

NMCB 4 DET PAKISTAN



AFTER ACTION REPORT MARCH 2006



**NMCB 4 2005-2006 OKINAWA DEPLOYMENT
DET PAKISTAN
AFTER ACTION REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

- A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- B. MOUNT OUT/TRAVEL
- C. TURNOVER WITH NMCB 74
- D. TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
- E. MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
- F. FORCE PROTECTION/SECURITY
- G. COMMAND AND CONTROL
- H. MEDICAL
- I. SUPPLY/CONSUMABLES
- J. VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
- K. DEMOLITION AND DEBRIS REMOVAL
- L. OTHER PROJECTS
- M. SAFETY
- N. PUBLIC AFFAIRS/MEDIA
- O. CAMP MAINTENANCE

Enclosures:

1. DET Pakistan Map Showing Relation Between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad
2. Map: 'South Asia (Pakistan and India): Earthquake'
3. DET Pakistan Completed Projects
4. Press Release: 16Dec05, 'U.S. Seabees Turnover Operations'
5. Press Release: 24Jan06, 'Pakistan Contractors and U.S. Navy SEABEES Work Together to Bring Back Muzaffarabad'
6. Press Release: 6Feb06, 'Rear Admiral LeFever Visits U.S. Military Adopt-a-Village Programs in Miani Bandi and Kardala'
7. Press Release: 13Feb06, 'Pakistan Military Engineer Acquire Construction Equipment from U.S. Navy SEABEES'

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 8, 2005, a devastating 7.6 magnitude earthquake occurred in northern Pakistan and India. The epicenter of the earthquake was near Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Aftershocks were many and continued for months. Severe damage occurred to buildings and homes. Over 76,000 people were killed in the initial earthquake, many more were injured and left homeless. Much of the Kashmir terrain was inaccessible as a result of the many landslides from the mountainous terrain. Communications in the outlying areas were lost. Following the Pakistan President's immediate request for assistance, world nations responded by sending financial and military assistance.

The Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan established for the effort was the Combined Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (CDACPAK), led by RADM Michael LeFever. The operation was called Operation LIFELINE. On the ground since October 10th, more than 1,200 personnel and 24 helicopters provided vital transportation, logistics, medical and engineering support in the affected areas. In addition to the work performed by Seabees, U.S. Chinooks flew over 4,000 sorties delivering over 20,000 pounds of sustenance and U.S. Army and Marine hospitals treated nearly 30,000 patients.

The CDAC-PAK Headquarters was located at the US Embassy Compound in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Islamabad is located approximately 60 miles south-southwest of Muzaffarabad.



NMCB 74 received the first call for NCF forces to deploy soon after the earthquake. After arriving on October 27, 123 personnel completed 29 relief projects, cleared over 30,000 cubic yards of debris from seven schools and built over 60 temporary shelters and 1000 Pakistani latrines.


NMCB 4 DET Pakistan arrived in Pakistan on December 13, 2005, and after a one day turnover, relieved NMCB 74 in place. The DET had forty personnel who completed 19 projects. Over 9,000 cubic yards of debris was removed from 5 demolition projects involving the removal of severely damaged school buildings. Fourteen temporary school facilities at 8 project locations were completed.

The location of NMCB 4 DET Pakistan camp was a Pakistani Embassy Compound in the city of Muzaffarabad, located just inside Kashmir in the Himalayan Mountains along the Pakistan/Kashmir border. The DET was collocated with an Army MASH unit and a small group of State Department personnel. Two maps showing the orientation of the DET with respect to the epicenter of the earthquake are provided in Enclosures 1 and 2.

While arctic temperatures were expected for much of the deployment, the Kashmir areas experienced a relatively mild winter, even though the night temperatures dropped to the mid-30's towards the end of December and most of January.

Engineering support equipment necessary to expedite the onset of relief efforts was pulled from numerous sources. In addition to the use of Army equipment, Naval Construction Force equipment from the 30th NCR and the 22nd NCR was utilized.

Upon the conclusion of the DET's construction relief efforts in the Muzaffarabad AOR, a total of 25 generators, dozers and dump trucks, valued at over \$2.2M was donated to Pakistan so they could utilize the equipment to further their relief efforts. No equipment from the Okinawa TOA was donated.



The DET moved to Qasim Airbase in Islamabad on February 16, 2006 to perform camp maintenance projects at the Operation's site locations in and around Islamabad. A representative 8'x11' seahut was also constructed at the Pakistani Presidential Palace for a visit by U.S. President Bush. While in Islamabad, an embark team worked closely with Construction Mechanical Training Institute (CMTI), contracted to clean and ship all equipment and materials being shipped by sea out of Pakistan.

