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# DEPLOYMENT COMPLETION REPORT

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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM III

October 2005 – March 2006

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## NMCB 22



NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION TWENTY-TWO

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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

NMCB 22 was mobilized during July 2005 at Port Hueneme and completed a unique training program where the unit trained and prepared for deployment while simultaneously planning and executing the F-year FEX requirement. During their time in Port Hueneme they added almost 100 personnel from outside the geographical reserve unit AO. Initial tasking information was unclear due to ongoing MEF strategy and priorities while existing units were completing required tasking. Consequently, the battalion tasked organized everyone for deployment and used this new organization for FEX while completing over 5562 mandays of training. The majority of personnel deployed in early September to Camp Morell, Kuwait while over 100 personnel assigned to support NMCB 133 remained behind to eventually deploy thru Camp Morell and then unto their respective AO. This detachment joined NMCB 133 deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan to support Task Force Sierra (TSF) a Special Operation Forces (SOF) command as outlined in NMCB 133's Deployment Completion Report. NMCB 22's mainbody was tasked with missions in Kuwait and Iraq as outlined in this report. The Kuwaiti mission supported, maintained, and improved Camp Morell, the base where all Seabees entering Iraq conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSO&I). The majority of personnel supported the MEF under 30 NCR in Western Iraq in Al Anbar Province.

The battalion assumed several turnover projects and remote detachment sites from the NMCB 24 and hit the ground running with early successful bridge repair in the city of Hit. Executed less than a week after TOA, the HIT bridge repair was a critical MEF request to be available for the October 2005 Iraqi elections as a show of positive progress and presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. By doing a thorough assessment and on-site design modifications that enabled in simplifying prefabrication and constructability of the repair, the crew rehearsed the day before and then completed the on-site repair in less than 4 hours safeguarding their personnel from the constant threat of attack.

NMCB 22 overcame multiple vendor and operational challenges to successfully complete over 55,000 SF of crater repairs at the Al Asad runway ahead of schedule for the 2nd Marine Air Wing. Upon arrival in country, the battalion worked directly with two separate batch plants to evaluate their performance and establish stable production. After successfully qualifying one vendor to accomplish a design they formulated which included subgrade preparation and design verification, they established an on-site QA/QC program continually monitoring the vendors performance resulting in over 2750 cubic yards of quality concrete. Working directly with Air Operations, the battalion successfully adjusted their schedule to allow essential arresting gear removal and re-certification. They worked with these impacts performing 24 hour operations for over two months completing this 1199 manday project in time for critical RIP of the air combat element. They successfully followed this effort by adjusting their resources to kick off a joint repair project on schedule on another runway. They continued this operation until their departure completing Phase II and III, an

additional 1055 mandays, finishing over 46 joints in addition to centerline repairs fixing severe spawling which was impacting and damaging aircraft. Their airfield quality control program resulted in all this concrete material being within 1/8" deviation to finish grade, exceeding US airfield standards.

Combat Outpost South (COP South) and the ISF Expansion Camp at Al Qiam, two of II Marine Expeditionary Force's top projects, were in direct support of Operation OP Sayaid and the ISF Base Camps and were successfully completed overcoming critical material and labor shortages. Together these facilities totaled over 118 SWA huts, 3 Davidson buildings, 2 Helicopter landing zones, complete camp electrical and plumbing distribution systems, as well as a 250-person 2-bay hardened dining facility for each camp. Their DFAC construction broke all construction and quality standard completing each facility in 5 weeks with no leaks in the winter rains. Less than 20 km from the Syrian border, the Seabees working at these camps also sustained appropriate security measures and operated at an increased level of threat. They established pre-fabrication yards, water points, and moved critical CLIV and personnel between the camps. NMCB 22 also managed over 59 Army personnel in addition to their own resources. The battalion was praised for the quality of construction of their SWA huts and completed all possible work at COP South on schedule. They continued to utilize adjacent and other resources to find materials that were critically short in theatre and finish punch lists as well as additional approved scope while launching new tasked projects. At the same time the unit supported immediate response missions for electrical generator wiring and repair, plumbing survey, and high voltage power line repair at Border Post (BP) Tarawa, BP Chapultapec, and BP Tinniean. In addition, until contracted resources were in place the battalion sustained the Al Qiam ISF camp performing fuel runs and plumbing and electrical repairs as well as spreading gravel. At night for the 3/6 Marines and CLB-2, these Seabees filled HESCOS to protect berthing, Command Operations Post, and Entry Control Points, as well as wetting and compacting of roads and building a stage for the USO and VIP visits during their off-hours. The battalion continually responded to mission requirements as well as completing tasking and at no time were any ISF forces required to use alternate camps or facilities due to NMCB 22 construction progress.

Operating out of Al Asad, NMCB 22 also overcame the major logistic challenges of operating in theatre. Their first two Tactical Movement Teams, (TMT), later renamed Convoy Security Elements (CSE), traversed over 18,000 miles to escort over 1,795 vehicles completing over 159 convoys from Al Asad to their respective detachment sites with zero friendly or neutral casualties. Creating a teamwork environment with adjacent units on base, they tracked the movements of over 13 security escort teams coordinating missions and sharing resources. Through this coordinated effort, they enabled 261 Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force vehicles to accomplish their direct war fighting mission by allowing them ride-alongs with their movement teams. By understanding the mission requirements across the Area of Operation (AO). NMCB 22 successfully utilized

over 1862 tractor trailers from Army and contractor resources saving over 4852 mandays of direct labor resources for use on priority MEF projects. 525 of these tractor trailers were escorted with adjacent security teams resulting in mission success with 0 risk to battalion personnel. By also considering the mine sweeping assets of these other units, they coordinated their missions in conjunction with these other movements safeguarding all personnel traveling under their security escort missions. Their planning process was praised by adjacent units, their tracker was adopted by 64th CSG and 553rd CSB, and their foresight created an environment in Al Asad that allowed these units as well as NMCB 133, NMCB 3, the 46th ECB, 84th ECB, 947th Engineering Company, MWSG-27, CLB-2, and RCT-2 to utilize their movement process to accomplish their movements in AO Denver to directly support the war effort.

Also sustaining mission critical facilities for the Marine Corps, NMCB 22 accomplished what others said could not be done at Camp Gannon. This front line base near the Syrian border required extensive electrical work estimated at over approximately \$20,000 of new wire and components and two months of labor. NMCB 22 launched a small skilled detachment to this site to perform an evaluation and resolve safety issues that included Marines being electrically shocked in the shower stations, making them unusable. In less than a month before materials could arrive, they performed electrical repairs that included reconnecting approximately 1000 meters of existing overhead power grid, providing 10 overhead service drops, skillfully constructing six expeditionary electrical panels from scratch, rebuilding electrical for three camp buildings, reconfiguring the entire base power, balancing generator performance and improving reliability to this base's critical Combat Operations Center (COC). This detachment achieved significant results ahead of schedule despite lack of materials, in-coming sniper rounds, and Indirect Fire (IDF), ultimately eliminating the need for more extensive construction. Returning to Camp Gannon over three months later the battalion took on additional repairs to the hardened dining facility and installation of a water well. The first NCF unit to successfully stand up a water well team in Iraq, NMCB 22 adjusted their resources and performed internal training to provide the MEF the first internal water well capability. Upon completion of the Camp Gannon well, the team was ready to take on additional wells across the AO had more materials been available.

The most highly requested service in the AO, NMCB 22 excelled at Camp Maintenance. Their detachment at Al Asad and Korean Villiage broke every work order record and received unending praise from the respective camp commandants. In Al Asad in support of 2nd MAW via the 67th ASG, they provided plumbing, electrical, builder and HVAC skills completing an average of 200 work orders per month. This small 15 man crew was often praised for doing the work of 30 or more and responded 24 hours 7 days a week to all trouble calls. They also provided electrical demand analysis, load calculations, and design recommendations which were used on several projects on the base as well as for future expansion plans for the base wide power distribution system.

They also provided electrical and HVAC evaluation and design suggestions to G6 for installation of a server room in a preexisting bunker. NMCB 22 was directly requested to sit on base power working group with the 67th ASG in order to work base power improvements and safety as well comments and evaluations to G4 on outside electrical designs and safety issues. NMCB 22 made improvements and repairs to virtually every electrical generation and distribution system, chilled water system and water/waste water system on base and also replaced over 100 new environmental control units (ECU). Not to be outdone, on the western front of Iraq, the battalion's detachment at Korean Village completed numerous improvement projects over 180 man day's contingency support for the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and multiple units of the United States Army, Air Force and Navy in that remote AO. This team prefabricated and erected multiple SWA Huts, two 16'x32' wooden tent floors at the Joint Border Control Center (JBCC) to provide out of the weather and off the deck berthing for stationed security personnel. They also repaired and improved multiple plumbing and electrical problems with limited materials at the Port of Entries, Waleed, and Trebil at times under Enemy Indirect Fire. Other projects included a new full functional, lighted/heated/cooled 66'x78' gymnasium, construction of a 25'x20' communications equipment repair area, the demolition of a 12'x15' concrete head facility, construction of 20'x25' light armored vehicles welding repair area, fabricating and installation of the 8'x8' camp front gate guard station, fabrication and erection of three 8'x8' guard towers, a 12'x4' salad bar for the galley, the remodel of the Very Important Person berthing area and Marine and Air Force explosive dog team's berthing area's, erection of a covered walkway between the medical triage area and the surgery area, along with dozens of shelves, desks, gun racks, chairs and work surfaces. At the same time camp maintenance functions were greatly improved, even with limited tools and materials, providing all of the heating and cooling equipment installation, power distribution and generator repair and maintenance and surfaces sustainment by fabricating specialized equipment to work with the severe dust layers. Det visits by IIMEF G8 specifically brought back unending praise from the units in Korean Village regarding the performance of NMCB 22. Back in Al Asad, the 2nd MAW (G4) specifically stated that they could not support Al Asad without these Seabees. NMCB 22's quality of work, skill, and performance at theses detachment sites have been exemplary and without fault. These individuals were directly recognized by the Brigadier General as well as other units receiving individual awards for their professional and service.

NMCB 22 also led multiple bridge reconnaissance missions and facilitated contingency design and construction for repair of damaged bridges on major convoy routes throughout AO Denver, Iraq. Their assessments and trusted calculations were of vital significance to 30 NCR, RCT-2, CLB-2, and other adjacent units. In one occasion they were to assess and repair or reconstruct the MSR Uranium wadi bridge bypass used by every convoy moving north and west of Al Asad. The bridge over the wadi was deemed unsafe or incomplete and coalition forces were forced to use the bypass which had washed out. The

battalion performed an assessment of the bridge structure and within minutes, it was determined that the actual bridge would be an easy fix, thereby removing the need for the bypass. In the end, their team not only repaired the bypass, but made the bridge passable as well in just two short days. NMCB 22 responded to two other critical bridge evaluation missions for MSR Bronze and Uranium again providing critical damage and repair information. Awaiting materials, they will most likely be chosen for these critical repairs as well.

Near the very critical Haditha Dam, NMCB 22 provided a very successful detachment that although they were very small in number, accomplished a number of projects impressing every unit in the area, "these 8 did the work of 80 Seabees." They completed installed force protection for Iraqi Security Force Battalion 2-2-7, moving over 250,000 cubic feet of earth to fill over 6000 linear feet of HESCOs. On several occasions, this work was provided under small arms and indirect fire. In addition, over 25,000 square feet of plywood was laid in less than ten days to provide structural integrity to more than 48 SWA huts. They reengineered and wired the electrical generation for the entire ISF 2-2-7 camp. During the night the detachment didn't stop and spearheaded improvements inside the dam providing the 3/1 Marines with an exchange, postal facility, BAS triage area, chapel, and many improvements to the quality of life. They also completed the tasking to the special forces ODA-555 camp ahead of schedule utilizing excess materials saving the Navy money and the need to task another unit. They also secured and spread more than 2400 yards of gravel in Haditha and a similar amount at Camp Hit. There the battalion supported that ISF camp replacing generators, balancing the electrical loads, and repairing a number of ECUs and ablution units. The Iraqi forces at Camp Hit were so upset when the Seabees left that they actually cried.

On board Al Asad, NMCB 22 exemplified the Navy / Marine Corps team, supporting numerous OIC discretionary projects out of their Alfa Company often responding at a moments notice to needs of adjacent units. They saved the base money and time by clearing and debris removal for site preparations of new PX allowing the contractor to begin construction ahead of schedule. The battalion supported earth moving for TF-145 clearing a site for future parking, indoor range, and SWA huts. Throughout the base they performed soil stabilization improving the equipment yard, road to 30th Class IV material yard, and ASP West including a berm for storage and site preparation for the issues lot. They installed fence for MWCS-28 and access roads were installed to guard tower at Flea Gate. The battalion trenched electrical and utility ways for RCT-2, CLB-2, and others. For G8 they graded and compacted entire lot for pad, equipment, and fence installation. For Mortuary Affairs, they fabricated and installed a new flag pole. Upon arrival 13 MEU and other units they quickly responded to level lots to allow expeditionary tent camp construction. They supported gravel and dirt movement often sharing their equipment with CLB-2. Their close working relationship also led to their use of CLB-2 cranes which supported multiple priority MEF projects. All this plus making a number of High



Boy loading ramps, hauling dirt, constructing fuel bladder berms, and various other clearing and grading support projects while also maintaining their equipment at 95% availability, and licensing over 85 direct and indirect personnel as tractor trailer drivers shows that NMCB 22 maximized the use of their battalion resources.

Not only supporting NMCB 22 projects, the minimal resources in the Bravo shops at times with the battalion khaki during off hours supported numerous OIC discretionary projects for units not only in Al Asad but also Haditha, Hit, Camp Wolf, and Ramadi. Completing over 156 projects some of the more significant jobs included replacing 14 wooden support columns with steel posts at the Base BAS TRIAGE Room, fabricating 9 up armor kits for the "Paystar 5000" series 18 trucks, fabricating 10 up armored ammo cans for Army Ranger security escort gun trucks, fabricating and installing a new gate for the main entrance to the Seabee Compound, making emergency repairs to fuel tanks in Ramadi, and saving the war effort \$30,000 by repairing a 10,000 gallon fuel tank eventually installed at Camp Hit. They also supported emergency assessments of piping at the Haditha Dam and at Hit Firm Bases. They reconfigured fuel storage berms and a loading ramp at Camp Wolf. They designed, fabricated and installed a plow system for the Bobcat and fabricated 4 heavy duty truck ramps all necessary to complete construction and meet the design requirements of the Al Asad runway project. They fabricated and installed a 35' tall flag pole for NCIS and designed, fabricated and installed stairs for ECP 2 at the Al Asad base. Other significant projects included a stage for the Vice President's visit constructed in less than 24 hours, constructing countless crates to allow shipment of Class IV materials for 30th material yard and constructing 6 SWA huts used for transient berthing, a concrete testing lab, and a dispatch office. They also remodeled NMCB 22 storage spaces into improved medical and chaplain offices, completed 2 building additions for RCT-2, built chapel pews, provided complete electric service, including main power supply, to the Hanger for VAQ-141 Prowler Squadron, and re-wired 2 buildings one for the El Paso National Guard Unit and one for EOD Marines attached to CLB-2. No matter how few resources NMCB 22 had available, improvements were made to their compound and base units were supported in every way possible.

