The U.S. Navy has made amazing progress in a hundred years. From coal power to nuclear power and hybrid electric drive; from weapons like basic guns and artillery to precision laser-guided munitions, lasers, and developmental electromagnetic railguns; from paper maps and charts to real-time satellite navigation—the Navy has come a long way.

While credit for the operational success of the Navy lies squarely on the shoulders of our Sailors, it’s important to know that the tools they use, many of them technological marvels, didn’t just happen. Putting those tools in the hands of Sailors, making it possible for them to sail into harm’s way and emerge victorious, takes a complex structure of setting requirements, development, evaluation, acquisition, and distribution on the front end and detailed plans for manning, training, equipping, and maintaining it all on the backend. The dedicated military and civilian personnel of the OPNAV staff have performed the vital functions of resource allocation, risk assessment, and balancing.

For more than 100 years, the person leading that effort has been the Chief of Naval Operations. The office has changed quite a bit since May 11, 1915, when Adm. William S. Benson took office as the first CNO, but I believe Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the 30th CNO, would agree that the one thing that remains the same is the importance of the office’s mission: to ensure our globally deployed Sailors have all the tools and training necessary to successfully achieve their missions and return home safely.

This book scratches the surface of the challenges and accomplishments of all 30 CNOs. I hope it gives the reader some insight into the office and importance of the work that goes on, often behind the scenes, to make possible the successes of the United States Navy.

S. J. Cox
Director
Naval History and Heritage Command
The Establishment of the Office

Creation of the office of Chief of Naval Operations marked the culmination of a well-defined and long-recognized need in the Navy Department. As early as 1798, the year the Department of the Navy was founded, Commodore John Barry of Revolutionary War fame proposed that a board of naval officers be named to assist the Secretary of the Navy. Growth of the Navy during the War of 1812, with deployment on oceans and lakes, placed increased demands on the Secretary and gave substance to Barry’s earlier recommendations. Accordingly, a law was passed on February 7, 1815, forming a Board of Navy Commissioners comprised of three naval captains appointed by the President. The act specified that “the board, so constituted, shall be attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, and, under his superintendence, shall discharge all the ministerial duties of said office, relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament equipment and employment, of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States.”

The commissioner system suffered from assignment of responsibility to a board rather than to individuals. The board’s ability to carry out its duties varied with the extent to which the respective Secretaries of the Navy delegated authority, and the board’s willingness to exercise authority, as well as the board president’s strength of leadership.

Actions against the Seminole Indians and West Indian pirates, suppression of the African slave trade, and protection of expanding worldwide commerce highlighted U.S. Navy operations during the 27 years of the board’s tenure. As a result of the secretaries’ frequent exercise of direct control over the relatively low-intensity naval operations during this period, the board tended to be purely advisory in areas of supply, building, equipping, and repairing ships.

Toward the end of the Board of Navy Commissioners’ span, it was charged that the board was slow to act and was criticized for a lack of individual responsibility. In 1842 the board was abandoned in favor of a bureau structure of administration. Five functional bureaus were created: Navy Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment, and Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; and Medicine and Surgery.

Bureau chiefs were individually responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and no formal means of coordination was provided. From time to time, secretaries would convene special purpose boards (strategy, personnel, etc.) as a need arose. Some secretaries relied heavily on individual bureau chiefs or one or more prominent officers for assistance and advice in conducting the affairs of the Navy. It was the stress of wartime requirements—the Civil and Spanish-American Wars—and the needs of operational direction, coupled with revolutionary technological advances, which brought into focus the serious shortcomings of departmental organization.

For the Navy, the period from the end of the war with Spain in 1898 to the beginning of American participation in World War I in 1917 was a time of change and uncertainty. The U.S. Government was committed to building a world-class navy, but getting that navy would require a transformation in how it was managed, directed, financed, trained, and supported.

In 1900, the Navy recognized the need for a general staff. Navy officers wanted a modern navy—one capable of deterring or fighting other modern navies, navies equipped with the latest naval technology and directed by formally trained officers.

At the same time, civilian secretaries of the Navy were often frustrated by the fragmented naval administration. In April 1904 Navy Secretary William H. Moody told the members of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy needed a senior uniformed adviser. Though his insight would not be realized at that time, it set the stage for the advent of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

At the turn of the twentieth century, then-Secretary of the Navy John D. Long created the General Board. Unlike the temporary boards of earlier eras, the General Board was to be a permanent body for the purpose of ensuring “efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast.” Although the General Board, which remained in existence until 1951, had no statutory status and was merely advisory, it did exercise considerable influence, particularly under the presidency of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey from 1900 to 1917.

Secretary of the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer initiated the naval aide system in 1909. To assist him in the efficient administration of the department and improve coordination of the work of the bureaus, Meyer named four officers as aides for operations, personnel, material, and inspection.

The aide for operations was the most important assignment and was the direct forerunner of the Chief of Naval Operations. However, like the numerous boards before them and the navy commissioners of the early nineteenth century, the aides lacked executive authority. Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, the last officer to be assigned as aide for operations was a prime mover in the establishment of a Chief of Naval Operations.

When Josephus Daniels took office as navy secretary in 1913, he inherited Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske as his aide for operations. Fiske, along with the upper officers of the Navy, realized that, while the Navy was in good condition for times of peace, it was not organized for war.

Fiske developed the basis of legislation that would establish the “Chief of Naval Operations.” He planned with Captains Harry S. Knapp, John Hood, James H. Oliver, and Lieutenant Commanders William P. Cronan, Zachariah H. Madison, and Dudley W. Knox to prepare the legislation for this position.

Two months later, a congressional enactment signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson on March 3, 1915 provided for a Chief of Naval Operations “who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President . . . from among the officers of the line of the Navy not below the grade of captain for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.”

In August of the following year, Congress authorized the rank of admiral for the Chief of Naval Operations and strengthened the office by adding that “All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations . . . shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such.”

With the enactment of the 1915 law, with the nation soon to be embroiled in World War I, the U.S. Navy for the first time had a professional naval officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, who, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, had statutory authority and responsibility for war plans, preparation for combat, and operations of the fleet.
Readiness of the forces afloat and of the Navy’s shore confronting Admiral William Benson.

In order that “there would no longer be the former separation of the material preparation of the fleet from its operations,” the duties of the aide for material were assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1915. The Navy’s preparedness and expansion, war planning and, after April 6, 1917, when the nation entered World War I, direction of overall combat operations were the responsibilities confronting Admiral William Benson.

Readiness of the forces afloat and of the Navy’s shore establishment to meet wartime demands was a matter of urgency. Admiral Benson initiated a systematic inspection of merchant vessels to determine suitability for conversion to naval auxiliaries. Concerted attention was directed to naval aviation, and seaplane development went forward on a priority basis. Naval district organization was modernized, and plans were made for navy yard improvement to absorb the stresses of war expansion.

Admiral Benson was an ex-officio member of the Naval Consulting Board named by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels in the fall of 1915 under the chairmanship of Thomas A. Edison. This important board focused the efforts of some of the country’s most distinguished scientific and inventive talent on naval matters and sponsored a farsighted and vitally significant industrial census to measure the national capacity to meet war requirements of the sea forces.

The Chief of Naval Operations’ testimony before Congress influenced passage of the 1916 Naval Appropriations Act, authorizing construction of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 67 submarines—the largest building program authorized to that date and designed to rank the U.S. Navy as “second to none.” Admiral Benson also successfully persisted in his efforts to increase naval personnel strength.

Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare campaign with its disregard for neutral rights on the high seas was a major factor in bringing the United States into World War I. Under the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations exercised direction and control of the mammoth naval effort. A stream of destroyer- and cruiser-escorted convoys carried millions of troops and their supplies through U-boat-infested waters to the battlefields of France. Destroyers based on Atlantic coast ports and in Europe were joined by naval aircraft for a vigorous offensive against the German submarines. The U.S. Navy rapidly developed and produced antisubmarine mines and took the leading role in laying the huge North Sea Mine Barrage from Scotland to Norway. A division of American battleships operated with the British Grand Fleet and, in France, heavy naval guns mounted on railway cars and manned by U.S. gunners pounded enemy targets at long range.

Following the defeat of the Central Powers and the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Admiral Benson went to Paris as naval adviser to the U.S. delegation at the peace conference and as a member of the Admirals of Allied and Associated Powers Committee, which recommended the naval provisions of the treaty. He strongly defended American interests in reference to freedom of the seas and fleet expansion. Admiral Benson retired from the naval service on September 25, 1919, urging resumption of the construction of major combatant ships that had been suspended during the war in order to concentrate production on antisubmarine forces.

William Shepherd Benson was born in Macon, Georgia, on September 25, 1855, and entered the U.S. Naval Academy from his native state, graduating with the class of 1877. He saw early service in the historic frigate USS Constitution (“Old Ironsides”) and the USS Hartford—of Civil War fame. In 1883 Benson was attached to USS Yantic in search of the lost Greely arctic exploring expedition. The future Chief of Naval Operations served three tours at the Naval Academy during the 1890s and early 1900s as an instructor in seamanship and senior assistant to the Commandant of Midshipmen (termed “Cadets” at that time). While at the academy, Benson, then a lieutenant commander, revised Admiral Stephen B. Luce’s Textbook of Seamanship.

Duty on board USS New York and USS Kearsarge was followed by command of USS Albany in 1908, and a year later assignment as Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Promoted to captain in 1909, Benson commanded the battleships USS Missouri and USS Utah. In August 1913 he was ordered to Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard with a supervision over the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts. He was on duty in Philadelphia when appointed Chief of Naval Operations. Always a champion of a strong American merchant marine, Admiral Benson served as chairman of the United States Shipping Board and trustee of the Emergency Fleet Cooperation after his retirement from the Navy. He died at his Washington home on May 20, 1932, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. Of this wartime and first Chief of Naval Operations, Edward M. House said, “Probably no other American Admiral ever had so many momentous questions come before him or met them more wisely.”
Admiral Robert E. Coontz
Second Chief of Naval Operations
November 1, 1919–July 21, 1923

The immediate post-World War I years were dominated by headlong demobilization of the armed forces, a mood of stringent economy in government, and the search for a lasting peace through disarmament and international agreements to limit naval armaments. Against this background, Admiral Coontz was confronted with the problem of retaining the Navy at a ship and manning level sufficient to assure safeguarding national defense and interests.

Initially directing attention to the shore establishment, the Chief of Naval Operations made personal inspection tours to obtain information “as to what station complements could be reduced, which station could be closed down and possibly sold, and what other property could be transferred or disposed of.” Admiral Coontz and other staff officers joined with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt Jr. to outline the United States’ position at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922. The Chief of Naval Operations was an advisor to the American delegation. A capital ship ratio of 5:5:3 among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan was agreed upon by the conference. Admiral Coontz argued that such a ratio was meaningless unless the U.S. Navy was maintained at treaty strength.

It was on the premise of treaty strength that he stood in firm opposition to drastic cuts in naval appropriation by Congress following the Washington Conference. “Men fight, not ships,” was the expressed conviction of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Just because a nation has hundreds of thousand[s] of tons of naval vessels tied up in navy yards does not mean that the ratio is being maintained when compared to another navy of equal tonnage which is fully manned and highly trained.” He was instrumental in winning Congressional approval for an enlisted strength of 86,000 men and money for improvements at West Coast and Pearl Harbor navy yards.

The Naval Research Laboratory, destined to achieve worldwide renown, became operational July 2, 1923. Naval aviation that had come of age in World War I combat moved ahead during Admiral Coontz’s term as Chief of Naval Operations. The Bureau of Aeronautics was created in 1921, and the following year USS Langley, the Navy’s first aircraft carrier, was commissioned. Admiral Coontz sponsored conversion of two uncompleted battle cruisers to aircraft carriers. They became USS Lexington and USS Saratoga and would be called upon to play historic roles in World War II, 20 years later.

Robert Edward Coontz was born in Hannibal, Missouri, on June 11, 1864. He entered the Naval Academy from that state and graduated in the class of 1885. Ensign Coontz served in the gunboat USS Pinta for nearly six years in Alaskan waters. The Spanish-American War found him on board USS Charleston, which participated in the capture of Guam and the final bombardment of Manila.

Coontz was executive officer of USS Nebraska and made the cruise around the world with the “Great White Fleet.” In 1909 he reported to the Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen. Shore duty in Washington, DC, on the Board of Inspection and Survey was followed by assignment as Naval Governor of Guam in 1912. Coontz commanded the battleship USS Georgia from December 1913 until mid-1915 when he became Commandant, Navy Yard, Puget Sound. He was commanding Battleship Division Six, U.S. Pacific Fleet, when named as Chief of Naval Operations.

After his four years in that office, Admiral Coontz became Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and later Commandant, Fifth Naval District. He retired on June 11, 1928, and died at Puget Sound Naval Hospital on January 26, 1935. Burial was in Hannibal, Missouri.
The fate of naval aviation and a critical cruiser shortage in the U.S. Navy, political upheaval in the Caribbean, and continued turmoil in China requiring the presence of ships and U.S. Marines for the protection of American citizens and interests were prominent issues dominating Admiral Eberle’s term as Chief of Naval Operations.

In 1925 President Calvin Coolidge named a board under the chairmanship of Dwight W. Morrow to formulate the first national aviation policy for the United States. The Morrow Board considered not “only commercial aviation but also the place of military aviation in the national defense.” Admiral Eberle’s testimony before the board convincingly countered extremist efforts to deprive the Navy of aviation or to form a separate aviation corps. He stressed that aviation must be integrated with the fleet and naval aviators must also be seamen. “The air forces,” he said, “operating with the Navy, whether based on carriers or on other vessels of the fleet, can only accomplish the maximum results when their operations are coordinated with those of the surface and sub-surface vessels.” Eberle further testified that a separate naval aviation corps would create a large body of officers and enlisted men, “restricted presumably to aviation duties,” who, when serving afloat and while not flying, “would be virtually passengers.” The Morrow Board’s findings on naval aviation reflected the Chief of Naval Operations’ thinking.

The Navy’s first rigid airship, Shenandoah, made a maiden flight in September 1923. Post-World War I economies and the headlong rush toward naval limitations seriously weakened the U.S. Navy, particularly in the category of modern cruisers. Admiral Eberle pressed the need for a “consistent and progressive shipbuilding program” to achieve parity with Great Britain. His presentation of the Navy’s position to Congress, based on sound factual documentation, was instrumental in obtaining authorization for eight vitally needed cruisers of the Pensacola and Northampton classes. A change to Navy regulations in 1924 broadened the powers of the Chief of Naval Operations, authorizing him to “coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel therefor as to insure maximum readiness of the fleet for war.”

Admiral Eberle was recognized as one of the Navy’s foremost training experts. As Chief of Naval Operations, his interest in training, combined with his sponsorship of a strong reserve, was reflected in a major revision of the Naval Reserve structure and in affording reservists realistic up-to-date training. Likewise, the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps was established in universities “to provide systematic instruction and training at civil educational institutions which will qualify selected students for appointment as officers in the Naval Reserve.”