The DET departed Pakistan to rejoin NMCB 4's Mainbody in Okinawa, Japan on March 5th and 9th. A portion of the equipment utilized for the operation was flown to Okinawa March 6, 2006. The remaining table of allowance gear and equipment was turned over to a contractor for return by a sea shipment.

B. MOUNT OUT / TRAVEL

SUMMARY

Extreme difficulty was experienced for movement of personnel into and out of theater. The relatively small number of personnel and the lack of a CDACPAK assigned mission priority for travel resulted in the inability to obtain military airlift for the trip into Pakistan. Personnel were subsequently split into 6 groups, all traveling at different time periods on a time consuming combination of commercial air, space available military charters and military cargo planes. The end result was a late arrival to relieve NMCB 74 personnel.

Thirty personnel departed Los Angeles International Airport for Norfolk, Virginia on December 9. After flying space available to Bahrain, they boarded a C130 for Islamabad,



Pakistan, arriving late on December 13th. Personnel were separated into 4 different groups on the commercial air portion. The remaining 10 personnel departed Port Hueneme December 15. Again separated into groups for the commercial portion of travel, one group was delayed in

Washington Dulles Airport due to weather, subsequently missed the connecting chartered MILAIR flight and did not arrive in theater until December 23.

All personnel arrived initially at Chaklala Airbase in Islamabad. The first group was driven to Muzaffarabad FOB while all other personnel were flown via helicopter.

Since NMCB 74 had already brought or was supplied with all necessary operational and camp gear, only personal gear and NMCB 4 Command specific administrative materials were carried into theater. Personal gear was limited to two bags (seabags or similar size) and one carry-on (alice pack or similar size) bag.

Leaving theater was even more difficult. The schedule for departure changed many times. The dates for personnel to fly out of Pakistan ranged from February 24 to the actual date of March 5. Leadership at CDACPAK stated that their frustration with the MILAIR system will be described in detail in their after action report. The schedule changed at least daily from March 1 to March 5. The DET's departure was linked with nearly 150 Marines who were also flying to Okinawa.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. When a relatively small number of personnel are traveling to an operation, request an air mission priority and travel assistance from the gaining operational command. Doing so should make travel smoother and more timely.
2. Medical records and other sensitive paperwork that is difficult to duplicate should be hand carried and not checked into commercial airlines as luggage. One piece of luggage with one group's medical records did not arrive with the personnel's flight. The luggage did not arrive into Pakistan for approximately 2 weeks.

C. TURNOVER WITH NMCB 74

SUMMARY

A limited time for turnover with NMCB 74 was the result of the lengthy time it took to arrive in Pakistan. The turnover focused mainly on accountability of gear, equipment and supplies over a little more than one day's time. A cursory review of past projects and a few points of contact were provided. Existing projects were visited and enough related discussions took place to round out the turnover.

Suspecting that a short time period for turnover was going to result, a written turnover was requested but not supplied. In the end, a quick turnover was completed that took



into account a complete inventory of all equipment and gear and the established concept of operations.

The camp itself, established by NMCB 74, was well thought out, neat, and complete for the contingency situation. Camp Can-Do was located a safe distance away from the Embassy main gate and had easy access on a gravel road that led only to the ALFA yard, the shower tents and the MASH's water purification unit. The trash pit was placed at the rear of the ALFA yard, with at least 100 yards separation to the nearest berthing. The latrine location was convenient for all personnel, and was located at least 35 yards from berthing and 100 yards from the contracted dining facility. The size of Camp Dan-Do was also appropriate for the collocation of all materials, equipment, tools and Seabee berthing.

The concept of operations was well established and worked very well. Of significant importance was the security concept of operations. Significant discussions were held to ensure a solid foundation for force protection was in place and active.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. When turnover time is expected to be limited, require a thorough written summary of operations, projects, reports, contacts, past problematic issues that could resurface and existing issues to resolve that will be discussed during turnover to speed along the process. A written turnover will also prevent unintentional failure to address a turnover item.

D. TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

A combination of Army and NCF dozers, dump trucks, HMMWVs and MTRVs were used for relief operations. The NCF equipment came from the 22nd and 30th NCRs. Daily Equipment Density and LOGSTAT Reports were completed and forwarded to CDACPAK Headquarters.

The Pakistani driving environment was chaotic, even dangerous at times. The accepted



practice of Pakistanis overcrowding the sidewalks and spilling into the street reduced an already narrow two lane road to one lane. Traffic standstills were routine with oncoming traffic delicately passing each other so as not to run over any of the civilian foot traffic. Pakistani drivers failed to obey any sort of traffic laws, freely passing vehicles on either

side and in the near vicinity of oncoming traffic, nearly causing head-on collisions.

