Return to Naval Historical
Center home page. 
Return to Naval Historical
Center home page. by Mark L. Hayes, Early History Branch, Naval Historical Center
Paper presented at Congreso Internacional Ejército y Armada
en El 98:
Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas on 23 March 1998.
The
United States Navy, much like the nation itself, was in a state
of transition in 1898. Traditionally the navy embraced a defensive
strategy with an emphasis on commerce raiding. In contrast, the
navy was asked during the Spanish-American War to gain control
of the waters around the Philippine Islands and the Caribbean
Sea. After twenty years of rapid decline into obsolescence following
the American Civil War, the navy was in the process of re-equipping
itself with steel warships of modern design. The implications
of these changes for the conduct of war at sea were not lost on
America's naval leadership, who had spent the years and months
prior to the war with Spain preparing for conflict with a European
power. However, the war itself revealed the growing tactical and
logistical complexities of modern naval warfare, and the U.S.
Navy, like all navies, was in the process of overcoming the challenges
presented by the technology of the new steel warships.
The
U.S. Navy had in commission over 600 vessels at the close of the
American Civil War. Nearly all of the new ships were wartime purchases,
hasty constructions, or made from unseasoned timber. After the
war, most were sold off or destroyed. In spite of international
crises such as the Virginius Affair in 1873, contention
with Great Britain over the Alabama Claims, and problems
with France over a projected canal in Panama, the strength of
the navy continued to decline. By 1879 only forty-eight of the
navy's 142 vessels were available for immediate service, and these
were obsolete wooden or old ironclad ships. Naval technology had
stagnated in the U.S., illustrated by the fact that there was
not a single high-power, long-range rifled gun in the entire fleet.
In 1884 the U.S. Navy's newest ships were wooden-hulled steam
sloops built in the previous decade.1
Modernization
began during the administration of President Chester Arthur in
the early 1880s. Rapid growth in overseas markets and a foreign
policy aimed at U.S. control of communications across the isthmus
of Central America drove the country towards naval expansion.
President Arthur addressed a receptive Congress in his first annual
message when he concluded, "I cannot too strongly urge upon
you my conviction, that every consideration of national safety,
economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation
of the navy."2 Two years
of debate on the nature of this expansion culminated with the
Navy Act of 1883, authorizing the construction of the steel cruisers
Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, and the dispatch
vessel Dolphin. Congress continued the process by approving
additional steel warships, including the New Navy's first armored
ships, USS Texas and USS Maine. Toward the end of
the decade the U.S. Navy still embraced a defensive oriented strategy
with cruisers designed for commerce protection and raiding. Even
the armored ships under construction were designed to counter
the threat of similar vessels in South American navies.3
It
was during the administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-93) that
the navy's strategy and policy began to change. In his inaugural
address, President Harrison called for the continued and rapid
construction of modern warships, and the acquisition of bases
to maintain the U.S. fleet in foreign seas. Later he urged Congress
to authorize construction of battleships, giving support to Secretary
of the Navy B.F. Tracy's goal of making the U.S. fleet strong
enough "to be able to divert an enemy's force from our coast
by threatening his own, for a war, though defensive in principle,
may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its operations."4 Tracy proved to be an excellent
administrator, and he marshaled allies for his expansionist policies
in both Congress and the navy, including Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan. Their work bore fruit with the Navy Bill of 30 June 1890,
authorizing construction of three battleships later named Indiana,
Oregon, and Massachusetts. Along with the battleship
Iowa, authorized in 1892, this force formed the core of
a new fleet willing to challenge European navies for control of
the waters in the Western Hemisphere.
While
civilian leadership and U.S. industry prepared the navy materially
for an offensive war, a new institution, the Naval War College,
prepared the service intellectually. Founded in 1884 and placed
under the direction of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, the War College
contributed greatly to the professionalization of the U.S. Naval
Officer Corps at the end of the nineteenth century. Explaining
to the Senate the reason for creating the institution, Secretary
of the Navy William E. Chandler stated that "the constant
changes in the methods of conducting naval warfare imposed by
the introduction of armored ships, swift cruisers, rams, sea-going
torpedo boats, and high- power guns. . .render imperative the
establishment of a school where our officers may be enabled to
keep abreast of the improvements going on in every navy in the
world."5
By
the 1890s the curriculum at the War College included training
problems where students drafted plans for operations in the event
of war with specific countries under particular circumstances.
Beginning in 1894 the War College, and later special boards convened
by the Secretary of the Navy, examined the possibility of war
with Spain over trouble in Cuba. When Secretary of the Navy John
Long formed the Naval War Board in March 1898, the Navy Department
and the McKinley administration had the benefit of four years
of planning for such a conflict. The first plan to emerge from
the Naval War College was a paper prepared in 1894 by Lieutenant
Commander Charles J. Train who was assigned to write on "Strategy
in the Event of War with Spain." Train believed that the
first priority of the U.S. Navy was the destruction of the Spanish
fleet which should be accomplished at the earliest possible date.
The plan called for the seizure of Nipe Bay on Cuba's northeast
coast as an anchorage and coaling station to support a blockade
of the island's principal ports. It was expected that a Spanish
expedition from Cadiz would attempt to relieve Cuba via Puerto
Rico, but would be met by a concentrated U.S. fleet ready to defeat
it.6
When
the Cuban insurrection broke out the following year, the officers
in charge at the Naval War College believed that it was important
to undertake a full-scale study of a Spanish-American conflict.
