1966

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
NAVAL AIR FORCE
FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 09501

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From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05A5G)

Subj: Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN 1966 Command History; submission of (U)

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST 5750.12 of 8 NOV 1966

Encl: (1) VF-14 1966 Command History
(2) VF-14 WESTPAC Cruise Report
(less Operations Review; Figures (1) and (2))
(3) Operations Review of WESTPAC Cruise Report
(4) 1966 Operational Statistics
(5) VF-14 Precedence List of 7 JAN 1967
(6) VF-14 Enlisted Roster of 10 JAN 1967

1. In accordance with reference (a), Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN Command History for calendar year 1966 is hereby submitted.

2. The classification of this letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures (2), (3), and (4).

J. H. Koach

J. H. KOACH

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FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN 1966 HISTORY

I. CHRONOLOGY OF HIGHLIGHTS

10 Jan. 1966-	Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN moved its home base from NAS Cecil Field, Fla. to NAS Oceana, Virginia.
23 Jan. 1966	VF-14 departed NAS Oceana for NS Mayport, Fla. to load aboard USS Franklin D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42) for training deployment in the Caribbean Area. (Roosevelt Roads, P.R.)
10 Feb. 1966	VF-14 returned to NAS Oceana, Virginia.
25 Apr. 1966	Squadron departed NAS Oceana to fly aboard ROOSEVELT for training cruise in the Guantanamo, Cuba operating area.
27 May 1966	Squadron returned to NAS Oceana.
20 Jun. 1966	VF-14 departed NAS Oceana to load aboard the ROOSEVELT for S.E. Asia cruise.
21 Jun. 1966	Departed NS Mayport, Fla. aboard ROOSEVELT for WESTPAC.
27 Jun. 1966	Arrived at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands to receive inspection team in preparation for Operational Readiness Inspection.
30 Jun. 1966	Completed Operational Readiness Inspection and departed St. Thomas area for Brazil.
8 Jul. 1966	Arrived Rio de Janiero, Brazil for 3-day rest and recreation period.
11 Jul. 1966	Departed Rio for Subic Bay, P. I.
31 Jul. 1966	Squadron aircraft flew off to NAS Cubi Point, Philippines.
1 Aug. 1966	ROOSEVELT arrived in Subic Bay, Philippines.
7 AAug. 1966	Squadron departed Subic Bay aboard ROOSEVELT for combat operations in Tonkin Gulf.
10 Aug. 1966	VF-14 commenced combat operations as part of CVW-1 embarked in USS Franklin D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42).
12 Sep. 1966	Squadron completed first combat line period and ROOSEVELT departed for Yokosuka, Japan.
15 Sep. 1966	VF-14 flew into NAS Atsugi, Japan to conduct limited flight operations during inport period.
26 Sep. 1966	VF-14 flew aboard ROOSEVELT on its return to Gulf of Tonkin.
2 Oct. 1966	ROOSEVELT arrived back on Yankee Station and commenced combat operations. ROOSEVELT experienced casualty of #1 screw.

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3 Oct. 1966	ROOSEVELT departed for return to Yokosuka for repairs.
6 Oct. 1966	VF-14 flew off for NAS Atsugi, Japan.
16 Oct. 1966	VF-14 flew aboard ROOSEVELT for return to Tonkin Gulf.
20 Oct. 1966	Arrived on Yankee Station and commenced Combat operations.
12 Nov. 1966	Completed second line period and prepared for return to Philippines.
13 Nov. 1966	ROOSEVELT departed Tonkin Gulf for Subic Bay.
14 Nov. 1966	VF-14 flew off to NAS Cubi Point, Philippines.
18 Nov. 1966	CDR R. C. ADAMS relieved as Commanding Officer by CDR J. H. KOACH.
20 Nov. 1966	VF-14 departed Subic Bay aboard ROOSEVELT for typhoon evasion.
21 Nov. 1966	Squadron returned to Subic Bay.
22 Nov. 1966	VF-14 departed Subic Bay for return to Tonkin Gulf.
24 Nov. 1966	Squadron arrived back on Yankee Station and commenced combat operations.
27 Dec. 1966	Squadron completed last line period and departed aboard ROOSEVELT for return to Philippines.
30 Dec. 1966	Squadron arrived NAS Cubi Point, Philippine Islands.

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II. BASIC NARRATIVE

For Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN, 1966 has been a year of preparation for and conducting the planned combat cruise in Southeast Asia aboard the attack carrier USS Franklin D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42). As part of Carrier Air Wing ONE, based at NAS Cecil Field, Florida, Fighting FOURTEEN had a normal assignment of twelve (12) F4B Phantom II aircraft, 247 enlisted men, 31 officers, including 14 pilots and 14 Radar Intercept Officers. VF-14, under the command of CDR R. C. ADAMS moved its home base to NAS Oceana, Virginia on 10 January 1966 as part of the "base loading" concept adopted by the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. On 23 January, VF-14 loaded aboard the ROOSEVELT at Mayport, Florida, for a four week training cruise in the Roosevelt Roads, P.R. area. The air wing primarily participated in air defense and anti-air warfare exercises, and during that period, VF-14 accumulated 90 day and 26 night carrier landings. The squadron suffered the loss of one aircraft during that period; at 0301 on 28 January, F4B Phantom, BUNO 151517, piloted by LCDR G. L. RIENDEAU, USN, 569692 and Radar Intercept Officer, LCDR J. S. BERTRAND, USN, 615064 crashed at sea following flame out. The crew ejected 7 miles east of the ship in the eastern Atlantic, and was picked up by the ship's rescue helicopter. The RIO received minor injury; the pilot received a compression fracture of a vertebrae. The squadron returned to NAS Oceana on 10 February.

On 15 April, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN received an Administrative-Material inspection by Commander Fleet Air Norfolk.

On 25 April, VF-14 flew aboard the ROOSEVELT for a second training cruise in the Guantanamo, Cuba operating area. During this five-week deployment, the squadron's F-4 aircraft began a modification program to

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install the Approach Power Compensator System and ECM equipment. The remaining aircraft returned to NAS Oceana on 27 May, having completed 176 day and 39 night carrier landings.

During the following four weeks, aircraft modifications were completed, and the squadron continued an accelerated training schedule to prepare for the upcoming deployment to WESTPAC. This training schedule included air intelligence and tactical briefings, airborne training and simulated air wing coordinated strikes against targets in the local area.

On 20 June, Fighting FOURTEEN again moved to NS Mayport, Florida to load aboard the ROOSEVELT, which departed the following day. The ship arrived at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 27 June to receive the Operational Readiness Inspection team. During the following three days, the ship and air wing underwent the operational readiness inspection and departed the Caribbean area on 30 June.

The ROOSEVELT arrived in Rio de Janiero, Brazil on 8 July for a 3-day rest and recreation period. From Rio, the ship proceeded directly to Subic Bay, Philippines, arriving on 1 August.

During the first week of August, VF-14 continued with training flights out of NAS Cubi Point, maintaining pilot proficiency and exercising the aircraft. On 7 August, the squadron departed Subic Bay aboard the ROOSEVELT for their first combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN conducted combat operations against military targets in North Vietnam on three line periods; 10 August-12 September, 20 October-12 November, and 24 November-27 December. Following the first period of operations, the squadron conducted limited flight operations out of NAS

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Atsugi, Japan while the ROOSEVELT was undergoing repairs at Yokosuka, Japan. The squadron experienced one operational loss of F4B BUNO 151018 when the aircraft flamed out 7 miles north of the carrier on station in the Tonkin Gulf. The accident occurred at 0218, 3 November. Both the pilot, LTJG E. J. DUCHARME, 683147 and Radar Intercept Officer, LTJG W. A. WOOD, 680414 ejected and were recovered by the ship's rescue helicopter. The pilot received minor injury; the RIO received a serious back injury.

On 18 November 1966, CDR R. C. ADAMS completed his tour of duty as Commanding Officer and was relieved by CDR J. H. KOACH. Fighting FOURTEEN completed its final combat period on 27 December and returned to Subic Bay for preparations to return to the United States.

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FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN WESTPAC CRUISE REPORT

(less Operations Review; Figures (1) and (2))

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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEARS INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Enclosure (2)

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S SUMMARY

We arrived on the line on 10 August after a long crossing and some refresher work at Cubi Point, P. I. This was the first Air Wing to start special operations on Yankee Station without a warm up period flying "In country" missions. However, the Air Wing commenced flying in areas of comparatively low risk, and the wisdom of this cannot be overemphasized.

Tactics and minimums are freely discussed in enclosure (3). A complete analysis of F-4 tactics is discussed in Annex TANGO CTF 77 OPORD 320-66. It is strongly believed that the tactics utilized and the weather minimums adhered to minimized combat losses and increased the Air Wings effectiveness over the beach.

The complexion of the war in NVM has changed since the Air Wing first arrived on the line. The enemy has vastly increased the effectiveness of his defenses, not only by increasing the numbers of AAA and SAM batteries but by relocating his sites so as to meet the threat imposed by the SEVENTH Fleet. This soon became apparent during our return from the last line period. Former relatively safe areas of operation became areas of extreme hazard. The enemy seemed to have an inexhaustable supply of AAA ammunition and SAMS. Although it was the same war, new tactics had to be devised to meet the changing threat. It was found necessary to support section armed recce flights over the beach with Iron Hand aircraft. TARCAP aircraft were required to be in the area in order to counter the increased MIG activity and threat. ECM aircraft were deemed very desirable in support of recce flights along the coast.

