Naval History and Heritage Command

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I
The Introduction

1. The most gigantic fleet in the world's history was assembled to launch the Allied invasion of Sicily. Over 3,200 ships, craft, and boats made up the Allied naval forces, of which more than 1,700 comprised the Western Naval Task Force.
2. This enormous armada was assembled in the Mediterranean from remote regions, and was here organized and brought to readiness for battle. Ships and craft were altered or modernized with special equipment and devices, and training was conducted to ensure that each group of the vast forces would execute its assignment as required by the detailed naval plans. In this manner the Sicilian campaign was originated, planned, organized and forces trained in the five months since the Anfa Conference at Casablanca.
3. The Western Naval Task Force, under my command, had the task of training, embarking, transporting, protecting and landing the American invasion troops in Sicily; of supporting the military operations by naval combatant forces; and of ensuring the rapid, orderly flow of logistic maintenance to the military forces throughout the campaign.
4. The Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean were so deployed as to gain the ascendancy over enemy submarines, and to bring to action and destroy any enemy forces which threatened the vast convoy movements engaged in the invasion.
5. The amphibious assaults were uniformly successful. The only serious threat was an enemy counter-attack on D plus one day against the 1st Infantry Division when a German tank force drove across the Gela plain to within one thousand yards of the DIME beaches. The destruction of this armored force by naval gunfire delivered by U.S. cruisers and destroyers, and the recovery of the situation through naval support, was one of the most noteworthy events of the operations. The continued employment of naval gunfire against enemy positions on the north coast during the reduction of the island phase of the campaign, the unique employment of landing craft in providing a service of supply of food, fuel and munitions to our front line troops on the north coast, and the skillful execution of flanking amphibious landings on the north coast contributed to a marked degree in the rapid defeat of the enemy.
6. The brilliant achievements of the Allied forces in this conquest, launched on a magnitude which heretofore had never been attempted, were due principally to the singleness of purpose which all forces demonstrated. The appreciation of each others' problems produced an inter-service spirit of co-operation and common endeavor which welded the naval and military forces into a single team possessed with the resolute will to win.
7. The huge task of assembling, training, and supporting large and complex forces, including green personnel and hundreds of craft of types yet untried in combat, entailed tremendous labor. The large scale planning involved in the assembly of forces and material, and in the proper employment thereof in detailed plans merits the highest admiration.
8. Such shortcomings and deficiencies as were noted are attributed principally to hurried preparations, the non-arrival of material in the theater, and to insufficient training. The ability of gun crews to quickly adjust themselves to battle conditions was notable. The courage and bravery displayed in action by the Allied forces left nothing to be desired. In combat our soldiers, seamen and aviators demonstrated tenacity, endurance and efficiency equal to or superior to that possessed by the enemy.

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Part II
Narrative of Events

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Part III
The Plan

Section I - PLANNING.

1. "Since the forces must be drawn from both ends of the Mediterranean and from outside, planning will be extremely complicated" (Extract from the introduction to the Joint Planning Staff's Appreciation of operation HUSKY, January 10, 1943).

2. This forecast was extremely accurate.

3. The painstaking planning preparatory to the invasion of Sicily paid ample dividends. The enormous task of formulating detailed plans to achieve the assembly and movement under perfect timing of huge naval forces to the combat area required staff work of the highest order. The fidelity with which the plans were executed indicates the perfection attained by the planning staff officers.

4. A detailed analysis of the problems, difficulties and omissions of planning, however, bring to light many points which should be corrected in the interest of continued success in future campaigns and operations. Such campaigns and operations will find us pitted against a more proficient and determined enemy schooled in counter methods designed to frustrate amphibious landings on his shores. Such enemy methods will surely include the adoption of new weapons to render ineffective our current offensive efforts. Hence the skill and military advancement of a cunning enemy imposes upon the Allied Nations the necessity of new developments in materiel, adequate training of our forces, and the creation of suitable and correct plans for their employment. Only by such progress can the future success of our amphibious operations be guaranteed.

Command

5. My directive for the conduct of this operation was identical with that issued to the Commanding General 7th Army, insofar as command relations were concerned. These directives established unity of command under the tenets of Paragraph 10, FTP 155, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935. Under the naval directive the Naval Commander was "in command of the Western Task Force from the time it has entered this area until the army is firmly established ashore." The command area referred to was specified in the directive and was defined by latitudes and longitudes in order to prevent interferences in movement between allied naval forces; all movements outside this area being under the direct control of Admiral Cunningham, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. The military directive issued to the Army Commander of the Western Task Force stated that the Naval Commander was in command "until your force is firmly established ashore."

6. Thus under the joint agreements of the U.S. Army and Navy, in amphibious operations involving army and navy forces the Naval Commander commands until the Commanding General of the Landing Force sets up his command post ashore and is ready to take over. The time when this shift of command takes place is invariably dependent upon the general situation. Usually the Army Commander establishes his command post ashore when all elements of the assault forces have landed and gained their initial objectives, when a beachhead of about 10,000 yards depth has been established to place the maintenance beaches beyond the range of enemy artillery, and when the Army supply system is operating in a normal manner.

7. During the exercises of command in succession there should be no conflict of interests. Under the unity of command initially invested in the Naval Commander he does not presume to dispose or to maneuver troops in combat ashore; neither does the Army Commander, upon setting up his headquarters and assuming the command, presume to maneuver ships and control their movements or tactical handling. However, the investment of joint command does mean that the Naval Commander has the full support of all elements of the Landing Force in accomplishing the naval tasks, and the Army Commander, upon succeeding to joint command, has the full support of all elements of the Naval Attack Forces in the achievement of the military tasks.

8. There are inconsistencies in the basic instructions issued to the armed services. It is apparent that FM 31-5, the only publication available to army officers before commencement of amphibious training under navy guidance, has not kept pace with FTP 155 and FTP 167. It is apparent also that there is a wide-spread misconception in the Army regarding command and responsibilities in amphibious operations. Not only is this universally experienced during the troop training period

conducted by the Navy, but it extends to the planning of operations and to the loading and administration of naval vessels. Thus military plans issued by various Army echelons set forth directives governing the disposition of navy craft and ship's boats, their speed, their loading and employment. Other Field Orders were issued controlling the opening of naval gunfire, restricted naval targets, etc. On board ship, orders have been issued by Army Commanders controlling the admission of persons to the War Operations Room and other parts of the ship in which the military commander was embarked. Such false concepts of the authority and responsibility of military commanders can only come about through the belief that Army Commanders exercise extensive command functions while afloat. This erroneous impression may be engendered through the unfortunate use of the term "Headquarters Ship" when referring to the Flagship of the Admiral, in which ship has been embarked the Commanding General of the corresponding Army echelon. The term "Headquarters Ship" is not an accepted naval designation; the term "Flagship" connotes the vessel from which a Flag Officer commands organized forces of the Navy.

9. There is a definite need for the revision of the basic documents governing joint operations. Such revisions should place the air forces allocated to an operation under the command of that commander responsible for the success of the joint undertaking. There is a need also for the wide promulgation among all services of the approved policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to command in amphibious operations.

Echelons.

10. In the interest of orderly planning, proper exercise of command, and coordinated execution of plans, it is desirable that the military, naval and air forces be organized on the same echelons.

11. In the Sicilian campaign the 7th Army organization placed the 1st and 45th Divisions under the command of a Corps Commander. Thus on the military echelon CENT and DIME assaults were under a single control. The CENT transports and major units arrived in the theater from the United States under a normal naval command. From the naval viewpoint it was neither desirable nor feasible to place the CENT and DIME naval forces under a single command. Although the CENT and DIME naval attack plans were in complete support of the CENT and DIME military attack plans of the Army Division Commanders concerned, the introduction of an additional echelon in the Army chain of command (which had no Navy counterpart) was productive of many difficulties.

12. The echelon of the Air Command in this campaign was at variance with both the Naval and Military echelons. The Tactical Air Force Headquarters retained control in the Rear Echelon of all supporting aircraft. An Air Officer was set up on the same echelon as the Naval Commander Western Task Force and the Commanding General, 7th Army, but that Air Officer was not empowered to order air strength into the assault area. His function was to control aircraft entering the area, and to request forces in support of the offensive land and sea operations. The Navy and Army commanders, who in succession were responsible for the success of the undertaking, did not exercise any authority over the air arm supporting the campaign. This arrangement is obviously contrary to the basic concept of command and is not conducive to success.

The Army.

13. During the planning phase the Force 343 (later 7th Army) Headquarters were at Rabat, French Morocco, and later at Mostaganem, Algeria. The former is 555 miles and the latter 165 miles from Algiers where the Navy Headquarters were located. The CENT and DIME naval commanders were in Oran, 200 miles westward from Algiers, and the JOSS commander at Bizerte, 335 miles to the eastward. The remote location of the Force 343 Headquarters introduced difficulties for all echelons of all services, and necessitated the assignment of liaison officers withdrawn from the naval planning staff, as well as journeys to the Army Headquarters for the purpose of coordination of plans, conferences, etc. These great distances, in a country where travel and transport is at best very difficult, increased the planning problems not a little.

14. All planners, army, navy and air should be located in the same building, and plans should be produced by all services on the same echelon in coordination. Any changes produced in the plan of any service could then be made known as occurring to the other services, the implications fully examined, and timely action taken by the services affected.

15. Planning by the higher echelons reached considerable detail, and changes later effected by staff officers created considerable confusion in lower echelons. For example, many changes

were made by higher authority in Division troop lists at a late date; these changes were promulgated at a very late date for inclusion in the subordinate plans, with the cumulative effect of delaying the completion of naval plans on the same echelon. Thus the loading of combat loaders and craft was undergoing change at a time when plans should have been fixed and in the possession of all naval commands concerned.