They gave the class of 1895 a "special problem" concerning
war with Spain where the objective was to secure independence
for Cuba. The plan, submitted to the Navy Department in January
1896, called for an early joint operations against Havana. Thirty
thousand regulars would be landed near the colonial capital from
a staging area in Tampa, Florida, fifteen days after war was declared,
followed by 25,000 volunteers two weeks later. The U.S. fleet,
based out of Key West, would intercept any Spanish expedition
attempting to reinforce the defenders in Cuba. Such a relief attempt
was expected thirty days into the conflict.7
The
Office of Naval Intelligence entered the planning effort later
in 1896. Lieutenant William Kimball prepared a plan that focussed
on a tight naval blockade of Cuba as the primary means of persuading
Spain to release control of her colony. Supporting attacks against
Manila and the Spanish coast would, it was believed, further induce
Spain to negotiate an end to the conflict. According to Kimball's
plan, only if these efforts failed to bring about peace, would
the army land in Cuba and operate against Havana. The Naval War
College criticized the plan on the grounds that it dispersed U.S.
naval strength to a dangerous extent, and warned that a blockade
alone would be insufficient to bring Spain to the negotiating
table. The proposed expedition to Spanish waters was thought to
be counter-productive as it might harden Spanish resolve and invite
unwanted diplomatic pressure from other European countries. However,
Captain Henry Taylor, president of the War College, endorsed the
idea to use the Asiatic Squadron against Spanish forces in the
Philippines, and this element would reappear in later plans.8
Rear
Admiral Francis M. Ramsay, chief of the influential Bureau of
Navigation, had long been an strong opponent of the Naval War
College, and it is likely that he was the one who persuaded Secretary
of the Navy Hilary Herbert to convene a board in the summer of
1896 to draft a separate plan for war with Spain. Like the Kimball
plan, the Ramsay Board focused on the a naval blockade, but added
the deep water ports of Puerto Rico to those of Cuba. The destruction
of crops in Cuba by both sides led the Board to believe that the
Spanish garrison needed to import food in order to survive. A
relief force from Spain would consume most of its coal simply
in crossing the Atlantic and thus would be in no position to engage
American naval forces. Although the present strength of the U.S.
Navy was sufficient to meet and defeat any fleet arriving from
Spain, the Board called for the purchase of a number of small
fast steamers to enforce the blockade. Finally, the European Squadron
should be reinforced by ships from the U.S. and the Asiatic Squadron,
and together operate against the Spanish coast after capturing
the Canary Islands as an advance base. Captain Taylor strongly
dissented from the views of the Board stating that large operations
in Spanish waters were too dangerous, and that a naval blockade
would not be sufficient to subdue Spanish forces in Cuba.9
Perhaps
confused by the different positions in the existing plans, the
new Secretary of the Navy, John Long, convened his own War Planning
Board under Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Station,
Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in June 1897. Chief Intelligence
Officer Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright was the only member
who had served on the previous board. The Sicard Board endorsed
the War College idea that joint operations against Havana would
be necessary to end the war. Therefore, the plan called for the
early seizure of Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, to serve
as a base of operations against the latter, and to deliver arms
to the Cuban insurgents. Purchased or chartered merchant steamers
were to be armed and sent to the Caribbean to enforce a swift
and strong blockade. This would also free the heavier ships to
intercept a relief force from Spain. The members emphasized the
need for colliers to refuel the fleet on blockade rather than
forcing vessels to return to coaling stations. Although the Board
rejected the idea of trying to capture the Canary Islands, it
recommended the formation of a flying squadron consisting of two
armored cruisers and two commerce destroyers to operate on the
coast of Spain in order to detain Spanish ships in home waters.
The plan called for the reduction and garrisoning of the principal
ports of Puerto Rico as soon as circumstances permitted. The Board
also returned to the idea of using the Asiatic Squadron against
Spanish forces in the Philippines. As in the previous plans, the
objects of these operations were to tie down or divert enemy ships
and to give the United States' a stronger bargaining position
at the peace settlement.10
When
war between the United States and Spain appeared unavoidable following
the destruction of USS Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February
1898, the Navy Department had a solid body of plans and documents
honed by four years of debate by its leading officers. Although
the realities of war would force several modifications, many of
the concepts laid out in the Sicard Plan were implemented: a strong
blockade of Cuba; support for the insurgents; operations against
Spanish forces in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; and the formation
of a squadron to operate in Spanish waters. Perhaps more importantly,
nearly every plan called for the purchase or charter of merchant
vessels to serve as auxiliary cruisers, colliers, and transports.
The data furnished in appended lists and the inspiration to act
quickly served as a basis for decision making in those crucial
weeks prior to war.
At
the beginning of 1898 the fleet of the United States Navy consisted
of six battleships, two armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers,
six steel monitors, eight old iron monitors, thirty- three unprotected
cruisers and gunboats, six torpedo boats, and twelve tugs.11 Noticeably absent from this list
are colliers, supply vessels, transports, hospital ships, repair
ships, and the large number of small vessels necessary for maintaining
an effective blockade of Cuba's numerous ports. As the Navy Department's
war plans clearly indicated, the government would need to purchase
or contract for scores of ships in the event of war with a naval
power. The destruction of the Maine propelled the department
into action. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt
organized a Board of Auxiliary Vessels which, utilizing material
in the department's war plans, prepared a list of suitable private
craft that would meet the Navy's expanded needs. On 9 March Congress
passed a $50 million emergency defense appropriation bill, and
the Navy Department began to acquire vessels. By the end of the
war, the navy had purchased or leased 103 warships and auxiliaries.
Another twenty-eight vessels were added from existing government
organizations including revenue cutters, lighthouse tenders, and
the vessels of the Fish Commission. After the war auxiliary vessels
such as colliers, refrigerator ships, and distilling ships became
a permanent part of the fleet.12
The
availability of coal was the single most important factor in determining
naval operations in 1898. A lack of coal severely limited Admiral
Cervera's options upon arriving in the Caribbean with his Spanish
squadron in the middle of May, and American concerns over coaling
nearly allowed him to escape from Santiago de Cuba near the end
of the month. There were essentially three sources of fuel available
for naval squadrons: coaling stations at friendly bases, neutral
ports, and other ships (usually colliers). Key West served as
the base for U.S. naval operations in the Caribbean. International
law permitted, but did not require, neutrals to provide visiting
ships of belligerents just enough coal to allow them to make it
to the nearest friendly port, but this was an option of last resort.
