


1967

CARRIER AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO 96601



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FF12/VAN-113
ADMIN: JEG/cn

Ser 01
25 MAR 1968

(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE
HUNDRED THIRTEEN

To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05A5G)

Subj: Command History for Calendar Year 1967 (OPNAV REPORT 5750-1);
submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12 (CH-1)

Encl: (1) VAN-113 Command History - 1967

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.



W. Dehart

W. DEHART

Copy to:
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09B9)
CCAENW-11

Reg. 868 532

4/2/68



Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DIR 5200.10

1967 CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS OF VAW-113

20 April VAW-113 Commissioned at NAS North Island, San Diego, California, Commander J. R. Eckstein Commanding.

29 April Departed CONUS aboard USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) as a unit of Attack Carrier Air Wing FOURTEEN (CVW-14) enroute to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

5 May-7May Arrived Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and commenced Operational Readiness Inspection.

9 May Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

12 May Crossed International Date Line.

15 May OPCON SEVENTH FLEET

18 May-21 May In Port Yokosuka, Japan.

21 May Departed Yokosuka for Cubi Point, Philippines.

24 May-27 May In port Cubi Point, Philippines.

28 May-12 Jun Deployed in Viet Nam Combat Zone.

13 Jun-17 Jun In port Cubi Point, Philippines.

18 Jun-24 Jul Deployed in Viet Nam Combat Zone.

28 Jul-31 Jul In port Cubi Point, Philippines.

1 Aug-3 Sept Deployed in Viet Nam Combat Zone.

8 Sept-24 Sept In port Yokosuka, Japan and Hong Kong.

25 Sept-16 Oct Deployed in Viet Nam Combat Zone.

18 Oct-23 Oct In port Cubi Point, Philippines.

24 Oct-12 Nov Deployed in Viet Nam Combat Zone.

14 Nov-16 Nov In port Cubi Point, Philippines.

20 Nov-24 Nov In port Yokosuka, Japan.

26 Nov OPCON FIRST FLEET

28 Nov Crossed International Date Line.

4 Dec Arrived CONUS

4 Dec-31 Dec Post Deployment Leave

II. NARRATIVE

A. Command Organization.

1. Type Squadron.

a. Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN was commissioned on 20 April 1967 at NAS North Island, San Diego, California, Commander John R. Eckstein 508563/1310, USN, Commanding. Commander Eckstein remained in command throughout calendar year 1967.

b. Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (VAW-113) is a carrier based squadron charged with the primary mission of airborne early warning in the sense of Article 312 of NWP 32 (c) and as defined in Chapter 2 of NWIP 10-3(A), to the extent implied by the radar, radio, and data link capabilities of the E-2A Aircraft. Secondary missions developed and extensively utilized in the Viet Nam combat zone include Strike Control/Navigation Assist, Intercept Control, Nighthawk, Search and Rescue, Middleman, and Tanker Rendezvous.

2. Officers.

a. Commanding Officer

(1) BIOGRAPHY OF COMMANDER JOHN R. ECKSTEIN, COMMANDING OFFICER:

Commander John R. Eckstein was born in Massillon, Ohio on April 14, 1928, son of Mr. and Mrs. John A. Eckstein.

He enlisted in the Navy in April 1946 serving as an Aerial Photographer's Mate. In June 1947 he entered the Naval Aviation College Program attending John Carroll University. He was appointed a Midshipman in February 1949, designated a Naval Aviator in August 1950 and commissioned Ensign in February 1951. He received his Bachelor's Degree from the U. S. Naval

Postgraduate School in March 1961.

He has been awarded the Bronze Star, the Air Medal with three Gold Stars, the World War II Victory Medal, the Occupation Medal-Europe, the National Defense Service Medal, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Viet Nam Service Medal and the Viet Nam Campaign Medal.

Tours of duty with the Fleet include Fleet Air Service Squadron 7, Fighter Squadron 63, Fighter Squadron 194, Composite Squadron 7, Composite Squadron 8, a two year tour aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS LEYTE, Operations Officer of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ELEVEN Detachment DELTA and Officer-in-Charge of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ELEVEN Detachment CHARLIE. He was designated Officer-in-Charge, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ELEVEN Detachment FOXTROT in December 1966. Commander Eckstein assumed command of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN in April 1967.