16. The 45th Infantry Division was required to load in the United States and sail for North Africa prior to the receipt of the Force 343 plan. For this reason the Naval Commander of the CENT Attack Force was unable to formulate his plans until after arrival in the theater of operations. Due to the flexibility of the combat-loading methods, however, satisfactory plans were produced without disturbing the pre-loaded transports.

The Navy.

17. Aside from the difficulties outlined above, the naval planners were seriously hampered in their study of beach characteristics because requests for PRU sorties, originated by the Naval Commander, were not given timely consideration. This condition was aggravated by the failure of the Air Force to provide the Naval Commander with requested prints of such sorties as were executed, though these prints were widely distributed among military commands which had no responsibility in the selection of assault beaches. The one set of low oblique pictures taken on June 18 were of great value in the naval study of shoreline details.

The Air Force.

18. The weakest link in the joint planning of the U.S. forces was the almost complete lack of participation by the Air Force. Upon the completion of the Force 141 plans, and the withdrawal from that planning staff of the army and navy planners of the Western Task Force, contacts with the Air Force were maintained with difficulty and information of the development of the Air Plan was unknown to either the army ground forces or the navy. Eventually an Air Plan was promulgated but it was found to be completely unrelated to the Military Attack Plan and the Naval Attack Plan. It contained detailed data on Air Force equipment and supplies to be landed over the beaches, but gave no specific information to the Naval and Military Commanders of what support might be expected during the assault or what, when, or where fighter cover would be provided. Bombing targets suitable for attack prior to D-day were worked out by the 7th Army Headquarters in conjunction with the Navy, and these requirements were made known to the Air Force. This list of targets was found to be unacceptable by the Air Force on the grounds that the targets were unsuitable; this in spite of the fact that the navy and the ground forces charged with making the amphibious assault were threatened by these targets. Other target lists were thereafter prepared and after much controversy, a list satisfactory to the Air Force was eventually contrived.

19. Bombing targets for D-day were similarly prepared by the ground forces and the Navy but up to the time of sailing neither the Naval nor Army Commander was informed of what bombing support, if any, could be expected. The Air Plan did state, however, that after D-day, requests could be submitted with not less than 12 hours' notice to a Target Committee located in North Africa.

20. Thus the Naval and Military Commanders sailed for the assault with almost no knowledge of what the Air Force would do in the initial assault or thereafter. They were not informed of the general air situation nor was this information broadcast to them at sea. This should have been done in order that the responsible commanders would be apprised of what softening of beach defenses and disruption of enemy communications had been achieved by the Air Force. Timely and complete intelligence information, acquired by our reconnaissance aircraft, should be broadcast to the Assault Commanders in addition to the assessment of the results of our bombing missions. Unless this is done, the assault forces are placed completely out of the picture as soon as they sail from the port of embarkation.

21. The Air Force did promulgate by dispatch to the forces at sea, the planned approach and egress of transport planes carrying paratroops on the night of D-l/D day. Written information on the plans for the employment of paratroops was never received. The matter of routing transport aircraft in the assault area had not been submitted to the Naval and Military Commanders for examination with a view to early recognition of implications to those two services. In point of fact, the route selected by the Air Force was not suitable from a naval standpoint. The Naval Commander, however, received this unilateral decision only after radio silence was imposed upon his forces, and he was unable to give voice to his objections. This failure by the Air Force to correlate plans, and acquire the timely concurrence of the other services in order that information could be

disseminated to all forces, contributed to a regrettable incident. On the night of the assault a number of the transport planes were off the prescribed route and approached the transports from the same direction as the enemy and arrived over the ships simultaneously with enemy dive bombers. One is brought to the conviction that had the Air Force joined the naval and ground force planners, as they had been so often urged to do, and thereby had brought all Air Plans into harmony with the plans of the other services, the unfortunate losses of our transport aircraft might have been avoided.

Section II - THE PLAN

1. The planning on the theater commander's echelon began in February 1943, by Force 141 (afterwards 15th Army Group), created by Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, and containing planners from American and British Armies, Navies, and Air Forces. Upon the completion of the 141 plans, the U.S. Army and Navy planning officers returned to normal duties on the staffs of the Commanding General 7th Army and Commander Western Naval Task Force and began preparing the plans of that echelon.

2. The Appreciation produced by Force 141 was based on the following Assumptions:

1. That the campaign for North Africa terminated on or before 30 April 1943.
2. That Sardinia remained in Axis hands.

3. The CONCLUSIONS of the Appreciation were briefly as follows:

1. General
   1. A heavier scale of air attack can be expected in the Eastern half of the Island than in the Western half.
2. Seaborne Assault Areas
   1. The Straits of Messina are closed to Allied surface vessels and submarines and are beyond the reach of fighter protection.
   2. Seaborne assaults between Messina and Palermo and between Catania and Messina are not feasible since they cannot be given fighter cover.
   3. Direct assaults on Palermo and Trapani are impracticable in the face of existing coast defenses. Beaches exist to land a large force to the West of Palermo, but such an assault is not practicable until our fighters can operate either (1) from airfields in the Western group, or (2) from airfields in the Southeastern and Eastern group.
   4. Suitable beaches exist in the Sciacca-Marinella and Avola-Gela sectors, over which to launch initial assaults, under land-based fighter protection, to seize airfields which will permit of further overland operations.
   5. If landings are made both in the West and Southeast, two naval covering forces may be necessary.
3. III. Relative Importance Of Areas
   1. The capture of Messina, and consequent isolation of the Island is of first importance, but initially its capture is not feasible.
   2. Its capture is most likely to be achieved by early seizing of the ports and airfields in the Southeast of the Island.
   3. The importance of an assault in the West lies in the increase in total port facilities and build-up, and it will help to immobilize the enemy reserves.
   4. The possession of Pantellaria, although desirable, is not worth the effort necessary to reduce it; the better course is to neutralize it by air action.
4. Comparative Rate Of Build-Up
   1. The maximum number of enemy mobile divisions, in addition to Static Troops, which are likely to be encountered is eight.
   2. Reinforcement through Messina will probably not increase, but will keep these divisions up to strength.
   3. Unless the Island is attacked so as to get the use of both Palermo and Catania, we cannot maintain sufficient divisions to conquer it.
   4. With the capture and development of Palermo and Catania, we can maintain the equivalent of 10¹/2 divisions together with air forces.

5. Southeastern and Eastern Assaults
   1. Two infantry divisions and one infantry brigade group are necessary to capture the airfields in the Southeast.
   2. Three infantry divisions are needed to capture Catania and protect the beaches and ports, but only two of these can be landed and maintained through the Avola beaches. The third should, therefore, land through beaches 37 and 38, after the necessary air cover can be provided from the Southeastern airfields.
6. Western Assaults
   1. A force of one division and one armored combat command should be landed in the Southwest area to capture the airfields at Castelvetrano and Sciacca.
   2. A force equivalent to two divisions with such additional armored elements as can be landed and supported, should be landed at Castellamare, Trappeto and Carini to attack Palermo from the West and operate to the South and West.
7. Timing Of Parachute Attacks
   1. Airborne troops are necessary to neutralize the beach defenses, and their maximum employment is required.
   2. Seaborne assaults should take place some two hours before first light.
   3. Airborne troops should be landed preferably in the dark or at dusk in sufficient time and at such a place as to be able to complete their task before the seaborne assault takes place.
8. Timing Of Assaults
   1. Owing to the over-riding importance of obtaining the maximum lift of parachutists, the initial Western assault must take place after the Eastern assaults.
   2. The Western assaults should take place as soon as possible after the Eastern assaults, but investigation shows that D plus 2 is the earliest time at which they can take place.
9. Date of Assault
   1. To allow the airborne troops to make use of some moon and to afford the approach to the coastline the cover of darkness, D day should be about 10 July, when the moon is in its second quarter.

OUTLINE PLAN

4. An outline plan based on the Appreciation was issued in early April providing for four phases:

Phase I - Preparatory Measures 
Phase II - The Assaults 
Phase III - Exploitation and capture of Catania and Palermo 
Phase IV - Reduction of the Island

Phase I - Preparatory Measures

1. The objects of the Naval Preparatory measures were:
   1. To reduce the enemy's naval strength.
   2. To gain the upper hand of enemy U-boats in the Mediterranean.
   3. To prevent the reinforcement of the Sicilian garrison by seaborne troops or material.
2. The objects of the Air Preparatory measures were:
   1. To reduce the striking power of enemy fighters and day bombers.
   2. To bomb enemy sources of supply, fuel stocks, base airfields, communications leading to Sicily, and naval and submarine bases in the Mediterranean.
   3. From D minus 14 to D day the scale of attack by day and night heavy bombers will be increased until a maximum is attained at the time of the assault. During

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   this time the bomber force will concentrate on targets immediately affecting the battle: firstly, on airfields in Sicily, Sardinia, South Italy and Crete, and secondly, on local communication centers in Sicily and on the immediately adjoining mainland.

Phase II - The Assaults

The Assaults are staggered to provide for attacks on D day in the Southeast and East, on D plus two day in the West, and on D plus five day in the Northwest.