Narrow roads and tight alleys were common in the city of Muzaffarabad, Pakistan. Just outside the city were many narrow and very uneven unimproved roads. The HMMWVs used during most travel in the AOR were oftentimes in very tight driving situations, making it hard to navigate. The 15-ton and 20-ton dump trucks were cumbersome to navigate through the city, where most of the demolition work was located. As a result of the size of the equipment, the area of operations was limited to the city of Muzaffarabad and some slightly outlying areas. Typical sport utility vehicles rented by CDACPAK were very useful when traveling either in or outside the city on the unimproved roads.

Information obtained from CDACPAK indicated that other national forces assisting with the relief efforts had small tracked construction vehicles and Bobcat type vehicles that were extremely useful in areas that could not accommodate larger equipment.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Consider the use and viability of smaller transport vehicles and construction equipment environments that will not easily accommodate larger TOA equipment. Smaller and more maneuverable tracked vehicles should be considered.

E. MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

Three Construction Mechanics were responsible for maintaining and repairing 40 pieces of CESE. Two mechanics were also assigned as field crew. Responsibilities included refueling all generators and heaters in camp as well as refueling equipment used on jobsites. The 11 dump trucks that were used for relief operations were new and required minimal maintenance.



Of the equipment that was utilized in theater, not all of the necessary operation and maintenance manuals were brought with the equipment. Additionally, no maintenance records were available.

CDACPAK provided funding for repairs. A restrictive customs process significantly slowed the ability to receive repair parts and materials from the command in Okinawa.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Technical manuals and maintenance records for all pieces of CESE should travel with equipment. Having this resource would have decreased the down time on equipment requiring repairs.
2. If the host nation has restrictive customs procedures, utilize local supply networks if possible.

F. FORCE PROTECTION / SECURITY

SUMMARY

The responsibility for overall camp and convoy force protection fell to a Pakistan Ranger unit with coordination and oversight provided by the Army MASH unit. Seabees were

responsible for Camp Can-Do perimeter wire and for the camp Entry Control Point watch at night. While the Army MASH and the Pakistan Rangers reviewed and established convoy security Standard Operating Procedures, the Seabees set-up their own convoy missions, requesting additional Pakistani security personnel when necessary, and rehearsing immediate action drills with the Pakistanis to ensure safe execution of movements.

The DET assigned a First Class Petty Officer to provide liaison communications daily between the Seabees, State Department personnel (to include the AOR RSO, Army force



protection personnel) and the Pakistan Rangers. Every morning, the Security Petty Officer coordinated with the Pakistan Rangers, ensuring sufficient security personnel departed with Seabee project crews. Every evening, the Security Petty Officer provided liaison with the Pakistan Rangers and the Army personnel for security requirements for the next day, ensuring

construction relief operations were not affected by lack of security forces. English was spoken very well by most supervisors and Officers, making communication very easy.

Coordination was performed mostly via cell phone or personal contact. Towards the end of the mission in Muzaffarabad, the AOR RSO received and provided hand held radios to the Army, Seabee and Pakistan security personnel, greatly enhancing security coordination. Radios were also provided to the Army personnel located at the Muzaffarabad Airport.

On at least 10 occasions, demonstrations, protests or cultural processions/celebrations affected the ability of the project crews to proceed into or continue working in the city. The cultural celebrations and most demonstrations were scheduled in advance with the PUNJAB Police, and were therefore foreseen and predictable. The protests were unpredictable, with the Pakistan Rangers mostly making conservative recommendations that the project crews remain in camp. The January 13, 2006 U.S. missile attack targeting a senior leader of Al Qaeda resulted in unpredictable numbers of protests throughout Pakistan. When news broke of the attack, project crews were immediately recalled to camp and the number of Pakistani security personnel was increased for the following few days.

Overall, the force protection provided by the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Rangers and local Punjab Police was excellent. The organization was an extremely operational and respected unit, able to perform superbly in this culturally sensitive environment. Integration of U.S. forces as a force provider may have been culturally insensitive or incorrect, possibly leading to an increased threat environment.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. In a nation with mixed feelings about the U.S., particularly when U.S. intelligence reports terrorist organizations in the immediate vicinity, an imbedded Marine Corps advisor would be useful to oversee security and relay security concerns to Headquarters personnel.

2. A sufficient number of compatible radios that will work between all coordinating units would be useful during joint



operations. Communicating with the State Department, Army and Pakistani Rangers was very difficult without them.

G. COMMAND AND CONTROL

SUMMARY

NMCB 74 had well established communications and an operational Tactical Operating Center (TOC) prior to NMCB 4 DET Pakistan arriving in mid-December. Two watches manned the TOC 24-hours a day.

Internal communications utilized XTS5000 hand held RT'S and XTVA base station. Convoy communications and project sites utilized XTS5000 hand held RT'S, VHF SINGARS, and cellular phones. External communications utilized DSN phone lines, cellular and Iridium phones.