He also served ashore at the Naval Aviation Technical Training Centers at Memphis, Tennessee and Jacksonville, Florida. In 1955 he was assigned to the Bureau of Aeronautics Representative's Office at Bristol, Tennessee. From February 1959 to March 1961 he attended the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California. From June 1963 to August 1966 he served as Maintenance Training Officer at Fleet Aviation Electronics Training Unit at Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California.

He is married to the former JoLind Benner of Memphis, Tennessee. They have three children: Karen, John and Michael. Commander Eckstein and his family reside in Bonita, California.

b. Executive Officer

(2) BIOGRAPHY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JACK L. BLACKWELL,
EXECUTIVE OFFICER:

Lieutenant Commander Jack L. Blackwell was born in Vicksburg, Mississippi on July 25th, 1933 son of Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Blackwell.

He entered the Navy in December 1953 in the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. He was commissioned an Ensign in January 1955 and designated a Naval Aviator in July 1955.

His decorations include the Viet Nam Campaign Medal, Viet Nam Service Medal with Bronze Star, Air Medal with three Gold Stars, National Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star, Navy Unit Commendation Medal, and the China Service Medal.

Tours of duty with the Fleet include Helicopter Utility Squadron ONE, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO, Assistant CIC Officer aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS ENTERPRISE, and Operations Officer of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ELEVEN Detachment DELTA. He was designated Assistant Officer-in-Charge, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ELEVEN Detachment FOXTROT in December 1966. Lieutenant Commander Blackwell was assigned as Executive Officer of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN in April 1967 at the time of the Squadron's commissioning.

He has served ashore at the Naval Aviation Technical Training Center at Glynco, Georgia and as a flight instructor at Training Squadron ONE, NAAS Saufley, Pensacola, Florida.

He is married to the former Elaine Eble of Cleveland, Ohio. They have three children: DeAnn, Susan and Dana. Lieutenant Commander Blackwell and his family reside in Coronado, California.

3. Command Composition

a. Aircraft

BUNO	MODEX
151710	NK 750
150527	NK 751
150534	NK 752
150532	NK 753

b. Aircraft Composite Photograph (Next Page).

c. Manpower Complement on 31 December 1967

(1) Officers	<u>24</u>
(2) Enlisted	<u>95</u>
(3) Personnel in Flight Status	<u>30</u>

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B. Operations Narrative.

29 April 1967 departed San Diego for an extended West Pac deployment under the operational control of Seventh Fleet.

5 May 1967 arrived Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to commence Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) administered by COMPAIRHAWAII.

5, 6, 7 May 1967 underwent ORI receiving a grade of 90.45%. Major problem areas were Link Eleven difficulties and low bogey detection rate on the first launch of the exercise.

28 May 1967 arrived on "Yankee Station" and flew first combat zone flights by this command.

11 June 1967 ended first line period on Yankee Station having built confidence in operations in this new environment. Performed Airborne Early Warning Mission and Strike Control Mission Primarily.

19 June 1967 returned to Yankee Station after in port period at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines. Continued combat operations.

24 July 1967 completed a 35 day line period on Yankee Station. This first lengthy period was marked by increased Nighthawk operations. This operation with E2A, OV-1B and A-4C aircraft from VAW-113, 131st Army Aviation Company and VA-146 respectively has been quite successful. Scheduled flights by the OV-1B along with two sections of A-4C aircraft have resulted in timely and accurate destruction of enemy road logistic traffic at night.

31 July 1967 departed Subic Bay nine days ahead of schedule to relieve the fire stricken USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59). Passed the FORRESTAL enroute to Yankee Station. Personnel transferred from FORRESTAL to CONSTELLATION briefed the crew on the disaster and showed the available films and video tape of the disaster.

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3 September 1967 completed a 38 day line period characterized by support of major coordinated strikes involving three CVAs and Air Force aircraft in the "Northeast Sector", the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. Departed Yankee Station for Yokosuka and upkeep and maintenance.

19 September 1967 arrived in Hong Kong for a five day visit.

12 November 1967 concluded Yankee Station operations having flown two daylight coordinated strikes and three cycles of night operations each day during this final line period. With the onset of cooler temperature and lower relative humidity one E2A flew a low station of coordinated strikes to enhance overland hostile aircraft detection.

4 December 1967 the command arrived in San Diego after stops in Subic Bay, R.P. and Yokosuka, Japan for transfer of certain material assets to relieving CVAs. This command flew four aircraft from the USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) to Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego to mark the end of operations for 1967. The balance of December was marked by post deployment leave for all but a skeleton work force.