The Camp Moreell detachment also accomplished a variety of missions that included the 24x7 operations and maintenance of Camp Moreell which included a gym, laundry, security, MWR room, theatre, and operations center. In addition they provided logistic support, travel arrangements, berthing and training for all ingoing and outgoing NCF personnel in support of Operation Iraq Freedom. They also coordinated RSOI/S2T2, TMT/CSE, weapons range, and Warrior Transition training for 2000+ personnel being deployed throughout the CENTCOM AOR. In total 4000 personnel and 190,000 lbs of cargo moved effectively and efficiently thru this critical staging area ensuring that all correct protective gear, weapons, and ammunition were issued and returned ensuring 100% accountability. These personnel received outstanding weapons handling and training in over 45 live-fire

ranges achieving 100% BZO rate with zero mishaps. Also ensured that all Tactical Movement Team (TMT) ranges and Phase II training were arranged and conducted providing the most focused training the NCF provided to this high risk mission. They were responsible for 5.6 Million dollars of the 22nd NCR assets. The detachment ensured that over 200 high-priority items were procured to different detachment sites for both mobilized battalions in the AOR supporting critical MEF projects. They implemented an improved CTR accountability developing an inventory system providing NSN's and a new SOP for future Battalions. Approximately 300 pieces of CESE successfully maintained; participated in three major ship offloads of NCF and Army CESE. The detachment continually improved Camp Moreell upgrading regiment forward staff office spaces, upgrade power distribution system, and renovate Entry Control Point (ECP). A total of 22 SWA hut berthing were constructed to eliminate dilapidated berthing tents providing much improved spaces for transient battalions. They also implemented an improved camp maintenance program for all berthing, ablution, armory, supply, and equipment spaces. The improved laundry facility maintenance saved \$8,000 in parts maintaining high quality of life service for all transient personnel. As well as construction tasking for Camp Morell, they completed OIC discretionary construction projects in support of adjacent commands including road and gravel work for the Army; amnesty area for Navy Customs; shade structure and grading work for the Air Force; and building additions/improvements for the Marine Corps.

The battalion also provided critical support to 30th Naval Construction Regiment and critical projects in their AO. The battalion provided 10 personnel that supported the operation of 30th material yards, supporting the movement and management of Class IV materials stock estimated at over \$60 million. They also provided 10 end dump drivers to support combined gravel movement operations to move over 100,000 cubic yards to East Ramadi ISF Complex (ERIC), Blue Diamand, Al Taqqadum, and many other bases. The battalion also supported gravel operations to the northern route from Rawah to COP North. Utilizing their batch plant expertise they also helped support the establishment and manning of an NCF expeditionary batch plant operation, to support concrete production in Al Taqqadum, for critical runway repair projects, and other base concrete construction. The battalion's experience with concrete also enabled them to repair the medical K-span slab and continue with the construction of the interior medical facility.

The main body returned to Kuwait in March demobilizing in April followed by the SOF force which returned approximately a month later. The Port Hueneme team that stayed behind to support the deployment returned after all personnel were demobilized from Port Hueneme. All missions were accomplished with an excellent safety record and no fatalities for any reason.

## II. ADMINISTRATION

### ***Advancement: August 2005 Cycle***

	E4	E5	E6
TIME IN RATE ELIGIBLE	27	74	65
PARTICIPATED	26	74	65
SELECTED	23	19	20
SELECTION RATE	89%	26%	31%
NAVY-WIDE RATE	92%	15%	12%


### ***Administrative Metrics***

a. Correspondence/ Letters	
i. Command Instructions/ Notices	7
ii. Letters	293
iii. Appointment Letters	46
iv. Plan of the Week	<u>24</u>
Total	<b>370</b>
b. Personnel Actions	
i. Personnel transfers	18
ii. Travel Orders	65
iii. Red Cross Messages processed	33
iv. Emergency leave	16
v. Personnel Casualty Reports	49
vi. Citizenship Applications	5
vii. Passport Applications	3
viii. Child Support Assistance	6
ix. Pay inquiries	380
x. DTAS records loaded	<u>500</u>
Total	<b>1075</b>
c. Awards	
i. Certificate of Appreciation (Army)	5
ii. Certificate of Appreciation (USMC)	26
iii. Letters of Appreciation	58
iv. Letters of Appreciation (Kellogg, Brown & Root)	6
v. Letters of Appreciation (USMC)	1
vi. Meritorious Mast	4
vii. Navy Achievement Award	277
viii. Navy Commendation Medal	37
ix. Outstanding Volunteer Service	3
x. Seabee Combat Warfare	141
xi. Fleet Marine Force Warfare Designation	23
xii. Junior Sailor of the Quarter	4

xiii.	Sailor of the Quarter	4
xiv.	Junior Sailor of the Year	1
xv.	Sailor of the Year	1
xvi.	Campaign Awards	<u>480</u>
	Total	<b>1071</b>
d.	Career	
i.	FITREPS	80
ii.	Performance evaluations	307
iii.	Frocking Letters (Aug 2005 cycle)	58
iv.	Command Advancement Program promotions	6
v.	Officer Promotion Letters	6
vi.	CBVET Completions	12
vii.	Reenlistments	7
viii.	Extensions	8
ix.	Retirement Packages	<u>4</u>
	Total	<b>488</b>
e.	Advancement Exams (Feb 2006 cycle)	
i.	Time in Rate eligible	239
ii.	Members missing courses	24
iii.	Eligible members demobilized	2
iv.	Eligible members that did not show for exam	2
v.	Total members up for advancement	207
vi.	LDO exams only	<u>3</u>
vii.	Total exams administered	<b>204</b>
f.	Reports	
i.	PERSTAT (daily)	178
ii.	LEGAL (weekly)	24
iii.	AWARDS (weekly)	<u>24</u>
	Total	<b>226</b>
g.	Legal	
i.	Discipline Review Boards	11
ii.	XOI	13
iii.	Captains Mast	<u>18</u>
	Total	<b>42</b>

### III. TRAINING

#### *Mobilization Plan*



## Port Hueneme Training Schedule

JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL
14	15	16	17
TH	F	S	S
Pre AP Arr.	NMPS	NMPS	NMPS
			AP Arrived

JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
NMPS	NMPS	MOCC	MOCC	MOCC	MOCC	MOCC
NMPS	NMPS	NMPS	NMPS	NMPS		
					.50 CAL	.50 CAL
					240B	240B
MB Arrived					NMPS	NMPS
					MK 19	MK 19
						DP Arrived

JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL	JUL
25	26	27	28	29	30	31
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
CBR	RANGE	RANGE	RANGE	BCS1	BCS1	BCS1
				RANGE	RANGE	RANGE
.50 CAL	.50 CAL	.50 CAL	.50 CAL	.50 CAL		29 PALMS
240B	240B	240B	240B	240B		COMM
NMPS	NMPS		RSO	RSO	RSO	RSO
MK 19	MK 19	MK 19	MK 19	MK 19		C2PC
NMPS	NMPS	NMPS	NMPS	NMPS	LIC EX	LIC EX
CST LDR	CST LDR	CST LDR	CST LDR	CST LDR	CST LDR	OIF
CRANE RIG	CRANE RIG	CRANE RIG	CRANE RIG	CRANE RIG		
				OIF		
				Post DP Arr.	NMPS	NMPS

AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
RANGE	RANGE	RANGE	CBR	BCS1	BCS1	BCS1
BCS1	BCS1	BCS1	CBR	RANGE	RANGE	RANGE
29 PALMS	29 PALMS	29 PALMS	29 PALMS	29 PALMS	29 PALMS	
COMM	COMM	COMM	COMM	COMM	COMM	COMM
RSO	RSO	RSO	RSO	RSO	RSO	
C2PC	C2PC	C2PC	C2PC			
1003.1	1003.1	1003.1				
BCS II	BCS II	BCS II	BCS II	BCS II		
CLS	CLS	CLS	CLS	CPR		
982.1	982.1	982.1	982.1	982.1		
NMPS	NMPS	NMPS				

AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
RANGE	RANGE	RANGE	CBR	BCS1	BCS1	BCS1
BCS1	BCS1	BCS1	CBR	RANGE	RANGE	RANGE
1062.1	1062.1	1062.1	1062.1	1062.1	1062.1	1062.1
66.1	66.1	66.1	66.1	66.1		
BCS II	BCS II	BCS II	BCS II	BCS II		
CLS	CLS	CLS	CLS	CPR		
730.2	730.2	730.2	730.2	730.2		
1009.1	1009.1	1009.1				
	3000D					

AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX
ABM	ABM	ABM	ABM	ABM		
1062.1	1062.1					

AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG	AUG
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX

AUG	AUG	AUG	SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP
29	30	31	1	2	3	4
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S
FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	FEX	

SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP	SEP
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
M	T	W	TH	F	S	S	M
	CLS	CLS	CLS	CLS	CPR		
65.1	68.1	73.1					
	TOA	CONTAINER	AUTO PARTS	AUTO PARTS			
	BCS1	BCS1	BCS1	RANGE	RANGE	RANGE	CBR
	RANGE	RANGE	RANGE	BCS1	BCS1	BCS1	

## Final Accomplishments from mobilization prep and training.

	Oct 03	Oct 04	Jul 05	Aug 05
	Attainment	No Phasing Future	No Phasing Future	No Phasing Future
	Overall	I&III	I&III	I&III
<b>CCC Total</b>	<b>CCC</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>86%</b>
Program Management A		63%	80%	80%
Program Management B		23%	82%	94%
Fielded Communicator		44%	78%	88%
Comm/Network Supervisor		50%	34%	74%
<b>CON Total</b>	<b>CON</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>86%</b>
Construction Safety		n/a	13%	88%
Vertical Construction		80%	84%	90%
Horizontal Construction		64%	54%	71%
Utilities Construction		88%	82%	82%
Construction Engineering		57%	71%	88%
Specialized Construction		17%	24%	83%
Construction Logistics Support		92%	94%	100%
War Damage Repair		71%	62%	100%
<b>MOB Total</b>	<b>MOB</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>86%</b>
Mount Out Capability A		0%	62%	67%
Mount Out Capability B		0%	27%	80%
3M Organization		0%	0%	0%
Def Combat Operations		44%	57%	56%
Def Combat Individual Weap		65%	75%	74%
Def Combat Crew Served Weap		44%	86%	88%
CBR - A - Individual		56%	58%	55%
CBR - B - Staff Training		28%	91%	95%
CBR - C - Team Training		27%	96%	97%
<b>FSO - Medical/Utilities Total</b>	<b>FSO</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>81%</b>
<b>NCO Total</b>	<b>NCO</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>72%</b>



### ***SCW Qualification Report***

	Number Personnel Assigned	Previously SCW Qualified	Qualified SCW on Deployment	Number SCW Qualified on Board at Deployment Completion
E1 – E6	447	37	129	<b>166</b>
E7 – E9	41	35	6	<b>41</b>
O1 – O5	15	5	9	<b>14</b>
		Beginning %		<b>Ending %</b>
		15 %		<b>44 %</b>

#### **IV. OPERATIONS**


Battalion operations was focused around task organization and the movement of materials. The day to day operations were the constant shifting of resources, drawing materials, and the movement within theatre.

Little information was available prior to mobilization to plan project teams. As a result two Air Det type company structures were developed to allow the majority of direct labor to be divided into whatever project teams were required. Key khaki were identified as "det capable" and COAs were developed to determine the types and quantities of projects the battalion could perform. Potentially tasking changed a number of times prior to turnover. Tasking continued to vary and change throughout deployment and the existing resources were restructured under this task organization framework.


The movement of materials to the project site was the responsibility of the battalion. A stockpile of common materials were already staged in theatre. The majority of materials were available or already on delivery. Materials were drawn from BOMs generated by the regimental designs and reviewed by the battalion. However, materials could not be drawn for projects until after the appropriate MEF code had approved the BOM for an approved MEF project. Consequently, Fragos to begin project work always superceded designs, BOMs, and ability to draw materials. In addition, the specific and sometimes unique materials for projects that were required due to specific design criteria were long lead items from outside theatre. Projects usually completed with punch list of work awaiting on specific material items.

These materials were drawn from NCR MLO sites in support of all NCF projects. The movement process was much more extensive than the MOCC concept and involved all aspect of battalion staff. The theatre environment also required maximum coordination and planning to minimize risk to personnel. Sufficient resources existed in theatre to support the movement of material as long as the battalion maintained a Tactical Movement Team (or Convoy Security Team). The battalion was able to move the majority of materials on non-NCF assets.


## *Task Organization Concept*




## Task Organization Result



## Class IV Process



## ***Movement Process***



## Level I Graphic

PROJECT	October				November				December				January				February				March			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
HIT Bridge																								
HIT ISF Camp ECU MOD																								
HAD ISF Camp ECU MOD																								
HADITHA Base Camp ODA 555																								
HADITHA Force Protection																								
CAMP GANNON Electrical Repairs																								
ASR Uranium Bridge Repairs																								
AQ ISF BASE EXPANSION																								
Secure SWA huts at AQ and HAD																								
COP SOUTH																								
AQ / CS Kitchen / Scullery PEBs																								
AL ASAD Crater Repair																								
AL ASAD Joint Repair Phase II																								
AL ASAD Joint Repair Phase III																								
Al Asad Seabee Transient Berthing																								
TQ Medical K-SPAN																								
Concrete Production at TQ																								
CAMP GANNON Water Well																								
CAMP GANNON DFAC Repair																								
HIT Fuel Tank																								
HIT Water Line Repair																								
KV Camp Maintenance																								
AA Camp Maintenance																								
AA CO Discretionary																								
TMT 1																								
TMT 2																								
LINE HAUL / CRANE CREW																								

## **SAFETY**

### **Safety Summary**

	<b>OCT 2005</b>	<b>NOV 2005</b>	<b>DEC 2005</b>	<b>JAN 2006</b>	<b>FEB 2006</b>
<b>Fatalities</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b># Lost Days</b>	0	22	5	7	1
<b># Lost Day Cases</b>	0	2	2	7	1
<b># Light Duty Days</b>	41	32	66	26	7
<b># Light Duty Cases</b>	4	5	3	4	1
<b># First Aid Mishaps</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b># Gov't Vehicle Mishaps</b>	3	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Number Mishaps</b>	13	8	8	6	4

### **On-Duty Mishaps**

	<b>OCT 2005</b>	<b>NOV 2005</b>	<b>DEC 2005</b>	<b>JAN 2006</b>	<b>FEB 2006</b>
<b>First Aid Mishaps</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Cases Light Duty</b>	4	5	3	4	1
<b>Light Duty Days</b>	41	32	66	26	7
<b>Cases Lost Work Days</b>	0	2	1	4	1
<b>Lost Work Days</b>	0	22	4	7	1
<b>Fatalities</b>	0	0	0	0	0

### **Off-Duty Mishaps**

	<b>OCT 2005</b>	<b>NOV 2005</b>	<b>DEC 2005</b>	<b>JAN 2006</b>	<b>FEB 2006</b>
<b>First Aid Mishaps</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Cases Light Duty</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Light Duty Days</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Cases Lost Work Days</b>	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Lost Work Days</b>	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Fatalities</b>	0	0	0	0	0



### **MEF AO Manday Summary**

<b>Project Description</b>	<b>Proj #</b>	<b>Total Project MDs</b>	<b>MDs Tasked</b>	<b>Final WIP %</b>	<b>Mandays Expended by Prior NMCBs</b>	<b>Mandays Expended this Deployment</b>
AA CRATER REPAIRS – PHASE 2	IZ4-522	1712	1229	100	1683	1199
AA JOINT REPAIRS – PHASE II & III	IZ5-537	5305	1000	20	0	1055
AA OIC, TRANSIENT BERTH., DISPATCH, ASR URANIUM, WOLF	IZ5-700, IZ5-736, IZ6-750	1635	1635	100	0	2335
AA & KV CAMP MAINTENANCE	IZ5-701	4935	4935	100	n/a	3708
HIT BRIDGE REPAIR	IZ5-734	212	212	100	0	69
HIT ISF CAMP, ECU MOD, FUEL TANK REPAIR, & WATER LINE REPAIR	IZ5-711, 728, 744, IZ6-758	3910	178	100	3728	98
HADITHA ISF CAMP, ECU MOD, FORCE PROTECTION, ODA555, & MIT SWA	IZ5-712, 729, 732 738, 741	6864	4707	100	2309	928
AQ ISF CAMP, MITT SWA, BASE EXPANSION & PEB	IZ5-713, 731, IZ6-733	6900	5715	100	97	5749
COP-S ISF BASE CAMP & PEB	IZ5-733, IZ6-733	6256	6256	100	0	5939
GANNON ELECTRICAL UPGRADE, DFAC REPAIR, WATER WELL REPAIRS	IZ5-725	849	503	100	0	503
TQ K-SPAN, CONCRETE PRODUCTION, SWAS	IZ5-215, IZ6-XXX	2692	824	76	500	1697
TMT	IZ5-703	8400	8400	100	n/a	8400
CRANE / LINE HAUL	IZ6-751	2549	1362	100	n/a	1362

