Naval History and Heritage Command

Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan

MISC D0026414.A1/Final December 2011

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Contents

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970-1974)

Sep 1970 Project SIXTY

     An assessment; direction to move

Mar-Apr 1974 "Missions of the Navy"

     Missions

--1--

Surface warfare officer
     Followed 3 naval aviator CNOs

Served under President Nixon; SECDEFs Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger; SECNAVs Chaffee, Warner, Middendorf

Drew on previous education & experience
     Naval War College & National War College graduate
     OSD/ISA (Arms Control), SECNAV EA, 1^st OP-96 (Director, Systems Analysis)
     Protege of Paul Nitze (NSC-68 Cold War strategy author)

Drew on ideas of subordinates (esp. RADM -later ADM - Stansfield Turner) & civilians (created CNO Executive Panel)

--2--

Came into office from Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV.
     Imaginative COIN thinker & operator in-country
     But saw Vietnam War as ill-advised drain on needed USN anti-Soviet resources, esp. for sea control

Had a clear agenda when he came into office and immediately created a capstone document as blueprint

Sought to implement it throughout his term

Had NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner promulgate its overarching themes at end of his term

Centralized Navy POM & budget decision-making

Publicly fearful of Soviet Navy

Sought to avoid USN anti-Soviet SSBN prosecution; focus on SLOC sea control

Opposed to Nixon-Kissinger arms control efforts (SALT I)

Conflicts with ADM Rickover

Signature programs: FFGs, PHMs, sea control ships, equal opportunity, personnel reforms

Later, continued to write on US naval policy and strategy

--3--

Memoirs:
     On Watch (1976)
     My Father, My Son (1986)

--4--

Overview
     Signed by CNO ADM Zumwalt (Sept 1970)
     "Assessment" & "Direction to Move"
     Medium-length (30 pp) SECRET brief & memo
     CNO flag officer special assistants drafted
     Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV Comprehensive plan, program guidance for Zumwalt term
              Precedent for subsequent annual CNO program guidance
     To re-optimize USN to counter Soviet threat
     4 USN capability categories; hi-low mix
              Sea control priority over power projection programs
     Listed 22 specific actions taken or proposed
     Presented 3 force structure alternatives
     Concepts proved more influential than programs

Signed by:
     CNO ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
     2 months after taking office

--5--

What it was
     Billed as "an assessment," "direction to move," "concepts"
     Secret briefing for SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF (Sep 1970)
     Secret memorandum to all Flag Officers (and Marine general officers)
     Medium-length (30 pages plus slides)
     Kickoff for development of POM-73 & precedent for subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt annual Navy program guidance

Why it was written (I)
     Show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through SLOC defense
     Re-optimize USN vs. growing Soviet at-sea combat & SLOC-cutting capabilities in a NATO-Pact war
     Take advantage of SECDEF Laird de-centralization of DOD POM & budget processes to services
              Establish CNO guidance as authoritative interpretation of SECDEF guidance
     Centralize under the CNO what had been a decentralized internal Navy program planning process, to implement his policies
     To guide USN, USMC flag/general officer actions, especially in developing POM-73 and subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt POMs
     Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV

--6--

Why it was written (II)
     Gain OSD & OPNAV support for CNO ADM Zumwalt vision to reconfigure fleet capabilities
            Focus more on sea control, less on power projection
            Add "low-mix" ships to established "high-mix" programs
     Focus on "capability categories," to reduce "union" parochialism
     Show that the Navy was conforming to:
            New national "Nixon Doctrine" policy of reliance on allies, focus on USSR
            Sharply reduced budget allocations
     Leave the 1960s and the Vietnam War behind
            Despite current ongoing major Navy Vietnam War combat operations

Context (I)
     2^nd year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
     SECDEF Laird (1969-73)
            Decentralization of DOD PPBS to services
     US-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons parity
     Detente, deterrence & disarmament policies vis-a-vis Soviets
     Nixon Doctrine: Allies do more<>      "1 1.2 War" national defense planning construct (reduced from "2 1/2 wars")
     Vietnam War still raging, but US withdrawing troops
     Improving US relations with China

     US economy in recession
            GDP growth slowing; inflation rate rising
            Modest U.S. government deficit spending
            Price of oil low and steady

--7--

Context (II)
     AVF impending
            USN downsizing; declining budgets
            But, DoN TOA now >DoA or DoAF
     SECNAV Chaffee (1969-72) (Made VADM Zumwalt CNO)
     New CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)
     Soviet naval buildup
            1^st Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 70
            Imminent deployment of Delta SSBNs w/ long range SLBMs, & Backfire-C bombers
     Six-Day War Egypt Styx anti-ship missile use shock (1967)
     N. Korean USN EC-121 SOJ shoot-down (Apr 1969)
     Violent Sino-Soviet border clashes & nuclear threats (1969)
     US withdrew from Libya Wheelus AFB (1970)

Context (III)
     USN in 1970: 769 battle force ships & declining sharply; 10 new ships authorized
     DON budgets declining CEP, OPNAV OP-00K, NADEC created (1970)
     Demise of OPNAV Long Range Planning Group (1970)
     Carriers changing to CV/CVN concept
     From CVAs & CVSs

--8--

Cited references
     Nixon Doctrine (1969)
     JCS Plans
     DoD FY 72 Fiscal Guidance
     FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget

Context: Other important publications
     CAPT E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., "A Course for Destroyers," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 1962)
     NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)
            Flexible response
            NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)
            SACLANT, Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc ("Brosio Study") (Mar 1969)
     DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
     Herman Kahn works
     Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)
     Paul Nitze thinking
     Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)

--9--

How it was written
     Drafted by RADM-SEL Stansfield Turner
            New OPNAV special office (Op-OOH)
            Drew officers from OP-60, OP-93, OP-96, Secretariat
     Finished by RADM Worth Bagley
     "60-day effort"
     CNO & SECNAV Chaffee briefed SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF Packard, to influence POM 73 (Sep 1970)
     Then distributed to USN, USMC flag & general officers
     Tracking goal accomplishment (measuring effectiveness) by new Coordinator of Decisions (OP-09C) (RADM Emmett Tidd)

Outline
     CNO's Project SIXTY presentation to SECDEF
     Assured second strike potential
     Sea control and projection
     Overseas presence
     Alternative combinations of sea control and projection forces
     Other types of change
     Summary

--10--

Key Ideas (I):
     Soviets & their navy are the priority threat
            Taken very seriously
            "CHICOM" threat mentioned in passing
     Soviet threat is global
     Alarming view of USN capabilities to defeat Soviets at sea
            55% w/ present forces
            30% w/ POM 72 forces
     Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
     Joint & allied coordination & cooperation
            Need allied navies to contribute more to sea control
     Reprioritized naval missions

Key ideas (II):
     22 specific actions taken or proposed
            Included topics for further study & analysis
     3 force structure alternatives
     Theater tradeoffs necessary. Gave details.
     Retire obsolescing forces early (for $)
     Modernize ("hi-low mix")
     New R&D initiatives
     Reduce support costs
     Pursue people programs
     Reduce forward deployments to ensure optimum rotation policies for personnel retention & motivation
     Testing new force packages: Add SSNs to surface task forces

--11--

What was new?
     Comprehensive USN statement of strategy & policy
            Annual CNO program guidance
     4 prioritized disaggregated capabilities
            Assured second strike
            Control of sea lines and areas
            Projection of power ashore
            Overseas presence in peacetime
     "Strategic deterrence must come first"
     Focus on sea control vs. Soviet threat
     Shift $ from VN-era USN power projection CV strike to defensive sea control
     Many new programs
            Sea control ships to replace CVSs (aborted)
            Perry-class FFGs
     Tracking goal accomplishment; measuring effectiveness