C. Special Topics

1. Operational Statistics: These statistics reflect the period 1 May-12 November 1967. This includes the entire operation with the exception of 4 aircraft flying from USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) to NAS North Island on 4 December 1967.

(a) Flight Hours-Day/Night 1191.3/397.7

(b) Combat Support Hours-Day/Night 959.0/362.3

(c) Sorties-Day/Night 434/106

(d) Combat Support Sorties-Day/Night 342/93

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- (e) Arrested Landings-Day/Night 389/110
- (f) Average Number of Air Crews On Board 5
- (g) Number of Aircraft Lost 0
- (h) Sorties 637 (Assigned)
- (i) Sorties CANX Aircraft Down 48
- (j) Sorties CANX AIR OPERATIONS 37
- (k) Air Aborts 11

2. Maintenance.

a. The following are composite readiness percentages for the period 1 May to 11 November 1967.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Operationally Ready	46.1
Not Operationally Ready	53.9
Not Operationally Ready Supply	28.0
Not Operationally Ready Maintenance	25.9
Not Operationally Ready Scheduled Maintenance	7.8
Not Operationally Ready Unscheduled Maintenance	18.1

b. Problem Areas

(1) Maintenance problem areas included the normally dependable T-56-8A engine. Three engine failures without sufficient time to rebuild Quick Engine Change Assemblies (QECAs), failure of four propellers without spare replacement, and lack of T-56 engine and propeller test facilities aboard the USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) or at NAS Cubi Point clearly defines the problem as lack of support for the T-56 engine and the A6441FN-243 Propeller in the WestPac area. It was recommended that a study group be established to determine the feasibility of and the handling equipment necessary to provide the C-2A with the capability of transporting a complete T-56 QCA. Propellers could be

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handled in a like manner if marked and disassembled after dynamic testing ashore.

(2) Maintenance of non-skid aircraft decking was another problem area. The aircraft decking was removed, the area cleaned, and painted with black lacquer. Then non-skid pads, FSM 7220-205-0389, were installed. The pads were found to wear well and were in good supply.

(3) Another problem encountered was an accumulation of fungus growth on fuel quantity probes. The procedure used to combat the growth is to ensure draining of accumulated water from fuel tanks each day. Even this procedure will only reduce fungus growth, not keep it from growing. It was recommended that Precision Aircraft Rework (PAR) be requested to purge fuel tanks and apply an anti-fungus compound during the PAR cycle.

(4) Fuel, oil and hydraulic fluid from the engine nacelle often drained onto the plastic covering (spaghetti) on the wires leading to the main landing gear micro switches, causing deterioration of the insulation of the wiring. It was recommended that a replacement substance be found by cognizant facility which will be resistant to fuel, oil and hydraulic fluid.

(5) Inability to isolate Inertial Navigation System faults to a specific Aircraft Replacement Assembly remains a problem. Delivery of a new line test set, scheduled for the near future will be of help in solving this problem.

(6) Extreme corrosion in the waveguides of the AN/APS-96 Radar set causes increased Vertical Standing Wave Ratio (VSWR) and possible

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damage to the radar set. Until a non-corrosive substance which has no effect on radar propagation is found, frequent inspection of waveguides is recommended to catch the corrosion before it reaches an advanced state.

(7) Frequent failures were experienced of the Communication Navigation Identification (CNI) blower motors. It was recommended that this motor be replaced with one of more rugged design. Until then it is recommended that spares be increased in the Supply System.

(8) Poor sensitivity of the AN/APX-7 IFF set caused video problems in the ATDS system. The problem was analyzed and problems were found in the calibration techniques being used. Liaison with the manufacturer and subsequent implementation of new procedures solved this problem.

3. Personnel

a. Personnel problems encountered during the year were initially highlighted in August when orders for SEAVEY segment A-67 were received for five ATCs and three ATIs, four of which were qualified Radar Operators (E-2A Flight Technicians). An operational hold was requested and granted on only one ATI whose experience was vital to successful operation of the ATDS/ATDS Data Link. At this same time the squadron allowance for airmen was nine while the on board count was twenty-three. Approximately twenty-five percent of enlisted manpower was non-rated. The initial period of operation as a squadron was characterized by a deficiency in strength and experience level.

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b. Reenlistment rates for the year were high.

(1) First Term	70.0%
(2) Career	66.7%
(3) Over-All	68.7%

c. Advancement rates are shown as percentage of personnel who passed the advancement in rate examination based on the number taking the examination.

