

**Naval Historical Center
Oral Interview Summary Form**

Interviewers:

Capt Michael McDaniel
CDR Carol O'Hagan

Interviewee:

Ens. Shaun Allan Chittick

Date of Interview:

4 Feb 02

Number of Cassettes:

N/A

Interviewer's Organization:

Naval Historical Center
Naval Historical Center

Current Address:

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(w) N231D7B Enlisted Community Mgr.

Place of Interview:

Navy Annex

Security Classification:

UNCLAS

Name of Project: Pentagon Terrorist Attack Incident

Subject Terms/Key Words: Pentagon; Terrorist Attack; 11 September 2001; triage; medical care; Leadership (Air Force Major)

Abstract of Interview:

Interviewee Information: Ens. Chittick was born in ████████████████████ to an Army family, his father a Major at the time on loan to NAB Little Creek as a signal officer. He grew up all over the US and overseas. When his father retired they settled in Blacksburg, VA. He finished high school, did a little college at Northern Virginia Community College – Manassas campus, and then joined the Navy. He met a SEAL and this is what convinced him to join the Navy. He joined the Navy in October 84, went to boot camp, Corpsman "A" school, Field Med Service School (school to train to be a corpsman for the Marine Corps), and right to BUDS (Basic Underwater Demolition Seal Training). He was at SEAL Team FOUR in Little Creek, VA for 6 ½ years followed by 8 years at Naval Special Warfare Development Group at Dam Neck, VA. While at Dam Neck he was selected for Limited Duty Officer (LDO) and was sent to BUPERS.

Topics Discussed:

Ens. Chittick is the Assistant SEAL, Diver, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewman, and Musician Enlisted Community Manager. They come up with predictions for advancement numbers. They look at overall community manning, the strengths and weaknesses. They interface with the recruiters and recruiting command. They essentially set the policy and guidance for all five of their communities. They are the subject matter experts for diving duty, parachute duty and demolitions within the Navy and all the pays that go along with those.

His office is located in the Sixth Wing of the third deck of the Navy Annex, Federal Office Building #2.

On 11 Sep there was a buzz going around the office about a plane hitting the World Trade Center. He and his boss, CDR Tom Carlson, walked downstairs to watch the TV in the PAO

office. As they watched the second airliner hit the second tower of the World Trade Center they knew it was deliberate. They decided to go back to get some work done before things started spinning.

The headed up to their office via the stairwell and heard a loud bang that sounded like someone had slammed the doors in the stairwell. On the third deck there was a whole mob heading in a beeline towards the fire exits. They were told to just get out of the building. They mustered in the parking lot across Columbia Turnpike. They could see black smoke and flames coming from the Pentagon. They couldn't tell if the building had been hit or something had hit near it.

They waited in the parking lot for about 45 minutes. Someone yelled for volunteers to head down the hill. Everybody started down the hill, so they stopped them. They asked for anyone with medical background and Ens. Chittick raised his hand, as he had been a SEAL Independent Duty Corpsman. That narrowed the field to about 5000 people. They stopped everyone under the bridge at Route 110. There was a big mob and no control with no clearly delineated chain of command.

There was an Air Force O-4 who designated himself traffic cop. People wanted to help and were pressing forward. There were already firefighters and rescue workers on scene as well as military people who had been in the Pentagon already working. There was all kinds of movement and activity. The Air Force Major told them nobody goes forward or back without checking in with him. The firefighters began to look toward the Air Force Major if they needed bodies. He divided them into skilled and unskilled labor. Anyone with medical background went on the left side; the non-medical types went on the right side. The medical group was to provide medical care, the other group was to move wreckage, look for bodies, carry rescue equipment and anything else. There was still a lot of frustration about what was going on. Rumors were rampant.

They got a report that another airliner was inbound so they chased everyone under the overpass for shelter. They decided to get all the medical equipment off the lawn and hauled that under the overpass. They were told that it had been a false alarm and went back to set up the trauma stations again. This happened two more times and finally they decided to keep the treatment areas under the overpass. Someone started putting a band of silver duct tape on everyone's arm. They wrote doctor, nurse or other on each person's arm. They also listed their skills. Ens. Chittick's skills listed were CPR, First Aid, and IV's. This helped the Air Force Major visually put together trauma teams. They tried to get a doctor and nurse for each team with some other people to help. After awhile they had three doctors and three nurses on each team.

Next they organized color groups for trauma. They had Green, Yellow and Red for proximity to target. Green was right against the wall of the Pentagon. They limited this to people who had been on the ground the longest. Ens. Chittick was on the Yellow team. They were at the leading edge of the overpass to Route 110. They were to receive any patients the Green team sent to them. This is taught to both civilian and military trauma centers. The Red team was back closest to the Navy Annex. Green was for life or death priority care. Yellow was more delayed stuff such as burns, fractures, and shock. Non life-threatening injuries with time on their hands. Red was people with concussions but no other symptoms, smoke inhalation. People with no real time line. Everything was funneled through the Green team. If they felt they needed to work on someone right away they got a team together, if not they escorted them to the Yellow team. Yellow would then decide if the person was theirs or should be passed off to the Red team.

Ens. Chittick's team saw a total of six patients, all of them had burns and smoke injuries but would be fine. They would all be admitted to a hospital, put on oxygen and monitored for 24 hours. The sixth patient came in on a stretcher with burns and was fading in and out of consciousness. She recovered as they worked on her. They had so many helicopters at the Pentagon they ended up medevacing some of their Yellow team patients. They were all working on the assumption that they would find a pocket of survivors and they would need to have the present patients taken care of them. Some of the patients never even made it to the Yellow team, they were picked up by helicopter or ambulance and whisked away. Two people in his trauma team were in the building close to where the plane hit and they refused to leave.

There were no bathrooms so someone drove a tour bus over with a bathroom in the back. This allowed people to get into some air conditioning and use the bathroom.

The firefighters were like machines going in and out of the wreckage. The senior firefighter on scene made the call at one point when he saw the roof start to collapse that nobody else would go in the building until things settled down. There was a caved in section hanging on an angle. The fire sprinklers were going trying to put out the fire and all the water was saturating the concrete and carpet and adding to the weight. As the debris got heavier around 1030 all the wreckage collapsed.

There were initially three distinct chains of command. The firefighters had their chain of command that they functioned well under. The police department had their chain of command, and they did well under this but they were unsure how to deal with the military. Then there was the military chain of command. Most people were headquarters type so there wasn't a distinct chain of command, maybe one hundred different chains of command within one and it didn't really work well.

The Air Force major establishing himself as the point of contact was one of the best thing that happened. He talked to the firefighters, police and military and became the established focal point down there. This was not by position of rank but by convenience. If the firefighters had a concern they'd broadcast it to him and he would get the word out.