Because the F-4 aircraft of VF-14 and VF-32 were inadequately equipped with electronic warning and jamming equipment, it became extremely hazardous to send them on armed recce missions inland without the company of A-4 Iron Hand aircraft. It is strongly recommended that future F-4 aircraft deployed to S. E. Asia contain electronic warning equipment similar to the A-4E.

The F-4 performed its BARCAP and TARCAP mission with little or no difficulty. MIG activity did not materialize against the force during our period on the line. However the probability of increased air-to-air aggressiveness on the part of the enemy's Air Force is a distinct possibility. The capability of the air crew of an F-4 to interrogate friendly and enemy IFF would be of considerable value in the air-to-air environment as it would often preclude the necessity for an identification pass on the part of the friendly and it would minimize radio transmissions concerning unidentified contacts thereby reducing overall net traffic.

Enclosure 2

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The record of performance of the two F-4 squadrons on this deployment points out the great versatility of the Phantom in either the fighter or attack role. It is a airborne weapons system unsurpassed in the world's inventory of military aircraft.

This squadron was not afforded the opportunity to adequately evaluate JETCONLAD delivery of ordnance, but it is believed that this system will prove effective in combat under adverse weather conditons.

Enclosures (1) through (6) reflect the concensus of opinion regarding the lessons learned and the problems encountered during this deployment. In conclusion, it is felt that Air Wing special operations are team operations , and that most every mission over NVN must be adequately supported by IRON HAND, CAP, ECM, and FLAK suppression aircraft. The F-4 has the versatility to be either an interceptor, fighter or bomber and can perform each mission in an outstanding manner.

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MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL REVIEW

General A total of twelve aircraft were assigned; however, the average on board count was only slightly more than nine. Because of limited space on board, all calendar checks were performed at NAS Cubi Point, P. I. At least one aircraft was in check at all times and a two or three day overlap of check periods was normal. In addition three aircraft were lost temporarily for an average period of 35 days each. Two underwent repairs at NIPPI, NAS Atsugi, Japan and one was repaired at Danang AB, RVN. At least one aircraft on board was used for cannibalization during which time it received extensive corrosion rework. There was a 24 hour day requirement for two fully operational ready F4B's for Condition One. During flight quarters the VF squadrons shared this commitment, each maintaining one aircraft in Condition One. This left a maximum of seven or eight operationally ready aircraft which could be used for the daily flight schedule.

Flight operations were normally scheduled on a twelve hour on, twelve hour off basis. A minimum of two hours was required for aircraft spotting both before and after flight ops. The remaining eight hours per day could be utilized exclusively for maintenance.

The squadron enlisted manning level remained fairly constant throughout the cruise, ranging from a minimum of 214 to a maximum of 221 assigned. A total of 14 personnel were involuntarily extended. An average of 28 personnel of Group IX rating structure were requiredd for various tasks such as mess cooks, S-6/Laundry, Post Office, etc, and 22 personnel were TAD from the maintenance department to IMA. An average of 150 personnel were available to the maintenance department, 16 of whom were in the check crew based ashore at Cubi Pt.

The maintenance department was divided into two working sections, each a twelve hour shift. By careful supervision and an occasional move of certain personnel depending on the workload, all major operational commitments were met.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSIT

The complete complement of twelve aircraft was not received until just prior to departure from CONUS. In addition all aircraft were inducted into a major modification program by COMFAIRNORFOLK during the final three weeks. All aircraft were modified for JETCONIA BS and AFC (AFC 172 and associated service changes). Four aircraft were equiped with AAR-24. Upon completion of the Mod program and during the transit period period to ORI, only one or two aircraft were considered to have operationally ready weapons systems. During the ORI, aircraft availability was considered poor. A large amount of electrical and weapons system discrepancies occurred, many of which were directly attributable to

incorrect and careless wiring during modification.

During the long transit from the Caribbean to WESTPAC, a full "E" level check was systematically performed on the weapons system of every aircraft. In addition several changes were incorporated into the APQ-72/APN-157 components. A complete list is included under the Avionics Sections. Limited flight operations were conducted during transit when weather and winds were favorable. These operations were especially beneficial to the maintenance department as they helped resolve remaining problem areas and exercised the aircraft systems.

Upon arrival in WESTPAC, all aircraft were combat ready. During the entire cruise aircraft were not released for flight unless the weapons system was fully operational with both a Sparrow and Sidewinder capability. This requirement was inviolate regardless of the assigned mission on any particular flight.

AIRFRAMES

There were no unusual or unexpected problems encountered that can be considered peculiar to WESTPAC. Cannibalization of airframe items was fairly low and was not considered significant. During the transit, wing tip reinforcement patches were installed on all aircraft as shown in the Structural Repair Manual, NW01-245FDA-3-1, Fig 2-138 dated 15 October 1966. The patch was increased slightly in size (16 1/2 X 9 3/4 inches) and thickness (.125) from the normal specifications. Only one wing tip repair was required throughout the entire cruise. Several aircraft required repair of the 47.8% stringers in outer wing panel. This was accomplished by the STRAAD team at Cubi Pt while the aircraft were in calendar check.

Since rapid turn-around is one of the keys to successful sustained operations, the flight deck trouble-shooters were placed under the supervision of the Airframes Branch with a highly qualified and experienced petty officer in charge. During flight operations they were available for quick repairs or to assess the repairs necessary without going directly to the work center. During standdowns and periods of no flying, they worked directly for the airframes work center, assisting in daily maintenance.

CORROSION CONTROL

All corrosion work was accomplished on board by a selected team under close supervision of a Chief Petty Officer. As each aircraft was inducted into corrosion control, it in turn became the temporary "hanger queen". Except for isolated instances, the aircraft were normally back flying in 4 to 6 days. Because of the hot, humid climate and associated high salt content, it was found that any aircraft that was left down for parts more than 10 days required an excessive length of time to return to a fairly reliable condition. This was due to corrosion of the seats, cockpit switches, wiring, and in some cases, engine accessories.

CALENDAR INSPECTION

Although all calendar inspections were performed at NAS Cubi Pt, the results were satisfactory. The only difficulties encountered were in parts support and a delay in communications between the embarked squadron and the shore based detachment. The shortage of parts required cannibalization of the next aircraft due in check in order to return the aircraft completing check to a flying status. No airframe corrosion control was accomplished at Cubi Pt. due to a lack of vacu-blasters and a source of low pressure air. However, a complete corrosion treatment and repainting was accomplished on all ejection seats.

POWER PLANTS

The only recurrent major problem encountered was foreign object damage. A total of thirteen engine changes were required due to FOD and an additional five engines required bending of the blades to remove minor FOD. The cause of most of the FOD was not known. However, Comstock clips and bits of arming wire, etc, were found on the flight deck. This was a continuing problem. Two instances of FOD were attributable to ingestion of debris following the firing of LAU-3 rocket pods. The incidence of FOD decreased markedly during the later part of the cruise. A procedure was instituted werein each intake duct was completely examined before every start by the plane captain. All LAU-3 firing was conducted from the outboard wing pylon only

The following high usage items are in short supply in WESTPAC:

- 600 Gal Centerline Tanks
- Intgrated Torque Boosters
- Fuel transfer pumps (hydraulic and electric)

SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Most flight crews utilized the pressure suit harness and a survival vest as shown in Clothing and Survival Equipment Change #26. SEEK-2 "soft pack" kits were obtained from COMFAIRWESTPAC shortly after arrival and are a great improvement over the old kits.

The survival radio is the single most important item of survival equipment. Upon arrival, all squadron custody PRC 49 and 49A radios were turned into the COMFAIRWESTPAC pool. Sufficient PRC 49B radios were made available for installation in all seat packs. In addition, each crew member was issured a personal URC-10 (AN/RT 10)radio which was carried in the survival vest.

The major problem within the purview of the AME shop was corrosion in the Martin Baker Seat and pneumatic lines in the cockpit due to salt spray and stack gas. Spray cans of corrosion preventative are difficult to obtain in WESTPAC. All seats were fully treated for corrosion at Cubi Pt. while the aircraft were in major check.

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FIRE CONTROL

On our departure from CONUS approximately 90% of the personnel had little or no experience in the AERO 1A weapons system. During the transit, all radars were given a complete "E" level check. This proved to be a very slow process due to the limited experience of the technicians. It is considered that many failures may have occurred because the radars were ground operated for additional time not normally required by more experienced technicians.

One Ratheon, one Westinghouse and one McDonnell Avionics Rep deployed with the F-4 squadrons. These gentlemen proved to be extremely valuable throughout the entire cruise. They provided a large amount of on-the-job and formal training in addition to resolving many of the more difficult problems.

JETCONLABS had been incorporated in all aircraft prior to departure from CONUS. The following changes were incorporated during the transit.

AVC 168- (a) Prevents automatic overide of the computer interlocks while in half action (b) eliminates possibility of a malfunction within the computer.
AVC 261- Incorporates firing envelope for AIM 9D missile
AVC 288- Prevents temporary loss of SPW III missile lock due to false sweep output from the computer due to a malfunction within the computer.
AVC 400- Calibration of AIM dot in BIT 4.

The AS 940/APQ-72 antenna was by far the most difficult item to obtain. There were no rotatable spares available and for more than half the cruise, this squadron operated with a total of only ten antennas for twelve aircraft. The cannibalization of this item was 2½ times higher than its nearest competitor.

