



AFTER ACTION REPORT

PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE RELIEF

OCTOBER – DECEMBER 2005

NMCB 74

NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION SEVENTY-FOUR




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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 8 October 2005, the Kashmir region of Pakistan suffered a catastrophic 7.6 magnitude earthquake. This natural disaster resulted in over 80,000 deaths and the complete destruction of many towns and villages in the region. On 10 October 2005, NMCB74 was issued a verbal warning order from 30 NCR to begin planning for the deployment of an Air Detachment (Heavy) to the affected region. The Pre-Deployment Site Survey Team arrived in country at 0500, 23 October 2005. The remaining elements of the Detachment were embarked in three phases. Detachment movement was completed by 0400, 25 October 2005.

The Detachment assembled on the APOD at the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) Air Base at Chaklala (Islamabad). A remote equipment staging area was designated by the Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) and was located approximately 20KM from the APOD. On 25 October 2005, the Detachment began assembling and staging convoys for follow-on movement to the Forward Operating Area. On the morning of 27 October 2005, the first of two convoys comprised of 15 vehicles and 65 pax executed a 120 mile overland open road march and fell in on the newly established Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Muzaffarabad. 212th MASH and elements from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad occupied the FOB. The second convoy with the remaining portion of the Detachment arrived at the FOB on 30 October 2005.

Project work began on 27 October 2005 and continued until 14 December 2005. Various types of humanitarian relief and disaster recovery related projects were completed. The Detachment was primarily tasked with the removal of earthquake related structural and geological debris at numerous school sites within the Muzaffarabad area. Additional support was provided in the form of tent camp latrine construction and installation, camp maintenance support for the Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DAC PAK) staff, the 212th M.A.S.H. and the 267th Quartermaster (Aircraft Refueling) Detachment, and shelter construction in the "Adopt-a-Village" initiative. Advanced Based Functional Component (ABFC) projects included sea huts, shaving tables, heads, urine tubes, and tent decks. Debris removal projects were often executed with the assistance of locally contracted equipment (excavators, large front end loaders, etc.). The tools and camp support equipment used in conjunction with this operation were drawn from the Okinawa TOA. Heavy construction equipment support was provided from three sources; the NCF TOAs in Okinawa and Bahrain, U.S. Army equipment from Exercises Bright Star and Northern Lights, and local contract.

Turnover with NMCB4 was completed on 15 December 2005. The Air Detachment redeployed directly back to CONUS. They arrived in Gulfport on 18 December 2005.

See following page...

Table 1: AIR DETACHMENT PAKISTAN LEVEL I

	OCTOBER					NOVEMBER						DECEMBER	
	10	15	20	25	30	5	10	15	20	25	30	5	10
Embark & Deployment													
PA104 Install Baking Oven (American Red Cross)													
PA101 Muzaffarabad Airport Fuel Berms													
PA102 Army Public School (Phase I)													
PA103 Kashmir University (New Campus)													
PA105 Army Public School (Phase II)													
PA107 Muzaffarabad Airfield Support													
PA106 Govt. Girls High School (Norrul)													
PA108 Engineer Camp setup (Iraqi)													
PA109 Tent Camp Latrines (USAID))													
PA131 Army Public School (Phase III)													
PA114 Neelum Public School (PhaseI)													
PA117 Govt Boys Jinnah Pilot School													
PA135 Thuri Park Tent Camp													
PA129 Manshera Kitchen/Community SWA													
PA130 Shinkiyari Fuel Berms													
PA136 Ministry of Education													
PA138 Air Traffic Control Tower (PACMIL)													
PA139 MASH Shot EX													
PA140 Miani Bandi Village													
PA141 Army Public School (Phase IV)													
PA142 Muzaffarabad Airport Terminal													
PA143 Neelum Public School (Phase II)													
PA144 Govt Girls College SeaHut													
PA156 University Campus (Phase II)													
CD000 Camp Maintenance (FOB)													
ID000 Camp Maintenance (DAC PAK)													
PA132 Force Protection Improve (FOB)													
PA133 Project Site Field Crew Maintenance													
Retrograde													

II. INTRODUCTION

NMCB74 entered Pakistan tasked with Disaster Recovery and Humanitarian Assistance. The mission was to be accomplished with a task organized Heavy Air Detachment drawn entirely from the Main Body site in Okinawa, Japan. The following OIC Intent statement was briefed to the Detachment:

- ***To forward deploy from Okinawa IOT to execute Road Repair, Debris Removal, and Humanitarian Relief operations as directed by DAC-PAK ISO the Government of Pakistan. Maximum consideration must be taken in the planning and execution of each phase of this operation to ensure Force Protection and Safety issues have been addressed. We must thoroughly coordinate our efforts through DAC-PAK.***

By the last week of October, the Detachment was fully engaged in planning and executing a variety of Disaster Relief related projects. The Detachment established direct liaison with Pakistan Military General Headquarters (Senior Military Engineer in Islamabad (MILENG), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistan Military (PAKMIL), Government of Pakistan (GOP) Kashmir Civil Authority and Department of Education, the United States Department of State, and the 212th MASH. Numerous coordination meetings and planning sessions between the Detachment and the aforementioned parties were accomplished allowing for the development of a draft work plan. Additional joint planning sessions were accomplished with the Commander of the 212th MASH regarding the elimination of camp redundancies at the FOB (i.e., shower facilities, heavy equipment lay down, etc.) and force protection coordination. The OIC attended nightly briefings with the Commanding General of the 12th Infantry Division (PAKMIL) whereby project status updates were provided.

Throughout the month of November and into the first week of December, NMCB74 established a cohesive Battle Rhythm that facilitated the execution of 23 projects resulting in over 3,000 earned mandays to include debris removal at eight school sites, the construction of 1,000 latrines, and the construction of numerous support facilities for two Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs). Additional support was provided to the GOP, PAKMIL, and other DAC forces in the form of camp maintenance, CESE repair, Class I and IV transport, MHE, immunizations, and engineering assessment services. The high point of the deployment came when the Detachment adopted a nearby village and assisted with the reconstruction/construction of 77 family shelters, a school (consisting of six Sea Huts), numerous latrines, and various other minor facilities. This effort was accomplished by working directly with PAKMIL soldiers and the residents of the village.

By the first week of December, the Detachment was successfully executing the preparation of 300 ST of TOA equipment for future embarkation back to Okinawa, Japan. The remaining 125 ST of TOA equipment were turned over to NMCB FOUR on 15 December 2005. This TOA equipment was contracted via DAC PAK for movement

by land and sea. The OIC was redeployed back to Okinawa on 4 December to accomplish turnover with relieving battalion at mainbody site. The AOIC and remaining Detachment personnel returned to Gulfport, Mississippi via NALO Flight on 18 December 2005.