Born in Denton, Texas, on August 17, 1864, Edward Walter Eberle entered the U.S. Naval Academy from Arkansas and graduated with the class of 1885. He was in charge of the forward turret onboard USS Oregon at the Battle of Santiago in 1898 when the Spanish fleet was destroyed. Eberle took part in Philippine pacification operations before returning for duty at the Naval Academy as Aide to the Superintendent and Commander of Ships. At the academy he wrote Gun and Torpedo Drills for the United States Navy—the first such manual prepared for modern ordnance.

Serving as aide and flag lieutenant to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Eberle, then a lieutenant commander, helped set up the first wireless telegraph installation on naval vessels. He also prepared operating instructions and developed codes for this new and vital communication medium. He served as executive officer on USS Louisiana during the historic around the world cruise of the “Great White Fleet.”

Several commands afloat were followed by assignment in 1911 to command the Atlantic Torpedo Fleet, specifically to develop tactical doctrine for the new destroyers coming into the Navy. Eberle pioneered in the use of smoke screens by destroyers and, off Guantanamo, he employed the emerging aviation corps to determine the depth at which submerged submarines could be detected from the air.

In November 1914 Eberle became Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard and Naval Gun Factory, and was detached the following year to be Superintendent of the Naval Academy. The acute need for officers generated by World War I expansion placed heavy demands on the academy, which Eberle met with efficiency and resourcefulness. Enlarged and accelerated classes of men were graduated in three years; at the same time large numbers of young men were rapidly trained at the academy as Naval Reserve officers.

Following World War I, Admiral Eberle commanded two battleship divisions in the Atlantic Fleet. He was designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet in July 1921 and two years later was named Chief of Naval Operations.

After completing his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Eberle served on the General Board until his retirement, August 17, 1928. He died at the Naval Hospital, Washington, on July 6, 1929, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Admiral Hughes expressed three primary objectives as Chief of Naval Operations: to organize and train the fleet to the highest state of efficiency and provide a nucleus for expansion in case of national emergency, to protect American interests in the disturbed areas of the world, and to cultivate friendly relations with foreign peoples.

Aircraft carriers became part of the Battle Fleet for the first time while Admiral Hughes was Chief of Naval Operations. USS Saratoga and USS Lexington joined in 1928 and participated in the fleet exercises of 1929 and 1930. These annual exercises convinced Admiral Hughes that an urgent need existed for additional light cruisers of improved design. The Chief of Naval Operations stated, “the light cruisers present with the fleet demonstrated their value, and the need for still larger numbers of these important craft was, as always in these problems, an obvious conclusion.” He successfully pressed for the authorization of 15 light cruisers. Likewise, the notable success of USS Saratoga and USS Lexington in the fleet exercises highlighted the requirement for expansion of naval aviation.

In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in January 1929, Admiral Hughes asserted, “the general war readiness of the fleet is not being maintained, and increased funds are needed for this purpose.” During his term as Chief of Naval Operations, five new light cruisers were added to the fleet; USS Ranger, the first ship in the U.S. Navy designed from the keel up as an aircraft carrier, was authorized; and the number of naval aircraft increased from 297 in 1928 to a total of 875 in 1930. With the onset of the Great Depression, however, naval construction and operating funds, as well as personnel levels, were severely curtailed.

Political tumult in China and the Caribbean necessitated the presence of ships and Marines to safeguard American nationals and interests. Assistance afforded by U.S. Sailors and Marines in the Nicaraguan election of November 1928 was notable. Admiral Hughes observed that “the conduct of the election was a success in every respect; no disorder occurred, there was no intimidation of voters, and the presidential candidate of both political parties publicly acknowledged the fairness and impartiality that characterized the entire conduct of the election.”

Charles Frederick Hughes was born on October 14, 1866, in Bath, Maine. Graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1888 was followed by more than a decade of virtually continuous sea duty. During this period he became an expert in deep sea sounding. In the monitor USS Monterey during the Spanish-American War, he participated in the bombardment of Manila’s defenses, and later, while on board USS Concord, took part in operations against Philippine insurgents. Various types of duties afloat and ashore including hydrographic work, torpedo instruction, and a tour in the Bureau of Equipment followed until December 1911 when he received his first command, USS Birmingham. After the Titanic disaster, Birmingham was assigned to the first ice patrol ever formed by any nation.

Captain Hughes commanded USS New York when that battleship was one of the squadron that joined Britain’s Grand Fleet during World War I. Promoted to rear admiral after the war, Hughes was assigned fleet commands of ever-increasing responsibility, briefly attended the Naval War College, and had duty as Director of the Fleet Training Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. With a four-star rank, he assumed command of the U.S. Fleet, September 4, 1926, and the next year was appointed Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Hughes retired November 1, 1930, and died at his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, on May 28, 1934. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
The challenges facing Admiral Pratt as Chief of Naval Operations were compounded by the severe national problems of the economic depression. Terms of the just-concluded London Naval Treaty had to be implemented, the fleet demanded modernization, and somehow the level of adequately trained personnel had to be maintained.

Admiral Pratt had supported the London Naval Treaty on the premise that the Navy would be built to treaty strength. Accordingly, he urged upon the President and Congress a long-range building program to attain this objective; stringent economy in all areas was also a necessity.

In November 1930, the Chief of Naval Operations approved reorganization of the U.S. Fleet into four forces: Battle Force, Scouting Force, Submarine Force, and Base Force. Thus for operations and fleet exercises ships were grouped into forces best suited to perform any given mission. For other than operational purposes, continuity of command was achieved by assigning ships to type commands.

At about the same time this fleet organization was adopted, Admiral Pratt, acting within the context of the London Treaty as well as for economy and improved efficiency, ordered a reduction of 4,800 men and the disposal or decommissioning of 48 ships.

The depression deepened, and more severe cuts in personnel, ship construction, and alterations were in the offing. In 1932, without success, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed suspension of construction on several destroyers in order to keep on active duty 5,000 men scheduled to be released.

As a means of obtaining a maximum state of readiness in this fiscal and manpower crisis, Admiral Pratt sponsored a “Rotating Reserve” plan wherein one third of the ships would be laid up on a rotating basis with skeleton crews, while the remainder operated with full peacetime complements.

Admiral Pratt found one bright spot in the personnel attrition being forced on the Navy. He saw it as an opportunity to upgrade naval leadership and the overall caliber, physically and educationally, of men accepted into the service. Nationwide unemployment had enhanced the attractiveness of a naval enlistment to highly qualified young men.

In spite of a drastically limited budget, some fleet modernization went forward. Conversion of the battleships’ fuel from coal to oil was completed, and limited new construction was funded. Aviation as a fleet arm took on increased importance. The keel of the USS Ranger, the first ship of the U.S. Navy to be built as an aircraft carrier, was laid. Men assigned to aviation duties by the end of June 1932 had increased to 12,408, or 15.6 percent of the Navy’s total personnel strength as compared to 4.9 percent in 1923. The number of aircraft exceeded 1,000 by 1933.

Admiral Pratt firmly held that the nation’s best defense posture demanded close coordination between the Army and Navy. Working with his Army counterpart, General Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Naval Operations reached agreements on such subjects as radio communication networks and the roles of the respective services in coastal defense. They jointly opposed creation of a Department of Defense and a separate air force because no economies would be realized by the move. Additionally, Admiral Pratt argued the growing offensive capability of naval aviation would be destroyed if taken from Navy control.

The Manchurian Incident in the fall of 1931 unveiled Japan’s aggressive intent in China and foreshadowed the cataclysmic events of a decade later. Admiral Pratt ordered the Atlantic-based Scouting Force to join the Battle Force in the Pacific to form a united U.S. Fleet.

William Veazie Pratt was born in Belfast, Maine, on February 28, 1869, and graduated in the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1889. During his early career, he served in ships of the new steel Navy including USS Atlanta and USS Chicago. The Spanish-American War found Pratt on board USS Mayflower participating in the blockade of the Cuban coast. Various sea assignments as navigator and executive officer were followed by attendance at the Naval War College from 1911 to 1913, command of USS Birmingham, and instruction at the Army War College. Pratt, now a captain, was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1917, and the following year was named Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. As Admiral Benson’s principal assistant, he played a key role in directing naval operations during World War I.

He acted as a naval adviser to President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. Returning from Europe, he assumed command of USS New York and was then Commander, Destroyer Force, Pacific, from October 1920 to July 1921. He was a technical advisor at both the Washington and London Naval conferences. Prior to being named Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Pratt had been president of the Naval War College, served on the General Board, and had held top fleet commands, including Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Admiral Pratt retired after 47 years of naval service on June 30, 1933. President Franklin Roosevelt briefly recalled him to active duty in 1941 to help expedite the development of escort carriers to counter the German submarine threat.

He died at the Naval Hospital, Chelsea, Massachusetts, on November 25, 1957, and is buried in the town of his birth. The New York Times carried an obituary tribute: “Admiral Pratt was a naval commander of the old school with a firm faith in the enduring role of sea power in a nation’s defense and a strong belief in the value of constant mobility, both in peace and war.”
These were years in which the clouds of impending conflict were thickening over Europe and Asia and which witnessed political upheaval in Cuba, requiring the presence of U.S. Navy ships in the Caribbean.

The readiness and efficiency of the Navy were critically hampered by deep personnel reductions imposed since the outset of the economic depression. Meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt several days before reporting as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Standley stated frankly, “Mr. President, to operate our fleet on this basis is unfair to the American people. They think they have a fleet in being. In reality, it is a phantom fleet.” He advised that the Navy was short some 30,000 enlisted men and requested an immediate increase in naval personnel. “If we do not get it, I am going to recommend that we lay up enough ships so that the ones we do operate will be effective fighting units of a smaller Fleet ready for action on a moment’s notice.” Admiral Standley’s solid argument prevailed and the downward trend was reversed during his term as Chief of Naval Operations. The Fleet Marine Force was established December 7, 1933.

To meet the needs of the constant technological changes inherent in a modern fleet, Admiral Standley staunchly advocated adopting a regular schedule of ship replacement. The system evolved would thus prevent vessels from becoming obsolete en masse. Shortly after his 1933 inauguration, President Roosevelt allocated public works funds amounting to $238 million to proceed with the building of some 32 naval vessels of varying types. Following this impetus, the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff took the leading role in drafting a bill to enable the Navy to build to full strength allowable under the Washington and London naval treaties. Championed by Congressman Carl Vinson and Senator Park Trammell, the Vinson-Trammell Act became law on March 27, 1934, and was a major step toward providing the nucleus of the Navy that would have to fight in World War II. A working plan was devised that provided for annual building programs designed to bring the U.S. Navy to treaty strength by 1942 and to ensure replacement of overage tonnage.

Illness forced Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson to be frequently absent from the Department, and Admiral Standley often bore the added responsibility of performing the duties of the Secretary’s office. The Chief of Naval Operations was also a delegate to the second London Naval Conference in 1935–1936.

William Harrison Standley was born in Ukiah, California, on December 18, 1872. After graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1895, he was ordered to USS Olympia. He had Spanish-American War service in the monitor USS Monterey and was in the gunboat USS Yorktown during the Philippine Insurrection. Standley’s varied tours afloat, including command, for the next 16 years were broken by assignment ashore at Tutuila, Samoa, to serve as Captain of the Yard, Chief Customs Officer, and Commander of the Native Guard. He was ordered to the Naval Academy in 1916 where he supervised construction of the new seamanship and navigation buildings and the enlargement of Bancroft Hall. A year in command of USS Virginia preceded attendance at the Naval War College and staff duty with the Battle Fleet.

In 1923 he reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Head of the War Plans Division. He took command of the battleship USS California on February 15, 1926.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1927, Standley returned to Washington, DC, as Director of the Fleet Training Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and later was named Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Various type commands followed and in 1933, just prior to being named Chief of Naval Operations, he was Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet.

Admiral Standley retired on January 1, 1937, but was recalled to active duty on February 13, 1941, and served on a number of boards and commissions. In the historic tradition of the naval officer diplomat, Admiral Standley was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from February 1942 to October 1943. He was again relieved of all active duty on August 31, 1945.

Admiral Standley died in San Diego, California, on October 25, 1963. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Admiral Leahy entered upon his duties as Chief of Naval Operations at a point when the international scene and the outlook for peace were deteriorating rapidly in Europe and Asia. During his first year in office, an acute crisis was created when Japanese aircraft sank the gunboat USS Panay in China’s Yangtze River.

The Chief of Naval Operations faced the urgent requirement of preparing the Navy for large-scale combat action should the nation become enmeshed in a global war. He pressed relentlessly for increased naval strength to meet the mounting threat. His vigorous support resulted in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1938. This legislation upped authorized tonnage by 20 percent and fixed the number of naval aircraft at no fewer than 3,000. Funds for the aircraft carrier USS Hornet and South Dakota-class battleships were also provided.

The serious lag in base development was of particular concern to Admiral Leahy. Under his guidance, the Hepburn Board conducted a detailed study of base requirements. Although unable to implement the board’s recommendations fully, the Chief of Naval Operations obtained a Congressional appropriation of $65 million for 15 air bases extending from Kodiak to Palmyra Island in the Pacific, and from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Quonset Point, Rhode Island, in the Atlantic.

Upon completion of his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Leahy was placed on the retired list. However, the illustrious career of this distinguished officer was far from finished. He was Governor of Puerto Rico from September 1939 until November 1940 when he became U.S. Ambassador to France. Admiral Leahy held this difficult diplomatic post in Vichy for more than two years. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, returned Leahy to active duty and named him his Chief of Staff in July 1942. The Admiral presided over meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff when the United States was host country. As a senior adviser, he accompanied the President to all the historic wartime international meetings. Leahy was promoted to five star fleet admiral rank on December 15, 1944.

President Harry S. Truman accepted Fleet Admiral Leahy’s resignation as Chief of Staff on March 2, 1949, but like all five star fleet admirals, he remained on active duty in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of the Navy.

William Daniel Leahy was born on May 6, 1875, in Hampton, Iowa. His 1897 Naval Academy class graduated in time to see active Spanish-American War service. Leahy was in the USS Oregon when she made her celebrated speed dash from the West Coast around Cape Horn to take part in the decisive battle off Santiago, Cuba. Returning to the Pacific, he took part in the operations to suppress the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion in China. Leahy was an instructor in the Department of Physics and Chemistry at the Naval Academy for his first shore duty from 1907 to 1909. Sea assignments as navigator and ordnance officer followed the Naval Academy tour. Late in 1912 he was ordered to Washington, DC, as Assistant Director of Gunnery Practice and Engineering Competitions.

World War I duty for Leahy was as executive officer of USS Nevada and Commanding Officer of a troop transport. The postwar years found him filling a broad spectrum of ship and shore assignments with emphasis on ordnance duties. He took command of USS New Mexico in June 1926 and 16 months later was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. On another Washington, DC, tour from 1933 to 1935, he was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Admiral Leahy was Commander in Chief, Battle Force, flying his four star flag on USS California, when appointed Chief of Naval Operations.