An abnormal amount of rain can be expected during the months of October thru April making it extremely difficult to maintain the radars properly. In addition to not being able to work on aircraft on the flight deck, water seepage greatly increases the radar failure rate. The following procedures helped to some degree: (1) "F" level carts were used to dry out radars prior to turn-up for launch; (2) the aircraft were turned up a minimum of 10 minutes prior to turning the radar to standby; (3) all rain removal ducts were rechecked for leaks and duct covers were used on the flight deck; (4) ordnance tape was placed around the radome where it joins the fuselage on aircraft parked on the flight deck at the completion of flight ops.

ELECTRIC SHOP:

Immediately upon leaving CONUS many difficulties were encountered due to the modifications on the #2 Miscellaneous Relay Panel. Shortly after

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combat operations commenced pilots became extremely critical of the instrument lighting required for night armed recce. Certain instruments were difficult to obtain; therefore, it is recommended that all instruments have perfect integral lighting prior to leaving CONUS.

Salt Water contamination of JP-5 caused several discrepancies of the fuel quantity indication system. Although the ship observed all precautions, the contamination appeared sporadically throughout the cruise. Once contamination was discovered, the only solution was to clean all [illegible] probes and recalibrate the entire system rather than attempt to isolate individual defective probes.

ELECTRONICS SHOP

Electronics Shop personnel, while small in number, were required to service and maintain several components that have special significance in Yankee Station Operations. Proper UHF communications is absolutely mandatory. The auxiliary guard receiver is particulary important in the Tonkin Gulf. Immediately after arrival on station, it was noted that most of the ATX guard receivers were weak or inoperative. This problem could have been eliminated if some emphasis had been placed on the Unit 5 of the AN/ASQ-19 prior to arrival.

Tacan is the primary means of navigation. However, the AN/ASN-39 Navigation Computer is a primary back up for night and instrument flights as there were several instances of suspected enemy tacan deception.

Four of our aircraft were configured with APR-24; the remaining eight were configured with APR-27. As was the case with the majority of the participating squadrons, innumerable problems were encountered with the APR-24. Estimates of "down" time range upwards of 90%, and none of our units could be classified as totally "up". A so-called "Get Well" program at NAS Cubi Pt failed to achieve desired results. The problem was two-fold, inadequately trained personnel and a critical shortage of APR-24 parts within the supply system.

The APR-27 was installed during the latter segment of our combat tour. This unit is a simple yet highly reliable item which is relatively maintenance free. The map cases were removed from the front cockpit and the APR-27 was mounted in its place utilizing the 28 volt auxiliary jack as a power source. The antenna installation is roughly depicted in fig (1) and utilizes the lower tacan antenna when the APR-27 is turned on. With the APR-27 off, the tacan goes back to normal operation. The entire installation was as depicted in preliminary operational instruction for Radar Receiver R-1412/APR-27 except for the following changes. A 1K OHM resistor was added in series with the APR-27 audio lead as an isolation resistor to prevent attenuation of the 9D aural tone. The audio lead was wired to pin M of the LS-459 vice pin C in order that both cockpits would receive the audio signal. See fig (2).

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WEAPONS BRANCH:

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The two F4 squadrons flew Armed Recce and BARCAP missions on alternated days which eliminated major configuration changes during any one day.

This squadron had a standard configuration of two wing pylons, one LAU-17 with two LAU-7 launchers, and one LAU-17 with the Aero 3A launcher plus a TER adapter. For BARCAP/TARCAP, two AIM-7E missiles were carried on the aft stations plus two AIM-9D missiles on the LAU-17. One AIM-7E and one AIM-9D were removed for night operations to increase the maximum landing fuel. All ordnance was carried on TERS on the wing pylons for armed recco missions. The normal loads were either four MK 82's, six MK 81's, 4 LAU-3's or occasionally 4 LAU-10's. The missile load was one AIM-7E and one AIM-9B.

For Night Armed Recce a third TER was added to the LAU-17 for 3 MK-24 flares.

The load for "ALFA" strikes varied slightly, but 12 MK 82's hung on MER's shifted forward on the outboard wing stations proved very successful and required a minimum of configurations change. The standard load for Condition I Cap was 2 AIM 7E, 2 AIM 9D, 3 LAU-3's and 3 MK 24 Flares.

An average of 17 ordnancemen, plus 2 or 3 "Augmentation" personnel were assigned as follows:

Supervisior - 2
Missile Loading Crew - 6 (1 augmentor)
Conv Ord Loading Crew - 6 (2 augmentors)
Day Check Maint. - 2
Nite Check Maint. - 2
Check Crew (Cubi Pt) - 1

although all personnel were assigned a primary task, it was sometimes necessary to utilize individuals on the other crew. Both F4 squadrons occupied the same maintenance space, and although a healthy competition existed, there were occasions when one squadron would give the other some assistance.

To assist the AQ's in trouble shooting missile discrepancies, an extension for the umbilical connection was developed. This allowed a missile to be checked out while it was on the cart prior to loading. If some doubt existed as to whether the missile or the aircraft system was at fault, the missile was easily moved to another aircraft and double checked.

LINE:

The biggest problem of the Line Division is the long hours required in a normal working day. The ship is normally at flight quarters from 14-16 hours a day. Unless the line has some strong leadership and supervision, the normal problems associated with shipboard operations such

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as cleanliness of aircraft, stowage of power cables, etc, become exaggerated with personnel fatigue. High morale, which is one of the primary factors of a good line, was instilled through friendly competition among the plane captains concerning number of sorties flown by and combat accomplishements of their assigned aircraft.

Life vests for line personnel are unobtainable in WESTPAC and should be ordered well in advance. An efficient and light-weight life vest can be ordered from FORTENER INC, Glendale, Calif. The item is called FLOTATION DEVICE, LIFEBELT, P/N 101. A belt type survival kit which included a whistle, a day-night flare and a packet of dye marker was made up by the paraloft and utilized by all personnel.

MATERIAL CONTROL

WESTPAC supply response is outstanding. Very seldom were "off ship" AOCP's outstanding for more than one week. The recent advent of the Tiger Tom requisition system for AOCP's and ANFE's provided excellent results. Any items of lower priority, expecially those that are bulky or heavy such as corrision control material, will not be received at sea. Careful planning is required while in port to replenish such items. A well stocked Serv Mart is available at Subic Bay and Yokosuka for many of these items.

Prior to deployment serious consideration must be given to Flight Deck Gear and Flight Clothing. It is recommended that cotton flight deck jerseys be ordered at the rate of four per man. Flight deck shoes were unobtainable half way through the cruise. It was found that the useful life of these shoes decreased with longer working hours and more strenuous labor. It is recommended that each man be provided new shoes on the commencement of the deployment.

Special Forces Fatigues (6 oz yd) are much cooler than Army/Marine Fatigues (oz/yd) when use as flight clothing. Special Forces Fatigues are JCS controlled through the Navy Clothing and Textile Office. Existing COMNAVAIRPAC instructions allow one Nomex Flight Suit per crew member. A minimum of three combat flight suits per crew member is recommended.

Most items of survival gear were extremely difficult to obtain. Vibram (treaded) soles were ordered open purchase from FRANK DUNCAN, Seattle, Wash. Flight boots were then soled by a local merchant, which proved more reliable than those accomplished on board by the ship's cobbler.

Many other items of survival equipment are covered in COMNAVAIRPAC Notice 13000 of Oct 1965. However, these items are still difficult to obtain in WESTPAC; therefore the para-loft should have an adequate supply of pencil flare guns with amber and green flares (open purchase from Penquin Associates) matrix light batteries, survival knives, and strobe lights prior to departure.

In general, pre-planning is extremely important. Coordination between the Air Wing and the ship as to the availability of all necessary items, such as high usage parts and the pre-X bins, cannot be stressed strongly enough.

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ADMINISTRATIVE

PERSONNEL

All facets of personnel transfer must be studied and prepared for (i.e. emergency leave, normal rotation). A problem arose wherein key personnel due for rotation in the October-January Seavey were ordered to detach during the 1st half of this period without provision for adequate relief. This command found it necessary to go to BUPERS and EPDOLANT and request these personnel be transferred at the end of the Seavey period (January). Such a requested extension poses severe morale problems. The entire personnel situation should be reviewed before deployment and necessary arrangements made with BUPERS/EPDOLANT for stability of personnel. QUALIFIED reliefs should be on board at least 1 month prior to scheduled rotation of key personnel.

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

This command found it desirable to make CMCO (Classified Material Control Officer) a primary billet. The importance of timely dissemination of classified information cannot be overemphasized, and the volume of subject information is such that the full time attention of an officer is required.

AWARDS

The present SEVENTH Fleet awards procedures require expeditious submission and extensive research of recommendations. It is advisable to have an Awards Officer (primary billet) who has demonstrated a talent for writing and an extensive knowledge of the English language. A poorly organized and dully written award recommendation will invariably be turned down by the CINCPACFLT Awards board. It is advisable to have the appointed officer study all SECNAV/CINCPACFLT/SEVENTHFLT instructions concerning awards and obtain, from returning squadrons, as many copies of actual citations as possible. This must be done prior to commencement of operations as there is little time for "study" once combat operations begin.