Not addressed
     Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
     Non-Soviet threats
     World trade issues
     On-going war in Vietnam
     USN submarine ISR operations
     Counterinsurgency; terrorist threats
     Coastal & riverine operations & programs
     Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
     Maritime Security Operations
     US Coast Guard
     US government inter-agency partners
     US industrial base & shipbuilding

Little on USMC
     Just distribution list & USMC CV TACAIR bid

--12--

Subsequent analyses & critiques
     Herschel Kanter & Thomas Anger, Navy Responses to Changes in the Defense Resource Planning Process (CNA 1973)
     ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976)
     David A. Rosenberg, "Project 60: Twelve Years Later" (1982)
     Jeffrey Sands, On His Watch (CNA 1993)
            Included measuring effectiveness
     Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space (Ch X) (2000)
     CAPT Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies (2004)
     Edgar Puryear, American Admiralship (Ch IX) (2005)
     Harlan Ullman, "A New Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Mar 2007)

Criticisms (I)
     "A non-Mahanian aberration" (Norman Friedman)
     Too defensive and fearful
     Too much focus on sea control vs. Soviets
     Too little focus on power projection vs. Soviets
     Sea control & power projection were actually intertwined, not bifurcated
     Wrongly assumed Soviet priority to cut SLOCs
     To abandon naval offensive would lose the fleet & the war

--13--

Criticisms (II):
     A step backwards from focus on forward USN influence on events ashore
     Wrong solutions to problems
     Unaffordable
     Led to tactical caution
     Not well connected to national policy of detente
     Not joint or allied enough
     Too parochial (surface-warfare advocacy)
     Too heavy on programmatics and too light on strategy
     Not a consensual document. One man's vision

Influence (I):
     Wide within Navy & DOD at the time
     Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on sea control
     Concepts more influential than specific programs
     Many programs repudiated by successors
     Subsequent Navy program planning used Project 60 "missions of the Navy" construct: Strategic deterrence, projection of power, control of sea lines
            Especially OP-96-led CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAMs)
            OP-96 reorganized internally along "mission area" & "support area" lines
            Overseas presence could not be used to justify forces, IAWDOD guidance

--14--

Influence (II):
     Institutionalized as annual CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG) (from 1971 on)
            Drafted in OP-96 (Systems Analysis) (RADM Turner (1971-2) et al.)
     As a Navy "program planning" document, OP-00H-drafted Project SIXTY & successor OP-96-drafted CPPGs eclipsed influence of OP-06/OP-60-drafted planning & strategy documents as conceptual basis for internal OPNAV & USN thinking during 1970s
     Led to USN emphasis on "second P" of PPBS, vice "First P"

Why did it have this influence (I)
     Personalities:
            Strong backing by forceful & thoughtful, but unorthodox & controversial, CNO ADM Zumwalt
            Continued advocacy by Stansfield Turner
                 As RADM & OP-96 (1971-2); and later VADM & President, Naval War College (1972-4)
     Effective CNO management techniques (special assistants, NADEC, Z-Grams, successor CPPGs)
     Deliberate fostering of OP-96-led OPNAV "program planning" as intellectual center of OPNAV staff, vice OP-06-led "planning"

--15--

Why did it have this influence (II)
     SECDEF Laird left Navy alone to implement its own plan
     Declining US defense budgets & post-Vietnam operational lull in 1970s led to USN focus on getting the budget right
     Limited internal Navy buy-in on many specifics
     Crystallized poles in USN thinking; sparked debates
     1982 ENS Rosenberg OP-965 retrospective study   showed utility of comprehensive USN policy statement
            Successive descendent CPPGs had become more programmatic & less conceptual & strategic overtime

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
     Set the example for all
     Conceptual roots of Missions of the U.S. Navy
     Triggered contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the US Navy
     Studied for lessons leading to The Maritime Strategy
     But spawned succession of CPPGs that refocused many in Navy away from strategy

--16--

Overview
     Drafted & signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner (Mar-Apr 1974)
            Drafting assistance by NAVWARCOL faculty
     Short (16 pp max) UNCLAS articles
     Described 4 Navy missions (from Project SIXTY)
     Showed relationship of missions to tactics
     Deliberate creation of a new vocabulary
     Principal target: US Navy officer corps
     USN officers should think deeply about their service
     Missions construct lends itself to analyzing naval issues
     Soviet Union the chief threat for USN to counter
     Lasting influence

--17--

Signed by VADM Stansfield Turner
     President, Naval War College (1972-4)
     Surface warfare officer
     Later, NATO CINCSOUTH, Carter Administration CIA Director (1977-81)
     Continued to write extensively on naval policy & strategy

What it was
     Billed as "Missions"
            UNCLAS Naval War College Review article (Mar-Apr 1974)
                 Short (16 pages)
                 Reprinted in Naval War College Review (Winter 1998)
            UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Dec 1974)
            Derived from Project SIXTY

--18--

Why it was written
     To get USN officers to think deeply about their service
            To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does
            To help naval officers understand what is best for the whole organization, not just their own platforms or programs
            To focus the Navy on cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)
     To inform future naval force structure decisions

            To form a basis to establishing priorities for allocating resources
            To assist in selecting the best among competing systems
     Institutionalize Project SIXTY framework
     Principal target: US Navy officer corps

Context (I)
     Last year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
            Watergate scandal 1972-4
     All US forces withdrawn from South Vietnam (1973)
            Northern combat actions against South Vietnam continued
     SECDEF Schlesinger (1973-75)
     All-Volunteer Force (from 1973)
     US economy in recession again; inflation rate rising
            Arab oil embargo; Price of oil soaring

--19--

Context (II)
     SECDEF nuclear strategy changes (1974)
     Palestinian attack at Munich airport (1970). Beginning of major terrorist campaign
            Munich Olympics (1972); Rome airport (1973)
     World food crisis (1972-74)
            Shortages, price hikes led to famines, unrest
     Yom Kippur War (1973)
            Battle of Latakia
                 1^st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception

Context (III)
     Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting (May 1972)
            High point of detente
     INCSEA agreement with Soviets (1972)
     ABM & SALT Treaties (1972)
     Soviet naval buildup
            Delta-class SSBNs w/long-range SLBMs (from 1972)
     USN-Soviet Navy Mediterranean confrontations (1970 & 1973)
     USN post-Vietnam War ops
     Indo-Pakistani War & Enterprise cruise (1971-2)
     Close Soviet-Indian military ties
     Improving US relations with PRC

--20--

Context (IV)
     Outgoing CNO Zumwalt (1970-74)
     OPNAV reorganization: Creation of "3 platform barons" as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) (1971)
            OP-02 (Submarines); OP-03 (Surface); OP-05 (Air)
            Formalized increased post-World War II officer specialization
     OPNAV OP-090 Net Assessment Office created
     OP-96-led "program planning" the dominant intellectual activity in OPNAV, vice OP-06-led "planning"
     Declining DON budgets
     USN in 1974: 512 battle force ships and declining sharply; 14 new ships authorized
     But, DON TOA now DA or DAF

Context (V)
     Sea Control Ship experiment on USS Guam with AV-8s & SH-3s (1972)
     Racial incidents on USN ships (1972)
     "Turner Revolution" at Naval War College (1972-4)
            Curriculum transformation, esp. Strategy & Policy Course (1972)
            New top-notch faculty, esp. Strategy Department
            Current Strategy Forum instituted (1973)
     Increasing USAF minelaying & surveillance support at sea
     Army at TRADOC developing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe

--21--

Context: Cited references
     Mahan

Context: Other important publications
     Project SIXTY (1970)
     Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)
     Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (1970)
     USN-USAF MOAs on B-52 minelaying at sea (1971, 1974)
     Future Maritime Strategy Study (FUMAR) (1973)
     "U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s"
     "Project 2000" long-range planning Study (1974)
     ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" articles in US Naval Institute Proceedings (with commentaries) (Jan-Nov 1974)