The Army's 44th Signal Battalion, based out of Mannheim, Germany, provided DSN phone lines, NIPR, SIPR, and VTC with their DCP-Tlight (Deployable communications package tactical Light) to NMCB 4 and the 212th MASH. The 212th MASH provided Armed Forces Network TV.

Most of the DET used the NCF Seabee Web-mail for electronic messaging. However, this webmail system is extremely slow when compared to traditional server based e-mail. The system proved unreliable when sending or receiving attachments. Additionally, the

system was often unavailable, significantly disrupting the DET's ability to communicate with CDACPAK Headquarters and with NMCB 4 Mainbody in Okinawa

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Assign an ET and PS to operations where consistent, reliable and proficient mobile communications and reporting are necessary.
2. Work with the S6 shop to find the best solution for electronic messaging. NCF Seabee Web-mail was minimally effective.

H. MEDICAL SUMMARY

The Army's 212th MASH on station provided all medical care in camp and support on projects. If MASH support was unavailable, combat lifesavers were available in case of an emergency. Additionally, project sites were provided with cell phones with the MASH's MEDEVAC phone numbers.

Prior to deployment, intelligence from NMCB 74 reported that the level of sickness in the area was higher than normal. Washing hands often and not eating local foods was



recommended. The MASH later reported that the air quality in and around Muzaffarabad was extremely poor with very high particulate matter.

At least 25% of the DET's personnel were affected by diarrhea. Five personnel required intravenous injections to remain hydrated. Three personnel were affected by severe cold symptoms. Antibiotics were prescribed for two of the 3 personnel.

One person developed a skin infection, most likely unrelated by the Pakistani environment, and was MEDEVAC'd out of Pakistan. One person, maintained a serious cough for the duration of the time in Muzaffarabad and developed a 102-degree fever within 2 weeks of arrival. The person was treated, healed and returned to complete the mission.

Prior to deployment, the Command's Medical Department prescribed two medications for the prevention of malaria to all personnel. Doxycycline was to be taken daily upon arrival into theater and taken until departure out of Pakistan. The second medication, Primaquine Phosphate, was to be taken daily for two weeks after departure out of Pakistan.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. When intelligence reports the theater is highly unsanitary and that sickness from excess bacteria could be expected, bring adequate amounts of hand sanitizer. Additionally, ensure proper training is provided describing the theater's environment and methods of preventing/defeating sickness.

I. SUPPLY / CONSUMABLES

SUMMARY

Consumables that were ordered by NMCB 74 prior to turnover were prone to lengthy shipping times and delays in customs upon arrival in Pakistan. As a result, a reliable local Pakistani supply was established by NMCB 74 and worked well, even though the quality of the construction material was less than typical U.S. standards.

The Supply Petty Officer actively maintained a steady flow of all materials necessary to keep projects moving. Daily LOGSTAT reports provided to CDACPAK Headquarters provided notification of overdue materials and parts. Funding was for all project materials as provided by CDACPAK, who either used a government purchase card or contract. Meals Ready to Eat and water were checked daily and ordered when necessary. Checkout of CTR items was also performed by the Supply Petty Officer.



LESSONS LEARNED

1. Get an accurate understanding of what funding is available and how ordering and tracking is accomplished immediately upon arrival. Shortly after turnover, there was confusion as to how the ordering system worked with respect to who actually processes the order against the funding account.

2. Keep kits together in one location to prevent an adjacent unit from packing them with their equipment. Keeping a Seabee logo on kits will also help to prevent confusion. Even though the kits were all stored on Camp Can-Do which did keep this mistake from occurring, there was still a concern that an adjacent unit would pack Seabee equipment, mistaking it for similar sized/packed Army equipment.

J. VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

SUMMARY

A vertical construction crew supported the relief efforts by constructing 16 seahuts for use as temporary school facilities. Ten temporary shelters were erected to complete a 70 shelter village housing project that was started by NMCB 74.

In general, the materials for the seahuts were prefabricated in camp and then transported to the work site. On average, prefabrication took anywhere from 1 to 2 days, with another 2 to 3 days to erect the structure on site.

Vertical (and horizontal) projects were verbally tasked by the Pakistan 476th Engineer Brigade. Even though repeated requests by the DET and CDACPAK for a written listing of projects were not acted upon, projects proceeded timely with little or no delays. Final selection of a subsequent project, decided by the CDACPAK Engineer and by the Seabee OIC or AOIC, took place as operational projects were being completed.

A listing of all completed projects is given in Enclosure 3.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Arrange for a translator. There were many miscommunications that occurred as a result of the language differences that existed. There were times that the miscommunication resulted in work being stopped or having to be re-done because the needs of the customer were not clearly understood.

