

**Naval Historical Center
Oral Interview Summary Form**

Interviewers:

Capt Gary Hall
Capt Michael McDaniel
CDR Carol O'Hagan

Interviewer's Organization:

Naval Historical Center
Naval Historical Center
Naval Historical Center

Interviewee:

VADM John Totushek

Current Address:

Date of Interview:

5 Feb 02

Place of Interview:

Pentagon

Number of Cassettes:

One

Security Classification:

Unclassified

Name of Project: Pentagon Terrorist Attack Incident

Subject Terms/Key Words: Pentagon; Terrorist Attack; 11 September 2001; Reserve mobilization; Reconstitution of Navy offices

Abstract of Interview:

Interviewee Information:

VADM Totushek was a NROTC graduate from the University of Minnesota. He went through flight training and became a fighter pilot. He did a few tours on active duty and left active duty in 1973. In the Reserves he flew another 10 years and then went to Norfolk doing staff jobs. In 1993 he made flag officer. He was asked to come back to active duty in 1997. His first job was as Director of Environmental Protection. In 1998 he was offered the job as Chief of Naval Reserve.

Topics Discussed:

Prior to 11 Sep his office had been on the fifth floor of the Pentagon. A few months prior to 11 Sept they had moved down to the new wing around the intersection of the Fourth Corridor and the E ring. They were just getting set up and organized. He ended up losing a lot of his stuff because it was on the floor, not the walls. That office didn't suffer a lot of burn damage, but the water damage was too severe to salvage the things that were laying on the floor.

On 11 Sep he had done several interviews and had just been introduced to the new German Naval attaché. At 0900 he had a meeting with some retired flag officers, Phil and Harry Quast. The aide stuck his head in the door and told him to turn on the TV. They watched the second airplane crash into the second tower of the World Trade Center live. They finished their discussion around 0930 and they left.

At the moment of impact VADM Totushek was working on papers at this desk. He couldn't really see out his window because of the angle his desk sat at. The aide reported seeing a big flash of fire. He remembers feeling the impact as much as hearing it. It was more of a thud

sound. Stuff from the overhead was flying around. The aide's window (which was bulletproof) gave way and there was debris from the overhead. VADM Totushek went out to make sure everyone was okay. They went out in the passageway and just 30 feet down the corridor was a lot of devastation. There was black smoke, it was very dark, the overhead was down. There were some people coming out and they told the people to come toward them. They tried to get some people who were panicking to slow down. They moved down the Fourth Corridor and down the Second Corridor and out of the building.

They went out to South Parking and they could see a lot of black smoke coming up. There was also a construction trailer on fire there, which the black smoke was also coming from. They unsuccessfully tried to call on the cell phones. They got in the aide's car, all four of them (the outgoing aide, incoming aide, yeoman and VADM Totushek) and went to his quarters at the Washington Navy Yard. As they got to the gate they were just starting to lock down and go to Force Protection Delta at the Navy Yard.

At the Navy Yard they were able to talk to people. The CNO arrived at the CNO's house a few minutes later. VADM Totushek was trying to contact their office in Crystal City and this took a long time. They spent the day at his quarters.

They had set up a temporary command center at the Navy Yard. He knew it would be crowded so he didn't try to go down there. This is where most of the senior Navy leadership spent the day. He knew they probably wouldn't be getting to the Reserve issues that day.

He was thinking about how they would be tasked to start the mobilization pretty quickly. It was obvious that Force Protection would be an issue they would have to address pretty quickly. They had some discussions about that.

They relocated their office five times since that day. The next day they went to their office in Crystal City. After two days they saw it would be better to have an office at the Navy Annex. They basically had three pukas to work in when they moved to the Annex. This was better though because they were having two a day meetings with the leadership. After a few weeks they relocated back to Crystal City and then they moved back to their original office on the Fifth floor of the Pentagon.

They started talking with PERS and N3/5 about mobilization. When the President signed the partial mobilization authorization they were in good shape about what they needed to do. The process was different from the past recalls and mobilization. This time there was so much emphasis on force protection that the requirements came in as what the basic allowance was and what the current onboard was. The first thing they did was set up mobilization cells to work 24 hours a day. The one at the Navy Annex was made up of N12, N 3/5 and themselves. They had the three key players, especially with N3/5 there to interface between RESFOR and OPNAV was invaluable. Because they just had a numbers requirement and nothing about the qualities of the individuals they quickly mobilized every MA and 9545 (NEC for police work). That was about 1200 people. There was still a requirement to get some more people who could act as force protection people to bring us up to Force Protection basically Bravo Plus or Charlie. The next round became known as the Auxiliary Security Force. All of these people came from the VTU. They were volunteers from the Naval Reserve or people who were IAP so they weren't hurting organized units. They sent them to a week school and taught them how to carry a shotgun. That was about another 4000 people on top of the 1200. This was phase 1 and 2.