Once they saw the six casualties the casualties stopped. Ens. Chittick's impression was that after the crash people either got out during the initial hour or two or there were no survivors. They had an initial estimate of 2400 casualties since 24,000 people work in the Pentagon and they estimated about 1/10 of the building had been destroyed. $1/10$ or $24,000 = 2400$. Police cars would come up with backboards and oxygen bottles and toss it to them. Rescue squads would pull up and just gut their vehicles. They tried to put everything in some type of organization.

Around 1400 they realized they weren't going to get a massive influx of casualties. They got some food and water from a Price Costco semi-truck. Ens. Chittick took charge of unloading the pallets of water and disseminating them. They started running out bottles of water to the firefighters. Vehicles started showing up with candy bars, fruit and sandwiches. They would let them go forward to resupply the firefighters so they kept running up to give food and water to the firefighters.

At one point all the firefighters sat down. They had just gotten word over their personal radios from their dispatchers that one of the World Trade Center towers had collapsed and they thought

200 firefighters had been killed. They sat down for about 10 minutes. After 10 minutes they all got back up like machines and started back to work.

Around 1800 they told everyone who needed to go home to go ahead. Nobody moved to leave. About 1900 they told the Green team to stay and Yellow and Red team to leave. They had to put their names and contact information as well as skills on a clipboard. They dragged their feet leaving. Ens. Chittick was exhausted. He couldn't get back into the Navy Annex on the Columbia Pike side so he had to go around to the Henderson Hall side. He got his keys and things. He went out to the parking lot and thought about going back to the Pentagon. He remembered their parting words that this might go on for days and that they might have to work in shifts. Somebody would need to go home and be fresh for the next day. He drove home.

Capt Senn and some of the people involved in the Green teams got flash burns from the explosion of the aviation gas held in tanks that exploded during the day.

The SEAL and EOD community has almost no one wanting to get out after 11 Sep. They have SEAL and EOD people who have been retired from 20 or 30 years that want to get back on active duty. They are chronically about 75% manned, but BUPERS has no mechanism in place to take a retired guy and bring him back on active duty. There is no provision for what happens to the retired pay. In this community there's an issue of currency also. Are you still qualified to dive and do all the things they do? They do fine with 75% manning because it's been this way ever since the community was formed. Recruiting was up but is starting to taper back down again.

He went to Disney World on vacation. They had everyone go through metal detectors. Disney hired more people to handle this new requirement.

He doesn't view airliners as passenger vehicles anymore but as potential weapons. Whenever he sees one flying low he looks to see where it's coming from and going to.

Force Protection is taken much more seriously by commands now. The SEALs have been consulted on several issues, inshore security, in harbor security, in port security. They have been asked if security should be SEALs and EOD guys wandering around facilities and they said no. SEALs are mainly an offensive capability. The EOD community has just had a bunch of missions handed to them and their OPTEMPO is high. Now people are using EOD for more proactive measures.

In terms of leadership the Air Force major who was acting as traffic cop was a good example of leadership. He managed 5000 people.

During the day, around 1400, an Army General showed up and said he had jurisdiction over the whole effort. The firefighters started telling him no and he said, "Yes, this is a Department of Defense facility. I'm Department of Defense". They said, "It's also a public building, on public land". The FBI showed up later in the morning and announced jurisdiction over the whole thing but the firefighters didn't let that stop their actions.

Abstracted by:
CDR Carol O'Hagan
6 FEB 02

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Unclassified

Name of Project: Pentagon Terrorist Attack Incident

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Transcript of Interview:

Interviewee Information:

Ens. Chittick was born in ████████████████████ to an Army family, his father a Major at the time on loan to NAB Little Creek as a signal officer. He grew up all over the US and overseas. When his father retired they settled in Blacksburg, VA. He finished high school, did a little college at Northern Virginia Community College – Manassas campus, and then joined the Navy. He met a SEAL and this is what convinced him to join the Navy. He joined the Navy in October 84, went to boot camp, Corpsman "A" school, Field Med Service School (school to train to be a corpsman for the Marine Corps), and right to BUDS (Basic Underwater Demolition Seal Training). He was at SEAL Team FOUR in Little Creek, VA for 6 ½ years followed by 8 years at Naval Special Warfare Development Group at Dam Neck, VA. While at Dam Neck he was selected for Limited Duty Officer (LDO) and was sent to BUPERS.

Topics Discussed:

Q. (8:15) Tell us about your experiences on—well where is your office located, first of all?

Where do you work?

A. We're in the sixth wing on the third deck.

Q. (08:22) Of?

A. The Navy Annex. So we're just upstairs. We're on the Columbia Pike Side.

Q. (08:29) Is that where your office was on 11 September also?

A. Sure was, Ma'am.

Q. (08:32) Tell us about 11 September. Tell us your recollection of that day.

A. OK, on 11 September there was a buzz going around in the office and it wasn't the usual work related. We're always buzzing; we always come up with things to worry about up there. They said, "Something's going on." You know, "Hey, a plane hit the World Trade Center." We don't have a TV up there, but we knew there was a TV in the Public Affairs office on the second deck.

Q. (09:02) How did you hear about the plane hitting the Trade Center?

A. Officemates that had gone down to get coffee or something, or gone on a break and happened to overhear it and stepped in, and looked at, and watched it on TV. So they said, "Hey, when you guys get a break go down there and they've got it on TV. It's replaying constantly." So we went down, my boss and I. It was CDR TOM CARLSON, we walked down about ten minutes after we heard about it, and we're standing in the PAO office watching on the TV screen, and as we were watching it the second airliner hit. So we were watching footage of the two airliners, and it started to dawn on us at that point that, you know, that was deliberate. That wasn't an accident.

The first one we could believe was accidental and not too long after that we said, “Well, hey, let’s go up and get some work done. Things are going to start spinning around here.”

We headed out of the PAO office. We got in the stairwell and headed back up from the second to the third deck and when we were in the stairwell we heard a really loud bang and it sounded like somebody slamming the double doors in the stairwell. So we were thinking, you know, “Oh, that’s pretty rude.” We got up to the third deck and there was a whole mob, everybody we work with and works around us in the various offices were all headed in a beeline toward Columbia Pike, toward the fire exits.

We asked, you know, “Hey, what’s going on,” and we were told “Just get out of the building. Just get out of the building.”

“Well, tell us what’s going on.”

You know, “You have to get out of the building, now.”

So we headed out of the building and mustered in the parking lot across Columbia Pike there, and by that time we saw rolling black clouds of smoke and flames coming from the side; we could see right down the hill to the Pentagon there. Couldn’t tell if the building had been hit or if something had hit near it. I remember somebody saying that it didn’t hit the building, “Thank God it didn’t hit the building.” Later on we found out, of course, that wasn’t true at all.

We had other people in the office when we got out. Talking to them in the parking lot they said they were sitting and heard the thing roar right overhead. Again, we were in the stairwell, so to us it sounded like doors slamming. We couldn’t place it as something outside the building.