D Day Assaults

1. ACID (ONE) FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from the Middle East as follows:
   1. One British Parachute Brigade to be dropped the previous night to assist in the capture of the beachhead.
   2. One British Commando landing over beach 42 to capture the coast defense guns at Cap Murro di Porco.
   3. One British Infantry Division and one British- Tank Battalion to land on a two brigade front over beaches 44 and 46 to capture Syracusa and Augusta and advance on Catania.
2. ACID (TWO) FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from the United Kingdom as follows:
   1. One British Commando landing over beach 47 to capture the coast defense guns at Avola.
   2. One British Infantry Division to land on a one brigade front over beaches 47 and 48 to assist in the advance on Syracusa, Augusta and Catania.
3. BARK FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from the Middle East as follows:
   1. One British Infantry Brigade Group to land over beaches 51 to 56 to capture the airfield at Pachino.
4. CENT FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from the Middle East as follows:
   1. One British Parachute Brigade to be dropped the previous night to assist in the capture of the beachhead.
   2. One British Infantry Division and one British Armored Regiment to land on a one brigade front over beaches 64 to 66 to capture the airfields at Comiso and Biscari.
5. DIME FORCE - A shore to shore movement mounted from Tunisia as follows:
   1. One British Parachute Brigade to be dropped the previous night to assist in the capture of the beachhead.
   2. One British Infantry Division and one Armored Regiment to land on a one brigade front over beaches 67 and 68 to capture the airfield at Ponte Olivo.
6. RESERVE FORCE - One Airborne Division less three Parachute Brigades. To be ferried from Malta and Tripoli: One Infantry Division and One Tank Brigade.

D Plus Two Assaults

1. ENSA FORCE - A shore to shore movement mounted from Tunisia as follows:
   1. One U.S. Parachute Regiment to be dropped the previous night between Castel-vetrano and beaches 86 to 88 to assist in the capture of the beachhead.
   2. One U.S. Regimental Combat Team to land over beach 84 on a two battalion front to capture the Sciacca airfield.
   3. One U.S. Infantry Division (less one RCT) with one U.S. Armored Combat Command to land on a front of one RCT over beaches 86 to 88 to capture the port of Mazzara del Vallo and the airfield at Castelvetrano.

Phase III - Exploitation and Capture of Catania and Palermo

Capture of Catania

1. IMMEDIATE RESERVE - One British Infantry Division mounted in landing craft from Tripoli and one Tank Brigade mounted from United Kingdom in ships, to land any time after

    

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D plus one onwards over beaches 37 and 38 or other beaches in our hands South of Augusta, to reinforce troops moving against Catania.

Capture of Palermo (D plus 5 assaults)

1. FISH FORCE - A combined ship to shore and shore to shore movement mounted from North Africa as follows:
   1. One U.S. Ranger Battalion to land over beach 1 to capture the coastal batteries at Capo S. Vito.
   2. One U.S. Infantry Division (less one RCT) and one U.S. Armored Combat Command to land on a one RCT front over beaches 2 and 3 with the object of severing road and rail communications between the West of the Island and Palermo and linking up with the forces at Castelvetrano.
2. GROG FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from North Africa as follows:
   1. One U.S. Parachute Regiment to be dropped the previous night to assist in the capture of the beachhead.
   2. Two Regimental Combat Teams to land on a one RCT front over beach 5 to advance East on Palermo.
3. HOOK FORCE - A ship to shore movement mounted from North Africa as follows:
   1. One U.S. Ranger Battalion to land over beaches 7 and 8 to capture the coastal battery at Capo Gallo.
   2. One U.S. Infantry Division (less one RCT) and one G.H.Q. Tank Battalion to land over beaches 6 to 8 on a one RCT front and advance East on Palermo.
4. RESERVES
   1. One Airborne Division (less two Parachute Regiments)
   2. One Infantry Division (one RCT to be on 12 hours notice from H hour of the D plus 2 day assaults).

Phase IV - Reduction of The Island

No plan for this phase has been prepared. The forces ashore by D plus 11 should amount to:

5. On 21 May 1943 the OUTLINE PLAN described was cancelled.
   By this date it was known that the assumption was incorrect that the campaign for North Africa would terminate by 30 April 1943. The neutralization of Pantellaria, Lampedusa, Linosa and Lampion was assured.
   The basic Strategic Concept did not change. The appreciation which produced the original OUTLINE PLAN remained unchanged.
6. Under date of 21 May 1943 a NEW OUTLINE PLAN was issued which provided for two phases:

   Phase I - Preparatory Measures 
   Phase II - The Assaults.

Phase I - Preparatory Measures

1. Naval and Air action will be undertaken during this phase with the object of gaining Naval and Air superiority over the enemy and reducing their striking power.
2. Operation of a Cover Plan to:
   1. Retard the reinforcement of Sicily by German troops.

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b. Reduce air and naval attacks on Allied shipping destined for Sicilian operation, from D minus 7.
c. Keep the Italian Fleet to the East of the Straits of Messina.

Phase II - The Assaults

All assaults were scheduled for D day at the same H hour. All assaults were concentrated at the southeastern end of the Island.

The British forces were to attack on the Southern coast East of Pozzalo, and on the East coast South of Syracusa. The American forces were to attack on the South coast in the Gulf of Gela.

The attacks scheduled for United States forces were:

1. CENT FORCE - A ship to shore movement from North Africa (ex U.S.) as follows:
   1. 45th Infantry Division landing over beaches 65 and 66 to capture the airfields at Comiso and Biscari.
2. DIME FORCE - A combined ship to shore movement (mounted from North Africa) and a shore to shore movement (mounted from Tunisia) as follows:
   1. 505th Parachute Combat Team (Reinforced) to land night D-l/D in vicinity of airfield at Ponte Olivo to capture same.
   2. 1st Infantry Division (less one RCT) landing over beaches 67 to 69 to capture the airfield at Ponte Olivo.
3. JOSS FORCE - A shore to shore movement mounted from Tunisia as follows:
   1. 3rd Infantry Division and one Armored Combat Command landing over beaches 70 to 73 to capture the port of Licata and the nearby landing grounds.
4. RESERVE FORCE - A combined ship to shore movement (mounted from North Africa) and a shore to shore movement (mounted from Tunisia) as follows:
   1. One RCT of 1st Infantry Division and one Armored Combat Command to be landed as the tactical situation demands in support of any of the planned assaults.

1. A comparison of the two plans revealed the following advantages and disadvantages:
   1. ORIGINAL OUTLINE PLAN

      Advantages

      1. As compared with Malta, Northeast Tunisia affords ample facilities for airfields within single engine fighter range of the Southwest coast of Sicily. It is therefore possible to operate, within the limits of their range, a far greater number of fighters over the Southwestern Sicilian beaches than those in the Southeastern portion of the Island.
      2. Additional fighter protection to Southwestern beaches can be provided by fighters operating from Pantellaria.
      3. With the capture and occupation of the airfields at Sciacca and Castelvetrano, fighter cover will be available to support landings West of the line Termini-Sciacca.
      4. The attack in the West will permit the quick juncture of forces on the line Sciacca-Palermo thus isolating enemy forces in the Western portion of the Island.
      5. With the early capture of the port of Palermo the administrative risks to the 7th Army are lessened.
      6. The staggered timing of the attacks will prevent the enemy from committing his reserves to the Southeastern portion of the Island.

      Disadvantages

      1. The limited range of single engine fighter aircraft makes it impracticable to provide effective air support for any landing made in the area North of a line exclusive Trapani - exclusive Catania, until such time as we are able to make use of airfields in Southwest or Southeast Sicily.

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2. Although Trapani and Catania are within range of single engine fighters operating from Tunisia and Malta respectively, both areas are near the limits of their practical operational radius of action. It would therefore not be possible to maintain effective fighter cover over these places without the use of airfields in Southern Sicily.
3. While our airforces are operating from North Africa and Malta, the only areas in which we can provide effective support for forces assaulting Sicily will be along the Southern coast of the Island between Marsala and Syracusa.
4. The airfield capacity on Malta restricts the number of sorties to be flown from the only air bases from which short range fighter operations against the Eastern end of the Island can take place.
5. The sea approaches from Tunisia to Western Sicily are exposed throughout their length to flank attack from aircraft based on Sardinia.
6. The ACID FORCE appeared to be of insufficient strength to accomplish the assigned task and its left flank is considered to be exposed from the direction of Ragusa; the build-up of the ACID FORCE was considered to be too slow."

B. NEW OUTLINE PLAN
Advantages

1. An attack from the East, rather than the West, would sever the garrison from Italy. Although a major assault in the vicinity of Messina is not feasible, its seizure is the key to the Island. An assault in the Southeast and a drive up the East side of the Island offers more opportunity of achieving this quickly than does an attack from the West.
2. The Catania plain is the focal point of main air bases in the Island. The capture of airfields in that area, combined with the occupation of those on the Southeast coast, would place the Western group in a very isolated position; and intensive air operations might eventually make them untenable.
3. The concentration of forces in the Southeastern portion of the Island increases the force of the blow. The early establishment of a continuous beachhead by the contiguous forces ensures mutual support and eliminates exposed flanks.

Disadvantages

1. Vulnerability of convoys to air attack by enemy aircraft operating from air fields in Western half of Island where enemy enjoys a flanking position with respect to our sea routes.
2. The beaches in the Gulf of Gela were more unfavorable for landing a large force than were the beaches selected under the old plan.
3. No ports of any consequence become available to the Western Task Force in the region of the assault, thus imposing continued beach maintenance for a period estimated to be thirty days. The study of tonnages required to maintain the 7^th Army plus the build-up forces versus the beach capacities indicated that the weights could not be brought in through the selected beaches.
4. The Gulf of Gela was of insufficient size to permit adequate sea room to various transport forces and gunfire ships without interferences.
5. The increased distance of the scene of the assault from Tunisia reduced the strength of the fighter cover to the smaller forces operating from Pantellaria. This increased distance also reduced the operational time of these aircraft over the assault area.