LEAVE

The leave situation in SEASIA is hampered by two things: first, there is very little air transportation available, and second, the R&R periods are devoted to aircraft maintenance and crew training. The large cities (Tokyo, Manila) are the most utilized for leave while in port, and tours are available to these cities. All TECH REPS and Philippine Nationals must have passports. All other personnel need only their Armed Forces ID card and shot card.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation on and off the ship will be set up by priorities on the ship's COD. Transportation back to the east coast has proven to be a problem in the past; however, with the advent of more east

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coast carriers in WESTPAC, procedures are being implemented to expeditiously return east coast personnel to their desired destination. Authority has been granted (BUPERS msg 191828Z AUG 66) to utilize MAC flights from Saigon to McGuire or Northwest Airline Flights (category 2) from Clark AFB to the east coast. All transportation requests should be sent by the ship to ATO Clark at least 2-3 weeks in advance.

SHOT CARDS

An up-to-date shot card is just as necessary to a military man as a passport is to a civilian. A constant check should be kept up by the flight surgeons to ensure shots are current. Detention and a full bag of shots is the price paid for not having an up-to-date shot card in hand when returning to the U. S.

MAIL

While in the combat zone, outgoing letter mail is free (this includes message tapes). Although the use of FPO San Francisco 96601 will expedite personal mail, FPO New York 09501 is still used for all official mail. Also while serving in the Vietnam Hostile Fire Zone, packages containing merchandise valued at $50.00 or less will be passed free through customs. Letter mail takes 5-8 days for delivery while parcel post takes as long as 6-10 weeks. Airmail packages fare better with delivery within 10 days to 2 weeks.

10% SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM

Wide dissemination of the 10% Savings Deposit Program should be made (refer SECNAVINST 7220.55 of 30 AUG 66). This is an excellent savings program but should be commenced at the start of the cruise to be worthwhile.

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SAFETY REVIEW

COMBAT STATUS REPORTING

Paragraph 28 of OPNAVINST 3750.6E sets forth the requirements for Combat Status Reporting of Aircraft Mishaps. NWIP 10-1 states that an aircraft unit enters combat status upon departure from its last permanent station prior to entering combat, and remains in such status until return to its permanent station, regardless of temporary departures from the actual combat zone for R&R, upkeep, repairs, etc. Strictly interpreted, this means that full accident boards and/or "long form" accident reporting procedures are not required once the squadron departs its home base in CONUS (i.e., OCEANA), except when and to the extent the appointing authority (CO or CAG) may direct.

This squadron adopted a "gouge" for combat reporting of aircraft mishaps, using the prescribed Preliminary Message format. The gouge provides a "fill the blanks" outline which can be made available for use by the SDO and other members of the squadron accident board, to prevent delays in reporting when the Safety Officer is not immediately available. Compiling the total list of "Info" addressees for these reports, in addition to those cited in paragraph 28 of OPNAVINST 3750.6E, has been a result of coming in contact with various instructions prior to, and during, the deployment. Our current addressee list follows, and is annoted to amplify/clarify the when and why of their inclusion:

	REASON/COMMENTS	REFERENCE
TO:		
NAVAVNSAFECEN	(para 28d of ref)	OPNAVINST 3750.6E
NAVAIRSYSCOM HQ	When Safety UR included	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
INFO:		
CNO	(para 28d of ref)	OPNAVINST 3750.6E
COMNAVAIRLANT	Controlling custodian	OPNAVINST 3750.6E CNALINST 3750.26G
COMNAVAIRPAC	Liaison while under OPCON of CINCPACFLT	OPNAVINST 3750.6E
COMFAIRNORFOLK	Cognizant home base COMFAIR for LANTFLT F-4 Squadrons	CNALINST 3750.26G CFWINST 3760.1A
COMFAIRJAX	Cognizant COMFAIR for Air Wing Commander	CNALINST 3750.26G
COMFAIRWESTPAC	Cognizant COMFAIR in area of deployment	CFWPINST 3750.2A

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INFO:	REASON/COMMENTS	REFERENCE
DEPCOMFAIRWESTPAC	COMFAIR representative for combat zone (located NAS Cubi Pt.)	
CFAD OCEANA	Include for all accidents, and for incidents/ground accidents involving injury or widespread public interest in the home base area.	CENINST 1771.1D
COMSEVENTHFLT CTF SEVEN SEVEN CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ____	Include for all accidents, and for incidents/ground accidents affecting operational readiness or capabilities.	Operational Commander Task Force Commander Yankee Team Commander Task Group Commander to whom ship assigned
NAVPRO MAC ST LOUIS	When Safety UR included (Material failure involved/ suspected, not due direct enemy action.)	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
AFPRO GE EVENDALE OHIO	When Safety UR included (engine malfunction involved/suspected, not due to direct enemy action.)	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
NAVTECHSERVPAC	When Safety UR included	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT	When Safety UR included	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC	When Safety UR included	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
DAS NORTON AFB	When Safety UR included	BUWEPSINST 4700.2A
Designated Overhaul Activity	When malfunction investigation requested.	BWFRLANTINST 4730.17A ASO Sect. C0004: "Master Repair List"

SAFETY ASSISTANTS

Although the requirements for formal accident reporting is waived, the myriad of smaller, but reportable, incidents/ground accidents ("crunches")/material failures and malfunctions, increases along with the acceleration of flight operations. It is recommended that a second officer, such as the Quality Control Officer, be assigned collateral duty as assistant Safety Officer, and further, that a YN be designated to handle the routine Safety "paper shuffling", as well as preparation of outgoing reports.

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WORK/REST CYCLES

The varying operating cycles assigned, schedule changes, and the continual condition CAP requirements dictate that personnel seize every available opportunity to rest. It is recommended that the Safety Officer establish some means of monitoring the work/rest cycles within the squadron, especially for flight crews and plane captains, to ensure that operational demands do not overtax personnel and cause serious fatigue problems.

ORDNANCE/WEAPONS LOADINGS & DELIVERY SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

The safe handling and delivery of Ordnance becomes extremely important on the line. Most assigned personnel, both ordnancemen and flight crews, will be relatively inexperienced in handling conventional ordnance in the amounts and types loaded daily on the line. It is recommended that the Safety Officer familiarize himself with ordnance safety precautions, especially those concerning LAU-17/LAU-7/Aero 3A launchers; MER's and TER's; MK 81 and 82 bombs; snakeye fins; MK 24 paraflares; LAU-3 and LAU-10 pods; 2.75" and ZUNI rockets; MK 4 GunPod; AIM-7E and AIM-9B/D missiles; and all arming/fuzing devices used with the above ordnance.

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2. SERE BOARD.

Prior to deployment, a squadron Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) Board was established to coordinate requirements for equipment, training, lectures, and reference materials in these fields. The board is composed of the Aviation Safety Officer as chairman; Survival Officer; Air Intelligence Officer; Aviators Equipment Officer; Material Officer; and assigned Flight Surgeon. The most important work of this group was accomplished prior to deployment and during the transit from LANT to PAC; first, by deciding upon, and obtaining, standardized survival items for flight crews; second, by arranging a syllabus of survival lectures and training periods; and third, by screening survival publications and making available the most useful ones as required reading material.

The following lecture/training syllabus was utilized:

a. Lectures

(1) SE Asia Terrain Brief - 1 hr.

(2) SERE Briefs, by country - 3/1 hr. periods.

(3) Medical Survival Items; First Aid and Self Aid - 1 hr.

(4) Animals and Insects, Sharks and Sea Snakes - 1 hr.

(5) Prisoner of War/Geneva Convention/Code of Conduct - 1 hr.

(6) Ejection Seat Operation/Parachute Descent over Land and Water - 1 hr.

(7) Survival Equipment Presentation and Demonstration - 1 hr.

(8) Debate on Questionable Survival Equipment - as required:

(a) Size and type of survival knife.

(b) 9 mm. pistol vs 38 Cal. Revolver

(c) Practical usage vs. weight and bulk of excessive/redundant equipment.

(9) Aeromedical Topics - 4/1 hr. periods.

(a) Oxygen Sense

(b) Ejection Sense

(c) "G" Sense

(d) Night Vision Sense

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(10) Combat Status Mishap/Malfunction Reporting Procedures and Responsibilities.

(11) Review of Medical Survival - 1 hr. (just prior to first combat operations)

b. Drills

(1) Flight and Survival Gear Inspection.

(2) Disarmed Ejection Seat Drill

(3) Parachute Separation Drills (using overhead hoist, and spreader bar with short length of risers and Koch fittings attached)

(a) Proper Release of Koch Fittings.

(b) Descent from Chute Caught in Trees (technique described in personal/Survival Equipment Crossfeed 1-66)

(4) Pistol Shoot - 9 mm. and 38 cal. ball ammo.

(5) Flare Shoot:

(a) MK 13 Day and Night Signals

(b) Pencil Flare Gun

Comparison of max height of trajectories

(c) 38 cal. Tracers

(6) Water Survival/Helo Pickup - by arrangement with ship/station helo detachment.

c. Schools

(1) SERE School (Brunswick/North Island) - completion required prior entering combat operations.

(2) Aviation Physiology Training Unit Courses - all crews current IAW COMNAVAIRLANT INST 3740.11C

(3) Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST) - required one-day-and-one-night course at NAS Cubi Point, for all flight crews. Request quotas from DEPCOMFAIRWESTPAC.

2. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT REFERENCES.