Q. (11:38) But never heard the airplane in the stairwell?

A. Never heard the airplane in the stairwell. Just a loud bang. So we stood around in the parking lot for 45 minutes, maybe, and they said, they announced that anybody—we were wondering about head counts and things like that, you know looking around at the mob out there, we thought it's going to be a real tough task getting any, coming up with any kind of order here. Getting any kind of accountability or a headcount, you know, who was left in the building? I made the comment that, "Well, you know, we're safe inside the Navy Annex. Nobody in their right mind would bomb the Navy Annex because then they might level everything and we might start over and get it right this time." (everyone chuckles) It's probably a little bit of dark sarcasm, but -.

Somebody yelled out, "Anybody who'd like to volunteer to help out down there, head down the hill." Needless to say, not knowing what to do, everybody started down the hill. So then they said, "Stop what you're doing. This isn't going to work." When it's unsafe, people are trying to cross the roads down there and we didn't know what we were going into.

Then they said, "Anybody with any kind of medical background?" So I raised my hand, I was a SEAL Independent Duty Hospital Corpsman in my previous life, in my previous phase of my career, so I know I could stick an IV. I know I could do CPR and some basic things, or I can at least help carry stretchers and monitor IVs and things like that. I knew I could help out in one fashion or another.

So that narrowed the field. We probably got down to about 5,000 people underneath the bridge on, I think it's 110. What they did was they stopped everyone at the bridge and wouldn't let you go any closer to the Pentagon than that building. At that point we had a big mob and no control. No clearly delineated chain of command and one of the first people that stood out was an Air

Force 04, he was a Major and I don't recall his name. It might have been MOORE, M-O-O-R-E, but he designated himself traffic cop.

So what he did was he tried to control the—because the mob kept pressing and the longer we stood around, the more people wanted, you know, “Well, why don't we just get some people up there.”

We were war gaming and everybody wanted to help. There was a lot of frustration down there and we were pushing our boundaries trying to get closer to the Pentagon and see if we could make a difference. You had firefighters and rescue workers already on scene there. You had military people that were in the Pentagon that were already working. They were, you could just see all kinds of movement and activity out there, and really I think at that point, all we would have done is just add to chaos.

So this guy designated himself traffic cop and he said, “I'll tell you what, nobody goes forward without checking in with me and nobody comes back without checking back in with me.” Then we divided, at that point, you know we had started to have some senior military people show up. O-5, O-6, and he said, “OK, this isn't a rank issue, and if I tell you to go stand over there, I'm not slighting your rank or anything.” He said, “All it is, I'm playing traffic cop. I've been, I picked up the role and now the firefighters are looking to me as the point-of-contact if they need bodies to come and help out and what not. The police and all, I've been down here since this first happened.” So he said, you know, “I'm not going to argue with anybody, but I'm just going to control movement. I'll be a logistics coordinator here in the tunnel.”

So the first thing he did was he divided us into skilled and unskilled labor, in those terms. He said, “If you have any kind of medical background,” — as you go under 110 bridge on Columbia Pike, you have a median there and he put all the medical types on the left side as you look at the

Pentagon and the median and all the non-medical types which were largely Marines and some other people that got down before they said, "Ok, no more volunteers." And he kind of defined the two groups. He said, "These people will provide medical care, but these people will help move wreckage, look for bodies, carry litters, or carry rescue equipment and anything else." So, there you know, there was a lot of standing around. Again there was a lot of frustration. "What's going on?"

The closer we got to the Pentagon, the less we knew, the less situational awareness we had. Up the hill we had a good view of the picture. We'd seen the World Trade Center hit by two aircraft. We saw the flames coming out of the Pentagon. We knew another airliner had hit there. We got word that there's maybe another airliner inbound any moment now. But the closer we got to the actual target site, the less information fed its way. We just started our own rumor mill down there and we had all kinds of stuff going on. Rumors about, "Hey, an aircraft is down in Oklahoma." "Something just hit the space needle in Seattle."

"We think LAX is next."

All these things started up and at one point, a bunch of us just looked around, like "Hey timeout! If you haven't heard it from some credible source, don't start passing it," because, you know we're hungry for any kind, each shred of information and we're willing to pass it around and act like we know what's going on.

About the time the rumors started flying one of the firefighters came over and said, "We have a report that there's another airliner inbound, and they think it's going to hit either the Capital or the Pentagon."

So they took everybody that was outside the tunnel and chased them down into the tunnel, under the overpass rather, for shelter, and we waited about two minutes and they said, "Hey let's go get

all the medical gear that's spread out all over the field there." They'd arranged some stretchers and some medical chests full of bandages and dressings and things. They said, "Get that all under here, too." So the mob rushed out from under the overpass. We grabbed all the stuff, we hauled it back in, and then they said, "OK, hey that was a false alarm, false threat." So we took the medical gear and we spread it back out again and we tried to set up trauma stations, or treatment sites in the field right there. Got that set up again, and then we got another call, "Hey," this time from a Navy O-6, "Hey, airliner's inbound. No kidding this time. It's two minutes out." So we passed the word and just like the telephone game, I heard the word go by as two minutes out, and then about three minutes went by and somebody said, "Hey, it's two miles out." I said, "OK, hang on," you know, "airliners travel pretty quick. Two minutes or two miles makes a big difference." So we ran back into the tunnel, the overpass again. That time limit expired. We took our medical gear and set it up a third time outside. So it must have looked pretty comical from overhead watching all the ants run out with the picnic and lay out the spread, and then collapse it back in and get under the underpass and then lay it back out again and collapse it back.

Finally, I pointed out, I said, "Hey, you know, if that airliner hits the Pentagon, we're done for. Whether we're under the overpass, or whether we're in that field. If it hits the bridge we're done for, so we should probably keep the treatment areas underneath the bridge where we're protected from the elements—we don't know how long we'll be here—we're protect from the elements, from rain, cold wind," and also from the—we started to have Medivac choppers landing right behind the overpass here. Setting up on the lawn out there and then, "It's a good control point. Let's kind of stay with what we have."

The running around with our heads cut off madness kind of stopped, and we got a little more organized and again I don't know who made the call. It kind of trickled down, but somebody

showed up with a roll of silver duct tape and started putting a band on everybody's arm and what they did is they were writing "doctor" if you were a doctor, "nurse" if you were a nurse or "other" if you were some, and put a red cross on you and wrote "doctor," "nurse," or other. And then they'd list your skills. CPR, first aid, IVs, for example, that's what I had on my arm. I was everything. CPR, first aid, and IVs, and that way if you were the traffic control, the logistics guy, this Air Force Major and he said I need five bodies and you know, they're pulling somebody out right now, and they need this, you can grab them, or you grab a doctor and when he's putting his team together, he knows what he's getting right away.

So we organized ourselves into trauma teams. They said the initial requires are –

Q. (21:43) Is there anything in field training that's taught you to do that? Or is that just somebody being innovative on the spot?

