1979

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HELICOPTER MINE COUNTERMEASURES SQUADRON FOURTEEN (HM-14)
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

DECLASSIFIED

IN REPLY REFER TO:
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From: Commanding Officer, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP 05D2)

Subj: Command History; forwarding of

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12B

Encl: (1) HELMINERON FOURTEEN Command History 1979

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is forwarded.

T. H. HOIVIK

Copy to:
Director of Naval History

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OPNAVINST 5513.16 SERIES
DATE: April 2000

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COMMAND HISTORY

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Enclosure (1)

I. Command Organization

a. Command. Commander Thomas H. HOIVIK, USN, [redacted] became the second Commanding Officer of HELMINERON FOURTEEN when he relieved Commander Robert E. JONES on 24 August 1979. Lieutenant Commander Frederick T. MASSEY assumed the Duties of Executive Officer.

b. Mission. HELMINERON FOURTEEN combines all the capabilities and responsibilities associated with an AMCM unit and an aircraft squadron; this includes mission systems and equipment, navigation networks, and the computer hardware and software required for conducting a total minesweeping operation. HM-14 is manned to operate and maintain eight Sikorsky RH-53D aircraft, 5 MK-105 hydrofoil-borne minesweeping devices and related equipment, as well as providing the expertise required for planning, executing and evaluating the effectiveness of a complete minesweeping operation. In addition to its primary mission of AMCM, the squadron is tasked with secondary missions of Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD), Search and Rescue (SAR) and Nuclear Weapons Transhipment.

c. Organization. The organization of the squadron remained unchanged during 1979. All detachments, when formed for missions, retain department status with the Officer-in-Charge reporting to the Commanding Officer.

II. Summary of Operations

5-9 MAR	Human Resources Assist Visit consisting of lectures and discussions is held. The squadron dedicated over 3000 manhours in human resources training.
12 MAR	Transition to Subsystem Capability and Impact Reporting (SCIR) is begun.
22 MAR	HM-14 is given its first Command Inspection by Helicopter Sea Control Wing ONE. Overall marks are satisfactory. The Supply Branch has the highest NORS Validation rate in AIRLANT (99.9%).
26 MAR	Detachment ONE departs for Panama City, Fl., to train for the operational evaluation of the AN/AQS-14 mine hunting Sonar equipment.
6-11 APR	Shipboard operations are conducted with the USS SHREVEPORT in VACAPES OPAREA.
1 MAY	Began loadout of equipment to San Diego, Ca.
6 MAY	HM-14 Commences a phased departure of its aircraft to NAS North Island for its EASTPAC deployment.
16 MAY	The Squadron is fully operational and begins pre-exercise training flights at San Diego. HM-14 achieves a "first" for the HM community by flying all eight squadron aircraft cross country for an EASTPAC deployment.

9-21 JUN	HM-14 operates from USS DULUTH for Exercise PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79 and provided support for their Mine Readiness Inspection for Certification. Equipment was then transferred at sea to the USS NEW ORLEANS, where a detachment supported an MRCI. Upon completion and return to port, the equipment was transferred to the USS CLEVELAND for support of another MRCI.
25 JUN	Begins loadout of equipment by truck from NAS North Island to NAS Norfolk.
27 JUN - 02 JUL	HM-14 conducts a phased departure of its aircraft to NAS Norfolk. C-5 and C-9 aircraft depart San Diego with squadron equipment and personnel.
6 AUG	HM-14 Detachment one departs for Newport Rhode Island for the Operational evaluation of the AN/AQS-14 with 4 Officers and 32 enlisted.
24 AUG	Change of Command. Commander T. H. HOIVIK, USN relieves Commander R. E. JONES, USN as second CO of HM-14.
21 SEP	HM-14 Detachment One returns from Newport R. I. after successfully completing the operational evaluation of the AQS-14 one week earlier than programmed
27 SEP	HM-14 Detachment two departs for NAS Roosevelt Roads for VOD support of the USS FORRESTAL.
19 OCT	HM-14 Detachment Two returns. During the detachment 230,075 pounds of cargo and 377 passengers were transported. The Det had a 97.3 percent operational readiness rate and flew 97.8 hours in 16 days of VOD operations.
24 OCT	HM-14 undergoes the first MRCI ever given to a fully operational squadron, onboard the USS AUSTIN (LPD-4). The inspection last 5 days.
21-23 NOV	HM-14 provides support to HM-16 for Exercise Evening Light. Squadron Personnel worked for 37 straight hours tearing down and loading 6 RH-53's aobard USAF C-5A's. From this point on, HM-14 has provided personnel and aircraft in support of Middle East Operations.
26-27 NOV	Conducts air operations in support of the MRCI for the USS INCHON (LPH-12)
1 DEC	HM-14 awarded the COMNAVAIRLANT 1979 Battle "E" for the HM community. In winning this award, HM-14 has been recognized for its outstanding operational achievements.
12-14 DEC	HM-14 undergoes its first Navy Technical Proficiency Inspection for Nuclear Weapons Transhipment. Inspection results were outstanding in all areas.

III. Special Topics

a. Operations Statistics

(1) Flight Time

	FLIGHT HOURS	AMCM HOURS	TOW HOURS
JAN	70.2	0	0
FEB	165.7	18.3	9.9
MAR	64.5	15.4	11.1
APR	150.6	38.3	20.1
MAY	293.9	23.3	15.0
JUN	271.9	85.3	57.2
JUL	123.2	0	0
AUG	148.7	96.3	77.0
SEP	176.5	92.5	71.7
OCT	188.6	65.4	35.6
NOV	166.6	24.5	15.5
DEC	170.8	24.7	15.1
TOTALS	1991.2	484.0	328.7

(2) Training

TYPE	MAN HOURS
Officer Training	1561.0
Aircrew Ground Training	2203.8
Nuclear Weapons Training	1263.0
Formal Training	17070.5
Enlisted Professional	5087.4
General Military Training	4727.1
On the Job Training	29538.65
Formal Courses of Instructions Attended	434

AHACS designated	10
HACS designated	6
1st Crewmen designated	12

b. SAFETY/NATOPS

(1) The main thrust of HM-14's Safety Program is the communication and education of proven safety principles to squadron personnel. The communication of this program is accomplished both formally and informally. HELMINERON FOURTEEN's informal methods of safety communications are as follows:

(a) Once weekly, the Safety or NATOPS Officer informally visits each shop to discuss operations and any problem areas within the shop.

(b) The Safety Officer is positioned in front of all hands at quarters for high visability and comments on an issue of safety.

(c) The Safety and NATOPS Officers provide a brief at All Officer Meetings (AOM's) Daily.

(d) Safety Bulletins are promulgated to point out situations pertinent to our personnel and their families.

(e) The Squadron Safety Petty Officer is on constant patrol in the hangar area and flight line, discussion and assisting in safety matters.

(f) The Operation Hazard Report and the correction of Safety Hazard Report were developed and promulgated. These forms have proven valuable in risk education and are not used for punitive purposes.

(g) Yearly Audiology screening of all squadron personnel is conducted through the Aviation Physiology Mobile Audiology Unit and all personnel assigned to flight deck operations are issued Aviaition Safety Spectacles.