III. EMBARKATION

NMCB74 received a verbal warning order from 30NCR on 8 October 2005 initiating the beginning phases of mount out planning. The stated requirement called for the mount out of one Heavy Air Detachment (125 pax). A final Deployment Order was issued via 30NCR on 19 October 2005 directing the deployment of the Air Detachment to Islamabad, Pakistan. A Pre-deployment Site Survey Team comprised of the S3 and four personnel (1 x LT, 1 x SKC, 1 x BUC, 1 x EOC) departed Okinawa on 21 October 2005. They arrived in country at 0500 on 23 October 2005. A second echelon comprised of ten personnel, five units of CESE, and some TOA items arrived via Contract Flight (AN124) at 2200 on 23 October 2005. A third flight with two personnel and the remaining TOA items arrived at 0400 on 25 October 2005. The final flight with personnel and weapons arrived at 0500 on 26 October 2005.

There were numerous changes to the mission guidance provided to the Battalion outlining the type of aircraft that would be available. Based on original direction, the Battalion successfully prepared over 66 pieces of CESE and an MCA(+) for embarkation. A load plan was developed and submitted to 30NCR. Amplifying information was provided and the original planning figure (CESE and total allowable ST) was drastically reduced. A final lift mission profile was developed and provided to the Battalion. The allowable aircraft allotment was reduced from 17 to three x C17 aircraft. Direction was provided indicating that all of the required CESE for this mission minus seven pieces from Okinawa would be provided via the Bahrain NCF TOA and the U.S. Army (Bright Star and Northern Lights). Load plans were completed for three x C17 aircraft. Within 24 hours of departure, the Battalion was directed to re-plan for 1 x AN124 (Russian Contract), one x Cargo 747, and one x 757 (Pax). These aircraft comprised the final airlift configuration.

By the first week of December, the Detachment was successfully executing the preparation of 300 ST of TOA equipment for future embarkation back to Okinawa, Japan. This TOA equipment was contracted via DAC PAK for movement by land and sea. On 13 December, custody of subject TOA equipment was signed over to contractor for future embarkation. The remaining 125 ST of TOA equipment were turned over to NMCB FOUR on 15 December 2005.

IV. TRAINING

In the period leading up to the deployment, the Battalion undertook a number of different training evolutions. All Detachment personnel attended classes on Rules of Engagement, Deadly Force, Customs and Courtesies, Pakistan Orientation, Religious Customs, Intelligence Overview, and Force Protection measures.

Minimal information was available regarding Force Protection guidance and Rules of Engagement. The Battalion staff referenced standing CENTCOM Rules of Engagement and current INTELSUMs to develop course content and to plan a Force Protection Package. Individuals drawn from the Battalion’s cadre of Auxiliary Security Force personnel were included in final staffing numbers to ensure that any QRF responsibilities could be met immediately upon arrival in country.

The establishment of a Joint Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was completed once the Detachment forward deployed to Muzaffarabad. NMCB74 personnel in addition to 212th MASH formed the FOB QRF. The Detachment’s USMC Advisor in conjunction with the Embassy Regional Security Officer initiated a series of training session and drills that refined the QRF concept. Specifically, the QRF training regimen became a standing process that focused on site-specific threats and required responses.


A licensing program was established with the intent of training as many personnel as possible in the operation of the Detachment’s equipment. Primary focus areas included HMMWVs, Dump Trucks, and Forklifts. A total of 53 personnel were licensed on five pieces of equipment during the deployment.

The SCWS program was continued while deployed. Five personnel were SCWS qualified and three others were re-qualified. The program followed the same format as that of Battalion and was characterized by nightly classes, exams, and boards.

V. OPERATIONS

a. OVERVIEW

From the onset of this operation, NAVCENT ENG immediately assumed and maintained the lead engineering planning role for the U.S. led response. NAVCENT submitted an RFF through CENTCOM for the assignment of one Heavy NMCB AIR DETACHMENT. The assigned Operational Command for this evolution was the Disaster Assistance Center PAKISTAN. At its core, the DACPAK was comprised of staff including the Commander from Expeditionary Strike Group ONE. Additional personnel from JFCOM, NAVCENT, ARCENT, etc. were added. The Operational Chain of Command for Phases I & II of this operation was as follows:



The DACPAK ENG cell was responsible for the planning and coordination of the Engineer mission including NMCB74 tasking and other externally resourced requirements such as airfield capacity surveys, etc.

The Detachment was involved a number of different projects that covered the spectrum of Disaster Recovery/Humanitarian Assistance operations. The development of the work plan evolved over the course of the deployment with a focus on local coordination and execution. The Detachment OIC was tasked with identifying projects in and around the Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu Kashmir area. Potential projects were to be cleared through PAKMIL and the DACPAKENG. Initial guidance provided by CDAC directed the OIC to focus on road clearing and debris removal in the Neelum Valley and then in the Muzaffarabad area. This tasking changed as the OIC arrived in country and had the opportunity to reconnoiter the area.

Upon arrival at the APOD, the OIC conducted a route reconnaissance of the Neelum Valley by helicopter. The U.S. Army provided flight support with U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The situation at the time in the Neelum Valley was characterized by countless landslides ranging in volumes from hundreds to thousands of cubic yards. DACPAK had originally desired for the Detachment to clear approximately 50KM of mountainous valley road. Over 100 landslides were observed in this section of the valley. Each landslide was characterized by large, unstable quantities of overburden material and steep slopes both above and below the road surface. In many locations the mountain had consumed the road and it was no longer recognizable. Overburden was found in varying forms of composition ranging from Dolomite to Clayey Sand and very large rock boulders. The OIC recommended that the road mission be re-evaluated based on in-country CESE, available skill set, force protection requirements, and life safety concerns. Simultaneously, the Government of Pakistan formally requested that DACPAK not allow U.S. forces to work in this valley because of safety concerns. The Pakistan military had been averaging one project related death per week on this section of road. This mission was scrubbed.

Work plan development then shifted focus to road clearing and debris removal in the Muzaffarabad area. CDAC instructed the OIC not to accept any debris removal projects where human remains may have been present; therefore roads appeared to be a logical choice. Upon arrival at the FOB, the OIC met with representatives of the Pakistan Military and the Inspector General's Office regarding potential tasking. The PAKMIL Representative (Brigadier General) did not wish for the Detachment to work on roads. In the opinion of the local Pakistan Officials, the roads were sufficiently cleared. The local representatives instead requested that the OIC to focus on three projects of their choosing. All three projects were structural demolition and debris removal projects. They included an Army Hospital, the private residences of Kashmir Government Officials (in the Government Enclave), and Kashmir University. The OIC rejected the first two projects, as he believed that they did not represent the nature of U.S. involvement in this operation and would run contrary to the IO campaign. The third project was accepted. From these meetings an execution strategy was developed and proposed to the DACPAKENG.