Fleet Admiral Leahy died at the Naval Hospital Bethesda, Maryland, on July 20, 1959. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
A month after Admiral Stark assumed his duties as Chief of Naval Operations, Hitler’s army invaded Poland, and World War II was underway. Western hemisphere defense and the Navy’s combat readiness were matters of such urgency as to permit no delay should the nation be drawn into the war.

To prevent belligerent actions in a zone encompassing water approaches to the Western hemisphere, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on September 5, 1939, ordered formation of a Neutrality Patrol—an action subsequently endorsed by the Pan-American states. Within a week eight units had been organized to cover offshore waters from Newfoundland to the Guianas. The Chief of Naval Operations called the presence of the Neutrality Patrol “a deterrent against embarrassing situations which might come within our waters.”

Admiral Stark spearheaded the drive for “Two Ocean Navy” legislation, that passed Congress in July 1940. The Naval Expansion Act provided more than 1.3 million tons of new construction, including Essex-class carriers, Iowa-class battleships, Cleveland- and Baltimore-classes light and heavy cruisers, submarines, Fletcher-class destroyers, plus auxiliaries, and escort vessels. Considerable time would, of course, be required before the tonnage authorized by this act actually became available. However, the active fleet was markedly strengthened when battleships USS North Carolina and USS Washington and aircraft carrier USS Hornet were commissioned in 1941.

World War I duty with Admiral William S. Sims in London had impressed upon Admiral Stark the vital nature of early planning for coordination between the U.S. and Royal navies. Accordingly in mid-1940, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley to England for informal conversations with British naval authorities. This was a move toward a 1941 series of secret Anglo-American staff planning sessions from which emerged agreements on major strategy and combined operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations prepared a perceptive national strategy evaluation that he presented to Secretary of the Navy Dudley W. Knox in November 1940. Admiral Stark recognized that Japan’s aggressive expansion threatened vital national interests in the Pacific, but he reasoned that Nazi Germany represented the gravest danger to American security. Therefore, he held that the right course would be an initial offensive strategy in the Atlantic and defensive in the Pacific if the United States entered the war.

The U.S. Navy, in addition to Neutrality Patrol Operations, undertook limited convoys of merchantmen carrying lend-lease materials and implemented the “Destroyers for Bases” agreement, which aided Britain’s battle against German U-boats and provided the United States with a chain of bases in the Atlantic for hemisphere defense. This was the “short of war” period that ended abruptly when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Following President Roosevelt’s decision to have one officer serve as wartime Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Stark was relieved by Admiral King as CNO. Admiral Stark remained on active duty as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, with headquarters in England, from April 1942, until the end of World War II. His command embraced all U.S. naval forces assigned to British waters and in the Atlantic coastal waters of Europe.

Harold Rainsford Stark was born in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1880. He entered the U.S. Naval Academy in 1899 and graduated with the class of 1903. He was the first twentieth-century graduate of the academy to become Chief of Naval Operations.

While on duty in the battleship USS Minnesota, Stark made the “Great White Fleet” cruise around the world, 1907–1909. During the next six years, he commanded four different destroyers and was engineering officer of the cruiser USS Brooklyn.

He went to the Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, in 1915 and, in June 1917, shortly after the United States’ entry into World War I, he took command of Torpedo Flotilla, Asiatic Fleet. He steamed his small destroyers in record time from the Philippines to the Mediterranean, where he took an active part in the antisubmarine campaign. Stark was detached in November 1917 to join Admiral Sims’ staff in London.

Duty in battleships, on major fleet staffs, at ordnance activities, and command at sea and as a Naval War College student were Stark’s assignments in the decade after World War I. He then served as Aide to Secretaries of the Navy Charles F. Adams and Claude A. Swanson. A year commanding USS West Virginia was followed by assignment as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance in 1934 with the rank of rear admiral. Returning to sea duty in 1937, Admiral Stark was Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, with his flag in USS Honolulu, when chosen to succeed Admiral Leahy as Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Stark was placed on the retired list as of April 1, 1946. He died at his Washington, DC, home on August 20, 1972, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
Ninth Chief of Naval Operations
March 26, 1942–December 15, 1945

Fleet Admiral King provided American naval leadership for World War II. Even in the darkest days immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, King never deviated from his basic precept: “We must do all that we can with what we have.” He combined an iron will, decisiveness of character, and insatiable capacity for work with high intelligence and an encyclopedic knowledge of naval subjects. Against all obstacles, these strengths and adherence to the principle of the initiative of the subordinate, carried him through the four years of war.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets came under the operational command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet only for combined operations. Faced with the problem of a “two ocean war” against the Axis powers of Europe and against Japan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered that “the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy and the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States therefor.”

Admiral King assumed these duties on December 30 and shifted from the flagship to Washington, DC. Relieving Admiral Stark on March 26, 1942, he also became Chief of Naval Operations. The President directed that these duties, under the Secretary, “shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.”

Although combined under Admiral King, the Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations remained separate entities throughout the war. In general terms COMINCH planned and executed operations, while CNO planned for and provided the men, ships, aircraft, and supplies necessary to carry out operations at sea.

Admiral King was the U.S. Navy member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. He participated in and left his imprint on every important war conference from Casa Blanca to Yalta. While fully supporting the basic allied strategy of defeating Germany first, King nevertheless steadfastly insisted that adequate strength go into the Pacific to keep pressure on the Japanese enemy and prevent it from consolidating earlier gains.

German U-boat sinkings, including off America’s East Coast and in the Caribbean, continued to rise to the point that Britain’s survival was in doubt. Admiral King took extraordinary actions. He transferred the Convoy and Routing Section of CNO to the U.S. Fleet staff in the spring of 1942. As antiship activities expanded and committed forces grew, he recognized the need for overall direction of operations, new techniques and tactics, and close liaison with the Army Air Corps, the British, and the Canadians. On May 20, 1943, Admiral King established the Tenth Fleet, an antiship command, to exercise direct control over all facets of the Navy’s war against U-boats, and for that purpose to allocate antiship forces to all commands in the Atlantic. Admiral King assumed command of the Tenth Fleet, which included a research-statistical analysis group composed of civilian scientists within its structure.

Under Admiral King’s direction the U.S. Navy became the most versatile sea force ever conceived. The U-boat was beaten in the Atlantic, and amphibious operations, unprecedented in their magnitude, led to land operations that brought Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” crashing down. In the Pacific, U.S. submarines severed Japan’s lifelines as powerful task forces fought their way through the island chains to Tokyo Bay, and the Japanese surrendered on board USS Missouri on September 2, 1945.

On October 10, 1945, the headquarters of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, was dissolved, and operational command of the operating forces reverted to the Chief of Naval Operations. Fleet Admiral King turned over his responsibilities to Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz two months later.

Ernest Joseph King was born in Lorain, Ohio, on November 23, 1878. Prior to graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1901, his class saw brief Spanish-American War service. Five years of sea duty were followed by three years instructing in ordnance and gunnery at the Naval Academy. King returned to sea in 1909, serving in various staff and engineering assignments and, in 1912, he came ashore for duty at the Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, MD. His first command was the destroyer USS Terry in 1914.

During World War I, King was awarded the Navy Cross for “distinguished service in the line of his profession as Assistant Chief of Staff for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.” Captain King’s postwar duty brought him back to the Naval Academy to head the Postgraduate Department. He commanded several submarine divisions and the Submarine Base, New London, from 1923 to 1926. During this tour he was officer in charge of the salvaging of USS S-51, which sank off Block Island in September 1925.

In January 1927 King reported to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, for flight training and was designated a naval aviator on May 26 of that year. Aviation-related assignments afloat and ashore followed, interrupted in 1927 by temporary duty in command of the salvage force that raised USS S-4. In 1930 he took command of USS Lexington. He next completed the senior course at the Naval War College and then was Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics as a rear admiral until June of 1936.

Admiral King served as a member of the General Board and continued to move up the command ladder. On February 1, 1941, he was named Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, from which assignment he became Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet/Chief of Naval Operations. He was the first naval aviator named Chief of Naval Operations. The President nominated him for Fleet Admiral, and he took the oath of office for that five star rank on December 20, 1944.

After being relieved as Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral King continued to serve in an advisory capacity in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. He died at the Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on June 25, 1956, and is buried in the Naval Academy Cemetery, Annapolis, MD. Of Fleet Admiral King, the distinguished naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, “He was a sailor’s sailor, who neither had nor wanted any life outside the Navy.”
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fter brilliantly leading American forces to victory in World War II, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, hailed down his flag at Pearl Harbor and relieved Fleet Admiral King as Chief of Naval Operations. Accorded a hero’s welcome at home, the quiet, self-effacing officer described himself as merely “a representative of the brave men who fought” under his command. When Admiral Nimitz took over as Chief of Naval Operations, rapid demobilization was the order of the day. He was faced with the perplexing problem of maintaining an effective fleet to carry out extensive operational commitments throughout the world. In the Pacific, naval vessels engaged in “Operation Magic Carpet” brought home more than two million American servicemembers over a period of six months. Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and other troops were lifted to their homelands, as the Navy conducted operations in the disarmament and the transfer of control and occupation of territories previously held by the enemies.

The task of reducing the most powerful Navy in history to a fraction of its wartime peak entailed drastic cutbacks in ships, personnel, and the shore establishment; surplus property disposal; and cancellations of construction contracts. Fleet Admiral Nimitz provided the administration necessary to achieve this huge rollback in an orderly fashion without destroying the Navy’s effectiveness. Programs were initiated for the establishment and maintenance of active and reserve fleets with the potential strength and readiness required to support national policy.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz faced a new set of challenges to American naval power. With the destruction of the German and Japanese navies and the advent of the atomic bomb, the continuance of a major U.S. Navy was questioned. Nimitz was persuasive in his efforts to retain balanced naval forces.

In response to the campaign to merge the military services within a single executive department and under a single Chief of Staff, his leadership played a key role in achieving a reasonable compromise, one in which naval aviation and the Marine Corps remained under the Department of the Navy.

The Navy effectively met the new challenges of the Cold War. The deployment of naval forces to crisis points in the Mediterranean and elsewhere was a major influence in stemming Communist advances.

In the midst of overriding demobilization pressures and extensive operational commitments overseas, Fleet Admiral Nimitz remained acutely aware that the efficiency of the postwar Navy hinged on the continued development and use of technological innovations generated by the war. To prepare to meet future threats, the Navy stressed research and development. Emphasis was placed on antisubmarine warfare and, in January 1946, a Coordinator of Undersea Warfare was established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with responsibilities for both submarines and antisubmarine warfare. The Chief of Naval Operations also directed attention to the potential of guided missiles as seagoing weapon systems and to nuclear energy for ship propulsion. Prophetically, he reported, “the Navy of the future will be capable of launching missiles from surface vessels and submarines, and of delivering atomic bombs from carrier-based planes.” As his two-year term drew to a close late in 1947, the first post-World War II Chief of Naval Operations could take satisfaction that the Navy had weathered the hazards of demobilization and reorganization. Transition to a peacetime posture had been the main problem when Fleet Admiral Nimitz assumed office; Cold War operations and preparedness for possible conflict were in the forefront when he left.

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hester William Nimitz was born in Fredericksburg, Texas, on February 24, 1885. After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1905, he was on the China Station for two years where, as an ensign, he had his first command, the gunboat USS Panay. Nimitz was with the young submarine service until 1913 when he was sent to Germany and Belgium to study diesel engines. Duty in the USS Maumee, the first diesel powered surface ship in the U.S. Navy, followed and, during World War I, he was Chief of Staff to Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Post-World War I assignments included a tour as Senior Member, Board of Submarine Design in the Navy Department; as executive officer of USS South Carolina; command of USS Chicago; on the staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and as a student at the Naval War College. Speaking at the college after World War II, Fleet Admiral Nimitz reflected on the value of this training there: “The war with Japan had been reenacted in the game room here by so many people in so many different ways that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had not visualized those.”

In August of 1926 he was ordered to the University of California where he established one of the first Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units. Various submarine and surface assignments followed, and in 1933 he commanded USS Augusta, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. Again returning to Washington, DC, he was Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for three years, back to sea to command a battleship division, and then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in 1939. Admiral Nimitz was serving as Bureau Chief when he was chosen to be Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Shortly thereafter he was given the additional responsibilities of joint command as Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. He was elevated to five-star fleet admiral rank in December 1944. Fleet Admiral Nimitz was one of the signatories of the Japanese surrender documents on board USS Missouri on September 2, 1945. He signed for the United States as General Douglas MacArthur signed for the United Nations.

Detached as Chief of Naval Operations, he became Special Assistant (Western Sea Frontier) to the Secretary of the Navy. Fleet Admiral Nimitz was extremely active in educational, cultural, and community affairs. He died at his quarters, Yerba Buena Island, San Francisco, CA, on February 20, 1966, and is buried in Golden Gate National Cemetery.
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld
Eleventh Chief of Naval Operations
December 15, 1947–November 2, 1949

Admiral Denfeld’s term as Chief of Naval Operations was a
time of stringent peacetime economy and severe cutbacks
in the national defense budget. Competition for the limited
funds and intense debate over the roles, force levels, and
missions of the three military services followed enactment of the National
Security Act of 1947. At the same time, the need continued for U.S.
naval forces to counter increasing threats to peace in the Mediterranean
and Far Eastern waters.

The Chief of Naval Operations emphasized the goal of
coordination of effort. He voiced Navy support of the unification concept
on the basis of each service being admitted to full membership on the
defense team.

Admiral Denfeld expressed grave concern over the prospect
that during this period of ferment, transition, and a sharply reduced fleet,
the Navy could be relegated to solely a convoy and antisubmarine role.
Aware also of the dangers inherent in over reliance on a single weapon
system, such as strategic bombing, he called for a balanced national
defense.

The Chief of Naval Operations resolutely set forth the nation’s
need of balanced naval forces to support the United States’ interests in
times of peace, to deter war, and to be prepared for defensive and
offensive missions in times of war. To meet these commitments to
national security, Admiral Denfeld reasoned logically, the Navy must
have the Marine Corps, aircraft carriers, and the modern weapon systems
made possible by ever expanding technology research. He also recognized
the Navy needed to move forward development to provide the Navy
with carrier-based atomic attack capability. Other areas of emphasis
included antisubmarine warfare and airborne and surface-launched
guided missiles. The seaplane tender USS Norton Sound was converted
to a mobile missile testing platform.

In April 1948 the Soviet Union precipitated a major crisis by
cutting off land access to West Berlin. U.S. Air Force planes were joined
by naval aircraft in the celebrated Berlin Airlift. Hundreds of thousands
of tons of food and supplies were shuttled to the isolated city, while
Navy tankers delivered millions of gallons of aviation gasoline at
Bremerhaven, Germany, to keep the humanitarian lift going and break
the Russian blockade.