--22--

How it was written
     Drafted at newly-transformed Naval War College
     Drafter: NAVWARCOL President, VADM Stansfield Turner (Jun 1972-Aug 1974)
            Had conceived and drafted CNO ADM Zumwalt's Project SIXTY
            Director of OPNAV analysis office (OP-96) before going to NWC
            Leaving Naval War College for command of US Second Fleet
     Editor & sounding board: CDR George Thibault (NAVWARCOL faculty)

Outline (Naval War College Review article)
     Usefulness of categorizing Navy missions
     Evolution of Naval capabilities and missions
     Definition of naval missions and discussion of their forces and tactics
            Strategic deterrence mission
            Sea control mission
            Projection of power ashore missions
            Naval presence mission
     Current and future issues involving naval missions areas

--23--

Key ideas (I):

4 "Missions:
Naval War College Review order
Strategic deterrence
Projection of power
Sea control
Naval presence
US Naval Institute Proceedings order
"Warfighting missions" Sea control
Projection of power
"Deterrent missions"
Naval presence
Strategic deterrence

Key ideas (II):
Each of 4 missions subdivided into "tactics"
Detailed & nuanced definitions & discussions of each

--24--

Key ideas (III):
"To force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input"
(Key goal of McNamara-instituted PPBS since 1961-2)
Missions as "outputs"
Tied to national objectives
Interdependent
NOT prioritized
Tradeoffs within/among missions
USMC implements a few of the tactics

Key ideas (IV):
USN officers should think deeply about their service
USN sea control focus may yield to naval presence focus (US Naval Institute Proceedings article)
Discussed historical development of Navy concepts
Placed 4 Missions in historical context
Soviets the chief threat
Communist Chinese threat mentioned in passing
Discussion of "blockade" as a discreet naval operation

--25--

Interdependent Naval Missions

Reproduced with permission from: Naval War College Review. Mar-Apr 1974 Vol XXVI, #5. "Missions of the U.S. Navy," by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College.

What was new
     Going public with Project SIXTY 4-capability construct
     Explicit discussion of "sea control" as superseding "control of the sea" terminology
     Rejection of "command of the seas" and "sea power" terminology
     Explication of "Presence" mission Tying mission areas to tactics
     Wide subsequent influence and citation

--26--

Not addressed (I)
     Explicit priorities among missions
     Non-Soviet threats
     World trade issues
     Submarine ISR operations
     Counterinsurgency & irregular warfare
     Convoy operations Coastal & riverine operations & programs
     Maritime Security Operations
     Terrorist threats
     Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
     "Fleet-in-being" or "force-in-being"

Not addressed (II)
     Sealift
     US Coast Guard; U.S. Army
     U.S. Merchant marine
       US industrial base & shipbuilding
     U.S. government interagency partners

Little joint or allied mention

--27--

Subsequent analyses & critiques
     ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976)
     John Allen Williams, "Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1981)

Were they "missions?"

What is a "mission" (officially)?

1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task.

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

--28--

Were they "missions?

What is a "mission" (officially)?

"The terms 'roles, missions, and functions' often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. 'Roles' are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services...were established in law. "Missions" are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. 'Functions' are specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles."

Joint Pub 02 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (July 2001)

Criticisms
     These weren't really "missions"?
     These weren't really the right missions.
     "Sea control" really 2 missions: "Offensive" & "Defensive" (CDR/Dr John Allen Williams USNR)
     Sea control & power projection intertwined, not bifurcated
     Presence not really a "mission"
     All 4 missions not co-equal
            Implicit primacy of "sea control" right/wrong
     New vocabulary shouldn't supersede older terms

--29--

Subsequent evolution of ADM Turner's thought
     4 roles/missions of the Navy
     Sea control
     Projection of power by amphibious assault
     Projection of power ashore by bombardment
     Strategic nuclear retaliation
            Today a new mission may be emerging
                 Defending the homeland or other land areas against attack by missiles through space
            Setting aside homeland defense...The other four missions are today of lessening importance to our country's security

ADM Stansfield Turner USN (Ret)
"Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?"
Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

Influence:
     Very wide and very long-lasting
     In particular, led to increased DOTMLPF focus on naval forward presence
     Cited throughout world defense literature
            E.g.: Japanese admiral quoted in 2007 conference paper
     Forged a long-lasting consensus on the missions of the US Navy
     Spilled over into CNO ADM Holloway 1^st (Mar 75) Posture Statement & US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jun 1975)

--30--

Why did it have this influence?
     Groundwork already laid by Project SIXTY, subsequent CPPGs, and OP-96-led OPNAV program planning
     Simple, elegant construct; Filled a conceptual void & need
     Widely adopted by Navy leadership
     Personality: VADM Turner reputation as USN's intellectual leader, inside & outside USN
      Adopted by academia (civilian & military)
     Links to ADM Zumwalt-specific policies muted

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
     New vocabulary used in almost all
     But "control of the seas" & "Sea power" terms persisted too
     4-mission framework triggered contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the US Navy & The Future of U.S. Sea Power
     Missions restated, re-ordered and/or modified somewhat in Forward...From the Sea, Anytime, Anywhere, Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, & added to in NOC (2006)
     Missions repeated in 2007 Program Guide to the U.S. Navy ("crisis response" added)
     Missions formed 4 of 6 "core capabilities" of Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower (2007)

--31--

Dec 1975     Strategic Concept for the U. S. Navy (S)

1976-78       CNO Reports (Posture Statements)

Jul 1976       "U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal"

Jan 1977     Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1)

May 1978   Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A)

(Mar 1978) (Sea Plan 2000) (S)
     A force planning study

   Naval aviator (nuclear power trained & experienced)
     Served under Presidents Ford & Carter; SECDEFs Schlesinger, Rumsfeld & Brown; SECNAVs Middendorf & Claytor     Experienced in initiating concepts & processes
            E.g.: NATOPS; USN program planning; CV concept (1968); Nuclear Powered Carrier Program; changed USN frigate nomenclature; CVBGs (1977); flexible, reconfigurable air wing; fostered CWC concept
     Combat veteran of three wars & numerous crises

--32--

Initially let previous concepts stand (he had been VCNO under ADM Zumwalt)

Progressively developed & promulgated a new coherent set of concepts to replace them

At end of his term, promulgated a final comprehensive statement

His DCNO for Plans Policy & Operations, VADM William Crowe, created a new Strategy & Concepts Branch (OP-603), staffed by hand-picked strategists (1978)

Fought successfully to prevent cruise missiles from being banned by US-USSR SALT II agreement

Signature program: CVN, CVBG

Later, continued to write on naval strategy & policy, & serve on high-level national & DOD commissions & study groups
     President, Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (1978-88)
     Chairman, Special Operations Review Group (investigating 1980 Desert One Iran Hostages Rescue debacle)
     Executive Director, President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1985)

     President, then Chairman of Naval Historical Foundation (1980-2008)

Memoir: Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam and the Soviet Confrontation (2007)

--33--

Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

Overview
     Drafted and signed by CNO ADM Holloway
     "Strategic Concepts"
     Principal targets: USN officer corps & Capitol Hill
     CLAS memo, then UNCLAS article, NWP, posture statement brochures, revised medium-length (37 pp) NWP
     Concepts evolved through various editions
     Comprehensive analysis of naval requirement development
     Rigorous flow from national policy to systems
     Focus on naval warfare tasks, across platforms
            Highlighted range of aircraft carrier capabilities
     No specific USN adversaries mentioned by name
     Still modestly influential

--34--

Signed by:
     CNO ADM James L. Holloway, III
     Successive drafts after 1 1/2 years in office

What it was
     Billed as "Strategic concept(s)"
     Secret signed document circulated to Fleet
     Commanders for comment (Dec 1975)
     CNO Reports (Posture Statements) (Jul 76, Apr 77, Mar 78)
            Pocket-sized for portability
     US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jul 1976)
     UNCLAS Naval Warfare Publications (NWP)
            NWP 1 (Jan 1977)
            NWP 1(A) (May 1978): 37 pages
                 Not formally cancelled until 1993
     Later boiled down in Holloway 1985 Oceanus article