## MEF Frago Summary

FRAG ORDER #	DATE ISSUED	SUBJECT	PROJECT #	PROJECT START	PROJECT COMPLETION	NLT DATE (original or adjusted)
R138-05	15-Nov-2005	Transfer OPCON of NMCB 22 Personnel (Camp Moreell)	N/A	18-Sep-2005		
R114-05	21-Sep-2005	South COP Construction	IZ5-733	24-Sep-2005	20-Jan-2006	20-Jan-2006
R119-05	3-Oct-2005	Hit Bridge Repair	IZ5-735	9-Oct-2005	12-Oct-2005	12-Oct-2005
R100-05	22-Aug-2005	NMCB 3 and NMCB 22/133 TMT Turnover Plan	N/A	10-Oct-2005	18-Oct-2005	N/A
R106-05	30-Aug-2005	MOD-1 to R080-05 ISF BN Camp Construction Hadithah	IZ5-729	10-Oct-2005	20-Oct-2005	
R105-05	30-Aug-2005	MOD-1 to R070-05 ISF BN Camp Construction Hit	IZ5-728	10-Oct-2005	23-Oct-2005	
R117-05	26-Sep-2005	Seabee Transient Berthing at Al Asad	IZ5-736	10-Oct-2005	6-Nov-2005	31-Oct-2005
R109-05	10-Sep-2005	ODA 555 Hadithah Base Camp	IZ5-732	10-Oct-2005	4-Dec-2005	1-Oct-2005
R151-05	12-Dec-2005	Al Asad Crater Repairs	IZ4-522	10-Oct-2005	14-Jan-2006	14-Jan-2006
R110-05	10-Sep-2005	Al Qaim ISF Base Expansion	IZ5-731	10-Oct-2005	26-Feb-2006	30-Oct-2005
R108-05	9-Sep-2005	MOD-1 to R099-05 Camp Gannon Electrical Upgrade	IZ5-725	11-Oct-2005	5-Nov-2005	14-Nov-2005
R128-05	19-Oct-2005	Deployment Safety Training	N/A	21-Oct-2005	21-Oct-2005	N/A
R115-05	21-Sep-2005	MOD-1 to R100-05 NMCB 3 and NMCB 22-133 TMT Turnover Plan	N/A	22-Oct-2005	18-Oct-2005	N/A
R121-05	8-Oct-2005	ISF Base Camp Force Protection at Hadithah	IZ5-738	24-Oct-2005	20-Nov-2005	
R142-05	25-Nov-2005	Transfer OPCON of NMCB 22 Company (-) to NMCB 133 Task Force Sierra ISO CJSOTF	N/A	8-Nov-2005	N/A	N/A
N/A		Temporary Berthing Additional SWA Huts	IZ5-736	15-Nov-2005	17-Feb-2006	
N/A		Uranium Wadi Bridge Assessment/Repairs (Concrete Culvert Bridge)	IZ6-750	21-Nov-2005	22-Nov-2005	
R124-05	11-Oct-2005	Secure MITT SWA Huts for Camp Hadithah and Al Qaim	IZ6-741	21-Nov-2005	12-Feb-2006	
R141-05	19-Nov-2005	MOD-1 to R114-05 COP South Construction (TACON of 46th)	IZ5-733	27-Nov-2005	20-Jan-2006	30-Jan-2006
R146-05	4-Dec-2005	MOD-2 to R114-05 COP South Construction (TACON of 46th)	IZ5-733	9-Dec-2005	20-Jan-2006	N/A
N/A		East Ramadi ISF Camp (Welding Repairs to Fuel Tanks)	IZ6-XXX	10-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2005	
N/A		Camp Wolf Bulk Fuel Storage	IZ5-700	14-Dec-2005	16-Dec-2005	
N/A		Vice President Stage Construction	IZ5-700	15-Dec-2005	17-Dec-2005	
N/A		Uranium Bridge Assessment (Mabey-Johnson)	IZ6-750	3-Jan-2006	3-Jan-2006	
N/A		Alpha Dispatch SWA Hut	IZ5-700	6-Jan-2006	25-Feb-2006	
N/A		Camp Wolf High Dock Installation	IZ5-700	27-Jan-2006	28-Jan-2006	
N/A		Bronze Bridge Assessment (Concrete columns)	IZ6-757	30-Jan-2006	30-Jan-2006	
R151-05	12-Dec-2005	Al Asad Joint Repairs PHASE II	IZ4-522	30-Jan-2006	26-Feb-2006	
R169-06	28-Jan-2006	MOD-1 to R110-05 Al Qaim (PEB)	IZ5-731	1-Feb-2006	26-Feb-2006	4-Mar-2006
R177-07	6-Feb-2006	TQ Concrete Production Team	IZ6-255	3-Feb-2006	TURNOVER	
R179-06	8-Feb-2006	Hit Waterline Repairs	IZ6-758	6-Feb-2006	10-Feb-2006	
R180-06	10-Feb-2006	Hardened DFAC Repairs at Camp Gannon	IZ5-722	13-Feb-2006	14-Feb-2006	
R180-06	10-Feb-2006	Camp Gannon Water Well Crew	IZ6-759	13-Feb-2006	12-Mar-2006	
R166-06	19-Jan-2006	MOD-3 to R114-05 COP South Construction (PEB)	IZ5-733	13-Feb-2006	4-Mar-2006	4-Mar-2006
R175-06	3-Feb-2006	MOD-1 TO 30 NCR R086-05 TQ Medical K-Span	IZ5-217	13-Feb-2006	TURNOVER	30-Apr-2006
N/A		Ablution Unit Installation at Seabee Compound	IZ5-700	20-Feb-2006	28-Feb-2006	
R136-05	15-Nov-2005	Camp Hit ISF Fuel Tanks	IZ6-744	21-Feb-2006	26-Feb-2006	
R151-05	12-Dec-2005	Al Asad Crater Repairs PHASE III	IZ4-522	26-Feb-2006	ONGOING	
N/A		Uranium Culvert Washout Repairs	N/A	7-Mar-2006	15-Mar-2006	


### ***Labor Distribution Summary***

	Oct-05	Nov-05	Dec-05	Jan-06	Feb-06	Mar-06	TOTAL	% TOTAL
DIRECT LABOR MD	6446	5142	6453	6559	5293	2053	31946	63%
INDIRECT LABOR MD	3720	3182	3463	3491	2955	1637	18448	37%
TOTAL MD EXPENDED	10166	8324	9916	10050	8248	3690	50394	
# TOTAL PERSONNEL	338	310	320	321	306	304	N/A	
# DIRECT LABOR PERSONNEL	223	209	212	214	205	207	N/A	
# INDIRECT PERSONNEL	116	101	108	107	101	97	N/A	
# WORKDAYS	28.5	28	28.5	29	26	15	155	
% DIRECT LABOR	66%	67%	66%	67%	67%	68%		

**\*Excludes Camp Moreell**

## Project Summaries

The projects were mainly located on the major FOBs of Al Anbar Province. Al Asad Airbase left over from the Iraqi Air Force, was the headquarters of the MEF Air Combat Element and the Regimental Ground Combat Element. It supported thousands of Coalition Force personnel, civilians, and third country national contractors. Korean Village is security hub for the supply route from Jordan. It also supported a number of smaller forward operating bases along the Jordanian and Syrian border. Hit was a small city south of the Al Asad Air Base along the Euphrates River. The Iraqi Security Force (ISF) camp was mostly completed by the prior battalion. The battalion completed a number of small missions in the area. Haditha was located at the Haditha Dam where all of the Iraqi commercial power is generated. Heavily guarded by coalition forces, Haditha had a number of tenant projects for US and Iraqi forces. At night the detachment continued to work inside the dam on OIC Discretionary projects where they and other forces berthed. Al Qiam near the Syrian border was located at an abandoned train station. The detachment mainly supported the improvements to existing and new ISF camps. Combat Operations Post South (COP-South) was one of three COPs that was constructed to close off the Syrian Border and control the Euphrates River Valley. The project was selected by the MEF approximately 8 miles from AQ in an undeveloped countryside. Camp Gannon was one of the most forward operating bases in Al Anbar Province located along the Syrian Border in a section marked off city blocks. Taqqadum Air Base was the operations hub for the U.S. Air Force and home to a number of tenant forces. The Tactical Movement Teams (TMT) operated between these bases and others included Camp Fallujah, Ramadi, Camp Moreell, and others.



## **AL ASAD (Main Body)**



Saw Cutting



Pouring concrete for R5

## **AA CRATER REPAIRS – PHASE II IZ4-522**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Repair 10 bomb craters on Al Asad runway.

**Personnel:** 25

**Duration:** 10OCT05 to 10JAN06

**Mandays:** 1199

**Tasking:** 50% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** High sack mix affected some of the crew. Safety Officer ordered additional boots and the crew leaders reinforced procedures to minimize risk.

**Significant QC Issues:** Helped established local vendor with consistent operation. Needed QC personnel and procedures at local batch plant and monitored all trucks to ensure water not inappropriately added.

**Significant Design Issues:** Used soil stabilization to improve foundation under runway. Custom designed mix to provide required strength with poor in country base materials.

**Significant Material Issues:** The correct sand type, concrete type, and gravel type supplies were difficult to maintain in sufficient quantities. Had to QC all incoming materials due to large amount of fines.

## **AL ASAD (Main Body)**



Joint Removal and Dowel Placement



Finishing

## **AA JOINT REPAIRS – PHASE II & III IZ5-537**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Repair joints on Al Asad runway. The project was divided into 4 phases due to locations on runway and taxiway. Phases II and III were projects of NMCB-22.

**Personnel:** 25

**Duration:** 23JAN06 to 22MAR06

**Mandays:** 1055

**Tasking:** 100% on Phase II, 40% on Phase III at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None.

**Significant QC Issues:** Continued to monitor batch plant operation. Utilized vendor equipment for break tests.

**Significant Design Issues:** Continued to use mix design. Resolved dowel design.

**Significant Material Issues:** Sand availability delayed several concrete pours. Contractor continued to run low on base materials due to operation of their supply lines to operate in country.



## **AL ASAD (Main Body)**



Leveling SWA Hut Flooring



Completed Front Row

## **AA SEABEE TRANSIENT BERTHING IZ5-736**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Replacement of tents used for traveling TMTs as temporary berthing with SWA huts. The outer two SWA huts in the photo above replaced two tents. The result was better sleeping conditions, especially during the day. Additional transient SWAs built later in deployment in second row behind first.

**Personnel:** 10

**Duration:** 10OCT05 to 06NOV05

**Mandays:** 171

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Utilized as training for first crews doing SWA huts.

**Significant Material Issues:** None

AL ASAD (Main Body)

**AA CO DISCRETIONARY**

	<b>Job Title</b>	<b>Manhours</b>
1	S1 Shelves	24
2	S4 Shelves	24
3	BAS Wall Removal	46
4	BAS	36
5	Chaplain's Office	324
6	Chaplain's Service Area	24
7	2 <sup>nd</sup> Recon BN – Conference Room	432
8	S3 Berthing	108
9	ANGLICO – Conference Room	36
10	Christopher W. Thompson Building Sign	42
11	DFAC Counter	72
12	KBR Dispatch Desk	60
13	KBR Lockers	12
14	CO Office	24
15	Camp Gettysburg Gym	72
16	EA Lab	1056
17	BN Quarterdeck Wall Frames	72
18	BN Quarterdeck Doorway	72
19	BN Quarterdeck Information Board	9
20	XO Office	36
21	New Head Deck	48
22	Generator Shed	48
23	Communications Shop Door	12
24	Chief's Doorway Deck	12
25	C Co. Rifle Rack and Shelf	12
26	S2 Office	36
27	Vice Presidential Visit Construction	1200
28	CLB-2 Hazmat Sheds	216
29	Air Wing Armory Counter	24
30	S3 Shop	48
31	Base Exchange Ramp	8
32	Observation Platform	120
33	CO Berthing	216
34	Temporary Berthing	2688
35	AEGIS Sign	60
36	MLO Crates	72
	<b>Total Manhours</b>	<b>7401 MH</b>
	<b>Total Mandays</b>	<b>925 MD</b>



## AL ASAD (Main Body)



Water Line Repair



Lighting

## AA CAMP MAINTENANCE IZ5-501

### **Highlighted Maintenance Task: Bagdadi Water Main Breaks**

NMCB 22 Camp Maintenance worked closely with the 67<sup>th</sup> ASG maintaining all of the water mains on and off base. A water line break occurred in the vicinity of the water treatment facility which was ten miles from base. A crew of NMCB-22 Utilitiesmen, headed up by UT2 Ramon, and Marines from the 272<sup>nd</sup> Marine Wing Support Squadron, went out to the break to repair the main. The Marines supplied the materials and NMCB 22 supplied equipment and skilled manpower. The water main was repaired in the early morning along with Army security, Marine heavy equipment, and Navy expertise.

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Camp Maintenance to support the 67<sup>th</sup> ASG on Al Asad Base. Support included HVAC, electrical, plumbing and general carpentry support. 1620 work orders were completed.

**Personnel:** 15

**Duration:** Entire Deployment

**Mandays:** 2599

**Tasking:** N/A

**Significant Safety Issues:** Electrical dangers during wet season.

**Significant QC Issues:** None.

**Significant Design Issues:** Helped the base redesign power distribution and generator use.

**Significant Material Issues:** Constantly seeking ways to expedite material requests which were supplied thru Marine Corps supply system.

## KOREAN VILLAGE



Building Gym



Berthing SWA Huts

## KOREAN VILLAGE CAMP MAINTENANCE IZ5-701

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** To provide Camp Maintenance and Quality of Life improvements. Also provided support to surrounding bases and outposts along border.

**Personnel:** 7

**Duration:** Duration of Deployment

**Mandays:** 1109

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Had to self design many solutions to camp and AO issues.

**Significant Material Issues:** None

**HIT**



Welding in support beams



Completed

## **HIT BRIDGE REPAIR IZ5-734**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Repair Hit Bridge over the Euphrates River which was damaged by a VBIED. MEF wanted completion prior to elections to bolster civilian support. Not intended for military use.

**Personnel:** 13

**Duration:** 09OCT05 to 12OCT05

**Mandays:** 69

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Exposure to Small Arms Fire

**Significant QC Issues:** Materials fabricated off-site at local base for safety. Initial measurements and prefab had to be correct.

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** Plenty of excess material were purchased.

## HIT



Installing ECUs



Fuel Tanks

## HIT ISF CAMP ECU MOD, FUEL TANK REPAIR, WATER LINE REPAIR IZ6-744, IZ5-728, IZ6-758

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Replaced burnt-out units in berthing and office spaces. Replaced one of the 10,000 gallon tanks due to leakage. Camp Hit and a nearby Firm Base's waterline breaks to alleviate traffic flow and quality of life for civilians. Project involved several separate trips to Camp Hit by an Al Asad based crew.

**Personnel:** 4 – 7

**Duration:** 3 Days to 3 Weeks as available throughout deployment

**Mandays:** 98

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Water line repairs were not significantly investigated and designed up front. One repair ended up being a natural tar pit that was trapping runoff.

**Significant Material Issues:** Original tank was designed and fitted with pumps for water and not completely welded. A similar tank was transferred to Al Asad, complete internal and external inspection and welding of all seams. Pressure testing ensured integrity.

## HADITHA



Finished Generator Install



MITT compound

## HADITHA FOB ISF CAMP, MITT SWA, & ECU MOD IZ5-712, IZ5-729, IZ6-741

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Complete the construction of a Battalion size ISF Camp and add two Environmental Control Units (ECU) to each SWA hut. Work included second deck of flooring, gravel, and MITT compound as material arrived.

**Personnel:** 8

**Duration:** 10OCT05 to 04DEC05

**Mandays:** 628

**Tasking:** 98% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** Work completed as materials became available. Gravel had to be delivered outside camp but in secure area.



## HADITHA



Super SWA Training Building



Force Protection

## HADITHA BASE CAMP ODA 555 IZ5-732

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Construct a Camp for Army Special Forces ODA 555. Work consists of site preparation, construction of a perimeter with an ECP, erection of a guard tower, construction of super SWA hut.

**Personnel:** 6

**Duration:** 04OCT05 to 04DEC05

**Mandays:** 187

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Special Forces on site wanted much different layout then scope designed by NCR from Army request.