The Navy assumed sealift responsibilities for all the armed
services on October 1, 1949, when the Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS) was established under the command of the Chief of Naval
Operations.

Although Admiral Denfeld’s testimony before Congress and
his public statements on strategy for national security and the maintenance
of strong, ready naval forces reflected thoughtful moderation, he was
relieved as Chief of Naval Operations prior to the completion of his tour.

Louis Emil Denfeld was born in Westboro, Massachusetts, on
April 13, 1891. Entering the U.S. Naval Academy from
Minnesota, he graduated in 1912 and, following the pattern of
the period, went to battleship duty. His World War I service
was in USS Ammen, a destroyer based on Queenstown, Ireland. He
continued in destroyers after the war, including command of USS McCall.
In 1922, Denfeld, then a lieutenant commander, reported to New London
for instruction in submarines. He served in USS S-30 and commanded
USS S-24 until June 1924, when he was detailed to the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations for duty in the Ships Movements Division.
This shore tour was followed by command of destroyer USS Brooks.

Between 1929 and World War II, Denfeld alternated between
the Bureau of Navigation, destroyer division command, and duty on
major staffs afloat. As a rear admiral, he was Assistant Chief of the
Bureau of Naval Personnel from January 1942 to March 1945. He then
commanded Battleship Division Nine, and with his flag on USS
Wisconsin, he participated in the Okinawa operation and bombardment
of the Japanese home islands.

Immediately after Japan’s surrender he returned to Washington,
DC, as Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel with
the rank of vice admiral. He directed the Navy’s successfully concluded
demobilization program and effected personnel plans
for the postwar Navy. On February 28, 1947, Admiral Denfeld was
named Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, and was so serving when appointed Chief of Naval
Operations.

Admiral Denfeld retired on March 1, 1950, and returned to
live in his birthplace, Westboro, where he died on March 28, 1972. He
is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman was named Chief of Naval Operations at a critical period. The turbulence of defense unification and intense competition for the budget still persisted. Both as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sherman’s leadership and political statesmanship generated a confidence that did much to calm interservice waters without sacrificing the Navy’s interests in aviation and other vital areas. His marked success in working with the other services ideally fitted Admiral Sherman to be Chief of Naval Operations at this difficult time.

North Korean troops poured into South Korea on June 25, 1950. Within the context of the United Nations resolution to assist South Korea in repelling the Communist invaders, American fighting men were again in combat just five years after World War II ended. U.S. Navy control of the sea was essential to the movement of men and supplies, the mounting of amphibious assaults, ship gunfire, air support, and coastal blockade. Superimposed on Korean War tasks was President Truman’s order to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Communists and also bar Nationalist attacks against the Chinese mainland.

The Chief of Naval Operations rapidly deployed naval forces to the Western Pacific. Mothballed ships in the reserve fleets were reactivated and, to help man them, Naval Reservists were called to active duty.

Admiral Sherman played a prominent role in shaping the Korean War strategy. He recommended a blockade of the North Korean coast and went to Japan to participate in planning the historic “end-run” amphibious assault at Inchon that sent the North Korean invaders reeling back.

Modern Russian mines encountered at Wonsan and elsewhere presented a serious threat to the projection of strength ashore in the combat zone. “When you can’t go where you want to, when you want to,” said Admiral Sherman referring to the mine hazard, “you haven’t got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock bottom foundation of all of our war plans.” He assigned the highest priority to mine countermeasures, an area that had languished in the post-World War II economy. An intensive reactivation in the program swiftly readied mine vessels for service in the Far East.

In 1950 the Navy gained its initial capacity for nuclear attack by carrier aircraft, the forerunner of an operational capability as a major sea-based deterrent force.

The Chief of Naval Operations went to Europe in the summer of 1951. At the conclusion of a highly successful military-diplomatic mission, including conversations with Generalísimo Francisco Franco regarding establishing U.S. bases in Spain, Admiral Sherman succumbed to a heart attack in Naples on July 22, 1951.

Forrest Percival Sherman was born in Merrimack, New Hampshire, on October 30, 1896, and graduated in the Naval Academy class of 1918. World War I found him serving afloat in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. He received his first command, the destroyer USS Barry, in 1921. The next year Sherman reported to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, for flight training. On December 22, 1922, he was designated a naval aviator and ordered to Fighting Squadron Two, Battle Fleet.

Instructor duty at Pensacola and study at the Naval War College were followed by duty on board carriers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga. During the academic year 1930–1931, Sherman taught in the Department of Seamanship and Flight Tactics at the Naval Academy and then returned to Saratoga for a second tour.

Following assignments in the Bureau of Ordnance, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and on major fleet staffs, Captain Sherman was ordered to command carrier USS Wasp in May 1942. He commanded her on September 15, 1942, when Wasp, heavily damaged by an enemy submarine attack during the Guadalcanal campaign, had to be sunk by friendly forces to avoid falling into enemy hands. Sherman was designated Chief of Staff to Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, in which assignment he was promoted to rear admiral before being transferred to duty as Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Admiral Sherman represented the Navy in the initial surrender conferences with the Japanese at Manila in August 1945 and was present onboard USS Missouri when the formal surrender was signed.

He briefly commanded a carrier division before coming to Washington, DC, in December 1945 as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations). In January 1948, Admiral Sherman was named Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean (changed to Commander, Sixth Task Fleet) and served in that capacity until appointed Chief of Naval Operations.

Of his untimely death, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, said, “In Admiral Sherman the United States has lost one of its most brilliant military minds. He had an understanding possessed by few men of the nature of American leadership in the free world.” The admiral is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
The naval buildup necessary to meet combat and logistic support demands of the war in Korea continued to be the matter of first priority when Admiral Fechteler began his duties as Chief of Naval Operations. Between the opening of hostilities in June 1950 and December 1952, the U.S. Navy added 526 ships to the active list—all but four were reactivated from the reserve mothballed fleets.

Modernization of the Navy moved forward on a broad front. Submarine USS Nautilus, the first vessel in history propelled by nuclear energy, was under construction, as was the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, the first of a new post-World War II class, designed to operate high performance jet aircraft. Several ships from the reserve fleets were converted to guided missile ships and Admiral Fechteler proposed that this number be increased. In collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission, the Navy initiated development of tactical nuclear weapons, including an atomic depth bomb for use against fast deep-diving submarines.

While fully alert to the potential of atomic weaponry and other technical advances, Admiral Fechteler also stressed the need for conventional warfare capabilities, including amphibious assault. New classes of amphibious ships, LSTs and LSDs, vastly improved and faster than World War II types, were joining the fleet and under construction. The Chief of Naval Operations likewise voiced the conviction that without a first-rate air arm the Navy would be “totally inadequate.” The war in Korea, he said, demonstrated anew “the mobility of carrier-borne air power and its ability to go in and deliver air support to ground troops.” In addition to the Korean experience, events in subsequent years bear witness to the soundness of the Chief of Naval Operations’ views.

Before Congress, where he was characterized as being incisive and extremely well informed, Admiral Fechteler successfully urged funding for a second Forrestal-class carrier. The Chief of Naval Operations also directed his attention to the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization naval forces and specifically the creation of a single NATO naval command in the Mediterranean. As Admiral Fechteler’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operations came to a close, an uneasy truce ended the fighting in Korea, where once again control and optimum use of the sea by the U.S. Navy and other United Nations naval forces had been indispensable to success.
The end of hostilities in Korea three weeks before Admiral Carney became Chief of Naval Operations was attended by reduction in force levels and redeployment. While guns were momentarily silenced following the Korean truce, trouble spots persisted in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, where aggressive threats to peace required a strong naval presence and much of the Chief of Naval Operations’ attention.

The close of the French-Viet Minh War and the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel stranded vast numbers of refugees who desired not to remain in Communist-dominated North Vietnam. Beginning in August 1954 and continuing until July of the next year, the U.S. Navy organized and conducted a huge humanitarian operation: Passage to Freedom. Some 300,000 refugees and thousands of tons of cargo were sealifted from North to South Vietnam. Admiral Carney directed the operation as a result of the Navy’s responsibilities as executive agent for the Pacific Command.

At the request of the Republic of China, elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet helped evacuate the military garrison and civilian population from the beleaguered Tachen Islands just off the China coast. Although the removal took place within range of Communist artillery, the presence in strength of Seventh Fleet carriers, cruisers, and destroyers was sufficient deterrent to any overt action by the mainland Chinese.

The demands of the Passage to Freedom and Tachen Islands operations reinforced Admiral Carney’s conviction that the post-Korean War Navy must be a versatile, balanced force capable of meeting any spectrum of hostile situations from an atomic confrontation to localized brush fire conflicts.

An area of major thrust by Admiral Carney as Chief of Naval Operations was modernization of the Navy. In public speeches and in appearances before Congress seeking shipbuilding appropriations, he stressed the acute threat of “block obsolescence,” that is, the danger that large segments of the fleet, built during World War II, would grow old and unserviceable all at once.

A dramatic and revolutionary development became reality with the commissioning and initial cruise of the submarine USS Nautilus—the world’s first nuclear-powered ship. And on December 11, 1954, USS Forrestal, the first of a new generation of aircraft carriers, was launched.

While working to update ships and weapons and incorporate the new technology, Admiral Carney never lost sight of the fact that the nation’s sea strength rested on the men and women of the Navy. To retain highly qualified personnel, the Chief of Naval Operations devoted himself to making naval careers attractive and increasingly rewarding.

Robert Bostwick Carney was born in Vallejo, California, on March 26, 1895. His 43-year naval career began in 1912, as he became a Naval Academy midshipman. After graduation in 1916, he joined the battleship USS New Hampshire. He was Torpedo and Gunnery Officer of the USS Fanning when she sank the German submarine U-58.

Between the wars, Carney commanded several destroyers and a cargo ship, and served as gunnery and executive officer in battleships and cruisers and with fleet staffs. Navy Department duty ashore included Fleet Training Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and small craft program coordination in the Secretary of the Navy’s office.

When the United States entered World War II, he was serving on the staff of Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, involved in convoy escort operations. From October 15, 1942, until July 1943, Captain Carney commanded the cruiser USS Denver, participating in Solomon Islands actions. He was promoted to rear admiral on July 26, 1943, and became Chief of Staff to Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander, South Pacific Force, and Commander, Third Fleet. Admiral Carney remained with Admiral Halsey throughout the remainder of the Pacific war campaigns. He concluded arrangements with the Japanese for entry of the Third Fleet into Tokyo Bay and accepted the surrender of Yokosuka Naval Base.

From 1946 to early 1950, Admiral Carney was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics). He took command of the Second Fleet on March 6 and on October 2, 1950, was promoted to four-star rank and named Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. He became Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, in June 1951, and retained that NATO command until appointed Chief of Naval Operations by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Admiral Carney retired from active duty upon completion of his tour as Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Carney died in 1990 of heart failure in Washington, DC, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
Fifteenth Chief of Naval Operations
August 17, 1955–August 1, 1961

Admiral Burke served an unprecedented six years in office as Chief of Naval Operations. These were years of intensified international friction and of revolutionary changes in ships and weaponry of the U.S. Navy. The undersea nuclear weapon capability conceived and developed in the brief span of five years added a vast new dimension to naval warfare.

The Chief of Naval Operations established a Special Project Office late in 1955, charged with the responsibility of developing a Fleet Ballistic Missile for sea launch. Admiral Burke backed the project with priority call on professional talent and other resources. Submarine USS George Washington submerged in the Atlantic on July 20, 1960, and fired the first Polaris missile. The missile arched to a target more than a thousand miles downrange. This phenomenal weapon married the nuclear submarine to the long-range solid fuel ballistic missile. Shortly, the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Missile System would be the keystone for American nuclear deterrence.

Like his predecessors, Admiral Burke saw the fleet’s combat readiness and fighting edge as the primary missions of the Chief of Naval Operations. Before Congress, he ably presented the country’s need for new types of ships to counter a growing Soviet naval strength. To provide new construction with maximum and flexible capability, he pressed forward with modern shipboard equipment development.

An impressive array of “firsts” occurred during Admiral Burke’s tour. The world’s first guided-missile ship—modernized USS Boston, with her Terrier antiaircraft system—joined the fleet in 1956; the first guided-missile frigates commissioned; the first nuclear-powered surface ships—USS Enterprise, USS Long Beach, and USS Bainbridge—were launched; and the first helicopter carrier designed for vertical envelopment amphibious assault was commissioned. Major progress was made in a variety of shipboard and air-launched guided missiles, sonar, and antisubmarine warfare weapons.

While breakthroughs in missiles and nuclear power were unfolding, Admiral Burke remained attuned to the requirements for powerful conventional forces afloat. He staunchly defended the aircraft carrier and the versatility of embarked aircraft. Concerned with “block obsolescence,” he sponsored new construction and the successful FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) program to extend the useful life of older destroyers.

A strong advocate of the role of small navies in combat, the Chief of Naval Operations contended that ships loaned to allies should be in top condition, ready for immediate service.

Admiral Burke held that the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation was much less than chances of brush fire conflicts breaking out any time or any place, and that these could be cooled or confined by a U.S. naval presence. Such proved to be the case during the Suez crisis, the troubles in Jordan, across the world off the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and in 1958 when the Lebanese government, threatened by aggression, asked for assistance. Marines from U.S. Sixth Fleet ships were landed at Beirut.

The Chief of Naval Operations responded to Cold War crises with notable initiative and keen insight. He rapidly ordered naval forces deployed, diverted if necessary, and so positioned in international waters as to render maximum service in implementing national policy decisions.

The Navy “is people” was a point that Admiral Burke constantly emphasized during his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations. He opened additional avenues of communication so that, from flag officer to seamen, all “would know, not only what they were doing, but why.”

Arleigh Albert Burke was born in Boulder, Colorado, on October 19, 1901. The first Chief of Naval Operations to be born in the 20th century, he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1923. Between tours of duty in various battleships and destroyers, he earned a master of science degree in chemical engineering at the University of Michigan as a Navy postgraduate student in explosive ordnance.

Burke was on shore duty at the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, DC, in December 1941. Ordered to the South Pacific, he commanded several destroyer squadrons. It was while he had Destroyer Squadron 23, the “Little Beavers,” that he earned the nickname “31-Knot Burke.” With one ship having boiler problems, DESRON 23 had been held to 30 knots. While en route to a muster point, Burke radioed he was pushing his squadron to 31 knots. With Burke commanding, Destroyer Squadron 23 participated in more than 20 engagements; destroyed a Japanese cruiser, nine destroyers, and a submarine; and accounted for some 30 enemy aircraft.

In March of 1944, Captain Burke reported as Chief of Staff to Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force 58/38 and saw extensive action with that force until just prior to the Japanese surrender.