--35--

Why it was written (I)
     So USN officers would understand basic USN concepts, doctrine & processes, in order to be able to contribute effectively to internal Navy decisions, make effective external cases for the Navy, and understand the implications of making changes
     To lay out the capabilities of the US Navy in support of the nation, including aircraft carriers
     Reaction to Project SIXTY & Turner "Missions" "Consolidation" of internal USN thinking, esp. "missions"
     To emphasize warfare tasks over platforms
            And in so doing highlight the versatility of the aircraft carrier

Why it was written (II)
     To reflect evolution of CNO ADM Holloway's thinking
     To influence Administration policies:
            To create a coherent Navy policy statement in anticipation of a possible Jan 1977 change in administrations (1975-6)
            To try to influence new administration policies (1977)
            To try to change administration policies (1978)
            To enlist Congressional support in influencing/changing Administration policies (1977-8)
     To achieve consensus on US Navy roles, missions, tasks, functions (and, ultimately, force levels & mix)
     Principal targets: USN officer corps, Capitol Hill, DOD

--36--

Context (I)
     CNO ADM Holloway (1974-78)
     2^nd year of Ford (R) administration (1974-77) thru 2^nd year of Carter (D) administration
     US voters repudiated Ford administration (Nov 1976)
     SECDEFs Laird, Rumsfeld (1975-77); SECNAV Middendorf
     SECDEF Brown (1977-81); SECNAV Claytor
     US economy pulling out of recession (from Mar 1975)
            But inflation rate rising & unemployment rate high
            Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
            Price of oil high but declining somewhat
     PRC occupied Paracel Islands; PLAN defeated VNN in South China Sea naval battle (1974)
     N. Vietnam victory, occupation of S. Vietnam (1975)
     Communist regimes in Laos, Cambodia (1975)

Context (II)
     National policy shift from Pacific military commitments
     Outgoing Ford Administration policies comfortable for Navy, if underfunded
     Soviets deployed SS-20 nuclear missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Central Europe (1975)
     US countered with Pershing II & GLCM INF deployment plans
     New Carter administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN Atlantic SLOC protection
            Robert Komer as DOD Special Assistant for NATO

--37--

Context (III)
     Arms Control Agreements & talks
            Seabed, INCSEA, SALT I, ABM
            US-Soviet talks to demilitarize Indian Ocean (1977-8 )
     Soviet fleet build-up
            New Delta-class SSBNs w/ long-range SLBMs (1972)
                 Soviet SSBNs no longer needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach CONUS targets
            Backfire-B bomber with ASMs (1972)
                 To keep US carrier aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets
            2^nd Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 75
     1^st USN, Soviet Navy reciprocal port visits (1975)

Context (IV)
     Increased Soviet interventions in 3^rd world
     Close Soviet-Indian military ties
     1^st nuclear weapon test by Soviet-friendly India (1974)
     Improving US relations with PRC
     Yom Kippur War (1973)
            Battle of Latakia
                 1^st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception

--38--

Context (V)
     Portuguese empire freed (1974-5)
     Periodic Korean crises
            Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)
     Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
     Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3^rd world ("Vietnam syndrome")
            Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

Context (VI)
     Declining USN force levels; fluctuating DON budgets
     USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized
     Emerging USN force level goal: 600 ships
     New systems entering fleet
     CWC concept entering fleet
     Internal USN "Repeal Zumwalt" debates
     Bitter internal US government aircraft carrier, VSTOL budget debates

            Culmination: Congress debated adding CVN 71 to carrier-less FY 79 defense budget (Feb-Aug 1978)

--39--

Context (VII)
     Specialized USN ASW carriers disappeared
            CVA/CVAN/CVS * CV/CVN
            CVWs transformed from 2 specialized air wing types to one general multi-mission model
     New fleet battle organization (1977)
            CVTF/CVTG * CVBF/CVBG
     Continued primacy of OP-96-led program planning as intellectual basis for OPNAV activity, vice OP-06-led planning
     OPNAV Op-96-OP-60 rivalry

Context (VIII)
     USN surface ship reclassifications (1975)
            CNO ADM Holloway initiatives
            Brought USN "frigate" nomenclature in line with international practice
            Eliminated perceived USN-Soviet Navy "cruiser gap"
            Eliminated USN surface combatant "escort" terminology
            CG/CLG
            CG
            DL/DLG
            CG or DDG
            DD/DDG
            DD/DDG
            DE/DEG
            FF/FFG
            PF
            FFG
     CNO ADM Holloway decision to halt CGN procurement

--40--

Context (IX)
     New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
     New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
     CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
     But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner plans to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis

Context (X)
     USN Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) created (1975)
     NAVWARCOL Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
     John F. Lehman as CNO consultant (from 1977)
     Army at TRADOC developed defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe (1976)
     Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
     Military Reform Movement (from 1976)
            SEN Taft, then SEN Hart. Bill Lind
            Adopted & advocated "lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix"
     Committee on the Present Danger (from 1976)
            Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.

--41--

Cited references
     Title 10 of U.S. Code
     DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
     DOD Total Force Policy
     Unified Command Plan
     JCS & USN Readiness Reporting Systems

Discussed historical development of USN strategy & law of the sea

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
     Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)
            Esp. Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976)
            Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)
     NSDM 242 Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)
     NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)
     ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (w/USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
            Bound & published as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)
     NSDM 242 Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)
     OPNAV OP-96, Project 2000 (1974-1977)
     USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)

--42--

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
     Barry Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities (1975)
     CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
     David Rosenberg & Floyd Kennedy, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972. Supporting Study: U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role, Part I - Naval Strategy in a Period of Change: Interservice Rivalry, Strategic Interaction, and the Development of Nuclear Attack Capability, 1945-1951 (Lulejian) (1975)
     Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (1976)
     SEN Taft "White Paper on Defense" (1976)
     US Army FM 100-5 Operations ("active defense") (1976)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
     CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9)
     NSDM 344 Navy Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977)
            Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
            Based on NSC study on "U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sep 1976)
                 John Lehman helped draft
     NSC PRM 10 Military Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977) & PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)
     USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)
     Sea Plan 2000 naval force planning study (1978)

--43--

How it was written (I)
     Personality: CNO ADM Holloway the driver
            Saw importance of "writing it all down", himself
            Advocate of direct senior involvement; not "completed staff work"
            Advocate of standardized processes throughout his career
            Denigrated fancy pictures and art work
     Assisted by
            Executive Assistant CAPT John Poindexter as sounding board
            CNO Fellow
            OP-60N (LCDR Joseph Strasser, Fletcher Ph.D.); 1-on-1 meetings
            CAPT Dirk Pringle (OP-64) for "readiness" section

How it was written (II)
     Unhappy with "4 Missions of the Navy," (which had informed his 1^st Posture Statement & 1^st US Naval Institute Proceedings article)
     Continuously reworked his ideas, in various media
     Added "readiness" section IRT perceived SECDEF Brown confusion on readiness terminology at Armed Forces Policy Council meeting
     Published in final form as NWP 1 (Rev A) in May 1978
     Saw it as a baseline. Ok to deviate from as required
            "If you're going to break the rules, you've got to have rules to break"

--44--

Outline (NWP 1 (Rev A)
     Part I: Generation of naval force requirements
            1. Introduction
            2. National strategy
            3. U.S. Navy support of the national military strategy
            4. Required capabilities and characteristics of naval forces
            5. Navy program development
     Part II: Planning, employment and readiness doctrine for naval operating forces

Key ideas (I)
     Strategic concepts drive force requirements
     Formal orderly top-down general processes
     Used accepted DOD definitions of terms
            "Mission," "roles," "functions," etc.
     Importance to US of open & free seaborne trade
     Importance of factors unique to shipbuilding