(h) The HM-14 Safety Improvement Suggestion form was developed and made readily available to all hands in order to improve safety in HM-14. The HM-14 Safety Mishap report was also developed and promulgated to further benefit HM-14 and the Navy's accident prevention program.

(i) Squadron awareness to safety is brought right to the home of each and every member with the publication "Vanguard", HM-14's quarterly newsletter. Each newsletter contains a safety related article applicable to the families of the men of HM-14.

(j) The Squadron Safety Officer has obtained from NAVSAFCEN a computer run of all H-53 accidents occurring since 1970. Selected accidents are briefed to all pilots during AOM's and the computer run is always available for pilots to read. Squadron pilots now have available to them and have been exposed to information paid for at a very high price. Should they be exposed to such situations, they are not better prepared to handle them correctly.

(2) Formal methods of communication and education of safety within HM-14 are conducted before, during and after deployments in the form of Operational Readiness Reviews and Safety Reviews.

(3) Safety awareness within individuals is a state of mind, generated and maintained by training and positive re-enforsement. A total of more than 10,000 man hours of formal safety training has been conducted since commissioning with over 8,000 man hours since 1 January 1979. In addition 2000 man hours of officer training has been conducted since 1 January 1979, spanning the spectrum from aviation safety to hunting safety. Our outstanding safety record of zero aircraft and automobile accidents reflects this valuable training.

(4) Goal: Zero Automobile Accident Rate. "Readiness through Safety" has been the paramount concern of the Squadron Safety Program, however areas of automobile and motorcycle safety have not been neglected. Prior to each extended holiday period a positive approach of formal and informal drive safe programs have been presented to the command. Shell Oil was contacted and copies of the "Answer Man" series have been made available to our personnel through the Safety Department. Command attention to vehicle safety has been paramount. The Commanding Officerroutinely discusses drive safe at quarters at AOM's. The success of this approach has resulted in our zero automobile accident rate.

(5) Industrial plant safety receives considerable attention. Since HM-14 acquired the West Side of LP-13, there has been enormous improvement in these spaces. NAS Safety Department and the Naval Station Fire Department have provided assistance in conducting an initial survey of the facility. Prior to HM-14's arrival these spaces were in extremely poor condition and today they have been completely rennovated by squadron personnel. Our recent inspection has shown outstanding improvement in all areas of industrial safety.

(6) HM-14 regards incident reporting as an integral element for improvement of operational readiness in the AMCM community. Rough message report forms and mishap reporting forms were developed to ensure accurate and timely submission of all reports. Although the number of aircraft and ground incidents have been significantly reduced through increased attention to detail, HM-14 has continued to make pertinent and timely information available to the AMCM community. Most significant was the identification of an incorrectly configured MK-103 sweep wire. Imminent failure of this sweep wire was adverted by the careful scrutiny of the mission safety observer. Failure of this component would have resulted in serious injury and loss of equipment. Gurther investigation revealed a discrepancy between NATOPS configuration and MIMS procedures. HM-14's identification of the problem and subsequent NATOPS change recommendation clearly adverted additional problems for the AMCM community.

(7) The HM-14 NATOPS program continually strives to promote safety through trainning and evaluation of all pilots and aircrewmen. The Safety and Operations Departments conduct weekly training to all hands striving for realism and meaningfulness. In accordance with HM-14 INST 1500.1 (Squadron Training Manual) the Officer NATOPS Ground Training Syllabus is conducted during weekly training sessions. This lecture series is augmented by NATOPS quizzes. In accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9 and COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3510.2 a continuous program for monitoring and evaluating existing procedures is being conducted. Twelve NATOPS changes have been submitted by HM-14 this year. HM-14 Standardization and Helicopter Aircraft Commander Boards were developed to provide the Commanding Officer with a method of enhancing squadron safety through standardization, while increasing the professional education of squadron pilots. As the secretary of the Squadron Standardization Board, the NATOPS Officer is responsible for conducting monthly meetings and recording minutes. As a result of this position he ensures that all pilots receive copies of the Squadron Standard Operating Procedures Notes, bringing to the pilots attention those items particularly important to flight operations.

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6 SEP 1979

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From: Commanding Officer, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commander Sea Based ASW Wings, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: End of Deployment Report

Ref: (a) COMSEABASED ASWWINGSLANTINST 3000.1
(b) COMHELSEACONWINGONEINST C3500.2

Encl: (1) Chronology of Deployment
(2) Operations Summary
(3) Deployment Statistics
(4) Administration Summary
(5) Maintenance Summary
(6) Safety Summary
(7) Lessons Learned/Recommendations

1. As prescribed by references (a) and (b), Enclosures (1) through (7) summarize HELMINERON FOURTEEN'S AMCM EASTPAC Deployment of 06 May through 02 July 1979. HELMINERON FOURTEEN deployed to NAS North Island with eight RH-53 Helicopters, 28 Officers, and 160 Enlisted personnel to participate in PHIBLEX/MAULEX EI-79, and support Minewarfare Certification Inspections for USS DULUTH, USS NEW ORLEANS, AND USS CLEVELAND.

2. This highly successful exercise was the first opportunity for an AMCM Squadron and COMTHIRDFLT SMCM Forces to operate in a joint mine countermeasures exercise. This exercise also marked the first time that a an AMCM squadron has deployed with its entire compliment of aircraft. The experience gained by MCM capable units and staffs in the execution of joint MCM operations in an amphibious scenario was invaluable. It is strongly recommended that similar operations be scheduled annually to enhance and develop tactics and coordination between all participating elements.

R. E. JONES

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CO, HM-16
COMINERON FIVE
COMPHIBRON FIVE

AMCM EASTPAC '79

06 MAY	COMMENCED PHASED DEPARTURE OF 8 RH-53's NORVA TO NORIS
07 MAY	ADVANCE PARTY DEPARTED VIA C-9 FOR NORIS
11 MAY	FIRST C-5 DEPARTED NORVA TO NORIS
12 MAY	C-9 PAX XFER TO NORIS
14 MAY	SECOND C-5 DEPARTED NORVA TO NORIS
16 MAY	6 OF 8 RH-53's ONBOARD NORIS - COMMENCED PRE-EXERCISE WORKUP
28 MAY	ALL RH-53's IN PLACE NORIS
08 JUN	EMBARKATION OF EXERCISE/MRCI SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ON USS DULUTH VIA LCU.
09 JUN	ONLOAD FOUR RH-53's USS DULUTH
09-12 JUN	EXERCISE PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79
12 JUN	AT SEA CROSSDECK MRCI SUPPORT EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL USS DULUTH TO USS NEWORLEANS
15 JUN	INPORT CORSSDECK MRCI SUPPORT EQUIPMENT USS NEWORLEANS TO USS CLEVELAND
20 JUN	SAN DIEGO HARBOR OFFLOAD OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT VIA LCU AND MS
25 JUN	COMMENCED PHASED DEPARTURE OF 8 RH-53's NORIS TO NORVA
29 JUN	FIRST C-5 DEPARTED NORIS TO NORVA
30 JUN	FIRST C-9 PAX XFER DEPARTED NORIS TO NORVA
01 JUL	SECOND C-5 DEPARTED NORIS TO NORVA
02 JUL	SECOND C-9 PAX XFER NORIS TO NORVA

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[redacted] (Unclassified upon removal of Appendix 3)

OPERATIONS SUMMARY

1. HM-14 commenced its EASTPAC 79 deployment on 6 May with the departure of the first of eight cross country helicopter flights from NAS Norfolk, Va. Squadron personnel and material transfers were completed via two C-5's, two C-9's, and seven flatbed trucks. By 16 May the squadron was fully operational and began pre-exercise training flights from NAS North Island.