After the meeting with PAKMIL it was clearly evident that DACPAK and PAKMIL had two completely differently interpretations of what was to be accomplished in the disaster zone. The OIC decided to develop a plan that would support the IO campaign and allow for direct USMILENG involvement with the local population in disaster recovery operations. The plan would focus on three areas. The first and the main thrust of the NCF effort would be the removal of debris at different schools sites within the Muzaffarabad area. This effort would be linked with USAID efforts to execute the “School in a Bag” program and would incorporate donated US tents. The second focal area was the support of local tent camps through ABFC construction. The support would come in the form of latrine construction, tent pad preparation (horizontal earth movement), and Sea Hut construction. The last area of emphasis was Camp Maintenance for the 212th MASH, DOS, and the 267th Quartermaster Unit (Refueling). In addition to these three areas the Detachment would be available to support any number of different relief efforts to include PAKMIL equipment maintenance, logistics movement, facility assessments, and carpentry projects. It was agreed upon at the DACPAK Staff level that this was an acceptable strategy and work proceeded with developing a viable backlog.

One of the challenges in the process of identifying designated schools was attempting to get all of the involved parties to agree and prioritize which sites were in the most need. Between 95 and 100% of all schools in the Muzaffarabad area suffered complete structural failure. In staying with CDAC directives to work with PAKMIL, the OIC approached this entity first. Initially they were reluctant to agree to with this concept and stonewalled in an effort to see the projects that they had outlined accomplished first. Working in parallel with USAID and the UN, the Detachment was able to identify the most needy schools first. The UN delegated responsibility for the schools to UNICEF. UNICEF was in-turn was working through GOP and the Ministry of Education to coordinate NGO and civilian relief efforts. There were differing opinions between USAID, UNICEF, and GOP as to how to develop a prioritized list of schools. While this “sorting out” process was working itself out, execution began on Kashmir University. A final list with an inclusive signature list to include all involved parties was drafted, signed, and promulgated to PAKMIL. Debris removal activities began immediately. A complete operational rhythm was established approximately 10-14 days into this phase of the deployment. A total of 31,000 CY of debris was removed from local schools. A total of seven school campuses with over 40 structures were demolished and removed from their respective sites. An indication of the effectiveness of this program was demonstrated at each site, but none more so than at the Jinnah Pilot School, where over 200 schoolchildren were back in school one day after the Detachment had completed debris removal.

The latrine project was another example of a cooperative work effort with USAID and the UN. The Muzaffarabad area is populated with a number of official and unofficial tent camps. In both circumstances, the immediate arrival of displaced persons had caused a number of health related problems. The largest problem was that of poor hygiene and improper camp layout. After attending a NGO coordination meeting, it was determined that the Detachment could immediately provide a positive contribution to the situation by assisting with the construction of toilet or latrine facilities. Working with USAID,

UNICEF, UNHCR, and Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), Detachment personnel were able to develop a latrine design that was cost effective, quick to assemble, and culturally compliant with the local population. It was agreed upon that 1,000 units would be constructed and deployed throughout the local tent camps. There was considerable confusion at the beginning of the operation as to who would provide guidance on where the units would be located. The Detachment offered to purchase material, construct, transport, excavate the holes, and place the units. UNICEF and many of the NGOs initially resisted direct involvement with the unit as a result of their natural suspicion of the U.S. Military. They wanted the product but did not want to be seen publicly with the U.S. Military. Once these organizations realized the production capability of the vertical platoon, they were very eager to engage and enlist the support of the Detachment in all phases of the project. As a result, the Detachment became involved in excavation and placement as well as construction of the latrines. On average, the platoon was able to construct 120 units per day with the only restriction being the availability of Class IV material. In the end, there was approximately a 50/50 split between pickup by the NGOs and placement by the Detachment. This effort proved to be a very successful initiative and the Detachment was informed by the U.N. that the Seabees had constructed up to 40% of the latrines being used in tent camps around the local area.

The Camp Maintenance Program rounded out the third major area of emphasis. It began immediately upon arrival at the FOB. The unit was co-located at the FOB with DOS and the 212th MASH. Detachment personnel quickly moved to establish proper hygiene and head facilities within the FOB. The 212th MASH had been at the FOB for approximately three days prior to the arrival of the Seabees. Much of the camp support equipment destined for the MASH did not make in country in a time for their movement to the FOB. Immediately, the Detachment was able to excavate slit trenches and repair Army constructed latrines. Urine tubes were placed and partitioned. Shaving tables and a gravel lined wash area were constructed. Within 48 hours, the Seabee shower tent and laundry skid were in full use and providing support to over 300 personnel. A large number of other projects were also completed to include a plywood deck for the Army Mess Tent, numerous shelves and desks, footbridges, wire protectors (road), crutches, etc. The Detachment also constructed a Sea Hut, leveled a shower trailer, filled HESCO barriers, and placed concertina wire, provided daily service for a generator, for local DOS activities. Limited camp support was also provided for the 267th Quartermaster unit located 10km away at the Muzaffarabad airport. It included water line repair, HESCO assistance, office space construction, and general equipment support.

As the deployment progressed a fourth area of emphasis was added to the work plan. This initiative was titled "Adopt-a-Village" and was designed to provide a concentrated USMILENG (Seabee) presence in a local village. PAKMIL and DACPAK were extremely supportive of this program as it was an opportunity to demonstrate joint relief operations between PAKMILENG and USMILENG forces and it could act as a bulwark against additional migration of displaced persons to Muzaffarabad. The village plan called for the construction of temporary shelters for each displaced family within that community. NMCB74 concentrated efforts in the Miani Bandi Village and completed 77

shelters. PAKMIL requested that the shelters be constructed out of local, salvaged material. Detachment personnel executed this task magnificently. They worked closely with the intended residents of each shelter. Secondly, there was to be debris removal at the school site and follow-on construction of six Sea Huts that would act as classrooms.



Members of NMCB 74 and Pakistan personnel break ground on a shelter in Miani Bandi Village as the future resident helps direct the work.

b. PROJECTS

A total of 29 projects were completed and 3,294 MDS earned during the course of the deployment. The following project summary data is provided:

Proj #	Project Title	Project MD Expended Cumulative	Debris Removed Total	% Complete
PA101	Muzaffarabad Airport Fuel Berms	29	NA	100%
PA102	Army Public School Debris Removal (Phase I)	19	1,200	100%
PA103	University Campus Debris Removal	175	3,199	100%
PA104	Install Baking Oven	2	NA	100%
PA105	Army Public School Debris Removal (Phase II)	41	1,336	100%
PA106	Government Girls High School	40	NA	100%
PA107	Muzaffarabad Airport Support	16	NA	100%
PA108	Iraqi Engineer Tent Camp (Cancelled)	57	NA	NA
PA109	Tent Camp Latrines (USAID)	203	NA	100%
PA113	Government Post Graduate Male School	99	4,175	100%
PA114	Neelum Public School (Phase I)	68	2,456	100%
PA117	Government Boys Jinnah Pilot School	84	4,386	100%
PA129	JABA Farms Sea Hut and Kitchens	65	0	100%
PA130	Shinkiari Fuel Berms	15	0	100%
PA131	Army Public School Debris Removal (Phase III)	111	4,254	100%
PA132	Force Protection (Muzaffarabad)	172	NA	NA
PA133	Project Site Field Crew Maintenance	90	NA	NA
PA135	Thurri Park Tent Camp	56	NA	N/A
PA136	Ministry of Education Building	170	3,405	83%
PA138	Muzaffarabad Airport Traffic Control Building	27	NA	100%
PA139	MASH Support Shot Exercise	3	NA	NA
PA140	Miani Bandi Village	379	845	NA
PA141	Army Public School (Phase IV)	57	2,297	100%
PA142	Muzaffarabad Airport Terminal	6	NA	100%
PA143	Neelum Public School (Phase II)	58	1404	100%
PA144	Govt Girls College SeaHut	22	NA	100%
PA156	University Campus (Phase II)	48	2,054	100%
CD000	Camp Maintenance (Muzaffarabad)	584	NA	NA
ID000	Camp Maintenance (DAC PAK)	422	NA	NA
RT100	Retrograde	176	NA	NA