--45--

Key ideas (II)
     Utility & importance of net assessment & analysis
     Importance of ship & a/c readiness & employment cycles
     Forward deployment & surge posture balance
     Coordinated joint & allied ops
     USN sea control a prerequisite for sustained Army, Air Force overseas campaigns (enabling)
     Capabilities-based. Discussed only generic threats
            Soviets not mentioned

Key ideas (III)
     Revised (& complexified) Turner concepts, vocabulary
            2 basic USN functions
                 Sea control (prerequisite)
                 Power projection
            3 USN roles
                 Strategic nuclear deterrence
                 SLOC security
                 Overseas deployed forces
                        Presence = a "clear side benefit" of forward deployment
                        Must reflect "combat capability"
                        Presence nota mission buys "reduced response time"

--46--

Key Ideas (IV)
     Fundamental warfare tasks
            AAW
            Strike             ASW
            Amphibious
            ASUW
            Mine
            Supporting warfare tasks
                 Special warfare
                 C³
                 Ocean surveillance
                 EW
                 Intelligence
                 Logistics

NWP 10(B) (1970)
     "Types of naval operations"
            Strike force operations
            Amphibious operations
            Anti-air warfare
            Anti-submarine warfare
            Mining & mine countermeasures
            Riverine operations
            Support operations
            Surveillance & blockading
            Search and rescue
            Domestic emergency operations

NWP 1 (Rev A) (1978)
     "Warfare tasks"
            Anti-air warfare
            Anti-submarine warfare
            Anti-surface warfare
            Strike warfare
            Amphibious warfare
            Mine warfare
            Special warfare
            Ocean surveillance
            Intelligence
            C3
            Electronic warfare
            Logistics

--47--

Key ideas (V)
     Warfare tasks across platforms
             Update of earlier NWP 10 listings
            Implicit primacy of strike warfare & carrier platform
            New CVBG force packages to incorporate CVS missions
     USMC = 1/2 of 1 of 6 "fundamental" warfare tasks

Key ideas (VI): Evolution of CNO ADM Holloway thinking
     1975 Posture Statement & NIP article
            Followed Zumwalt-Turner "4 Missions" construct
     Dec 1975 SECRET Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy
            "Sea Control is the fundamental U.S. Navy function"
            Naval presence a "unique capability"
     1976 Posture Statement & July 1976 US Naval Institute Proceedings article
            Two principal functions: Sea Control & Power Projection
     1977 & 1978 Posture Statements
     May 1978 NWP 1 (Rev A)
            Naval presence a "clear side benefit"

--48--

Generation of A Naval Force Requirements

What was new (I)
     Heavy CNO involvement in initial drafting
     CNO signature
            Contrast with Naval Warfare (NWP 10) of 1950s & 60s
     Comprehensive taxonomies & processes
            Even submarine reconnaissance role embedded in chart

--49--

What was new? (II)
     Capabilities-based threats
            No mention of Soviets
            Contrast with ADMs Zumwalt & Turner's approach
     Mention of benefits to US of "a system of free & open trade"
            Reference to a "system" will not reappear for 20+ years
     NWP-Posture Statement similarity

Not addressed
     Soviets (or any other adversary) by name
     Terrorist threats
     Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
     Maritime Security Operations
     US Coast Guard
     Arms control
     U.S. government interagency partners
     Blockade

--50--

Barely addressed
     "Sealift" mentioned as part of "logistics" task
     Unconventional warfare, coastal & riverine interdiction subsumed under Naval Special Warfare

Were they "strategic concepts?"

What is a "strategic concept" (officially)?
     The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures which stem from it

     Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

--51--

Subsequent analyses & critiques
     ADM James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007)

Criticisms
     Too long & complex
     Too dry & lifeless
     Too generic, general & abstract
     Too hard to update & keep current
     Too "doctrinal"
     All form & no substance
     Did not convey a "story" or "narrative"
     Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies Not the right vehicle to achieve internal USN consensus

--52--

Influence:
     In NWP format, modest within USN
            Used in war colleges
            Still cited in 2005
                 P.H. Liotta & Richmond M. Lloyd Naval War College Review article on strategy & force planning
     In Posture Statement format, influential on Capitol Hill during budget battles
            Especially spring-summer 1978 re: FY 79 budget & CVN-71.
     ADM Holloway influence on John Lehman

Why did it have the influence it did?
     Deep, personal involvement by CNO ADM Holloway
     But ADM Holloway little known to defense academics Comprehensive
     Wide distribution as internal USN NWP & external Posture Statements
     But USN "wary of doctrine" limited buy-in by officers
     Posture Statement format had short shelf life
     Overshadowed by in Washington by Sea Plan 2000 debate
     Superseded by The Maritime Strategy
     Never updated

--53--

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
     Warfare tasks adopted in The Maritime Strategy

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

--54--

Overview
    Signed by SECNAV Claytor (Mar 1978)
             Article signed by Under SECNAV Woolsey

     Principal target: SECDEF, OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV
     SECRET 2-volume force planning study
             Separate UNCLAS medium-length (23 pp) abridgement of study executive summary
             USN Woolsey International Security article
      Drafted by a working group; NAVWARCOL professor lead
       Maintain stability - Contain crises - Deter war spectrum
       Focus on countering Soviet threat
       Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets
       7 USN missions
        New technology as USN enabler
        3 USN force level options
        Great short-term influence. Overshadowed later by Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy

Document signed by:
         SECNAV W. Graham Claytor (1977-9)
                2nd year in office
                Went on to become Carter Administration Deputy Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary of Transportation (1979-81)

Article signed by:
           Under SECNAV R. James Woolsey (1977-9)
                   2nd year in office
                   Went on to become Bush Administration CFE Ambassador (1989-91); Clinton Administration CIA Director (1993-5)

--55--

What it was
     Billed as a "force planning study"
     "Major source document of DoN planning and policy"
     Massive SECRET study
            Book length (889 pages in two volumes)
     UNCLAS abridgement of Executive Summary
            Medium length (23 pages)
     SECDEF Brown tasked SECNAV Claytor (Aug 1977)
     SECNAV Claytor signed (Mar 1978)
     Under SECNAV Woolsey summarized in International Security (Summer 1978)
            "Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom"

Why it was written
     To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
     To try to reverse policies & concepts underlying PRM 10, PD 18, general Carter Administration/SECDEF Brown defense policy & strategy, & US Army/USEUCOM recommendations on US defense policy & strategy, especially focus on central Europe & ground combat
     To bolster Congressional Navy supporters in ongoing bitter inter-branch government debates on funding more carriers, esp. CVN-71
     To act as an advocacy vehicle for SECNAV Claytor & USN Woolsey
     Principal target: NSC staff, SECDEF & OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV, Capitol Hill

--56--

Context: (I)
     Early in 2^nd year of Carter administration
     SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
            Robert Komer as Special Assistant for NATO Affairs
     SECNAV Claytor; USN Woolsey
     Outgoing CNO ADM Holloway
     Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation
            U.S. government deficit spending plateauing
            Price of oil high but declining somewhat
     Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3^rd world ("Vietnam syndrome")
            Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

Context: (II)
     Administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
            Focus on ASW, ASUW, AAW, readiness, not strike, amphibious ops
     NSC PRM 10 & PD 18 policies slighted Navy roles
     OMB Randy Jayne indicted Navy for incoherence
     Bitter internal US government CVN, VSTOL budget debates, culminating in carrier-less FY 79 DOD & presidential budget proposal (Feb 1978)
     Congressional dissatisfaction with Carter Administration naval policies, especially omission of new CVN in FY 79 defense budget proposal

--57--

Context: (III)

     USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships, & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized
     DON budgets fluctuating modestly
     Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
            1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships
            1974: Holloway HASC recommendation: 600 ships
            1974: DEPSECDEF HASC statement: 575-600 ships
            1977: NSDM 344: About 600 ships in mid-1990s
      1977: Outgoing SECDEF Rumsfeld: "closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships" by mid-1990s
     New systems entering USN fleet
     CWC becoming institutionalized in fleet