Colliers were the most common source of fuel for vessels of the
fleet blockading Cuba. Six were available to the U.S. fleet early
in the war, and an additional eleven were purchased by the end.
The
endurance of a ship depended on a number of circumstances, such
as bunker capacity, the amount of coal stored on deck, the quality
of coal, how many boilers were lit, and the ship's speed while
under way. Most major warships of the U.S. fleet had an operational
range in the neighborhood of 4000 nautical miles, or just over
two weeks of continuous steaming at ten knots.13
Naturally, ships' commanding officers were reluctant to allow
their bunkers to get anywhere near empty, and they availed themselves
of nearly every opportunity to add to their supply of coal.
Coaling
from open lighters in port was the quickest and most efficient
means of refueling a ship. Winches set up on the warships hauled
the coal on board in bags, where small carts carried them to the
coal chutes leading from the upper deck directly to the bunkers.
When coaling from colliers it was best to find a sheltered anchorage
safe from the effects of rough seas. Coaling in the open sea with
a ship alongside was always considered a dangerous evolution.
Colliers were equipped with cotton-bale fenders to protect the
ships when the motion was slight. However, any situation where
the swell was sufficient to cause either ship to roll more than
three or four degrees or rise more than one or two feet was considered
too dangerous to attempt. There were many occasions when coaling
at sea was simply not possible, and perhaps many more where it
was considered problematic. The speed with which coal could be
taken on board varied widely, most often dependent on the weather.
On 31 May USS Brooklyn took on coal at a rate of eighteen
tons per hour, while eight days later she achieved a rate of nearly
fifty-seven tons per hour. The weather rarely cooperated long
enough for more than a few hundred tons to be loaded on board
before rising seas called a halt to the operation.14
It is important to have an appreciation of the problems
inherent in refueling warships of the day for a proper perspective
on strategic and operational decisions made during the war.
Secretary
Long formally organized the Naval War Board in March 1898 to advise
him on strategy and operations. Initial members were Assistant
Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard (who
had just arrived from command of the North Atlantic Station),
Captain Arent S. Crowninshield, and Captain Albert S. Barker.
By May, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan joined the organization. Roosevelt
left to become a lieutenant colonel in the First Volunteer Cavalry
Regiment, and the Navy Department reassigned Captain Barker to
command USS Newark. Although it had no executive authority,
the Board exerted considerable influence on operations through
its advisory capacity. In particular, Mahan's views often dominated.
Following earlier war plans, the Board recommended concentrating
on Spain's outlying possessions with a close blockade of Cuba,
giving the army time to mobilize sufficient strength for land
campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico.15
As
the Navy Department worked with the president and the War Department
in developing strategy, Secretary Long began repositioning naval
units in preparation of the opening of hostilities. Since January,
much of the North Atlantic Squadron had been concentrated for
winter exercises at Key West, Florida. The first colliers did
not reach the fleet until 3 May, nearly two weeks after the blockade
began. On 17 March the battleships Massachusetts and Texas
were ordered to join the armored cruiser Brooklyn at Hampton
Roads, Virginia, to form the Flying Squadron under Commodore Winfield
Scott Schley. The protected cruisers Minneapolis and Columbia
joined Schley's force prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The
squadron was organized to protect the U.S. coast against a sudden
descent by the Spanish armored cruisers of Pascual Cervera's squadron,
known to be concentrating in the Cape Verde Islands. The Navy
Department recalled the protected cruiser USS San Francisco
and Commodore John A. Howell from Europe. On 20 April Howell assumed
command of the newly formed Northern Patrol Squadron, which was
responsible for the protection of the coast and coastal trade
from the Delaware capes to Bar Harbor, Maine. Rear Admiral Henry
Erben commanded the Auxiliary Naval Force with his headquarters
on shore at New York City. This command consisted primarily of
eight old iron monitors stationed at several U.S. ports.16
Assistant
Secretary Roosevelt sent a telegraphic order to Commodore George
Dewey on 25 February commanding him to concentrate the ships of
the Asiatic Station at Hong Kong. In the event of war he was to
take his squadron and destroy the Spanish ships in Philippine
waters. Dewey's command at Hong Kong consisted of the protected
cruisers Olympia, Boston, and Raleigh, and
the gunboats Concord and Petrel. The Revenue Cutter
McCulloch joined the force on 17 April, and the protected
cruiser Baltimore arrived on 22 April. Dewey also prepared
for future operations in a region without friendly bases by purchasing
the British steamers Nanshan and Zafiro to carry
coal and supplies for his squadron.17
Anticipating
a showdown with Spanish fleet in the Atlantic theater, Secretary
Long ordered the battleship USS Oregon to depart from its
home port at Bremerton, Washington, for San Francisco, California,
on 7 March, to begin the first leg of a 14,700 nautical mile journey
to Key West. The gunboat USS Marietta made the battleship's
voyage quicker and easier by arranging for coal and supplies in
South American ports along the way. The Oregon left San
Francisco on 19 March, under the command of Captain Charles E.
Clark, and arrived at Callao, Peru, on 4 April, traveling 4800
miles in just sixteen days. The battleship departed Callao on
7 April, and arrived at Sandy Point at the southern tip of the
continent ten days later. Rendezvousing with the Marietta on
21 April, the Oregon headed north, putting into Rio de
Janeiro on 30 April, where Secretary Long warned Captain Clark
that Admiral Cervera's squadron was at sea. Departing Rio on 5
May, the American battleship arrived at Bahia, Brazil, three days
later. Not wishing to submerge his ship's armor belt in case of
an encounter with the Spanish squadron, Clark ordered on board
only enough coal to reach Barbados, where he arrived on 18 May.