2. The deployment consisted of three major phases: (1) Pre-exercise workups (2) AMCM participation in PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79, and (3) AMCM support of MRCI's for USS DULUTH, USS NEW ORLEANS, and USS CLEVELAND. These phases are outlined in appendices 1 through 3 respectively. The main objective for EASTPAC 79 was to increase operational readiness through extensive traiâágg and coordinated operations with all MCM support units and SMCM forces.

3. The squadron was highly successful in achieving its overall goal as well as all individual phase objectives (see appendices 2-3). In so doing HM-14 accumulated a total of 664.2 flight hours, 75 Tow hours, 25 OPTOW hours, and qualified 7 Aircraft Commanders and 2 First crewman.

4. HM-14 began a phased return to NAS Norfolk on 25 June with the departure of the first of the eight trans-continental helo flights. Between 27 June and 2 July the remaining squadron personnel and material departed NAS North Island, again via two C-9's,atwo C-5's and seven flatbed trucks.

Appendix 1 - Synopsis of Pre-exercise work-ups
Appendix 2 - Synopsis of PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79
Appendix 3 - Synopsis of MRCI support (USS DULUTH, USS NEW ORLEANS, and USS CLEVELAND)

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SYNOPSIS OF PRE-EXERCISE WORK-UPS

1. The period of 17 August to 8 June 1979 was dedécated to exercise planning and preparation and pre-exercise work-up flights including: area familiarization, raydist logistics and MK-103 training flights. MK-105 operations were precluded during this time frame due to the non availability of a ship or suitable launch/recovery site at NAS North Island. Some difficulties wer were encountered with raydist equipment installation including, sige surveys and land utilization, however through coordinated effort and the use of ground and air transportation raydist installation was completed prior to exercise commencement. With the exception of MK-105 operation, all pre-exercise objectives were successfully met and valuable pilot and aircrew training was achieved. (See Appendix 3 for flight data, mission summary and training)

2. Pre-Exercise Operations and Training Summary:

a.	Intra-Theatre Self Lift	179.7
b.	FAM/INST	58.2
c.	AMCM	32.8
d.	TOW	20.6

e. Qualifications completed

(1) One NATOPS check and three additional pilots within one flight of Mission Commander Qualification.

(2) One first crewman and seven additional aircrewmen with two flights of first crew qualification.

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SYNOPSIS OF PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79

1. (C) The squadron deployed abourd USS DULUTH on 9 June 1979 following an LCU assisted equipment transfer from NAS North Island to Naval Station San Diego. For the next three and one half days HM-14 participated in coordinated sweep operations with MINERON FIVE NRF as a prelude to an exercise amphibious landing staged off the southeast corner of Camp Pendleton. The area required to be swept consisted of allarge holding area (2000 yds X 10500 yds) orientated parallel to the coast, and two boat lanes (1200 yds X 2000 yds) connecting with the beach.

2. (U) Objectives for the exercise indluded:

a. Exercise amphibious squadron staff in the planning, conduct, and execution of MCM in an amphibious scenario.

b. Familiarize AMCM capable ships with AMCM equipment, tactics, and procedures incident to MCM operations.

c. Exercise MCM operations in approach area clearance procedures.

d. Exercise AMCM tactics, doctrine, and procedures

e. Exercise LCU in AMCM scenario.

Additionally specific AMCM objectives for the exercise uncluded:

f. Completing a MK-103 precursor sweep of the western edge of the amphibious assault area to determine the extent of the moored mine threat and the pesvide a safe track from which MSO's could initiate moored sweep operations if necessary.

g. Conducting maximum MK-106 influence sweeping in the holding area during simultaneous AMCM-SMCM operations.

h. Evaluating the suitability of utilizing a sliding buffer zone joint field sweep technique for AMCM-SMCM combined operations to maximize uniformity of the entire across the field sweep rate.

i. Increasing operational readiness through coordinated system employment and training.

3. (U) All stated objectives were successfully met. The following results apply and are considered most significant.

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a. (C) The combined AMCM-SMCM effort was successfully completed in the holding area producing a 99% clearance probility against ship counts 1-5 (based on projected MKB, KMD, and KMD-II influence mine threat provided by scenario-intelligence). AMCM contributed significantly to this endeavor by dweeping eleven practice mines.

b. (U) Influence mines in the boat lanes were countered as planned by MSO's utilizing mine hunting techniques, although the final exercise AMCM mission was directed into thes areas.

c. (U) The sliding buffer zone proved highly feasible and accomplished its purpose of maximizing uniform sweep rates across the field. This technique simply apportions the amount of the field being swept by each force according to the relative sweep rates demonstrated by them. Additionally this method provides for minimum interference between AMCM and SMCM units, while providing an excellant opportunity to fine tune cooperative spirit and teamwork between surface and airborne MCM forces.

d. (C) By assuming all AMCM influence missions had been flown only in the originally assigned eastern half of the area, the following AMCM mine clearance percentages were computed for the projected MKB, KMD, and KMD-II threat. These figures serve as the primary measure offeffectiveness of AMCM sweep operations.

SHIP COUNT	PERCENT CLEARANCE ACHIEVED
1-4	99
5*	98
6	94
7	85
8	74
9	57
10	41

*(most probable tactical settings)

4. (U) Overall flight statistics for the exercise period 9-12 June 1979 were as follows:

TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	73.6
TOTAL LOGISTIC FLIGHT HOURS	14.5
TOTAL TEST FLIGHT HOURS	4.7

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TOTAL AMCM FLIGHT HOURS	54.4
TOTAL TOW HOURS	40.4
TOTAL OPTOW HOURS	21.6

5. (C) AMCM sweep efforts for exercise PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79 concluded on 12 June 1979 with the simultaneous at sea transfer of HM-14 personnel, equipment and helo assets from USS DULUTH to USS NEW ORLEANS. This transfer was completed utilizing one LCU and four HM-14 RH-53Ds.

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SYNOPSIS OF MRCI SUPPORT

(USS DULUTH, USS NEW ORLEANS, AND USS CLEVELAND)

1. HM-14 operationally supported the successful completion of MRCI's on DULUTH, NEW ORLEANS, and CLEVELAND. Due to the long interval since each ship had last supported AMCM operations, HM-14 conducted extensive briefings for all ships prior to each scheduled MRCI period. There briefings included in depth MK-105 launch and recovery procedures as well as embarkation/debarkation plans. The optempo for each ship was steadily increased as higher levels of familiarization were achieved.