Phase 3 became the other requirements. A lot of Intelligence people were mobilized. Several MIUW and Small Boat organizations were mobilized. They mobilized more individuals than units, especially because of the security issue. They have written over 10,000 orders and probably about 9,000 have actually been deployed. The authorization is 14,400.

The Joint Staff initially called his office asking what they thought the Naval Reserve requirement would be. They told them they needed to talk to N3/5. That never happened so the best they can tell the Joint Staff made up the first requirement, which was 3000. They went back and asked for 14,400 and they think they can stay within that. SECDEF made the decision that even though we can mobilize people for up to 2 years, we would only mobilize for 1 year and then at the end of the year leave it up to the Secretaries to extend that. They are now trying to get Navy to give them a requirement so they can see what people they need to keep on for another year so they can detail the people on active duty right now. The people who were mobilized that took drastic pay cuts need to get back to their lives. There are also people from New York that were doing police work that feel they have more important work to do in New York. It looks like there will be a provision for substituting people in for the people who need to go home after 1 year. To do this they need to look at what the requirement will be. Then they need to get into the detailing process of how to fill that requirement.

The other issue is the fact that a lot of people are not going to sell their homes. They got permission to basically TAD people to the place they were “permanently” moved, because it more realistically fit the definition of what they were doing. Some of the people overseas are really on an unaccompanied tour, so they have been trying to look at it that way.

Since 1991 the emphasis on the Reserves is how can you help the Navy on a day-to-day basis and what kind of civilian skills do you bring to the mix. Now VADM Totushek is telling Navy maybe if the Navy is the premier force to play our away games, maybe our home games should be played by the Navy Reserve. The Reserve FA-18's actually stood duty during the first few days. The P-3's doing maritime surveillance along our coast would be beneficial. They are working now with Fleet Forces Command to set up a new organization, which will figure out how to handle force protection. It is going to be called Naval Coastal Warfare. This will be integrated with active duty and a reserve capability in it. There will be enough active duty capability so they can do the ongoing things and a reserve capability that can be set in place in case a war plan is activated or for security things.

His prognosis is that the Navy Reserve numbers won't change. SECDEF has given guidance that the Reserve won't look at large numbers in increasing end strength. The Reserves will shift focus.

CNO told them this is different from anything they have ever done. In the last 15 years when things have been active they have let the CINC involved handle it. Washington has supported the CINC with materials, money, etc. This is different because this is global and will involved more than one CINC. Secondly it will be a long duration. They are using planning horizons of 5 years. He organized them on the OPNAV staff to get involved with things they haven't traditionally been involved with to preplan what might be coming down the pike. Examples are how many battle groups are you going to have to keep deployed beyond what we normally do. If it's going to be more than 3 battle groups what do we have to do to equip and train those battle

groups. They've looked at everything from what to do with weapon categories and new crewing concepts to keep battle groups deployed and not break OPTEMPO.

VADM Totushek has been trying to visit mobilized reservists to see how this is impacting them. He is a little concerned about what the implications will be to the force after we've done this awhile. They are sending a survey out to the force to get their feedback about the mobilization experience.

They've done good things this time. They immediately energized the Ombudsman program. They set up web pages for information. They are trying to pay attention to families because a lot of families don't know about the rights and responsibilities available to them with a family member on active duty. They have set up a reserve sponsor duty for people coming on active duty to work just like the sponsor program with active duty people.

There was a tremendous outpouring of people wanting to be involved during the first few weeks. There is a program starting up to harness this. All they did initially was take their name and keep a record of people who had volunteered. There is a draft instruction that OSD is doing that talks about a more formalized way to use these people.

They have been negatively affected on Reserve recruiting. The people on active duty that might have gotten off and joined the reserves, stayed on active duty. A lot of people came back to active duty. Those that decided to get off active duty know we're mobilizing and have made the decision that they don't want to do this, so they don't sign up for the Reserves. They usually recruit 70% veterans per month, in the last few months it has fallen to 50%. In the last few months they have missed the enlisted number.

Lessons Learned:

They could more rapidly set up mobilization cells so they are ready to go. His staff probably needs to do some manpower training.

They got into detailing and looked at active duty billets that needed to be filled and tried to match the rate requirement to the person's rate. They also tried to match people geographically so they wouldn't recall someone in San Diego to go to Norfolk. They set up the ability for people to swap assignments just like on active duty.

