

Lessons Learned 10 OCT – 23 OCT

- [REDACTED]
1. He said there should be more flashlights and fire extinguishers inside the building. He said that he wished there had been a fire drill earlier. He said that people just seemed to know their way out of the building. Does not remember if there was an alarm or not. There were no security people directing anyone at any of the exits during the evacuation. It was orderly but not organized.

Paul Brady

Lessons – stay prepared spiritually and materially. Can't let this happen again

Provide good strong intelligence network

Be aware of what is going on in the country

Listen to see what is going on.

At least when we were in a confrontational role with the Soviet Union they were rational people, these people are not.

HMC Hamilton

Lessons learned:

We need to understand Islam. The whole concept of what the religion is. Right now we are ignorant about where these people are coming from. During his cruises on the USS Enterprises at port visits Americans were not well liked. There was a lot of tension.

People need to be aware of their surroundings.

Educate people so they can understand what they're up against.

Change our tactics. They know they can't fight us at their level. They know how we think.

The triage was set up at Henderson Hall, but nobody ever got back there.

In this type of explosion, there was a lot of smoke. Anyone close to the fire never made it out, they were overcome with smoke. That was the new wing, so a lot of smoke was trapped. So because of the design of the building the smoke and heat were trapped. That was a down side because people got caught because of smoke inhalation. So we didn't get to treat the second and third degree burns because the people were killed by smoke inhalation.

A lot of people with smoke inhalation that did escape got better once they got in the open air.

[REDACTED]

Lessons learned: He strongly noted the need for fire dampers. He claims fire alarms going off in the past and DPS being completely unaware. The building itself held up well. Again stressed the importance of fire dampers. He said that there should be emergency breathing devices, as on a ship, but didn't know if people would know how to use the equipment. He says the Pentagon has a "chimney affect" during a fire due to the small corridors. He doesn't know how the other services are trained in fire. He said the Pentagon did not practice evacuation plans. He also stressed the need for recall trees. He said that his office did a lot of internal headcounts at first, then moved on to phone tree. The Millington phone line was very good. The question was what

to do the next day. He was getting mixed messages from DoD and the news media. First day he was at the Navy Yard. Later on he was at the Annex, then Crystal City. He discussed what he thinks will be done as far as reconstruction of the Pentagon. He believes that the planes pilot (terrorist) knew what he was doing. He believes that the pilot was definitely aiming for the Pentagon. He thinks that if the plane hit the Pentagon high, and on the roof it would have done much more damage. He also feels that the Anthrax scare is local and not terrorists from a foreign country

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The teamwork was great. No matter the rank structure everyone joined together very well and very quickly. The military training most people had helped them work together as one team.

CDR Perez

1. Lessons learned: The lesson I took out of this if you going to be put in harms way the Pentagon is the best place to be because there are a lot of folks out there that are just phenomenal. For me it was neat to see people run towards the fire not away from it. You had just as many people running towards the fire as you had away from the fire.
2. Second the damage control training fire control training you receive out in the fleet is invaluable. Worth its weight in gold.

██████████ – Community Manager of the Medical Service Corps – 22 Oct 01

1. One of the issues for the Medical Service Corps is that it is 6 – 10 years to get someone fully trained in their specialties. POMs only go out about five years, and you need to go 10 years out to be able to determine how changing the accession numbers will affect the community.
2. The community is under strength in areas where there is a specialty, such as surgeons. In other areas they are actually over strength. You can't pay them enough to make it worth their while. These coincide with areas of critical wartime specialties. We train as many as we can of those specialties in service.
3. Desert Storm was interesting from the reserve side of the house. For instance, a physician practicing his specialty in San Diego. All of the billets with his specialty in San Diego are full, so they cross assigned him to an East Coast unit, although he drilled in San Diego. He was recalled but sent to the East Coast. It ruined his private practice. This created in difficulties with people leaving after Desert Storm. This is a continual problem. Reserves rely on individuals that have a continuing reserve obligation when they leave active duty.
4. Lessons learned from the USS COLE – N131 stood up a watch at the Annex. They were the eyes and ears of CNP. We headed off a lot of difficulties. We coordinate with Millington who had CACO responsibility. His job was to ensure CNP was not blindsided and left without the proper information. They coordinated information to ensure

Millington and CNP were both providing the same information. They developed spreadsheets to track the folks. We stood up the watch bill, had the software on line and we incorporated what we learned from the COLE. The Navy was the lead in this regard as compared to the other services. The COLE was a dry run for what was done here. The SOPs were already in place. We were operating within hours of the event.

Other lessons learned - the CNT uniform is prohibited onboard ship, yet it was worn by some of the victims at the Pentagon. In one case it literally curled up into a spear shape on someone's back.

5. Is there such a thing as being too prepared? Our clinic in this building does not have the stores to cope with a similar disaster. Did they have a disaster plan to set up a trauma center here? How much do you stage in a place like this? There was initial confusion as to who was in charge – NDW, Arlington firefighters, etc. That will always be the case in a situation like this with multiple commands involved.
6. A more structured plan for mustering would have been helpful. Everyone scattered and our bosses did not have a clue where we were.
7. BUMED is right across the river and can be called on. They were waiting for someone to say come help, but the call didn't come.