2. Support for USS DULUTH's MRCI was provided in conjunction with PHIBLEX MAULEX E1-79. The resulting flight summary and statistical information included in Appendix (2) of HM-14 Operations Summary for EASTPAC 79.

3. Following the squadrons at-sea transfer from DULUTH to NEW ORLEANS via LCU and 4 RH-53's, the unit completed four MK-106 stream and recoveries from 13 June to 14 June 1979. The associated flights supported a squadron leval mine sweeping exercise conducted off the State Beach area in addition to assisting the NEW ORLEANS MRCI. The following statistical information applies to this period:

TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	37.2
TOTAL LOGISTICS FLIGHT HOURS	29.0
TOTAL TEST FLIGHT HOURS	1.0
TOTAL AMCM HOURS	4.4
TOTAL TOW HOURS	2.8
TOTAL OPTOW HOURS	2.0

4. Following a pierside LCM crossdeck from USS NEW ORLEANS to USS CLEVELAND at Naval Station San Diego, HM-14 personnel put to sea from 19 to 20 June 1979 to complete the CLEVELAND MRCI. Once again this evaluation was successfully supported with the following flight information:

TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS	5.7
TOTAL LOGISTICS FLIGHT HOURS	3.5
TOTAL AMCM FLIGHT HOURS	2.2
TOTAL TOW HOURS	2.2

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Appendix (3)
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DEPLOYMENT STATISTICS

1. General:

	MAY	JUNE	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
Days Deployed	25		30	2	57
Days at Sea	0		10	0	10
Days In AMCM Shorebased Workups	14		7	0	22
Days in Transit	9		6	2	17
Days Shore Based	25		23	2	50

2. FLIGHT DATA SUMMARY

	MAY	JUNE	JULY	TOTAL
Total Hrs/Day/Night	274/262/12	272/256/16	117/102/16	664.2/620.8/43.4
Avg Flt time Pilot/Crew	23.9/24.3	22.6/22.6	7.8/6.4	53/53
Sorties Sched/Flown/ Percent	53/26/49	103/53/51	4/4/100	160/83/51
Total Landings/Day/ Night	298/250/48	399/261/11	71/62/9	
AMCM FlightsHours	22	85	0	107
TOW HOURs	10	60	0	75.
OPTOW Hours	0	25	0	25
Intra Theatre Self Lift	174	83	76	333
Logistics Hours	11	44	0	55

3. MISSION/SORTIE/BREAKDOWN

AMCM

Enclosure (3)

AMCM	SCHEDULED	FLOWN
AMCM		33
MK-103	54	15
MK-104	0	0
MOP	1	1
INSTRUMENT/FAM	27	15
LOGISTICS	20	19
INTRA THEATRE SELF LIFT	16	16

4. Number/Type Mines Cleared

Bottom Magnetic Influence	8
Bottom Combination (MAG/Acoustic) Influence	3
TOTAL	11

5. TRAINING

a. Flight Crew Training

(1) Designations Accomplished

AMCM MISSION COMMANDER	5
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER	2
SECOND PILOT	1
FIRST CREWMEN	2
INSTRUMENT CHECK	7

(2) Aircrew signoffs

MK-103	16
MK-106	7
MOP	2
RAYDIST	8
CAMERA	5

b. Ground Training

Pilots Completing Instrument School	2
Pilots Completing Swims/Physiology	2
Officer Professional Training	294 Man Hrs
Enlisted Professional Training	1259.4 Man Hrs
Aircrew Groung Training	515.1 Man Hrs
General Military Training	1311.5 Man Hrs
On the Job Training	13,550.6 Man Hrs

c. Safety Standown Training

On 31 May and 1 June 1979 the Squadron Conducted a two day safety review. 480 man hours of pilot and aircrew training and 1608 hours of general safety training was accomplished.

d. Nuclear Weapons Training -75.0 man hours accumulated conducting refresher training and periodic weapons load drills.

ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY

1. The areas of responsibility for the Administrative Department during the Squadron's EastPac Deployment of 6 May to 2 July 1979 were as follows: TANGO/requests/TAD orders, Pay, Berthing, Messing and Transportation in addition to the normal administrative routine that involved legal, ESO, PAO, advancements and transfers.

2. Initial TANGO requests to COMNAVAIRLANT required breakdown into four categories.

a. Advanced Party.

b. Officer requests with three rental cars.

c. Enlisted personnel flying in squadron aircraft.

d. Enlisted personnel flying normal Government air.

All officers and aircrew were authorized advance per diem to facilitate and reduce financial burden on squadron aircraft cross-country flights. Since messing/berthing was available at NAS North Island, normal per diem rates were as follows: Officer approximately $10.30 per day and Enlisted approximately $2.45 per day.

3. To prevent possible LES errors, ensure timely receipt of promotion longevity pay and reduce administrative workload in preparing arrival/detaching endorsements, an agreement with the Finance Center Naval Station Norfolk, was made to leave pay records in Norfolk. All checks/PDQ receipts were forwarded to the Branch Finance Center NAS North Island and were received by pay day for issue.

4. NAS North Island provided BOQ berthing for all officers. Berthing for all enlisted personnel was inadequate and Transient Quarters with three to four men per room were utilized. BEQ's were cramped with inadequate storage space for all hands. Prior to Squadron arrival, the Advance Party was issued rooms, keys, and linen for issue to incoming personnel.

5. The NAS North Island Enlisted Dining Facility (DEF) was available to all hands. Additionally, box lunches/dinners and breakfast were available for individuals required for squadron operations during meal hours. Requests for boxed meals had to be forwarded to the EDF by COB the day prior. Because of boxed meal availability missed meals were not authorized Officers were authorized to utilize the EDF in addition to the O-Club which was closed on Monday, Tuesday for dinner, and everday for breadfast. Messing should not have been considered available for officers due to the inadequacy of facilities and late working hours past EDF's operating hours. This required frequent utilization of commercial facilities.

6. NAS North Island base transportation was adequate for weekday service with bus stops adjacent to the Hangar and Chow Hall. However, weekends and nights were a problem due to no scheduled service. Therefore Squadron ve-

hicles had to be utilized to their fullest. The lack of adequate transportation had a significant impact on night and early morning effort which always required during deployment operations. Public works provided two passenger vans, and one pickup for squadron use. Additionally any special vehicle needs required a minimum of one day notice. The three rental vehicles authorized for use by 28 Officers was not adequate.

7. The squadron public affairs program proved very effective in acquainting the community with airborne mine countermeasures operations. Several local newspapers carried full page pictures and articles in addtions to numerous presentations to the command briefing to AIRPAC, PHIBRON Staff, several helicopter communities, and ROTC Midshipmen.

8. Educational serviced provided excellent service in ordering correspondence courses, administering military leadership exams, and ensuring adequate dissemination of advancement tests and programs. During the deployment, advancement exam results were published with 31 advanced, 29 PNA, and 1 failed

9. During the deployment, the CO's wife and Squadron Ombussman provided excellent service in assistance with family related problems. This was further enhanced by having a direct phone linkage to Norfolk, however deployments outside CONUS would hot have this benefit and would be required to rely more heavily on a designated wing representative.