The Oregon steamed into the American base at Key West on
26 May in efficient condition and ready for operations against
the Spanish fleet.18
Although
President McKinley continued to press for a diplomatic settlement
to the Cuban problem, he accelerated military preparations begun
in January when an impasse appeared likely. McKinley asked Congress
on 11 April for permission to intervene in Cuba. On 21 April,
the President ordered the Navy to begin the blockade of Cuba,
and Spain followed with a declaration of war on 23 April. Congress
responded with a formal declaration of war on 25 April, made retroactive
to the start of the blockade.
International
law required a blockade to be effective in order to be legal.
With the absence of colliers and the Atlantic fleet divided between
Key West and Hampton Roads, the American effort was initially
limited to the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia
Honda, and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The U.S. fleet at Key
West at the beginning of hostilities consisted of three armored
ships, three monitors, one protected cruiser, two unprotected
cruisers, seven gunboats, one armed yacht, six torpedo boats,
and five armed tugs. In the early light of 22 April, Sampson's
fleet deployed from Key West to steam across the Florida Straits
and begin the blockade. Sampson believed he could reduce the defenses
of Havana by rolling up the Spanish fortifications from the west.
However, Secretary Long, following the advice of the Naval War
Board, ordered him not to risk his armored ships unnecessarily
against land fortifications in light of Cervera's potential deployment
to the Caribbean. The Navy Department was considering occupying
the port of Matanzas, garrisoning it with a large military force,
and opening communications with the insurgents. Long wanted Sampson
to keep his most powerful ships ready to escort the transports
if McKinley should decide on an early landing in Cuba.19
By
the morning of 23 April the advance ships of the blockading fleet
were off their assigned ports. Additional vessels reinforced them
over the next several days. The U.S. Navy struggled during the
first weeks of the war to assemble the logistical apparatus necessary
to support the blockade. Ships had to keep steam up in their boilers
to pursue unknown vessels as they came into sight. Until colliers
were fitted out and sent south, most of the blockading ships were
forced to return to Key West to coal. Fresh water and food were
also in short supply during the early days of the war.
The
blockade was monotonous duty broken only by the rare capture of
a Spanish vessel or an exchange of gunfire with gunboats and batteries.
Although the Navy Department prohibited Sampson's vessels from
engaging heavy batteries, like those around Havana, they allowed
the bombardment of smaller field works. On 27 April the New
York, Puritan, and Cincinnati shelled Point
Gorda at Matanzas to prevent the completion of new batteries.20 Most encounters were only skirmishes
resulting in few if any casualties.
A
few actions were intense, such as the one at Cardenas on 11 May
when the U.S. Navy gunboat Wilmington, the torpedo boat
Winslow, and the Revenue Cutter Hudson were drawn
deep into the harbor by Spanish gunboats. Hidden Spanish batteries
ambushed the Winslow, severely damaging her, killing ten
and wounding twenty-one of her crew. While under heavy fire the
Hudson towed the torpedo boat out of the harbor as the
Wilmington covered the withdrawal with rapid fire against
the Spanish guns.21
The
U.S. blockading forces also undertook operations to isolate Cuba
from telegraphic communications to Madrid via Cienfuegos, Santiago,
and Guantanamo. The most celebrated action of this type occurred
on 11 May off Cienfuegos. Commander Bowman McCalla of the cruiser
Marblehead organized the party and planned the operation
to cut the underwater cables leaving the city. Marine sharpshooters
and machine guns in steam cutters poured a continuous fire into
Spanish positions on shore, along with gunfire support from the
Marblehead and the gunboat Nashville, while sailors
in launches dragged the sea floor with grapelling hooks for the
cables. The launch and cutter crews endured heavy Spanish fire
for three hours and cut the two main telegraph cables (leaving
a third, local line), and dragged the ends out to sea. Every member
of this expedition was awarded the Medal of Honor.22
The
strength of the North Atlantic Fleet and the effectiveness of
the blockade grew as U.S. Navy vessels concentrated in the Caribbean
and yards converted and armed vessels purchased by the Congressional
Bill of 9 March. From the start of the blockade until the capitulation
of Santiago de Cuba in mid-July, the North Atlantic Fleet added
to its strength three battleships, one armored cruiser, one monitor,
five protected cruisers, one unprotected cruiser, seven auxiliary
cruisers, four gunboats, two torpedo boats, five armed tugs, six
revenue cutters, nine armed yachts, two supply ships, a hospital
ship, a repair ship, a distilling ship, and thirteen colliers.23
Secretary
Long telegraphed Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong on 21 April informing
him that the U.S. blockade of Cuba had begun and that war was
expected at any moment. On 24 April, British authorities informed
the commodore that war had been declared and he must leave the
neutral port within twenty-four hours. Dewey also received a telegram
from the Navy Department, instructing him to proceed immediately
to the Philippine Islands and begin operations against the Spanish
fleet. However, Dewey wanted to receive the latest intelligence
from the American consul at Manila, Oscar Williams, who was expected
daily. The American squadron moved to Mirs Bay on the Chinese
coast thirty miles east of Hong Kong to await a circulating pump
for the Raleigh and the arrival of Williams. They spent
two days drilling, distributing ammunition, and stripping the
ships of all wooden articles (which could add to the damage of
fires on board ship caused by enemy gunfire). Almost immediately
after Williams arrived on 27 April, the American squadron departed
for the Philippines, in search of the ships of the Spanish squadron.
The consul correctly informed Dewey that Rear Admiral Patricio
Montojo y Pasaron intended to take his ships to Subic Bay. What
Williams did not know is that Montojo returned to Manila after
taking his squadron to Subic Bay only to discover that the defenses
he had hoped to fight under were far from complete.24
Dewey
sent two of his cruisers to reconnoiter Subic Bay on 30 April.
Finding it empty, and in defiance of the reports of mines in the
channel, the Americans pressed on into Manila Bay and discovered
the Spanish squadron near Cavite. Leaving his two auxiliaries
in the bay guarded by the McCulloch, Dewey formed his remaining
ships into a line and steamed in a oval pattern along the five-fathom
curve, pouring a heavy fire into the outgunned Spanish force.
