Lessons Learned 28 Jan -

Mr. Jerry Henson

Mr. Henson is a pack rat. In the old Command Center he had two big cabinets filled with documents. Prior to moving to the new Command Center they had scanned all the files they felt were critical and burned them on CD ROM. Those are all gone now. They spent the last four months recreating files.

When he was in the courtyard on the stretcher he remembers seeing the crystal blue sky. He didn't know who had pulled him out of the building. He thought their awards were way below what they deserved. (They received the Navy Marine Corps Medal) Mr. Henson feels they should have received the Navy Cross, it was enemy action.

Capt Kern Lessons Learned:

The iron grid network put into the renovated section kept floors four and five in place for about 20-30 minutes. This was exactly as it was designed. If floors four and five had collapsed immediately they would have had no way out.

Ms. Livingston was a remarkable leader throughout the whole thing. In putting together the Navy Command Center the Navy chain of command was right in place and worked very well. That type of organizational understanding made reconstituting very good. The CNO and the Secretary were out of town on 11 Sep. The Secretary's was probably the only plane in the air on 12 Sep when he flew back from Texas. The CNO and the Secretary didn't join the Navy Command Center until 12 Sep. The Navy as an institution fell back on the chain of command, continuity of command relationships and it served them very well.

Emergency egress signals that would have been helpful to them would have to have been on the floor as the hallway was full of smoke.

Ms. MacDonald

As far as the reservists who helped man the Command Center, it was good to have them but confusing as they changed day to day. She would like to have a roster of reservists that would be available for a period of time to man the Command Center and who have been trained.

There are seven stateside area coordinators. Two have been through mass casualties situations, herself and the coordinator in Norfolk during the Cole incident. She recommends when there is a mass casualty, because each area has only one coordinato,r they should send another area coordinator to the affected area to assist. This wa there are two experts to answer all the questions.

In this incident they dealt with military and civilians. It was hard to find the next-of-kin on civilians. They didn't even have DNA on the civilians. She hopes that some sort of legislature is made as a result of this to have some sort of file as to what the benefits are for government civilians and who to contact in an emergency. They provided CACO's for every Navy person whether contractor, active duty military, reservist, or civilian. ADM Ryan made this decision.

Lessons Learned: Mr. Hoerst

There are the required number of fire extinguishers located throughout the Pentagon, but they are too small to fight a real hose. They needed fire hoses. They needed first aid stations set up around the Pentagon.

They learned lessons about establishing where people were. There wasn't a good evacuation plan in place. Those lessons have been taken to heart and practiced.

At their office spaces in NC2 they have put crash bags, with bolt cutters, flashlights and other tools to help people get out of the office in an emergency. Evacuation plans are posted.

He thinks there is some kind of public building code against putting fire hoses in public buildings. Some offices even have ropes to throw out the window for escape purposes. These are the things that have been done in his code, and his code purchased these items. He doesn't know what other codes are doing.

It would be good, if the Navy could afford it, to provide emergency escape hoods to put over your head in order to escape from smoke-filled spaces.

Lessons Learned –

He went across the street and started to try to reconstitute N76. He tried to call his wife on the cell phone and couldn't get through. His office had gotten two way pagers two weeks prior that could send email. His niece also had one of these pagers. He emailed his niece to tell his wife that he was okay and that got through. As a lesson learned from 9-11, they found these pagers are the best way to communicate. They were able to reconstitute as a division faster than most because of these pagers.

You need a rendezvous point that everyone is aware of. Practice evacuating to the rendezvous point. People also need to know who to call to muster in.

Have damage control equipment in your space, axes, crowbars, emergency radios and lights to enable a person to get themselves out of emergency situation.

They are trying to get an Exit light and emergency light in all spaces that will stay on when power is lost.

There needs to be evacuation packages sporadically located throughout the Pentagon with pickaxes, flashlights, etc. The evacuation action officer is now walking through the evacuation routes to make sure construction or other things haven't blocked planned evacuation routes.

ENS Chittick

There were initially three distinct chains of command. The firefighters had their chain of command that they functioned well under. The police department had their chain of command, and they did well under this but they were unsure how to deal with the military. Then there was the military chain of command. Most people were headquarters type so there wasn't a distinct chain of command, maybe one hundred different chains of command within one and it didn't really work well.

The Air Force major establishing himself as the point of contact was one of the best thing that happened. He talked to the firefighters, police and military and became the established focal point down there. This was not by position of rank but by convenience. If the firefighters had a concern they'd broadcast it to him and he would get the word out

The SEAL and EOD community has almost no one wanting to get out after 11 Sep. They have SEAL and EOD people who have been retired from 20 or 30 years that want to get back on active duty. They are chronically about 75% manned, but BUPERS has no mechanism in place to take a retired guy and bring him back on active duty. There is no provision for what happens to the retired pay. In this community there's an issue of currency also. Are you still qualified to dive and do all the things they do? They do fine with 75% manning because it's been this way ever since the community was formed. Recruiting was up but is starting to taper back down again.

Force Protection is taken much more seriously by commands now. The SEALS have been consulted on several issues, inshore security, in harbor security, in port security. They have been asked if security should be SEALS and EOD guys wandering around facilities and they said no. SEALS are mainly an offensive capability. The EOD community has just had a bunch of missions handed to them and their OPTEMPO is high. Now people are using EOD for more proactive measures.