NAVAL OPERATION PLAN

8. My Operation Plan 2-43 (Serial 00218), dated 26 May 1943, fully supported the Military Plan promulgated by Commanding General, Force 343 (later 7th Army). My basic plan follows:

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File A4-3/N 31 Serial: 00218	WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE U.S.S. Monrovia, Flagship,
SECRET BIGOT - HUSKY	ALGIERS, ALGERIA May 26, 1943 (1030)
OPERATION PLAN       No. 2-43

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. 1. 80. CONTROL Force 
      80.1 Force Flagship 
      Monrovia (FF), McLanahan.

      80.2 Escort Group 
      Desron Seven less Desdiv 14 and Mayo, Eight (9 DD).

      80.3 Screening Group 
      Ordronaux, 
      MTBron Fifteen (17 PT).

      80.4 Demonstration Group 
      10 - ARBs, 
      PT 213.

      80.5 Minelaying Group 
      Keokuk, Salem, Weehawken, 
      Escorts (as assigned).

      80.6 Reserve Group 
      Orizaba, Chateau Thierry, 
      6 LST, 
      7 LCT, 
      11 LCI(L), 
      16 LCI(L), British.

   2. 81. DIME Attack Force, Rear Admiral Hall, U.S.N. 
      Transdiv Three (8 APA-AKA) 
      H.M.S. Prince Charles (LSI(S)), 
      H.M.S. Prince Leopold (LSI(S)), 
      Savannah, Boise (2 CL), 
      Desron Seventeen (9 DD), 
      Steady, Sustain (2 AM), 
      YMS 62, 69, 207, 208, 226, 227, (6 YMS), 
      PC 621, 624, 625, 627, (4 PC), 
      SC 676, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, (6 SC), 
      Hopi (towing pontoon causeways), Redwing, 
      16 LST (including 2 carrying pontoons), 
      19 LCI(L), 
      U.S. Army forces (as assigned).
   3. 85. CENT Attack Force, Rear Admiral Kirk, U.S.N. 
      Ancon (F), 
      Transdiv One, Five, Seven (18 APA-AKA), 
      Philadelphia (1 CL), 
      H.M.S. Abercrombie, 
      Desron Fifteen, Sixteen less McLanahan, Ordronaux (16 DD),

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ColeBernadouDallas
SteadySustain
16, 18, 34, 36, 37, 43, 55, 58, 63, 64, 82, 83,
542, 551, 556, 557, 558, 591,
1029, 1030, 1043, 1044,
NarragansettNauset

d. 86. JOSS Attack Force, Rear Admiral Conolly, U.S.N. 
Biscayne (F), 
H.M.S. Princess Charlotte (LSI(S)), 
H.M.S. Princess Astrid (LSI(S)), 
Crudiv Thirteen (Brooklyn, Birmingham) (2 CL), 
Desron Thirteen (9 DD), 
Seer, Sentinel (2 AM), 
YMS 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78, (6 YMS), 
PC 543, 545, 546, 550, 559, 562, 626, (7 PC), 
SC 497, 498, 503, 506, 508, 522, 526, 530, 532, 533, 534, 535, 638, 639, 649, 651, 655, 666, 695, 696, 697, 770, 771, 977, 978, 979, (26 SC), 
Moreno (towing pontoon causeways), Intent, Resolute, 
40 LST (Including 5 carrying pontoons; others carrying 6 LCVP and fitted as hospital carriers), 
85 LCT-5, 54 LCI(L), 
12 LCT-3 or 4, British, 
9 LCG(L), British, 
7 LCF(L), British, 
U.S. Army forces (as assigned).

e. 87. Train, Captain Tuggle, U.S.N. 
Delta, 
Vulcan, 
Mount Baker, 
Tarazed, 
Winooski, Mattaponi, Chicopee, Salamonie, Chemung, Niobrara, Chamberlain.

1. Information .
   1. Current information on hostile forces and on characteristics of the Theater of Operations is listed in Information Annex, Annex A. Additional information, as available, will be separately distributed.
   2. The Western Task Force is part of a combined Allied force which has as its mission the capture of SICILY as a base for future operations.
   3. The Western Task Force is being employed in the waters to the westward of the island. Operations by British forces on the same echelon are taking place simultaneously in waters to the eastward of the southeastern portion of the island.
   4. The area of the Western Task Force is bounded:
      1. On the North, by the parallel of thirty-eight degrees North.
      2. On the West, by the meridian of twelve degrees East.
      3. On the Southwest, by a line drawn one one zero degrees from POINT SPADILLO (PANTELLARIA).
      4. On the Southeast, by a line drawn two two five degrees from RELIGIONE POINT (SICILY).
   5. Enemy ports which will come under the control of UNITED STATES forces are PORTO EMPEDOCLE, MARSALA, TRAPANI, and PALERMO. Other ports on the southern coast may be occupied during the early phases of the operation in order to maintain our military forces. Maintenance of our military forces will be undertaken also

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through the port of SYRACUSA as soon as that port is captured and made available to our shipping. Upon the opening of ports to the shipping of the Eastern Task Force, additional British landing craft may be allocated to the Western Task Force to assist in the maintenance over the beaches of UNITED STATES military forces.

6. British submarines will act as navigation beacons in each area selected for American attacks (see Submarine Plan, Annex H).
7. Fighter coverage of the Western Task Force will be provided: by North African Coastal Command during movements along the north coast of Africa and during passage through the TUNISIAN war channel; by the MALTA command during the northern approach on D minus one day. Until the capture of SICILIAN air fields: cover over the CENT Attack Force and DIME Attack Force will be provided by MALTA; cover over the JOSS Attack Force by PANTELLARIA. When SICILIAN air fields are captured and placed in operation, (probably D plus three), day and night fighter cover will be provided over landing beaches, ships lying off-shore, and convoy movements. (See Air Plan, Annex F).
8. Friendly aircraft participating in the operation will be marked with existing National markings, except that the UNITED STATES white star will be enclosed in a yellow circle. Thus all Allied aircraft will have the general similarity of a circle, i.e., the British and French roundel and the UNITED STATES circle enclosing the star. (See Air Plan, Annex F).
9. Force "H," a strong British force, will cover the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the IONIAN SEA. If the Italian Fleet sorties from western ports of ITALY, Force "Z," a strong British force, will operate southward of SARDINIA in positions favorable to covering the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the TYRRHENIAN SEA.
10. On D minus two, a Covering Group, consisting of UNITED STATES cruisers and destroyers, will cover the eastward movement of Allied convoys, operating in accordance with Covering Group Directive, Annex O.
11. During the nights D minus two/D minus one a British screening force comprising two MTB flotillas and one MGB flotilla will operate to screen the western flank of the Western Task Force. The operating area of this screen will be west of the meridian thirteen degrees forty minutes East, and north of a line connecting Latitude thirty-six degrees forty minutes North, Longitude thirteen degrees forty minutes East, with Latitude thirty-eight degrees North, Longitude eleven degrees East. At zero eight hundred on D day this screen will come under the command of Naval Commander, Western Task Force.
12. Controlled mine fields are reported to exist off all southern beaches, except possibly beach number eighty-eight. Beach data given in Information Annex, Annex A.
13. During moonlight on D minus one, own paratroops will be dropped from transport planes into zones behind the enemy lines in order to capture enemy airfields and divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the assault from seaward.
14. When military operations are undertaken for the reduction of the island, a Support Force, comprising light cruisers and destroyers, will be assigned to support the reduction operations by naval bombardment.

Assumptions

1. That the initial landing will take place during darkness.
2. That strong submarine, E-boat, and air attacks are to be expected.
3. That mines may be encountered.
4. That no harbors will be available and that initial landings must be over beaches.
5. That weather conditions will permit landing through the surf on designated beaches.
6. That false beaches will not preclude the landing ships and craft from landing on the true beaches.
7. That own paratroops will divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the landings made from seaward.
8. That the maintenance and build-up of the military forces can be continued over beaches until adequate ports become available and are rendered usable to meet logistic requirements.

2. This force will firmly establish Western Task Force in positions ashore on the island of SICILY suitable to its capture of the south-eastern portion of the island in order to assist in seizing and holding that island as a base for future operations.

3. 1. CONTROL Force, Force Flagship operate as directed by Naval Commander Western Task Force.

      Escort Group escort convoys in accordance with Convoy Plan, Annex I. Protect convoys against submarine, surface, and air attack. Upon arrival in attack area, render gunfire support as directed.

      Screening Group screen JOSS Attack Force against hostile surface forces approaching from bases in WEST SICILY. Frustrate enemy E-boat raids. Operate in accordance with Screening Group Directive, Annex K.

      Demonstration Group conduct deceptive operations in accordance with Demonstration Group Directive, Annex L.

      Minelaying Group lay mines in accordance with Minelaying Group Directive, Annex M.

      Reserve Group LCT's sail with TJS-1 enroute to DIME area, LST's sail with TJM-1 en-route to DIME area, and LCI(L)'s sail with TJF-1 enroute to DIME area; Orizaba and Chateau Thierry sail with CENT Attack Force joining DIME Attack Force in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G; subsequent movements as directed by Naval Commander Western Task Force.