REPRESENTATIVE PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS

ARMY PUBLIC SCHOOL DEBRIS REMOVAL

Scope of Work Summary:

A total of five buildings were demolished and 9087 CY of debris removed in four phases.

Project Start Date: 29 OCT

Project Completion Date: 30 NOV

Average Crew Size: 9

Total Man-days (MDS): 228



Amplifying Information:

This project was executed jointly with Afghan Foreign Nationals (Contractor) and NMCB74 personnel. The original structure was located adjacent to the UN compound and was surrounded by electrical lines. Extreme caution and coordination with local officials was accomplished prior to the commencement of work. The dumpsite location was coordinated with local GOP officials and PAKMIL. Approximately 300 schoolchildren occupied the site within one week of completion. Additional Seabee assistance was provided in the form of bench and fence construction and road leveling (grading).

KASHMIR UNIVERSITY DEBRIS REMOVAL

Scope of Work Summary:

A total of four buildings were demolished and 5253 CY of debris removed.

Project Start Date: 13 OCT
Average Crew Size: 15

Project Completion Date: 12 DEC
Total Man-days (MDS): 223



Amplifying Information:

This was the final demolition project of the deployment. Over 5,253 CY of debris across a 20-acre footprint were removed. Located in the middle of the old section of town, the project site and its assigned dumping location proved to be logistically challenging. The dump trucks had to transit through three tent camps and navigate roads that were no wider than 15 feet. The dumpsite was a ravine located 1.5 miles from the jobsite. Upon arrival at the dumpsite, the operators were required to back their trucks to the edge of the ravine and release their load. There was a constant danger of debris striking civilian personnel. Refugees would attempt to jump in the back of the trucks as they traveled down the road in order to salvage steel rebar. This was addressed with PAKMIL security. Civilian personnel would also loiter at the base of the ravine in order to try and remove any type of retrievable material. PAKMIL security was unable to completely stop this from happening. As a result of this situation, a Seabee was placed at the dump location with a PAKMIL guard in order to minimize danger to the local populace. The University site was adjacent to a large tent camp. Once cleared, it served as an alternate location for the erection of additional tents and the placement of latrines. Additionally, local Health Officials were able to construct a Cholera isolation ward at the site.

THURRI PARK TENT CAMP LATRINE CONSTRUCTION AND INSTALLATION

Scope of Work Summary:

A total of 1,000 latrines were constructed and placed around the Muzaffarabad area. The Detachment established a pre-fabrication yard within the FOB. The placement of the units was accomplished by providing delivery service and supporting septic trench excavation.

Project Start Date: 3 NOV
Average Crew Size: 5

Project Completion Date: 12 DEC
Total Man-days (MDS): 259



Amplifying Information:

The latrine design for this project was developed jointly with the UN, OXFAM(NGO), and Detachment personnel. Soil conditions in the Thurri Park tent camp did not allow for the excavation of unlined septic trenches due to unstable nature of the soil. The camp is located in a riverbed with a sandy soil base. A number of different solutions had been proposed to counter the problem of trench collapse. Initially the Detachment placed perforated 55-gal drums beneath each unit. This course of action proved problematic, as the waste product was unable to properly disperse into the soil. The final solution was developed using local labor resources to construct brick lined pits beneath each unit.

MIANI BANDI VILLAGE

“ADOPT-A-VILLAGE”

Scope of Work Summary:

A joint initiative developed with PAKMIL that was intended to provide temporary shelters for individuals impacted by the earthquake. Local, salvaged materials were to be used in the construction of a single shelter for each family in the Miani Bandi village. Each shelter is approximately 15' x 25' with a six post, pitched roof frame. Each shelter is sheathed in corrugated metal. Additional work included the demolition of the village school and the removal of associated debris. Four standard size Sea Huts were constructed to serve as classrooms for the school.

Project Start Date: 22 NOV
Average Crew Size: 17

Project Completion Date: Turnover
Total Man-days (MDS): 379



Amplifying Information:

A total of 70 shelters and four Sea Huts were constructed in the village. The site was located approximately 15 km from the FOB and was in the vicinity of the Muzaffarabad airport. Joint operations with PAKMIL Combat Engineers were accomplished. This project received substantial outside interest. List of dignitaries that visited the site included Representative James Kolbe, Chairman of the House Appropriations Cmte, Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, LTGEN Karl Eichenberry, CFC-A.

c. CESE MANAGEMENT

Air Detachment deployed with 11 pieces of equipment from Camp Shields, Okinawa and received 27 pieces of equipment from NMCB THREE Detail Bahrain and 15 Army units. Upon arrival in Islamabad most of the equipment was already staged at a designated area at Construction Machinery Training Institute (CMTI). Most of the equipment was found to be in excellent condition but some needed immediate attention before the convoy north to Muzzarafabad.

While in Muzzarafabad, a skilled and highly motivated team of 14 Construction Mechanics and 20 Equipment Operators ran a very thorough equipment maintenance and dispatch program that followed NCF equipment management guidelines. All Alfa Company personnel worked together to ensure all vehicles were properly dispatched, pre-started and maintained. A 3M equipment maintenance program was implemented and utilized. The mechanics also worked on Pakistan Military and Contracted Civilian equipment.

Description	
CESE hours operated	4,150
Miles driven	7,250
3M Checks	15
# of interims	100
# of repairs (non-US Equipment)	80
Availability	94%

d. FORCE PROTECTION ACTIONS FROM PAKISTAN

Upon arriving at Camp Can Do in Muzaffarabad the Detachment immediately implemented security measures. The first priority was to clear an area for the main compound. The area was very rough and riddled with debris, so it was first scraped down approximately 6 inches and leveled off. The next area of improvement was the placement of double strand concertina around the main compound. The area was approximately 100 m x 50 m. It had stakes placed every 5 m with the wire hog nosed clipped together every 3 m. Once the perimeter was placed, a gate was constructed using a single stand of concertina wire. The ends were re-enforced using 2x4 in the shape of an X. There were two sections that could be opened wide enough to allow an MTRV to come into the compound. Adequate lighting was placed inside the compound with the lamps facing to the outside. All MLO materials in addition to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Khaki berthing, and the MWR tent were inside the compound.