K. DEMOLITION AND DEBRIS REMOVAL

SUMMARY

The demolition crew efficiently worked with locally contracted Pakistani excavator and front-end loader operators to demolish earthquake damaged buildings and to remove the resultant debris from project sites. Equipment was moved to and from the project sites using a locally contracted flatbed truck.



The excavator operator separated and piled rebar for reuse by the Pakistanis. Citizens would remove this valuable commodity after completion of the day's project work. For safety and security

reasons, no citizens were allowed on site while Seabees were working. Piles of large stone were also stockpiled for reuse in rebuilding typical Pakistani type homes.

A listing of all completed projects is given in Enclosure 3.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Provide training for country specific driving regulations and hazards prior to driving in a new environment. The narrow roads Pakistan created hazardous situations with the large construction equipment and HMMWVs used.
2. Understand and plan foreign nation security requirements into project planning. Host nations may have different security requirements than we are used to. In the planning of projects it was very important to allow time to meet the host nation's security requirements.

L. OTHER PROJECTS

SUMMARY

In addition to the demolition and seahut construction projects, twelve other projects were completed. Most notable were: various force protection projects, including widening of an unimproved road next to camp; installation of a sandbag wall at Muzaffarabad airport; installation of a leach field next to a transient tent camp to alleviate flooding; and the replacement of over 1,200 feet of water line which included the repair of the water source connection, necessary to reestablish water supply to 500 villagers, their Mosque and school.



Projects at Qasim Airbase included: shower/latrines drainage repiping; camp flooding drain installation; and multiple small quality of life improvements.

There were no tool, material, equipment or funding situations that affected the completion of any project.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Maintain control of work projects where differences exist between the priorities of work. The operation's mission involved vertical construction in addition to the demolition projects. The Pakistani Engineer Brigade wanted to direct Seabee efforts

primarily to demolition work, creating minor disagreements during early work coordination meetings.

M. CAMP MAINTENANCE SUMMARY

Camp maintenance was a high priority for Seabee tasking as directed by CDACPAK Headquarters. Upon arrival, Seabees were operating a combination of Army and Seabee shower tents and provided water resupply. Seabees also provided trash removal operations and generator maintenance support. Many minor projects were completed throughout the camps that improved the quality of operations and quality of life for personnel.



The Army and the State Department relied heavily on Seabee camp maintenance support throughout the operation. Both specifically expressed their reliance on Seabee labor during their outbriefings with the CDACPAK Commander.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Need to bring consumable equipment parts for TOA equipment when deploying to an environment with an unreliable supply network. No spares or consumable parts (i.e. filters) were brought along with the equipment. Some equipment was rendered non-operational when a replacement part could not be obtained. Without improvising, showers and the laundry unit would have been shutdown.
2. Electrician's kit should include an electronic multimeter for troubleshooting electrical equipment. The included tester is not adequate for this.
3. More 220V/120V-distribution boxes were needed to develop a better load distribution diagram for the camp. We only had two and needed at least four.

N. SAFETY SUMMARY

The operational environment in the assigned AOR had many peculiarities, each presenting some degree of safety risk. Simply driving to and from each project site was hazardous. On project sites, the constant vigilance of project crews and Pakistan Rangers to keep local civilians off of the sites prevented unnecessary risks of injury. Even in camp, the health risk from the reported abundant amount of bacteria threatened everyone.

To minimize the potential for injuries and sickness, ORM was incorporated into all facets of the operations. Daily project site Safety Petty Officer briefs, Safety Officer lectures 4 times a week at quarters, proper work supervision and the provision of appropriate safety gear were critical in maintaining a safe working environment. Hard hats, gloves, hearing and sight protection were consistently worn on all project sites. Even though the weather was not as cold as was expected, sufficient cold weather gear was obtained prior to deployment and was valuable for at least one out of the 3 months deployed to Pakistan.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Analyze the driving environment and ensure proper training is provided for the equipment to be used.
2. Prepare a ready-to-fly assortment of safety equipment/materials for use in contingencies.

O. PUBLIC AFFAIRS/MEDIA

SUMMARY

Due to the media interest in the relief efforts, there were many local and world media visits to the projects and camp. Many were spill-overs from visits to the Army's MASH hospital unit. All media were cleared through either the CDACPAK Headquarters and the Pakistan Rangers or the Army MASH unit and the Pakistan Rangers.


NMCB 4 DET Pakistan media releases are provided in Enclosures 4 through 7.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Continue assigning appropriate personnel as 'face men' to meet with media. Continue media refresher training.