   2. DIME Attack Force establish assigned Army Forces ashore near GELA by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the airfield at PONTE OLIVO, extend the beachhead to the East and Northeast to include the line RAGUSA-CHIARAMONTE-CALTAGIRONE and gain contact with the British forces on the East. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights which threaten transports, beaches, and landing craft. Take advantage of opportunity to move transports inshore during darkness, and in daylight when shore batteries have been silenced. Upon joining in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G, sail Orizaba and Chateau Thierry of Reserve Group to DIME area. Expedite unloading transports; utilize fully twelve LCT's ex-JOSS Attack Force.
   3. CENT Attack Force establish assigned Army Forces ashore near SCOGLITTI by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the airfields at COMISO and BISCARI, extend beachhead to the East and Northeast to include the line RAGUSA-CHIARAMONTE-CALTAGIRONE, and gain contact with the British forces on the East. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Provide own air spot. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights which threaten transports, beaches, and landing craft. Take advantage of opportunity to move transports inshore during darkness, and in daylight when shore batteries have been silenced. Sail Orizaba and Chateau Thierry of Reserve Group, releasing in accordance with Departure and Rendezvous Plan, Annex G. Expedite unloading transports; utilize fully fourteen LCT's ex-JOSS Attack Force.
   4. JOSS Attack Force established assigned Army Forces ashore near LICATA by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned. Capture and secure the port and airfield at LICATA; protect the left flank of the operation against interference from the northwest. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex B. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights which threaten landing craft and beaches. Sail craft of Reserve Group as follows; LCT's in TJS-1, LST's in TJM-1, and LCI(L)'s in TJF-1. Prior to execution of JOSS Approach Plan, release Reserve Group. Exploit port facilities to maximum to ensure troop maintenance. Be prepared to unload four coastal freighters upon arrival D plus four day. When unloaded from assault flight release twelve LCT-5 to DIME Attack Force and fourteen LCT-5 to CENT Attack Force.
   5. Train render logistic services to all Task Forces as required. Base on ORAN, ALGIERS, BIZERTE, or as directed.
      1. This Operation Plan will be placed in effect by dispatch or sealed orders.
      2. D day and H hour will be signaled.
      3. The assault is to be pressed home with relentless vigor regardless of loss or difficulty.
   --28--

4. Take every available measure to ensure,
   1. earliest warning of submarine attack, and
   2. destruction of hostile submarines.

5. Destroy enemy forces encountered.
6. Take all practicable precautions against mines.
7. Take appropriate steps to ensure safety of submarines stationed as beacons. Escort submarines in accordance with Submarine Plan, Annex H.
8. Employ smoke to fullest extent for defense against enemy action and to screen own operations.
9. Take special precautions to ensure early recognition of friendly aircraft.
10. Take special precautions to avoid compromise of infra-red receivers.
11. Extend timing of boat waves to avoid congestion on beaches.
12. Site pontoon bridges expeditiously.
13. Ensure effective boat salvage operations.
14. Clear landing ships and craft promptly in order to ensure prompt follow up. Provide adequate escorts. Route shipping in accordance with Convoy Plan, Annex I.
15. Maintain radio silence and visual silence except, as modified by Communication Plan, Annex C.
16. The following documents, in the possession of Commanders of Attack Forces, are in effect:
    1. MEDITERRANEAN (W) Combined Navy/Air Orders.
    2. MEDITERRANEAN (W) Naval Air Defence Orders.
    3. MEDITERRANEAN (W) Secret General Orders.
17. Landing ships and craft base on BIZERTE - TUNIS; other ships base on ORAN - ALGIERS.

4. Evacuation of wounded in accordance with Medical Plan, Annex D. Logistic support in accordance with Logistic Plan, Annex E.
5. Use Communication Plan, Annex C. Use zone BAKER time.
   Rendezvous:

A. CASABLANCA B. GIBRALTAR C. ORAN D. ARZEW E. ALGIERS F. BOUGIE G. PHILIPPEVILLE H. BONE I. BIZERTE J. CAPE FARINA K. TUNIS L. CAPE BON M. SOUSSE N. TRIPOLI

O. LINOSA P. LAMPEDUSA Q. PANTELLARIA R. MALTA S. SYRACUSA T. RELIGIONE POINT U. CAPE SCALAMBRI V. SCOGLITTI W. GELA X. LICATA Y. Latitude 36°53'N      Longitude 13°50'E Z. Latitude 36°07'N.      Longitude 13°30'E

The Short Title of this Plan is "HON/W2".
Naval Commander Western Task Force in Monrovia with DIME Attack Force.

H. K. HEWITT,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Naval Commander Western Task Force.

ANNEXES (To be issued separately)

A. Information Annex B. Fire Support Plan C. Communication Plan D. Medical Plan E. Logistic Plan F. Air Plan G. Departure and Rendezvous Plan H. Submarine Plan

I. Convoy Plan J. Approach Plan K. Screening Group Directive L. Demonstration Group Directive M. Minelaying Group Directive O. Covering Group Directive P. Intelligence Annex

--29--

DISTRIBUTION:

§ 20 Copies furnished CinCMed for distribution as deemed advisable. Copies for British Units listed in Task Organization will be distributed via Task Force Commander.

* 30 Copies furnished CTF 86 for further distribution to Flotilla and Group Commanders of LST's, LCI(L)'s, and LCT(5)'s.

J. M. BOIT, 
Commander, U.S.N.R., 
Flag Secretary.

--30--

Part IV
Execution of the Plan

Section I - Rehearsals

1. Amphibious training of the 1st Infantry Division and 2nd Armored Division was conducted in the Arzew area, while the 3rd Infantry Division carried out shore to shore training in the Bizerte-Tunis area. The 82nd Airborne Division moved from Casablanca to its training area near Oudja, and finally to its staging area near Kariouan, Tunisia.
2. All Army units comprising the assault forces were moved forward to staging areas by June 22, the date of the arrival from the United States of the 45th Division embarked in combat loaded transports.
3. The period 22 June - 4 July was utilized in carrying out rehearsals of the assault landing and in special training of task groups. This special training included operations by certain escort vessels with the British submarines designated as navigational beacons, training of AMs, PCs and SCs in the operations of Control Vessels, and training of various types of Support Craft.
4. In addition to this brief training period, the time was utilized for the installation of necessary radio equipment, special signaling devices, voice projection apparatus, etc.
5. Rehearsals were held at selected beaches near the ports of embarkation. In the case of the CENT and DIME Forces, this involved the movement to sea of the loaded transports, escorts and gunfire support ships. Due to the proximity of enemy aircraft and enemy submarines, these night operations were undertaken at considerable risk. Selected units of each RCT were landed on the rehearsal beaches in accordance with the scheme of maneuver planned for the actual assault. These rehearsals were not full scale landings.
6. The 3rd Infantry Division embarked in the landing ships and landing craft assigned for the operation and carried out a number of night shore to shore exercises in the Bizerte area.
7. Upon the completion of the rehearsals, all vehicles that had been landed were sent back to the concentration areas for re-waterproofing and reloading aboard ship.
8. Troops of the 45th Infantry Division were placed ashore for five days' reconditioning training. Upon the completion of the rehearsals, troops of all divisions were assembled in staging areas for final loading in assault transports and craft. The staging areas had been selected by the Army with relation to available bivouac areas close to loading ports selected by the Navy.
9. The rehearsals for the Sicilian invasion were hurriedly planned because of the shortage of time available and were at best a "dry run" on reduced scale. To ensure maximum benefit of rehearsals, adequate time should be available for detailed planning in order that the exercise may simulate as nearly as possible the actual assault. Individual RCTs should land as units prior to the full scale landing of the division. In the latter case it should be carried out in such manner as to require complete unloading of a limited number of ships or craft in the execution of the plan of attack of certain RCTs. This completeness is particularly desirable in order to give the Shore Party, Beach Party and boat crews a full scale workout. Token rehearsals invariably stop short of the critical phase of the landing when beaches become heaped with supplies, boats are disabled, and the Army supply system is in danger of breakdown. Full scale unloading during rehearsals would bring the beach organizations face to face with their real problems and would permit corrective measures to be taken before the actual assault. In planning such full scale rehearsals the following must be provided for:
   1. replacements or repair of boats and craft lost or damaged during the rehearsal
   2. re-waterproofing of all vehicles landed during rehearsal
   3. adequate time to reload ships and craft for the assault
   4. adequate time to hold critiques after the rehearsal, make necessary changes to plans and distribute same to forces involved.

Section II - Convoys and Routing

1. For the initial assault on the island of Sicily, over six hundred ships and landing craft were allocated to the Naval Commander, Western Task Force. Of this total, one hundred and thirty

--31--

warships, consisting of cruisers, destroyers, PCs, YMSs, SCs were available to escort, covering and support duties. Three hundred and twenty-four ships and landing craft, consisting of combat loaders (APAs, AKAs, XAPs, and APs), LSTs, LCI(L)s, and LCTs, were made available for loading and transporting assault troops and necessary assault weapons, of the Seventh Army, from the mounting and staging ports in North Africa to the CENT, DIME, and JOSS Attack areas on the South coast of Sicily. The remainder of the vessels allocated comprised PT Boats, Air Sea Rescue Boats, Minelayers, Landing Craft Gun and Flak, and fleet tugs. There were four Belgian LSI(S) of the Prince Leopold class and one British monitor.