A. Well, we train for mass casualty scenarios and –

Q. (21:51) With identifying people like that? Different skills?

A. Some people do.

Q. (21:56) OK.

A. On my level within our unit I was the medical. I might have had one other Corpsman with me, so, and we knew each other's skills inside and out, and we trained our platoons in everything up to sticking IVs, some combat first aid, so we had a good, we only had to keep track of sixteen people. So we really didn't have to write down things like that. This is more of a, what doctors in large trauma centers do. The other thing too, was it became important because we had an odd

mix. We had civilian doctors starting to show up. We had military doctors. We had corpsman, nurses, both civilian and military. The hospital emergency rooms in the local area started taking anybody who wasn't working a shift, right, anybody who just came off a shift, putting them in a bus and sending them down and they'd just show up as a flock. We'd just process them over to the side. Armband them, write their qualifications on it and then start divvying them up where ever they're needed. What they tried to do was get a doctor and a nurse for each team as a start, and then some other people just to help with some medical background, and I think by, after a while we had about three doctors and three nurses on every team and then some of the rest of them were there for moral support, or you know grunt work and then they started organizing color groups for trauma. Where they had green, yellow and red as far as your proximity to the target, so, or the site of the incident.

So green was right up against the wall of the Pentagon, and they limited that. They kept some teams that had been on the, people that had been on the ground the longest, down at the crash site the longest, they were forward. They had the best situational awareness. They knew what was going on with the Pentagon. They knew the kind of people, the kind of casualties they were getting out of there.

I was on the yellow team, one step back. We were at the leading edge of the overpass and we were to receive any patients that the green team sent to us, and this is taught to most civilian and military major trauma centers. Color code your groups, so if you say, go find green, you can run around to the mob and say, "Green, where's green? Where's green? Where's green?" They wave you in and you tell them, "I'm told to report here. What do you have for me."

Q. (24:28) Can you tell us the breakdown again?

A. Green, right up against the building, the wall of the Pentagon. You had yellow at the leading edge of the overpass, the overpass for 110, closest to the Pentagon, and then red was back closest to the Navy Annex from the Pentagon.

Q. (24:48) And the categories would mean what? Green would be for - ?

A. Green would be for priority care, or immediate care, people that, life or death right now. Yellow was for delayed stuff, burns, fractures, shock. People with non-life threatening injuries that had time on their hands. So we were the second wave.

Q. (25:14) What would red be?

A. Red would be delayed. You know, people with concussions, but no other symptoms. People with smoke inhalation, just people that you could sit on. You had, you had no real time line. So that the priorities were green were to get the first transports out of there, either with the Medevac helicopters or the ambulances. Yellow, everybody came, was funneled through the green team. They would see them and if they needed something right away, they'd task a team to start working on them right now. If they didn't feel the need to work on them right now, they immediate sent, they took some guys to escort them to us in yellow, and then they'd just leave there. "Here they're yours." They'd go back to their immediate patients and we, we would sort out, you know, is it one of our guys, or do we pass them along.

While I was there I saw a total of six patients, five of them walked in. They all had burns, they all had smoke injuries, but for the most part they were, they were going to be fine. They would be admitted to a hospital and I'm sure they all were put on oxygen and monitored for at least 24 hours.

Q. (26:32) So they'd be yellow, they would –

A. Right, now the sixth one came, a woman came in on a stretcher. She was really badly burned. Had smoke inhalation injuries and she was fading in and out of consciousness. She wasn't aware of where she was or who she was, and I'm sure that was probably part of the effect of the blast, the concussion. But she was recovering as we worked on her. She was coming back to consciousness and out of the six we saw they had five out—they had so many helicopters back there, they went ahead and said even though we don't need to Medevac these people, let's get them out, right away, they said, "Let's get them out of here," because we were still, we were all working under the impression that we were going to find a pocket of survivors in there, any minute now. So we kept telling each other, "Everybody be patient, be patient, be patient when they find this magical pocket of survivors, we're just going to be, we're going to be busy here. And we need everybody focused.

So, you know, we're standing on the edges of our toes, leaning forward toward the building, you know, watching the green team sort through people and send them our way, and some of them they didn't, never ever made it to us. Some of them were picked up by helicopter or ambulance before they even got to us, but only six came through our specific trauma site and most of them were flown out pretty quickly.

Two of the guys on my trauma team were in the building on the side that was hit and they refused to leave. They came down there. They got checked out by the medics, or corpsman, or doctors, whoever saw them, and as soon as they were told they were all right, they came over and got an armband put on them and said, "How can I help?" That was, that just stuck with me. That was really impressive.

We had a female on our team. She was a civilian contractor who had been a nurse in the Air Force. Got out and she was working in the Counter Terrorism Center in the Pentagon. Happened to have a cell phone.

Initially, when the crash happened, everybody got— all the phones were dead here—everybody got out in the parking lot, mustered in the parking lot, and got on their cell phones and tried to call, and the cell phone nets were just absolutely tied up, Nobody could talk to anybody. So around about eleven or twelve o'clock, close to noontime down there under the tunnel, we were talking among our trauma team, again, waiting for more survivors to come out and the rumors were flying, and at some point or another, this girl looked at me and she said, “You know, this is a crock. I work in the Counter Terrorism Center, and,” you know, “we would know exactly what’s going on. We would know if we have other airliners going down all over the country,” like the rumors that were coming to us or whatnot. And I asked if anyone was still in there, would still be in her office, and she said, “Oh, yes. If it burns to the ground, we’ll have our office manned. Someone will be in there doing something.”

So she got on the cell phone and called the office and they said, “Here’s the summary. One and two, plane number one and plane number two hit the Trade Center, plane number three hit the Pentagon, another plane was headed for either the Capital or the Pentagon. We may never know, but it crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, and that’s it.” They said, “Anything else is unsubstantiated, at this time.”

So we had, at that point, I said to her, “You know, you might want to put that out to someone, like maybe the Air Force Major,” since every time he talks now that we were conditioned to his voice, and we knew everybody would listen. So she went and told him. He passed that out to everybody. Then they decide that’s a pretty good idea, you know, when ever we’d get a good

shred of intelligence or information about what was going on, it would get funneled to him and then he would broadcast it out to the group.

There were no bathrooms down there. Again, little logistical problems. Somebody drove a tour bus and parked it down and they had, of course, a bathroom in the back of the tour bus, and it was air conditioned so people could get in there and cool off a bit, if they were out in the sun working hard. Especially the firefighters. Those guys were like machines, in and out of the wreckage, in and out of the wreckage. As close, actually I take that back. They were close to the wreckage. Some of them made limited forays into the building, but the senior firefighter/rescue worker on scene made the call at one point. When he saw the roof start to collapse from the damage, he said, "All right, nobody else goes in the building 'til this settles down," and what was happening we saw the, we saw a section cave in, but it was hanging from one side. One side, all the supports on the roof fell down and it was hanging on an angle for a while, and what happened was, the fire sprinkler's were going, trying to put out the fire, and all this water was saturating all the concrete and the carpet and anything that would hold water in that building, and adding to the weight. As the sprinkles went, all the wreckage would get, the debris would get heavier and heavier, and nine, ten o'clock that morning, probably about ten o'clock, ten thirty that morning all this wreckage just suddenly collapsed in a section. Now you see the big piece missing out of there. Initially that wasn't missing, most of it was hanging off the right hand side and you looked at it. And as the water, as the sprinklers soaked everything, it eventually just collapsed, and if we'd had people in there at the time, we might have lost them. So that was a good call by the head firefighter. And again, something most of us wouldn't have thought about at the time, on the scene.