Montojo's gunners replied from their ships and two 5.9 inch guns
on Sangley Point, but with little effect. The Americans scored
critical hits on the larger Spanish warships, setting them ablaze.
After nearly two hours of fire, Dewey ordered his captains to
withdraw, acting on reports that his ships were running low on
ammunition.25
Dewey
took his squadron five miles off Sangley Point and signaled his
captains to come on board and report their condition. The commodore
discovered that his squadron had sustained very little damage
and that he had plenty of ammunition to continue the battle. After
allowing the crewmen of his ships to enjoy a light meal, Dewey
ordered his ships to reengage the remnants of Montojo's shattered
squadron. The Spanish admiral had pulled his surviving vessels
behind Cavite into the shallow waters of Bacoor Bay to make a
final stand. Hitting the Spanish ships in their new anchorage
proved difficult, and Dewey ordered the gunboats Concord
and Petrel, with their shallow draft, to destroy them at
close range. The garrison at Cavite raised a white flag at about
12:15, and the firing ended shortly thereafter.
Montojo's
fleet was destroyed, suffering 371 casualties compared to only
nine Americans wounded. When official word on the magnitude of
the Navy's victory reached the United States, nearly a week later,
the American public heaped enthusiastic praises on Dewey as wild
celebrations erupted throughout the country. Meanwhile, the U.S.
squadron took control of the arsenal and navy yard at Cavite.
However, 26,000 Spanish regulars and 14,000 militia garrisoned
various points in the Philippine Islands including 9000 at Manila.
Dewey cabled Washington stating that, although he controlled Manila
Bay and could probably induce the city to surrender, he requested
5000 men to seize Manila.26
Admiral
Cervera had repeatedly warned the Spanish Ministry of Marine that
his squadron would face certain destruction if sent to the Caribbean.
Even so, he departed the Cape Verde Islands under orders on 29
April with his squadron of four armored cruisers, towing three
torpedo-boat destroyers, intending to steam for Puerto Rico. To
look for the Spanish squadron, the U.S. Navy Department had three
fast former mail steamers, Harvard, Yale, and St.
Louis, establish a patrol line stretching from Puerto Rico
and along the Leeward and Windward Islands. As long as Cervera's
location remained uncertain, the strength of the U.S. fleet would
be divided between Rear Admiral Sampson's North Atlantic Fleet
based in Key West and Commodore Schley's Flying Squadron based
in Hampton Roads; the former to maintain the blockade of Cuba
and the latter to guard the east coast of the United States from
a sudden descent by the Spanish cruisers.27
Sampson
correctly deduced that Cervera intended to make for San Juan,
Puerto Rico, and he determined to deprive the Spanish fleet of
the benefits of that port. Leaving his smaller ships to maintain
the blockade of Cuba's northern ports, the American admiral embarked
on an eight-day journey, plagued by the slow speed and mechanical
unreliability of his two monitors. The American force arrived
off San Juan early on 12 May. After a nearly four-hour bombardment
of the Spanish works, Sampson broke off the engagement and returned
to Key West, satisfied that Cervera's ships were not in San Juan.28
The
Spanish squadron's crossing of the Atlantic had been slowed by
the need to tow the fragile destroyers. As he approached the West
Indies, the Spanish admiral dispatched two of these vessels to
the French island of Martinique to gain information on American
movements and the availability of coal. On 12 May Cervera learned
that Sampson was at San Juan. The Spanish admiral also discovered
that the French had refused to sell him any coal. Driven by the
need to refuel his ships and the desire to avoid combat with a
superior American squadron, Cervera steamed for the Dutch harbor
of Curaçao. He arrived there on 14 May only to be further
disappointed when the expected Spanish collier failed to arrive,
and the Dutch governor authorized the purchase of only 600 tons
of coal. After considering his options, Cervera chose to take
his fleet to Santiago de Cuba where he arrived on the morning
of 19 May.29
With
Sampson out of touch for long periods during his return from Puerto
Rico, the Navy Department on 13 May ordered Commodore Schley's
Flying Squadron to Charleston, South Carolina, in preparation
to intercept the Spanish fleet. Further orders directed Schley
to Key West and a meeting with Rear Admiral Sampson. The Navy
Department believed that Cervera's most likely objective was Cienfuegos
because of its rail connection to Havana. Therefore, after arriving
in Key West on 18 May, Schley received orders to take his squadron,
reinforced by the battleship Iowa and several small vessels,
and proceed to Cienfuegos. On 19 May, after Schley left on his
mission, the White House received a report that the Spanish ships
had run into Santiago de Cuba. The source of this information
was Domingo Villaverde, an agent working as a telegraph operator
in the governor-general's palace in Havana. This connection was
a closely guarded secret, so when the information reached the
Navy Department as an unconfirmed report, Long's telegram to Sampson
sounded less than certain.30
Sampson
forwarded Long's notice to Schley along with his own decision
to maintain the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos, believing that
even if Cervera had put into Santiago, he would have to bring
his squadron west to deliver the munitions thought to be an essential
part of his mission. USS Minneapolis and the St. Paul
were sent to Santiago to confirm the presence of the Spanish squadron,
and Sampson instructed Schley to keep in communication with them.
On 20 May Sampson received a report from the assistant chief of
staff at Key West confirming the previous report from Washington
that the Spanish squadron had put into Santiago. He then sent
orders instructing Schley to proceed to Santiago if he was satisfied
that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. On 21 May Sampson sent the
collier Merrimac with 4500 tons of coal to Schley's support.