During the Korean War, Rear Admiral Burke served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Far East; commanded a cruiser division; and was a member of the Military Armistice Commission. He then returned to duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director of the Strategic Plans Division until 1954. In April of that year, he took command of Cruiser Division Six, and in January 1955 he became Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic, from which assignment he was appointed Chief of Naval Operations by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Admiral Burke was transferred to the retired list on August 1, 1961. In ceremonies that day at the Naval Academy, his four star flag was struck, and the Secretary of the Navy expressed the “thanks of a grateful Nation and the enduring affection of sailors everywhere.” He died January 1, 1996, at National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, and is buried at the U.S. Naval Academy cemetery in Annapolis.
As Admiral Anderson took over the watch from Admiral Arleigh Burke, he pledged to keep the Navy “on course and steaming strong regardless of what the future may portend.” Speaking at the change of command ceremony, the new Chief of Naval Operations could not foresee that the immediate future held an ominous and direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union—the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Reconnaissance aircraft in the fall of 1962 detected Russian offensive ballistic missile launch sites under construction in Cuba. These weapons posed a dire threat to national and hemispheric security. To back demands that the sites be dismantled, missiles removed, and Russian ships carrying missiles or components to Cuba turned back, President John F. Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of the island. The Chief of Naval Operations was designated to act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on quarantine matters.

In a graphic demonstration of readiness, U.S. Navy ships of many types were almost immediately on the quarantine line carrying out the Presidential directive. The Soviets backed off. The entire operation was a dramatic illustration of how the precise application of the right amount of seapower can support the foreign policy of the United States. Admiral Anderson said in summation, “There is no substitute for well-trained, versatile and indoctrinated ready forces, under competent professional leadership with secure, rapid and reliable channels of communication.”

Other high-tension areas demanding a naval role during Admiral Anderson’s tenure included Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Southeast Asia, and Berlin. The tinderbox situation in Berlin, after erection of the infamous wall, dictated a decision to activate reserve ships and call selected Naval Reservists to active duty.

Meanwhile, modernization of the fleet and introduction of advanced technology continued to move ahead. Additional fleet ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered surface ships went into commission. The Navy, looking to the future as well as the present, went forward in antisubmarine warfare, Antarctic research, space, and oceanography.

Accidental loss of nuclear submarine USS Thresher in April 1963 pointed up the price sometimes demanded by duty and progress. Detection, photography, and ultimate recovery of parts of Thresher at depths exceeding 8,000 feet led to improvements in deep submergence research vehicles and submarine safety.

The Chief of Naval Operations continued to emphasize the importance of research and development, stating, “there is no escaping the facts that if we are going to compete, we have to pay the entry fee, and that today’s probable combat environment of electronic, ballistic, supersonic and nuclear equipment demands sophisticated equipment.”

While Admiral Anderson was key to the absolute necessity for the most modern weapon systems, he also knew that the Navy is, and has always been, “primarily an assembly of people,” and that morale “is all important.” He likewise stressed the nation’s requirement for a flexible means of meeting global contingencies of any magnitude and highlighted the preeminent role of aircraft carriers as such a means of projecting U.S. military power wherever deemed necessary.
Sacramento—the first of a new type capable of simultaneous alongside and helicopter replenishment at sea of fuel, ammunition, provisions, and stores. Fleet modernization continued as older destroyers and other types passed through the fleet rehabilitation and modernization program.

Admiral McDonald shaped and guided the extensive buildup of naval strength consonant with an expanding U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and the retaliatory carrier air strikes.

U.S. Navy operations spanned the widest range from carrier strikes to coastal interdiction, gunfire support, amphibious landings, riverine warfare, and logistic support. The unchanging importance of the sea lanes was once again demonstrated by Vietnam, where all of the bulk fuel, more than 99 percent of the ammunition, and 95 percent of all other cargoes went by ship.

The Chief of Naval Operations took justifiable pride in the responsiveness of the Navy in projecting national power quickly and effectively. Before Congress and to the American public, Admiral McDonald set forth his views on the mobility and flexibility of naval forces, which gave them the inherent capability for selective fine tuning. “We can,” he said, “strike with swift precision, if ordered, doing harm only to those who would harm us; we could, if necessary, cause overwhelming catastrophe to our enemies; and we can carry out any mission between those extremes. To accomplish these finely graduated purposes, we operate from mobile floating bases limited by little else than an adequate depth of water for safe navigation . . . sea-based forces require neither international nor local license to move anywhere on the high seas.”

In addition to Southeast Asian operations and continuing crises in other areas of the Far East, the Navy was able to fulfill its worldwide responsibilities. The government of the strife-torn Dominican Republic requested the presence of U.S. Navy ships and Marines. The Sixth Fleet remained a stabilizing influence in the Mediterranean. At the same time diverse other requirements, including the training and readiness of space recovery forces, were met. In 1964, an all-nuclear task force of carrier USS Enterprise, cruiser USS Long Beach and frigate Bainbridge circumnavigated the world without refueling and without logistic augmentation. This Operation Sea Orbit dramatically demonstrated the capabilities and potential of nuclear-propelled ships. Later, off Vietnam, the nuclear ship went into combat for the first time in history.

By 1965, the Chief of Naval Operations could announce that the last of the programmed total of 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines was under construction and that development of the advanced Poseidon missile, with greater range, payload, and accuracy than Polaris, was authorized.

A General Order on the assignment of authority and responsibility in the Department of the Navy, issued by Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze in April 1966, gave the Chief of Naval Operations direct command over the Naval Material Command and its bureaus.

Admiral McDonald placed strong emphasis on antisubmarine warfare and saw to it that an adequate segment of the Navy’s budget was channeled for progressive development in this critical field. Likewise, the Navy made increasingly important contributions to oceanographic research. Programs typified by SEALAB and Alvin were intensified.

The retention of highly trained Navy pilots and technical ratings was a matter of concern. To make a naval career more attractive, Admiral McDonald repeatedly and successfully pushed for better housing, pay, enhanced medical benefits, shipboard habitability, and—consistent with the needs of the sea service—a more normal home life for all naval personnel.

David Lamar McDonald was born September 12, 1906, in Maysville, Georgia. He entered the Naval Academy in 1924, graduated four years later, went to battleship duty and on to flight training at Pensacola. Designated a naval aviator in 1931, various aviation duties followed, including a tour with Fighter Squadron Six in USS Saratoga and at Pensacola as a flight instructor.

At the outbreak of World War II, Lieutenant McDonald was serving on carrier USS Ranger as Flag Secretary to Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet. Later in the conflict he was air officer and executive officer of USS Essex and on the staff of Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Postwar duties included assignment as Director of Military Requirements in the Bureau of Aeronautics, Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air and the Under Secretary of the Navy, attendance at the National War College, and command of the carriers USS Mindoro and USS Coral Sea. He attained flag rank in 1955 and was ordered as Director of the Air Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In November 1957, Admiral McDonald was named Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe. Command of a carrier division followed until July 1961, when he reported as Commander, Sixth Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe. From April 9, 1963 until named Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral McDonald was Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, with additional duty as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and Commander of the Naval Component of the U.S. Forces in Europe.

The citation accompanying the Legion of Merit medal awarded to Admiral McDonald before he transferred to the retired list on August 1, 1967, noted his “rare ability to identify central issues, to balance economic requirements against military necessities, and to ensure that the capabilities of the military services are expeditiously and cooperatively employed in the best interest of the United States.”

Admiral McDonald died at the age of 91 in 1997 and is buried at the United States Naval Academy Cemetery in Annapolis, Maryland.
Conduct and support of operations in Southeast Asia remained the first priority item during the Moorer years in the Navy’s top assignment. The Chief of Naval Operations described the diverse nature of the Navy’s combat role in this unusual conflict: “Today, our Navy and Marine forces utilize every available technique and skill. Tactics akin to those used by gunboats in the Civil War are exploited in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam. At the same time offshore, our carriers and amphibious task forces are operating with the most complex and sophisticated electronic and weapons systems known to man. On board our Navy river boats, the seamen’s eye and the bamboo pole are used to navigate, while far at sea satellite navigation systems guide our ships.” In-country an accelerated training program moved ahead, looking toward turning over total operational responsibilities to the South Vietnamese Navy.

The demands of the combat area strained the Navy’s capability to meet mission requirements in other sectors of the globe. Confronted, likewise, with force level reductions and the necessity to present a credible worldwide readiness posture, a vastly increased tempo of at-sea time was required of all fleet units. The resulting effect on career motivation and retention rate was severe. Admiral Moorer directed attention to meeting the needs of Navy men and their families by stating, “no matter how complex or how awesome you build the weapons of war, man is still the vital element of our defense team. Men make decisions, men fight battles, men win wars.”

Two tragic events occurred—accidental loss at sea of the nuclear submarine USS Scorpion and the boarding and capture of USS Pueblo by the North Koreans—disasters entirely different in nature, but each with considerable impact.

Time and again before Congress and the public, the Chief of Naval Operations focused on the expanding and aggressive employment of the Russian Navy. “A Soviet bear who has demonstrated a new fondness for deep salt water,” said Admiral Moorer, “represents a real and substantial challenge to free world maritime supremacy.”

Rather than quantity—the numbers game—for the U.S. Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations stressed quality for ships, aircraft, and personnel. “We must be prepared for almost any environment in any area of the world.” Admiral Moorer pressed for continued modernization and the phasing out of older ships to overcome the encroaching obsolescence of much of the active fleet. He drew notice to the fact that one new advanced design multipurpose ship could perform the mission of two or more old ships, and better.

Admiral Moorer considered a strong, broadly based research and development program—and incorporation of the most advanced technology—as matters of the utmost importance. He urged construction of a third Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier, while pointing out the increasing significance of carrier forces as the availability of overseas land bases continued to diminish. The program of converting Polaris submarines to receive the new Poseidon missiles moved ahead.

Thomas Hinman Moorer was born February 9, 1912, in Mount Willing, Alabama. After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1933 and Gunnery and Engineering duty in cruisers, he reported to Pensacola for flight training and was designated a naval aviator in 1936. His first flight duty was on board carriers and, at the time of the Japanese attack, he was attached to a patrol squadron based on Pearl Harbor. Moving with his squadron to the Southwest Pacific in the early desperate days of the war, Moorer’s PBY was shot down off Darwin, Australia. Returning from the Pacific in July 1942, he was sent to the United Kingdom as a mining observer for Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He then commanded a bombing squadron in the Atlantic and was later on the staff of Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, as Gunnery and Tactical Officer.

His immediate postwar assignment was with the Strategic Bombing Survey established by the President to study the effects of all types of air attacks on the enemy. This was followed by various sea and shore assignments including executive officer, Naval Aviation Ordnance Test Station, Chincoteague, Virginia; Experimental Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California; a year in study at the Naval War College; and Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air).

Promoted to rear admiral on August 1, 1958, he served in the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, then later as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (War Gaming Matters), and then to sea as a carrier division commander. In November 1960, he returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Long Range Objectives Group, and in October 1962 assumed command of the Seventh Fleet. In June 1964, Admiral Moorer became Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The following April he broke his four-star flag in the dual national capacity as Commander in Chief, Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and in the NATO capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. President Lyndon B. Johnson elevated Admiral Moorer to Chief of Naval Operations and President Richard M. Nixon reappointed him on June 12, 1969. The Senate confirmed his nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 17, 1970, and he took office July 2—the first former Chief of Naval Operations to hold the post.

Admiral Moorer died in 2004 and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.
When he was tapped as Chief of Naval Operations at 49 years old, Admiral Zumwalt became the youngest officer ever named to the post. His tour was one of sweeping changes within the Navy. Entering office as defense spending declined and with a steadily aging fleet, he saw it as his job to ensure the Navy remained capable of meeting the Soviet threat. That included a program of retiring, sometimes ahead of schedule, obsolete fleet forces, in order to improve capability and maintenance elsewhere. He had to do so while enabling an overextended Navy to continue to meet mission requirements, acquire affordable equipment, and ensure lifecycle costs made it possible to adequately man, train, equip, and maintain the force. The result was a number of new programs that had lasting impacts on the warfighting readiness of the Navy.

The Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigate (FFG) was designed to provide commanders with increased capability at a reduced cost. With Admiral Zumwalt’s support, the program produced 51 FFGs for the U.S. Navy. They served the U.S. Navy for 38 years, from 1977 through 2015, and more than 20 of the American ships went on to serve in the navies of Bahrain, Egypt, Poland, Pakistan, and Turkey. The class was described by former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. as “one of the most successful shipbuilding programs in the Navy’s postwar history.”

By the time Admiral Zumwalt became CNO, the Navy was no longer building fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The newest of the original “41 for Freedom” SSBNs was commissioned three years earlier and ongoing strategic arms limitations talks, if ratified, would prevent modernization of the aging SSBN fleet. Admiral Zumwalt saw this as a threat to the future readiness of this important element of the nation’s strategic deterrent and put his support behind the design and construction of a new, more capable class of SSBN. The Ohio-class submarines were an evolutionary leap ahead of their predecessors, designed specifically for extended patrols, stealth, and increased accuracy and range of weapons. Thirty five years after Ohio was commissioned in 1981, all 18 of the boats in the class remained in service.

Admiral Zumwalt also championed the F-14 Tomcat as the Navy’s replacement for the F-4 Phantom. Admiral Zumwalt sold a reluctant Congress on the F-14 with calculations comparing a 13-carrier force carrying 301 F-14s to a 16-carrier force carrying 903 of the old F-4s. The smaller force, he said, was “militarily more effective; $2.5 billion cheaper in procurement costs; $500 million a year cheaper in operating costs and requiring 17,000 fewer Sailors.” The F-14 served in the U.S. Navy for more than 30 years from 1974 to 2006.

Admiral Zumwalt believed it was his job to “modernize and humanize the Navy,” yet he is especially remembered for his progressive personnel programs. To articulate his position on the changes he planned, Admiral Zumwalt implemented a series of naval messages given the moniker “Z-grams.” The first Z-gram was released the day he took office. A torrent of the missives followed (the first 92 of a total of 120 came out in his first year in office). They addressed personnel matters that Admiral Zumwalt described as “Mickey Mouse” issues that he believed were partially responsible for plummeting retention of a force. Reversing that trend was one of his top priorities. On November 10, 1970, he released Z-57. In it, he advised the fleet he intended to rid the Navy of demeaning or abrasive regulations, singling out one issue in particular: fashion. “I will not countenance the rights or privileges of any officers or enlisted men being abrogated in any way because they choose to grow sideburns or neatly trimmed beards or moustaches or because preferences in neat clothing styles are at variance with the taste of their seniors.”

But not all the Z-grams dealt with “Mickey Mouse” issues—some were the foundation of policies that remain in effect today. During Admiral Zumwalt’s term as CNO, the Navy, like the nation, experienced racial unrest. In Z-66 dated December 17, 1970, Admiral Zumwalt noted “there is significant discrimination in the Navy.” However, he didn’t shrink from it. “We do have problems, and it is my intention . . . to take prompt steps toward their solution.” He directed each command to appoint a special assistant for minority affairs with direct access to the commanding officer, and for commanders to ensure a minority group wife was included in the ombudsman program. He also directed the Naval Supply Systems Command to renew emphasis on meeting the special needs of minority groups in ships’ stores and other service organizations. He understood this was just the beginning and committed to further study and action. To emphasize his determination, he gave commanders until January 15, 1971—less than a month—to take action on the directives. He wrapped up the Z-gram saying, “There is no black Navy, no white Navy—just one Navy—the United States Navy.” Minority firsts in the Navy in the succeeding years can trace their roots to Z-gram 66.