So, you had, initially three distinct chains of command. The firefighters had their own chain of command and they were functioning well under their chain of command. The police department had their chain of command and they did well under theirs but they were unsure on how to deal with the military types. You know the civilian crowd, they could tell you, "Stay back beyond this line." They put out police tape and they could control the crowd. The military were moving in and out of the crash site and they had a harder time controlling. And then we had the military chain of command. So firefighters, police and military, and most of us were headquarters types, so that it really wasn't a distinct chain of command. We had a lot of senior people down there, but we had everything you could imagine. Especially out of the community manager shop. We had people from supply. We had people from medical, people from deck department, aviation, aviators, we had everything. So within the military we may have had a hundred separate chains of command all within one. It didn't really work well.

One of the best things that happened was the Air Force Major, once he established himself as the point-of-contact, he talked to the firefighters, he talked to the police, he talked to the military and after a while he became the established focal point down there. Again, not by position of rank, but by position of convenience. If the firefighters had a concern like, "Hey the airliners inbound. We need to get everyone under the tunnel." They'd communicate it to him and he'd broadcast it out.

That seemed to work fairly well.

It got more confusing as civilian doctors and nurses started showing up, but they didn't come in to take charge of the situation. They came in to take charge of the medical situation and they dovetailed nicely into anything we had set up there. They just added to it, augmented it, and

enriched it. So they didn't come down to sling egos or battle out control over anything. They were a welcome addition.

I'd say, once we saw our six casualties the flow of casualties stopped. We really didn't see anything else, and the impression I got was that after the crash, all the survivors either got out, almost right after the impact or within an hour or two after the impact, or there were no survivors.

The fire just caught on and kept heating up, and heating up and heating up and it became an inferno, and anybody who was left in there that could not get out, probably succumbed to smoke and fire. So by the time they got to them the, in the day following or the day after that, they were just picking up pieces or bringing bodies out.

But again we didn't know. One of the original estimates we got when we showed up at the Pentagon was, somebody said we have anywhere up to about twenty-four hundred casualties down there. They arrived at that number by saying about twenty-four thousand people work in the Pentagon. We estimate that ten percent of the building was destroyed so we'll say ten percent of twenty-four thousand is twenty-four hundred, and that's where they came up with that number.

We had police cars that would come up and open their trunks and they might have a backboard and an oxygen bottle in there, and they'd just open it up and toss it to the crowd and we'd sort it and organize it. Lay it out. Rescue squads, entire rescue squads would pull in there. Open their truck and just gut it. They'd let us take everything out of it and we'd try to organize it, you know. Put everything in some sort of order out there, according to priority and need.

Let's see, as the day wore on, I think we started to realize we weren't going to get a massive, outflux of casualties—or influx into our trauma stations of casualties.

Q. (37:32) Do you remember a point where you just kind of made that, had that realization?

A. Probably around 1400, about two hours after it began.

Q. (37:41) That must have been a very sobering thought.

A. It was, but we were all in denial at the same, you know it's kind—we're thinking on several levels that day, and I think real, if you listened to your rational mind it told you that nobody else is coming out of there alive. But we were blocking that out at the time and we were saying, "I'm staying here until they send me," you know, "they make us leave." And we had that attitude, you know, surely they're going to find something and again we didn't, we didn't really know what happened with—you had the rest of the Pentagon around there. We didn't know, if there were, if the damage we saw was the only damage to the building or if it had gone through that section and gone through the courtyard and out the other side and maybe there were more people on the other side or not. We didn't really know.

So we hung in there, and I guess around 1800 that day—let me cover a couple of more things that happened. The Air Force Major came around and said, "Is there any gear that you think you need here, that you don't see? I'll find the point-of-contact to get it." So we, immediately the doctors stepped forward with lists of medical supplies. "We'd like to have this. We'd like to have that."

Electronic stuff for monitoring heart rates, ventilator units and things like that. Again at this point we didn't know what we were going to see, but we knew we had a lot of smoke inhalation. Then we said, you know, "We need to get some food and water down here. Not only for us, but especially for the firefighters and rescue workers." Those guys really didn't take a break the

entire time. They were like automatons, going back and forth between the crash site and the tunnel, constantly. So at one point there was a Price Cosco semi that pulled up and a guy got out and he said, I was told you guys needed water. This is all yours and he opened the back up, so I took charge of that. You know, I'm use to moving a lot of stuff, because we carry a lot of stuff wherever we go. We broke down pallets of water and disseminated underneath the overpass there in our little shelter, and then whenever—what we started doing was running out bottles of waters to the firefighters as they were closer to the crash site, because those guys were dehydrated more than anybody.

Then vehicles started showing up with candy bars, fruit and then later on sandwiches. So we were, we wanted to do anything positive we could Anything we thought was beneficial and suddenly, it became our mission to keep, they wouldn't let us go forward, but they would let us go forward to re-supply the people that were up front, the firefighters. So we'd run up with sandwiches and fruit and stuff and hand it to them, and you know they'd say, "Thanks." They'd eat it as they were moving and then keep going.

A big defining moment I remember was I don't, I'm going to have to guess on the time. It might have been right after about noon, but you can check this with the—I don't know what time the World Trade Centers collapsed, but at some point or another, all the firefighters just sat down and a couple of them walked over to our overpass and sat down. And we asked what was going on. It's like they just took a big time out, and they had just gotten word over their personal radios that they carried to talk to each other from their dispatchers that hey, one of the Trade Center buildings collapsed and just killed, we think it killed two hundred firefighters up there. And just the emotional weight hit them at that moment and they just sat down. About ten minutes, if that, about ten minutes and then it was like, got a job to do and they just got back up like machines

and went, and I remember, we wanted to help out at that point. It was like, you know we really ought to say something to these guys. Put a hand on them and, but what do you say to them. I remember there was a big conflict like, they wanted to be left alone. They just needed to deal with it for a few minutes and move on and they did. You know, again, like clockwork and it was really impressive. And that moment really struck me when suddenly there was a surreal time out, and they all stopped what they were doing, and—we had to asked around awhile and then somebody said, “Hey,” somebody that overheard one of their radios, said, “Hey, you know, two hundred may of them just died in New York City.” And then you know, now it hit us, but, and they were already on the road to recovery. We were processing that, again, we’re not firefighters.