Two days later the rear admiral departed Key West and cruised
in the Bahama Channel with a force of thirteen ships to block
any attempt by Cervera to enter Havana from the north side of
the island. As additional information arrived at the Navy Department
confirming Cervera's presence at Santiago, Long and Sampson dispatched
several messages encouraging Schley to proceed to that port and
prevent the Spanish squadron from escaping.31
The
Flying Squadron arrived off Cienfuegos early on the morning of
22 May when Schley received the first notice that the Spanish
squadron might be at Santiago. The following day he received the
second. However, the initial uncertainty of the Spanish squadron's
whereabouts and the difficulty of observing ships in Cienfuegos
led Schley to remain where he was. Finally, on 24 May, the commodore
learned through Cuban insurgents that Cervera's ships were not
in port. That evening the American squadron headed east, two days
later than Sampson expected.32
In
his message informing Sampson of his departure Schley stated that
he was concerned about having a sufficient supply of coal in his
warships. The Iowa had arrived off Cienfuegos with half
her capacity, and on 23 May she took on just 255 tons more. The
Texas was also short of coal, and her projecting sponsons
made coaling at sea almost impossible. The one collier then with
the squadron was insufficient to coal enough ships when the weather
afforded an opportunity. Schley informed Sampson that these concerns
and his desire to coal his ships at a protected anchorage led
him to choose Môle St. Nicolas, Haiti, as his next destination.33
The
Flying Squadron arrived at the longitude of Santiago on 26 May,
and Schley communicated with the American cruisers watching the
port. Engine problems on the collier Merrimac caused the
squadron to average only seven knots in its journey from Cienfuegos.
The weather had been too rough to allow coaling at sea and several
of his smaller vessels in addition to the Texas were running
low on fuel. Rather than remaining on station with his larger
ships and trusting Sampson to supply him what he needed, Schley
ordered his squadron to head west for Key West to refuel. Sampson,
who had since returned to Key West, and Secretary Long were shocked
when they learned of Schley's intentions on 28 May. Making it
clear that he and the Navy Department expected the Flying Squadron
to remain on station, Sampson assembled his squadron and departed
for Santiago. On 27 May the weather off the south coast of Cuba
improved, and Schley reversed course once again, finally establishing
a blockade at Santiago de Cuba on 29 May.34
Schley's
coaling problems impressed on Sampson and the Navy Department
the need to seize a sheltered anchorage on the south coast of
Cuba, and Guantánamo Bay had already been considered. Shortly
after Schley established the blockade of Santiago Sampson ordered
the First Marine Battalion at Key West to embark on their transports
and prepare to land in Cuba. At the same time he sent Commander
Bowman McCalla and USS Marblehead to reconnoiter Guantánamo
Bay as a possible anchorage. McCalla's report was favorable, and
on 10 June the Marine battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Robert
Huntington landed, establishing a position on the east side of
the outer harbor that served to protect the fleet during its coaling
operations throughout the campaign.35
Having a reliable location to refuel so close to Santiago
proved invaluable to the blockading fleet. It allowed American
captains to keep steam up in their ships' boilers ready to pursue
Cervera's squadron when it attempted to break out. On the morning
of 3 July, the battleship Oregon had all four boilers lit,
giving her the speed necessary to catch the Cristobal Colon
in the running fight during the final stage of the Battle of Santiago
de Cuba. This high rate of coal consumption could be maintained
because the Oregon was able to refuel four times from 1
June to 3 July, once at sea and three times at Guantánamo
Bay.36
Although
McKinley and his advisors had intended to wait until the end of
the rainy season to send a major land expedition to Cuba, they
believed that the bottling up of the Spanish squadron at Santiago
afforded the U.S. an opportunity to strike a damaging blow to
the enemy's military capability in the Caribbean. On 1 June Sampson
received a report from Secretary Long that 25,000 men under Major
General William Shafter were preparing to embark for Cuba from
Tampa, Florida, and that the North Atlantic Fleet should convoy
the troops and assist the landing near Santiago. As the navy prepared
to carry the troops, Sampson took steps to tighten the blockade
of Cervera's squadron.
At
the onset of the campaign Sampson seized on the idea to sink a
vessel in the narrow channel leading to the harbor of Santiago.
His intention was to keep the Spanish ships from escaping until
the army could capture the city or assist the navy in passing
the forts and mines at the harbor entrance. The Naval War Board
in Washington approved, and Sampson selected the collier Merrimac
under naval constructor Richard Pearson Hobson for the operation.
Hobson and seven volunteers took the ship into the channel during
the early morning hours of 3 June. Spanish gunfire from shore
batteries shot away the vessel's steering gear and anchor chains
making it impossible for the Americans to sink the vessel in the
proper location. Only two of the ten prepared scuttling charges
went off, and the Merrimac came to rest too far up the
channel to pose a serious obstacle. Hobson and his men were captured
by the Spanish.37
Major
General Shafter's troop transports departed Tampa on 14 June,
rendezvousing with their navy escorts the following day. The expedition
arrived off Santiago on 20 June and began to disembark east of
the city at Daiquiri two days later. In addition to providing
escort for the convoy, Sampson's ships furnished fifty-two steam
launches, sailing launches, whaleboats, lifeboats, and cutters
to help the army and its equipment ashore. Shafter expressed deep
appreciation for the navy's assistance in this matter, as the
boats on the army's transports were too few in number to disembark
the expedition in any reasonable length of time.38
Sampson's
armored ships maintained a tight blockade of Santiago de Cuba,
coaling from colliers in open water when the seas were calm and
from colliers at Guantánamo Bay when the weather required
it. On the morning of 3 July, Admiral Cervera attempted to break
out of the American blockade thus precipitating the Battle of
Santiago de Cuba. Off the entrance to the bay that morning were
the battleships Texas, Oregon, Iowa, and
Indiana, the armored cruiser Brooklyn, and the armed
yachts Vixen and Gloucester. Most of the battle
was a running fight as the blockading vessels attempted to get
enough steam up to keep up with their quarry. Foul bottoms and
poor quality coal reduced the speeds of the usually swift Spanish
cruisers. Ranges were often in excess of 4000 yards: greater than
the crews trained for and longer than the new rangefinders could
handle. In addition, radical turns in the early stages of the
battle further complicated the gunnery problem for the Americans.