The following are basic references from pre-deployment planning and submission of requirements:

(a) COMNAVAIRLANT NOTICE 10470 of 18 OCT 65,

Subj: Aviators Jungle Personal/Survival Equipment

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(b) COMNAVAIRPAC NOTICE 13000 of 17 SEP 65,

Subj: Aviators Jungle Personal/Survival Equipment (included as encl. (1) to above CNAL NOTE).

(c) COMFAIRWESTPAC NOTICE 013000 of 9 JUN 66,

Subj: Aviators Personal Survival Equipment (U)

3. INDIVIDUAL SURVIVAL ITEMS.

(a) Survival Radios. Phase III of the program outlined by reference 2(c) above has been completed, meaning that all attack carrier squadron flight crew members have been provided with two late-model radios. In practice, each pilot and RIO of our squadron was issued a URC-10/RT-10A (one-piece, integral battery) radio to carry on his person; and a PRC-49E (two-piece, separate battery) radio was packed in each RSSK-1 seat kit in all aircraft. The RT-10 type radio is a real jewel--handy, compact, and with a very low failure rate (as compared to the PRC-49 series). We made fitted cloth pouches for our RT-10's, with neck straps and cut-outs for the speaker-phone, telescoping antenna, and operating switch. Normal carriage in a pocket on the survival vest is recommended, rather than around the neck. However, once in a survival situation, the radio can be pulled out, slung quickly aroung the neck, then carried and operated freely without requiring time and effort to remove from pouch or pocket.

(b) Flight Suits. The squadron found the Special Forces fatigues superior to all other flight suits/fatigues. (See comments under Material Control). Also recommend obtaining soft Marine fatigue caps for all flight crews. These can be stuffed into survival vest or flight suit pocket.

(c) SEEK-2 KITS. These two-package "soft-pack" kits are about the best thing the Navy has ever done in the field of personal survival equipment. They are far superior, in both content and compactness, to the "hard-shell" SEEK-1 Kits. An itemized list of contents is attached as addendum (1). The kits are issued by COMFAIRWESTPAC upon arrival. Each of the two packages measures 7½ X5X1¼ inches. Both can be accomodated in a single 7½X5X2½ inch pocket on the survival vest. Some people (especially the shorter ones) preferred to carry them in two flat pockets across the back of the survival vest, thus also providing a small back-pad.

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(d) Jungle Descent Line. For descending from a chute caught in high trees (trees 100' or higher are not uncommon in the hills of NVM), each crew member was issued 100 feet of Type III shroud line. This 500-pound test line is less bulky than the ½ inch tybular nylon described in Cross-feed 1-66, yet still plenty strong to support any known pilot/RIO, provided the proper technique is employed. The trick is to release one Koch fitting at a time, after the descent line is rigged and tied to the chute risers, and at the same time lowering oneself gently onto the support of the shroud line. A word to the unwary: if you release both Koch fittings simultaneously and "drop" onto the shroud line support, a combination of high G-loading and instant friction heating on the shroud line will pop the line and dump you quickly to the deck almost every time.

(e) Signal Panels. The Air Force SAR people recommend carrying a bright-colored cloth panel for visual ground-to-air signalling. Our paraloft made up 12 X 36 inch reversible flourescent red and chartreuse panels for all flight crews to carry.

(f) Water Bottles. A canteen is pretty bulky to carry around in the cockpit, but a plastic 8oz. baby bottle makes an effective water container that can easily be placed in a pocket on the survival vest. The Air Force is now issuing these baby bottles to all their SEASIA combat crews. According to Dengler and others, thirst is one of the most immediate problems upon "arriving" in a survival situation, so a ready "nip" at the beginning is a good thing to have.

(g) Pencil Flares. Green and yellow pencil flare cartridges are recommended, since red ones may in some cases be mistaken for flak or small arms fire. The green and yellow cartridges are not currently available in Navy supply, but may be ordered open purchase from Penguim Associates, Pennsylvania Avenue, Malverin, Pennsylvania. Recommend at least four each of red, yellow, and green for each crew member.

(h) Pistols. The Air Wing obtained sufficient Smith & Wesson 9 mm. automatic pistols for all flight crews. However, no tracer (signalling) ammunition is available for it, and the gun is reported to jam occasionally. Many crew-men continue to carry the .38 revolver, with both ball and tracer ammo. (The tracers will rise at least twice as high through a jungle canopy as a pencil flare cartridge).

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(i) Plastic Survival Charts. Ship's AI obtained these upon first arrival at Cubi, and issued them to all flight crews. North Vietnam, and much of Laos, is covered in six 1:250,000 charts printed back-to-back on three plastic sheets. Some or all of these can be folded and placed in a flight suit pocket. The plastic sheets can be used as a poncho or ground cover.

(j) Blood Chits and Morphine Styrettes. These are issued by AI and the Flight Surgeon, respectively, prior to arrival "on the Line".

(k) Ammonia Ampules. Four of these were taped inside each front and rear cockpit, and four more issued to each aircrewman. (We didn't have to use any, but they could mean the difference in keeping you conscious if injured, until you're back to the ship or at least out to sea.)

(l) Hack Wrist Watches. AirLant recommended approval to NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ and submitted our requisitions for obtaining "issue" wrist watches for flight crews. (Those personal engraved and fancy ones with sweet sentiments are best left in the drawer, along with all rings, etc.) We have never received either final word on our request, or the watches. Recommend additional follow-up via AirLant, to see if you can obtain these. (Ref: VF-14 ltr ser 282 of 14 JUN 66; CNAL-332B ltr ser 3354 of 6 JUL 66, Subj: Aviators Hack Wrist Watches).

(m) Torso Harness/Survival Vest Rigs. Most people in the squadron have used the MA-2P pressure suit harness and modified SV-1/2 Survival Vest combination satisfactorily throughout the cruise. Three F-4 ejections, all successful, were made with it, and all involved water floatation, with the MK-3C life preserver attached to the survival vest (a clip from the bottom of the vest to the torso harness on each side adequately restrains the MK-3C from riding up too high). This MA-2P harness/vest combination is much cooler, provides better freedom of movement, and enables quicker access to injured torso areas of the body, than does the standard cloth-enclosed torso harness. As to type and location of pockets on the survival vest, there seem to be no two people who want exactly the same thing. Therefore, we have found it best to standardize where possible, but allow each crew member to arrange individually with the Paraloft for exact location of pockets and gear on his own vest.

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CONTENTS OF SEEK-2 SURVIVAL KIT; PACKET NO. 1 - MEDICAL

1. LIQUID SOAP (PHISOHEX)
2. KLING BANDAGE (ELASTIC GAUZE, 2 inch x 5 yards)
3. SUN AND BUG REPELLENT OINTMENT (1 oz. tube)
4. RAZOR KNIFE (folding)
5. INSECT REPELLENT, WIPE-ON TOWELETTES (6)

   Alternate Uses (only after completely dry):

   --Fire Starter
   --Toilet Paper

6. EYE OINTMENT (1/8 oz. tube) (BACITRACIN OPHTHALMIC)
7. LEECH REPELLENT, LIQUID (½ oz. plastic bottle) (N,NDIETHYL-META-TOLUAMIDE)
8. INSECT REPELLENT, LIQUID (½ oz. plastic bottle) (N,N-DIETHYL TOLUAMIDES)
9. ASPININ TABLETS (16)
10. ANTISEPTIC OINTMENT (½ oz. tube) (BACITRACIN-NEOMYCIN) (for wounds & burn)
11. DIARRHEA TABLETS (12) (DIPHENOXYLATE HYDROCHLORIDE & ATROPINE SULFATE)
12. ANTI-MALARIA TABLETS (4) (CHLOROQUINE & PRIMAQUINE PHOSPHATE)
13. ANTI-CHAP LIPSTICK
14. TWEEZERS (1 pr.) & SAFETY PINS (5)
15. ANTI-INFECTION TABLETS (18) (OXYTETRACYCLINE)
16. BAND-AIDS (6)
17. ALERTNESS TABLETS (5) (DEXTRO AMPHETAMINE SULFATE)
18. SALT TABLETS (24)
19. ANTI-MOTION SICKNESS TABLETS (12) (MECLIZINE HYDROCHLORIDE)

--- ALUMINUM FOIL, HEAVY DUTY (7 x 10 in. sheet)

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CONTENTS OF SEEK-2 SURVIVAL KIT; PACKET NO. 2 - GENERAL

20. SOAP, Cake (DIAL)

21. MIRROR, SIGNALLING (2in x 3in)

22. WATERPROOF MATCHES (12) AND FLINT

23. COMBINATION HACKSAW AND KNIFE BLADE (use pencil flare gun for handle)

24. SUNGLASSES (plastic lenses with elastic headband)

25. FIRE STARTER SHEETS (4 - 3in x 2in impregnated) & TINDER (Cotton)

26. FLASHLIGHT & CORD (Miniature)

27. WATERPROOF RECEPTACLES (2) (PROPHYLACTICS)

28. SPONGE (2½ x 5in, compressed)

29. ARROWHEAD (metal)

30. CANDLE (3½in)

31. FISHING KIT (LURES, HOOKS, & SINKERS) & FISHING LINE

32. WATER PURIFICATION TABLETS (50) (IODINE)

33. SEWING KIT (3 assorted needles, 3 assorted safety pins, thread)

34. CANDY (Large Tootsie Roll)

35. MOSQUITO HEADNET & MITTENS (Nylon)

36. WIRE SAW

37. COMPASS, WRIST

38. BOUILLON CUBES, BEEF (4)

--- ALUMINUM FOIL, HEAVY DUTY (7 x 10in sheet)

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OPERATIONS REVIEW

FIGHTER MISSIONS

A. BARCAP Consists of two or more F-4's providing protection for support aircraft. They are positioned to engage any MIG threat to friendly airborne forces. Aircraft fly a loose deuce formation and altitudes vary from 5000-20,000 feet.