Q. (42:55) But that’s how you heard the buildings had collapsed?

A. Sure had. From the firefighters squad radios.

Let’s see, around eighteen hundred, they said, OK, we understand that some of you have to go pick up your kids from daycare, or go home and feed the kids, you know, if both spouses work in your families. Some of you have other errands that you need to run. Some of you are going on duty up here, standing watches or whatnot. So anybody that wants to leave, come over here. Make sure your name’s on a clipboard. Your names and your contact information and your qualifications, and you can leave. Another stunning moment for me was, they said, “Anybody just raise your hand and then step over here,” and nobody moved. Five thousand people, nobody, you know, and you know, I mean I’m married, I don’t have any kids, so I figured I could stick it out, and good call. Let’s cut some people away that we don’t need, because most of us are standing around anyway. And nobody moved. They gave them the option and nobody left. So that gives you some insight into the mentality that was going on down there and the, well, the

emotion, the loyalty, the commitment. Again everybody wanted to do some good and everybody was frustrated. They wanted, it's like I'm not leaving here 'til I do something positive.

That lasted about an hour, about 1900, about an hour later they finally said, "OK, here's the deal. Green team stick around. If you're on yellow or red, you're out of here, but make sure you're on this clipboard." And again a bunch of us dragged our feet to get out of there and they just about went around with a stick and chased us all away.

So then we started a slow walk up the hill, looking over our shoulders going from the small picture up close to the bigger picture further away and thinking, you know, "it's going to be a long night."

I was exhausted and I'm sure everybody felt exactly the same way. I was absolutely exhausted. I couldn't get back inside the Navy Annex. I walked up to the gate, the Columbia Pike side, to go get my backpack, my cell phone, keys to my car, my civvies, and there was a Marine Gunny Sergeant with a M-16, and I said, "Hey, I need to get my stuff. It's in the building. I'm coming from the crash site."

He said, "Well you ain't coming in here, sir."

So I said, "Well, is the cemetery side open, and he said, "Oh, it is. You can get in through there."

I said, "Do I need any IDs or anything. I don't have any."

He said, "Well, yes, you should have them, but they'll understand." So I walked around. I got in that way. Got my stuff. Again, went out to the parking lot, took a long look down the hill. Gave it half a thought to going back down there again, and then I thought, one of the parting words they told us when they chased us away was, they said, "This may go on for days. We don't know. So we may have to start working in shifts." They said, "Somebody needs to go home, rest,

and be fresh. Maybe tomorrow. We've got all your contact info and believe me we won't hesitate to call you if you're needed."

I got in my truck. Drove home, by then traffic had settled down some. I remember in the air, there were no contrails in the sky, and there's always traffic. I live out by Dulles International Airport in Sterling, and so I work by one major airport and I live by another one, and I always see contrails and never thought about it until the day when there weren't anymore contrails in the air. There was no noise, nothing passing overhead.

Made it back home, turned on the news. I was going to get an update, eat something and go to bed, and my wife and I probably stayed up until 2 in the morning watching. Just constantly watching what was going on between New York and Washington DC, they had constant coverage on every, we were flipping channels to see if we could get a better report.

My wife informed me when I got home, she said, " You know, everybody that we know is calling. They know where you worked. They're all calling to see if you're OK." And she said, "Around eleven this morning I told them, well I haven't heard from him. But I'm sure he's OK. He was either," she said, "Since I haven't heard from him, I assume he's down at the crash site." And when I got home and told her, "Yes, I'd been down there all day, " you know, and had silver tape still on my arm with all my medical stuff. And at that point she was not worried anymore. I did get to call her around noon. I borrowed somebody's cell phone when the nets finally opened up. I called her. I said, "I'm here. You might see, they've got news cameras down here. You might see me walking across the camera here or there, with a, carrying a bunch of stuff. I'm fine. I'm just, you know, down here trying to do some good with a whole bunch of other people. Don't know when I'll be home, but," and I said, you know, " I don't have any, there's no way to contact me so I'll just call you periodically if I'm down here a while."

I probably got home about 2100 that night. I went down about 9:30, zero nine thirty, probably got home about 2100, 2130 that night. So it was about twelve hours, counting my transit time home.

But that was it, for the day of.

Q. (48:59) At what point did you know that it was an airplane that hit the, did you know that as soon as you saw the building after coming out of the stairwell and looking out, did you realize then that it was an airplane that had hit?

A. Once we got out, as we were headed across to the parking lot, some guy said a plane flew over, right over the top of the Navy Annex, and hit the Pentagon. And then other people said, “No, it hit right in front of the Penta—“ it didn’t actually hit the Pentagon, it hit right in front of the Pentagon. And we were hoping for the best and once we looked down the hill all you could see was smoke. You couldn’t tell if there was any damage. And we wanted to believe that it didn’t hit the Pentagon and somebody said, “See it didn’t hit. It hit right in front of it by the helicopter pad.” I think we believed that for awhile, because we couldn’t tell any difference. We had a bunch of people come away with flashburns. Some of the people that were on the green team, CAPTAIN SENN, and some of the other medical types that were right up against there. Apparently they were closing in on the side of the Pentagon. You have the helicopter pad right there, right by the impact point, apparently they had white gas or aviation gas stored in big tanks inside the building right where the plane happened to hit, and miraculously they didn’t go up when the aircraft hit and burned. But as the Pentagon heated up and started to burn, all of a sudden a big plume of white, full white-hot flame went up from the side of the building. These guys had flash burns on one side of their faces. That’s how close they were, and again, that’s

another reason they didn't let anybody in the building. One you had the danger from the fire, and then you had the danger from the collapse. There was a car, a government vehicle parked outside the helicopter pad and a short while after that big plume of flame went up, these guys got their courage up again and talked the firefighters into letting them get close to the crash site. So, and I'm talking two, three hundred yards away and they're trying to get closer, because they just know that there are people in there who need medical care, and it's driving them crazy. They want to get in and make an evaluation.

They must have gotten inside of a hundred yards and that government vehicle that was sitting by the helicopter pad, finally heated enough where the gas tank cooked off. So suddenly there's a boom and another big flash of white-hot flame and then they backed off. And after that the firefighters really said, "No! Nobody goes. We don't know what's going on at this point, so you guys stay right here and they had, they just established a line as close as the firefighters would allow them and they had their stretchers set up. They had IV bags all plugged in ready to go, all their stuff laid out and again, we were yellow. We were the second wave back. We were on standby and we had runners that would go back and forth between the groups, so that if they found anything they would send some guys. Rather than heat up, we assumed that the green guys wanted to stay up forward, so we said, rather than getting a patient, getting four doctors on the litter carrying him back and then waiting for lifeflight. We need the doctors up front. You carry them back to us. We'll get him the rest of the way and go. And then you guys, you stay up there. So green always stays forward, yellow stays in the middle, red stayed back and really never got that far. You know we were back there in the hope that it would, and we were frustrated, but in hindsight it's, I don't know whether to say it's good that we didn't have more patients, casualties

isn't a good word, or bad, but as it turned out the effort turned into more of a body recovery after the fact.