Enclosure 1




Enclosure 2

South Asia (Pakistan and India): Earthquake

OCHA Situation Report No. 8

Issued 13 October 2005

GLIDE: EQ-2005-000174-PAK



Epicentre
 Date: 8 October 2005, 3:50 UTC (8:50 local time)
 Magnitude: 7.6
 Depth: 10 km
 Location: 34.432°N, 73.537°E
 More than 140 aftershocks (21 aftershocks over 5 on Richter scale)

Muzaffarabad
 Population: 200,000
 Destruction: 80% - 90%

Indian-administered part of Kashmir
 Killed: 1,280
 Missing: 14
 Injured: 5,944
 Buildings damaged: 32,723

Pakistan
 Killed: 25,180
 Injured: 60,000
 Affected: 4 million (1 million seriously)
 Needs*: shelters, medicines, cargo helicopters, heavy machines to remove debris from road, financial assistance



***Needs (indicated by Gov. of Pakistan):**

- Helicopters
- 50,000 winterised family tents (only some 5,000 have been distributed to date);
- 1,000,000 blankets;
- Medicine: typhoid drugs and antibiotics (in syrup form for infants);
- Disinfectants (for bodies);
- Water purification kits and tablets;
- Food (cooked and tinned, high energy biscuits).

Up to now, recorded commitments of 100,000 blankets and 37,000 tents

Map data source: UN Cartographic Section, DevInfo, Aroworld, USGS, Indrnav.com.
 Code: OCHA/GVA - 2005/0169

Created by the ReliefWeb Map Centre
 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
 United Nations - 13 October 2005

The names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Enclosure 3

Proj #	Project Title	Project MD Expended Today	Project MD Expended Cumulative	Debris Removed Today	Debris Removed Total	% Complete
PA136	Ministry of Education Building	0	190	0	5056	100%
PA140	Miani Bandi Village	0	413.5	0	845	100%
PA157	Sahali Sarkar Government Girls School	0	50	0	2301	100%
PA158	Nia Mohalla Government Girls School	0	38	N/A	N/A	100%
PA159	Post Graduate College for Women	0	58	N/A	N/A	100%
PA160	Muzaffarabad Airfield Protective Wall Barrier	0	10	N/A	N/A	100%
PA161	Ali Akbar Awan School for Boys	0	64	0	3497	100%
PA162	Post Graduate College for Men	0	65	N/A	N/A	100%
PA163	Miani Bandi Boys High School in Kardala Village	0	153	N/A	N/A	100%
PA164	Kardala Girls Middle School	0	46	N/A	N/A	100%
PA165	Narul Girls High School	0	14	0	598	100%
PA166	Narul Girls High School Drainage	0	1	N/A	N/A	100%
PA167	Camp Force Protection Project	0	16	N/A	N/A	100%
PA168	University Project (Phase III)	0	72	0	2947	100%
PA169	Post Graduate College For Women	0	82.5	N/A	N/A	100%
PA170	Miani Bandi Boys High School Phase II	0	42	N/A	N/A	100%
PA171	Govt Elementary College for Women	0	51	0	1543	100%
PA172	Shohal Village Waterline	0	4	N/A	N/A	100%
PA173	Nia Mohalla Govt Girls School	0	6	NA	NA	45%

Enclosure 4



[Embassy News](#) [U.S. Citizen Services](#) [Visas to the U.S.](#) [U.S. Policy & Issues](#) [Resources](#)

EMBASSY NEWS

You Are In: [Home](#) > [Embassy News](#) > [Latest Embassy News](#)

- ▶ [Ambassador](#)
- ▶ [About the Embassy](#)
- ▼ [Latest Embassy News](#)
- ▶ [Press Releases](#)
- ▶ [Speeches](#)
- ▶ [Job Opportunities](#)
- ▶ [Earthquake Photo Packages](#)
- ▶ [Departments and Offices](#)

PRESS RELEASES

U.S. Seabees Turnover Operations

12/16/2005

U.S. Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan

U.S. SEABEES TURNOVER OPERATIONS

Islamabad, December 16, 2005 – The 140 U.S. Sailors of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 were formally recognized today by United States Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker, and Rear Admiral Mike LeFever, Commander of the U.S. Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan, for their important contributions to the ongoing U.S. earthquake relief efforts in Pakistan.

NMCB 74 is returning to their homeport in Gulfport, Mississippi, after successfully completing their seven-week humanitarian mission in Pakistan. They are being replaced by NMCB 4, a contingent of 40 SEABEES from Port Hueneme, Calif.

At the request of the Pakistani Government, NMCB 74 deployed to Pakistan on October 27, 2005, to provide additional engineering and construction capability in the city of Muzaffarabad. During the past seven weeks, they have assisted in reconstruction projects around the city to include removing more than 32,539 cubic yards of debris – equal to 1,627 dump truck loads – from seven school sites. Additionally, the SEABEES built community centers, housing shelters, field kitchens and sanitation facilities.