B. TARCAP Is deployed in the immediate target area to engage enemy air opposing the strike group. The loose deuce formation is generally employed and the altitude most generally utilized is 5000-6000 feet.

C. ARMED RECONNAISSANCE A section of aircraft deployed to reconnoiter pre-briefed routes and attack targets of opportunity. Authorized targets are governed by the current rules of engagement but generally consist of those composing the enemy's LOC. The operational formation favored for this role is the loose deuce during day missions. At night the wingman generally flies a radar trail 3-5 miles astern and both aircraft carry 3 MK 24 flares. Altitudes for recce work generally run between 5000-6000 feet.

D. PHOTO ESCORT One F-4 escort to accompany the photo aircraft on his reconnaissance or bomb assessment damage mission. The F-4 flies in an offset trail position in order to spot flak for the photo aircraft and to provide MIG protection.

E. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT Two F-4's, under control of an airborne Forward Air Controller, are directed against selected targets in and out of NVM.

F. STRIKE Usually four or more F-4's composing one bombing element on a coordinated strike. The F-4 has proved very effective in this role.

G. FLAK SUPPRESSION Usually two or more F-4's in company with the Strike Group. Ordnance carried and tactics employed are generally directed by the strike leader.

GENERAL TACTICS

The Loose Deuce section was generally utilized. It is the best operational formation both from the standpoint of lookout doctrine/radar search and mutual support.

Altitudes flown over the beach vary between 5000-6000 feet as this is the best compromise to meet both the SAM and AAA threat. Airspeeds over the beach varied between 350-400 knots depending on mission and predominant threat. The slower speed was utilized when possible during recce work to increase the chance of spotting lucrative targets.

Constant [illegible] in both azimuth and altitude greatly decreases the chance of being [illegible] by AAA fire and this tactic was strictly adhered to when over any portion of NVN.

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SAM EVASION TACTICS

Proficiency in Split "S" and high G spiral is necessary in the combat environment in North Vietnam and should be practiced at every opportunity, including at night, prior to deployment. Do not rush the night work, however, and be sure of the terrain over which you're working. VX-5's AEN on anti-SAM tactics provides excellent basic guidance and maneuvers from which to start. All pilots must be aware of the altitude/airspeed combinations which permit the safe execution of complete split "S" break.

AIR-TO-GROUND DELIVERY TACTICS

This squadron employed steep dive angles (45°-60°), weather permitting, in order to minimize risk and to increase accuracy of ordnance delivery. Afterburners were used in pull up prior to rolling in so as to decrease the time of vulnerability and minimise risk. Release altitudes should be above 4500 feet, and generally, 6000 feet is preferable. Minimum pull out altitude should be 3000. Although the ORI does not provide a realistic proportion of "testing" in the Air-to-Ground mission, a large part of the pre-deployment training cycle must be devoted to this work. Practice varying entry conditions of altitude and airspeed (there is no such thing as a "canned run" in North Vietnam). For variety (the bad weather days) it will be worthwhile to practice 10° and 20° rocket runs with a maximum simulated altitude of 5000 feet.

AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING

This squadron encountered no air opposition on this deployment. However, the frequency of MIG encounters in the area of operations is increasing and proficiency in ACM should be stressed in predeployment training. Knowledge of the enemy's aircraft weapon systems, and air-to-air tactics is essential for a combat ready F-4 squadron. VX-4 AEN on Air Combat Maneuvering provides an excellent text.

COORDINATED STRIKE PRACTICE

Coordinated strikes were scheduled with increasing frequency during our tour on the line. The "group-grope" should be practiced as a confidence builder. Discounting flak and SAM's, there is nothing quite like 16 to 20 airplanes diving into the same air space to release ordnance at approximately the same time. Coordinated attacks can be realistically practiced by a division of airplanes on almost any type target (less ordnance). Getting to the right point in space at the right time is the important thing here, and it does take practice. Coordinated strikes on heavily defended targets take much planning and demand a high degree of proficiency in execution.

CONFIGURATION

Notwithstanding the maximum gross wight/wind-over-over-deck limitations of the FDR; the optimum F-4 configuration was found to be as follows:

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STA 1&9: Tank pylons W/adapters MER or TER

STA 2 : LAU-17, 2 LAU 7A, AIM 9D or 9B

STA 8 : LAU-17 W/adapter, TER

STA 5 : 600 gallon tank

STA 3&7: AIM 7E

STA 4&6: empty

This configuration permits all the flexibility necessary for Yankee Team operations. Bomb loads utilized ranged from 4 MK81's to 12 82's, or 4 82's and 4 83's for the Alfa strikes. Six LAU 3A's have been utilized. More than 6 rocket packs are impractable for the flak suppression role since the F-4 has no rocket ripple capability. Incorporation of rocket pairs is a must. LAU-10's have been utilized but infrequently due to the ship's requirement to return the empties for reload. LAU-10's should be loaded on stations 1 & 9 to minimize the possibility of FOD from the rocket motors. It is undesirable to carry any ordnance hardware back to the ship both from the drag and the landing weight penalties realized. The items underlined above remained on the airplane at all times. There was no adapter utilized on station 2. This was to permit the carriage of the AIM 9D missiles. Once adapter hardware becomes available (LAU-17 to LAU-7/AIM 9D with TER installed) it is recommended that the TER adapter be left on station 2 as well.

Missile loads for armed recce missions were one AIM 9 and one AIM 7E. The "Echos" were utilized exclusively. BARCAP and TARCAP loading was 2 and 2 during the day and 1 and 1 at night. The missile load was reduced to permit increased landing fuel. The 35,000 lbs. max landing clearance was not utilized except as subsequently noted. When the 35,000 lbs. clearance was received for the MK 7 mod I arresting gear, an attempt was made to utilize this added 1,000 lbs. of landing weight. Immediately the mumber of wing stringer cracks multiplied. Although not factually substantiated, it is believed that the 35,000 lbs. weight and the occasionally hard landings at this weight contributed to this structural damage. In view of this development, 35,000 lbs. traps were not utilized except in special circumstances.

ECM EQUIPMENT

Four airplanes were equipped with the APR-24 passive and warning gear immediately prior to deployment. This equipment, due to its low reliability, lack of spare parts, an trained AO/AT's to maintain it, an coupled with the extremely "dirty" EW environment of North Vietnam, provided little or no improvement in operational capability of the F-4 weapons system.

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At approximately the midpoint of this deployment, wiring diagrams and the "black box" for the APR-27 warning gear were available to the squadron. The equipment has proven to be dependable in its operation and reliable it its warning. All airplanes operating in the SAM environment should have this or similar equipment. It suffices to say that the air crew needs every advantage possible when dealing with the SAM. In addition, equipment such as the ALQ-51 is urgently needed in F-4 aircraft to operate in this area of operations.

TANKERS

Whenever possible the F-4 should commence their first approach at maximum trap fuel. The KA-4 may be effectively utilized in this role to "Top-Off" the F-4. However, due to the KA-4's normally limited amount of give away fuel (2000 maximum without refilling the store), and its slow transfer rate, it has proven to be ineffective as an emergency tanker for the F-4. It has been demonstrated on several occasions at night that a low state F-4 on a bolter or a wave off will be back on the ball with just about the same fuel as the previous pass after having received 2000 lbs. from a KA-4. In addition, the less than optimum reliability of the store precludes reliance on the KA-4 in any emergency tanking situation. This squadron's policy was to recommend tanking at 2000-2400 lbs. at night and 1500 to 2000 lbs. during the day - depending on the pilot's performance and the condition of the pattern. At night the pilot was directed to tank to an amount so that his next ball call was at 35,000 lbs. gross weight. This permitted him one extra pass over what he normally would anticipate, plus a little extra fuel for "irregularities" in the pattern. This tanking was done from the KA-3 with no particular problems. Emergency tanking switchology: INTERNAL ONLY, IFR TO EXTEND ONLY (NOT TO REFUEL). Tanking must become a very matter-of-fact evolution and proficiency in tanking is absolutely essential for S. E. Asia operations. Tanking at 50,000 lbs. gross weight with 12 MK 82's presents no problems except for the expected higher power settings required to hang in there.

NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE

Night reconnaissance continues to be the most demanding mission flown in S. E. A. VF-14 letter of 8 September 1966 (CONF) discusses procedures in detail. Most important, get plenty of night work prior to deployment. The more practice you have at it, the more comfortable and confident you will feel.

MINIMUMS

The Air Wing has established specific minimum ceiling and visibility limits for bombs and rocket delivery, i.e. 8000 feet and 5 and 5000 feet and 5 respectively. These have worked well and the limited combat damage and loss sustained by the Air Wing speaks well for these criteria. If you stay above 3500 feet and 350 knots and jink constantly, your chances at being hit by AAA or AW are reduced. Disregard these minimums and tactics and you are increasing your chances of being a combat statistic.