**Significant Material Issues:** Since ODA was low priority for MEF tasking, Army provided materials on-site via separate channels.

## HADITHA



Initial Camp



Filling HESCOs

## HADITHA FORCE PROTECTION IZ5-738

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Construct force protection in-between and around SWA huts and install two ECPs.

**Personnel:** 6

**Duration:** 24OCT05 to 20NOV05

**Mandays:** 113

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** HESCO fill sequence was important due to space constraints. Designed vehicle path thru areas to allow for trash pickup.

**Significant Material Issues:** Work included establishing dirt quarry site which was later used as dump for Haditha damn forces.

## Al Qiam



Potable Water Tanks Installed



Placing second layer of flooring

## AQ ISF CAMP IZ5-713

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Completed the construction of a Battalion size ISF Camp. Work included water tanks, gravel, and second deck of flooring on all SWA huts. Support was required throughout deployment to repair damage to camp and sustain fuel to generators.

**Personnel:** 2 - 10

**Duration:** Entire Deployment

**Mandays:** 156

**Tasking:** 99% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Iraqi Army occupied camp above capacity. Usage created significant damage that at times had to be repaired for their continued operation.

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** None



## Al Qiam



2 Bay DFAC roof under construction



Placing gravel on finished camp

## AQ ISF BASE EXPANSION IZ5-731

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Build a Brigade-size ISF Camp

**Personnel:** 10 - 65

**Duration:** 10OCT05 to 26FEB06

**Mandays:** 5441

**Tasking:** 7% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Lumber was very twisted and poor quality. The best materials were selected which still created safety issues for building peers and personnel.

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** Initial materials allocation delayed due to theatre wide priorities. Some materials were substantially delayed. Resources eventually had to be moved onto other projects limiting resources available. (See attachments)

## Al Qiam



Laying out and counting parts



Completed

## AQ PEB

IZ6-733

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Build a pre-engineering building for food preparation at the ISF Camp.

**Personnel:** 4-12

**Duration:** 01FEB06-26FEB06

**Mandays:** 152

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Did not come with assembly drawings. Did not seem sturdy enough to withstand Iraqi sand storms. Drainage had to be modified to work at site location.

**Significant Material Issues:** A number of components were missing and damaged.

## **COP-SOUTH**



Initial site selection



Final LZ being Finished

## **COP-SOUTH ISF BASE CAMP IZ5-733**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** 1,500 man ISF camp. The camp consisted of 55 SWA huts, tents, perimeter wire and berms, two ECPs, a 2-bay hardened DFAC, fuel and water storage and an electrical power distribution system.

**Personnel:** 50-125 (Includes 50-60 Army personnel)

**Duration:** 24OCT05 to 20JAN06

**Mandays:** 5697

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Moral was high for harsh dusty environment with little amenities.

**Significant QC Issues:** Solid QC process received complements for quality of work.

**Significant Design Issues:** Camp underwent several design changes including some after completion. Electrical distribution was designed by crew leader and many commercial items had to be repaired / modified to function such as tank stands and ablution units.

**Significant Material Issues:** A success plan was generated to track BOM approval and material availability to meet shipment / construction plans.

## **COP-SOUTH**



Steelwork



Ready to Skin

## **COP-S PEB IZ6-733**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Build two pre-engineering building for food preparation at the ISF Camp.

**Personnel:** 4-12

**Duration:** 13FEB06 – 04MAR06

**Mandays:** 242

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None


**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** Some parts again fabricated to complete project.

## GANNON



Surveying the situation



Hand made panel boxes

## CAMP GANNON ELECTRICAL UPGRADE IZ5-725

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Originally a four phased project to establish power generation, install a new distribution system, complete the interior wiring and establish a redundant power source. The small team launched without materials and used existing infrastructure to rewire camp, free up generators, and improve safety.

**Personnel:** 8

**Duration:** 11OCT05 to 5NOV06

**Mandays:** 292

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Many downed power lines and exposed generator wiring. Exposure to Small Arms Fire

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Design was for a more permanent civilian repair. The marines needed contingency construction to improve safety and reliability.

**Significant Material Issues:** None provided.

## **GANNON**



Water from roof leaked past HESCOs



Repaired and tested

## **CAMP GANNON HARDENED DFAC REPAIR IZ5-722**

### **PROJECT DATA**

**Scope:** Conduct emergency repairs to a leaking DFAC roof at Camp Gannon.

**Personnel:** 3

**Duration:** 13FEB06 to 17FEB06

**Mandays:** 7

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Exposure to Small Arms Fire

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** None



## Taqquadum



Capping Slab



Finished Rough Out

## TQ SSTP K-SPAN AND CONCRETE OPERATIONS IZ5-215, IZ6-XXX

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Construction of hospital clinic in existing K-span. Work required repairing existing floor with capping slab. Work also required to support NMCB 133 in creation of concrete batch operation.

**Personnel:** 32

**Duration:** 28JAN06 to 20MAR06

**Mandays:** 1697

**Tasking:** 60% at Turnover  
76% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** Concrete production problems early in the project delayed the concrete pours. Crew support construction of SWA huts and other NMCB 133 projects.

## TMT



Final Checkoff



Heading over the Horizon

## TACTICAL MOVEMENT TEAM IZ5-703

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Tactical Movement Teams, later renamed as Convoy Security Teams, were responsible for the escort of all types of vehicles between Forward Operating Bases.

**Personnel:** 50

**Duration:** Entire deployment

**Mandays:** 8400 completing 159 convoys escorting 1795 vehicles

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Condition of CESE.

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** By coordinating movement with adjacent units, the TMTs was able to follow other convoys, utilize sweeper assets, and gave 261 ride alongs to other vehicles.

**Significant Material Issues:** Due to the likely hood of breakdowns by both military and civilian vehicles, the TMT ran with 7 vehicles which included a MTRV as a tow vehicle. The number of TMT personnel were not increased.



## CRANE / LINE HAUL



Staged and Ready



Always bring a Tow

## CRANE / LINE HAUL IZ6-751

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Utilization of the CESE to transport Class IV material and equipment to project sites. Personnel were required to drive flat bed and end dump assets escorted by the NMCB TMTs as well as adjacent units assigned to escort gravel runs. The crane crew was also utilized in missions to support various projects at Hit, Haditha, AQ, and COP-South utilizing NCF and coalition forces assets.

**Personnel:** 6-26

**Duration:** Entire deployment

**Mandays:** 1362

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Condition of CESE.

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** The amount of Class IV materials that required movement to Al Asad and then onto the battalions projects was significant. The battalion CESE assets were not enough to transport them to the required detachments sites. Received over 1,862 tractor trailers w/drivers from adjacent units with 525 being escorted by adjacent unit security teams. All total 4852 mandays saved.

**Significant Material Issues:** Due to the likely hood of breakdowns by both military and civilian vehicles, the TMT ran with 7 vehicles which included a MTRV as a tow vehicle. The number of TMT personnel were not increased.

## **V. CAMP MOREELL**

Camp Moreell was separate from the Main Body of the battalion and reported to the 22<sup>nd</sup> NCR. Their mission included the 24x7 operations and maintenance of Camp Moreell which included a gym, laundry, security, MWR room, theatre, and operations center. In addition they provided logistic support, travel arrangements, berthing and training for all ingoing and outgoing NCF personnel in support of Operation Iraq Freedom. As well as the projects identified below, they also completed OIC discretionary construction projects in support of adjacent commands including road and gravel work for the Army; amnesty area for Navy Customs; shade structure and grading work for the Air Force; and building additions/improvements for the Marine Corps.

## CAMP MOREELL



Replacing Tents



SWA City

### 24 SWA HUTS KU5-828 and KU6-826

The detachment worked to construct 22 SWA huts at Camp Moreell so that Seabees transiting the camp would have better quality of life and no longer have to sleep in tents. This effort eliminated all tents from Camp Moreell. The project was completed one month ahead of schedule and before the camp reached capacity during the 2006 surge.

#### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Remove existing strongback tents, grade and gravel area, construct SWA Huts

**Personnel:** 6

**Duration:** September 2005 – February 2006

**Mandays:** 461

**Tasking:** 8% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** Redesigned wiring paths – eliminated required overhead access panel.

**Significant Material Issues:** None

## CAMP MOREELL



Trenching



New Panel Boxes

## SWA HUT PRIME POWER KU5-829

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** Replaced electrical main panels with higher capacities. Replaced power runs from panels to SWA Huts with larger gauge wire via trenches. The result was all power lines that had previously been placed on the ground within the berthing areas are now underground.

**Personnel:** 4

**Duration:** September 2005 – January 2006

**Mandays:** 25

**Tasking:** 34% at Turnover  
100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** Existing wire was undersized for electrical load carried.

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** None

## CAMP MOREELL



Front Decking



Rear Entrance

## OPERATIONS OFFICES REMODEL PROJECT KU5-500.2

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** The battalion worked to remodel operations offices at Camp Moreell in order to accommodate additional 22NCR forward staff personnel. The project included building an additional office space between the existing SEA huts, remodeling and painting the interior spaces of the SEA huts, and remodeling the interior of the white trailer on the west side of the flag poles as a new OIC office. Personnel from NMCB 133 Water Well Team assisted with this project.

**Personnel:** 5

**Duration:** November 2005 – January 2006

**Mandays:** 70

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** None

## CAMP MOREELL



Clear Area



Reading Area

## REMODEL DRY STORAGE FOR CAMP LIBRARY KU5-500.4

### PROJECT DATA

**Scope:** The battalion remodeled an unused dry storage space to create a camp library. This project resulted in the creation of a quiet space for reading books/magazines and writing letters. The previous library was located in the MWR building. Removed old galley equipment, insulated the interior of building, rewire for lighting, installed paneling and book shelves. A covered porch for the building was also constructed

**Personnel:** 5

**Duration:** January 2006 – March 2006

**Mandays:** 58

**Tasking:** 100% at Deployment Completion

**Significant Safety Issues:** None

**Significant QC Issues:** None

**Significant Design Issues:** None

**Significant Material Issues:** None

## VI. CESE equipment

Overall CESE condition is good.

Factors leading to CESE break done:

- The extremely rough road conditions tend to put extra stress on the trucks resulting in the need for maintenance outside of the normal PM cycle.
- Rough roads lead to excessive tire wear.
- Dusty conditions lead to the need to change air filters more then normal.

There has also been a need for different types of MHE in addition to the standard 4K and 12K.

### EQUIPMENT POPULATION

Vehicles	Beep	Oct 05	Nov 05	Dec 05	Jan 06	Feb 06	Beep
In Service	293	317	298	304	295	281	273
In Preservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	293	317	298	304	295	281	273

### PM & INTERIM REPAIR ERO SUMMARY

Month	Repairs	Type A	Type B	Type C	Total	PM:INT Ratio
Oct 05	66	97	14	11	188	1.8 : 1
Nov 05	18	78	15	20	131	6.27 : 1
Dec 05	79	72	24	10	185	1.34 : 1
Jan 06	65	90	32	12	199	2.06 : 1
Feb 06	43	56	22	4	125	1.9 : 1
Beep	28	82	26	11	147	2.9 : 1
Total	299	475	133	68	975	2.26 : 1

### EQUIPMENT AVAILABILTY STATUS

	Beep	Oct 05	Nov 05	Dec 05	Jan 06	Feb 06	Beep
<u>On Deadline</u>							
Auto	5	5	2	3	4	4	1
Construction	7	6	6	3	4	4	2
MHE	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Total	13	12	9	7	9	9	3
Total EQ In Service	284	286	269	267	257	246	244
% Availability	95%	91%	91%	88%	87%	88%	89%

## **VII. APPENDIX 1: Smart Cards**

### ***Mobilization Smart Card***

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## NMCB-22 Mobilization Information

### **During Mobilization**

**First Off:** You are not mobilized until called by your Reserve Center. Do not make any major financial or employment decision until you are called.

**The Call:** Upon receiving the call, notify your chain-of-command and your employer. Your orders should say Report No Later Than (NLT) July 25<sup>th</sup>. Do not quit your job, your employer must allow you to fulfill the responsibilities on your orders once you notify them. It is recommended that you utilize vacation to prepare you and your family for mobilization. See the Battalion Website for *Family Care Plan, Activation/Mobilization Checklist and PreDeployment Guide*. Also NKO has mobilization training and your local Reserve Center should also have materials to help you prepare.

**Orders:** When you receive your orders, notify your chain-of-command and provide a copy to your employer and spouse. Note: Navy pay begins as soon as you can go into the ResCen and stamp the orders. However, it will take time before this shows up in your bank. Have sufficient savings in your account to support the bills.

**Flights:** Flights will be arranged by your reserve center to **LAX** and should be schedule as directed by your chain of command. Fly Dates: Pre-AP-July 14, AP-July 17, MB-July 20, DP-July 24. Absolutely NLT 25 July, any other dates must be approved by the chain-of-command and S3.

**Itinerary:** When you receive yours, notify your chain-of-command and fax to the RSS: (817) 782-5884.

### **At Port Hueneme, CA**

We will be in training in California for approximately two months. You will be notified of your training schedule and mobilization chain-of-command once you have reached Port Hueneme (PH).

**LAX:** Upon arrival, report to the USO at LAX: (310) 645-5830. Transportation will be provided to Port Hueneme. Any issues, missed flights or delays report to the CDO at the MOCC in PH: (817) 917-7540

**Mobilization:** We are not mobilized until we have processed through NMPS in PH. Bring copies of all the paperwork (see gear list) with you even if you gave copies to the local Reserve Center.

**Liberty:** Liberty will be authorized as appropriate considering training schedule and performance. We have a very packed training schedule, do not plan to sight-see or see visitors/guests on base.

**Berthing:** Open bay barracks. Minimize bringing valuables. Bring a lock for your personal item storage.

**Facilities:** CBC Port Hueneme / Naval Base Ventura County info: <http://www.nbvc.navy.mil/> Also see *PH Welcome Aboard Package* for additional info.

### **During FEX: 15 Aug – 1 Sep**

We will FEX in Woodlands Camouflage Utility Uniform. 782 and associated gear will be issued for training.

### **Deployment to South West Asia (SWA)**

**Mission:** To support the Marines and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We will be performing critical construction and material movement. A critical mission that we will be well trained for and perform as we always have, "The Professionals." Please feel free to share this with your friends and family. A *Deployment Guide* with mailing address, financial, ombudsman, and other information for your family will be provided before we leave.

**Gear List:** Desert Camouflage Uniforms (DCU) and equipment will be issued during training. It is recommended that you DO NOT buy additional equipment until we have received both equipment and specific tasking. See *Recommended Gear List* to think about if you have them. Everything you need for deployment must be packed in 1 Seabag and 1 Alice Pack. Minimize!