(1) E-4 Exam	67%
(2) E-5 Exam	57%
(3) E-6 Exam	44%
(4) E-7 Exam	25%
(5) E-8 Exam	75%

4. Operational Doctrine and Tactics

a. General.

Cyclic operation during 1967 consisted of three triple cycle launches and one double cycle launch daily during Yankee Station operations. This permitted uninterrupted on station coverage, maximum inflight troubleshooting, adequate time to initiate the ATDS system and time to heat and dry the system prior to landing. Operator performance during the lengthy flights was not normally degraded by fatigue.

Low stationing of the E-2A and shipboard operation have the same environmental limitations. Under the high dew point conditions in the Tonkin Gulf during the summer months (up to 89 degrees F) the ATDS equipment rapidly accumulates moisture. Moisture degrades system operation and often causes component failure. This has limited low station operation.

Tape recorders were employed on a number of flights to record UHF voice communications. At present a military recording installation is not available so small commercial recorders were used.

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These were found to be quite useful in debriefing flights of high interest.

b. Airborne Early Warning. AEW was performed in the Gulf of Tonkin with one E-2A during cyclic operations, and two E-2As for ALPHA strikes.

(1) Cyclic Operations: The E-2A was stationed at an altitude varying from 10,000 to 20,000 feet in a random barrier determined by the carrier's position and UHF communications range. The E-2A provided radar coverage over water, IFF tracking to 250 miles from the E-2A, and communications with aircraft and surface units. The E-2A, as an AEW picket unit for AAW, was utilized for air and surface detection over water. The four radio nets normally monitored by the E-2A were strike, attack primary, BARCAP Control and PIRAZ clearance. NTDS/ATDS data link coordination was effected on PIRAZ net.

(2) ALPHA Strikes: A secondary E-2A was launched for each ALPHA strike to provide radar detection over land and backup for the primary E-2A. Over land detection was accomplished by stationing at low altitude, 100-350 feet, 15-30 miles off the coast. Non-squawking aircraft could be detected at ranges exceeding 100 miles from the E-2A and intercepts with TARCAP and/or MIGCAP could be performed. The high E-2A could control the intercept while an NTDS unit or the low E-2A reported the bogey via Link 11. The high station should never be abandoned if only one E-2A is available. MIG warnings passed on guard by the low E-2A or other units were relayed to the strike force by the high E-2A on the frequency they were utilizing. The limiting factor in low station operation of the E-2A was the high dew point condition

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encountered in the Gulf of Tonkin during summer months.

c. Strike Control/Navigation Assistance. Strike control has been the major secondary mission of the E-2A. All squadrons in Air Wing FOURTEEN have utilized this capability. A-6 pilots used the E-2A for vectors to coast-in-point (CIP) when their systems were degraded, A-4s normally requested steers to CIP, target information, and flight separation, primarily at night; and the RA5Cs used the E-2A for CIP and for periodic system updates. The publication of numbered E-2A reference points (CTF77 OPORD 320-YR), which VAW-113 referenced in X, Y from two prominent radar fixes made strike control relatively simple and accurate. The E-2A controller needed to know the desired point (by number) and the side number of the aircraft requesting the vector. With the aircraft positively identified by Mode 2, SIF, the controller could easily maintain positive control and, as a minimum, could continuously monitor the progress of flight. VAW-113 E-2As have frequently provided close control for strike aircraft in bad weather and at night, and on several occasions to a range of one-half mile.

d. Middleman. E-2A Middleman was provided during coordinated strikes. With Middleman employed it was not possible for the E-2A to monitor all of the required tactical frequencies. Often, due to inversion layers and UHF problems, the CVA could monitor the strike frequency directly with better results. In such cases, the E-2A is informed by the CVA that Middleman is not required, enabling the E-2A radios to be used for the other tactical requirements.