Another Z-gram that has become a milestone for equality in the Navy is Z-116: Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the Navy. Like Z-66, Z-116 began the process of more fully integrating women into the Navy. Admiral Zumwalt not only believed the Navy could do better in the fair treatment of women, but he also saw women as “a vital personnel resource” in the early days of the all-volunteer force. Among other things, Z-116 opened ratings to enlisted women, established a pathway for women to be assigned to ships, and opened all staff corps and restricted line communities to women.

Emo Russell Zumwalt Jr. was born in San Francisco, California. He was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1939, graduating in 1942, a year early, due to World War II. His early sea tours included service aboard four destroyers and USS Wisconsin. He commanded USS Tills, USS Arnold J. Isbell, USS Dewey, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Seven, and Naval Forces, Vietnam. He served ashore in a number of important billets on the staffs of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. President Richard M. Nixon nominated him as CNO, and he took office on July 1, 1970, retiring on the same date in 1974. Admiral Zumwalt died January 2, 2000, at the age of 79. “At a time when morale and enthusiasm were at an all-time low, he had the vision to see a great future for the Navy,” said President William J. Clinton during a memorial service for Admiral Zumwalt. “The changes he brought about three decades ago will continue to shape the character and culture of our Navy for a long time in the 21st century.”
I

t was a time of great transition for the United States when Admiral James L. Holloway III took the helm as the Navy’s top military leader, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1974. The nation and the Navy were healing from the trauma of Vietnam and transitioning from the draft to an all-volunteer force.

While bolstering predecessor Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s revolutionary strategic and personnel initiatives, Admiral Holloway set goals of his own on readiness, flexibility, offensive capability, balance, and personnel professionalism and stability.

The seasoned admiral had the difficult task of leading the Navy through the challenges of inflation, defense spending cuts, and the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

As the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union increased after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and communism spread into Angola by Soviet and Cuban forces in 1976, Admiral Holloway was among other military leaders who held the line as the Soviets continued to flex their growing fleet further and further into international waters. Playing a crucial role in negotiations during Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, Admiral Holloway’s direct influence on President Gerald Ford ended the SALT II Treaty proposal to ban the cruise missile, which is still the Navy’s principal offensive weapon for destroyers, cruisers, and submarines.

Having newly-gained leverage, Admiral Holloway, an advocate of standardized processes, set out to reorganize fleet operating forces into battle groups, integrating carriers, cruisers, and submarines into individual tactical units. These battle groups would exploit the expanded warfare capabilities of surface combatants and enable a full range of naval abilities—in support of the national strategy of forward posture—to handle hostile threats.

This led to one of Admiral Holloway’s most significant contributions as CNO: establishing the Battle Force Fleet organization. By using understandable terms and language, the instruction provided a succinct and common reference for all naval personnel while providing Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a deeper understanding of the Navy’s roles in effective joint strategies, plans, and operations.

While under Admiral Holloway’s watch, the Navy assisted in the evacuation of thousands of Cyprus residents during political unrest between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1974. The Navy also provided support in 1976 during evacuation of Americans from Lebanon and the Korean DMZ incident when two American Army officers were killed by North Korean soldiers during a tree-trimming in the Joint Security Area.

Admiral Holloway’s leadership and ability to advocate for the Navy were also evident during the early days of the F/A-18 Hornet. In 1975, the CNO successfully argued to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to sign off on the Navy’s fighter-attack F-18 type rather than the Air Force preference of the F-16 Light Weight Fighter (LWF). The F-18 type was designed for the all-weather capable AIM-7 Sparrow III missile, while the F-16 LWF was designed for the Sidewinder missile system that operated best under clear-air conditions. The F/A-18 replaced both the A-7 attack plane and the F-14 Tomcat, with the Hornets coming into the fleet in 1983.


James Lemuel Holloway III was born in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1922. He and his father, Admiral James L. Holloway Jr., both served as four-star admirals in the U.S. Navy while on active duty, the only son and father to do so to date. This member of Naval Academy class of 1943 reached the fleet a year early due to acceleration of graduation for several wartime-era classes. He served on destroyers during World War II, torpedoeing a Japanese battleship during the Battle of Surigao Strait as gunnery officer of USS Bennon.

Following World War II, he became a naval aviator. He flew missions during the Korean War and in 1959, as the Deputy CNO for Air Warfare, developed the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) program. This program is still in effect more than 55 years later and has been credited with substantially reducing naval aviation accidents.

He commanded the first nuclear-powered carrier, USS Enterprise, during two Vietnam War combat cruises in the Gulf of Tonkin and, returning to the Pentagon in 1968, he helped establish the Navy’s Nuclear Powered Carrier Program, building the USS Nimitz and paving the way for nine more supercarriers. Other accomplishments include commanding Sixth Fleet Carrier Striking Force during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 and commanding Seventh Fleet in 1972 during the Vietnam War.

Having served 36 years on active duty, Admiral Holloway retired in 1978, but he remains closely involved with the Navy. In 2007 Holloway published Aircraft Carriers at War, a book that he describes as a “contemporary perspective of the events, decisions, and outcomes in the history of the Cold War—Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet confrontation—that shaped today’s U.S. Navy and its principal ships-of-the-line, the large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.”

Admiral Holloway served as president of the Naval Historical Foundation from 1980 to 1998 and ten years more as chairman. Since 2008 he has served as elected chairman emeritus. His support for the Navy’s official history programs made possible the Naval History and Heritage Command’s online Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships project, one of the most important U.S. naval history resources available to a worldwide audience.
During the years following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the Navy was faced with the challenges of an all-volunteer force after the draft ended in 1973. Many draftees left when their term was up. A number of noncommissioned officers, seeing improved prospects for pay and quality of life in the civilian sector, also left, taking with them decades of collective expertise. Retention rates fell from 64 percent to 45 percent. It was during this time that Admiral Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations.

Testifying before Congress, Admiral Hayward called this mass exodus a “hemorrhage of talent” that severely affected the combat readiness of the Navy. In 1980, the year Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer coined the term “hollow force,” the lack of boiler technicians and machinist mates forced USS Canisteo to be removed from operations. Unless the President, Congress, and the public fulfilled their commitment to raise pay to a level comparable to that of the civilian sector and improve living standards, the Navy would be forced to place more of the fleet in an inactive status indefinitely.

In a 2002 interview with Paul Stillwell for the book Reminiscences of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired), Admiral Hayward summed up the challenges: “Not enough people, not the right kind of people, nobody’s been trained.” One of his first initiatives as CNO was to travel to all of the training commands. He observed tiles falling out of the ceilings, insufficient tools to train the Sailors, and bases in disrepair. In response, Admiral Hayward directed his admirals, “You find the money to fix that problem. We cannot tolerate that. . . .Let’s get some pride back into who we are.” Within six months, Admiral Hayward indicated he was pleased to see attitudes turn around.

Admiral Hayward also looked to his senior enlisted leadership, not to put out new directives or instructions, but to “execute the ones we have in a professional manner,” as he explained in a 1981 All Hands Magazine article. He emphasized that “our standards must be more than a mirror of society. Civilian members of our society have not taken solemn oaths; we in the Navy have. . . .Our standards must be visibly higher than those of the society around us.”

Admiral Hayward tied the issue of retention to the Navy’s need to outpace the Soviet threat and maintain supremacy on the ocean. Without crucial staffing, the most advanced warfighting systems and ships in the world would not be ready to fight when called upon. The fleet was “undermanned and overworked,” Admiral Hayward recalled during a Stillwell interview. He recognized that “the Vietnam demand was an intense one, and that intensity kept the focus properly on Vietnam.” But in the meantime, a Soviet naval threat loomed.

The U.S. Navy began operating in the Indian Ocean to counter the Soviets, who were increasingly deploying “out of area,” according to Hayward’s 1979 strategic document “The Future of U.S. Sea Power.” The Soviets were also building up their submarine fleet and Backfire-B bombers. Yet thanks to the investment made in a little atoll about 1,000 miles south of India called Diego Garcia, the Navy had nuclear deterrence capability against the Soviets. Admiral Hayward further strengthened the Navy to meet the challenge of a growing Soviet power by building sophisticated submarines, surface ships, and aircraft and promoting a global, offensive-minded maritime strategy. The 12-carrier battle group was his design.

When the Iran hostage situation began in 1979, the Navy had already been operating continuously in the area. “But it was stretching the heck out of our forces,” Admiral Hayward recalled during a Stillwell interview. The Navy was also operating in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. With the resources and manning available, the Navy was “trying to meet a three-ocean requirement with a one-and-a-half-ocean Navy.”

Admiral Hayward warned that just because the nation was “technically” at peace, the Navy should not relax. “We should not be lulled into thinking that the job will be any easier because we are operating in a ‘peacetime’ environment,” he advised in the March 1982 All Hands Magazine. During a 1982 change of command for the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, Hayward continued to press for the need of both manning and ships: “Our narrow margin of maritime superiority over the Soviet navy has vanished.”

Admiral Hayward managed to successfully argue for an increase in fleet capabilities. The citation for his 1982 Defense Distinguished Service Medal reads: “He was singularly effective in facilitating just pay and compensation for military personnel, and in initiating critical building programs to enhance essential naval warfare capabilities.”

Thomas Bibb Hayward was born in 1924 in Glendale, California. After serving as an enlisted Sailor during World War II, he attended the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating in 1947. An aviator, he repeatedly served on board aircraft carriers at sea and in training and test pilot commands ashore. Combat command of Carrier Air Wing Ten and aircraft carrier USS America during the Vietnam War rounded out his sea duty, and he served as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet and then as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet prior to being named CNO.
Admiral Watkins served as Chief of Naval Operations as the relationship between the United States and the Soviets began to deteriorate toward the end of the Cold War. The Soviets were expanding their boundaries of operations in the oceans, including sailing into the Gulf of Mexico.

During his tenure as CNO, Admiral Watkins developed a maritime strategy for dealing with the Soviet navy, keeping their naval forces on the defensive and ultimately demonstrating to the world that the United States Navy was a formidable foe.

It would not be an easy task. According to a Congressional Budget Office report in March 1982, between 1970 and 1980 the number of ships in the Navy fell from 847 to 538 and uniformed personnel declined from 675,000 to 525,000. Watkins’ predecessor, CNO Thomas B. Hayward, stated the Navy “had been at virtually a wartime operating tempo since the beginning of the Vietnam conflict and has never stood down.”

Admiral Watkins would be one of the early supporters of President Ronald W. Reagan’s military buildup to defend against a missile attack, believing nuclear deterrence would work as well as a defense mechanism rather than just perceived just as an offensive threat.

The Reagan administration proposed a 600-ship initiative to bring the armed forces back into fighting shape to prepare for a potential face-off with the Soviets. The ambitious five-year plan called for 133 new construction ships at the cost of more than $80 billion, but the 600-ship initiative was never achieved under mounting pressures to reduce the national deficit.

Admiral Watkins would work tirelessly to oversee the rebuilding program that would continue the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine program first commissioned in 1981; a redesign of the Los Angeles-class attack submarines that allowed 12 new vertical launch tubes capable of firing Tomahawk missiles; and ramping up the production of the remaining seven Nimitz-class aircraft carriers to join USS Nimitz, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and USS Carl Vinson. The 600-ship initiative also included recommissioning the pre-World War II-era Iowa-class battleships—Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin—that had already served in four wars. They were to be refitted with Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles to augment their 16-inch guns. The plan also called for weaponry that included Harpoons, Tomahawks, and AGM-88 HARM missiles, and the 25 cruisers and destroyers included in the program would be equipped with AEGIS or AEGIS-derivative AAW systems.

Massive naval exercises were held annually in sea areas close to the Soviet Union. Admiral Watkins ensured naval forces operated in support of national objectives in Grenada, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf as well.

Improving the quality of life for Sailors and their families was an immediate priority for Admiral Watkins, who pushed for better pay and more support for spouses and children when the Sailor was deployed. The CNO also encouraged a new generation of officers to become more deeply involved in what the Navy was doing at home and globally. This effort addressed an era he described as one of “violent peace” with a new forward-thinking and forward-deployed maritime strategy.

That strategy would come into play in March 1986 when the Navy challenged—yet again—Libya’s claim to the entire Gulf of Sidra by crossing Muammar al-Qadafi’s “Line of Death.” On March 23 Libya launched four surface-to-air missiles toward USS America’s F-14A Tomcats conducting freedom of navigation operations that would begin a day of missile-launching attacks and counterattacks. By the end of the airstrike, there were no American losses, but 35 Libyan seamen were killed and there were numerous material losses.

James David Watkins was born on March 7, 1927, in Alhambra, California, the sixth of seven children. After receiving his bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1949, Watkins served on submarines during the Korean and Vietnam wars. In 1958 he earned a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

As a nuclear officer, Admiral Watkins served under Admiral Hyman G. Rickover during the development of the nuclear propulsion program.

He served as executive officer of the submarine USS Barbero and as both executive officer and commanding officer of the submarine USS Snook. He participated in two cruises to the Western Pacific and the Snook, under his command, was the first nuclear-powered submarine to visit the Republic of Korea and Yokosuka, Japan. He was executive officer of USS Long Beach during the Vietnam War, which included a deployment in 1968 to the Gulf of Tonkin while supporting Task Force 72.

Admiral Watkins’ broad knowledge of naval operations propelled him up the Navy’s chain of command. As a flag officer, he served as Chief of Naval Personnel, Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. In 1982 President Ronald W. Reagan appointed Admiral Watkins to the post of Chief of Naval Operations.

He held many prestigious posts after his retirement from 37 years of naval service in 1986. After completing his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins was appointed by President Reagan to lead the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic; from 1989 to 1993 he served as the Secretary of Energy for President George H. W. Bush; and in 2001 he was named chairman of the Commission on Ocean Policy, a position created by President George W. Bush.

Two weeks after retiring as CNO on June 30, 1986, Admiral Watkins gave the eulogy at the funeral for his mentor and long-time friend, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who he credited with shaping him as a young officer. “The Navy changed me,” Admiral Watkins told The Los Angeles Times in 1988. “(Admiral Hyman) Rickover had an intense interest in getting involved with the best and the brightest, and he drove it very hard. . . . He got me to understand the importance of education and doing everything you can to measure up to your God-given potential.”

Admiral Watkins died at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, on July 26, 2012. Interment was at Arlington National Cemetery.
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost facilitated the transition of the U.S. Navy from a Cold War focus on sea control to a new emphasis on regional littoral conflicts.