**Weather:** Warm initially turning to winter/cold. Bring cold weather undergarments to California.

# NMCB-22 Mobilization Information

## Phone List

USO: (310) 645-5830

MOCC in PH: (817) 917-7540

MOCC in Ft Worth: (817) 782-5882/5887; FAX -

(817) 782-5884; Emergency After Hours Cell -

(817) 437-0403 / (817) 675-0866

PROHIBITED ITEMS/NOTES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* PORNOGRAPHY OR SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIAL</li> <li>* DRUGS OTHER THAN PRESCRIBED MEDICATIONS w/ ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIONS AND OVER-THE-COUNTER MEDICINES</li> <li>* ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES</li> <li>* FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, EXPLOSIVES - OTHER THAN MILITARY ISSUE</li> <li>* KNIVES OVER 4 INCHES</li> <li>* WHITE PHOSPHORUS MATCHES</li> <li>* CONTACTS (MUST BRING GLASSES)</li> <li>* CELL PHONES (WHEN IN THE FIELD AND DEPLOYED)</li> <li>* NOTE: ALL POWER IN SINIA IS 220V, ENSURE ELECTRONICS ARE DUAL VOLTAGE. OUTLET ADAPTERS AVAILABLE IN PX. MAKE SURE IT WILL OPERATE ON 50/60 HERTZ.</li> <li>* NOTE: LARGER BASES HAVE PX'S WITH TOILETRIES, GEDUNK, UNDERGARMENTS, MARINE PT GEAR, DVDS, RADIOS, CAMERAS, ETC. IF YOU'RE ASSIGNED TO A BASE WITHOUT A PX, SOMEONE CAN BRING THINGS TO YOU ON A CONVOY RUN.</li> </ul>

REQUIRED GEAR LIST FOR MOBILIZATION TRAINING AND FEX		
SEABAG OR FOOTLOCKER		1
UTILITIES - BLOUSE AND TROUSERS (WOODLAND CAMOUFLAGE)		3 SETS
WEB BELT and BUCKLE (with black subdued tip)		2
UTILITY COVER (WOODLAND CAMOUFLAGE)		2
HARD HAT, WITH INSIGNIA		1
BOOTS, COMBAT (AT LEAST 1 PAIR STEEL TOED)		2 PAIR
POLISH/BRUSH FOR BOOTS		1
BLOUSING STRAPS		2
SOCKS, CUSHIONED TOE (green or black)		7 PAIR
UNDERSHIRT, BROWN		7
UNDERSHORTS		7
DOG TAGS w/ Chain and Silencers		2
SHOWER SHOES		1
PT GEAR (blue short [2], brown T-shirt [5], blue warm-ups [1], socks [5] ) [plan for 7 days per wk]		5 Sets
RUNNING SHOES		1 PAIR
CIVILIAN CLOTHES (COLLARED SHIRT [2 Long Sleeve], LONG PANTS DRESS/CASUAL (NO JEANS, OBSCENE GESTURE CLOTHING), BELT, CLOSED-TOE SHOES, SOCKS)		MAX 4 SETS
LAUNDRY BAG with LARGE PIN		1
PILLOW CASE (fill with clothing articles for pillow)		1
EYE GLASSES (No contacts)		2
GAS MASK INSERTS (if you have one)		1
PAPERWORK: ORIGINAL ORDERS (with Itinerary), PAGE 2, PASSPORTS (CM/GOV), BIRTHMARRIAGE/DIVORCE CERTIFICATES, MORTGAGE/LEASE AGREEMENTS, ETC.		1
FLASHLIGHT (with extra batteries & red lens)		1
LOCK (combination)		1
NAVY ID CARD		1
NOTE PAD (small) AND PEN/PENCIL		1
SEWING KIT		1
HYGIENE GEAR (towel, wash cloth, toothbrush, electric shaver, mirror, baby wipes, etc.)		As Required
CLOTHESLINE (1/4' x 50')		optional
PERSONAL 782 GEAR		optional

## NMCB-22 Mobilization Instructions

MILITARY UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT WILL BE ISSUED DURING TRAINING. Before Deployment there will be an opportunity to mail extra CUU and extra items home.

RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL GEAR FOR DEPLOYMENT IF YOU HAVE IT (REMEMBER IT WILL BE WINTER)		
	SWEATER, WOOLLY PULLY	1
	POLY PRO OR OTHER LONG UNDERWEAR (UNDERARMOR IF DESIRED)	2 Sets
	WARM THIN GLOVES SUITABLE FOR USE WITH RIFLE (DESERT TAN) (they wear out quickly)	2 PAIRS
	GATOR NECK (TUBE TYPE SCARF THAT CAN BE PULLED OVER FACE)	1
	THERMAL SOCKS	3 PAIRS
	SKI MASK (ESSENTIAL FOR TMT PERSONNEL)	1
	SCARF (BROWN OR TAN ONLY)	1
	WATCH CAP (BLACK OR TAN ONLY)	1
	SWEAT SHIRT AND SWEAT PANTS (BLUE)	1
	WARM SLEEPING ATIRE	2

CHECK	ADDITIONAL GENERAL RECOMMENDED ITEMS
	LEG HOLSTER FOR PISTOL (KHAKI AND TMT PERSONNEL- Issued one does not work with body armor)
	SHOULDER HOLSTER FOR PISTOL (RECOMMENDED FOR FEMALES IN ADDITION TO LEG HOLSTER)
	B.L.I.S.S. KEVLAR HELMET SUSPENSION KIT (AVAILABLE AT OREGONAERO.COM \$107) A DEFINITE HEAD/NECKSAVER
	3 POINT HARNESS FOR M16 RIFLE (ESSENTIAL FOR TMT - MAY BE ISSUED)
	POCKET KNIFE OR LEATHERMAN/GERBER TOOL (ENSURE PACKED WITH CHECKED IN LUGGAGE)
	TRAVEL ALARM CLOCK W/SPARE BATTERIES
	ATM CARD, CREDIT CARDS, CHECKS, \$200 DOLLARS CASH
	BATTERY OPERATED RAZOR W/SPARE BATTERIES
	DUCT TAPE (GREEN/BLACK)
	ZIPLOC BAGS (various sizes for small and large items) (good to pack skivvies in Ziplocs)
	LONG DISTANCE PHONE CARD - can get here in Port Hueneme
	550 CORD ROLL
	SKIN PROTECTION: SUNSCREEN (SPF 15+), INSECT REPELLENT, HAND SANITIZER, SKIN LOTION, KLEENEX, MOLESKIN
	APPROVED CAMOUFLAGED PUP TENT (SHELTER HALVES WILL BE ISSUED)
	NOTE: ON CONSUMABLE ITEMS BRING MINIMUM SUPPLY - AVAILABLE AT PX AND IN CARE PACKAGES
	BUCKET (IF DESIRED)
	CAMERA/FILM (IF DIGITAL, BRING SOFTWARE, CABLE, AND EXTRA MEMORY)
	READING MATERIAL (SEABEE REFERENCES or PERSONAL), SCOWS PQS BOOKS
	USB THUMB DRIVE for UNCLAS DATA TRANSFER
	PLAYING CARDS/PUZZLES ETC.
	MP3/WALKMAN/RADIO W/SPARE BATTERIES
	BANDANNA (OVERSIZED GREEN/BROWN FOR PROTECTION FROM SAND)
	CIVILIAN FLEECE JACKET (neutral color)
	CAMEL BACK (BLACK/DESERT) - Personal Ones OK..maybe Issue Item as well
	OUTLET ADAPTERS (MIN 2) - 120/220V Nominal 50/60 Hz
	DVD MOVIES
	DR SCHOLLS BOOT INSERTS
	GOGGLES (OPTIONAL - commercial are smaller and considered by some to be more comfortable than issued goggles)
	PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE (AS REQUIRED) (9-12 Month Supply if Possible)
	ASPIRIN / IBUPROFEN (OPTIONAL) some physicians recommend 81mg aspirin (children's dose) on long flights to prevent blood clotting
	STATIONARY / ENVELOPES

### ***Demobilization Smart Card***



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## Demob Smart Card

<p><b>96 Hr Liberty is Four Day Special Liberty</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Must complete Special Liberty Form &amp; provide contact info at all times.</li> <li>- Must check out with NMCB 22 – This 0800 muster is a workday.</li> <li>- You have four complete days off. You may end your liberty early.</li> <li>- Limit: 300 miles unless you have completed a special request chit.</li> <li>- On the 5<sup>th</sup> day, you must muster at 0800 with NMCB 22 in Port Hueneme.</li> <li>- Your demob process will then start.</li> <li>- Keep your chain-of-command informed of where you are!</li> <li>- You are still under the UCMJ, be safe and responsible.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Change of Command</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tentatively scheduled for 2 April.</li> <li>- All personnel demobilizing and on Delayed Party Flight must attend. Those on 96 hr liberty are exempt.</li> <li>- DP personnel do not begin their special liberty until after the change-of-command.</li> <li>- Uniform is DUUs.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Embark (FOBs to CM and CM to PH)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Two Seabags max (60/40lbs split) (One may be aice pack which is NOT carry-on)</li> <li>- One typical airline carry-on (15/30 lbs for below/above E6)</li> <li>- NO FOOTLOCKERS! Mail them home.</li> <li>- No personal gear in Org. Boxes.</li> <li>- Carry assigned weapon to CM, crated to PH</li> <li>- Every flight has Flight Commander. Keep them and your chain-of-command informed.</li> <li>- ALL GEAR will be inspected by customs for prohibited items. See chain-of-command for list.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Back into the reserves</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- You may only begin drills after your terminal leave is over.</li> <li>- You have max. of 60 days from end of discharge to return to drill status--otherwise you become UA.</li> <li>- A special request chit is required if the member wishes to take authorized absences for the remainder of FY06.</li> <li>- A chit can also be submitted to make up drills for FY06.</li> <li>- No AT is required for FY06. However, you may have required schools like Leadership Continuum as part of your rank or enlistment contract. Work with your chain-of-command and S7 to schedule.</li> </ul>
<div data-bbox="310 1105 451 1159" data-label="Text">Version 4</div> <div data-bbox="310 1208 451 1261" data-label="Text">3/11/06</div> <div data-bbox="487 1066 833 1328" data-label="Image"> </div>	<p><b>While at NMPS in Port Huenme</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- You may need to stand duty as needed to help all of us demobilize.</li> <li>- Berthing Options: Bldg 267 (free and close to NMPS), hotel provided at Country Inn or TBD (bus to/from base provided), or your own hotel reservation, for example if with family (no transportation provided).</li> <li>- A rental car is at your own expense. Duty Bus will do rounds in town.</li> <li>- Turn in Travel Claim for the hotel with ResCen when you demob. Speak to them or CM1 Record at the RSS if you need your GTCC turned on.</li> <li>- Muster with your chain-of-command, then with NMPS Group. Report to your chain-of-command at the end of workday.</li> <li>- Liberty is authorized by your Company Commander or Dept. Head.</li> </ul>

Refer to Command Policy or Chain-of-Command for more detail. All information here is subject to change at any time.

## Demob Smart Card

<b>Turn-in: Al Asad</b> - IFAK Kits - Keys - Tools and Tool Kits	<b>Turn-in: Camp Moreell</b> - Ammo Pouches (9mm & M16 as applicable) - Gortex Jacket and Bottoms. - Kevlar Vest, Neck and Groin protector. - SAPI Plates - 4 Part Sleeping Bag	<b>Turn-in: Port Hueneme</b> - Alice Pack & Straps - Web Belt & Suspenders - CBR Cannisters - Gas Mask and Carrier - Kevlar Helmet with cover - Leg or M9 Holster (as applicable) - Poncho and Poncho Liner				
		<b>Port Hueneme #'s</b>  NMCB-22 Admin 805-982-6685 NMCB 22 Duty Cellphone: 817-917-7540 NMPS: 805-982-5007 PSD: 805-982-5445	<b>Warrior Transition</b> - Three Days: Class, Turn-in, Rest. Sequence may be in any order. - Classes: Reunion/Transition & Suicide Prevention/Action, Admin/Legal & Safety, and Medical/Dental. You must attend all classes. - Each class will have Class Leader. Report back to your chain-of-command after class. - Chain-of-command is deployment organization. - If you are there longer, hit the gym and share stories.			
<b>NMCB TWENTY-TWO FY-06 Drill Schedule</b>						
UNIT	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Ft Worth 0122	22/23	20/21	17/18	15/16	19/20	23/24
San Ant. 0522	6/7	6/7	8/9	5/6	9/10	3/4
Austin 0622	1/2	13/14	10/11	8/9	26/27	9/10
Corpus 0722	22/23	20/21	24/25	22/23	26/27	23/24
Amarillo 0822	8/9	20/21	10/11	15/16	19/20	9/10
El Paso 1122	22/23	20/21	24/25	29/30	26/27	23/24
Har'gen 1222	w/0722	w/0722	w/0722	w/0722	w/0722	w/0722
OKC 1322	8/9	6/7	17/18	8/9	12/13	16/17
Waco 1422	18/19	20/21	10/11	8/9	12/13	16/17
LBK 1522	8/9	20/21	10/11	8/9	12/13	9/10
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>Remember this?</p>  </div> </div>						

Refer to Command Policy or Chain-of-Command for more detail. All information here is subject to change at any time.

VIII. APPENDIX 2: COP South Consumed Class IV

	CU YDS	LINEAL FEET	UNITS	BOARD FT	# NAILS	SQ FT PLYWOOD	GAL WATER
EXCAVATION	87277						
HESCO FILL & SANDBAGS	12249.7						
LINEAL FOOT OF BERM		9500					
PERIMETER WIRE		8700					
SWA HUTS			55	73920	4303	140800	
DAVIDSON [TOC]			1	11552	563	19072	
BURNOUTS			20	10525	150	8160	
TENTS			74	18692	626	51968	
DFAC [2 BAY]			1	58096	2519	58240	
ROADS		4197					
DUST ABATEMENT							216000
TOTALS	99527			172785	8162	278240	216000



## IX. APPENDIX 3: COP South Shipment Calendar

COP(S) MATERIAL  
MOVEMENT  
CALENDAR

OCTOBER

BEST OF ALL



Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
					1 ORIGINAL PHASE 1 START	2
3 NMCB22 TOA	4	5	6	7	8 TACTICAL OPERATIONS PUT LAUNCH ON HOLD UNTIL 18 OCT	9
10	11 AA TO AQ	12 AQ TO AA	13	14	15	16 AQ TO AA
17 AQ TO AA	18	19 AA TO AQ CONCERTINA, BARBED WIRE, STAKES, SAND BAGS, HESCOs, PLYWOOD, NAILS, HINGES	20 AQ TO AA	21	22 COP SOUTH LAUNCH WITH TACTICAL ASSETS - 15PAX NMCB22, 8 PAX 983RD ECB(H)	23 ORIGINAL PHASE 1 (IOC) DUE
24 AA TO AQ (for CS) HESCOs, HESCO PANELS, LUMBER, PLYWOOD, NAILS, DOORS, A/C UNITS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS	25 AQ TO AA	26	27	28 AA TO AQ AA TO AQ (for CS) CONCRETE BASES, GUARD TOWERS, LUMBER, PLYWOOD, NAILS, RIGID FOAM, SPRAY FOAM, DOOR HARDWARE, ELECTRICAL (GENERATOR)	29 AQ TO AA	30
31 AA TO AQ	<b>NOTES</b> ALL MATERIALS SHIPPED TO AL QAIM FOR COP SOUTH HAD TO BE OFFLOADED AT AL QAIM. MATERIALS MOVED ON NEXT AVAILABLE MOVEMENT WITH CLB-2.					

COP(S) MATERIAL  
MOVEMENT  
CALENDAR

NOVEMBER

BEST OF ALL



Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
	1 AQ TO AA	2	3	4 AA TO AQ (for CS)	5 AQ TO AA	6
				HESCOs, CEMENT, REBAR, LUMBER, DOOR HARDWARE, SCREEN, PAINT, PLUMBING, A/C UNITS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, ELECTRICAL		
7 AA TO AQ (for CS) CEMENT, REINFORCING STEEL, PLATE, PIPE, REBAR, WELD ROD, NAILS, VISQUEUNE, SPRAY INSULATION, HINGES, A/C UNITS, SMOKE DETECTORS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, ELECTRICAL	8 AQ TO AA	9	10	11 AA TO AQ MATERIALS FOR AQ 731 SHIPPED	12 AQ TO AA	13 AA TO AQ (for CS) ABLUTION UNITS, ROOF PANELS, LUMBER,
14 AQ TO AA	15	16	17 AA TO AQ (for CS) ABLUTION UNITS	18 AQ TO AA	19 AA TO AQ	20 AQ TO AA
21	22	23	24	25 AA TO AQ	26 AQ TO AA	27
28 AA TO AQ ABLUTION UNITS, CEMENT, ROOF PANELS, LUMBER, PLYWOOD, NAILS, SCREWS	29 AQ TO CS TO AQ	30 AQ TO AA	<b>NOTES</b> MATERIAL MOVEMENT AND SWEEPER ASSET SYNCHRONIZED WITH CLB-2 TO ALLOW DIRECT SHIPMENT TO CS WITHOUT OFFLOAD AT AQ.			





Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
			1	2	3	4
			19 FAX 4TH ARRIVE (TOTAL 60 AT COP SOUTH)	AA TO AQ (direct to CS) HESCOS, ROOF PANELS, FUEL TANKS, NAILS, VISQUENE, SPRAY INSULATION, DOORS, DOOR HARDWARE, ELECTRICAL (GENERATOR)	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
23 FAX 4TH ARRIVE (63 TOTAL AT COP SOUTH)	AA TO AQ (direct to CS) LUMBER, DOOR HARDWARE, PLUMBING, A/C UNITS, SMOKE DETECTORS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, ELECTRICAL	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA		AA TO AQ	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
AA TO AQ (direct to CS) LUMBER, HARDWARE, MISC	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA		AA TO AQ (direct to CS) HESCOS, RIDGE CAPS, NAILS, CAULKING, VISQUENE/PLASTIC, SPRAY INSULATION, DOORS, DOOR HARDWARE, SMOKE DETECTORS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, ELECTRICAL	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	AA TO AQ (direct to CS) HESCOS, CONCRETE BASES, GALVANIZED STEEL, RIDGE CAPS, TANK STANDS (HDO), ROOF PANELS, LUMBER, NAILS, SCREWS, CAULKING, SPRAY INSULATION, DOORS, DOOR HARDWARE, PLUMBING, A/C UNITS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, ELECTRICAL	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	Majority material for AQ	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA	
26	27	28	29	30	31	
AA TO AQ (direct to CS) CHAIN LINK FENCE, HESCOS, CONCRETE BASES, ROOF PANELS, LUMBER, NAILS, SCREWS, CAULKING, RIGID FOAM, VISQUENE, DOORS, DOOR HARDWARE, SCREEN, A/C UNITS, SMOKE DETECTORS, ELECTRICAL	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	AQ TO AA		AA TO AQ (direct to CS) CONCERTINA, BARBED WIRE, PICKETS, GUARD TOWERS, NAILS, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, SMOKE DETECTORS, ELECTRICAL	AQ CS-AQW/CLB2	



Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
AA TO AQ (direct to CS) HESCOS, TANK STANDS, CORRUGATED STEEL, STEEL PIPE, NAILS, SCREWS, CAULKING, VISQUENE, SPRAY FOAM, DOOR HARDWARE, A/C UNITS, PLUMBING, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, SMOKE DETECTORS, ELECTRICAL	AQ TO AA					
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	AA TO AQ (direct to CS) SAND BAGS, CONCERTINA, BARBED WIRE, POSTS, HESCOS, FENCE GATE, HOG RING FLIES, WIRE FABRIC, REBAR, REINFORCING STEEL, PLATE, NAILS (LO SHIPMENT), SCREWS, PLASTIC, SPRAY FOAM, DOORS, DOOR HARDWARE, SCREEN, LINOLEUM, EPOXY, PRIMER, PLUMBING, ELECTRICAL	AQ TO AA			AA TO AQ (for CS) ISOs, GUTTERING, DOOR HARDWARE, DRYWALL SCREWS, ELECTRICAL	
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
AQ TO AA			AA TO AQ (direct to CS) ISOs AND REEFER ISOs	COP SOUTH COMPLETE ALL AVAILABLE MATERIALS	COP SOUTH FOC (RETROGRADE OF 46th REGTS)	AA TO AQ
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
	AQ TO AA		AA TO AQ			AA TO AQ
30	31	NOTES CLB-2 RIP REMOVED SWEEPER ASSETS AND MATERIAL MOVEMENT SUPPORT FROM AQ. ALL CONVOYS ON OWN BETWEEN AQ-CS.				
	AQ TO AA					



Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
						AA TO AQ TO CS ISOs, FUEL TANKS, REMAINING PLUMBING
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
CS TO AQ TO AA				AA TO AQ TO CS ISOs, PEBs	CS TO AQ TO AA	
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
AA TO AQ TO CS PEB PLUMBING	CS TO AQ TO AA					
27	28	NOTES				
AA TO CS PLUMBING						



Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
		1	2	3	4	5
		AA TO AQ TO CS RETRO OF CLIV	CS TO AQ TO AA		PEB's COMPLETE	AA TO AQ RETRO OF CLIV
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	AA TO AQ TO CS RETRO OF ALL CLIV IN CS	CS TO AQ TO AA				
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
		PEB FOC				
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
			TOA			
27	28	29	30	31		

## **X. APPENDIX 4: Commendatory Correspondence**

### **In Recognition of Engineering and Repairs to Roads and Bridges**

*Ensign Lanier,*

*OUTSTANDING WORK.....Everything I've heard so far tells me that this is a true success story. A good example of how the Marines and Sailors who travel these roads identified the solution to the problem and fixed it themselves. This has been the source of many frustrations for several years and it could not have been done without the "can-do" Seabee attitude. Well done.*

*Semper Fi,*

*Major Swier*  
(CSSE CLB2 Operations Officer)

---

### **In Recognition of Support during a Incident involving a NMCB-133 Convoy**

*Skipper,*

*I just wanted to pass on my sincerest thanks to you and your Double Duece team. From your COC which relayed communications to us during the incident, to your Doc's support in the BAS, along with the care and feeding you did for our troops, your team really went above and beyond the call of duty. It made an extremely challenging situation much easier to manage with the knowledge that you folks watched our back. Your guys showed what's truly best about the Seabees, that we always take care of each other. I'm proud to serve with you.*

*V/R*

*CO NMCB-133*

---

### **In Recognition of Support at COP South Project**

*S3:*

*We went through the pictures from CECS Hancock's trip to COP South last night – the camp looks great. Everything I hear from everyone who visits is that LT Windham is a rock star, which you already knew, but I thought I'd share. CAPT Brown was very happy and is looking forward to the trip up there on the 20<sup>th</sup> with MEF G8, RCT2.*

*R/S*  
*LCDR Darcy Wolfe*  
*30NCR FWD R3*

**In Recognition of the Haditha Detachment**



**AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASI SİLAHLI QÜVVƏLƏRİ  
SÜLHMƏRAMLI QÜVVƏLƏR KOMANDANLIĞI TƏRƏFİNDƏN**

**FƏXRİ FƏRMAN**

**VERİLİR**

ABŞ DƏNİZ QÜVVƏLƏRİ MÜHƏNDİS HEYƏTİNƏ, (SEEBEE) ONDAN ÖTRÜ  
Kİ, HADİTHA SU ELEKTİK STANSİYASINDA XİDMƏT MÜDDƏTİ ƏRZİNDƏ  
AZƏRBAYCAN SİLAHLI QÜVVƏLƏRİ SÜLHMƏRAMLI QÜVVƏLƏR BÖLÜYÜ İLƏ SIX  
DOSTLUQ ƏLAQƏLƏRİ YARATMIŞ XİDMƏTİMİZ ÜÇÜN ZƏRURİ MATERİALLARIN  
ALINMASINDA VƏ QURULMASINDA BİZƏ LAZİMİ KÖMƏKLİKLƏR GÖSTƏRMIŞLƏR.

İRAK İSLAM RESPUBLİKASININ AZADLIĞI UĞRUNDAN GEDƏN ƏMƏLİYYATLARA  
DƏSTƏK, DAMBA SES-DA YENİ YARANAN İRAK ORDUSUNUN KAMPININ  
QURULMASI, SES-NİN YENİDƏN BƏRPASI ZAMANI YÜKSƏK GÖSTƏRİCİLƏR ƏLDƏ  
ETMIŞLƏR.

ƏLDƏ ETDİKLƏRİ NƏİLİYYƏTLƏRƏ GÖRƏ AZƏRBAYCAN SİLAHLI QÜVVƏLƏRİ  
SÜLHMƏRAMLI QÜVVƏLƏR BÖLÜYÜNÜN Ş/H-İ ADINDAN MÜHƏNDİS ÇALIŞMA  
QRUPUNA (MÇQ-22) ÖZ DƏRİN TƏŞƏKKÜRÜMÜZÜ BİLDİRİR, GƏLƏCƏK İŞLƏRİNDƏ  
UĞURLAR ARZULAYIRIQ.

**AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASI SİLAHLI QÜVVƏLƏRİ  
112 SAYLI HƏRBİ HİSSƏNİN SÜLHMƏRAMLI QÜVVƏLƏR TABORU  
SÜLHMƏRAMLI QÜVVƏLƏR BÖLÜK KOMANDİRİ:**

**MAYOR**

**=EYYUBOV RAMİZ MUSTAFA =**

İRAK İSLAM RESPUBLİKASI  
ƏL-ANBAR VİLAYƏTİ,  
HADİTHA ŞƏHƏRİ  
04.12.2005



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ALPHA 555  
2ND BATTALION, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)  
HADITHA DAM, AL ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ  
APO-AE 09333

ODA 555 (Triple Nickle)  
Camp Nickle, Haditha, Iraq  
20 November 2005

To Whom It May Concern:

The purpose of this letter is to formally recognize the achievements and level of commitment of the following men of NMCB-22.

<b>Massingill, Johnny</b>	<b>CMC(SCW)</b>	<b>263-87-8258</b>
Warwick, James	CM-2	558-85-1363
Cepeda, Jesus	SW-2	451-69-4255
Fredericks, Michael	EO-3	450-91-9684
Lopez, Robert	UT-3	455-89-2431
Stephens, Matthew	EO-3	451-61-3901
Martin, Michael	EO-3	444-60-5269
McCutchen, Robert	EO-2	458-33-2333

On numerous occasions the men of NMCB-22 volunteered to assist in the fortifications and defense of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 555 Base Camp, which enabled the ODA to focus on their mission accomplishment.

The men of NMCB-22 worked countless extra hours to assist the Detachment with their Force Protection needs. They went far above and beyond what was expected of them in their particular circumstance. The Seabees were already tasked to accomplish work on the IA Camp with the minimal number of personnel and materials. Their work ethic is at a level comparable with any member of the Special Operations community that I regularly associate with and has earned them the respect of every member of my Detachment.

The men of NMCB-22 that were operating at Haditha Dam are far and away the best engineers that the Detachment has ever had the pleasure of working with. Their dedication to duty and personal sacrifice in the name of mission accomplishment speaks volumes on their level of commitment. This team would be at a loss without their efforts. Again, I wish to commend these men of NMCB-22 for their commitment and their unsurpassed support of Special Operations Forces and the Green Berets of the *Triple Nickle* operating in the Al Anbar Province.

I can be contacted at [scott.barber@us.army.mil](mailto:scott.barber@us.army.mil) or DNVN: 302-3614-555.

  
SCOTT H. BARBER  
CPT, SF  
Detachment Commander

Ministry of Electricity

- The power General Department for The middle Areas of Iraq.
- Haditha Dam power station.

ON Behalf of ALL Haditha Dam power station workers we give our great full Thanks to ALL (NMCB22) members ~~who~~ we write Their names Below to what They give ~~offer~~ offers and Their cooperation to make us capable to work again inside The station Location and The Dam place and to prove The preformans and Keeping on The numbers working time very good for The Time That They was with us. we hope we will work together all the time to rebuild all the iraqi structures.

Hassan yehya Hassan

Station manager

29-11-2005

- massingill Johnny

- worick James

- fredericks michael

- cepeda Jesus

- Lopez Robert

- martin michael


- mcenthen Robert

- Stephens matthew

وزارة الكهرباء  
المديرية العامة لانتاج الطاقة الكهربائية  
للمنطقة الوسطى  
مديرية توليد كهرباء سد صيدته

نيابة عن متبني مهم توليد كهرباء سد صيدته  
نقدم بالشكر الجزيل الى اعضاء جمعية NMCB  
المدرسة الساتم ادناه لما ابدهه من تعاون ومجهود متواصل  
في بناءه فهدف العمل داخل موقع الحطم والسد وتمييزه  
مستوى الادارة والمحافظة على دوام المنتجه بصورة  
ممتازة طيلة فترة تواجدهم معنا فتمنا ان تكون وبتيرة  
العلاقة دائمة لعمارة بننا جميع قطاعات العلاقة  
-Massing Johnny

- Warwick James  
- Cepeda Jesus  
- Fredericks Michael  
- Lopez Robert  
- Martin Michael  
- McCubben Robert  
- Stephens Matthew

  
مفاتيح  
مدير المصنع  
29-11-2005

UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
GRC  
HADITHA DAM, AL ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ



To Whom It May Concern;

I would like to take the time to give recognition to the following members of the NMCB-22.

• Massingill, Johnny	CMC (SCW)	263-87-8258
• Warick, James	CM-2	558-85-1363
• Cepeda, Jesus	SW-2	451-69-4255
• Fredericks, Michael	EO-3	450-91-9684
• Lopez, Robert	UT-3	455-89-2431
• Martin, Michael	EO-3	444-60-5269
• McCuthen, Robert	EO-3	458-33-2333
• Stephens, Matthew	EO-3	451-61-3901

As Project Manager for the USACE at Haditha Dam I have asked the men of NMCB-22 for their skilled professional help and assistance in many areas in and around the project. With the Seabees already tasked with building the Iraqi Army Camp, and time spent assisting the US Army Special Forces, I was amazed that when asked they would always, somehow, find time to give an extra hand. It's the work ethics these men show and share that make us all proud to be part of what America stands for.

The men of NMCB-22 operating at Haditha Dam are of the highest performing group of engineers I have had the pleasure to be associated with. Their dedication, personal sacrifice, and commitment to their mission, and the mission of others stationed here will never be forgotten.

I would like to again, commend these men of NMCB-22 for supporting the Iraqi Engineers, Iraqi workforce and the mission for which I was assigned.

Chester W. Lowery  
Project Manager  
USACE  
Haditha Power Plant  
Lowery GS-12 Chester W (GCE RCT2 3/1 COE)



**In Recognition of the Korean Village Detachment**

To the Seabees of NMCB 22  
Camp Korean Village Det Al Anbar Province Iraq

From the Marines and Sailors of  
H&S CO TF Highlander, 1<sup>st</sup> LAR 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division,  
Thank you for your tireless efforts to improve and maintain  
Our combat efficiency and morale during OIF 04-06

Semper Fidelis & Godspeed.....



**In Recognition of Korean Village Detachment via Correspondence to Higher HQ**

**From:** Thiele Capt Gregory A (GCE LAR BN)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 15, 2006 3:33 PM  
**To:** Whimpey LT Douglas B (CE G-8 Engineering Officer)  
**Subject:** SeaBees

Lt Whimpey,

I have heard that there is a move afoot to pull the SeaBees from the outlying camps and consolidate them with their parent battalion. I can certainly understand the potential reasons for doing so, and while I cannot speak to the impact that this will have at other camps, I can say that without a doubt it will have a major adverse impact on the tenants of Korean Village, Waleed, Trebil and the JBCC.

We have a very small crew of SeaBees operating out of KV, but their efforts are felt far out of proportion to their numbers. They were placed here to do basic maintenance and upkeep of more than 120 SWA Huts here on camp. They do this and much more. They have helped us rebuild our guard posts and improve our force protection posture. They have helped us build sinks with running water so that we can improve the quality of life for the camp's tenants. They helped us build a new gym by assembling contracted tents without directions, not to mention clearing the site, and hooking up all of the lighting and environmental control units. They have also gone out to Trebil and Waleed to fix their showers and to the JBCC to enclose the mess hall there. This is not meant to be an all-inclusive list, simply an example of how valuable the SeaBees are to us.

I cannot adequately express how important our SeaBees have been out here. I can only say that I have never served with any SeaBees before, but after having the opportunity to see what they bring to the fight for the last six months, I never want to go anywhere without them ever again!

Respectfully,  
Capt Thiele

## **XI. APPENDIX 5: Lessons Learned**

The Lessons Learned are organized by the source department/company that identified them. The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation.

### **SOURCE: MEDICAL**

This section provides future medical staff a ready reference for improvement from a medical perspective.

#### **1. WORKSPACE**

- a. Medical Space
- b. Upon arrival to Port Hueneme the Medical department personnel were immediately expected to provide a fully functioning BAS. The warehouse was grossly inadequate without an area to provide sick call, evaluations, treatment or Medical administration.
- c. Provide a secure area for the Medical providers to work.

#### **2. SUPPLY**

- a. Medical Supplies for Sick Call and/or Training
- b. There were no medical supplies available for use during the mobilization phase at Port Hueneme.
- c. In the designated battalion medical space, an Authorized Medical Allowance List (AMAL) of supplies should be available for sick call along with a phone, computer and printer/copier as well as administrative supplies.