It would be nice to have a database that would give complete visibility of the Reserve structure so they could match people to billets.

The biggest issue facing the Naval Reserve is what the impact of this will be on them. Attrition is one of his big emphasis areas. They have some stop loss in place and some people mobilized so initially they will think the numbers are good. It will be interesting to see what happens a year from now with the attrition numbers.

Abstracted by:
CDR Carol O'Hagan
6 Feb 02

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Topics Discussed:

A. (01:50) Interestingly, we had been in this office which we are sitting in now, which is upon the fifth floor of the Pentagon when I took over the job in 1998. Just about, I can get you the exact date, but just a few months before September we moved down to the new wing, and we'll get you, I probably can't remember the address, but basically the intersection of 4th Corridor and E ring, that's where our office was that day. So we had just kind of moved into our new digs

down there when things had happened. We were just getting set up and organized. Had most of the pictures hung not all of them. In fact, a funny thing that happened, but I lost a lot of my stuff, because what was still on the floor I hadn't hung on the wall and when—we didn't, that office didn't suffer burn damage, but water was extensive so by the time we got back in there everything was in the open and they had to stop and take a lot of the stuff. So I lost several of my plaques and memorabilia that was too bad to take out.

Q. (02:40) Could you tell us about the events of September 11th, please,

A. Yes, as we were talking— those moments will be with me forever. I had a kind of normal day that day. I had several people come by the office for interviews and I was just introduced to the new German Naval Attaché, he and the outgoing Attaché were in the office earlier in the morning. Then it seems to me at 9:00 I had a meeting with a couple of retired flag officers, the Quast brothers. Phil Quast and his brother Harry were in the office and we'd just been talking for a few minutes when the aide stuck his head in the door and said, "You ought to turn on the TV, because something happened up in New York."

So we turned on the TV and we were watching and saw the second, second collision.

Q. (03:38) So you saw that live.

A. Well, on TV yes, and then returned to finish our discussions somewhere around 9:30, and they departed and the aide said they went up the hall towards E ring, and they said, what made us really worry about them was that just before about 9:40 or ten minutes later, he started to come back by, towards what was the crash site. As it turned out we found out later they turned and

went down 4th corridor luckily instead of proceeding around the E ring or they'd have been right— gone.

So that at least worked out OK. Then you know, at the moment of impact I was sitting at my desk working on some papers and from the angle that my desk sits, you can't really see completely out the window, because of the angle. You had to get up and take a long look at the window. But the aide reported that he saw the big flash of, of, fire. I remember feeling the impact as much as hearing it. It was more of a big concussion. Not very loud, a bang or anything, it was more of a loud thud kind of sound. You know, a lot of stuff flying around from the overhead, it seemed a lot of it. Then the interior glass of the aide's—aide was sitting closest to the wall that was toward the crash site, and his window, the inner pane of his window, which is one of the new bulletproof windows, gave way. You know like peppered glass. Little balls of glass came shooting out and there was a lot of debris from the overhead.

So I got up and went out into the anteroom to make sure everybody was OK out there. They were a little bit shaken, but OK, and we went from there out the passageway and just 30 feet down the corridor was a lot of devastation. It was very dark, the black smoke was pouring out the win-the overhead was down. Couldn't really tell exactly the extent, but some people were coming out so we went over there. Basically told them, you know, "come this way," and there was the beginnings of some panic. You know, some people were starting to try and run and things like that and we basically tried to get them to slow down, let them know they would be o.k., all we needed to do is actually to exit the area. So from that point on we moved down the 4th corridor and over to the 2nd corridor and then out.

Q. (06:43) Did you know what it was a plane at that time?

A. I knew it was a plane because of the folks on the TV. In fact my TV was still on at the time that it hit, so I was pretty sure I knew exactly what it was. When it first hit, the first thing that entered my mind was “bomb,” but I said, “no, that’s a plane. That’s the same thing that’s happened in New York.”

So we went out to South Parking and went around the corner and I could see, actually there was a lot of black smoke coming up that I think had to do with the fact that there’s a construction trailer out there that was on fire, and it was putting out this really black smoke from the insulation from the trailer. But then of course there was a lot of black smoke from the JP fire, as well.

We tried to call on the cell phone—the cell phones didn’t work—just to get in touch with our office and let them know we were OK. So the aide said, “Well, my car’s right here, why don’t we go some place.”

I said, “Why don’t we go over to my quarters over at the Washington Navy Yard.” So we jumped in his car, my whole front office and I, all four of us, because we were just turning over aides. We had, the outgoing aides were still there as well. And we drove home. Luckily we did that when we did, because as we came up to the gate, LaTrove (phonetic) gate, which is 8th Street over at the Navy Yard, they were just starting to lock down Navy Yard. They were going to Charlie and we got inside, I mean they were going to Delta.