Smoke from the weapons' brown powder and frequent mechanical failures
further reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's gunfire.
The battleships and the Brooklyn generally registered hits
when they achieved a parallel or near parallel course with the
Spanish cruisers and maintained it for several minutes. Although
only 1.29 percent of American shots hit their targets, the volume
of fire was sufficient to destroy or run aground each one of Cervera's
vessels.39 The defeat of this squadron
freed President McKinley and the Navy Department to pursue other
plans.
In
the years prior to the war, U.S. planning boards had never reached
a consensus on the issue of deploying a squadron of warships to
European waters. Although the Naval War Board had not ordinally
planned such a deployment, the formation of the Spanish Navy's
Reserve Squadron resurrected the debate. Following the departure
of Cervera's squadron to the Caribbean, the Ministry of Marine
began to organize a second squadron under Rear Admiral Manuel
de la Cámara y Libermoore centered around the battleship
Pelayo and the armored cruiser Emperator Carlos V.
Although it was believed by the Navy Department that this force
would reinforce Cervera, it held out the possibility that the
Spanish ships would head for the Philippines. Consequently, the
monitors Monterey and Monadnock were prepared to
undertake a slow and hazardous voyage across the Pacific to reinforce
Dewey's command at Manila. On 16 June the Reserve Squadron departed
Cadiz and steamed into the Mediterranean bound for the Philippine
Islands.40
The
Navy Department responded to the news of Cámara's deployment
by ordering Rear Admiral Sampson to detail two battleships, an
armored cruiser, and three auxiliary cruisers to be ready to depart
for Europe if the strong Spanish force passed into the Red Sea.
When the Reserve Squadron arrived at Port Said on 26 June, Washington
decided to organize formally a force entitled the Eastern Squadron.
The command was activated on 7 July under the leadership of Commodore
John C. Watson, and consisted of the battleship Oregon,
the protected cruiser Newark, and the auxiliary cruisers
Yosemite and Dixie. The battleship Massachusetts
was added on 9 July, the auxiliary cruiser Badger on 12
July, and the protected cruiser New Orleans on 17 July.
The navy also assembled six colliers and a refrigerator ship at
Hampton Roads, Virginia, to support the Eastern Squadron's deployment.
The Navy Department allowed news of the squadron's formation and
its intended target to be widely circulated. It was hoped that
such news would force Spain to recall the Reserve Squadron to
Spanish waters.41
Cámara
ran into difficulty attempting to refuel his ships at Port Said.
The Egyptian government refused to sell him coal, nor would it
allow the Spanish squadron to take on coal from its own colliers
while in port. Cámara was forced to take his ships out
to sea where bad weather prevented any attempt at coaling. The
Spanish admiral took his squadron through the Suez Canal, into
the Red Sea and began to refuel on 7 July. The delay gave the
Spanish government an opportunity to reconsider Cámara's
mission in light of the near certainty that American ships would
enter Spanish waters. The Sagasta government made the decision
to recall the Reserve Squadron to Cadiz, and Watson's deployment
was held in abeyance for the time being.42
Even
though Spain no longer threatened Dewey's control of the situation
at Manila, the Navy Department was still concerned about German
intentions, especially in the Philippines where it was thought
Germany might try to take advantage of the situation to increase
her colonial possessions in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Sicard and
Captain Crowninshield of the Naval War Board still wanted to send
Watson to reinforce Dewey. Captain Mahan dissented from this view.
In the mean time, Watson's ships were needed to support the expedition
to Puerto Rico. By the time the Eastern Squadron was free to depart
the Caribbean peace negotiations were under way and Watson's deployment
was held back for good.43
One
overlooked role in the story of the Eastern Squadron is that played
by the repair ship Vulcan. She was fully equipped with
lathes, jacks, and small foundries for brass and iron castings.
The Vulcan reported for duty off Santiago on 1 July and
was stationed at Guantánamo Bay for the remainder of the
war. During that time she filled 528 orders for repairs and 256
requisitions for supplies. This work included making extensive
repairs of boilers, engines, and pumps, much of it fitting out
the ships of the Eastern Squadron as it prepared for its trans-Atlantic
voyage.44 It is thought that the
pressure put on the Spanish government by the possible deployment
of the Eastern Squadron was an important factor in starting peace
negotiations in August 1898. If so, the repair ship Vulcan
played a significant role in bringing about an end to the war.
The
U.S. Navy provided escort and support for the army's final two
campaigns of the war. On the afternoon of 21 July the lead forces
for the invasion of Puerto Rico got under way from Guantanamo
Bay. Thirty-five hundred men embarked in nine transports were
escorted by the battleship Massachusetts as well as the
Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia, and Yale,
all under the command of Capt. F. J. Higginson. Originally planning
to land east of San Juan at Playa de Fajardo, the expedition's
commander Major General Nelson A. Miles directed the Navy to land
his force on the island's south coast. The expedition arrived
off Port Guanica on the morning of 25 July. Lieutenant Commander
Richard Wainwright of the Gloucester requested and received
permission to send a landing party ashore. They soon came under
fire from the small Spanish garrison, but held their position
until the first army troops arrived and secured the landing place.
Wainwright also assisted the amphibious landing at Port Ponce
three days later by sneaking into the inner harbor the night before,
gathering up a number of barges for the army to use.45
In Manila Bay, Dewey's squadron maintained a foothold at
Cavite, opened communications with the insurgents, and provided
naval gunfire support during the army's assault on Manila on 13
August.