In November, they adopted the Miani Bandi village adjacent to the Muzaffarabad airport as part of the Pakistan Government's "Adopt-a-Village" program. In addition to removing debris from the village, the SEABEES built four new school structures and assisted the Pakistan Military and local homeowners in rebuilding 40 shelters.

The Sailors of NMCB 74 shared a similar circumstance with

the Pakistani people. In August, many of the Sailors' own homes were destroyed when Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast of the United States. They were deployed to Okinawa, Japan, at the time, and were unable to return home.

"It has been an honor to serve here in Pakistan," said Lieutenant Jerry McNally, officer in charge of the SEABEE detachment. "We have been truly inspired by the courage and perseverance of the Pakistani people, and have made many friends. We won't forget them."

The Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 will complete the Miani Bandi Adopt-a-village project and begin new projects designated by the Government of Pakistan.

[back to top ^](#)

[HOME](#) | [EMBASSY NEWS](#) | [CITIZEN SERVICES](#) | [VISAS](#) | [POLICY & ISSUES](#) | [RESOURCES](#)
[CONTACT US](#) | [PRIVACY](#) | [WEBMASTER](#)



Enclosure 5



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
ISLAMABAD • PAKISTAN



[Embassy News](#) [U.S. Citizen Services](#) [Visas to the U.S.](#) [U.S. Policy & Issues](#) [Resources](#)

EMBASSY NEWS

You Are In: [Home](#) > [Embassy News](#) > [Latest Embassy News](#)

- ▶ [Ambassador](#)
- ▶ [About the Embassy](#)
- ▼ **Latest Embassy News**
 - [Press Releases](#)
 - [Speeches](#)
 - [Job Opportunities](#)
 - [Earthquake Photo Packages](#)
- ▶ [Departments and Offices](#)

PRESS RELEASES

Pakistan Contractors And U.S. Navy SEABEES Work Together To Bring Back Muzaffarabad

01/24/2006



Muzaffarabad, January 24, 2006: U.S. Navy SEABEE dumptruck receiving a load of rubble from a Pakistani contractor at Muzaffarabad University. Working together SEABEES and Pakistani contractors removed over 7700 cubic yards of debris as the Muzaffarabad reconstruction efforts continue.

Muzaffarabad - U.S. Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan – Under the direction of Pakistan Military Engineers, U.S Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEES) and Pakistani contractors are now working together to rebuild Muzaffarabad.

This week the Pakistan contractor and the Navy SEABEES surpassed the 40,000 cubic yards mark of cleared debris. This represents over 2200 truckloads and is enough to fill a football stadium with 12 feet of rubble. Over 7700 cubic yards alone were removed from the University.

"Our progress is measured in debris excavated and shelters built," said Lieutenant Mike Trest, Officer in Charge of the SEABEE Detachment. "We couldn't accomplish all of this without our Pakistani partners. They are expert equipment operators and extremely hard workers."

Currently a Pakistani excavator and front loader are removing rubble in conjunction with a SEABEE bulldozer and dump trucks. Pakistan Military Engineers are also at the site to supervise and coordinate the effort.

In the nearby village of Kardala, U.S. SEABEES are constructing three "SEA Huts." These 5 X 8 meter structures are made from locally purchased lumber and will be used as a temporary boys high school. As in Muzaffarabad, the Pakistan Military Engineers determine this site's location and project priorities.

Since October, the SEABEES built over 70 temporary

shelters, 15 SEA Huts, and are now on their 12th demolition project in the Muzaffarabad area.

The SEABEES, part of Mobile Construction Battalion Four, are from Port Hueneme, California and were deployed to Muzaffarabad on Dec.12 to assist the Government of Pakistan in relief efforts.

"We are bringing Muzaffarabad back one truckload at a time," said Trest. "This is one of the most rewarding assignments of my career."

For more information contact CDR Gary Kirchner at the Disaster Assistance Center, Public Affairs Operations Cell 0300-501-2623.

[back to top ^](#)

[HOME](#) | [EMBASSY NEWS](#) | [CITIZEN SERVICES](#) | [VISAS](#) | [POLICY & ISSUES](#) | [RESOURCES](#)
[CONTACT US](#) | [PRIVACY](#) | [WEBMASTER](#)



Enclosure 6



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
ISLAMABAD • PAKISTAN



[Embassy News](#) [U.S. Citizen Services](#) [Visas to the U.S.](#) [U.S. Policy & Issues](#) [Resources](#)

EMBASSY NEWS

You Are In: [Home](#) > [Embassy News](#) > [Latest Embassy News](#)

- ▶ [Ambassador](#)
- ▶ [About the Embassy](#)
- ▼ [Latest Embassy News](#)
 - [Press Releases](#)
 - [Speeches](#)
 - [Job Opportunities](#)
 - [Earthquake Photo Packages](#)
- ▶ [Departments and Offices](#)

PRESS RELEASES

Rear Admiral LeFever Visits U.S. Military Adopt-A-Village Programs In Miani Bandi And Kardala

02/06/2006



Miani Bandi, February 6, 2006: Girls standing outside of SEA HUTS, temporary school buildings built by U.S. Navy SEABEES in Miani Bandi.