So we got inside and drove down to the house and my wife was having a tough time, because my son works in New York, so she didn’t know where either one of us were really. And of course she was seeing the pictures of where the crash was, so she knew it was close to the office.

There we were able to talk to people finally, and as a matter of fact CNO was worried when he got home. I beat him home by just a couple of minutes. When he got back he was worried that

we didn't, you know, didn't survive the crash and so he had told his wife to call down to quarters and see if ■ knew anything. When she called down, that was one of the first calls that got through. I happened to pick up the phone and so that's how they found out we were OK.

We finally were able—but the phones were still clobbered, even the regular phones were kind of clobbered, so it was hard to get through to people and of course we were trying to let as many people know, both the office in Crystal City and the people out. It took us a long time, they were putting up on the screen you remember most of the day, "If you're military, please contact Millington," because Millington was where the clearinghouse, you're OK, was. It was hard to get through even on cell phone.

So we pretty much spent the day at my quarters. They had set up a temporary command center in the Navy Yard, but I knew it was going to be real crowded down there so I didn't even try to go down there. And we had to, my daughter had gone to work. She was living with us at the time. She had gone to work, and had turned around and come back home. We had to go tell the Marines that it was OK to let her in, because they were really locking everything down by that time.

That's about it, unless you have some specific questions that I –

Q. (10:36) So you went directly from your office out into South Parking?

A. Right.

Q. (10:39) How would you characterize the egress?

A. As I said, there were several people who were kind of panicky and I think we, I think we calmed them down on the way out. Just got everybody, just the old fire drill, just get moving, just

keep moving, and let's all get out of the building. I don't know exactly how many there was going to be so, and once we got out in the parking lot, we felt like, you know, maybe it was not a good place to be standing around, so one of the other ideas for leaving, you know, we didn't completely know if there were going to be anymore airplanes drop out of the sky or not.

Q. (11:22) So was there some official word to try to get people moved out of there, or was it-?

A. No, of course now because it was so many people moving in so many different directions, there was no ability to understand how many people were, who was, and to account for people was very difficult, because everybody left in all directions. The Pentagon's so big that there were multitudes of, and basically where we were, you couldn't see anything, and basically they did not want people to go towards the park. The people that were kind of organizing the area over there. So there really wasn't much to do other than (unintelligible 12:03).

Q. (12:04) Were you aware of what, I guess there was a group that was reconstituting at the Annex?

A. The Annex reconstitution, basically happened the next day. As I said, the leadership went over to the Navy Yard and set up a temporary command center over there, and that's where most of the people spent, most of the senior leadership in the Navy, spent the day over there. And I was aware of that, but I knew it was going to be crowded, that there probably was not going to, they were not going to be getting to the reserve issue that day, and they knew where I was if they needed me. So we stayed, we stayed at the quarters.

Q. (12:48) What was going through your mind while all this was going on? What kind of thoughts?

A. I guess I was primarily thinking about what we were going to be needing to do. How we were going to be tasked to start the mobilization very quickly. I was certain that's what we were going to be doing, it was pretty obvious to me that Force Protection was going to be an issue that we're going to have to address very quickly. And so I had some discussions in the afternoon once we were able to get back on line and talk with Crystal City, and who all wants to talk about things we want to start preparing for, for the mobilization. And of course that turned out to be very true in the next few days.

Then I went through a series of office moves. I've relocated my office five times since that day. The next day we went to Crystal City, because I have an office there, and then we saw how hard it was, and all, now the Navy had reconstituted up to the Annex, and security was such that getting back and forth was very, very difficult. We did that for, I think for one or two days, and saw immediately that it was going to be better to have an office up at the Annex. So office is a very broadly defined term here, because we basically got a little PUKA, or three of them to work in, so, but that was the right thing to do at the time, because we were basically having two a day meetings with all leadership in the Navy. And just being there was what you needed to do, so we spent a couple of weeks up there doing that. Then relocated back to Crystal City and then they finally got this space cleaned back up and ready for us. Because it, they had gutted this place of all of our communications, so they came in and re-established communications and got us new furniture and stuff. I don't think we repainted or anything. So here we are back here again.