Pre-war
plans and preparations by the U.S. Navy contributed substantially
to the American victory. Most major strategic decisions were anticipated
by the Naval War College studies and the secretary's war planning
boards. Information appended to the boards' reports on merchant
ships available for purchase or charter provided a strong background
for Roosevelt's Board of Auxiliary Vessels as it sought to provide
the U.S. fleet with ships such as colliers, auxiliary cruisers,
and repair ships, indispensable for conducting war. In particular,
the early procurement of colliers gave the U.S. Navy the strategic
mobility to extend the blockade to Cuba's southern ports, keep
Cervera's squadron bottled up in Santiago de Cuba, and threaten
to send a major force to European waters. In addition Dewey's
purchase of Nanshan and its cargo of coal permitted him
to hold Manila Bay until an American expedition arrived from across
the Pacific Ocean. Secretary Long's pre-war orders preparing and
concentrating U.S. warships in the Atlantic theater ensured material
superiority over any expedition Spain might send to the Caribbean.
There
are several areas where more extensive preparations would have
enhanced the navy's effectiveness even further. If the U.S. had
constructed specialized colliers with their own winches, like
those in the British Navy, these vessels could have refueled Schley's
ships at sea more rapidly during the brief times that the weather
allowed. If the navy had had plans to seize Guantanamo Bay, the
Isle of Pines, or some other sheltered anchorage on the south
coast of Cuba at the beginning of the war, the U.S. Navy would
have been in a much better position to prevent Cervera from entering
any port in Cuba. Stronger coastal defenses might have prevented
the public cry for warships to defend the major harbors of the
United States, thus negating the need to divide the fleet between
the North Atlantic and Flying Squadrons.
The
overall success of U.S. naval operations during the Spanish-American
War demonstrated the value of extensive peace-time preparations.
In the technological warfare of the last one hundred years, the
most important preparations have not always been the construction
of major warships, but also planning for adequate logistical support
and vigorous intellectual debate.
Notes:
1. U.S. Navy Dept. Register of the
Commissioned, Warrant, and Volunteer Officers of the Navy of the
United States, Including Officers of the Marine Corps and Others,
to January 1, 1865 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1865), 283-95 (hereinafter Navy Register). John
D. Long, The New American Navy, 2 vols. (New York: Arno
Press, 1979) 14. Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All the World's
Fighting Ships, 1860-1905 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1979)
115.
2. Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American
Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1966), 23-25. Long, The New American Navy, 15-16.
3. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution, 36-37. John C. Reilly, Jr. and Robert L. Scheina, American Battleships 1886-1923, Predreadnought Design and Construction (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Instituted Press, 1980), 20-22.
4. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution, 55 and 59.
5. Long, The New American Navy, 75-76.
6. Ronald Spector, Professors of War; The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977), 89-90. David Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), 73-74.
7. Ibid., 74. Spector, Professors of War, 90-91.
8. Ibid., 91-93. Trask, War with Spain, 74-76. J. A. S. Grenville, "American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896-98," Journal of American Studies (April 1968): 33-47.
9. Report of the Ramsey Board contained in Grenville, "American Naval Preparations. . .," 38-41.
10. Report of the Sicard Board contained in Grenville, "American Naval Preparations. . .," 41-47.
11. Navy Register, January 1, 1898, 131-33.
12. Trask, War with Spain, 82 and 86. John D. Alden, The American Steel Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 123-24, 382-83.
13. Calculated by taking a vessel's coal capacity and dividing it by average consumption rates found in U.S. Navy Dept., Bureau of Equipment, Reports of the Efficiency of Various Coals, 1896 to 1898 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 15-79.
14. Alden, American Steel Navy, 224. U.S. Navy Dept., Office of Naval Intelligence, Notes on Coaling War Ships (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 7-27.
15. Trask, War with Spain, 88-89. U.S. Navy Dept., Bureau of Navigation, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 33.
16. For a detailed examination of U.S. ship movements prior to hostilities with Spain see French Ensor Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain, The Spanish-American War, 2 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 1: 3-2, 401, and Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 21-29, 37-43.
17. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 27. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 65-66. Trask, War with Spain, 91-92.
18. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 12-16. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 47-56.
19. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 127-132. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 168, 171-72, 174-75.
21. Ibid., 200-208. A.B. Feuer, The Spanish-American War at Sea; Naval Action in the Atlantic (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 65-73.
22. Ibid., 75-82. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 186-99.
24. Ibid., 65-70. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 154-58, 166-68.
25. Reports of the Battle of Manila Bay from commanding officers are found in Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 69-93. For a detailed secondary account see Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 154-213.
26. Trask, War with Spain, 371.
27. Ibid., 113-14. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 1: 151. Jefferery Michael Dorwart, "A Mongrel Fleet: America Buys a Navy to Fight Spain, 1898," Warship International, 2: 1980.
28. Trask, War with Spain, 114-119. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 214-249.
29. Trask, War with Spain, 115-118.
30. Ibid., 121-22. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 265-68. David F. Trask, "American Intelligence During the Spanish-American War," in Crucible of Empire; The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath, James C. Bradford, ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 33.
31. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 268-73, 276, 285.
33. Ibid., 292-93. H. W. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, Naval History of the Spanish-American War (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900), 229-30. Notes on Coaling War Ships, 27.
34. Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 302-307, 321-327.
35. Jack Shulimson, "Marines in the Spanish-American War," in Crucible of Empire; The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath, James C. Bradford, ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 141-42.
36. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 299.
37. Feuer, The Spanish-American War at Sea, 95-111. For a first hand account of this operation see Richard P. Hobson, The Sinking of the Merrimac (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988).
38. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 676, 683-91.
39. Feuer, The Spanish-American War at Sea, 169-79. Christopher B. Havern, Sr., A Gunnery Revolution Manqué: William S. Sims and the Adoption of Continuous-aim in the United States Navy, 1898-1910 (unpublished master's thesis, University of Maryland), 11-19.
40. William J. Hourihan, "The Fleet That Never Was: Commodore John Crittenden Watson and the Eastern Squadron," American Neptune (April 1981): 93-97.
41. Ibid., 98-100. Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 37-38.
42. Hourihan, "The Fleet That Never Was," 101-102.
43. Ibid., 102-109. Trask, War with Spain, 284-85.
44. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 437-38.
45. Trask, War with Spain, 353-57. Feuer, The Spanish-American War at Sea, 201-214.