In terms of leadership the Air Force major who was acting as traffic cop was a good example of leadership. He managed 5000 people.

During the day, around 1400, an Army General showed up and said he had jurisdiction over the whole effort. The firefighters started telling him no and he said, "Yes, this is a Department of Defense facility. I'm Department of Defense". They said, "It's also a

public building, on public land". The FBI showed up later in the morning and announced jurisdiction over the whole thing but the firefighters didn't let that stop their actions.

Lessons Learned:

The new Command Center will be a sealed space with positive pressure and bioterrorism proof.

There will be battery backups for the emergency lighting.

They are working on a COOP (Continuancy of Operations Plan) recall list. This would allow the essential people to be contacted automatically.

They did get Site R up and running within 6 hours of the attack. Now they are looking at what if we don't want to relocate that far. What can they do locally. It turns out the Navy Annex, where they went, was a very logical and appropriate place to go. You have to have a remote site outside the Washington, D.C. area that can do all the recalling, message traffic, and email. They are working on improving those capabilities. They are occasionally using reserves up there to do dual ops to test it out.

Everything they do they put on a server. The server is in the Navy Command Center. Their H and O drives server is in the basement of the Pentagon. They were able to recapture some of this information. They lost a lot of historic sorts data. They need to have servers in the D.C. area and at Site R. There is now a duplication of memory.

The Marine Corps had planned to collocate their Command Center right next to the Navy Command Center in October or November 2001. Fortunately that had not happened prior to 11 Sep or both the Navy and Marine Corps Command Centers would have been wiped out.

Now they are rethinking that collocation. There was a five-year plan to put all the Command Centers in one location, now they are rethinking that.

Since 11 Sep he has been in IWARs (Integrated Warfare Architecture Reviews). They take programs and do assessments on them to find out if they are what they need for the future. They try to look at certain areas, not everything in the world. They had been focusing on the Navy's support to the Coast Guard. ADM Crenshaw put him at the head of the team for Homeland Security in late September. They went through the time since September doing assessments. They are now working on CPAM (CNO's Programming Assessment Memorandum), which are those things they found that are problems and how much money should be dedicated to those problems. He sees a tremendous amount of duplication. There is almost competition between different groups trying to get their product to the CNO. For the longest time N7 had the Homeland Security ball because they picked it up and ran with it. N3/N5 needs to do it. It's as if there was an effort in N3/N5 to say N7 has it, give it to them. But it's a policy issue, N3/N5 needs to handle it.

received a Navy Commendation Medal for his actions on 11 Sep. He felt it was just a show.

Capt Roemer Lessons Learned:

She thinks the Navy should have had representatives at the family's homes much earlier in the day.

There has been no long term counseling available for the reserve personnel who are attached to the Navy Command Center. It's important that they have a way to get rid of some of the things they have had to deal with.

At first and PERS 6 both had control of the database. They could both update the database. After a few days total control of the database was given to PERS 6. N1 would check the database for accuracy of the items they knew about. It would get frustrating because there would hours between N1 notifying PERS 6 to update the database and it actually occurring. During the briefs N1 had to have the current database included in the brief, but they would have information that would not be showing on the database because of this delay in updating by PERS 6.

Lessons Learned:

Have installed fire-fighting equipment in the Pentagon, such as fire axes, crowbars, etc. Within N76 they made up bags containing firefighting and damage control equipment, which they placed around their area when they moved to Crystal City.

talked to the SPRINT team but in his group he was with people who were in Crystal City when the Pentagon was attacked so it was hard to relate to them. He hasn't had much of a chance to talk to the others that were there with him. They preferred to stop talking about it after the first few days and the fact that they had to reorganize changed their working relationships.

Ms. Susan Livingston

Key challenges in the aftermath of 11 Sep: There was so much learned that day from the perspective of the Pentagon, military services and the nation. Life fundamentally changed that day. Right now it is a problematic and iffy situation out there. How do you plan for the unexpected? We talk about the agility, flexibility and capability of our fighting forces but we need to match our decision-making structures in the same manner. This is not an environment that will adjust to bureaucratic processes very well. We need to streamline our processes to make them flexible for decision-making. She sees us already falling back into our bad habits and bureaucratic ways. In the initial days after

11 Sep, however, things got done very quickly. There was no continuity of operation planning, except for the Marine Corps, that was effective for the Department of the Navy. There had been no plan for the senior Navy leadership. Almost instantly something was set up and set into motion. She does not think they are there yet, however. This glacial movement is not going to work anymore.

The most important lesson learned for the future is the agility and flexibility of decision-making. The kinds of threats we're facing in the future are going to require that kind of decision-making.

There is no such thing as force protection in this environment and no one can define the parameters. She hopes we just don't fight the last war, which, for the people there, was the plane flying into the Pentagon. Even now when they talk about renovation it is now still based on a plane flying into the Pentagon again. If she were a terrorist, she'd get another way.

Lessons Learned:

They should put the new blast proof windows in the whole Pentagon. She feels they saved them. The windows held long enough for the fire to go past rather than shattering the window.

Her office is the repository for everything above a certain level of classification. If it were to be destroyed all those records for the secretariat would be gone.

They worked on the evacuation routes. They have talked about lights on the floor like in an airliner.

One of the things he saw was a lack of emergency manning structure for the Pentagon. There was no command structure or codified order. There should be a command structure that everyone knows about. There should be a watch team automatically stood up to report to a certain location and than have this pool drawn from to create various teams.