#### **3. COMMUNICATION**

- a. Communication between Battalions (outgoing and incoming)
- b. It was unknown what Medical supplies, medications or capabilities were in theatre prior to arrival. This information would have helped immensely with Medical planning.
- c. The departing battalion should provide the relieving Battalion with the following minimum information prior to the relieving battalion departing CONUS: The formulary, supply inventory and medical assets and in theatre. Identify a facilitator for this as the incoming battalion medical personnel may not have the point-of-contact information for the in theatre Medical personnel. Mandatory communication should occur between the Medical Officers as well as the senior enlisted personnel.

#### **4. NMPS**

- a. Medical Staffing at NMPS
- b. NMPS lacks adequate medical support to support a BN-sized mobilization. The mobilizing battalion's Medical department is going through NMPS and SRT training. It should not be expected to provide the manpower, planning, organizing, facilitating and transportation for the Medical portion of NMPS.
- c. NMPS needs more medical staff support from the active duty clinics and hospitals.

#### **5. MEDICAL**

- a. Credentialing of Providers
- b. The credentialing of Medical providers was difficult and time consuming. Pharmacy services, lab requests, radiology and other needed services were delayed and challenging to get without credentials or privileges for the providers.
- c. Make the Credentialing of Providers part of the NMPS process.

## 6. MEDICAL

- a. CHCS Access
- b. The use of the CHCS, a computerized system to order new tests (blood, x-ray, etc.) at Branch Medical Clinics, was not available to the mobilizing battalion's Providers (corpsmen). This caused long delays in medical services as well as consuming many man-hours finding alternate ways to arrange for medical services.
- c. Make CHCS available to a visiting battalion's Providers as part of the credentialing process.

## 7. MEDICAL

- a. Data Entry Capability into MRRS (A database for entering an individual's medical data.)
- b. Only one person had access to MRRS and was expected to enter all the health record updates. The NMPS personnel were unable to do this because they had no access and no other Battalion personnel had access.
- c. Grant MRRS access to NMPS Corpsmen and more USNR Corpsmen during mobilization.

## 8. MEDICAL

- a. Prescription Medications
- b. The Port Hueneme BMC (Branch Medical Clinic) Pharmacy was frequently unable to fill prescription medications or was unable to fill a deployment supply.
- c. Provide a list of local private pharmacies that accept TRICARE and arrange for a legal way for the private civilian pharmacies to provide a six month deployment supply.

## 9. SUPPLY

- a. Mobilization Medical TOA
- b. Many man-hours were spent requisitioning and justifying required Medical supplies and gear.
- c. Develop a Standard mobilization Medical TOA for Battalion Medical departments to include to following:
  - 1) Medical Aid Bags (one per Medical personnel)
  - 2) A Sick Call Authorized Medical Allowance List (AMAL) (Complete)
  - 3) Combat Lifesaver bags (45 per Battalion)
  - 4) A mobilization notebook with points of contacts, instructions for obtaining medical supplies (both in port and in theatre), a copy of COMFIRSTNCD 6000, a copy of chapter 9 in the Manuel of Preventive Medicine, local and in theatre assets (non-specific to locations for OPSEC reasons), A list of local pharmacies that accept TRICARE, the SOP for treating uniforms with permetherin, the formulary for the BMC, Hospital points of contact and the in theatre instructions for personnel casualty reports and patient tracking.

## 10. SECURITY CLEARANCES

- a. Access to Reporting Tools
- b. Many of the required in theatre medical reports can only be submitted via SIPRnet. Because of the constantly changing nature of the NCF mission, it is impossible to expect only one representative from the Medical department to submit the reports from the many different detachment sites in theatre.
- c. All medical personnel need a Secret clearance and a SIPR account.

## 11. TRAINING

- a. Medical Skills Training
- b. Many Reserve Medical personnel do not practice the trade in their civilian jobs and need specific training and skills to function in a Combat zone. The time to learn these skills is before deployment. Program 9 (those assigned to Marine Units) Medical personnel are budgeted for an additional 12 days per year, specifically for Medical training. Corpsmen assigned to Seabee units also need the same types of training.
- c. Develop a standard program for Seabee Medical personnel specifically for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Include not only Medical skills but also sick call and administrative requirements.

## 12. OPERATIONS

- a. Medical personnel mobilization
- b. The Battalion Medical department is expected to provide services, answer questions, solve issues, research processes and cover training evolutions. It is unreasonable to expect this when the staff personnel are still being processed and are undergoing required training.
- c. Mobilize at least a portion of the Medical staff early. Include the Medical Officer, the Senior Corpsman, the LPO and the Corpsmen that will be assigned to the Convoy Security Element (CSE). These personnel must complete the required NMPS process and SRT training before they can properly provide the services expected by the Battalion.

## 13. SUPPLY

- a. Female Field Urinary Device
- b. Current convoy and convoy support operations are extremely hazardous and require long hours on the road. Stopping a convoy every time somebody needs to void their bladder is unreasonable. The males are voiding into empty water bottles. Initially, the convoy had to make stops to allow the females to void on the side of the road. These females were purposely dehydrating themselves to lesson the number of times they had to stop.
- c. Make commercially available female field urinary devices a part of the Battalion TOA.

## 14. ADMIN

- a. Warrior Transition
- b. Warrior transition is a very important aspect of deployment. Currently Battalions are creating their own programs with no standard requirements.
- c. Develop a standard 1NCD Warrior transition program.

## 15. ADMIN

- a. War Diary
- b. Each department is tasked with submitting a war diary entry. What is submitted is left up to the department.
- c. Develop a standard format for what is required for the Medical portion of the war diary.

#### 16. DENTAL

- a. Opposing Teeth
- b. A member cleared NMPS without enough teeth to adequately masticate (chew) most MRE's. He reported to the BAS complaining of abdominal problems. It was discovered that he was unable to eat an adequate diet in the field. During the Dental portion of NMPS, the Dental records were screened for personnel needing exams, x-rays, etc. If the Dental record showed that nothing was needed, and that the member recently had an exam, then the member was cleared.
- c. Add the following question to the Medical screening: "Do you have any problems eating or digesting solid food and do you have any special dietary requirements?" Provide at least a brief Dental exam on all members being mobilized.

#### 17. MEDICAL

##### Hernia Exam and Awareness

The number of hernia incidents diagnosed was significant enough to impact the mission.

Make a hernia exam a standard part of the NMPS process. Make hernia prevention a part of the required GMT.

#### 18. TRAINING

- a. Combat / Operational Stress
- b. Combat and Operational stress are frequently encountered by Hospital Corpsman. Currently the training in recognizing, evaluating, and treating patients with operational and combat stress is very limited.
- c. Develop a training reference booklet specifically for non-IDC Corpsmen.

#### 19. ADMIN

- a. Patient Tracking
- b. When a Seabee is MEDEVAC'd, the command needs to know where he is, his diagnosis, his prognosis and the plan. The problem is that most Reservists have no prior training on how to do this, and must identify who is responsible for the tracking. When a Seabee has a medical problem, it is assumed that the Medical department does this tracking. Tracking personnel is an administrative issue (If they did not have a medical issue would the Medical department track them?). The various programs (TRACCES, GPMRC, etc.) that track patients in theatre require training, special access justification and are largely unknown to Reserve personnel. The typical Battalion Medical department is not set up to track patients.
- c. Develop an SOP for tracking patients similar to the one that the US Marine Corps uses. The Battalion tracks the members in theatre and the Regiment tracks patients once they leave theatre. Provide training and access for Medical, S1 and R1 personnel during the mobilization process and ensure that the relieving Battalion is competent in using the system and know how to report the movement of patients.

#### 20. PAY

- a. Independent Duty Corpsman Special Duty Pay
- b. It took seven months to approve the Special duty pay for qualified Independent Duty Corpsmen. Many man-hours were consumed by the Medical department and the Administrative department in obtaining this pay.
- c. The Independent Duty Corpsman assigned to our Reserve Seabee Battalion all came from active duty commands. Who is responsible for the pay issues? Educate the command personnel responsible for pay on how to get the active duty TAD personnel paid or special duty pay.

#### 21. MEDICAL

- a. Prescription Medications
- b. A six month deployment supply of prescription medication could not be obtained through the Port Hueneme BMC (Branch Medical Clinic) Pharmacy. Although the pharmacy was unable to provide the medications, they could assist the members with the online ordering of a deployment supply of medications. The mail order system took too long and the Medical department spent a lot of time teaching members how to fill out the forms.
- c. The deploying Battalion should have priority and the BMC pharmacy should assist with online orders of deployment prescription supplies.

#### 22. MEDICAL

- a. Six month prescriptions on a nine month deployment
- b. A six month supply of prescription medication ran out before the end of deployment due to the time spent in the mobilization site. The members were instructed to report to medical at least 6 weeks before they were to run out of medications. Many times the members reported to Medical needing refills when they were completely out. Many of the medications were not available in theatre and had to be shipped from CONUS. The mail system is inconsistent and the turn around time for waiting for the meds was 2-6 weeks.
- c. Create a spreadsheet during the mobilization process of personnel on prescription medications to include name, rate, ssn, medication, dose, instructions and date when prescription will run out. The Medical department can then use the mail order system to order deployment supply medications not available in theatre.

#### 23. MEDICAL

- a. Eyewear
- b. Several issues with eyewear occurred. The availability of optometry in theatre is extremely limited. When eyewear was broken, getting replacements was difficult without the prescription. Also the inserts for the protective eyewear, specifically the ESS brand did not fit properly.
- c. Research the market for ballistic glasses that work with the prescription "BC" glasses currently issued. Issue an extra set of glasses. Verify that optical prescriptions are included in medical records.

#### 24. MEDICAL

- a. In theatre medical reports
- b. The Medical department in theatre is responsible for submitting several reports. These reports include: The Medical SITREP, the DNBI (disease non battle injury) report, the Binnacle list and the health services report. Due to the high operational tempo and the often scattered personnel, it is difficult to train all the Medical personnel in these required reports. The learning curve caused delays and incorrect submission of reports.
- c. Provide CONUS training on these reports to the department during a single training session so that personnel receive the same information and can agree on what the requirements and expectations are before arriving in theatre.

## **SOURCE: OPERATIONS**

The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation. This section provides future operations staff a ready reference for improvement from an operations perspective.

### **1. RESCEN (NOSC)**

- a. Coordination with RESCEN is essential.
- b. DET OIC needed to be at RESCEN daily for coordination and resolution of problems. They were put on the most delayed party flight to Port Hueneme to ensure all their personnel made it out of detachment sites. A weekly and sometimes daily conference call was held to facilitate communication. Some RESCEN allowed them to mobilize early to support the det personnel while others had to take off of work at no pay until this could be corrected when they arrived at NMPS. Since OICs were last to reach Port Hueneme, these officers and chiefs were missed and behind the rest of the battalion.
- c. Key det personnel should receive orders with earlier mob dates but later flight dates to ensure NOSC support to work at their geographic location.

### **2. MOBILIZATION**

- a. Mobile Phones
- b. Mobile Phones are essential to support communication in Port Hueneme. Battalion personnel were left using their personnel phone or if so lucky their former employer's phone and for some paying out-of-network charges.
- c. Mobilization support should include 20+ local cell phones for units to use during mobilization.

### **3. MOBILIZATION**

- a. Orders
- b. Some battalion personnel were recalled for long term ADSW as part of the internal support for mobilization. Order writing went through multiple evolutions without results in automatic order writing systems. Orders were finally cut manually after five weeks. Result was one member spending five weeks without pay and unable to apply for civilian employment due to pending MOB which resulted in significant financial hardship due to delays in the order process.
- c. Recommend manual order writing within two weeks of initial failure of automatic system.

### **4. MOBILIZATION**

- a. NMPS Groups.
- b. Personnel arriving were assigned groups for NMPS processing. Personnel arriving between groups were assigned to previous group. This resulted in delays waiting for briefs organized by NMPS. Many briefs could be completed by a visit to appropriate office on base. While NMPS generally took 5 days, some personnel doing the steps themselves completed NMPS in two days. Groups often sat around for long periods waiting for briefs at NMPS when they could have completed other processing stations.
- c. Recommend a checklist of all NMPS requirements with locations to have requirements checked off. Battalion operations should manage groups and NMPS provide the times the particular briefs and stations will be available for battalion use.

### **4. MOBILIZATION**

- a. Follow-on appointments.
- b. Follow-on appointments were missed due to conflicts with SERT/Training requirements.
- c. Recommend follow-on appointments be coordinated by battalion medical once the individual starts getting thru required training.



5. MOBILIZATION

- a. Berthing.
- b. Personnel berthed according to arrival and subsequently assigned berthing in barracks as it became available. This method made small unit integrity very difficult. Re-organizing from geographic organization into a deployed military organization also made this extra difficult.
- c. Recommend adequate berthing accommodations be made for the entire mobilizing battalion in order to organize their personnel and allow berthing by unit assignment.

6. MOBILIZATION

- a. Training
- b. The training opportunity during mobilization was excellent. ABFC was very flexible and offered multiple opportunities for ad-hoc crew skills training and familiarization. More personnel were trained during mobilization than any two T-years.
- c. Recommend more opportunity be given units during mobilization for difficult skill attainment. This would free up these Seabees in subsequent T-years to do additional training or tasking.

7. MOBILIZATION

- a. FEX
- b. The FEX was incorporated into the mobilization training to facilitate the mobilization schedule. The result was a unit that was planning for both deployment and FEX simultaneously while maximizing the training opportunity in Port Hueneme while reorganizing with over 100 personnel who they had not met before.
- c. Not recommended. All other lessons learned are focused on the deployment.

8. ORGANIZATION

- a. Personnel Assignments and Battalion Organization.
- b. Personnel were constantly being reassigned from one unit to another. This was necessary to fine tune skills to suspected tasking. Although necessary, notification of detachment/company leadership was not sufficient. Posting a list on the wall was also not adequate. Leadership and affected personnel needed to be provided with listings noting changes in assignment. This resulted in one UA that remained unnoticed for nearly two weeks.
- c. A transfer form should be used to move personnel between departments which includes signatures of both company chiefs, the member, and the ops chief.

9. EQUIPMENT

- a. Testing Lab
- b. The unit lacked an operational testing lab upon arrival.
- c. Have a fully functional, deployable testing lab. This could be accomplished by setting up an ISO container as a testing lab. It would not be difficult to install lighting, cabinets, storage and ECU's into a self contained lab. Fleet Hospital has expandable ISOs (both single and double-sided expandable) for Dental XRAY rooms and other nodes that tie into the Temper Tents of the hospital itself. This could be adapted into a mobile testing lab fairly easily.

10. EQUIPMENT

- a. Surveying Equipment
- b. By using outdated equipment, we are doing the Navy and it's Seabees a disservice. The latest equipment is more accurate and less labor intensive and can be directly imported into AutoCAD. It also allows the Seabee to get a better job when they decide to leave the service because they will be trained on the latest equipment.

One of the recruiting enticements is the training the member will receive in the Seabees.

- c. Get rid of the theodolites and get the Battalions outfitted with the latest surveying equipment.

#### 11. EQUIPMENT

- a. CESE.
- b. The main body and detachment sites did not have enough fork lifts to load/off-load materials. These assets had to be constantly borrowed from KBR and adjacent units.
- c. Need more forklifts and especially larger allocation of smaller forklifts for loading/unloading/staging of materials, generators, etc.

#### 12. EQUIPMENT

- a. Plotter (Large-Size Printer)
- b. The lack of a plotter made it difficult for the BN to produce large size drawings for the projects.
- c. Get a plotter for the BN Engineering shop and make it deployable. A color plotter would be able to plot both full and half size drawings of project instead of trying to past together multiple letter-size sheets. It could also be used, with the proper software, to plot maps and charts for the S2 department instead of relying upon the Marines to plot for us.

#### 13. SOFTWARE

- a. Personnel Accounting and Databases.
- b. At least 7 excel files existed for Admin, Operations, Flights, Security Clearances, Uniform sizes, Licenses, etc. All together there were 5 sets of AP/MB/DP lists for the mobilization. To Port Hueneme, To FEX, From FEX, To Camp Moreell, To Theatre. These lists were not the same due to different requirements at each location and different transportation quantities. PISTOL does not provide adequate tools for all the battalions needs. Lack of military computer assets also makes it unavailable to all personnel who need to access it. These files also had to be emailed to facilitate communication even though they contain personnel information.
- c. Recommend establishment of web accessible Battalion Operations Database capable of internal computer network using any personal or military computers. This will allow one common database of personnel for all S code and company functions that operates at their homes, geographic det sites, mobilization site, and theatre of operation. Read and write access can be controlled by password.