Context: (IV)
     Soviet fleet buildup
            Especially submarines & Backfire-B bombers w/ ASMs
            Increasing Soviet "out-of-area" deployments
     OPNAV morale rattled
     Resurgence of OP-06 influence within OPNAV; increasing dissatisfaction with OP-96-led analytical program planning as intellectual center of naval thought
     Unofficial "Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s)
            Convener: CDR Norm Mosher
            Members included Sea Plan 2000 contributors, OP-06 and 0P-96 staff officers

--58--

Context: (V)
     Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea
     US Army implementing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe
            Internal Army resistance to defensive concepts building, esp. at TRADOC
     Soviets deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe (1977)
     US rapprochement with PRC
            Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dead (1976)
            Deng Xiaoping takes power (1978)
     Periodic Korean crises
            Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)
     Communist regime in Vietnam aligned with USSR
     Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)

Context: (VI)
     Increased Soviet interventions in 3^rd world
     Operations & plans
            Jordanian crisis (1970)
            Cienfuegos crisis (1970)
            Indo-Pakistan War (1971)
            Mideast War/ resupply of Israel (1973)
            Mayaguez incident & amphibious raid (1975)
     Increased war gaming activity at NAVWARCOL
            Center for Advanced Research created (1975)
            ONI "Newport Detachment" created (1977)

--59--

Context: (VII)
     Non-DOD policy experts
            Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
                 Adopted & advocated "lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix" RADM (Ret) Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
            "Team B" assessment of Soviet threat (1976)
            Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976)
            John Lehman as independent US Navy CNO consultant

Context (VIII)
     New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
     New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
     CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med
     But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

--60--

Cited references
     NSSM 3 (1970)
     NSC PRM 10 Military Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977)
     SEN Taft "White Paper on Defense" (1976)
     Other (DOD papers, congressional reports, studies & theses)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
     NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)
            NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)
            Flexible response
     Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)
            Esp. Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976)
            Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)
     NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) (1977-78)
     DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
     Consolidated Guidance
     JSCP & OPLANS

--61--

Other contemporary publications (II)
     NSDM 344 Navy Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977)
            Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
            Based on NSC study on "U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sep 1976)
                 John Lehman helped draft
            GAO UNCLAS report on NSC study (Mar 1978)
     PD 27 Procedures for Dealing with Non-Military Incidents (1978)
     USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)
     US Army FM 100-5 Operations ("active defense") (1976)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
     ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
            Bound & published as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)
     CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
     Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (1976)
     Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," (Commentary Jul 1977)

--62--

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
     NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)
     USN SEAMIX I study (1973)
     USN SEAMIX II study (1975)
     CNA Sea War 85 study (1975-8)
            Atlantic campaign in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
            (Scenario for Tom Clancy (LT Larry Bond) Red Storm Rising)
     CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings ongoing (1977-9)
     CNO ADM Holloway NWP 1 "Strategic Concepts" drafting efforts ongoing
     USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)
            Ongoing simultaneously
            Re: CVNs, CVVs, VSSs, etc.

How it was written (I)
     SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey requested SECDEF authorize DON study of range of USN roles (Jul 1977)
     SECDEF so tasked SECNAV (Aug 1977)
     To examine probable range of naval tasks
     A series of policy and feasibility analyses
     USN-USMC study group drafted
            Director: F.J. (Bing) West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former USMC)
            12 military team members (10 USN; 2 USMC)
            Staff incl/ LCDR Ken McGruther (NWC) & LCDR Jim Stark (OPNAV OP-965), OP-06 representatives, others

--63--

How it was written (II)
     SECNAV Graham Claytor, USN James Woolsey, VCNO ADM Robert Long active oversight
     No significant CNO (ADM Holloway) role
     Liaison with ADM Hayward & staff (CINCPACFLT)
     Influence of consultant Hon. John Lehman
     Analytic support: Presearch, Inc.
            Len Gollubin, President
     Tensions between "policy analysts" & "quantitative analysts"
     SECNAV delivered study to SECDEF (Mar 1978)
     USN Woolsey summarized in International Security (Summer 1978)

Outline (UNCLAS Executive Summary)
     Introduction
     The international environment
     Basic study findings and trends U.S. security objectives: General
     Security objective: Maintenance of stability
     Security objective: Containment of crises
     Security objective: Deterrence of global war
     Security objectives and naval missions: A summary
     Force/funding options
     Assessment of Sea Plan 2000 force alternatives
     Fiscal assumptions

--64--

Key ideas (I):
     3 national security objectives & 7 USN Missions
            I. Maintain stability
                 1. Forward deployments
            II. Contain crises
                 2. Calibrated use of force against the shore
                 3. Superiority at sea in a crisis setting
            III. Deter global war
                 4. SLOC defense
                 5. Reinforcement of allies
                 6. Pressure upon the Soviets
                 7. Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future
     No priorities given
     Disregarded Zumwalt/Turner & Holloway typologies

Key ideas (II):
     Soviet Union the dominant threat, across the spectrum
     One single dominant force sizing criterion is wrong focus for naval forces
     Carriers necessary, important, not highly vulnerable
     New technology enabled strike fleets to win
            Especially Aegis, EW
            Entire Volume II addressed technology assumptions
     Navy-Marine Corps team
     Sufficient numbers of ships are important
            Especially carrier numbers
     Vital role of USN forces in supporting, influencing allies
            But far less on contributions of allied naval forces
     "Forward naval operations can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a land war in Europe"
     NATO Europe center & flanks interdependent

--65--

Key ideas (III)
     Deter major war: USN contributions
            War with Soviets will be global
            USN forces should take the offensive worldwide Operate forward & increase risks to Soviets
            Survivable USN SSBN force USN SLOC protection
            Support allies
            Capability to open second front, especially in Pacific
            Hedge against uncertainty of where & how war would start
     A primary use of naval forces:
            Contain conflicts & so prevent outbreak of major conflict

Key ideas (IV):
     Passing mention of "blockade" as a naval activity
     3 USN force level alternatives
            Option 1
                 439 ships (1% budget growth)
            Option 2
                 535 ships (3% budget growth)
            Option 3
                 585 ships (4% budget growth)

--66--

COMPARISON OF SEA PLAN 2000 FORCE OPTIONS

Illustrative Alternative Force Levels

--67--

What was new? (I)
     Major Navy future force level needs study (since at least 1945)
     Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO involvement
     Drafting by committee
     Peace-crisis-war spectrum used as framework
     7-mission construct
     USN lead in anti-air warfare touted
            Aegis system introduction

What was new? (II)
     Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets
     Horizontal escalation
     Strong USMC amphibious assault role
     Call for perception management
     Naval forces can prevent major global war through containing lesser conflicts
     Identification of four "uncertainties" to hedge against

--68--

Not addressed (in UNCLAS "Executive Summary")
     Priorities among missions
     World trade issues
     Jointness U.S. Army
     Submarine ISR operations
     Mine warfare
     Humanitarian Assistance& Disaster Response Maritime Security Operations
     US Coast Guard
     US Merchant Marine
     US inter-agency partners

Subsequent analyses & critiques
     James Hessman, "Sea Plan 2000," Sea Power (May 1978)
     "Notebook," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jun 1978)
How Good Are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces? (Feb 1980)
     John Allen Williams, "Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1981)
     Francis J. West et al., Review of USN Long-Range Planning (CNA, 1985)
     ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner "The Future of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean," Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1992)
     John Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (Naval War College Press, 2004)

--69--

Criticisms:
     Unrealizable
     Unrealistic funding assumptions
     Overly optimistic re: Soviet threats
     Too carrier-centric
     Overly focused on conventional anti-Soviet warfighting & offensive sea control; not enough on defensive sea control or 3^rd world contingencies (CAPT John Allen Williams USNR) (1981)
     Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies
     GAO critique "How Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces"
     "Executive Summary" not always congruent with analysis