Once the main compound was completed, work started on the Alfa yard where all of the CESE was stored. The area is approximately 400 m long by 250 m wide. The first priority of work was to place double strand concertina around the eastern, southern and the western edges. The northern edge was left open to allow easy access for the vehicles to enter and exit the compound. Once that was completed a single strand of barbed wire (tanglefoot) was placed about 8 inches to the front of the concertina at about 6 inches

high to stop animals from getting into the wire. The next step was to place lighting throughout the compound to light up the area during times of darkness.

A double strand concertina was placed around the bivouac area that was shared with the 212th Army MASH unit co-located with the Detachment. During that time the U.S. Embassy delegation also arrived and a double strand of concertina wire was placed around their compound. HESCO Barriers were strategically placed around the area that was jointly shared with the MASH unit. A serpentine of HESCO Barriers were placed at the main entrance to the U.S. Forces compound. Over 200 HESCO Barriers were placed and filled and over 4,500 feet of concertina wire was strategically installed in various locations around the U.S. compound. At the request of the Pakistan Rangers, three fighting positions were excavated along the landing zone.

The Pakistan Army and Rangers (Frontier Guard) provided internal and external compound security. The Rangers, a component of the Interior Ministry were originally tasked with interior and exterior perimeter security. This included roving patrols and entry control point operations. As the international mission expanded and NATO forces began to arrive, the Rangers were dispersed to other locations where they provided operational control of both Pakistan Army and domestic anti-terror police forces. This became the model of security operations at the Muzaffarabad FOB.

There was a two-man QRF on stand by around the clock to help augment Pakistan forces and the U.S. Army's standing guard force. A total of six personnel assigned to the QRF that had recently gone through the ASF training in Okinawa. An un-announced weekly joint drill was conducted. The Detachment complied with an area emergency evacuation plan that was developed by Commander, 212th MASH as he was the designated Area Commander. A public loud address system was placed with speakers sited in strategic locations to provide ample notification to the entire U.S. compound of any danger. This speaker system was also used to notify the QRF of any emergencies.

Pakistan Ranger/Police escorts were required to accompany all U.S. personnel when we left the safety of the compound. A nightly meeting with the Rangers/Police was scheduled to coordinate the following days convoy security requirements. The size of the convoy/project dictated the size of the security force and whether a vehicle escort would also be used. There did not seem to be any equation to dictate the number of security personnel compared to U.S. personnel other than one security person per vehicle. Upon exiting the compound at the main gate, the Detachment personnel were required to give your name, destination, and the name of your lead security person to the guard. Upon returning, the same information was compared to the departure information in addition to a vehicle check comprised of review of the underneath of the vehicle. Over 230 convoys traveling 7,250 miles were safely conducted in this high threat area.

VI. SAFETY

Stand-downs and discussions relating to safety awareness were commonplace throughout homeport and during the deployment. Through constant instruction, Operation Risk

Management (ORM) became a very reliable tool in assisting Seabees in identifying and handling unsafe conditions both on and off the jobsite. Supervisors ensured heavy equipment operator's were briefed daily on using backing guides and driving safety both to and from the jobsites. No class "A" mishaps occurred during the deployment.

Category	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Total Mishaps	0	8	2	10
Total Mishaps on Duty	0	7	2	9
Total Mishaps off Duty	0	1	0	1
Fatality	0	0	0	0
Lost Time Cases	0	2	0	2
Lost Work Days	0	2	0	2
Light Duty Cases	0	2	0	2
Light Duty Days	0	2	0	2
Vehicle Mishaps w/o injuries	0	5	5	10
No Lost Time Cases	0	6	2	8

VII. ADMINISTRATION

Air Detachment deployed with 123 personnel. The deployment was an overall success with the following summary of significant events.

ADMINISTRATION MILESTONES	
ADVANCEMENTS	15
EMERGENCY LEAVE	1
MEDEVAC	1
REENLISTMENTS	6
SCWS	5
PERSONNEL REDEPLOYED	9

America Red Cross messages were received in Okinawa, Japan and communicated to Pakistan via DSN telephone. Orders and necessary paperwork for any follow-on emergency leave cases were coordinated with the battalion Travel Coordinator in Okinawa, Japan.

Air Detachment Pakistan participated in the command urinalysis program through Bagram, Afghanistan. Personnel were escorted to Afghanistan, samples were taken and results were shipped in accordance with Navy guidelines.

Morale, Welfare and Recreation services were available for the troops while deployed to this remote location hundreds of miles away from any active U.S. Military base. Due to the thorough damage done by the earthquake and the high threat level, personnel were unable to use any facilities off camp. With the help of the Army 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital the Detachment was able to establish good MWR facilities. On Camp

Can Do, there were many different options that personnel had to choose from. In the MWR tent there was regular showing of movies using the "Theatre in a Box" brought with the Air Detachment. Personnel viewed movies on a large theater style 62" screen or a 25" TV. The Detachment had a selection of over 200 movies to choose from including action, drama, adventure, comedy, science fiction and animation. They were also able to enjoy AFN Europe, which provided the opportunity to keep up with news, sports, and favorite television shows. The MWR tent also had two DSN phone lines that were accessible 24 hours a day and gave the Air Detachment Personnel the opportunity to keep in touch with loved ones or to take care of personal business. To help with phone call cost, Veterans of Foreign Wars donated provided 15-minute phone cards that were issued to the troops to assist in contacting home. The MWR Tent also contained two computers with Internet access allowing personnel to check e-mail, keep track of leave and earnings statements, and also to help prepare for the holidays with online shopping. The Air Detachment brought a large assortment of board games, playing cards and sports equipment like footballs, frisbees and soccer balls. To maintain physical fitness, an assortment of gym equipment was constructed. A pull-up bar, dip bar and a sit up bench were built. Personnel could also take advantage of a ½ mile running course (inside the wire) to keep themselves in top running condition. In addition to what was on the Camp Can Do, personnel could go over to the 212th Mash unit and take advantage of their MWR Facilities. Camp Resolute (212th MASH) had a MWR Tent fully equipped with AFN Europe running 24 hours a day and movies using a 32" TV and DVD Player. The tent also came equipped with four telephone lines and two Internet connections. Camp Resolute also had a complete gym set up equipped with two weight benches, one multi-purpose workstation, two sets of dumb bells and a large selection of free weights. Camp Resolute also provided an MWR store complete with sodas, snacks, warm weather gear and selected hygiene products.

VIII.SUPPLY/LOGISTICS

Although other commands and units, which included all military services, had arrived in theater two weeks prior to the Air Detachment, there was still a great amount of confusion on how funding was to be provided for the earthquake relief effort.

The Detachment deployed with tent camp facilities, tools kits and ARP that were drawn out of the TOA at Camp Shields, Okinawa and embarked to Pakistan. A 90-day supply of administrative consumables were packed and brought with the Detachment from Okinawa.