#### 14. SOFTWARE

- a. Drafting Software
- b. Two computers, one SIPR and one NIPR, restricted the amount of work that could be accomplished. Obtain the latest version of AutoCAD and other up-to-date software.
- c. Purchase a Navy-wide license with the manufacturers that would allow an unlimited amount of users. This will allow the required amount of computers to be used, both NIPR and SIPR, for the production of the required drawings

#### 15. SOFTWARE

- a. CBCM Software
- b. The CBCM Level III & II set up was too specific for most of the projects that we were tasked.
- c. Use the FASTPLAN section of the CBCM. We also discovered that it was easier at times to convert to MS-Project.

#### 6. OPERATIONS

- a. Site Visits
- b. Site visits give the staff members the opportunity to experience and see the conditions of the project as well as gain familiarity with the obstacles put forth by the Class IV materials and the environment.
- c. Ensure that the Operations staff members make trips to the sites. Even taking the opportunity to make a Class IV convoy run provides tremendous insight into the headaches of material movement.

## **SOURCE: ALPHA COMPANY**

The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation. This section provides future Alpha Company staff a ready reference for improvement from an Alpha Company perspective.

### **1. TRAINING**

- a. CESE Licensing
- b. Upon arrival in country, mission dictated the need for personnel to operate 20 Ton Tractors, MTRVs, HUMMVs and Fork Lifts. As a battalion we had a deficiency in licensed operators due to lack of training prior to deployment. This was due to the lack of accessible CESE to train on in Port Hueneme. The training of personnel on CESE needs to be as important as all other skill requirements. Since it is not part of the readiness numbers, it tends to get pushed to the side to get other training numbers up.
- c. Solution
  - 1) Time and equipment needs to be provided for all rates to train on CESE. Reserve Sites need to be provided with the key pieces of CESE currently in use. Personnel should have easier access to IDTT orders to reserve center/detachment sites that have the CESE for training.
  - 2) The higher commands need to have some type of agreement with other branches of service in the areas where members drill to make access to CESE easier.
  - 3) Training for CESE should be included in the SRT training at Port Hueneme/Gulfport prior to deployment for all rates.

### **2. TRAINING**

- a. The lack of trained personnel left the battalion short on personnel to perform the duties at outlying detachment sites.
- b. Upon arrival in country, only a few ALFA personnel had been exposed to the key billet positions, and only a few personnel had been exposed to the paperwork side of the CM shop (i.e. parts look up and supply 1250 form completion). The lack of technicians trained in the paperwork process cost man-hours. The Cost Control clerk had to either take the time to train them or take time away from his duties to complete the paperwork for the technician.
- c. Teach the technicians on how to fill out all forms properly. Then have them teach any new people that come into the shop. Proper paper work is important for accurate logs and documentation (remember it is a legal document). Also, it is important for everyone to learn the systems, forms and procedures. Your shipmates need this knowledge in order to advance and to be productive.

### **3. EQUIPMENT**

- a. CESE Availability: Tractor Trailers
- b. There has been an inadequacy in the availability of 15, 18 and 20 ton Tractors. The mission dictated the need to move Class IV and CESE to outlying detachment sites. The extremely rough road conditions tend to put extreme stress on the trucks resulting in the need for maintenance outside of the normal PM cycle. At times when trucks were in need of repair there would not be enough tractors available to allow for time down to perform needed maintenance resulting in a need to find other means of transporting materials.
- c. Have a better understanding of the mission and increase CESE as needed to accomplish the mission keeping in mind that the harsh conditions are causing additional wear beyond the norm.

#### 4. EQUIPMENT

- a. CESE Availability: Forklifts
- b. There has been inadequate numbers of material handling equipment (MHE). The mission dictated the use of several 4K and 12K's to load trucks at the MLO locations as well as the need for MHE at detachment sites and project sites for off loading capabilities. The demand was so high at times that an area would be left without MHE and were waiting on others to complete their tasks. When MHE were in need of repair there would not be enough available to allow for downtime to perform required maintenance. There has also been a need for different types of MHE outside of just the 4K and 12K.
- c. Increase the number of 4K and 12K's assigned to the battalions. Add additional MHE such as 6K and 10K's.

#### 5. SUPPLY

- a. POL Ordering
- b. The lead time on supply items can be anywhere from 30 to 90 days. The possibility of running out of needed parts and/or POL was constant.
- c. Keep a good inventory of consumables (POL). There has been difficulty acquiring some of these products, especially hydraulic oil and grease tubes.

#### 6. SUPPLY

- a. Ordering Cleaning Material and Rags, Etc.
- b. These products are used often and very rarely mentioned when you are down to the last one or two of these products.
- c. Order supplies such as spray paint, rags, WD-40 and cleaners in advance.

## **SOURCE: MARINE ADVISORS**

The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation. This section provides future Marine Advisors a ready reference for improvement from a Marine Advisor perspective.

### **1. WEAPONS TRAINING**

- a. RSO&I Training conducted in Camp Moreell, Kuwait
- b. The weapons' training that was conducted upon arrival at Camp Moreell, Kuwait was not sufficient and should not have been conducted there. The practicality of the weapons training conducted at Camp Moreell was not applicable to a real world situation. MPRI Inc, a division of L3, is the company that runs the ranges in Kuwait and also teaches the vast majority of combat type shooting. The minimal amount of training that is received is not of any immediate benefit to our Seabees as they prepare to enter a fluid combat zone.
- c. The type of instruction received from MPRI can be received in the CONUS and should be part of the deployment work up, not part of the actual deployment. With proper planning ranges and instructors, it could be scheduled at Marine Corps ranges or Fort Hunter Liggett. Range staff from both Port Hueneme/Gulfport could also be sent to combat/tactical shooting instructor courses so there would be minimal reliance on other branches for the instruction. Increasing the range time to 5 full days would also enhance the lessons learned and thus allow a more confident Seabee to enter into a combat zone.

### **2. TRAINING LOCATIONS**

- a. A lack of proper training sites hampers training
- b. With the amount of Combat Security Element (CSE) movement and the delivery of class IV material, it is vital for Seabees of all rates to experience proper range and driving training. While there are no ranges close to Port Hueneme, there are excellent facilities available. Convoy and live fire training should not be limited to CSE members. Equipment Operators, Builders and other OF13 rates need to have this training. The mission also required that non-OF13 rates perform tasks such as driving trucks. Therefore, it would be prudent to ensure all personnel receive as much training as possible.
- c. The open space in 29 Palms and their combat town would be a great asset for such training. The combination of open terrain and the change to an urban setting mimics the driving conditions found in Iraq. The use of such an area would greatly enhance the overall teamwork and coordination within any Seabee battalion and allow for smoother convoy operations once in Iraq or any other combat environment. It is unknown what is available near Gulfport.

## **SOURCE: COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT**

The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation. This section provides future communications staff a ready reference for improvement from a communications perspective.

### **1. STAFFING**

- a. Communications Department staff on advance party
- b. Communications needs were not adequately considered or included in the planning process and no members were on the advance party. Communications assets and networks are too important to be addressed as a second or third-level consideration.
- c. The S6 and S6C should be decided well in advance of a deployment. Network Administration and password creation for the incoming unit is required on Day 1.

### **2. TRAINING**

- a. Network configuration and management system training prior to deployment
- b. The battalion's lack of trained Information Technicians on Seabee equipment impedes the mission due to the fact that non-IT rates are used to support computer network assets and Server systems.
- c. IT and ET rates need to be consolidated in the communications support shop and trained as hardware and software experts

### **3. EQUIPMENT**

- a. NMCI Assets in theatre
- b. NMCI assets are not usable on the tactical networks without a complete reinstallation of all software.
- c. Do not bring NMCI computer assets into theatre.

### **4. EQUIPMENT**

- a. Tactical Data Networks (TDN) are not rugged enough
- b. Current TDN servers are not field-hardened and lack the filters and environmental control systems to properly maintain them over extended use in adverse conditions.
- c. Systems need to be procured which are designed to withstand the tactical environment in which they are used. Commercially available environmental cabinets which contain air filter systems and air conditioners would greatly extend system life and usability.

### **5. TRAINING**

- a. Training by the NCF on TDN configuration, management and deployment
- b. There should be a series of schools for non-IT/ET rate Seabees that are assigned to a communications support role. A 1 to 2 week school teaching Microsoft Exchange Server management is not adequate training for someone expected to run a network.
- c. Teaching in stages is more effective for network administration training than a 2 week, one-time, crash course. Commercial training schools are a viable alternative to a formal military school for this knowledge.

## 6. STAFFING

- a. Communicators assigned from outside the communications department
- b. Having a communications department responsible for training and supplying all communicators would result in a more effective organization able to support all contingencies and provides more depth in the event of injury, sickness and/or demobilization. All communicators should be assigned to the communications department where they can be trained and rotated through watches at different stations.
- c. Wherever communications equipment goes so must a trained communicator on that equipment.

## 7. COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING

- a. Specific communications training deficiencies prior to deployment
- b. Communications support personnel were not trained in programming, troubleshooting or supporting any of the following; XTS-5000 hand held radios, ICE or Warlock systems and Blue Force Tracker. Training on the CYZ-10 just scratched the surface in 811.1. This device should have a class of its own just learning about configuring and transferring load sets, cloning units and proper paperwork maintenance for crypto.
- c. Send Seabees to the available Marine Corps and Army schools for these skills if the training is not offered by the NCF training commands.



## **SOURCE: ADMIN**

The format is (a) Item, (b) Discussion, (c) Recommendation. This section provides future administrative staff a ready reference for improvement from an administrative perspective.

### **1. PAY**

- a. Access to LES information
- b. Personnel should be monitoring their LES regularly so there are no surprises.
- c. All personnel should set up a MyPay pin to monitor LES information. It takes 6-8 weeks for tax-free status and SAVE pay to kick in. Inform Seabees to be patient.

### **2. PAY**

- a. Special Duty Pay for Independent Duty Corpsmen
- b. Active duty corpsmen may be entitled to SDAP if they are filling an IDC billet.
- c. Begin the paperwork immediately and send directly to BUPERS. Members need a page 13 entry and a letter signed by the Commanding Officer.

### **3. PAY**

- a. Benefits issues while deployed
- b. Fixing pay issues while deployed is difficult because all correspondence goes through Port Hueneme/Gulfport. Members may need to provide copies of lease/mortgage, divorce decrees, marriage licenses, child support papers, single parent dependent care certificates and family care plan certificates.
- c. Ensure that Seabees take care of all pay issues with PSD at Port Hueneme/Gulfport prior to departure.

### **4. NSIPS:**

- a. NSIPS access
- b. The Battalion Admin staff had no NSIPS access. All entries had to be made by the staff at Port Hueneme.
- c. Find a method for direct NSIPS access in theatre.

### **5. ORDERS**

- a. Requirement for Letter of Release by O-6 or above
- b. All personnel leaving Iraq need orders and a 'letter of release' signed by an O-6. This includes personnel traveling to Camp Moreell—even if they arrived here from Camp Moreell without orders. The Commanding Officer of the unit may be an O-5.
- c. Be aware of this administrative requirement. The Base chaplain's office can help in emergency leave cases.

### **6. EMERGENCY LEAVE**

- a. Red Cross Messages
- b. The Red Cross did not always send a message directly to us. Messages occasionally went to the Regiment, arrived at Camp Moreell, or even have been sent to the RSS back home. We tried to correct this but were unsuccessful.
- c. Advise family members to get the Red Cross Case Number when they report a situation to the Red Cross, and send this number to the Ombudsman, the S-1 or the member. This way we can contact the Red Cross directly and get them to read the message to us rather than wait for them to send it to us.

## 7. EMERGENCY LEAVE

- a. Travel and Paperwork Requirements
- b. Emergency Leave travel arrangements need to be made. As soon as the Red Cross message is received, contact your Port Hueneme/Gulfport Admin staff and Camp Moreell so they can begin making travel arrangements.
- c. Paperwork Requirements: Member needs:
  - 1) Orders
  - 2) Letter of release
  - 3) Copy of Red Cross Message
  - 4) Copy of p. 2
  - 5) Leave chit (7 or 10 days, depending on circumstances)

## 8. REENLISTMENTS

- a. Difficulties of Reenlisting in theatre
- b. All personnel should already have enough obligated service to complete their active duty recall tour here. However, there may be some who slipped through the cracks and whose reserve centers did not reenlist or extend them enough months. There is no financial incentive to reenlist in theatre, and all the documentation required to do the paperwork has to be gathered in Port Hueneme/Gulfport. Members should be warned that because they are temporarily on active duty, that there may be a delay in applying their reenlistment and any bonus when they return to reserve status.
- c. A command should set a policy on voluntary reenlistments while in theatre. Avoiding unnecessary reserves reenlistments while on active duty saves time and manpower.

## 9. AWARDS

- a. HHQ Expectations on Awards
- b. Make sure your BN staff understands the R1's expectations on awards: Who will be considered for a COMM or higher? What type of incident warrants a CAR submission?
- c. Read the recent ALMAR 010/06. Discuss awards process with the R1.

## 10. AWARDS

- a. Availability of Awards Items in Theatre
- b. The base exchanges may or may not always carry a large stock of Navy uniform items.
- c. Order all end of tour awards immediately. Order SCWS pins. Order crowns for personnel who you anticipate will be frocked or promoted through Command Advancement Program (CAP). Check with other bases to see which exchanges carry these items in country.

## 11. PCR

- a. Events that trigger a Personnel Casualty Report
- b. What constitutes a PCR? Does this include any injury that requires a MEDEVAC, or any injury that causes the member to miss work?
- c. Review the Regiment's policy on making Personnel Casualty Reports. Make sure the R1 shares his/her same expectations on what constitutes a reportable injury.

## 12. EVALS/FITREPS

- a. Completing blocks on forms correctly while on active duty
- b. Reservists do not often need to complete Evals and Fitreps for mobilization.
- c. There are standard items that must appear in certain blocks. Billet Subcategory: RESAC1 or RESAC6 (depending on how long mobilized). Duties: Include the following: MOB (365 days): OIF YYMMDD (Date Seabee Mobilized)

## **SOURCE: CHAPLAIN**

Lessons Learned are divided into Pre-Deployment and Deployment Categories. This section is listed in paragraph format vs. Idea/Discussion/Recommendation format of the other departments.

### **PRE-DEPLOYMENT**

1. Chaplain should be mobilized four to six weeks before Seabees are mobilized. An incredible amount of time was spent in pre-deployment counseling as well as making detachment site visits for pre-deployment preparedness briefs. Feedback on these briefs was very positive.
2. The pre-deployment guide should be distributed along with pre-deployment preparedness briefs and/or family days so information can be distributed and questions/issues resolved prior to separation from loved ones. A guide supplement could later be produced and distributed with information unknown at that time such as postal information, more specific contact info, etc.
3. A professional web site should be established and working before deployment so it can be immediately populated with information as it becomes available. Pictures and stories immediately published on the site would curb anxieties held by the family members and be a morale builder for both members and their families.

### **DEPLOYMENT**

1. There were no religious supplies staged at Port Hueneme for the Battalion. Religious supplies were available at the RSS & staged at Camp Moreell, as well as forward at Al Asad. However, there were not adequate supplies at Port Hueneme to fill expressed needs. Due to the extended amount of time the Battalion stayed there, a two month supply is recommended at Port Hueneme.
2. A more thorough plan on how to handle Red Cross messages should be developed prior to arriving at Port Hueneme. The administrative process of handling emergency messages and/or emergency leave is not the responsibility of the chaplain. The chaplain's primary role is to console and potentially counsel members after having received news of a situation back home. The chaplain can be available to accompany the chain of command in delivering the information to the member, but like CACO calls, is not the official party who delivers it.
3. Due to warrior transition responsibilities of the outgoing chaplain, and the ramp-up responsibilities of the incoming chaplain, a face-to-face turnover between the two is an extreme challenge. It is recommended that the incoming chaplain arrive with main body. Both chaplains should coordinate with their respective commands to make sure a turnover is accomplished.