Influence:
     Highly controversial for a few years
     Center of intense open & classified discussions on USN roles & forces
     Used to support arguments inside & outside Congress for increased Navy funding, especially for CVN 71
     Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on power projection
     Experience helped develop new cadre of USN strategists (e.g.: LCDR Stark, LCDR McGruther)
     Launched Global War Games to test hypotheses

--70--

Why did it have the influence it did?
     Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO, other USN leadership involvement & ownership
     Most coherent & detailed compilation to date of Navy strategy views in current world & US policy context
     Study format & study team composition limited buy-in by the fleet
     Soon superseded by CNO ADM Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy (which incorporated many elements)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
     Strong & direct conceptual influence on "The Future of U.S. Sea Power" and The Maritime Strategy
            Horizontal escalation
            Centrality of naval strike & amphibious assault
            Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
     Enumeration & analysis of uncertainties
     "Peace-crisis-war" framework used in The Maritime Strategy, Forward...From the Sea, Navy Operating Concept, & Sea Power 21
     Also, Sea Plan 2000 influenced USCINCPAC ADM Long Pacific Campaign Plan, which formed core construct for 2^nd version of The Maritime Strategy (1984)
            ADM Long had been VCNO overseeing Sea Plan 2000

--71--

ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

     Jan 1979 CNO Strategic Concepts (Top Secret)
     Jan 1979 CNO Posture Statement (UNCLAS)
     May 1979 The Future of U.S. Sea Power (UNCLAS)
      Fundamental principles

  Naval aviator
     Naval War College & National War College graduate; George Washington University International Affairs master's degree
     Extensive previous experience in Navy program planning

--72--

     Began term as CNO having developed new theater strategies for the Pacific & influenced Sea Plan 2000
            Previous tours as post-Vietnam Commander, Seventh fleet, then Commander, Pacific Fleet
     Within 6 months as CNO had expanded on his Pacific theater thinking to embrace the globe
     Maintained same course for duration of his term
     Created flag officer dialogue during 1^st year in office
     Encouraged NAVWARCOL Global War Game
     Created CNO's Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
     Expanded mandate of OP-095 directorate to encompass all naval warfare; moved responsibility for warfare area program planning from OP-96 to OP-095 (1980)
     Created OPNAV Long-Range Study Group (OP-00X) (1980-82)

--73--

CNO Strategic Concepts (1979)

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

--74--

Overview
     Signed by CNO ADM Hayward (May 1979)
     Primary targets: OSD, Congress, USN officer corps
     CLAS briefings & letter; then UNCLAS Posture Statement & very short (6 pp) article
     Principal drafter: CNO Executive Assistant
     "Fundamental principles of naval strategy"
     Call for USN maritime superiority, indeed, supremacy
     Global forward, offensive USN ops vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
     More allied naval contributions encouraged
     12 CVBGs the centerpiece
     Need to keep USN technological edge
     Heavy influence on The Maritime Strategy

Signed by:
     CNO ADM Thomas B. Hayward
     Successive versions within 1^st year in office

--75--

What it was
     Billed as "Fundamental principles of naval strategy"
     Classified versions
            TS "CNO Strategic Concepts" (Jan 1979)
            Vetted at Flag Officer conferences
            Briefings
     Then much shorter UNCLAS versions
            FY 1980 CNO Report ("Posture Statement" (Feb 1979)
            Testimony before House Seapower Subcommittee (Feb 1979)
                 Very short (7 pages)
            US Naval Institute Proceedings "Naval Review" issue article "The Future of Sea Power" (May 1979) culled from testimony
                 Very short (6 pages)
            Briefings

Why it was written (I)
     To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations
            Dampen Zumwalt/Turner/Carter emphasis on SLOC protection
     Influence & change perceptions about utility of USN
                 By U.S. political leadership
                 By Soviets
     Explain why US needed "maritime superiority" - even "supremacy" - especially in war with the Soviets
     Elevate debates on USN budget to strategic level, especially to provide rationale for high-quality platforms & systems over less capable ones, and to deploy 12 carrier battle groups

--76--

Why it was written (II)
     To catalyze US Navy strategic thinking:
     To influence and/or resist Carter Administration policies (1978-80)
     To influence Congressional policies toward the Navy (1978-80)
     To prepare for possible Administration change (1980)
     Expand CNO ADM Hayward's earlier C7F & CPF fleet operational concepts to global policy & strategic level
     Primary targets: OSD, Capitol Hill, USN officer corps
     To achieve internal USN consensus, based on evolution of ADM Hayward's thinking

Context (I)
     3^rd year of Carter administration (1977-81)
     SECDEF Brown (1977-81)
            Robert Komer now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
     Continued Carter administration focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection
     New CNO ADM Hayward (1978-82)
     Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation
            Price of oil high but declining somewhat

--77--

Context (II)
     Continuing Soviet interventions in 3rd world
           Esp. Afghanistan Communist coup (1978)
     Continuing US rapprochement with PRC
          Deng Xiaoping takes power in PRC (1978)
           Soviet-aligned Communist regime in Vietnam invaded, occupied PRC-aligned communist Cambodia (1978)
     Emerging concerns over oil security & Gulf region
     Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords (Sep 1978)
     Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)
     SALT II Agreement limitations (1979)

Context (III)
     Continuing Soviet Navy build-up
          Especially submarines, Backfire-B bombers with ASMs
     Continued increase in Soviet "out of area" deployments
     USN force levels rising modestly; DON budgets flat
     USN in 1979: 471 ships; 16 new ships authorized
     New systems deploying in USN Fleet
     CWC concept becoming institutionalized in fleet
     CMC full member of JCS (1978)
     Increasing USAF minelaying, ISR support at sea
     US Army developing new, more offensive operational doctrine

--78--

Context (IV)
     Intensified bitter internal US government debates on carrier funding (1978-79)
          Congress added unrequested CVN 71 to FY 79 defense budget (Aug 1978)
          President Carter vetoed entire budget bill due to CVN funding
          Congress could not override CVN veto (Oct 1978)
          CAPT John McCain head of OLA (1977-1981)
     Feb 1979 DOD budget request for FY 80 included CVV
     US economic slowdown (1979)

Context (V)
     NIFTY NUGGET worldwide DOD mobilization & deployment command post exercise (1978)
          Exposed weaknesses in joint inter-modal integration, including sealift
          Led to Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) establishment (1979)
     Major public debates on US defense policy & strategy
          Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)
          Retired RADM Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)
     Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (from 1976) (Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.)

--79--

Context (VI)
     Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal
     OPNAV morale wavering
     VADM Bill Crowe (OP-06) & RADM Bob Hilton (OP-60) created new OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) (1978)
            CDR Hank Mauz, CDR John Bitoff, CDR Bill West, LCDR Phil Dur, LCDR Joe Strasser, LCDR Peter Swartz, etc.
     Global War Games began at Newport (1979)
            Examined US-USSR war issues TACTRAGRUs created
     Unofficial "Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group continued
     (late 1970s)
            Convener: CDR Norm Mosher (OP-965)

Context (VII)
     New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops
     New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific
     But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

--80--

Context: Important contemporary publications (I) (none cited in document)
     NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)
            NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)
            Flexible response
     NATO Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) (1978)
     DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
     CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9)
            CAPT William Cockell & CAPT James Patton
     NSDM 344 "Navy Shipbuilding Program" (Jan 1977)
            Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers

Context: Important contemporary publications (II) (none cited in document)

     Consolidated Guidance
     NSC PRM 10 Military Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977) & PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)
     USN-USAF MOAs on cooperation at sea (1975, 1979)
     Sea Plan 2000 naval force planning study (1978)
     USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)
     CNA outer air battle studies
     John F. Lehman, Jr., Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices (1978)