MAINTENANCE SUMMARY

1. Load-out preparations for EASTPAC deployment commenced 1 May 1979 with the containerization of as much support equipment as possible. The squadron utilized two C-5 aircraft and seven flatbed trucks for the shipment of AMCM support equipment to NAS North Island. The phased departure of all eight aircraft began on 6 May 1979 with the departure of the first two aircraft. On 14 May 1979 six aircraft were on station at NAS North Island. Some difficulties were experienced during the transcontinental flight: one aircraft required a main rotor blade change and lower baloon seal replacement. MARTD Dallas provided the expertise for the latter difficulty which was greatly appreciated. A second aircraft went down in El Paso, Texas with a discharged APP fire bottle and slip ring problems. The last two of eight aircraft arrived at North Island 28 May 1979. The period 19 May through 8 June was utilized as a pre-exercise work up period. Maintenance efforts were hampered during this time frame due to late arrival of equipment on flatbed trucks, nonavailability of several cited IMRL items which had to be utilized on the last two aircraft (both in Norfolk and during their cross country flights) and an unusual number of component failures. During the entiee deployment NAS North Island provided invaluable assistance in critical areas. One shortcoming was the sporadic availability of a crane from Public Works. Because of the many main rotor blade changes and other maintenance requiring use of a crane, valuable man hours were wasted waiting for the crane to arrive.

2. During the period 9-20 June HM-14 was conducting operations with two LPD's and one LPH. Last minute ship cancellations, reassignment, and the necessity for two crossdecks with minimum transient time prohibited the loading to the entire maintenance crew and equipment aboard the ship. Since the squadron cannot support full maintenance at two separate locations due to a lack of manpower and duplicate sets of special support equipment, major squadron maintenance was required to be conducted from the beach with only minor maintenance and troubleshooting capability aboard ship. This seenario is not typical for amphibious exercises and should be avoided in the future. On 8 June 1979 all AMCM equipment required for exercise operations was loaded aboard USS DULUTY via LCU. On 9 June 1979 four aircraft were flown aboard. One aircraft went down immediately for the entire exercise with a main gear box chip light. Several other major component failures also occured including: wight main rotor blades, two tail rotor blades, seven sleeve and spindles, one main gear box, two long electrode failures and two short electrode failures on the MK-105 were experienced. QAR's are being submitted in relations to these failures. On 12 June 1979 an at-sea transfer of support equipment from USS DULUTY to the USS NEW ORLEANS VIA LCU was conducted. The operations was extremely slow due to B and A crane problems aboard NEW ORLEANS. The end r result was that the ships boats had to be engaged the entire day tending three MK-105 sleds to prevent damage. On 15 June AMCM equipment was transfered at pierside from USS NEW ORLEANS TO USS CLEVELAND via LCU again. CLEVELAND's MRCI was conducted successfully and all equipment was off loaded and returned to North Island on 20 June. During the post exercise period 21-25 June 1979 the maintenance department concentrated on corrosion control and preparing aircraft for the return to Norfolk, commencing 25 June 1979

SAFETY SUMMARY

1. Safety Statistics

Aircraft Incidents	12
Ground Incidents	1
Personnel job related injureis	2

2. While deployed, HM-14 was able to accomplish a significant amount of Safety/NATOPS Training, as well as the recognition of problem areas and the development of procedural solutions. Cooperation of all hands toward operational readiness reached its pinnacle during this deployment. Under arduous and sometimes hazardous conditions, the squadron safety checks and balances were successful in adverting serious aircraft problems and personnel injuries. Aircraft incidents, were handled precisely and professionally by all pilots and aircrew. Strict adherance to NATOPS, NWP 27 and OPNAV 3700 proved once again to be the foundation for safe aircraft operation and mission success.

3. Preceding exercise PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79 a two day safety standown was held. The results of reemphasizing safety awareness was readity apparent and were reflected in the high operational readiness of the squadron. It is strongly recommended that a safety standown be held prior to each deployment.

4. MK-105 launch and recovery operations reemphasized the need for all MK-105 launch/recovery crews to be thoroughly trained by Boatswain Mate personnel on proper line handling procedures as well as general shipboard safety. Another potential hazzard was small boat operators wearing inflatable floatation devises which do not provide for floatation of the individuals are unconscious. However, standard kapok life preservers are too bulky to wear while working around MK-105/106 equipment. The squadron is presently investigating the feasibility of purchasing water ski vests. They provide adequate floatations if injured, are relatively inexpensive and allow maneuveribility.

Finally, environmental considerations must be examined thoroughly prior to deployment. The excessively hot weather in San Diego contributed directly to at least one ground incident. Work schedules and operations must be correlated to provide adequate rest and sustenance at all times. However, during adverse weather conditions, in hot or cold climates it becomes even more critical. Training for supervisors in this area is warranted and should be emphasised.

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LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Lesson: Prior to AMCM operations in PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79, no squadron/LPD workup period was available. To achieve peak performance for a sweep operation, an exercise workup is highly desirable to familiarize ship and squadron personnel with coordinated operating procedures.

Recommendation: Future deployments of this nature should include a scheduled three day workup period prior to any actual exercise.

2. (U) Lesson: Squadron loadout aboard USS DULUTH required four equipment relocations in an eleven day period (including one at sea transfer). As a consequence, the squadron's major maintenance capability was left at NAS North Island. In virtually all respects the packup taken aboard was sufficient to support scheduled activity. However, some equipment shortages did occur which adversely impacted the optempo until replacement items arrived from the beach. EMCON conditions precluded communications with the Beach Det which further aggravated the logistics problem. The only alternative was to onload and crossdeck 180 people and 275,000 lbs of equipment vice the actual 79 people and 108,000 lbs. Additionally, the impact of multiple crossdecking is disruptive to maintenance productivity.

Recommendations: Due to the disparity between support requirements for an AMCM exercise and an MRCI, recommend avoid scheduling adjacent exercise sweep/MRCI periods. This would allow a time frame to reconstitute squadron maintenance assets between embarkation periods.

3. (U) Lesson: The concept of a floating buffer zone between air and surface forces may be an effective tactic in some scenarios. It provides a high degreeof operational flexibility by allowing the buffer zone to be adjusted as output or maneuvering restrictions dictate. A buffer zone between air and surface forces, greatly facilitates maneuvering coordination between helicopters and MSO's.

Recommendations: None.

4. (U) Lesson: PHIBLEX/MAULEX E1-79 furthered the concept of joint SMCM and AMCM sweep operations in the same minefield. Daily segment swapping between the two forces was utilized in an attempt to achieve a more uniform clearance rate across the entire field. Such segment swapping greatly increases the complexity of individual force planning procedures and data analysis; including determination of runs per track remaining and overall determination of countermeasures effectiveness.

Recommendation: The same uniform clearance rate could be achieved through apportionment of the minefield rather than segment swapping. This would reduce the aforementioned complexities and allow for more accurate computations using existing Wang programs available.

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5. (C) Lesson: The failure of three new MK-105 electrodes impacted considerably on the sweep effort attained. The electrodes parted about one foot behind the attaching bar, where the electrode wires are joined to the bar.