Initial funding for the Detachment was set at \$100K and was provided through PACOM down through 1NCD to the 30th NCR R4. Upon arrival to Pakistan, the Detachment realized the challenges of acquiring funding. Supplemental (\$100k) funding was requested through 30th NCR. This allowed the Detachment to place an expediter at DAC PAK to interact with local military contracting and husbanding agents. In all, a total of \$300K was provided for the purchase of supplies, construction materials and the equipment rental of three excavators, a front-end loader, and a flatbed truck. Upon being

in-country for three weeks, funding was established and coordinated through DAC PAK J4. A total of \$143K was provided through DAC PAK J4 for those requirements.

An initial issue of water and meals were supported through funding from 30th NCR. The Detachment purchased and embarked a three-day supply of water and MRE's from Okinawa. Resupply of water and MRE's were accomplished through a joint effort with the 212th MASH. Inter-theater funding was provided through DAC PAK J4 to provide this class of supplies. On 1 December 2005, a contractor was acquired by DAC PAK J4 to provide Breakfast and Dinner at a contracted dining facility located at the camp. MRE's were still utilized for the lunch meal.

The Detachment deployed with a Barber Kit and utilized a predetermined Culinary Specialist Petty Officer on a regular basis to cut hair in the absence of a trained barber.

IX. COMMUNICATIONS

Air Detachment Pakistan's communication requirements consisted of "normal office" communications. Five cellular phones were provided by the State Department, along with nine cellular phones delivered from the Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DACPAK). Cellular phones were used for general communications with project sites and information sharing between personnel. Cellular phones were assigned to the OIC, AOIC, Duty Officer, S4 and all others were assigned to Air Detachment project sites. Cellular phone coverage throughout the region was good with exception to remote mountainous regions. For areas not accessible with cellular phones an Iridium Satellite phone was issued and used. A combination of Iridium and cellular phones provided communication access one hundred percent of the time.

Initial internet access was provided through INMARSAT and allowed for the setup of one laptop. Although slow, it provided excellent NIPR access. Internet access was then provided by 44C2 signal located at 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) Army camp. A local intranet provided file sharing and internet sharing for computers installed within Air Detachment Pakistan's compound. Internet was available for six Dolch Laptops, which included two MWR computers. DSN capabilities were supplied by 44C2. Two DSN lines were set up for the Tactical Operations Center and two for MWR access. A scan/email technique was used with an all-in-one 7110 printer for digitally sending forms and information to the main body. A digital sender was also made available through the 212th MASH. The all-in-one also provided copying; however, due to ink shortages use was limited. A LaserJet printer was provided for day to day printing of reports.

Internal communications were provided through XTS-5000 and allowed for communication with key personnel. XTS radio units were assigned to the TOC Watch, A6, A4, Dispatch and B6. XTS 5000 communications provided excellent inter-camp communications. XTS radios were also given out for convoy and project communications and provided excellent communications throughout the area.

Short-range VHF communications were available through the use of RT-1523s. However, due to mountainous terrain, communications were often spotty. PRC-119s were able to reach up to 5 KM. VRC-90's were able to reach 12 miles without loss. To overcome the terrain, HF communications were installed as backup for the VHF. HF provided excellent voice support where VHF was unusable. HF was tried up to twenty miles from camp and experienced no loss due to terrain. PRC-150 were deployed to projects with high movement and low visibility, reach back was provided through GRC-231 located in the TOC.

Satellite voice communications were maintained with Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan through a PRC-117. Satellite visibility was excellent in the area and provided distant reach back communication.

AFN was provided by the 212th MASH and installed by NMCB 74 communication technicians. AFN presented a unique problem with acquisition due to low visibility with Indian Ocean Region (IOR) satellites. To overcome this issue a European satellite was used.

The use of SIPR access was provided through the 44C2 Army Signal Team and allowed for Naval Message Traffic to be passed with no issues.

Secure telephonic communications was delivered through STUIII located at the 212th MASH.

The following communications assets were deployed with the Detachment:

- Laptops: [8] non-secure laptops / [3] secure laptops (deployed with Air Detachment)
- Printers: HP Office jet 7110 / HP LaserJet
- Cellular Phones: [5] state department / [9] Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan provided
- Satellite Phones: INMARSAT / [2] Iridium
- Handheld radio: [16] XTS-5000
- Vehicular Travel: [3] VRC-92 / [6] VRC – 90 / [8] PRC-119
- Long Range: [2] GRC-231 / [2] Vehicular HF / [1] PRC-150
- Satellite Voice: [3] PRC-117

X. MEDICAL

Air Detachment deployed with one Independent Duty Corpsman and two General Duty Corpsman. The medical department was responsible for the routine and emergent care needs of deployed personnel. Before deploying to Pakistan, the medical department was prepared to work independently due to the isolated duty area. The 212th MASH unit was in place less than 250 feet from Camp Can Do. The MASH is a freestanding, fully operational hospital equipped with an Emergency Room, Operating Room, Laboratory, Radiology Department, two Intensive Care Units, Orthopedic Department, Preventive

Medicine Unit, Pharmacy, Water Purification Unit (ROWPU), and Dental Officer. Due to the close proximity of the 212th MASH, there was no need to have a fully operational Battalion Aid Station. The Independent Duty Corpsman treated all minor illnesses or complaints, any major medical problems were treated by the 212th MASH.

The Medical Department deployed equipped with 304 Sick Call block, 699 AMAL block and Molle bags for each Hospital Corpsman. The use for each block was minimal due to the relationship with the 212th MASH Army Hospital. Over the counter medications were used to treat minor illnesses.

From October to December, temperatures lingered in the mid to upper 70's for the highs and mid to upper 30's for the lows. The night and mornings are particularly cold; this in turn reduced the number of mosquitoes, reducing malaria chances for service members. Service members were issued cold weather gear prior to deployment to the region. There were no instances of cold weather injuries. Project worksites presented with copious amounts of dust from rubble removal, this in turn led to mild upper respiratory infections in some of the troops, the problem was alleviated after placing emphasis on the use of protective face masks and issuing them to the troops. Due to the lack of local sewage and sanitation facilities, special emphasis on hand washing was the most effective way to cut down on the spread of viral illnesses and bacterial transfer. Seabees at project sites, who shook hands with the locals but were not able to wash their hands, were able to disinfect them with hand sanitizer.

Supplemental vaccinations included Hepatitis A and B, Tetanus, and Typhoid. Smallpox was also given due to Threat Condition and Force Protection Condition for the region.

Emergency communication needs were met with Motorola XTS 5000's. Communication needs were also accomplished through the use of cell phones, email and DSN. Points of contacts were maintained within various departments of the MASH to assist in situations requiring medical attention beyond the organic capabilities of NMCB 74.