Q. (53:14) What did you do with your armband?

A. I'm sure I tossed it out. Wish I had it. Trying to think of any other memorabilia. We saved the front page of the newspaper, I think, and an issue of *Retired Officers Association Magazine* that my parents have. They have a picture of a guy in khakis and they swear it was me and they brought it over to my house, and I took a look at it and said it wasn't.

First I said, "The picture's taken too close. I got that close a couple of times and got chased back each time. So it's somebody else." And then the more we looked at it, the more I realized it wasn't me. CAPTAIN SENN, you can recognize him in it, and what I'm, thinking of is I'll probably get a hold of my parents, and if I can't get the issue itself, I'll get the month and the year of the Retired Officers Association, the magazine that had, it had a good article about it in there, and I don't remember reading much of it. I looked at the picture, though, and they were all random pictures taken of what we were doing down there.

That's really the only memorabilia. We had, I remember getting home and I have pockets full of IV needles and other stuff that I had to haul it all down to the medical clinic the next day. But seems like I had rolls of medical tape in all kinds of pockets. I had roller gauze tucked in here and there, and I got home and my wife was just, well she wasn't laughing. Nothing was really funny that day, but she just looked at me, like that's typical, you know, for my job she was used to me coming back with pen lights and all kinds of other just gadgets and stuff, and I came back with all kinds of medical gadgets and stuff, and pieces of paper with stuff written down on it and all.

I think it was all, the medical gear I turned back in, again, I used to be a corpsman and you don't want that stuff laying around and most of it was reusable so I just brought it in. The clinic took care of it, but the other stuff I think I tossed out. Again I didn't give any thought to you know, this might be famous some day. You know, this might be –

Q. (55:53) An artifact.

A. An artifact. Something to cue my memory for what went on there. It was something I was trying to flush out what happened. Ohhh, my sum total of the day, I sat down and talked to my wife several times in the days that followed, and I said, "You know, the day started out very negative. It was a big shock to the system with two airliners, three airliners hitting public buildings," and I said, "Any negative feeling or anything, or any depressed feeling I might have had at the beginning of the day was I guess maybe neutralized, equaled out by the feeling I got, the group feeling I got from the people that showed up, the volunteers that showed up to help." Watching the fire, the things that I talked about, the firefighters in action and just a, any black mark I might have put on human nature that day, was erased. Cancelled out by all the positive effects I saw. The crowd's reaction, the, and again, it crosses all boundaries, military, civilian, medical, professional, amateur. We had everyone running around down there. Everybody had, was united in one common goal. Everybody wanted to do good. Again people all got their names put on a list and their intent was to come back. I know everybody went and probably did the same I did and watched TV, and thought you know, any minute now if the news comes on and they say, "Hey, we just opened up a pocket in the basement, of survivors trapped," people were going to get in their vehicles and beeline straight out there, and you'd just see headlights and tail lights everywhere, of everybody converging. Like, "Ok, I'm back ready to go to work." It just, I

carried away that positive feeling from the response. It renewed my faith in human nature that day.

The sad part is the thought that you know it takes a tragedy on a scale like that to bring out the best in people, and I just wonder why it has to be something like that that makes humans shine. But anyway, so it's -

Q. (58:42) Life sets, particularly in your billet. Anything that you can attribute or point to or identify from a historical perspective about this time period that we're living in, which is obviously a pivotal time in history?

A. From our enlisted community alone, the SEALs and EOD guys, almost none of them want to get out, understandably. Now the way they look at it, the Super Bowl's here and there's a chance to play. We had SEALs and EOD guys that have been out for twenty and thirty years that are calling us trying to get back in. They've retired, and we keep telling them, you know, there's no mechanism to bring you back on active duty and we have plenty of guys. Not quite true. We are chronically about 70 to 70% manned, but there's no, BUPERS has no mechanism in place to take a retired guy, bring him back on active duty you know. What happens to his retirement pay, if you suddenly stop his retirement and start him back on active duty and then what happens to it, how do you re-start his retirement pay when he goes back again into retirement. There's no provision for doing so.

Q. (1:00:02) Has there been any discussion of looking at that possibility?

A, Not really.

Q. (01:00:04) Do you think there might be?

A. No, there's, they have the active duty for special work where they can bring officers back, they can bring enlisted back, for the most part they're steering away from that. If the guys—with our communities there's an issue of currency in qualifications. If you've been out for a certain amount of time, you know, has your physical condition deteriorated. Are you still medically qualified to dive, and jump and do all the things we do? How long has it been since you've been around a parachute or dive equipment or explosives? And we're not hurting that bad. We do fine with 57% manning because it's been that way ever since our communities were formed. Recruiting was up. There was a surge in recruiting for a while. And –

Q. (01:00:02) Do you still see that?

A. Not really it's starting to taper back down again. Let me think of any, any other effects. Outside the community since then I've taken, used our time-share and taken a vacation down to Orlando, Florida. They said to travel, you know, arrive at the airport three hours before your flight and expect delays, intense security and all. We did that and we got through security in an hour and we sat for two hours. I brought a book, because I knew we were either going to wait on the front end or in the middle or afterward. So it doesn't matter. We got to Disney World. That's where we went for vacation and security there, they knew they were going to shut the park down, or at least restrict it. They were searching everybody that went in there. Everybody went through a metal detector. Well what they did was they hired more people, especially at the opening and closing times, they had extra people out there, manning the gate. They were processing people through like you wouldn't believe. They were very efficient

about it and what I'm getting to, is I'm giving you a perspective, the changes I've seen outside work as a result of this.

They were very apologetic. "I'm sorry. I sorry, sorry for the delay." You know, "Please enjoy your stay," you know, "just understand this is only on the entry to the park and all. If you leave the park, you'll have to go back through it."

Going back out through the airport, same thing. There were longer lines, but the airport, at least Orlando and Dulles, hired more people to process through, process passengers through security faster. You get to the airport and look at it, like "Oh, my gosh, look at that line." There'd be a big line, but they're moving pretty quickly through there. Yes, there are more security procedures in effect, but they've responded to the increase security with more people so they're still able to move people through.

We noticed, we don't travel with carry on baggage anymore, it's just too much of a hassle, going in and having them rifle through. Rightfully so, they need to know what you're taking on the plane that you have access to while you're flying. So we travel as light as we can. We checked just about everything

Going to public events in and around, actually anywhere, but in and around the area, primarily we don't carry daypacks anymore with a bunch of stuff. I still take one to work and all, but it's a given that they're going to go through it, coming into the Navy Annex or Henderson Hall, either way.