Q. (15:09) Can you take us through the process that happened in the days after, about the recall.

A. You know we basically started talking with PERS and with N3/5 who has a great deal to do with mobilization. When the President signed the partial mobilization authorization we were in pretty good shape with what we needed to do. The process this time was not going to be any different than it was before, even from the last recalls and mobilizations we've done. Almost since 1991 we've done a lot of these. But this time there was so much emphasis on Force Protection that the requirements came in merely as the delta between what the basic allowance was and what the current onboard was. We just got a raw number. Our PA's this, our current onboard is this. Delta is this, that's what we need. Because of that we did a couple of things, I think, very smart. The first thing we did is we set up some mobilization cells that would work 24 hours a day. One over at the Annex that was made up of N1, N1/2 Actually, N3/5 and ourselves. So that we had the three key players even though really we are not a direct player in mobilization at OPNAV at all. But having N3/5 there with it, seemed to make sense to help with data, to be an interface between RESFOR work and OPNAV. I think was an invaluable piece. Because, as I said, because we had just basically a numbers requirement there was nothing that really talked about the qualities of these individuals so the people asking for reservists weren't saying if they wanted a Master Chief or a Third Class or anything in-between. They were just saying, "Hey, I want an MA." So we very quickly went through and mobilized every MA that we had and every 9545 (that's NEC for police work) and that was about twelve hundred people. And then there was still a requirement to get some other people who could at least act as Force Protection people to bring us up to Force Protection level, basically Bravo plus or Charlie.

So the next round, this was becoming known as the Auxiliary Security Force. These were folks that generally speaking were either volunteers from the IRR, well all of them came from VTU. Volunteers from just part of the Naval reserve or also people that were IAP were kind of targets,

because they weren't in any billets so we would not hurt any units that were organized. So a lot of fine people that came, that had nothing to do with Force Protection before they were mobilized. We sent them to a week's school and taught them to carry a shotgun and those folks are all around the world right now.

Q. (18:55) What kind of numbers are you talking about?

A. I would tell you that off my, we could get you the real number, but my guess would be probably another four thousand people that we mobilized.

Q. (19:04) On top of the twelve hundred?

A. Since that time though, once we got that first phase done, phase 2 began, well phase one was really the MA's and the 9545s. Phase 2 was the, this auxiliary Security Force. In phase 3 came the other requirements. A lot of intelligence people were mobilized, several of our MIUW and Small Boat organization were mobilized, and in fact we mobilized more individuals again this time than we did in units, especially because of the security people. The number right now is approaching—we've written I think over ten thousand orders and probably about 9000 people have actually reported.

Q. (20:14) The threshold right now is 14,400?

A. 14,400 has been authorized, initially, this is interesting as well. We got a call from the Joint Staff asking what we thought the Naval Reserve requirement was going to be and my folks told the person that was calling that it wasn't our place to say. They needed to talk to N3/5 would be the people that would be making that call. That call never went, so the best we can tell the Joint

Staff made up the level of, I think, 3000 was the first number that they put for the Naval Reserve that we probably would need. We immediately went back to them and asked to increase that. It took a couple of weeks, but we finally did get the increase up to 14,400. It looks like we may be able to stay within that depending upon how—as you’re probably aware the Secretary also came out with guidance, the Secretary of Defense came out with guidance that said that even though the Title Ten says that for Partial Mob, you can mobilize people for up to two years that we want to mobilize people for a year only, and then take a look at what happens and talk to that authority, which they have deemed to be the Secretaries of the Services and could either extend a person for another year if they wanted to or not. We’re right now looking at how we’re going to do that, sustain them past this first year and trying to get Navy to give us a requirement as to what they see as the people we will need for another year, so that we can detail the people that are on active duty right now. Once again, we have numerous people that were mobilized and taking fairly drastic pay cuts, those people, I think need to get off active duty and back to normal lives.

We got other individuals that we mobilized from places where, an interesting phenomenon is that those people, we had several people who were up in New York that once they got the immediate emergency under control, got mobilized by the Navy to go do police work. Some of those folks are feeling like they have more important work to do still in New York and so that’s more of an emotional issue than a monetary issue, but it’s something we ought to address.

So I’ve been pushing the Navy, I think they’re listening to me, that we ought to do this as a detailing process. There are others, numerous people that would like to stay on active duty. People that feel like they want to be part of this. That for whatever reason feel like they’d like to stay on active duty and we’re trying to facilitate that. Make it easy for them.

Then there were others that, as I said, need to go home, and then there's this body in the middle that we may have replaced some of those people by sessions with non-active duty so that we can let some of them go. Others may even stay a little while longer, others we will replace with other mobilized reserves, and so that's where our plan is as to what we're going to do in the future, but there's a lot of work to be done before we get there.

Q. (23:32) So there's going to be a provision for some substitution?

A. Well that's what it's looking like, That's John Totushek's intent and so as this unfolds you'll see how successful it was, but that's the drum I've been beating all the time.