The level of treatment capabilities were as follows:

Level 1: NMCB 74 Independent Duty Corpsman

Level 2: 212th MASH

Level 3: Air transport Ramstien AB/Lanstuhul Regional Medical Center, Germany

A key point that should be noted is that 24 Detail personnel suffered from nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. From 26-29 November, 14 Seabees (8 from the same platoon) were treated for viral gastroenteritis. The Preventive Health Officer at the MASH determined that all the cases were viral in nature and not an outbreak of cholera or dysentery. Constantly reminding personnel of the importance of hand washing decreased further incidents significantly.

A few Seabees developed sunlight sensitivities due to taking Doxycycline. The symptoms were alleviated after educating the patients on the use of sunscreen. There

were mild upper respiratory infections in some of the Seabees at Camp Can Do. Some of the contributing factors include, increased elevation, smoking, and dust from the project worksites and around the camp.

APPENDIX A

LESSONS LEARNED

1. **KEYWORD: ADMINISTRATION**
 - a. **ITEM: Country Clearance Forms for Weapons**
 - b. **DISCUSSION:** There was confusion upon arrival in Pakistan regarding the presence of personal weapons. The Detachment had originally planned to transport all of its weapons in a configured TRICON. A combination of factors led to the Detachment having to individually carry weapons in country. This issue is discussed in the Embark portion of this report. The Deployment Order clearly stated that personal weapons were required. It further stated that all Special Clearances for entry into Pakistan were waived. Lastly, weapons policy questions were submitted in the form of RFIs to the DAC Staff on three separate occasions. Every answer indicated that personal weapons were authorized and in-fact required. The result of this communication glitch was a 13-day period of quarantine for the Detachment's weapons. The Detachment was forward deployed to the FOB without weapons for approximately 15 days without an adequate means to protect itself.
 - c. **RECOMMENDATION:** The Battalion should not assume that the receiving command has a complete understanding of the DEPORD. The Battalion should not assume that completed RFIs have been properly staffed and communicated to the gaining command. A formal request for weapons entry approval should be coordinated through the Regiment.

2. **KEYWORD: SUPPLY**
 - a. **ITEM: Funding Sources**
 - b. **DISCUSSION:** The Detachment faced major challenges concerning the procurement of CLASS III, IV and IX material. Funding sources had not been determined prior to deployment and as a result there were delays associated with the immediate execution of vertical construction projects and the repair of CESE.
 - c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Assume that you will need Class IV material that is in addition to that which is brought with the MCA. Standard Class IV should suffice. The material should be procured and load-planned with the Detachment. At the beginning of an operation of this nature, it is not realistic to think that a Class IV pipeline will be established.

3. **KEYWORD: SUPPLY**
 - a. **ITEM: Class IV storage.**
 - b. **DISCUSSION:** Due to limited space within Camp Can Do, the Class IV material was stored in the same location as the builder shop making it difficult to track material received and issued.
 - c. **RECOMMENDATION:** If area allows, segregate MLO and the BU shop so the materials won't become confused and tracking can be completed by BM.

4. KEYWORD: SUPPLY
 - a. ITEM: Local Taxes and Customs Procedures
 - b. DISCUSSION: The Detachment experienced difficulties with importing repair parts and supplies from the Mainbody site. This was particularly true when the Detachment attempted to bring concealed weapons holsters and assorted CESE repair parts into the country.
 - c. RECOMMENDATION: Establish contact with U.S. Embassy representatives as soon as possible in order to determine tax requirements.

5. KEYWORD: SUPPLY
 - a. ITEM: Class IX Procurement
 - b. DISCUSSION: Our situation was unique in that the majority of CESE utilized were non-standard CESE that was sourced from both the NCF and the U.S. Army. This rendered the Bahrain MOD 96/98 irrelevant. The procurement of repair parts was particularly challenging. It was very difficult to line up NSN with local vendor stocks. Additionally there were no technical manuals provided with the equipment.
 - c. RECOMMENDATION: Given the use of U.S. Army equipment, assign a senior mechanic (E6 and above) to work as an expediter within the J4 staff. This individual can work within the cell to establish necessary relationships to facilitate the procurement of required parts.

6. KEYWORD: SUPPLY
 - a. ITEM: Consumables
 - b. DISCUSSION: We experienced shortfalls in some of our consumable stocks. Items noted include: (1) Printer Cartridges; (2) Paper (8x14) and (3) Three Ring Binders.
 - c. RECOMMENDATION: Assume a high consumption rate. Bring more consumables if load planning allows for it.

7. KEYWORD: EMBARKATION
 - a. ITEM: DUNNAGE
 - b. DISCUSSION: During arrival, pallets were placed on the deck, which made them difficult to pick up, and could have led to the destruction on the pallets.
 - c. RECOMMENDATION: Recover all dunnage for 463L pallets to be used for placement of pallets on the ground.

8. KEYWORD: OPERATIONS
 - a. ITEM: TASKING
 - b. DISCUSSION: Upon arrival there was not tasking established for the Detachment so it took several days of communicating Seabee capabilities to the J-staff.
 - c. RECOMMENDATION: Immediately upon receipt of a warning order, provide capability briefing to the originator of the RFF.

9. KEYWORD: MEDICAL
 - a. ITEM: Health Records
 - b. DISCUSSION: Health Records for personnel assigned were shipped as Organizational Gear to Pakistan in order to provide proof of health of members for

country clearance. They were not necessary at any other times and the chance for damage to the records is great considering weather, storage, etc.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In future operations, recommend carrying PHS Form 771 (Yellow Card) and DD 2764 (Patient Care Summary) and leaving the actual health record with the main body medical facility. These forms are adequate for proof of health and vaccination of Detachment members without posing risk for damage to medical records. Another benefit is minimized weight of organizational gear.

10. KEYWORD: MEDICAL

a. ITEM: Malaria Prophylaxis

b. DISCUSSION: Recommended malaria prophylaxis for Pakistan AOR is Doxycycline capsules (daily) or Mefloquine tablets (weekly). Medical staff was able to provide adequate amounts of Doxycycline for members of the crew with only those with allergies to Doxy using the Mefloquine. Several members experienced side effects of sun-sensitivity during the initial two weeks of deployment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: In order to ensure compliance with daily dosing with junior members, issue Platoon Commanders bottles of Doxycycline to administer during daily quarters formations. Entrust staff to comply with daily dosing on their own.

11. KEYWORD: MEDICAL

a. ITEM: Medical Supplies

b. DISCUSSION: The Detachment TOA consists of AMMAL's 302, 303, and 304 within the MCA and are kept in the "de-humidified" warehouse at Okinawa deployment site. The items, which expire (medications, chemicals, certain other consumables) are on a "deferred" status and are not stored with the rest of the TOA. Upon receiving the 48-hour warning order for this deployment, deferred medications were requested for the AMMAL 304, but could not be delivered earlier than one to two weeks. To overcome this hurdle, INCD purchased a USMC AMMAL 699 complete and ready at 3rd Medical Logistics Group at Camp Kinser in Okinawa. This AMMAL supports basic sick call and minor trauma needs for 300 personnel for 30 days, and is better suited for the needs of this type of Detachment.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Future operations that require "48-hour" mobilizations need to liaison with INCD Force Medical Officer immediately to request the deferred medications. Additionally, the Battalion Medical Officer should be aware that the deferred medications might be best acquired through an adjacent unit.