I had one more point I was thinking about on the security issue. Oh, I turned my, I had my truck turned into the shop for a check up and I was sitting down with an older women, in a new place, I'd never been to. I was talking to her about this place, and the reputation of the workers and all. As she was talking, telling me what a great place it was, again this is out by Sterling, so we've

got Dulles International Airport. As we were talking, I saw an airliner coming in low, and she saw that I was, I was listening to her, but I wasn't making eye contact with her. So she saw that and then I stopped her and apologized. I said, "Look I don't mean to be rude, but I find, it suddenly occurred to me, I no longer look at airliners as passenger carriers. I look at—as benign carriers of passengers, now I look at them as potential weapons." Whenever I see one that's low I look to see where it's coming from and where it's going to, and I said, "It's a disturbing thought and it just struck me, and I apologize." And she said, "You know, I 'd never thought of it that way, but yes, the world has definitely cha—" "So like that is an example of another thing that's changed in our society. It wouldn't have occurred to us. It might have been something out of science fiction or you know, a drama, novel. You'd read it, and you'd say, you know, "that's crazy." A good story, but you know what's the reality there and then we lived it on 9-11.

Q. (01:05:52) Where do you go from here?

A. In relation to this, or career wise?

Q. (01:06:00) Oh, career-wise

A. I head to SEAL Delivery Vehicle School in Panama City, Florida. Three months down there learning to drive our mini-sub and then probably thirty days to, you know, get packed up and all, and then I'm going to head over to SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One in Hawaii, in around July or August and my wife will probably follow around October. I'm going to go make sure we've got a place for us and the pets before she comes in with all the stuff. She packed us up from Virginia Beach to move us up here, and she's more than willing to pack us up to go to

Hawaii. But, tour out there for about three years and then I hope to come back to Little Creek, but we'll see. We'll go see where the Navy leads me and what makes sense career-wise.

Q. (01:06:57) Another question that's unrelated, but do you stay in touch with the Independent Duty Corpsman community?

A. I do. It's been, right now I really do, when I go, as I go to my next command and so on, I'll become a little more distant from it, but I was a senior Enlisted Independent Duty Corpsman so the other senior enlisted IDCs kept tabs on me and we talk back and forth. I represented the medical side at the Naval Special Warfare development group, even in my OPs role there. When I got up here, and the senior, I kind of disappeared off their radar screen for a while. You know, "Hey, we had a E8 IDC and he went LDO so he's gone off the books," and nobody really thought about where I went and the next thing you know, one of them called in asking about one of his troop's conversions package or something or another and the next thing you know, he said, "Wait a minute. Who is this again?" I told him who I was and then they asked what I was doing here and suddenly the word was out. He said, "We have a former IDC working in the enlisted community manager shop." In other words, we have an in, up at BUPERS. So I wasn't trying to distance myself from them, but the words out. They know I'm here so I get called, you know, "Hey we need to make this happen." So I'm still in the loop. They know they have a sympathetic ear up here.

Q. (01:08:35) Have you seen anything from lessons learned, like what happened with *Cole*. I had a chance to be part of the team that went down and interviewed them. Master Chief Parlie (phonetic) and Moser (phonetic) Doc Moser (phonetic). They were doing some things

internationally with other nations as well, but from the Independent Duty Corpsman, not specifically, but also some flyaway teams and those things. Have you heard anything about that in your capacity, either the follow through or lessons learned?

A. Not really. The word I get up here is, the thing I see more is the physical security side. Suddenly the Masters-at-Arms rate is increasing six fold. Or they want to increase –

Q. (01:09:16) Master Chief Moser works that?

A. Well, no he's also the senior enlisted for divers, EOD SEALS, and SWICK.

Q. (01:09:26) Oh, not Master-at-Arms?

A. Right, Master-at-Arms is a sub—but we work right across the way from those guys and we talk to them a lot, because Master Chief Marshall's EOD. I'm a SEAL and we have two high attrition pipelines. We lose seventy percent of our guys in training and he loses fifty-five to sixty percent and a lot of these guys, we notice a lot of these guys that drop out of training go right to physical security. They go, they step up to the plate; they strike out. They go right to Lackland Air Force Base through MAA School and then out to the fleet, and most of them go to physical security billets overseas. We're seeing a lot of that.

The other thing we get involved with is force protection. That's changed considerably.

Something that was an annoying requirement is now, well actually is was mandatory, but there was kind of a lack-a-dasical attitude before about it. Now commands are really serious about it. You know, when you travel anywhere you have to have that ATFP stamp on your orders, especially overseas.

We've been called in, we've been consulted on several issues. In-shore security, in-harbor security, in-port security.

“Do you think security should be SEALS and EOD guys wandering around facilities?”

We said, “No.” At least for SEALS we're mainly an offensive capability. We're not particularly trained for a defensive role, but we're seeing—EOD, the EOD community has just had a bunch of missions handed to them on a platter. So their off-tempo's already real high and now suddenly they're on the hook for all kinds of things, that—now they always did explosive ordnance disposal. If a ship called up and said some guys are playing around, are underneath our hull, or around our hull or around the pier, can you do a sweep and see if anything's amiss down there, they always did that role. But now I think there are more proactive measures where people go in ahead of time. They go in deliberately and inspect things. They may have EOD come in before a major gathering and do kind of a site survey. They just seem to be getting tasked a lot more lately.

Q. (01:12:16) Who would be some other ones to talk with, that would be good to talk with about either 9-11 or the War on Terrorism.

A. Let's see, now again operationally we're almost as far removed from anybody here in our role, but CAPTAIN SENN.

Q. (01:12:32) Talked to him.

A. OK, talked to him already. HM1 POWELL. I'm sure he gave you his name. There was another HM2 JEREMY WILKINSON. He might have been down here. Boy, if you could pin down that Air Force Major, I think it was MOORE. He'd be, I'd recognize his face. He'd be a

good one to talk to from the traffic cop perspective. Mainly just because he was, he was a focal point, and he contributed quite a bit to managing the chaos. Five thousand people down there trying to break down the door and do some good. It was really hard to manage on the day. Later in the day, after about 1400, we started seeing flag officers show up down there from all the services, and I wasn't present for it, but I heard an Army three-star showed up and announced that he had jurisdiction over the whole, everything that was, the whole effort, and there was a big turf war. The firefighters telling him no, and he said, "Yes, this is a Department of Defense Facility. I'm Department of Defense."

They said, "It's also a public building. It's on public land. You're standing on public land." So here's a little—you know on our level we weren't worried about whose turf it was or who was calling the shots as long as the shots were making sense.

Apparently politics stepped in there at some point and again it was blurred. You had other issues with, you know, the FBI showed up, late in the response, not late, but they showed up later in the response that morning and announced jurisdiction over the whole thing. I think at that point the firefighters just looked at it like, whatever. Do whatever you need to do, but we're not stopping our actions and what we're doing here.

They didn't interfere with the military, at that point we were just a body pull for manpower.

Trying to think of some other names. I might have to come up with some guys and bring it down later. And I will, I'll dig around and see if we have any artifacts. The most memorable one I saw was that TROA magazine. The *Retired Officer's Association*, that was a really good spread, and then of course, you have the *Time/Life* came out with the pictorials.

Q. (01:15:38) Special edition, yes. Anything else you want to add for the historical record?

A. No. Probably eaten up a good part of that tape as it is.

Q. (01:15:48) that's good though, it's a good part of the story. Thanks for being with us.

A. OK, thanks, Sir.

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Ethel Geary
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