Q. (23:47) Well, do you need, need to establish the procedures for that to happen, is that -?

A, Yes, we've got, first of all we've got to look at what the requirement's going to be. Somebody's got to be able to do the analysis that will project with the number of MAs we're turning out of A school, the next year, the next nine months, what's the total number required going to be for these MA security kind of people. And then we need to get into this detailing process of how we're going to fill those. Give the kind of algorithm.

I think that, I think we'll be successful in being able to do it that way. It makes more sense to me, it's the way you'd treat anybody else on active duty.

The other issue we're dealing with is the fact that a lot of these people immediately—we had this problem of, hardly any of them are going to sell their homes and take PCS orders even though they're going for a year or two. So we got permission to basically take care of this problem of having to live someplace near where they're doing the duty plus keeping their home back home. So we got the permission to basically TAD them, even though they were being permanently

moved there by, by ordinary definitions, we basically TADed them because it more realistically fitted the definition of what they were doing. They really were away from home. But then we've got the other issue with some of the people we sent overseas to do this and realistically speaking they're on an unaccompanied one-year tour, if you want to look at it that way. So I've been trying to push the Navy to look at it that way, and you get some resistance, of course, from people that are afraid of spending money and other things like that. But I think we're going to be able to make some progress there as well. And the people aren't complaining about the fact that they're overseas, they're saying you know, if you did this with active duty person where you were going to send them unaccompanied, you'd make arrangements to get them home once in a while or to get the families over to see them. Those kind of issues. So we're working on issues like that as well.

Q. Where do you see, the reserves role playing out with the definition of the homeland security role of the Navy and defense.

A. There's a lot there that is going to kind of transform the way that we have been looking at ourselves, I think, over the past few years. Since 1991, I think the emphasis has been on how can you help the Navy on a day to day basis and what kind of civilian skills do you bring to the mix. Those kinds of issues have been in the forefront, and now when you stop and think about it, one of the messages that I'm taking to the Navy is, maybe you ought to look at the Navy Reserve at, if you want, you know, the common theme is that Navy is one of the premier people, premier forces that fights our away games. We don't want to play like away games. Maybe the home game should be played by the Naval Reserve. That you try to set up war fighting kinds of capabilities that you can, that you can keep here at home so then a lot of our assets come into

play. Our FA-18s, our fighter attack squadrons actually some of them did TAM (phonetic) CAP missions in the first two days when things were kind of disorganized. We borrowed missiles from the Air Guard in some cases, and strapped them on our FA-18 and were out there standing the duty with the rest of them. Our P-3s to have maritime surveillance and eyes are (phonetic) capabilities along the coasts would seem to be an asset that would be very, very beneficial to have. Our, of course, our MIUW, are those kinds of units that have been heavily used before. We are working right now with combined, or Fleet Forces Command, I mean to set up a new organization of how we're going to handle force protection, and it's going to be under an organization we're going to call Naval Coastal Warfare. That's the water side of course, and it will have both, it will be an integrated organization of active duty and you know reserve capability in it. An active duty capability so that they can do more of the ongoing things we seem to be doing all the time, and then the reserve capability would be a little bit more robust, that you could send to places in case of, you know, a war plan gets activated, or maybe to do some homeland security things again. So we are working on a lot of issues, but a lot of them have, I think, more to do know with us being, doing more like we were trained to do. Some of the war play things and we had kind of been leaning toward before.

Q. (29:19) And what's your prognosis for what they will do to the numbers?

A. My prognosis is that our numbers won't change. Secretary of Defense has given guidance for the upcoming POM developed that we aren't going to be looking at any large increases in end strength. The active duty probably needs to increase end strength, so they're going to have some issues that they're going to have to deal with. I think we will probably once again keep our end strength the same, but maybe shift focus from some areas to others. But that's always an

interesting thing to do, because you've got to get Navy to work with you for what new requirements are, and sometimes getting them to focus on that has been difficult in the past.

Q. (30:16) Any estimate on how long that will take. That might take.

A. Sheeew, I wish I could tell you. It will be, it will be a couple of years.

Q. (30:32) Can you share with us what your role had been as far as the actually planning for the, how we're going to fight the new threat?

A. Well, CNO, and by the way this is an unsolicited comment about Vern Clark, but God bless him for being here at this time. He has really proven to be a tremendous leader. Those of us that knew him before never doubted that he would be, but it just is very, very fortunate to have him in the position he's in now.