2. Oran was the staging port for the combat-loaded Forty-fifth Division because that port was under the operating control of American Naval Command, the combat loaders, which brought this Division from the United States, could be accommodated there, and because it was farthest removed from possible air attack. Bizerte and Tunis were the mounting ports for LSTs, LCI(L)s, and LCTs because those ports were large enough to accommodate the landing craft and were the North African ports located closest to the assault areas assigned to the Western Task Force. Sousse became the staging port for the LCI(L)s because the movement cleared Tunis of some of the traffic load and because the assault voyage was shortened for the embarked infantry. Algiers was the loading port for combat loaders of the DIME Force because Oran harbor became filled to capacity and Algiers was the only other port on the North African coast where large ships could be berthed.
3. In order to utilize escort ships to the fullest possible degree, ships were initially classified into four principal categories according to speed, operating range, and mounting and staging ports. In like manner the individual convoys were made up, first, to meet the same considerations and second, to provide for economy of aircraft fighter cover. The combat loaders were assigned to a convoy in two sections, originating from Oran and Algiers. LSTs mounted troops and armor in Bizerte and Tunis and sortied from those harbors at approximately the same time, to rendezvous in the Tunisian War Channel and to proceed Easterly together. LCI(L)s mounted in Tunis, staged through Sousse and departed from that port on D-l. This LCI(L) convoy then made junction with the LST convoy while enroute to an assigned Gozo Island landfall, prior to making the Approach to the assault areas. LCTs were sections of one convoy, the two sections respectively departing from Bizerte and Tunis and joining up in the War Channel, thence proceeding Eastward, via Cape Bon, South of Pantelleria and toward Malta holding to that course until 1700 on D-l when the convoy turned North into the Approach.
4. The maintenance of the military forces during operation HUSKY involved three naval phases. The first phase included all convoys moving to reach the assault area on D day. Phase two was the follow-up. It included all convoys moving to reach the assault area after D day and until the military forces comprising the Western Task Force was landed in Sicily, and, it likewise included the maintenance of those forces. Phase three involved troops additional to the assault forces of the Western Task Force which were moved into Sicily. Phase two was a continuing movement during the early stages of phase three.
5. All assault convoys were routed by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, until they entered the area of operations assigned to the Western Task Force.
6. Convoy routes were chosen to meet the following considerations:
   1. That convoys should approach the attack areas during darkness and should arrive in the Initial Transport Areas in time to meet H hour.
   2. That convoys must be prepared to meet strong submarine, E-boat and air attacks and that mines might be encountered.
   3. That swept channels should be used wherever possible.
   4. That convoys should be within reach of the maximum air coverage throughout voyages.
   5. That routing should avoid mutual interference with other forces.
   6. That movements of ships support the "Cover" Plan.
   7. That wherein troops are crowded into landing craft, the time afloat should be reduced to a minimum compatible with other considerations.
   8. That a landfall rendezvous for ships and landing craft would give these vessels an accurate navigational fix.
7. These considerations were met as follows:
   1. That convoys should approach the attack areas during darkness and should arrive in the Initial Transport Areas in time to meet H hour.

--32--

Since H hour was set for 0245, the attack convoys were required to be in the Initial Transport Areas at approximately H-3 hour in order to carry out the assault landing on schedule.

Convoy speeds-of-advance used were thirteen knots for combat loaders, twelve and a half for LCIs, eight knots for LSTs, and six and a half for LCTs. The time of rendezvous of LST and LCI convoys off Gozo Island was 1600/D-l and the passage of the combat loaders through that point was on and after 1850 the same day. To meet this schedule, convoy NSF-1 left Oran on D-5 and was joined by the first section at Algiers on D-4. LSTs and LCTs sortied from Bizerte and Tunis on D-2. LCI convoys left the staging port of Sousse on D-l.

b. That convoys must be prepared to meet strong submarine, E-boat and air attack and that mines might be encountered.

Task Force Commanders of DIME, CENT and JOSS Forces made provision in their orders to meet submarines and air attacks. Convoy routes were through swept channels wherever possible and enemy surface vessels attacks were guarded against by Covering Groups and Screening Groups.

c. That swept channels should be used wherever possible.

Swept channels, other than harbor and port exits, included the Tunisian War Channel, the Gulf of Tunis Channel, a swept channel in the vicinity of Sousse, and swept areas in the vicinity of Pantellaria.

d. That convoys should be within reach of the maximum air coverage throughout voyages.

Air cover was available during Phase I,

i. off the Algerian and Tunisian coasts by aircraft of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force,
ii. in the Sicilian Strait by U.S. Air Corps S. E. fighters operating from Pantellaria and Lampedusa,
iii. in the vicinity of Malta and in the Malta Channel by RAF fighter squadrons operating from Malta. The maximum fighter cover was planned for convoys at dawn, dusk and during periods of moonlight.

Air cover was planned during Phase II and Phase III,

i. off the beaches, by aircraft operating from Malta, and, when possible, by twin engine fighters based in Tunisia;
ii. by aircraft operating from captured air fields in Sicily.

e. That routing should avoid mutual interference with other forces.

In order to avoid mutual interference, convoys were scheduled as to approximate time of leaving mounting or staging ports, and were further scheduled as to arrival at points where there was urgent necessity for keeping clear of other shipping. Due to narrowness of the Tunisian War Channel, and in order to effect rendezvous of forces joining up, and to keep air forces informed of location of convoys, it was necessary to stipulate time of arrival off Bizerte, as well as to declare a speed over the ground in order to avoid overtaking while in the War Channel. In like manner, there was a time set for the landfall of LST convoys off Gozo Light and for the subsequent joining up of LCT convoys. The first section of NCF-1 was routed through the Gozo rendezvous at 1850 on D-l in order that it might follow closely behind the United Kingdom convoy KMF-18 and yet pass the North Gozo tangent in time to allow the second section to remain on an adequate schedule.

One of the problems involving convoy routing was proper timing to prevent mutual interference. According to the first draft of the Convoy Plan, Second Section of NCF-1 (CTF 85) was scheduled to leave Oran on D-4, was to rendezvous with First Section NCF-1 to seaward of Algiers on D-3, and was to proceed Easterly behind the First Section NCF-1 at a distance of six miles. Expected speed of advance was thirteen knots. This was scheduled because British convoy KMF-18, at speed of 12 1/2 knots, was scheduled to be in advance of NCF-1 by a sufficient distance at Algiers that the overtaking NCF-1 convoy would still be thirty minutes of cruising time behind at the moment of passing Bizerte. This was provided in CinCMed HUSKY Orders in order to prevent interference in the Tunisian War Channel between convoys KMF-18, NCF-1 and the landing ship and landing craft convoys of CTF 86 which were making sortie from Bizerte shortly after dawn on D-2. Accordingly, KMF-18 planned to pass Bizerte at 0500 on D-2. A further benefit of this schedule was that it provided for economy of fighter cover over the area transversed.

The convoy plans issued by CTF 81 and CTF 85, however, brought up the possibility of a night-time rendezvous off Algiers under the above plan, and, since night rendezvous are undesirable, CTF 81 requested that time of rendezvous at Algiers be moved up as necessary to permit

--33--

junction of the two sections of NCF-1 in daylight, preferably on D-4. This request necessitated the second section departing Oran on D-5.

In the execution of the changed plan, the net result of this request by CTF 81 was twofold. After junction of first and second sections NCF-1, onward routing from Algiers was altered in order to prevent interference between convoys NCF-1 and KMF-18. The speed and speed-of-advance of NCF-1 was reduced below thirteen knots, thereby causing increased concern over the possibilities of submarine attack. Commander, Western Naval Task Force, sent orders to the Officer in Tactical Command to increase speed. Second, this late hour change in the speed of advance of NCF-1, and in the routing of that convoy, affected the North African Air Force plans to some extent. Planes, ordered to cover the sortie and initial passage of NCF-1 Easterly from Algiers, were late in making contact with that convoy.

f. That movements of ships support the "Cover" Plan.

The movements of Landing Craft Convoys were in the direction of Malta, and the routing of the combat loaders was in the general direction of Tripoli, with the object of deception of the enemy as to the destination, date and intentions, generally, of our forces. In this manner was the routing of American ships and craft coordinated with the routing of ships and craft of the Eastern Task Force in order to carry out the conditions of the Cover Plan.

g. That wherein troops are crowded into landing craft, the time afloat should be reduced to a minimum compatible with the other considerations given.

Landing Craft (infantry), carried troops from Bizerte and Tunis to Sousse on D-4. These troops remained ashore until the afternoon of D-2 and then reembarked for the assault flight. By this means, the time of troop carry, under crowded conditions, was reduced to a minimum in this instance. Due to the scarcity of large harbors in Northwest Africa, a long haul had to be accepted in the case of combat loaders, and an extended period of time afloat had to be accepted with LCT convoys.

h. That a landfall rendezvous for ships and landing craft would give these vessels an accurate navigational fix.

Routing the LST and LCI convoys through a landfall rendezvous off Gozo Light made possible a more accurate approach to the Initial Landing Craft Areas while at the same time supported the "Cover" Plan by having the convoys maintain a base course Eastward toward Malta as long as possible.

8. The Operation Orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, required the presence of a Covering Group (TG 80.7) during the Eastward passage of Naval Attack Convoys along the North Coast of Africa and through the Tunisian War Channel. The Covering Group, comprising three light cruisers and seven destroyers, was formed off Algiers on D-4, when sections of NCF-1 made junction. They then steamed Eastward, ahead of the convoys NCF-1 and KMF-18, so as to maintain a suitable covering position with relation to the transports. Convoys KMF-18 and NCF-1 were scheduled to pass outside Bizerte at approximately 0600 and 0630/D-2, respectively. During night hours D-3/D-2, as these convoys entered the Tunisian War Channel, the favorable covering position was, Northward of a series of minefields which protected Bizerte, and Eastward of the convoys such that enemy surface vessels would not be able to attack the convoy from the Tyrrhenian Sea without interception by the Covering Group. Hence the Covering Group Directive advised the approximate position Latitude thirty-eight degrees ten minutes North, Longitude eleven degrees zero zero minutes East at 0100/D-2. Then, since the two convoys KMF-18 and NCF-1 were approximately twenty miles East of Bizerte at 0800/D-2 and were heading for Cape Bon with the intention of rounding to the South, Covering Group was advised a second approximate position in Latitude thirty-seven degrees seven minutes North, Longitude eleven degrees forty minutes East at 0800/D-2. This movement provided for rotating the Cover in relation to the convoys during their passage through the War Channel, in order to interpose continuous interception forces between convoys and possible enemy sorties. The second position of the cruisers also served as information for the North African Coastal Air Force to establish daylight fighter cover over them.
9. Prior to publication of the Covering Group Directive, consideration was given to provision of night fighter cover to that group during the night of D-3/D-2. CTG 80.7's route was close North of a minefield which extended Northerly from a point in the vicinity of Bizerte, a distance of nearly one hundred miles. It was not possible for the Covering Group to pass closer to the North Coast of Africa except by passing through the War Channel which movement was not compatible with the mission of the Covering Group. The North African Coastal Air Force stated that no night fighter cover could be provided because the route of the cruisers was beyond the operating range of single engine fighters and that twin engine fighters were not available.