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OP ORDERS

Squadrons should obtain their own copies of CTF 77 Yankee Team Op Order 320-YR and COMSEVENTH Fleet Op Order 201-YR. All aircrews should be intimately familiar with the contents of these two publications prior to deployment. Although many briefings on this material will be given, a solid background on the contents of these publications is highly desirable.

MISSILES

The AIM 9D became available during the final line period. In order to satisfactorily carry these missiles, the LAU-17 missile pylons had to be configured for missile carriage only, due to the lack of proper adapter hardware. It should be noted that because of the unavailability of MK 15 2 pulse fuzed, the 9D's full capability against maneuvering targets cannot be realized. This should be briefed in the event the situation has not improved in the immediate future.
AIM 7E's were carried exclusively. They have proved to be highly reliable and very sensitive. Do not be alarmed if your missiles tune on the flight deck or in close formation with missile power in standby. The F-4 next to you probably has his 157 on. The surest test is an airborne 5 minute steady select light. AMREP cards must be completed on all flights. Bring a good supply with you. Prior to deployment, missiles, particularly AIM 7's, should be carried whenever possible - even at the expense of 435 lbs. max trap fuel. Having a select light with a 7E waffer is a bit different from the real thing. It will take a while to get all the bugs out of the aircraft system and the bad missiles sorted out. Pocket note book records by the ordnance crew as to what missiles were on what planes and which stations frequently helps resolve problem areas without detailed trouble shooting.

CREW STABILITY

All possible effort should be made to obtain a firm roster of air crews prior to deployment. Under no circumstances should nugget pilots and RO's be sent to a squadron after the first period on the line. It is felt that such personnel represent a liability to the squadron that can cause no end of problems. Regardless of the Level Readiness concept, an Ensign with 99 hours in type and a total of 20 carrier landings, the last of which may have been a month and a half prior to reporting, is not ready to perform the assigned missions of Yankee Team operations. The squadron "on the line" is hard pressed and ill-equipped to provide him with the necessary experience and proficiency. The answer here is crew stability. Where replacements are necessary because of losses, they should be made with more experienced personnel, even at the cost of some stateside or Mediterranean squadron instability. Sixteen to eighteen crews appears to be adequate to handle the routine F-4 squadron commitments.

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1966 OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

MONTH	FLIGHT TIME (Hours)	SORTIES	CARRIER LANDINGS Day	CARRIER LANDINGS Night
JANUARY	219	186	40	10
FEBRUARY	249	162	50	16
MARCH	348	242	00	00
APRIL	302	254	48	11
MAY	330	231	128	28
JUNE	290	222	72	32
JULY	87	52	45	00
AUGUST	567	352	213	98
SEPTEMBER	349	202	108	73
OCTOBER	264	161	112	04
NOVEMBER	394	229	145	70
DECEMBER	443	251	207	30
TOTAL	3842	2544	1168	372

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEARS INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Enclosure (4)

[redacted]

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OPERATIONS STATISTICAL SUMMARY

CRUISE DATA 21 JUNE to 27 DECEMBER 1966

HOURS 2060
SORTIES 1137
DAY CV LDG 830
NIGHT CV LDG 275

COMBAT DATA

LINE PERIOD	PILOTS/RO's	HRS	SORTIES	LANDINGS D/N
10 AUG-12 SEP	15/15	725	411	246/165
20 OCT-12 NOV	17/17	454	260	198/62
24 NOV-27 DEC	15/15	506	296	250/40
TOTALS	-----	1685	967	694/267

DISTRIBUTION OF SORTIES BY TYPE

CAP (BARRIER/FORCE)	514	53%
ARMED RECCE/STRIKE	318	33%
TAR CAP	67	6.8%
ESCORT/WX RECCE	55	5.8%
CAS (FAC CONTROL)	8	.8%
MISCELLANEOUS	5	.6%
TOTAL	967	100%

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

MK 81 Bombs	427	
MK 82 "	418	
MK 83 "	18	
MK 24 Flares	541	
2.75" Rkts	9709	(511 LAU 3A Pods)
ZUNI Rkts	156	(44 LAU 10A Pods)
20mm	140	(MK 4 GunPod)
AIM 9B	6	(Training)
AIM 7E	1	(Training)

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Enclosure (4)

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FOREWORD

Only in recent years has the submission of squadron activities been required. Because of the absence of reports in the earlier years and conflicting statements in the various reference materials used in preparing Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN History, this report is in fact limited in coverage. However, the facts stated herein are authenic and can be verified.

Gratitude must be expressed to Mr. A. O. Van Wyen, Naval Aviation Historian, for his help and advice in writing this history.

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The squadron had its first taste of war aboard the USS RANGER. A part of a huge task force, it struck and invaded the North African Coast near Casablanca on November 8-11, 1942. VS-41 destroyed 16 fighters, strafed enemy ships and airfields, and provided air coverage for landing operations. Although five TOPHATTER pilots were shot down, all were recovered in good health.

In February 1943, the TOPHATTERS were redesignated VB-41 under the command of LCDR J. P. LUNGER. In March the squadron boarded the USS RANGER for war exercises in Argentina. The USS RANGER met and provided air coverage for the SS QUEEN MARY on the last half of the voyage carrying Prime Minister Winston Churchill to his meeting in Quebec with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the same year the squadron flew the SBD-3 DAUNTLESS and on 4 August 1943 became designated once again as VB-4 under LCDR R. M. MILNER.

VB-4 took part in the first American naval strikes in Norway against German forces on the fifth of October 1943. VB-4 was then attached to Air Group FOUR and this CAG attacked German vessels in Norway's inner channel at Bodo Harbor, Alter Fjord, and Kinna Head. 40,000 Tons of enemy shipping were rendered useless, but the squadron lost two aircraft in the encounter.

In October 1944, under the command of LCDR G. O. KLINSMANN, VB-4 boarded the USS BOUGANVILLE for further transfer to the USS BUNKER HILL (CV-17) at Saipan. For the following four weeks, the TOPHATTERS made numerous strikes in the Phillipines and vicinity. They provided support for the landings of Leyte and struck at Ormoc Bay and Luzon. On 1 December 1944, the squadron went aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and participated in blanket operations over Luzon in connection with the Mindoro landing.

The TOPHATTERS were among the first to operate in the China Sea area (January 1945). From 3 until 9 January, the squadron flew sorties against Formosa, Okinawa, and Northern Luzon in support of the Lingayen landing. The TOPHAT could also be seen at Iwo Jima and the Ryukyus.

The TOPHATTERS war record is indeed impressive. It is one of the very few squadrons that saw action in both the Atlantic and Pacific campaigns. The squadron received FIVE Battle Stars:

1. North Africa Landing, 8-11 November 1942 on USS RANGER
2. Norway Raids, 2-6 October 1943 on USS RANGER
3. Support of Leyto Operations, November 1944 on USS BUNKER HILL
4. Support of Mindora and Lingayen Operations, December 1944 - June 1945 on USS ESSEX
5. Support of Iwo Jima Operations, February 1945 on USS ESSEX.

The squadron also received two Presidential Unit Citations as units on board the USS BUNKER HILL and the USS ESSEX. After participating in the first naval carrier air strikes on Tokyo, the squadron under LCDR H. W. CALHOUN returned to the States.

At first VB-4 was stationed at Alemeda, California, but was soon moved to Watsonville, California. On 8 July 1945, VB-4 was transferred to COMNAVAIRLANT and reported to Wildwood, New Jersey on 17 July via Quonset Point and there the squadron remained until the formal victory of the Allies and the end of World War II.

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observed this pilot on one of his sprees and proposed the TOPHAT as the new squadron insignia. Fighter Squadron ONE unananimously approved as its new insignia the TOPHAT which has remained to the present although the squadron has been known at various times as the HIGH HATTERS, HAT-IN-THE-RING, and presently, the TOPHATTERS.

In the early 1930's due to the prevailing economic condition of the country arising from the stock market crash, naval aviation was adversely affected and operations were very limited. During this period the TOPHAT sailed on the wooden flight deck of the USS SARATOGA (CV-3) and remained attached to the "SARA" from 1929 to 1938. The squadron's home port was then San Diego, California. From 1927 to 1933 the squadron flew five aircraft: FB-5, F2B, F8C-4, and the F4B-3. In July of 1931, LCDR G. F. BOGAN returned to the reins for the second time. He was relieved on 4 June 1932 by LCDR F. P. SHERMAN (4), who on 1 July 1933 turned over his command to LCDR M. T. SELIGMAN.

Later, the squadron's designation was again changed. On 1 July 1934, it became known as VB-2B still flying the F4B-3. With the new designation came a new skipper, LCDR A. P. FLAGG. The squadron was destined to remain VB-2B for three years. In 1937 they were informed that again their designation would be changed. So frequently were designations changed that the following excerpt is found in BAUER NEWS LETTER NO 48 of 15 April 1937:

> "We are proud of 'Bombing Two'. We have held that name for nearly three years, and we hope we have borne it with credit. Before that we worked hard for Fighting One....Tradition forms a large part of the foundation of the Navy, and the tradition of any unit is connected with the name of that unit. We build our tradition on a number and the number changes. We rebuild the tradition and again the number changes...."

Apparently this little writeup had no influence for on 1 July 1937, VB-2B became VB-3. That same year the squadron received the SD2U-1 VINDICATOR and a new CO in September, LCDR I. D. WILTSIE.