One of the first things he did was say that this is different than anything we've done probably back to World War II, from a couple of stand points. In the last ten, fifteen years, when things have been very, very active, you know we have just, we have just let the CINC, was involved with that particular flare up we'd let CINC handle it and all we would do here in Washington is try to support them as best we could with materials, money, and you know. He recognized immediately that this would be different from a couple of standpoints.

First of all the global, so it's going to effect more than one CINC. Second of all it's going to be a long duration. We're using planning horizons of about five years or so as just an initial wag (phonetic) as to how long it's going to take. And so, and so it was different from the standpoint of what we were going to have to do. And so he organized us here on the OPNAV staff to get involved more with things that we traditionally had not been involved with before. About trying

to pre-plan what might be coming down the pike at us, such as how many battle groups are we going to have to keep deployed beyond what we normally do with our current OPTEMPO?

Things like that.

And if in fact as we all know it's going to be, it's going to be more than a couple of battle groups, or three battle groups at a time, then what do we have to do to organize, train and equip those battle groups to get them ready to go. And so we looked at everything from what we want to do with our weapons inventories, what we need to do with maybe new crewing concepts so that we can keep battle groups deployed and not break OPTEMP, try to keep it as close to OPTEMPO as we can. Just a tremendous amount of work has been done at the three-star level looking at the, the implications of this war on terrorism and what it means to the Navy and of course, because we're the forward deployed force it means a lot to us and we're going to be heavily engaged for the next five years.

So we've been involved in all that and then of course, off shoots of that have become how are we going to use the reserves. Which is some of the things we've just discussed, but there's a lot going on right now, and it's very, very busy and at the same time, I've been trying to get out and visit reservists that have been mobilized so we can find out, you know how this really is impacting them.

I'm a little bit concerned about what this, it's like any other mobilization or recall we've done, it impacts some people very positive and some people very negatively and what are the implications going to be to the force after we've done this for a while. So we're trying to get a survey out to all the units that have been mobilized and let us know what you're, you know it's the same survey that we took a year ago, about your druthers about staying in the Navy Reserve

or not. Do that again but put in some questions that are focused on the mobilization experience and has this soured you, or will you overcome it and stick with it, kind of thing.

Q, (34:59) How all that progresses will be a very key part, I think of the historical; record story of this period in history, You know how that impacts the reserves, and –

A. I think you're right. Yes, exactly. We've done some great things this time, At least there are enough of us around that remember Desert Storm and some of the things we fell short on and so we've tried to attack some of those things. Some of them we've done better than others, but we immediately energized the Ombudsman program throughout the universe of the force, so that the families weren't left behind and forgotten, but still I know there's probably incidents out there, where because our communications are so poor in this organization that we probably did not, but we set web pages. We made sure there was an Ombudsman operation in almost every command around the county. We tried to get the information out, pamphlets and things like that to augment the way it's been mobilized. Again, I'll be kind of anxious to hear what you guys think about that. We try to pay attention to families because in a lot of places the families don't know what their rights and responsibilities and things that are available to them when they're going to come on active duty.

So we've tried to attack that very hard. Tried to make sure that we had this, and this is especially true for the enlisted folks, but it should be true for everybody, that we call it the "reverse sponsor program" so as people came on active duty, if they were going to go to a gaining command, an active gaining command that we had the ability to call the gaining command when the person is about to go and say who's my sponsor, so they had a positive handle of, with a name and telephone number when they got there, that somebody could take them under the wing, just like

we do on the rest of the active duty squadrons to show them, or active duty units I should say, to show them around, tell them about the local area. Tell them about what things might be a little different in their command. That seemed to be fairly well received as well. But there, you're exactly right, there's stories yet to be written and we've got to make sure that we do everything so we try, try and help those folks.

Q. (37:27) We've heard a lot too from the personnel side and others about the outpouring of people wanting to be involved in some capacity, you know, those that want to, feel like a need to do something.

A. Yes, there was a tremendous amount of that feeling I think in the first couple of weeks and it was interesting that most of the people I heard, of course most people I know I guess are older, but you know the people that I talked to were people that were fairly senior but wanted to do something.

Frankly we haven't, there's a program now starting up as to how we could harness some of those things, but all we've done, all we did initially was take their name and telephone number and basically keep a record of people as they volunteered. But I mean most of them were, as I said, people that had flown airplanes, and –

Q. (38:21) You mean retired.

A. Yes, retired generally be.

Q. (38:25) What are they, are they thinking of ways to tap into that?

A. Well as I said there's a draft instructions out now that OSD's doing I think, that basically talks about something a little bit more formalize for how we would be able to use people like that. Probably one of the cute stories is that somebody called up BUPERS and was talking to this person and telling about his credentials, I think it was. And finally the Lieutenant that was on the phone with him said, "Well, we're going to rate you 8-I."