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e. IR/Night Hawk Coordination. Night Hawk and IR tactics were especially satisfying and productive from the standpoint of effective E-2A utilization. As experience was gained, these tactics became very efficient, accurate and effective.

f. Search and Rescue. During cyclic operations or coordinated strikes the high station E-2A was in an excellent position to detect and control a SAR situation. The E-2A would relay, on guard, the position of the emergency squawk in relation to the PIRAZ ship or SAR DD, whichever was closer. E-2A controllers could then vector RESCAP and rescue helicopters to the scene once the pilot was sighted and permission had been granted by CTG 77.0 to proceed with the rescue. Pilots must often be reminded to squawk emergency IM, state on guard channel their voice call, side number, and difficulty, and switch to SAR primary frequency. The E-2A could easily monitor and communicate with all units involved in a SAR and is the logical unit to be used for overall SAR coordination.

g. Surface Surveillance. Constant radar surveillance of the Tonkin Gulf area was also maintained by the E-2A to detect and control attack aircraft against any surface threat to the task force. Surface contacts were easily detected at ranges up to 200 miles. Under current SOP, the PIRAZ ship has control of the BARCAP, and to investigate an unidentified surface contact the E-2A must request control of BARCAP or advise the PIRAZ ship to vector the BARCAP on the contact as reported on Link 11 by the ATDS.

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h. Tanker Rendezvous. Tanker aircraft were monitored at all times by the E-2A, and VAW-113 controllers effected numerous joinups with tanker and strike aircraft. When the standard tanker stations were not optimum, the E-2A would reposition the tanker aircraft to provide the most expeditious rendezvous, tanking and return to the ship.

i. PIRAZ Procedures. In August 1967, Air Wing FOURTEEN devised and implemented PIRAZ procedures utilizing the E-2A as a coordination center. The procedure is summarized below:

(1) On coordinated strikes, the E-2A would automatically check the entire strike group into PIRAZ and report this to the strike leader. "Feet Wet" reports were then made to the E-2A and, after all elements were accounted for, the strike group was checked out of PIRAZ by the E-2A and a report made to the strike leader.

(2) During cyclic operations, and for independent units on coordinated strikes, the E-2A provided PIRAZ check in/out services on request. This became a routine function for Air Wing FOURTEEN pilots and VAW-113 controllers, and was especially convenient since the E-2A monitors PIRAZ frequency at all times.

(3) At the completion of each cycle or strike, the E-2A would verify that all events had checked in and out of PIRAZ and would clear up any discrepancies that existed. For future operations, it is recommended that VAW squadrons and Air Wings attempt to establish a procedure whereby PIRAZ controllers automatically advise airborne AEW aircraft of the check in/out status of all parent carrier events at the completion of each cycle or strike to reduce the number of PIRAZ violations.

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(4) Air Wing FOURTEEN staff also tasked VAW-113 to investigate each CONSTELLATION PIRAZ violation reported in the periodic PIRAZ summary. Records were maintained in squadron debrief sheets.

j. NTDS/ATDS. The link 11 data link provided an excellent means of operational coordination among ATDS E-2As and NTDS ships. A number of equipment and procedural problems were encountered during the predeployment phase and early in the cruise. Fortunately, most of these problems were solved resulting in excellent link coordination and utilization. Problems that still exist are discussed below:

(1) Grid Lock. The ATDS computer program permits rapid manual grid lock of the ATDS picture to the NTDS reference ship. As this is accomplished, and because the E-2A has radar contact with all ships in the Tonkin Gulf, it becomes readily apparent when other participating units (PUS) are not grid locked. This frequently situation causes many dual track designations and seriously degrades the quality of track information received. The E-2A should be used to check and coordinate Link 11 grid lock at one-half to one hours intervals.

(2) During the last line period (25 October to 11 November) numerous Link 11 tracks were received classified as "Unknown Air, Engaged". These were erroneously identified NTDS originated tracks and would disappear or change to "Friend, Air" tracks within two minutes. The cause of this is not known and the problem should be investigated. This problem was referred to the CTF 77 staff.

(3) VAW-113 E-2As were not able to successfully receive the PU or tracks from BELKNAP while all other PUS and tracks were received

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consistently. Conversely, NTDS ships reported good link with BELKNAP. Under these conditions the ATDS were unable to determine which internal tracks were being reported by other units and the result was dual designated tracks from ATDS. This problem appears to be related to NTDS data terminal operation, and it has been referred to the CTF 77 staff.

(4) Strike aircraft over the beach often change to "Friend, Surface" tracks (within the ATDS) while orbiting the target area, and are reported on the link with "Friend, Surface" classifications. These are automatic functions in the ATDS and cannot be prevented by the ATDS operator. NTDS units must recognize this ATDS limitation and coordinate the reporting of these aircraft directly with the E-2A.

5. Community Relations and Civic Action included squadron contributions to Navy Relief, Combined Federal Campaigns and sponsorship of the Imperial Beach, "California Beavers", a little league baseball team.

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