PN1 Prince Brown – mortuary at Dover Air Force Base Interview date 22 Oct 01

1. Lessons learned: He wrote three pages of lessons learned (will provide us with a copy). Escorts need a place where they can sit around and relax and wait for you, not stand around and read privileged information about the deceased. Each service should have their own e-mail account and address set up prior to your arrival. Direct access to Dover's system vice BUPERS network.
2. Others – SITREPS were sent daily, but information was not always forthcoming back to them. For instance, a LCDR who had no personal awards. He pushed that issue, and as it turned out he was right, he did have awards. Or an AW1 without air crew wings. He reviewed the ribbons and medals to ensure the uniforms were correct.

Lessons Learned: Tripp Lloyd

The SPRINT team needs to go and actively talk to people, not wait for people to come to them.

Don't give people choices about whether to participate in SPRINT team meetings, make it

mandatory. The survivors are victims and NEED someone to COME TO THEM for "triage" –

don't expect me to crawl off my stretcher and come to you to say, "I need help".

The SPRINT team dissolved after a short period of time when there was still need present (months later). If you make it hard for people who have been traumatized and wait months to get help, they will probably not get help.

It was very difficult to get his wife counseling help. Perseverance got the counseling for her, not the Navy system. There needs to be a better “safety net”.

Better emergency lighting in enclosed spaces. Emergency generators were placed outside because it was assumed an attack would come from the inside. Battery powered lights that come on automatically would be helpful.

Practice emergency evacuation drills.

Mr. Rick Sandelli, N31 15 Oct 01 Lessons Learned

3. We should have had a common muster area. Should have backed up the info to another command center, to Site R or to the Annex so that you could go to another command center, pick up your recall roster and start calling. That was done, but it was not planned out prior to the event. As for continuity of operations, there is a whole workgroup now – Secretariat Advisory Group (SAG). The SAG’s charter is to get the instruction redrafted with lessons learned, alternate headquarters, etc. We had an automated recall section which was wiped out that had not been hooked up yet. It goes through an automated recall and even tells you where to report. It was destroyed in the attack. He recommends not putting it in the command center; that it be placed in an alternate site. There needs to be a redundancy in the system.
4. Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan is designed to implement succession. It moves senior leadership, groups of succession, to the alternate site and to various areas. It was not executed. He does not know why it was not implemented, except that perhaps it cannot be implemented piecemeal.
5. Lessons learned – have an alternate site for our service headquarters. We don’t have anything equivalent to the Marines’ Quantico. We do have a Navy Yard, Anacostia, but both are very small. If we are to move the ops and service headquarters to the alternate site our footprint there must be enlarged. Need an alternate ops center in one location, and alternate headquarters space at another. This is all a part of the SAG.

4. As for communications, there is a GETS card, an emergency access card. It is a part of discussions now. Flyaway kits to include blackberries, portable VTC kits.



Lessons learned:

-Military we are trained to take charge, everyone at the flag level tried to take charge and were countermanding each other. The military didn't want to turn it over to the civilians.

-In case of an emergency don't bother the fire fighters and the EMS. Let them do their job, let them be in charge.

-We needed stretcher-bearers in the first 20 minutes. We didn't have them.

-In case of emergency we need a platoon of Old Guard or Marines to be stretcher-bearers immediately. Not volunteers but a platoon of troops with someone in charge.

-Define the chain of command among the various agencies such as federal (FBI), civilian (Arlington County) and military for all fire fighting, medical and rescue services.

-When you really need medical support it will be in the first 30 minutes. Within an hour you will have everything you need. It's the first 20 minutes that important. People need to know "buddy aid" (emergency first aid). The medical needs are immediate.



Have a muster plan. Know where and when to muster.

Navy Annex is setting up a medical block of supplies to have in case of emergency for triage situations.

Carry your cell phone.

The American public needs to see us in uniform. We are the strength of the American public.

It is a pride to have the privilege to wear the uniform.

The people working at the Annex and Pentagon are living in an aftermath of war. It is traumatic for all who work here and at the Pentagon.

We have great leadership in the Navy. CNO, VCNO, Chief of Navy Personnel. Primary and secondary next of kin were all assigned CACO officers. All the awards are done and on the person before they were in the casket. All funerals had a flag officer present regardless of what

else was going on. Our leadership was able to hear the humanistic needs of the survivors and families.

The schools that were off the day after Sept 11 due to the events left unsupervised children home. These children were watching the news coverage all day with no adults around to discuss what they saw.

CDR Thomas Sawyer, MSC, USN
09 October 01
Lessons Learned

6. Lessons learned – be more aware of building evacuation plans, mass casualties and fire drills. More aware of your surroundings. The USS COLE incident got us up and running for this event because we had already had to set up a crisis action center for CNP.

7. His training in dealing with mass casualties came from dealing with motor vehicle accidents while stationed at Camp Pendleton. They dealt with I-5 accidents. Also in Saudi he set up field hospitals to include operating and treatment rooms. This experience was ten years ago but he remembered it all that day. After the Gulf he served as a training officer of a field medical training school. In that job he used Gulf war experiences to help illustrate training concepts.

8. The SPRINT team was invaluable in helping people to cope with the experience. Commanding officers of the ships of different commands are on board and realize how important they are. Combat psychological help – the farther away a patient gets from the front line the harder it is to get him back to the front line, so they catch them early and quick, help them to understand their feelings. That the best group to be with is the group back at work. This accelerates the healing process and gets us back to business as usual.