Islamabad - U.S. Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan – Today in Miani Bandi and Kardala, Rear Admiral Michael LeFever, Commander United States Disaster Assistance Center, toured the temporary Boys and Girls schools built by U.S. Navy Mobile Construction Battalion's ("SEABEE"s) Adopt-a-Village

program. During the visit, Admiral LeFever presented a "Good Will" plaque commemorating U.S. and Pakistan friendship.

"We came at the invitation of the Pakistan people and as friends," said Admiral LeFever. "Through project's like "Adopt-a-Village", our understanding of each other and our friendships continue to grow stronger.

In Miani Bandi and Kardala U.S. Navy SEABEES completed 9 buildings that are now being used as a temporary girls and boys high school. In the community, the SEABEES, working with the Pakistan military, built 70 temporary shelters.

"The buildings are what we call SEA HUTS," said Lieutenant Michael Trest, the Officer-in-Charge of the U.S. Navy's SEABEE detachment. "These structures are made out of new plywood, posts, and corrugated metal."

The SEABEES, part of Mobile Construction Battalion Four, are from Port Hueneme, California and were deployed to Muzaffarabad on Dec.12 to assist the Government of Pakistan in relief efforts.

"I speak for all is us in uniform when I say that this is a

mission and a memory that none of us will ever forget,"
said Admiral LeFever.

For additional information contact Commander Gary
Kirchner, Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan Public Affairs
at 0300-501-2623.

[back to top ^](#)

[HOME](#) | [EMBASSY NEWS](#) | [CITIZEN SERVICES](#) | [VISAS](#) | [POLICY & ISSUES](#) | [RESOURCES](#)
[CONTACT US](#) | [PRIVACY](#) | [WEBMASTER](#)



Enclosure 7



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
ISLAMABAD • PAKISTAN



[Embassy News](#) [U.S. Citizen Services](#) [Visas to the U.S.](#) [U.S. Policy & Issues](#) [Resources](#)

EMBASSY NEWS

You Are In: [Home](#) > [Embassy News](#) > [Latest Embassy News](#)

- ▶ [Ambassador](#)
- ▶ [About the Embassy](#)
- ▼ **Latest Embassy News**
 - [Press Releases](#)
 - [Speeches](#)
 - [Job Opportunities](#)
 - [Earthquake Photo Packages](#)
- ▶ [Departments and Offices](#)

PRESS RELEASES

Pakistan Military Engineers Acquire Construction Equipment From U.S. Navy SEABEES

02/13/2006



Rear Admiral Michael P. LeFever, Commander, Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan and Major General Imtiaz, Director General of the Pakistan Army Engineers, shake hands to commemorate the turnover of SEABEES equipment in Muzaffarabad on February 13, 2006.

Islamabad - United States Navy Construction Battalion Four (NMCB 4) Detachment Pakistan SEABEES turned over \$2.5 million worth of construction equipment to Pakistan Military Engineers Monday as part of the ongoing transition from relief to reconstruction.

The equipment includes three D-7 bulldozers, one 15-ton dump truck, nine 20-ton dump trucks, seven 100-kilowatt generators and four generator skids.

"This equipment is vital to the continuing mission of rebuilding Pakistan," said Navy Lt. Michael W. Trest, officer in charge, NMCB 4 Detachment Pakistan. "The transfer supports Pakistani authorities to effect long-term reconstruction in the earthquake affected regions."

Since arriving in Pakistan in October, the SEABEES of NMCB 4 and NMCB 74 completed 12 demolition projects, cleared 50,000 cubic yards of debris, enough to cover almost 800 cricket pitches. The SEABEES also built 70 temporary shelters and 15 SEA HUTS – transitional shelters now being used as schools. These projects were primarily accomplished in Miani Bani, Kardala and Muzaffarabad.

"The SEABEES of NMCB 4 and NMCB 74 absolutely lived their 'Can Do' motto," said Rear Adm. Michael LeFever, Commander of U.S. Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan. "They dedicated themselves to helping our Pakistani friends after the devastating earthquake."

For further information please contact Disaster Assistance
Center Public Affairs, Lt. Corey Schultz, at 0300-5012184.

[back to top ^](#)

[HOME](#) | [EMBASSY NEWS](#) | [CITIZEN SERVICES](#) | [VISAS](#) | [POLICY & ISSUES](#) | [RESOURCES](#)
[CONTACT US](#) | [PRIVACY](#) | [WEBMASTER](#)