Recommendation: Engineering study be initiated to improve electrode design. As an interim solution, consideration should be given to bonding an MSO size stainless steel mesh towing stocking to the electrode's weak point.

6. (U) Lesson: LPH MK-105 stream/recovery procedures provided in NWP-27-3 are not sufficiently detailed. This command has experienced a 100 percent turnover in launch team personnel since the last period of LPH operations (15 months previous). Because of inexperienced personnel the launch team had initial difficulties launching and recovering the MK-105; many of the problems stemmed from a lack of procedual documentation.

Recommendation: Withe the limited opportunities for LPH AMCM operations, precise and detailed launch and recovery procedures must be on hand. HM-14 will submit a change recommendation to NWP-27-3 containing the necessary additional information.

7. (U) Lesson: HM-14 established and maintained a shore based raydist network which was employed by both aircraft and MSO's. Any number of navigation system saved duplication of effort and equipment.

Recommendation: When feasible, both air and surface MCM units operating in the same area should utilize a common taydist net.

8. (U) Lesson: Raydist sites were chosen with the goals of establishing all sites on government owned land and establishing locations which would facilitate set up, tear down, and maintenance. Although the resultant selected sites were less than optimally located, the Wang calculator raydist net programs showed that they provided for adequate coverage of the anticipated mine field to be swept. An eleventh hour change in one site location was necessary because the original site had been occupied by another tenant. Wan programs for the new net configuration were run. These programs uncovered a new raydist program deficiency which prevented computer processing of the data necessary for pre-plot generation and P-6B raydist program associated data analysis. The problem involves the program's ability to process locational data with the particular minefield. Although the newly located site was not compatible with the P-6B program it was completely compatible with the cockpit flight director system and was used in lieu of preplotted tracks.

Recommendation: COMNAVAIRSYSCOM - AIR 5303 - fund further evaluation and correction by MCSC. In the interim, only optimal raydist net mine field geometries will be utilized.

9. (U) Lesson: The area offshore from Camp Pendleton did not have a navigation buoy for initialization. A master reference buoy (MRB) was determined to be an acceptable alternate and was laid the day prior to exercise commencement. This necessitated a raydist survey of the buoy that same day, prior to a an accurate determination of its mooring reliability. In actuality the buoy drifted during the night, probably due to entanglement in a moving kelp mass, resulting in initialization errors the following day. The next day the MRB disappeared altogether which necessitated the establishment of a new initialization errors the following day. The next day the MRB disappeared altogether

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which necessitated the establishment of a new initialization point at another MRB. In the interim, helicopters initialized at a surveyed land position and then returned to the ship for equipment stream.

Recommendation: For a raydist initialization point, utilize either (a) a previously planted MRB whose reliability has been established; (2) a fixed reference point or previously proven navigation aid; or (3) if no other means is available, a raydist table should be maintained on the launching platform itself.

10. (U) Lesson: The raydist cockpit director again proved to be an excellent addition to the precise navigation system. A Wang program deficiency prevented manufacture of preplotted tracks and the cockpit director had to be relied on entirely for raydist operation. When sweep areas were quickly shifted, the director's flexibility permitted immediate transition to the new areas. Sweep track runs using the director resulted in a very small navigation error (E).

Recommendation: None.

11. (C) Lesson: Large patches of kelp found in the minefield made it necessary to steer around these obstructions as passing through them would have resulted in loss or damage to the MK-104 device. Such detours could produce holidays within a minefield which may require sweeping by alternate means (i.e. Mine hunt).

Recommendation: MCM Commander should chart obstructed areas and schedule alternate sweep methods.

12. (U) Lesson: Civilian pleasure craft in the minefield area were a continual navigation hazard.

Recommendation: Minesweeping areas should be announced by notice to mariners and a picket boat be employed to keep pleasure craft out.

13. (U) Lesson: A shortage of IMRL tools necessitated a split of assets between the beach and ship detachments. This created situations where a needed tool was not readily available, resulting in considerable maintenance delays while waiting for the tool to be transported from one site to the other.

Recommendation: Increase IMRL allowance to enable the squadron to split its assets when required.

14. (U) Lesson: The infeasability of loading the 90 day pack up aboard DULUTH due to the at sea transfer requirement resulted in decreased performance aboard ship during the period 9-12 June 1979.

Recommendation: Whenever possible, avoid planning an AMCM embarkation on board ship where the entire maintenance packup cannot be onloaded.

15. (U) Lesson: The use of flatbed trucks created several problems. The continuous vibrations and shocks occurring to sensitive electronic and mechanical gear had an adverse effect on reliability and maintainability of the gear. Flatbed trucks are unreliable due to fuel shortages and strikes. This results in the squadron being unable to operate during the week the trucks are in transit, thereby negating the quick response capability of the squadron.

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Furthermore, the AMCM community and the USAF require training and experience in conducting the complicated AMCM/C-5 loadout.

Recommendation: Use C-5 aircraft exclusively vice flatbed trucks to ensure prompt delivery of required support equipment.

16. (U) Lesson: ASO was unaware of our presence at Norht Island and as a result documents passed to ASO were cancelled due to NAS North Island not being tasked with H-53 supply support.

Recommeddation: ASO should be informed of the squadrons location prior to deployment.

17. (U) Lesson: AFM funding was not established at NAS North Island immediately on arrival. There was a two day delay subsequent to notifying COMNAVAIRLANT.

Recommendatinn: TYCOM should ensure that AFM funding is established prior to deployment.

18. (U) Lesson: The long waiting period for receiving a crane when required, kept aircraft in a down status needlessly on several occasions.

Recommendation: The squadron should deploy with its own crane if more dedicated usage cannot be provided by the supporting activity.

19. (U) Lesson: The 90 day packup is designed to support only six RH-53 aircraft and does not contain raydist equipment spare parts.

Recommendation: Expand the present pack up to support eight aircraft and include raydist spare parts to support related aircraft and site equipment.

20. (U) Lesson: A major problem area was in copying material. The squadron currently leases an A. B. DICK 901 Copier which was left in Norfolk due to lease and service limitations. Copying requirements were met by utilizing other squadron's assets at NAS North Island. This was both time consuming and inefficient.

Recommendation: Strongly recommend the purchase of portable copy machine.

21. (U) Lesson: During the deployment, six reserve personnel were ordered to the command. There were three officers and three enlisted. Two problems arose with the assignment of active duty reserves. One area was that several enlisted orders did not have HM-14 NAS North Island on their orders. Instead their orders read "HM-14 Shore componet NAS Norfolk". This has now hopefully been resolved through liaison with the Reserve Center at New Orleans. Secondly processing of a reserve's travel claim required two weeks (the exact time a reserve is on active duty). Liaison with the Reserve Center in New Orleans will hopefully rectify the problem.

Recommendation: Do not send reserve personnel to a deployed/active duty command. They should be ordered to a reserve unit and then ordered TAD for training with the active duty unit.