In 1938, VB-3 boarded the USS RANGER (CV-4) with their VINDICATORS. In 1939 the squadron was renamed VB-4 and on 15 March 1941, it became VS-41. A month later LCDR William G. HARRIS assumed command. The squadron changed their bunks from the USS RANGER to the USS YORKTOWN (CV-5) for short operational cruises.

May 1941 found VS-41 in Norfolk still flying their VINDICATORS. The squadron once again boarded the USS RANGER for various exercises and upon a cruise to the Cape of Good Hope, they received word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. For the remainder of 1941 and early 1942, VS-41 trained for action in Bermuda, Norfolk, and Quonset Point. In April 1942, the squadron furnished detachments for the USS RANGER while she transported Army aircraft to Africa. Skipper HARRIS was relieved by LCDR CARPENTER in May, but the new commanding officer was killed just two days later; the succeeding CO, LCDR L. P. CARVER, took command on 1 June 1942.

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4. ADMIRAL F. P. SHERMAN won fame in the Pacific for his actions during World War II.

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Shortly after the war, the TOPHATTERS operated from Norfolk and sailed on the USS GUADALCANAL and the USS TARAWA. In 1946 the squadron began flying the SB2C-5 HELLDIVER and on 15 November, VB-4 was redesignated VA-1A. On 1 May 1947, VA-1A was shore-based at San Diego. During that year, the squadron deployed for short operational cruises aboard the USS TARAWA.

On March 17, 1948, VA-1A received their first F4U CORSAIR and on the 24th of June, 1948, LCDR James W. WYRICK assumed command, but was shortly relieved by LCDR L. E. BURKE, Jr., on 27 July 1948(5)Approximately three weeks later, VA-14 deployed aboard the USS TARAWA with Air Group ONE for a round-the-world-cruise. After completion of this cruise, VA-14 received orders that its home station would be Cecil Field, Florida, and on 19 December 1949 was designated Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN (VF-14) with an all-weather intercept mission; LCDR R. C. COATS became skipper. From 1949 through 1953 the TOPHATTERS boarded many "fighting ladies" for short operational cruises: USS LEYTE, USS PHILIPPINE SEA, USS SIBONEY, USS SAIPAN, USS ORISKANY, USS KULA GULF, USS WASP, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN, and the USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42).

By 1954 the TOPHATTERS were prepared for the advent of the jet. Receiving 12 F3D SKYKNIGHT all-weather fighters in January 1954, VF-14 deployed to Key West for intensive night interceptor training. It was during this period that VF-14 adopted their motto: "WE DO NOT FLY IN SPITE OF THE WEATHER, BUT WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF IT". LCDR V. E. BINION was then in command.

In the early fall of 1955 the TOPHATTERS were informed that they were "number one on the list" to train in the Navy's newest night fighter, the F3H-2N DEMON. On 8 March 1956 the squadron received its first DEMON. From 1957 to 1959, VF-14 participated in two Mediterranean deployments, a NATO cruise, and numerous fleet exercises, all aboard the USS FDR, affectionately known as the "ROSIE". For superior performance in fiscal 1959, the TOPHATTERS were awarded the Commander Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet Battle Efficiency "E" and the Chief of Naval Operations Safety Award (both awards as all-weather interceptor squadron).

VF-14 operations for fiscal 1960 consisted of two fleet exercises, a weapons system evaluation, and a Mediterranean deployment aboard the ROSIE. Again VF-14 copped the COMNAVAIRLANT Battle Efficiency "E" and the CNO Safety Award (for all-weather interceptors).

During fiscal 1961 FITRON 14 once more proved itself as the best all-weather fighter squadron in the Navy. Adding another FIRST to its record, the TOPHATTERS won BOTH the COMNAVAIRLANT and CNO awards marking THREE consecutive winning years (Fiscal 1959-60-61). During fiscal 1961, Fightin' FOURTEEN participated in a short Caribbean training cruise and another extended Mediterranean tenure aboard the USS FDR.

The TOPHATTERS, known for many years as the "World's First and Foremost Fighter Squadron", feel that they have established a history that more than entitles them to this slogan: First in origin, Foremost in achievements!

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5. The squadron was redeignated Attack Squadron FOURTEEN (VA-14) on 2 AUG 48.

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ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE VF-14 TOPHATTERS

SEP 1919	An element of Air Detachment, Pacific Fleet at San Diego, California
15 JUN 1920	Torpedo Plane Squadron FIVE (VT-5)
7 SEP 1921	Patrol Squadron 4-1 (VP-4-1)
23 SEP 1921	Combat Squadron FOUR (VF-4)
1 JUL 1922	Fighting Plane Squadron ONE (VF-1)
1 JUL 1927	VF-1B
1 JUL 1934	VB-2B
1 JUL 1937	VB-3
1 JUL 1939	VB-4
15 MAR 1941	VS-41
1 MAR 1943	VB-41
4 AUG 1943	VB-4
15 NOV 1946	VA-1A
2 AUG 1948	VA-14
19 DEC 1949	VF-14

Reference: Aviation Historian
Room 2303A
Munitions Building
Constitution Avenue
Washington 25, D. C.

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YEAR	AIRCRAFT	SQUADRON
1920	NM	Torpedo Plane Squadron 5
1921	R6L VE-7SF	Patrol Squadron 4-1 Combat Squadron 4
1922	JN - partial compliment	Fighter Squadron 1 (VF-1)
1923	TS-1	
1927	FB-5	VF-1 insignia adopted
1928	F2B	
1930	F8C-4	
1932	F4B	
1933	F4B-3	
1934		VB-2B
1936	BFC-2	
1937	SD2U-1 "VINDICATOR"	VB-3
1939		VB-4
1941		VS-41
1943 1944	SBD-3 SBD-4 "DAUNTLESS"	VB-41 - later in 1943 became VB-4 again.
1946	SB2C-5 "HELL DIVER"	VA-1A
1948	F4U-4 "CORSAIR"	VA-14
1949		Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN (VF-14)
1951	F4U-5 "CORSAIR"	
1954	F3D-2 "SKYKNIGHT"	"WE DO NOT FLY IN SPITE OF THE WEATHER, BUT WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF IT", motto adopted.
1956 to present	F3H-2N "DEMON"	

Reference: Aviation Historian
Room 2303-A
Munitions Building
Constitution Avenue
Washington 25, D. C.

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AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ON WHICH VF-14 AND ITS PREDECESSORS SAILED

1926	USS LANGLEY (CV-1) - First aircraft carrier
1929	USS SARATOGA (CV-3)
1938	USS RANGER (CV-4)
1941	USS YORKTOWN (CV-5)
1942	USS RANGER (CV-4)
1943	USS BOUGANVILLE
1944	USS BUNKER HILL (CV-17) USS ESSEX (CV-9) USS LONG ISLAND (CVE-1)
1945	USS ROI (CVE-103)
1946	USS TARAWA (CV-40)
1948	USS BOXER (CV-21)
1949	USS TARAWA (CV-40) USS LEYTE (CV-32)
1950	USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
1951	USS SIBONEY (CVE-112) USS SAIPAN (CVL-48) USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) USS KULA GULF (CVE-108)
1952	USS WASP (CVA-18) USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)
1953	USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42)
1954	USS INTREPID (CVA-11)
1956	USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59)
1957 to present	USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVA-42)

Reference: Fleet Movement Center
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

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COMMANDING OFFICERS 1919-1962

CAPT H. C. MUSTIN	1919
LCDR E. W. SPENCER	15 JUN 1920
LCDR W. MASEK	23 SEP 1921
LCDR P. M. BATES	4 MAY 1922
LCDR H. C. WICK	JUL 1924
LCDR R. F. WOOD	MAR 1925
LCDR G. F. BOGAN	JAN 1927
LCDR H. C. WICK	JUL 1928
LCDR A. W. RADFORD	JUL 1930
LCDR G. F. BOGAN	JUL 1931
LCDR F. P. SHERMAN	4 JUN 1932
LCDR M. T. SELIGMAN	1 JUL 1933
LCDR A. P. FLAGG	JUL 1934
LCDR E. W. LITCH	29 JUN 1935
LCDR I. D. WILTSIE	SEP 1937
LCDR R. E. BLICK	OCT 1939
LCDR H. V. HOPKINS	1940
LCDR W. S. HARRIS	APR 1941
LCDR CARPENTER	MAY 1942
LCDR L. P. CARVER	1 JUN 1942
LCDR J. P. LUNGER	DEC 1942
LCDR R. M. MILNER	1943
LCDR G. O. KLINSMANN	1944
LCDR H. W. CALHOUN	6 JUN 1945
CDR J. K. CLIFFORD	18 JUL 1947
LCDR J. W. WYRICK	24 JUN 1948
LCDR L. E. BURKE, Jr.	27 JUL 1948
LCDR R. C. COATS	10 JUN 1950
LCDR J. C. KENNEDY	DEC 1951
LCDR V. E. BINION	DEC 1952
CDR R. F. TRUDEAU	JAN 1954
CDR A. D. ROACH, Jr.	APR 1955
CDR A. D. LEACH	10 APR 1957
CDR M. G. O'NEILL	1 NOV 1957
CDR C. BAUMEISTER, Jr.	19 JUN 1959
LCDR C. I. TULLY	16 SEP 1960
CDR W. F. CHAIRES	16 DEC 1960
CDR E. M. CADENAS	16 JAN 1962

Reference: NAVY DIRECTORIES
VF-14 Historical File
Naval Aviation Historian