He confronted growing tensions in the Middle East, complicated by the Iran-Iraq War. Less than one year into his tour, on May 17, 1987, the USS Stark was hit by two missiles fired by an Iraqi aircraft that killed 37. Starting in 1987 and for more than a year, the Navy supported Operation Earnest Will, escorting Kuwait-owned tankers to ensure their safe passage in the Gulf. In response to a missile attack on the MV Sea Isle City, the Navy launched Operation Nimble Archer to destroy two Iranian oil platforms. Only a few months later, on April 14, 1988, the guided-missile frigate Samuel B. Roberts, while on escort patrol in the Persian Gulf, was severely damaged by an Iranian mine. In response the Navy retaliated by attacking more oil platforms and Iranian vessels during Operation Praying Mantis. While hostilities were active in the Persian Gulf, there were operations close to home as well requiring naval capabilities. In 1989 the U.S. Navy provided critical support to SEAL and other military forces operating to restore democracy in Panama.

At home, he faced the more pressing task of meeting Defense Secretary Dick Cheney’s request for the military to cut its projected spending by $180 billion.

Just one year into Admiral Trost’s term as CNO, President Ronald W. Reagan was urging “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” By the end of Admiral Trost’s term, the Berlin Wall was down. As the Soviet Union crumbled, however, Admiral Trost never wavered from his belief that the Navy needed to remain vigilant with its forward presence. He warned of “governments of fanatics” whose national policy was to destroy democracy. “They move in wherever they perceive a weakness. They use terrorism as an instrument; they use it coldly and deliberately. In many ways, these governments are an even more visible threat to us . . . .”

Among his goals as CNO was to maintain the Navy’s global maritime superiority, “a sufficient force to carry out our national strategy of deterrence, crisis control and support our allies,” not only from larger threats, such as the Soviet Union and China, but also from smaller nations, drug traffickers, and terrorists. To achieve that mission would require the U.S. Navy to maintain its advantage in antisubmarine warfare, using forward flexible forces that only the Navy could provide.

Admiral Trost made joint international exercises with allies a part of the Navy’s operational and training missions. He invited CNOs from other countries and also visited them to assess their viability as allies and partners.

In October 1989 Admiral Trost made a historic visit to the Soviet Union where he met with his Soviet counterpart and fellow submariner, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin. His trip’s purpose was to enhance mutual understanding and reduce tensions between the two countries. Admiral Trost toured a nuclear-powered submarine and cruiser and spoke to more than 1,200 students, faculty, and senior officers at the Soviet naval academy.

Admiral Trost dealt with more than budget cuts and the Soviets. A series of mishaps in 1989 forced Trost to suspend all air, land, and sea operations for 48 hours in order to review safety procedures. Among those was the explosion on April 19 that killed 47 gun turret crewmen on the battleship USS Iowa. Within hours of the incident, Trost issued a moratorium on 16-inch guns being fired.

Through his guidance and perseverance in keeping the Navy and Sailors at operational readiness, the United States was prepared to lead a multinational force in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, months after his departure from office.

A native of Illinois, Carlisle Albert Herman Trost was born in Valmeyer in 1930. After graduating first in his class from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1953, he joined the crew of a destroyer and then attended submarine school and was trained in nuclear power, graduating number one in that class as well. In 1956 he was stationed on USS Sirago.

As a junior officer he was awarded an Olmstead Scholarship to study at the University of Freiburg, Germany. During the 1970s Admiral Trost completed assignments as the naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy; Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel; and Director, Navy Program Planning. During his more than 37 years of commissioned service, Admiral Trost served at sea in destroyers and diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines. He was executive officer of two nuclear-powered submarines and commanding officer of a fleet ballistic missile submarine.

Subsequent to selection to flag rank in 1973, he commanded Submarine Flotilla One and Submarine Group Five. Later operational assignments included Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Seventh Fleet; Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. Ashore, Admiral Trost was military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy; on the Navy staff as Director, Systems Analysis Division; Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel; and Director, Navy Program Planning.

He retired at the end of his term as Chief of Naval Operations on June 29, 1990.
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II led the Navy in a period of significant drawdown of U.S. naval forces in the wake of the presumed end of the Cold War. The Navy staff was reorganized, reduced in size, and diversified while embracing closer joint operations with the other services. The shore establishment was significantly reduced and bases closed to match the needs of a smaller Navy.

He oversaw the introduction of new platforms and systems that improved capabilities, including precision strike operations. The nation persistently called on the naval capabilities throughout his tour, starting with Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991. He also served concurrently as the CNO and as acting Secretary of the Navy for seven and a half months in 1993, after SECNAV Sean O’Keefe left that office when President George H. W. Bush’s term ended January 20, 1993.

Admiral Kelso oversaw revolutionary changes within the OPNAV staff and profoundly changed the means by which the Navy processed and made decisions. In keeping with Joint Staff practices, he changed “OP” codes to “N” codes, and the staff was reorganized to align with a “Napoleonic” arrangement used by both the Army and the Joint Staff. In a period of dramatic change, he helped transform not merely the organization but also the processes by which information could be shared and considered. He is credited with dramatically changing the means by which more informed decisions could be made by the Navy.

As CNO at the time of the 1991 Tailhook Convention, during which numerous incidents of sexual assault and harassment were found to have occurred, Admiral Kelso found himself at the epicenter of the debate on the treatment of women in the military. Tailhook was a turbulent event for the entire Navy, resulting in the resignation of Secretary of the Navy Henry L. Garrett III on June 26, 1992, and arguably precipitated momentum to support widening opportunities for women in the services. Admiral Kelso, a proponent of allowing women to serve in expanded roles, embraced the integration. While for women in the services. Admiral Kelso, a proponent of allowing women to serve in expanded roles, embraced the integration.

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Admiral Kelso also worked through considerable public interest surrounding a gun turret explosion on the battleship USS Iowa that killed 47 crew members in April 1989. The initial Navy investigation completed before he took office suggested the explosion was a deliberate act most likely caused by one of the crew members. The Navy’s findings precipitated Congressional and media interest, and ultimately the CNO apologized to members of the Sailor’s family, stating publicly there was no evidence to support he had committed suicide and “despite all efforts no certain answer regarding the cause of this terrible tragedy can be found.” The four battleships that had been recommissioned in the 1980s—Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri and Wisconsin—were all decommissioned by 1992. All now serve as museum ships.

Frank Benton Kelso II was born on July 11, 1933, in Fayetteville, Tennessee. He attended the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1956. Kelso served at sea on a cargo ship and diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines. He was the engineering officer on a ballistic missile submarine, the executive officer of two nuclear-powered submarines, and the commanding officer of two attack submarines.

His shore assignments included command of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School; staff of Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command; and U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. He served as Commander, Submarine Squadron 7; Division Director, Submarine Distribution Division in the Naval Military Personnel Command; and Section Head of the Submarine Programs Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training). He was selected for promotion to rear admiral in 1980.

Admiral Kelso served as Director, Strategic Submarine Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and then as Director, Office of Program Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. In 1985 he became Commander, Sixth Fleet and NATO Commander, Naval Striking Force and Support Forces, Southern Europe. During this tour members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro and killed a disabled passenger. They negotiated safe refuge and were flown toward Tunisia; the plane was intercepted by U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats and forced to land in Siganella, Sicily, where the hijackers were arrested and later tried for murder.

In March of 1986 the United States initiated a series of “Freedom of Navigation” exercises that challenged Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi’s “line of death.” Then-Vice Admiral Kelso deployed elements of Task Force 60, including three aircraft carriers, 250 aircraft (1,546 sorties), and 26 ships and submarines across the line and triggered Libyan action. The next month, following additional terrorist attacks sponsored by al-Qadhafi, the United States launched Operation El Dorado Canyon—attacks against Libyan military targets. Under Admiral Kelso, U.S. aircraft attacked three target areas near Tripoli.


He retired in 1994 after 38 years of service. Kelso returned to his hometown in Fayetteville, Tennessee, in 2003 where he remained until his death at 79 on June 23, 2013. He is buried in Fayetteville in the historic Rose Hill Cemetery.
Admiral Jeremy "Mike" Boorda, known as a “Sailor’s Sailor,” was the first surface warrior to hold the office since Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and the first enlisted Sailor to rise continuously from the ranks to become Chief of Naval Operations. Within a year, he had promulgated “Forward . . . . From the Sea,” which emphasized a post-Cold War Navy focused on combat-credible forward presence that would be borne out consistently in operations. Experienced in manpower and personnel areas, he managed the largest mandated reduction in naval personnel since World War II with sensitivity and careful priorities while driving Navy modernization with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, a new attack submarine, Surface Combatant 21, and theater ballistic missile defense.

Forward presence as a central U.S. Navy tenet was the premise in “Forward . . . . From the Sea” and the primary driver in the Navy’s budget while Admiral Boorda was Chief of Naval Operations. It also included justification for the twelfth carrier. Experienced in manpower and personnel areas, he managed the largest mandated reduction in naval personnel since World War II with sensitivity and careful priorities while driving Navy modernization with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, a new attack submarine, Surface Combatant 21, and theater ballistic missile defense.

Admiral Boorda became Chief of Naval Operations after a relatively bumpy period of negative publicity for the Navy—from Tailhook to a cheating scandal at the U.S. Naval Academy to an accidental firing on a Turkish destroyer—and he worked hard at returning a sense of pride to those serving. His predecessor, Admiral Frank Kelso, had instituted the “Sailor’s Creed” for all enlisted to memorize at boot camp. Admiral Boorda replaced the word “bluejacket” with “Navy” to include all hands in this unifying effort, emphasizing that Navy personnel are Sailors first and their ranks second.

Much like Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Boorda focused his energies on improving the quality of life for all Sailors. He was well known for ignoring concerns about setting precedents that could not be maintained, emphasizing instead the need to do the right thing for individual Sailors. His tenure saw the first women deploy in combat and the first African-American admiral, J. Paul Reason, achieve four-star rank. Admiral Boorda also reinstituted a program known as “Seaman to Admiral” to provide Sailors the same promotional opportunity he had.
Admiral Jay L. Johnson served as interim Chief of Naval Operations following Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda’s death in May 1996, and he was confirmed for the position in August. During his confirmation hearing, Admiral Johnson stated, “As a vision for the future, let me just say that we will steer by the stars and not the wake.” He explained that four stars of equal magnitude in the constellation would guide the Navy: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork, and pride.

Described as a champion of reform, Admiral Johnson improved the interdeployment training cycle—the period between deployments—by reducing at-sea time, easing wear and tear on equipment, and ensuring Sailors could spend more time in port with their families. His improvements included empowering the Navy’s commanding officers by removing redundant inspections and burdensome paperwork and raising morale among Sailors, while giving commanders the opportunity to truly lead their ships, squadrons, submarines, and SEAL teams.

Even as the Navy was reduced in size over the previous decade, the number of operational tasks for the Navy continued to increase, from promoting stability, providing timely crisis response, deterring aggression, or if required, fighting and winning, a responsibility Admiral Johnson said was the Navy’s “most fundamental, enduring strength.”

Admiral Johnson employed a three-part strategy—shaping, responding, preparing—with a force shaped around 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups. The Navy often had half of its fleet underway, and 32 percent of that forward deployed, capable of responding to a full spectrum of crises whenever tasked.

Admiral Johnson also led the Joint Chiefs of Staff in calling for improved personnel compensation. He was the first service chief to step forward and support food stamp relief for needy Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, and Marines. He was instrumental in restoring full retirement pay for military retirees and in pushing for larger increases in annual military pay raises.

With promulgation of the “. . . From the Sea” and “Forward. . . From the Sea” naval strategies, Admiral Johnson guided the Navy to focus on operating in the littoral zones of the world that encompassed areas of strategic importance to the United States, as well as to enhance the reach inland from the sea for joint and coalition forces.

“Seventy-five percent of Earth’s population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major commercial centers lie in the littorals,” Admiral Johnson said of his 1997 strategy plan. “These are the places where American influence and power have the greatest impact and are needed most often. For forward-deployed naval forces, the littorals are a starting point as well as a destination. The mission may require us to exercise our considerable reach and operate far inland.”

To replace worn-out equipment, Admiral Johnson emphasized development of the next generation of ships, aircraft, and information systems.

An advocate for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program, Admiral Johnson emphasized the importance of maintaining the Navy’s air superiority into the future. He believed the F/A-18E/F was the cornerstone of the future of carrier aviation and the Navy’s number one aviation priority. “You can’t think about the F/A-18E/F without thinking about Jay Johnson,” said Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig. “He virtually willed this program into success. We are buying aircraft that will transform the nature of naval aviation and protect it for decades ahead because of Jay Johnson.”

Additionally, during his tenure Admiral Johnson helped formulate military policy to respond to persistent tensions and aggressive actions in Southwest Asia, such as Operation Desert Strike on September 6, 1996, in retaliation for Saddam Hussein moving 40,000 troops into northern Iraq, threatening the Kurds, and violating the no-fly zone. A coordinated cruise missile attack targeted Iraqi air defense infrastructure. When Operation Provide Comfort ended on December 31, 1996, the Navy continued to offer protection for the Iraqi population in Iraq with the no-fly zones of Operations Northern and Southern Watch, which expanded the reach of the zone to include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Hussein continued to resist UN directives to allow Special Commission inspectors into Iraq to look for weapons of mass destruction, so from December 16 to 19, 1998, U.S.-led coalition forces bombed Iraqi targets during Operation Desert Fox.

Admiral Johnson also helped form NATO’s answer to Serbian aggression in Operation Allied Force in 1999. While he served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sailors participated in 45 operations around the world, ranging from humanitarian efforts to intense combat.

Jay Lynn Johnson was born in 1946 in Great Falls, Montana, and raised in West Salem, Wisconsin. Johnson graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1968 and, upon completion of flight training, was designated a naval aviator in 1969. Johnson served two combat tours in Vietnam. He later flew F-14 Tomcat fighters and commanded Fighter Squadron 84. He next commanded Carrier Air Wing One and led its squadrons in a 1986 strike on Libya. In July 1994 Johnson took command of the U.S. Second Fleet. He became Chief of Naval Operations during a time of increased U.S. commitments to international peacekeeping operations.

Admiral Johnson retired as the 26th CNO on July 21, 2000, in a retirement and change of command ceremony at the U.S. Naval Academy, where his naval career began.
Admiral Vernon E. Clark
Twenty-Seventh Chief of Naval Operations
July 21, 2000–July 22, 2005

Admiral Clark had been Chief of Naval Operations only two months when a terrorist suicide attack blasted a hole into the side of guided-missile destroyer USS Cole while the ship was harbored at a Yemen port on October 12, 2000. As the Navy adapted to an enemy with neither geographic borders nor moral boundaries, the September 11, 2001, attacks further signified that the battlespace had changed. American Airlines Flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon just yards from the CNO’s office. Admiral Clark would spend the remainder of his time as CNO shaping the Navy to fight a war against terrorism.