12. KEYWORD: FORCE PROTECTION

a. ITEM: Weapons, Ammunition, and Armory issues.

b. DISCUSSION: Due to the high threat area and the sensitive nature of our mission we were required to carry our service pistols in a concealed method. The M16A3 rifles and M500 shotguns were not allowed to be shown or taken out of the Armory Tri-Con. We were not allowed to conduct any work at night so the AN/PVS 7C that were brought were not utilized at all. Prior to deployment from Okinawa we sent RFIs many times concerning what weapons we would be allowed to bring into the country and what condition we would be allowed to carry our weapons. None of the information we received communicated the sensitive nature of us carrying our weapons.

Had we been aware, we would not have walked off the plane with our weapons in hand, we would have brought concealed carry holsters for our service pistols. Since we did not, we attempted to purchase holsters locally but the quality of those holsters were not up to par. We also attempted to have some sent from the US but they were held up in customs for four weeks. We also would not have brought as many M16A3's and shotguns since we could not carry them openly without any way to conceal them. Also the amount of 5.56mm ammunition brought would have been significantly less.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Communicate all weapons, ammunition and armory issues prior to deploying. The Battalion should not assume that the receiving command has a complete understanding of the DEPORD. The Battalion should not assume that completed RFIs have been properly staffed and communicated to the gaining command. A formal request for weapons entry approval should be coordinated through the Regiment.

13. KEYWORD: FORCE PROTECTION

a. ITEM: Rules of Engagement

b. DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment we sent RFIs attempting many times to receive concrete Rules of Engagement (ROE). All that was received from our requests was to use the standard CENTCOM ROEs located on their web site. You cannot use the standard ROEs for CENTCOM in this type of mission. We were deployed for a humanitarian purpose not a combat mission. The only rule given was to use lethal force against lethal action.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that proper training is provided for all personnel that include ramp up levels of engagement. More in house training on the different types of force that can be utilized in a humanitarian operation would benefit personnel in these types of situations. The only training most personnel have is to speak loudly and to chamber a round in our weapon when threatened. More training in Compliance Techniques, Non-Lethal Baton, and Butt strikes with the M16A3 in a Non-Lethal environment would be beneficial during homeport or prior to these types of deployments.

APPENDIX B
CRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
OCTBOER 2005

8 Oct – Verbal warning order received from 30 NCR

10-13 Oct – Initial planning and preparation for 250 pax/66 Piece CESE package (COA#1)

13 Oct – TPFDD submitted

14Oct – Begin mount-out

16 Oct – Mount out complete for COA#1. Vehicles staged and prepared for movement to airfield.

17 Oct – Begin re-plan for COA#2 (125 pax detachment with minimal rolling stock)

18 Oct – DEPORD received.

18 Oct – Restage CESE and reconfigure TOA to meet new COA. Begin load planning assuming 5 C17 aircraft.

19 Oct - Re-plan assuming 3 C17 aircraft. Cut TOA and CESE to meet aircraft availability.

20 Oct – Re-plan assuming 1 x AN124 aircraft, 1 x B757, and 1 x Cargo 747. Adjust TOA and CESE configuration accordingly.

21 Oct – S3 departs on PDSS with 4 pax (EOC, BUC, SKC, and LT).

22 Oct – Phase 1 Air Detachment deploys via Thailand with CESE and some TOA items (10 pax/ AN-124 aircraft)

23 Oct – PDSS arrives in Pakistan

23 Oct – Phase 2 Air Detachment deploys with remaining TOA items (2 pax/ Cargo 747 aircraft)

24 Oct – Phase 1 arrives in Pakistan

24 Oct – Phase 2 arrives in Pakistan

24 Oct – Phase 3 Air Detachment deploys (106 pax/B757 aircraft)

25 Oct – Phase 3 arrives in Pakistan

25-26 Oct – Reform Detachment and prepare TOA/CESE for movement to the FOB. CESE was resourced from outside units and staged 20KM from the APOD.

26 Oct – Convoy #1 departs APOD for the FOB (120mi)

27 Oct – Begin work on Camp Can Do.

28 Oct – Line Haul assets return to the APOD for Convoy#2

29 Oct – Convoy #2 departs APOD.

29 Oct – First day of work.

NOVEMBER 2005

1-30 Nov – Execution (Disaster Recovery/Humanitarian Assistance OPS)

5-7 Nov – EAD El FITR Holiday period (Seabee Work Continues)

24 Nov – Thanksgiving Holiday (the only off-day during this operation)

29 Nov – Detachment notified of RIP with NMCB4

30 Nov – Embark party (7 pax) return to Chaklala to prepare excess TOA items for shipment to Okinawa and Bahrain. Staging excess U.S. Army equipment for return to Karachi.

30 Nov to 14 December – Embark party prepares TOA equipment for contracted movement to Okinawa and Bahrain.

DECEMBER 2005

1 Dec – Contract Line Haul with excess TOA items executed

2 Dec – TOA downloaded and staged at CMTI

3 Dec – S3 departs FOB for Chaklala

4 Dec – S3 departs Pakistan for Okinawa (prepare for NMCB4 MB turnover)

4 Dec – Detachment Pre-AP (34 pax) movement to Chaklala

11 Dec – Detachment AP (37 pax) movement to Chaklala

12 Dec – NMCB4 AP (30 pax) arrives Chaklala

13 Dec – NMCB74 convoys NMCB4 to Muzaffarabad

14 Dec – Embark party releases TOA equipment to contractor for movement to Okinawa and Bahrain.

15 Dec – Detachment MB (43 pax) movement to Chaklala

17 Dec – Detachment (114 pax) departs Pakistan

18 Dec – Detachment (114 pax) arrives Gulfport, Mississippi

APPENDIX C

MEDIA COVERAGE

The media coverage for this operation was significant. An average of three media visits per week was experienced. DAC PAK employed the use of their internally deployed PAO resources, to include Combat Camera, to accompany most of these visits. DAC PAK assigned a PAO representative to the 212th MASH to accommodate the numerous visitors that we were experiencing at the Forward Operating Base. The Detachment deployed with a PH1 who was utilized as our PAO liaison for all visits. He also was utilized to capture progress on projects and events when no media resources were available.

Media visits included local Pakistan newspaper and media agencies, CNN, CBS News, NBC, MTV, Navy News, Fleet Forces Command, AFN among others.

APPENDIX D

COMMENDATORY COMMENTS

The success of the Detachment was acknowledged and communicated by all leadership and visitors alike. Verbal Bravo Zulus were given on numerous occasions by various UN agencies, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, various Department of State agencies, CFC-A, CDAC, PAKMIL Military and Police Units. Command presentations were given to the Battalion by the following organizations: Pakistan Rangers, Pakistan Army Engineering Directorate, Pakistan Army 12th Infantry Division, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, and the Commander Task Force 212th MASH Camp Resolute.