--81--

Context: Important contemporary publications (III) (none cited in document)
     NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)
     Jamie McConnell et al. (CNA), "Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy" (1978), etc.
     ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles in (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)
            Bound as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)
     CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
     Taft-Hart-Lind White Paper on Defense (1978 ed.)
     Gen Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, August 1985 (1978)
     Col John Boyd USAF briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1970s)

How it was written (I)
     Drafted by CNO EA (CAPT Cockell)
            Sovietologist w/ law degree
            Prior tour as ADM Zumwalt's CEP Director (OP-00K)
     Influenced by Hayward CEP Director CAPT Jim Patton (OP-OOK)
            Fletcher School Ph.D.
            Prior tour on SECSTATE Kissinger Policy Planning Staff
     Heavy personal CNO ADM Hayward involvement
            Influenced by recent fleet experience as C7F, CINCPACFLT
            Influenced by previous OPNAV experience as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090)

--82--

How it was written (II)

     Roots: Hayward thinking in fleet as C7F, CPF (1976-9); previous experience as USN program planner (OP-090)
            "Sea Strike:" Hayward-Cockell-Patton-Dr. Al Brandenstein PACFLT "prompt offensive action" concept vs. Soviet Far East
            To pin Soviet forces in place in global war (& avoid PACFLT "swing" to LANT/EUR), influence PR /Japan decisions (1977-79)
            Leveraged existing & new USN technologies. Included USMC
            Listed "incompatibilities" that impeded implementation
            "Sea Strike" existed only in briefing format. An alternative concept. Did not reflect actual war plans of the period
            Tested in at sea exercises & war games
            "Influenced Sea Plan 2000; CINCPAC (former VCNO) ADM Long PACOM campaign plan; subsequent PACOM, PACFLT war plans

How it was written (III)
     Circulation to flag officers by TS memo as "CNO Strategic Concepts" (TS) (Spring 1979)
     Numerous flag officer conferences (1979)
            Opinions & insights debated
            Annapolis, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, San Diego
     Publicized externally through briefings, Congressional testimony, US Naval Institute Proceedings article

--83--

CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979)

Key ideas (I):
     Focus on global conventional war with Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact
            NATO had global concerns
            War in Europe the least likely scenario
            USN NORLANT convoy escort only one of many important USN roles
            Why & how a war starts will influence USN response capabilities
            Uncertainties re: Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea
            Strategic nuclear forces & other contingencies not considered

Key ideas (II):
     Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued)
            NATO-Pact War will be global
            USN must be offensively capable to destroy Soviet forces US is and will be outnumbered
            USN margin of superiority = carriers & at-sea sustainability
            USN must not mirror-image Soviets
            USN must retain technological superiority
            USN must draw on sister services & allies

--84--

Key ideas (III):
     Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued)
            US must capitalize on Soviet geographical disadvantages & defensive mentality
            USN must fight with what it has on hand
            USN must use tactics that ensure favorable attrition ratios NATO northern flank has direct impact on NATO center

            The "Swing Strategy" is an anachronism
            US must prioritize key areas & choose order for sequential control, given limited USN force levels

Key ideas (IV):
     Call for USN "maritime superiority" (even "supremacy")
     "Sea Control" & "Power Projection" seen as "confusing" concepts
     Soviet Union the priority threat
     War with Soviets will be global
            Not confined to Central Europe
            Swing strategy an anachronism
            Offensive strike operations

--85--

Key ideas (V):
     12 CVBG minimum: The centerpiece & priority
     Need to distribute USN offensive capability among greater number of platforms
     But quality of platforms has priority over quantity Need for highly capable USN platforms
            Vs. Low-end USN ships
     Offensive USN ops/ systems have priority over defensive Need to keep USN technological edge
     Sequential operations necessary, given USN force levels
     Need for perception management

Key ideas (VI):
     Discussion of:
            8 principles
            5 conclusions
            Regions of the world
     No priorities provided

--86--

What was new?
     Fleet origins
     Call for allied & sister service support to achieve maritime superiority
     Emphasis on the Persian Gulf & access to oil
     Call for favorable attrition ratios
     Role of naval forces post-conflict

Not addressed
     Priorities among regions
     Non-Soviet threats
     US Marine Corps
     Amphibious assault
     Submarine ISR operations
     Sealift
     U.S. Coast Guard
     U.S. Merchant Marine
     U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
     US inter-agency partners
     US Air Force & US Army

--87--

Subsequent analyses & critiques
     ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Total Force," US Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1979)
            In same issue as ADM Hayward article
            Focus on SLOC protection as well as NATO flanks
            Pessimistic on Soviets, USN CVN vulnerability
            Advocated "hi-lo mix" of USN platforms
     "Comment & Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul-Dec 1979; Jan 1980)
     John Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (2004)
     Gregory Vistica, Fall from Glory (1995)
     CAPT James Patton (Ret), "Dawn of the Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (May 2009)

Criticisms
     Too ambitious. Unexecutable
     Not aligned with contemporary Carter Administration national defense policies
     Over-emphasis on power projection & carrier strike warfare; neglect of SLOC security
     Only European theater should matter, not Pacific

--88---

Influence: Significant, and grew overtime
     Began to forge a consensus within the Navy on USN rationale
     Engaged Navy Flag Officers & OPNAV staff
     Set stage for Strategic Studies Group (SSG) & influenced Global War Games
     Influenced Capitol Hill debates
     Congress replaced DOD-requested CW with unrequested CVN 71 in FY 80 defense budget (Oct 1979)
            Weakened President Carter did not veto; signed into law (Dec 1979)
            Later christened USS Theodore Roosevelt (1984)

Why this influence?
     Powerful, clear, simple messages
     Direct CNO involvement & ownership
     Repetition
     Reinforced by fleet exercises & Global War Games
     Not aligned well with Carter administration defense policy when written
     But aligned with rising popular, Congressional defense views
     Increasingly aligned with new Carter Administration focus on power projection & Third World ops in wake of fall of Shah of Iran & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (late 1979)

--89--

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
     Strong & direct conceptual influence on The Maritime Strategy
     Especially calls for:
     Global offensive forward ops vs. Soviets, * Sister service & allied naval support to USN
     Perception management

1970s: Text & content of each document

     Can be found in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents (2007)

--90--

CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context

Swartz, Peter M., U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider before you write one, (CQR D0020071.A1/Final, March 2009). https://www.cna.org/reports/2009/us-navy-capstone-strategy-what-to-do

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): A Brief Summary, (MISC D0026437.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/navy-capstone-strategies-a-brief-summary

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts. Introduction, Background and Analyses, (MISC D0026421.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-intro-background-analysis

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume I, (MISC D0026417.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-in-the-world-volume-1

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume II, (MISC D0026417.A2/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-in-the-world-volume-2

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026414.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/capstone-strategy-policy-and-vision-documents

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026418.A1/ Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-in-the-world-1970-to-1980

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1981-1990): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026415.A1, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-capstone-strategies-1981-to-1990

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1981-1990): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026419.A1/Final (December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-context-and-strategies-1981-to-1990

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026416.A2/Final, March 2012). https://www.cna.org/reports/2012/us-navy-capstone-1991-to-2000

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1991-2000): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026420.A2/Final, March 2012). https://www.cna.org/reports/2012/us-navy-in-the-world-1991-to-2000

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026241.A2/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/us-navy-capstone-vision-2010

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026242.A2/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/navy-capstone-strategies-and-concepts-2010

Swartz, Peter M., and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume I, (MISC D0026422.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/capstone-concepts-1970-to-2010-vol-1

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume II, (MISC D0026423.A1/Final, December 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/capstone-concepts-1970-to-2010-vol-2

Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009), (CAB D0020997.A5/2Rev, January 2010). https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy - U.S. Air Force Relationships 1970-2010, (MISC D0024022.A4/1Rev, June 2011). https://www.cna.org/reports/2011/navy-air-force-relationship

MISC D0026414.A1/Final

CNA
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