Under his guidance, the Navy was at the forefront during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In OEF, the Navy outfitted the USS Kitty Hawk with a contingent of special forces from which a meaningful land campaign could be launched and sustained. In OIF, five carrier strike groups deployed in simultaneous support of major combat operations in the war. The Navy also operated closer to the home front while supporting Homeland Security’s Noble Eagle response following the 9/11 attacks.

To counter the risk of regional and widespread terrorism, Admiral Clark stressed that the Navy “must expand its striking power, achieve information dominance, and develop transformational ways of fulfilling our enduring missions of sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift and forward presence.” He would achieve that with his innovative strategic plan, “Seapower 21,” which utilized three fundamental concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. These elements would revamp the Navy into a more cost-efficient, strategically defensive, and effective service. Admiral Clark stated, “Bringing the fight to our enemies is our mission. Transforming ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades ahead is our imperative. Our task: Prevail today while bridging to a successful future.”

Warfare had become anything but predictable, so he sought to improve flexibility of the ship maintenance schedules that rendered non-deployable significant portions of the fleet. His Fleet Response Plan brought major change to the means by which ships were maintained. His other innovations included standing up the Expeditionary Strike Group Command for fast action overseas. Admiral Clark recognized that “speed is not just about how fast your ships or airplanes go, it also is about how responsive and agile your organizations are.”

Through his tenure as CNO, Admiral Clark remained focused on his top five priorities: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and alignment. That included a shift from a planned maintenance system to one based more on the readiness condition of the ship in order to maintain operational readiness. “It’s critical to mission accomplishment,” explained Admiral Clark, “If our fleets, staffs and various systems are in alignment, we can more effectively accomplish our primary mission and that’s victory in combat.”

As the first CNO to face budget constraints following 9/11, Admiral Clark applied business tactics to reorganize the Navy into a more efficient and productive military branch. He proposed cutting the number of military personnel in order to reallocate the funding to purchase more ships. To balance the impact of this policy, he promoted the education of current staff. In order to increase retention of naval service members he implemented a personnel plan that enabled Sailors to develop their own career paths. The Navy expanded educational opportunities for Sailors with internet-based courses afloat as well as traditional opportunities like the Program Afloat for College Education (PACE). Admiral Clark credited the Navy’s personnel with making “ours the greatest Navy ever to sail the world’s oceans; our ability to attract, train, and retain them is a testament to the health of our service and an indicator of our proper heading as we chart our course into the twenty-first century.”

Admiral Clark retired many ships during his time as Chief of Naval Operations. Innovations in systems maintenance and a reduction in the number of personnel required to serve on active ships further cut operational costs across the fleet. While Admiral Clark served as CNO, the Navy purchased ships on an installment plan rather than paid in full, which made available additional money for personnel retention and educational training. “At the heart of everything good that is happening in our Navy today is the vital fact that we are winning the battle for people. We are attracting, developing, and retaining a talented cadre of professionals who have chosen a life of service. Our ability to challenge them with meaningful, satisfying work that lets them make a difference is fundamental to our covenant with them as leaders,” Admiral Clark testified before the House Appropriations Committee in March 2005.

He retired a few months later on July 22, 2005, the longest serving CNO since Admiral Arleigh Burke.

Vernon E. Clark was born in Sioux City, Iowa. A graduate of Evangel College, Clark continued his education to earn a master of business administration from the University of Arkansas. Afterward, he attended Officer Candidate School and received his commission in August 1968.

He served aboard destroyers such as USS John W. Weeks and USS Gearing. During his time as a lieutenant, he commanded the Asheville-class gunboat Grand Rapids. He later commanded USS McCoy, USS Spruance, Atlantic Fleet’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center, Destroyer Squadron Seventeen, and Destroyer Squadron Five.

During his time ashore he served as an Assistant Director of the System Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Other assignments included Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) as well as Administrative Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
As a fleet officer, Admiral Michael G. “Mike” Mullen envisioned seapower as a show of force to deter terrorism or other acts of aggression. As Chief of Naval Operations, however, seapower began to take on a different meaning. It still included a strong forward presence in the blue waters and brown littorals, but it also included those serving on shore providing humanitarian aid or rebuilding infrastructure torn down by years of conflict.

As Admiral Mullen told students at the Naval War College in August 2005, the bigger picture relies on a “very different image of seapower” that includes “doctors and nurses healing the sick.” American warships may deter acts of violence, but it will be the service members providing aid who will change how Americans are perceived globally, Mullen explained in a 2006 interview with Seapower Magazine.

Just one month into his assignment as CNO, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans with loss of life and property damage. On Admiral Mullen’s watch, the Navy dispatched Sailors, Seabees and more than 20 ships, including hospital ship USNS Comfort; provided medical services for the hurricane-stricken city; and oversaw search and rescue, search and recovery, and dive and salvage operations.

A bit further from home, Admiral Mullen was tasked with providing the forces and capabilities to support the combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen referred to the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan as the “long war,” one that will be “generational,” with perhaps his grandchildren and even their children still fighting it.

Despite the strain on his current fleet in directly supporting two wars, his vision never waned. “I have three priorities … and they are to get it right for our people, operate our fleet and build the fleet for the future,” he said during an All Hands call at Naval Station Norfolk in May 2007.

As the United States continued fighting in ground wars, the Navy’s role became more expansive, and its definition of seapower evolved with mushrooming threats. According to Admiral Mullen, seapower was a “forward-deployed Navy, rotational and surge capable, in support of the joint force, large enough, agile enough, and lethal enough to deter any threat and defeat any foe.”

In January 2006 Admiral Mullen established the U.S. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to realign the existing expeditionary units under a single type command. NECC aimed to be more capable, responsive, and effective in responding to the requirements ordered by U.S. joint combatant commanders fighting terrorism and beyond.

Admiral Mullen also developed the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, which was designed to stabilize the fleet at 313 ships from 281 ships. The 2007 plan supported the Navy’s trend toward modernization and a larger force to carry on the fight against terrorism while remaining capable of providing humanitarian relief and deterring potential combatants in the maritime domain.

During his tenure as CNO, Admiral Mullen tasked the Naval War College with creating a new maritime strategy that addressed the challenges of the time and guided the Navy in an entirely new, globally connected environment. Representatives from the CNO’s staff and the Naval War College traveled throughout the country to facilitate the Maritime Strategy Symposium Series. This effort to define a new maritime strategy for the nation included involving American citizens through a series of public forums.

The maritime forces of the United States—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—came together to create the unified maritime strategy. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was released under Admiral Mullen’s successor, Admiral Gary Roughead.

Michael Glenn “Mike” Mullen was born in 1946 in Los Angeles. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy as a recruited basketball player and graduated in 1968. In 1985 Mullen earned a master of science degree in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and in 1991 he graduated from the advanced management program at the Harvard Business School.

As a junior officer, he served in various leadership positions aboard USS Collett, USS Blandy, USS Fox, and USS Sterett. Mullen commanded three ships: USS Noxubee, USS Goldsborough, and USS Yorktown. As a flag officer, he commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two and the George Washington Battle Group. His last command at sea was as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet/Commander, NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic.

Shore assignments included Company Officer and Executive Assistant to the Commandant of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy. He also served in the Bureau of Naval Personnel as Director, Surface Officer Distribution and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the staff of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. On the Chief of Naval Operations’ staff, he served as Deputy Director and Director of Surface Warfare; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8); and as the 32nd Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Before being named Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mullen’s final operational assignment was as Commander, Joint Force Command Naples/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. After two years as CNO, Admiral Mullen was sworn in as the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 2007. He was nominated and confirmed unanimously for a second term, which began Oct. 1, 2009. Admiral Mullen retired on Sept. 30, 2011.
Admiral Gary Roughead assumed the Navy’s helm nearly six years into a multifront war on terror. The Navy was supporting military operations against terrorists at sea and contributing significant forces to operations against enemies on land—in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in numerous countries around the world.

As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Roughead guided the Navy through a challenging period of transformation in fiscal, security, and personnel matters. He had to sustain an ambitious wartime fighting force, yet transition the 20th-century Navy to an increasingly perilous 21st-century battlespace, which included cyber warfare, the proliferation of affordable nuclear and missile technology, nonstate combatant networks and forces, the increased focus on naval power by many nations, and spiraling force acquisition costs and delivery timelines. He was also determined not to reduce the nation’s historical commitment to supremacy at sea. As he put it, he never wanted to see America’s Sailors in a fair fight.

As Chief of Naval Operations, his leadership reshaped the Navy strategically and operationally. Shortly after taking office Admiral Roughead, among others, introduced A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the landmark U.S. maritime strategy document coauthored by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It was, in effect, a blueprint for the future of the nation’s maritime forces and relationships with its many global partners.

Innovations under his administration restructured Navy fleets in a number of ways. He reestablished Fourth Fleet in the Caribbean and then appointed for the first time a Navy SEAL as commander of a numbered fleet. He also stood up Fleet Cyber Command as the Tenth Fleet, while consolidating the Navy’s information-related communities together in the Information Dominance Corps.

Recapitalizing a global blue-water fleet remained a priority throughout Admiral Roughead’s tour. His leadership was critical in securing investment and support for a dual-block purchase of the littoral combat ship. He advocated buying ten ships of both variants in order to rapidly expand force structure with agile, fast, and flexible platforms more capable and responsive to the threats faced at sea. The Navy also restarted the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production line while truncating the DDG-1000 program to three ships.

One concerted effort launched in the wake of the 9/11 attack was the recruitment and growth of special forces—in the Navy’s case, SEALs—to more nimbly respond to world events. Efforts in this regard bore fruit in two high-profile operations during his tour as CNO. The first was the at-sea rescue of the captain of the hijacked American-flagged motor vessel Maersk Alabama, who had been taken hostage by pirates off Somalia in April 2009. The second was the successful raid and killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011.

Two events that captured the world’s attention demonstrated Admiral Roughead’s investment in delivering capability and capacity when nations needed it most: Operation Unified Response (the U.S. military’s response to the January 12, 2010, Haiti earthquake) and Operation Tomodachi (the Department of Defense’s disaster relief to Japan following the March 12, 2011, earthquake and tsunami). Within one week of the Haiti earthquake, the U.S. Navy had dedicated 17 ships, 48 helicopters, and 12 fixed-wing aircraft in support of approximately 10,000 Sailors and Marines for Operation Unified Response. As many as 16 U.S. Navy ships participated in Operation Tomodachi. Commander, Seventh Fleet oversaw 160 search and relief air sorties for 1,100 flight hours, delivered 260 tons of relief supplies, and helped clear the ports of Hachinohe, Aomori; Miyako, Iwate; and Kesennuma, Miyagi. These disasters and the corresponding relief efforts illustrated the value of the American maritime forces in an increasingly connected world.

Admiral Roughead recognized that the influence of social media had become undeniable on the global stage and publicly espoused that government leaders who were reluctant to allow access to social media were making a strategic error. He went on to say that the Navy was irreversibly committed to engaging in social media throughout the organization and had come to realize the demand for radical transparency in external communications.

Admiral Roughead also led the Navy in another considerable change for the military force, the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that prevented openly gay people from serving in the military. As CNO, Admiral Roughead led the Navy through a comprehensive training and certification program aimed at ameliorating religious and societal concerns of its members. He certified the service was ready to implement the change and, three days before Admiral Roughead left office, the policy was officially repealed on September 20, 2011.

Gary Roughead was born in 1951 in Buffalo, New York, and is a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Among his six operational commands, Roughead was the first officer to command both classes of Aegis ships, having commanded USS Barry and USS Port Royal. As a flag officer, he commanded Cruiser Destroyer Group 2, the George Washington Battle Group, and U.S. 2nd Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic and Naval Forces North Fleet East. At the time he was on active duty, Roughead was one of only two officers to have commanded the fleets in both the Pacific and Atlantic, having commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Joint Task Force 519, as well as U.S. Fleet Forces Command, where he was responsible for ensuring Navy forces were trained, ready, equipped, and prepared to operate around the world, where and when needed.

Ashore he served as the Commandant at the U.S. Naval Academy, during which time he led the strategic planning effort that underpinned that institution’s first capital campaign. He was also the Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs, responsible for the Department of the Navy’s interaction with Congress, and the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command during the massive relief effort following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Roughead retired on November 1, 2011, after more than three decades of service in the U.S. Navy.
Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert harnessed innovation to build a relevant and capable future Fleet during a period of growing security challenges and fiscal uncertainty. Greenert’s combination of disciplined leadership, operational experience, and budget acumen enabled him to navigate strategic and financial changes and leveraged technical and organizational advances to meet the Navy’s mandate of providing access and maritime dominance where it matters, when it matters.

Hailing from Butler, Pennsylvania, Jonathan Greenert graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975. His career as a submariner culminated in command of USS Honolulu. He went on to subsequent fleet command assignments, including Commander, Submarine Squadron 11; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Marianas; Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet; and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command.

Greenert has served in various fleet support and financial management positions, including Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8); Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Chief of Staff, U.S. Seventh Fleet; head, Navy Programming Branch and Director, Operations Division Navy Comptroller. He served as 36th Vice Chief of Naval Operations prior to being selected as Chief of Naval Operations in 2011.

As Chief of Naval Operations, Greenert led initiatives to establish enduring warfighting advantages, improve forward presence, and enhance readiness. He spearheaded new concepts for undersea, electromagnetic maneuver and cyber warfare to build on longstanding strengths of the Navy while expanding the use of unmanned systems in all domains. Propelling these concepts forward, he deployed laser technology afloat for the first time, pushed the electromagnetic railgun for at-sea testing and transition, and watched the first carrier-landing of an unmanned system.

Further increasing the capacity and reach of naval forces, he implemented new approaches to enhance the relevance and capability of the Fleet through modular and reconfigurable ships and more flexible personnel management systems. To address an increasingly contested maritime environment with limited resources, Greenert expanded the forward basing and deployment of naval forces around the world, in addition to accelerating a number of speed-to-fleet initiatives. He stressed the innovative use of auxiliaries to carry adaptive force packages, initiating a period of experimentation that allowed the Navy to maximize the utility of every Fleet asset and weapon. In the Arabian Gulf, he responded to Iranian rhetoric by doubling the number of minesweeping and patrol ships, converted a retired LSD and deployed it as an afloat forward staging base, deployed new unmanned ISR, mine detection and countermeasure technologies, and built a multi-national coalition to demonstrate international resolve. In the Asia Pacific region, he increased the number of forces, deployed the newest capabilities, and fostered improved understanding between navies, which led to the passage of the Code for Unplanned Encounters At Sea (CUES) and solidified Singapore as a new forward operating location for the Littoral Combat Ship. To improve the readiness of the fleet, Greenert implemented a new plan to train and prepare ships for deployment, filled personnel gaps at sea, sustained education opportunities for Sailors, and expanded opportunities for women in submarines and special warfare.

Greenert is a recipient of various awards including the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, and Legion of Merit. In 1992, he was awarded by his peers the Vice Admiral Stockdale Award for inspirational leadership.