The guy said, "I don't know what 8-I is."

He said, "Well when the enemy action gets to 8th and I we'll call you."

(everyone laughs.)

But interestingly it's effected, we seem to be effected on reserve recruiting negatively. And it's like this, those people that had this feeling that were on active duty, pulled their papers and stayed on active duty, we involved them. A lot of people came back to active duty, but they're tending to go back to active duty. Those that decided no, I'm going to go ahead and get on with my life and resign or retire from active duty, know we're mobilizing so they've already made the decision they don't want to do that, they want to do something more. So they're not signing up so they won't get mobilized. So we've seen, we usually recruit about 70 to 80 percent veterans each month, the last two months it's dropped to 50%, which is a statistically relevant figure I think. And for the last couple of months we've missed getting the enlisted number so we're a little behind in our recruitment numbers this year, where as earlier we did a good job last year. So, yes, we've seen a little bit of an interesting kind of backlash where you'd expect, if you didn't think through that you might think that, gee, people will be signing up in droves, but they don't seem to be.

Q. (40:38) As you think back over the last several months are there some lessons learned that you could share with us?

A. Yes, we are capturing lessons learned, of course, and I would tell you that there's going to be a lot of things involved with how we, we could more rapidly set up our mobilization cells so that they are ready to go, I think. Basically it was a pick-up game, these things are at the last minute and when you're going to man something 24 hours a day. Of course all my staff are not manpower experts, most of them are other experts. So—but they became manpower experts in very short period of time and I think that tells us we probably need to do some training for things like this and my staff along with it.

I thought we did a wonderful job down in New Orleans in getting that up and running but it took a, it was a burden to the staff down there. We basically stopped doing other kinds of things. We were undergoing a reorg – or an alignment I guess is the proper word these days down there right now, and we stopped doing that. We just basically stopped doing, because the same people were very involved with that are the ones that very basically manned the mobilization cell. Which in that cell of course is the ones that basically once we got the information from 3/5 up here, they're the ones that would translate that into find the action person that would go in. They actually got into detailing which we've never done before, because as I mentioned before there wasn't this quality thing so they went back and would look at the active duty billet that was needed to be filled and saw what rank that person was supposed to be and tried to match it up as best we can. We also tried to match it up regionally so that we weren't recalling people from San Diego to go to Norfolk and visa versa.

Now the problem, of course was that these events would come in, I mean to get that number I can't tell you how many events we've done, but the events were generally in numbers that some

of them were one person, some were twenty. I guess the average would probably be twenty. So as you're doing 20 people at a time when you try to do this process, you run out of the right people and you might get into some of this. So we set up the ability for people to swap just like we do on active duty. I don't know how many of those we've done, but we did set up that ability. It would be nice to have and this is one of those nice to have things, but I haven't figured out how to pay for it yet, but a database that would give complete visibility of the whole reserve structure so you could see where all the billets were, where all the empty people, where all the people are, where all the billets are where you could best match them up, because you know we do that regionally now and it's not entirely satisfactory, but we're getting there.

Q. (43:51) What percentage of the events come in with names and others just with requirements?

A. Well, in these, as I said, the first ones were no names.

Q. (43:59) No names.

A. It was all just numbers. Later on as we started getting into specialties like intelligence, some of those came in with name requests and there have been other name requests that have nothing to do with that, but we did, I couldn't tell you how many we had that were named, but I would say maybe, this is a real wag, maybe a quarter of them might have been by a name.

Q. (44:26) As you look forward to the next several months, you shared some of this with us, but what would you say the biggest issues you see facing you and the reserves?

A. I think the biggest issue is, what the impact of this is going to be on the Naval Reserve Force and how can we, this is, you know, one of my big emphasis areas this year is on attrition and

guess is the best way to describe it. He manages film productions, be they commercials or larger film shoots.

Q. (47:07) What kind of questions have they had during this period of history?

A. They really, you know I would tell you we had a wonderful Christmas vacation. We all just went over to England and spent a week over there and were together kind of away from all this for a while which was very therapeutic for all of us. Their questions have not been very much related to the issues. They've been more related to the impact on the family and basically what it means to all of America, rather than anything focused on the reserves so they've been interested in this from the way that it impacts all American I think as much as anything that has to do with the reserve force.

Q. Admiral we really want to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule.

A. My pleasure.

Q. To talk to us. Thank you for your leadership in the Naval Reserve.

A. Thanks, thanks, glad to do it.

Q. Thank you sir.

Transcribed by:
Ethel Geary
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