on the target.

b. Inasmuch as this ship does not have jet blast deflectors installed, the jet spotting area of the flight deck will be critical with 12 to 16 jets scheduled when all prop aircraft are on board during the time that normal Korean-type air operations are conducted. In order to spot jets as closely together and as expeditiously as possible and yet make provisions for weeding out duds, spotting plates of 1/8" x 6" x 8" aluminum were screwed to the flight deck for the nose wheel and starboard wheel. While setting up the spotting of these plates, consideration was given to the following:

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- (1) Movement of duds spotted forward when wings are spread.
- (2) Jet blasts.
- (3) Spreading of wings of all jets when excessively high and gusty winds are encountered. (Reason stated under "Aircraft Maintenance" below).
- (4) Location of tie down cleats in relation to landing gear.

2. Catapults and Arresting Gear.

a. During the period of this report 223 catapult launches were made, of which 132 were F9F, 65 were F4U, and 26 were AD. No difficulty was experienced with the catapults, even though the maximum permitted pressure of 3500 lbs. was utilized during almost all of the jet launches.

b. During this operating period the armament on the F9F's had to be reduced because of the light winds. Although Catapult Change No. 36 (maximum pressure 4,000 lbs.) was installed on both catapults during this vessel's yard availability in February, pressures in excess of 3,500 lbs. are still prohibited for F9F-2's because of the fact that the new, stronger launching pendant has not been made available to the fleet.

c. Because of the increase in the basic weight of the AD-4 over the earlier models of the AD, the ordnance-carrying capability has been considerably reduced. The basic weight of the AD-4 is 13,038 lbs. This includes 618 lbs. of armor and two additional 20 MM guns. Allowing 2280 pounds for gasoline, 576 pounds for ammunition, 240 pounds for oil and 200 pounds for the pilot, a total of 16,334 pounds is arrived at prior to adding the bomb load. Crowded deck space, combined with low wind conditions makes it necessary that some AD's be catapulted; hence, the bomb load is limited by the maximum catapulting weight of 20,500 pounds, making the maximum bomb load 4,166 pounds.

d. A total of 261 landings, all day, were made, of which 132 were F9F, 64 were F4U and 65 were AD. All landings were normally arrested with no barrier engagements.

e. During the refresher operating period in the Hawaiian area and prior to the Operational Readiness Inspection, a large number of F9F tail hook droppings was experienced as the jets taxied forward from the Fly 3 area after landing, resulting in the Davis barriers and barricade being torn. On one particular recovery, tail hooks dropped on three jets which required the replacement or rerigging of the Davis barriers or barricade each time and which resulted in a total time delay of 15 minutes. Naturally, this delay is not acceptable, particularly when low-state jets are airborne. Although pilots were repeatedly cautioned as to the proper techniques to employ in coming out of the gear and crossing the barrier area, it is believed that occasional tail hook dropping will occur. To prevent this, this command now houses tail hooks completely in the Fly Three area immediately after the cross-deck pendant has become disengaged from the tail hook. Contrary to the first impression, this increased delay in obtaining a ready deck for the next jet is not appreciable--maximum of 5 seconds--after personnel are experienced. It is considered that this procedure is definitely superior to that of placing the tail hook in the "stringer" position inasmuch as there can be no possible delays in the recovery caused by tail hooks dropping.

3. Aircraft Maintenance

a. The new type of wing jury strut for the F9F-2, Part No. GR-GT-521 is considered to be inferior to the old type, Part No. GR-GT-491 as far as securing the wing properly when folded. The new type does not prevent the wing from going up further than its normal folded position. During periods of high, gusty winds, particularly with winds on the port bow or beam, it is possible for the wing to be damaged by either being blown up beyond the normal fold position and beyond the vertical and to end up inclined toward the fuselage or to be blown up sufficiently beyond the normal fold position to permit the yoke of the new type jury strut to become disengaged, thereby permitting the wing to drop.

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In either case, the wing fold actuating cylinder will become damaged. Although the new type jury strut is easier to remove prior to launching than the old type, it is recommended that the new type not be used on board ship.

4. Aviation Ordnance

a. On 24 June during the catapulting of AD-4, BUNR 129005, a 2000# GP AN M 66 on the center Douglas bomb rack broke off and was lost over the bow. The MK34 suspension band was recovered and examination revealed failure at the weld near the belt flange. The weld appeared to be poor in spots. A RU DAOE is being submitted. The aircraft was damaged structurally aft of the midsection and requires either a major overhaul or is a strike.

C. - SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in rendering supply support to combat aircraft during the current cruise. Specific areas or instances of trouble and recommendations to relieve them are as follows:

a. Although CVG-7 planes had just come out of O & R prior to being deployed, approximately 500 more line items have been requested in the six weeks (including three days of combat operations) the air group has been aboard than were drawn by CVG 102 in the first twelve weeks (including three weeks of combat operations) of last year's cruise. Last minute scrambles for materials were caused since many of the parts requested were not listed in the applicable section "A" or "B" Allowance Lists and were not carried on board because of no prior usage; also, operational spares on hand were seriously depleted because of the volume of use. It is recommended that all aircraft be placed in first class operating condition prior to deployment and that proper maintenance checks be allowed to insure that this is so.

b. Requests for Section "H" and Section "U" material have been much larger than could be anticipated from past usage. It is recommended that squadrons be required to have a full allowance of this material prior to coming aboard ship.

c. It was necessary to provide the initial allowance of field shoes for all aviators with a resultant charge of their cost to the ship's operating allotment. Since ships having to operate in the combat zone have a hard time staying within their monetary limitations, it is recommended that a special allotment be authorized to meet this requirement.

d. Survival equipment is extremely hard to procure in the forward area and is usually received from some other ship departing WestPac. This means that the gear is some that has already been used and in most cases it is not RFI. It is recommended that air group personnel be allowed and be required to obtain an original allowance from the supporting air station prior to deployment.

e. Procurement and issue of exposure suits has presented quite a problem. Since these suits are scarce in the forward area and must be individually fitted, it is recommended that initial issues be made in CONUS.

f. Quantities of flight deck clothing requested greatly exceed those allowed in the Section "A" Allowance List for both initial outfitting and replacements. It is recommended that the allowance of flight deck clothing be revised to allow two original outfits per man (except for shoes) plus sufficient quantities for replacements.

g. Several oxygen regulators, stock number R83-PR-2867-A1, issued to date have been found to be defective. Although BuAer advised that regulators with serial numbers of 500 and below were defective, those issued had serial numbers in the 1200 and 1400 series. It is recommended that oxygen regulators again be screened to determine if additional ones should not be issued.

h. To date, there have been 13 failures of the F9F wing fold actuating cylinder, stock number R83-GR-134095. It is recommended that an attempt be made to determine the cause of these failures and that the results be promulgated to other ships and units deploying to WestPac since replacements are not available in the forward area.

i. Main landing gear wheel assemblies on F4U-4 aircraft have been broken in landings 11 times so far. It is recommended that other ships be informed of possible high usage on this item for future planning.

j. The ship has been unable to obtain certain essential Section "B" spares such as HO3S-1 main rotor assemblies, main rotor blades and tail rotor assemblies. It is recommended that special effort be exerted to make items such as these available to the fleet.

2. Since personnel of the ship cannot anticipate special needs and requirements of an air group before it comes aboard and because many supplies are not available beyond the CONUS, it is strongly recommended that the CVG materiel officer and one aviation storekeeper be required to report to the ship at least two months prior to leaving for WestPac. The materiel officer should be cognizant of the items which the air group will require, especially critical and high usage items of each squadron, in order that all essential material can be on board before the ship departs the states.

D - ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. The current task force directives state that tubes not be blown on boilers during daylight hours.

a. It is recommended that a re-evaluation of the circumstances be considered. Since aircraft carriers cannot blow tubes when the wind is across the flight deck from the starboard side, it is necessary to request a course change from the OTC, to put the wind on the port beam. Many times the situation is such that this cannot be done. This results in long periods of 24 to 36 hours in which tubes have not been blown.

b. After 12 to 16 hours of steaming without blowing tubes it is extremely difficult to accelerate, at the high speeds required to launch jet aircraft, without making smoke. This can only be done by using a great amount of excess air which, in turn results in very difficult steaming conditions. Also, failure to blow tubes for long periods results in continuous discharge of soot postiles from the stack at higher steaming rates.

c. Frequent blowing of tubes will result in a discharge of black soot for a very short period which may be more acceptable during daylight hours than longer periods of smoky steaming.

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