10. Phase two was the follow-up. It included all convoys moving to reach the assault area after D day and until the military forces comprising the Western Task Forces were landed in Sicily and it likewise included the maintenance of those forces.
11. Additional to the ships and landing craft allocated for the initial assault, approximately sixty ships were allocated to the Commander, Western Naval Task Force. These ships participated in the follow-up and supplemented the turn around of landing craft in loading and transporting further elements of the 7th Army. These sixty ships were sailed in three convoys; two from Oran and Algiers on D-3 and D-4, and one convoy from the United Kingdom passing Algiers on D-l day. The convoys followed the normal coastal route along the North African coast at speeds of advance of eight knots for the two originating in Oran and Algiers, and a speed of twelve knots for the United Kingdom convoy.
12. In the turn around for landing craft, all that were designated for carrying supplies were directed to proceed to Bizerte because the Army supply depot (Eastern Base Section) was located there. Tunis was the loading point for vehicles and personnel only. Hence, after departure of the assault convoys, no maintenance supplies were loaded at the port of Tunis. The routes which were designated for returning landing craft ran westerly from the Attack areas to a position north of Pantellaria and to the Tunisian War Channel off Cape Bon, thence by swept channels to Tunis or Bizerte as appropriate. The landing craft route back to the Attack areas was by swept channels to Cape Bon and then easterly and south of Pantellaria, thence on northeast courses to the proper landing craft area. Each route was six miles wide and convoys were directed as follows: "Convoys or groups of ships or craft with a speed of advance of ten knots or more are to keep to port of the center line. Convoys or groups of ships or craft with a speed of advance of less than ten knots are to keep to starboard of the center line." The primary reason for designating shuttle routes was for simplification of aircraft fighter cover and ease of surface patrol. Furthermore the routes were made narrow because it was not possible to sweep a wider channel against mines with the mine sweeping forces available. Also the routing helped to prevent convoys from crossing one another, especially at night.
13. Phase three involved movements of troops into Sicily, additional to the assault forces of the Western Task Force. These movements involved the continued shuttle of landing ships and craft from Tunisian and Tripolitanian ports, and the employment of personnel ships and M/T store ships from Algerian and Egyptian ports. Finally the logistic build-up of the occupation forces was provided in UGS convoys from the United States and KMS convoys from the United Kingdom. Combatant vessels of the Western Task Force were employed as escorts for these convoy movements affecting the Seventh Army, which were routed by direct route to designated Sicilian ports available at the time. Phase three commenced before the second phase had been completed and ran concurrently with it until the Western Task Force had been landed in Sicily, after which the third phase continued in accordance with the plans of the Allied Force Headquarters which provided for distribution of forces in Sicily as a base for future offensive operations.

Section III - APPROACH:

1. The Approach Plan of the Western Naval Task Force was designed to provide an orderly, timely, and well-coordinated approach from a landfall rendezvous, and permit daylight deployment of forces in order to deliver simultaneous attacks in strength.
2. Factors affecting the Approach Plan were:
   1. The preliminary disposition of forces imposed by the steaming radii and seaworthiness of various types of vessels employed.
   2. Movements of forces conforming to the "cover plan."
   3. Movements of covering forces.
   4. Routing of forces to ensure maximum air coverage.
   5. Mutual non-interference by forces with regard to space and time factors.
   6. Economy of time afloat for troops embarked in landing craft.
   7. Consideration of mineable waters.
   8. Selection of a suitable landfall favorable to obtaining an accurate navigational fix.
   9. Enabling units and groups sailing in different convoys to effect rendezvous in daylight.
   10. Placing the main assault forces on a long run on the approximate approach course.
   11. Permit deployment of forces during daylight on the approach course.
   12. Selection of approach courses most suitable for use of fathometer and radar during close approach to enemy shores in darkness.
   13. Selection of approach courses requiring the minimum of maneuvering by assault ships after entering initial transport area.

3. The Approach Plan as promulgated, satisfied, with minor exceptions, all the factors tabulated above. It provided for the routing and timing of landing craft convoys sailing from Sousse, Tunis, and Bizerte to enable the LSTs (Convoy TJM-1) and LCIs (Convoy TJF-1) to make a rendezvous and later a landfall 270° 5 miles from Gozo Island light at 1600 on D-l, thence proceeding northwestward to join LCT movement (Convoy TJS-1) at 1800 near the meridian of 14° East from whence the approach was made by the JOSS Force.
4. During D-l the weather was most unfavorable for craft convoys, the wind velocity being about 35 knots with a moderate sea. In spite of this heavy weather, the craft made the Gozo landfall on time where the LSTs and LCIs of the CENT, DIME, and KOOL groups were released. The JOSS forces, comprising the "greater part of the craft, then maneuvered to execute the JOSS approach. On a northerly course the LSTs had difficulty making 8 knots, the LCIs were taking seas over solid, and the smaller craft were making heavy weather of it. The formations were in good order but gradually began to straggle. The LCT convoy was directed to proceed independently and considerable concern was felt as to whether the LCT tank waves would arrive at the assault beaches in time to support the assault infantry. This was accomplished, however, in the face of extremely adverse weather conditions.
5. In order to meet the H-hour, it became necessary to press the JOSS LSTs and LCIs in spite of the wind and sea conditions. This caused some LSTs in the groups to lag to the extent as to lose sight contact with the next group ahead, resulting in some craft becoming separated from their proper groups and eventually anchoring in the wrong area in the initial transport area. The Control Ships, acting as escorts during the approach, likewise became separated and were not in their proper positions in the Rendezvous Areas to assemble and lead the assault LCVPs to the beach.
6. The JOSS forces, however, closed on the reference vessels and the Beacon Submarine, which were on their prescribed stations and which made the prescribed beacon signals in the face of enemy searchlight illumination and momentarily expected enemy gunfire. The navigational phase of this approach could not have been improved upon, and all Attack Groups were able to attain their initial transport areas and land at their respective beaches.
7. The DIME and CENT forces were routed well southward of Malta so as to make a long run on the approximate approach course. These forces comprised Convoy NCF-1; the DIME force being the 1st section, scheduled to pass through a position 270° 5 miles from Gozo Light at 1850; and the CENT force, 2nd section, steaming about 7 miles astern of the 1st section, scheduled to pass through position 270° 5 miles from Gozo Light at 1920.
8. Also approaching this position westward of Gozo was convoy KMF-18 carrying the BARK (SOUTH) assault forces. KMF-18 was scheduled to pass the Gozo tangent at 1815, ahead of Convoy NCF-1, but, due to head winds and seas, this convoy was behind schedule. This force was also observed to be westward apparently of the intended longitude when passing 270° from Gozo Light.
9. At any rate, the DIME force passed through the assigned position on time, and the CENT force nine minutes behind schedule. The slight delay of the CENT force may be attributed to the maneuvers executed by the second section of NCF-1, beginning at 1802, when this force slowed to ten knots, and at 1815 began taking cruising disposition in accordance with CTF 85 Approach Plan.
10. The LSTs and LCIs of the CENT and DIME Forces, upon being released off Gozo Light at 1600, headed northeastward to assigned positions where routes were taken to enable the smaller vessels to join up with the transports coming up from the southward. As these craft headed up on northerly courses, they were given a considerable set by the wind and sea then existent. The CENT LSTs rolled heavily in the trough of the sea causing a shift of cargo in some ships; this formation was then maneuvered by changes of course and speed to permit shoring of cargo.
11. Thus, when the two sections of NCF-1 passed northward of Gozo, LSTs and LCIs were observed across their approach courses. This resulted in considerable maneuvering by simultaneous ships movements by the combat-loaders, particularly by the CENT Force which maneuvered along the meridian 14° East until 1953 when northeasting was begun at standard speed to get on

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proper approach track which was reached at 2050. Meanwhile the DIME Force increased speed to make up the loss of time but the LSTs and LCIs were unable to maintain position in the heavy seas, and gradually fell behind the combat loaders. For simplicity of navigation and ease of handling, the DIME Force approached in a single column of two cruisers and eleven transports flanked on one side by a column of LCIs and on the other by LSTs; due to straggling these columns became inordinately long.

12. At 2305 one division of the CENT Force was further delayed by the transport Thomas Jefferson which stopped for twelve minutes to lower and cast adrift a support boat. The four ships astern of the Jefferson also stopped to maintain position on the ship ahead.
13. There was no difficulty in the approach to the initial transport areas due to the paucity of distinctive landmarks on shore or the rolling nature of the terrain behind the shoreline. Navigation was greatly simplified by
    1. The accurate fix off Gozo with a short run of about fifty miles thereafter,
    2. Judicious use of the SG radar in conjunction with
    3. the supersonic fathometer and
    4. dead reckoning tracer.
14. The SG radar picked up land at 22,000 yards and from thence on was a good navigational aid. The Beacon Submarine served as a final check and enabled ships to move into assigned positions with accuracy.
15. In spite of ragged station keeping and adverse weather conditions the CENT forces reached the assigned area at 0040 and the DIME forces at 0045.
16. The landing ships and craft made best of way to the assigned initial areas and were able to land on the beaches when required.
17. The planning and execution of the approach from the standpoint of navigation and seamanship left nothing to be desired and was one of the highlights of the operation.