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Code 80:THH:whr
3100
Ser 496
04 DEC 1979

From: Commanding Officer, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commander, Helicopter Sea Control Wing ONE

Subj: End of Detachment Report

Ref: (a) COMCARGRU SIX 200025Z OCT 79
(b) COMNAVAIRLANT 281135Z AUG 79

Encl: (1) Chronology of Detachment
(2) Operations Summary
(3) Deployment Statistics
(4) Maintenance Summary
(5) Administration Summary
(6) Safety Summary
(7) Lessons learned/recommendations

1. HELMINERON FOURTEEN Det TWO deployed to Roosevelt Roads, P.R. from 25 September to 19 Oct 79. During this period the detachment provided VOD support services for the USS FORRESTAL (CV 59).

2. Although the detachment was tasked with providing VOD support only for critical outsized cargo, the detachment was required to meet two and three logistic overheads a day for routine cargo, passenger and mail support. During the course of the deployment the Det carried 230,075 pounds of cargo (nearly double previous HM dets) and 377 passengers. However only two items were critical outsized, i.e., could not be carried by H-46 or C-1A. To meet this requirement the Det flew 97.8 hours or a rate 3 1/2 times the WSPD authorization.

3. A 97.3 percent operational ready rate was achieved by employing two shifts per day with the day shift providing trouble shooters and cargo handlers and the night shift performing a majority of the maintenance and inspections. All maintenance and cargo handling were provided by 5 aircrewman and 12 maintenancemen. Any less or number would have resulted in not meeting the schedule or being unable to move cargo at the land base.

4. Seventy-one percent of the squadrons total flight time during this period was devoted to VOD and therefore lost to AMCM training. The 97.8 hours flight time equates to about 30 AMCM missions. In as much that over 97 percent of the cargo, mail, and passengers carried by HM-14

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3100

Det TWO could have been carried by an H-46, it is recommended the future VOD support commitments be conducted by support squadrons such as HC-6, HC-16, VRC-40 etc.

5. Enclosure (1) through 7 comprise the end of detachment report and provide documentation of the remarkable success this detachment enjoyed.

6. Appendix (1) is a synopsis of cargo carried.

T. M. HOIVIK

23 November 1979

From: Officer in Charge, Helicoptdr Mine Countermeasures Squadron FOURTEEN, Detachment TWO
To: Commanding Officer, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: End of Detachment Report

Ref: (a) COMCARGRU NIX 200025Z OCT 79
(b) COMNAVAIRLANT 281135Z AUG 79

Encl: (1) Chronology of Detachment
(2) Operations Summary
(3) Deployment Statistics
(4) Maintenance Summary
(5) Administration Summary
(6) Safety Summary
(7) Lessons learned/Recommendations

1. From 25 Sep 79 until 19 Oct 79 HELMINERON FOURTEEN DET TWO provided VOD support services for USS FORRESTAL (CV-59). During this period the DET accumulated 97.8 flight hours, transported 377 passengers, and carried over 115 tons of cargo.

2. Enclosures (1) through (7) comprise the end of detachment report and provide documentation of the remarkable success which the detachment enjoyed.

3. Appendix (1) is a synopsis of cargo carried.

R. A. HUGHES
LT USN

CHRONOLOGY OF DETACHMENT

25 SEP 79	Advance party departed NAS Norfolk for NS Roosevelt Roads, PR.
27 SEP 79	BJ534 departed NAS Norfolk.and flew aboard USS FORRESTAL (CV-59). Remainderoof Det and equipment departed NAS Norfolk for NS Roosevelt Roads via C-9.
29 SEP 79	BJ-534 flew ashore to NS Roosevelt Roads.
30SEPP 79 - 16 OCT 79	VOD Operations, vicinity of Puerto Rico.
16 OCT 79	BJ-534 flew aboard FORRESTAL for transit to CONUS.
18 OCT 79	BJ-534 departed FORRESTAL for NAS Norfolk. Det personnel and equipment remaining at NS Roosevelt Roads departed for NAS Norfolk via C-9.
19 OCT 79	BJ-534 arrived NAS Norfolk.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY

1. HELMINEROM FOURTEEN Detachment TWO was tasked with providing VOD support for critical outsized cargo for the USS FORRESTAL (CV-59) during it's TYT-3 and ORE periods. This tasking was accomplished utilizing 1 RH-53D, 4 pilots, 5 aircrewman and 12 Maintenance personnel.

2. The deployment began with a one officer advance party arriving at NS Roosevelt Roads, PR on 25 Sep. The main body of the Det, along with tools and packup, arrived via C-9 on 27 Sep. The aircraft flew aboard FORRESTAL on 27 Sep, 80 miles at sea from NS Mayport, FL. The aircraft flew ashore on 29 Sep. VOD operations commenced on 30 Sep and continued until 16 Oct.

3. Detachment return began on 16 Oct with the aircraft flying aboard FORRESTAL for transit to CONUS WITh the possibility of a period of operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The remainder of the Det and equipment departed NS Roosevelt Roads for NAS Norfolk Via C-9 on 18 Oct. The aircraft departed FORRESTAL for NAS Norfolk on 18 Oct in the vicinity of Crooked Island, Bahamas. The aircraft arrived at NAS Norfolk,on 19 Oct.

4. The detachment was exceedingly successful in providing the VOD support required by FORRESTAL. As noted in reference (a), without the LOX/NITROGEN supplied by the Det, FORRESTAL would have been unable to support the extensive flight ops required for an ORE.

5. During the course of the deployment the DET carried 230,075 pounds of cargo (nearly double previous HM dets) and 377 passengers. However only two items were critical outsized, i.e., could not be carried by an H-46 or C-1A.

Appendix (1)-Synopsis of Cargo Carried

SYNOPSIS OF CARGO CARRIED

1. Reference (b) stated that "RH-53 assets made available for transport of critical outsized cargo or circumstances when ship is unable to utilize normal logistic support aircraft."

2. Deployment statistics show that an RH-53 was necessary for only 3 percent of the total cargo carried. This consisted of one J-79 engine externaled for 45 miles and one A-6 Radome in a packing craft to large for an H-46 to carry internally and not suitable for external flight.

3. Of the remaining 97 percent, 13 percent was self lifted det support equipment. Included in this was a 12,200 pound fork lift externaled from the ship to assist the det in cargo loading. In addition to our normal tasking of nitrogen and LOX carts, the Det carried Torpedoes, fress fruits and vegetables, sidewinder nitrogen charges, smdl and tens of thousands of pounds of general cargo.

4. A major slowdown to cargo ops was a lack of H-53 compatable pallets. three half size RCAF pallets were found at the MAC terminal, however, after one trip to the ship they were never seen again. Wooden pallets were plentiful, but could not take the place of a steel pallet.inIterms of amount of cargo that can be placed on them and ease of loading into the aircraft.

DEPLOYMENT STATISTICS

1. General:

	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	TOTAL
DAYS DEPLOYED	4	19	23
DAYS AT SEA	3	3	6
DAYS SHOREBASED	1	15	16
DAYS IN TRANSIT	1	1	2

2. Flight Data Summary:

	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	TOTAL
TOTAL HRS/DAY/NITE	20/11.35.1/5.0	77.7/73.34/4.3	97.8/88.5/9.3
AVG FLT TIME/PILOT/CREW	10.0/10.6	38.7/31.2	48.7/41.8
SORTIES SCHED/FLOWN/%	5/6/120%	43/43/100%	48/49/102%
TOTAL LANDINGS/DAY/NITE	14/3/1	90/86/4	104/99/5
LOGISTICS HRS	7.6	67.7	75.3
SELF LIFT HRS	7.5	10.0	17.5
INSTRUMENT/FAM	5.0	0	5.0

3. Mission/Sortie/Breakdown

	SCHEDULED	FLOWN
LOGISTICS	43	44
INSTRUMENT/FAM	1	1
SELF LIFT	4	4

4. Passenger/Mail/Cargo Breakdown

		% OF TOTAL CARGO
PASSENGERS	377	
BAGGAGE	9131	4
MAIL	7624	3
H-53 ONLY TRANSPORTABLE CARGO (2ITEMS)	6900	3
H-46/H-53 TRANSPORTABLE CARGO	137,802	60

C-1/H-46/H-53 TRANSPORTABLE CARGO	38,218	17
DET SUPPORT EQUIPMENT	30,400	13
TOTAL	230,075	100

5. External/Internal/Cargo Breakdown

EXTERNAL CARGO	37,975
INTERNAL CARGO	192,100

MAINTENANCE SUMMARY

1. Upon the formation of the detachment on 20 September 1979 the maintenance crew was likewise formed and aircraft 534 (Buno 158751) was assigned. The maintenance effort began with a phase "B" inspection and incorporation of AFB 146 prior to departing NAS Norfolk. These major maintenance actions together with routine upkeep and the formation of the detachment were accomplished within a one week span. During the phase inspection three main rotor blades were changed. During the entire deployment two post maintenance check flights were conducted. One prior to depatture and the other for a dampner bearing change at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, P.R.

2. Tools and IMRL for detachment operations were in many cases one of a kind and thus left at home operations in a tenuous positions

3. The space assigned at Roosevelt Roads, although inadequate, meets the needs of a small detachment. Hangar space, with overhead hoist, was available when needed. Station and AIMD support were both very good.

4. The aircraft performed well and no major component changes or major maintenance was accomplished. Two twenty-five hour and one fifty hour inspection were accomplished. The detachment enjoyed a 95.3 percent airer craft availability.

5. While deployed the maintenance effort ran on two shifts with many of the day shift personnel utilized basicaly as troubleshooters and cargo loaders. The night shift performed the bulk of the maintenance and readied the aircraft for the next days flight.

ADMIN SUMMARY

1. One officer was assigned as advance liaison and preceded the main body of the detachment by two days. This provided sufficient time to make all necessary prior contacts as well as orientation time. This was important since all det personnel were unfamiliar with the area and it allowed for smooth commencement of operations immediately upon arrival of the Det.

2. BOQ, chow passes, local purchasing chits, transportation and working spaces were arranged prior to det arrival without any difficulties. A minor problem with the BEQ occured when the rooms assigned were not ready for acceptance inspection upon arrival of the Det. This caused a 90 minute delay for check-in. BEQ rooms were acceptable and messing was within walking distance. Officer billeting in the BOQ was adequate except for the lack of air-conditioning. Meals were available at the COM-O (at the BOQ); however, breakfast is not provided.

3. Two fullsize Chevy Vans satisfied virtually all of the dets transportation needs. Both vans were rented from civilian sources in San Juan and gas was purchased from the NEX. Government provided transportation was unavailable due to over-commitment of the base to local hurricane relief operations. The large distances between living and working spaces proved to be an inconvenience however this had very little effect on the Det operationally.

4. The fact that the FY-80 budget was not approved until just prior to our return to CONUS created hardships on certain Det personnel. In keeping with base directives the Disbursing Officer refused to pay any advance per diem except to those personnel who had rental vehicles authorized on their orders. Advance per diem was paid to all personnel immediately after the budget was accepted without further problems. Paychecks for 15 October were sent via C-9 aircraft and were received on payday.

5. Mail pickup was arranged through the post office and air operations utilizing the FPO address.

SAFETY SUMMARY

1. High tempo operations continued throughout the period creating the potential for many mishaps aboard ship. The overall training of carrier personnel and AMCM aircrewman with respect to H-53 VOD operations is low. Fortunately only two minor handling incidents occurred and both were directly attributable to the inexperience of the cargo handlers aboard ship. First a NAN 2/2 cart was being off loaded on the ship and struck the edge of the ramp and second a forklift struck the starboard aircraft elephant ear. Both incidents were minor and repair was minimal. If future VOD dets are limited to 5-6 enlisted personnel, then all cargo handling must be accomplished by ship and station personnel. It is therefore paramount that carrier and station personnel be trained in H-53 cargo operations.

8. Lesson: Utilization of a FPO address resulted in significant delays to delivery of Det mail.
RECOMMENDATION: A post office box with a plain language address vice a FPO address should be used to expidite mail delivery.

LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Lesson: AMCM pilots/aircrewmen are not trained in the cargo loading/unloading techniques required for extensive cargo transporting OPS.
RECOMMENDATION: Conduct cargo handling training (internal and external loads) at both the FRS and squadron level.

2. Lesson: There are no set guidelines as to limitations of H-53 VOD OPS. individual squadron's SOP, wing directives, out-dated instructions, NATOPS and judgement calls by OINC's/HAC's all combine to give a some what confused picture as to what a HM VOD Det will or won't do.
RECOMMENDATION: In its expanding HM role, HELSEACONWING ONE should collate all instructions in use into a comprehensive HM VOD instruction.

3. Lesson: Large scale cargo movements require much co-ordination and man power to accomplish. The MAC terminal at Roosevelt Roads is not staffed to handle extended H-53 OPS. Additionally, MAC terminal's first priority is to load/unload regularly scheduled logistics aircraft. This resulted in DET pilots acting as cargo staging/loading officers and Det maintenance personnel acting as cargo handlers. If future detachments are limited to 5-6 enlisted personnel including aircrewman, no detachment personnel will be available for cargo handling.
RECOMMENDATION: Ships should supply cargo handlers TAD to the MAC terminal, dedicated for H-53 cargo ops. Another option would be to augment MAC terminal personnel with station supply personnel.

4. Lesson: In excess of thirty minutes was required to load and unload cargo. This was caused by having to handle each pallet individually via forklift.
RECOMMENDATION: Low profile K-loaders compatabile with the RAMP are in use on LHA's. These should be made available for future VOD Dets. Additionally half sized aluminium pallets should be used when available.

5. Lesson: It often occurred that personnel were unable to proceed to the proceed to the chow hall at scheduled meal times due to the tempo of OPS and ~~chow hall cargo handler~~ meal times due to the
RECOMMENDATION: Provisions for "missed meal" funding prior to deployment are necessary when detached as a small unit.

6. Lesson: CV's are not familiar with H-53 VOD OPS.
RECOMMENDATION: Prepare an RH-53D VOD "Dog and Pony Show" that can be shown to shipboard cargo handlers to familiarize them with the aircraft and VOD OPS.

7. Lesson: The use of an advance liaison officer was invaluable in establishing the det at Roosevelt Roads.
RECOMMENDATION: The advance liaison concept should continue to be used on future dets to this area. However, a one day lead time should be adequate.