Section IV - BEACON SUBMARINES

1. Three British submarines were employed in the operation: HMS Seraph(CENT); HMS Shakespeare (DIME); HMS SAFARI (JOSS). Prior to departure from North African ports, each submarine operated briefly with the escort vessel with which it was to effect rendezvous during the approach phase of the operation. These exercises were conducted in the Oran, Algiers, and Bizerte areas.
2. These submarines took up offensive patrol stations in a prescribed operating area in the Gulf of Gela on D minus three. While patrolling on station these submarines observed nightly displays over land of aircraft flares, anti-aircraft gunfire and bomb flashes. Low-flying aircraft and aircraft flares forced Seraph and Shakespeare to dive during the early morning of D minus two. On the night of D minus two, Seraph, while trying to lay a type FH-830 buoy, was interrupted by an enemy E-boat, necessitating a quick dive.
3. All ships were on assigned stations as required. The Seraph was contacted by destroyer Cowie at 2318 on D minus one; theShakespeare was contacted by destroyer Cole at 2215 on D minus one; and Safari was contacted by the destroyer Bristol at 2230 on D minus one.
4. All submarines made retirement under escort according to plan, reaching Malta on D day. Escort of Seraph picked up survivor during early morning of D day who turned out to be an American soldier who had fallen overboard from a transport. As Safari was leaving station near Licata under escort of PC-543, this submarine had two sticks of bombs dropped near her by JU-88s. No damage was suffered.
5. Although the Task Forces had been deliberately routed to enable them to obtain a sure navigational fix four or five hours prior to reaching the assigned initial transport areas, and in spite of the valuable navigation aid available in the modern radar equipment, it was decided to employ Beacon Submarines to ensure accurate location of the transports off the assault beaches. In the Gulf of Gela, where the CENT and DIME forces were somewhat cramped for sea room, it was deemed essential that these forces be accurately fixed and mutual interferences avoided.
6. The employment of Beacon Submarines should be dependent upon attendant circumstances in each instance. In areas of strong or variable currents, or where no landfall is available from

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which to make the approach, or where no distinctive landmarks exist for radar fix, the Beacon Submarine is of inestimable value. By placing submarines on station several days in advance of the assault, these vessels can conduct reconnaissance of selected landing beaches, land amphibious scouts, observe enemy defense activities on shore, such as placing of barbed wire, machine gun pits, etc. A patrol of the area can locate enemy mine fields, observe coastal traffic and routes habitually followed through enemy mine fields, and can determine the extent of enemy coastal patrols all of which may affect the entry of our forces into those waters. It is essential, of course, that such information as is gained by submarines on station patrol be made available to the Task Force Commander prior to or upon his arrival in the assault area.

7. Where the circumstances dictate the withdrawal of the Beacon Submarine before the assault, use can be made of various types of buoys laid by the submarine as navigational aids to the approaching assault forces.

Section V - THE LANDING

1. The Western Task Force, (U.S. Seventh Army), was firmly established ashore over beaches in southern Sicily by the Western Naval Task Force. Army forces in assault were composed of three reinforced divisions, of which the 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions reinforced formed the Second Corps and were landed over beaches in DIME and CENT areas, respectively; and the 3rd Infantry Division reinforced which was landed over beaches in the JOSS area. Army forces in floating reserve were one Regimental Combat Team from the 1st Infantry Division and one armored Combat Command from 2nd Armored Division.
2. Army forces and beaches, DIME assault.

   In the vicinity of Gela, two Ranger Battalions and two Regimental Combat Teams comprising the 1st Infantry Division reinforced, less one RCT, (DIME Force), were landed in assault. The Ranger Battalions were landed over beaches in front of Gela in LCVP's and LCA's; one battalion having been embarked in the Attack Transport U.S.S. Dickman, and the other embarked in two British LSI (L)'s, thePrince Charles and Prince Leopold. The reserve for the Ranger landing was a Combat Engineer Battalion in three LCI(L),s. Two Battalion Landing Teams, respectively from each Regimental Combat Team, were landed in assault in LCVP's from Attack Transports, (APA and XAP) over assigned beaches. The third Battalion of each Regimental Combat Team, was in regimental reserve for its own RCT, and was embarked in eight LCI(L)'s.

   The DIME assault beaches and assigned Army forces were as follows, reading as from West to East, total frontage approximately 8,800 yards:

Beach	Forces	Transport
RED	1st Ranger Battalion	Dickman
GREEN	4th Ranger Battalion	Prince Charles Prince Leopold
YELLOW	1st Battalion, 26th RCT	Barnett
BLUE	2nd Battalion, 26th RCT	Lyon
RED 2	2nd Battalion, 16th RCT	Thurston
GREEN 2	1st Battalion, 16th RCT	Stanton

3. Army forces and beaches, CENT assault

   In the vicinity of Scoglitti, three Regimental Combat Teams comprising the 45th Infantry Division reinforced, (CENT force), were landed in assault. Two Battalion Landing Teams from each Regimental Combat Team were landed over assigned beaches in LCVP's having disembarked from APA's and XAP's. The third Battalion of the 180th Regimental Combat Team acted as reserve for the Second Corps. The Third Battalion of the 179th Regimental Combat Team acted as reserve for the 45th Division. The third Battalion of the 157th Regimental Combat Team acted as reserve for its own RCT. These reserve Battalions were embarked in the XAP Frederick Funstan on the West, the XAP Florence Nightingale in the center, and the APA Biddle on the East, respectively of the 180th, 179th, and 157th Regimental Combat Teams, in that order.

   The CENT assault beaches and assigned Army forces were as follows, reading as from West to East, total frontage approximately 25,000 yards:

Beach	Forces	Transport
RED	1st Battalion, 180th RCT 2nd Battalion, 180th RCT	Calvert Neville
GREEN	2nd Battalion, 179th RCT	Dorothy Dix [Dorothea L. Dix]
YELLOW	1st Battalion, 179th RCT	Leonard Wood

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Beach	Forces	Transport
BLUE	As assigned, during the follow-up
RED 2	As assigned, during the follow-up
GREEN 2	2nd Battalion, 157th RCT	Thomas Jefferson
YELLOW 2	1st Battalion,157th RCT	Charles Carroll
BLUE 2	As assigned, during the follow-up

4. Army forces and beaches, JOSS assault.

In the vicinity of Licata, one Ranger Battalion and three Regimental Combat Teams comprising the 3rd Infantry Division reinforced, (JOSS Force), were landed in assault. The Ranger Battalion was landed over assigned beaches in LCA's; having been embarked in two British LSI(S)'s, the Princess Charlotte and Princess Astrid. Two Regimental Combat Teams were landed in column of Battalions, the assault Battalions, respectively landing in LCVP's, having embarked in LST's; the following Battalions, in each case landing in LCI(L)'s. Two Battalions of the third Regimental Combat Team were landed in column, in LCVP's; having embarked in LST's. The third Battalion of this Regimental Combat Team was landed, behind the Ranger Battalion, in LCVP's; having embarked in LST's. One armored Combat Command, Combat Command A, Second Armored Division, acted as floating reserve for the JOSS Force.

The JOSS assault beaches and assigned Army forces were as follows, reading as from West to East, total frontage approximately 22,000 yards.

Beach	Forces	Transport
RED	1st Battalion, 7th RCT  2nd Battalion, 7th RCT  3rd Battalion,7th RCT	Landing Craft  Landing Craft Landing Craft
GREEN WEST	3rd Ranger Battalion	2-LSI(S)'s
GREEN EAST	2nd Battalion, 15th RCT	Landing Craft
YELLOW	3rd Battalion, 15th RCT  1st Battalion, 15th RCT	Landing Craft Landing Craft
BLUE	2nd Battalion, 30th RCT  1st Battalion, 30th RCT  3rd Battalion, 30th RCT	Landing Craft Landing Craft Landing Craft

5. The floating reserve for the Western Task Force, (KOOL Force), was composed of Combat Command B, Second Armored Division, and the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division. These forces were embarked in the Chateau Thierry, the Orizaba and in Landing Craft.
6. Although the DIME landing has been called "combined landing", that is, ship to shore and shore to shore (landing craft); the CENT landing called ship to shore; the JOSS landing called shore to shore; the initial attack by the assault Battalions was everywhere ship to shore. The assault Battalions were all landed in LCVP's and LCA's; having embarked originally in transports and landing craft. The differences in manner of effecting the landing applied to the reserve or follow-up forces. The three reserve Battalions of the DIME Force were landed in LCI(L)'s, the three reserve Battalions of CENT Force were landed in LCVP's from transports, four of the immediate follow-up Battalions of JOSS Force were landed in LCI(L)'s, and two in LCVP's from LST's.
7. Debarkation.

   Shortly after midnight, July 9-10, immediately following the arrival of Combat Loaded transports, British LSI(S)'s, and landing ships in their assigned initial transport and landing ship areas, the debarkation operations began. In spite of poor weather conditions, in all transport areas, the lowering and troop loading of the initial assault wave LCVP's and LCA's was carried out in a minimum of time and with only minor incidents. Ships in DIME and CENT areas experienced difficulty in hoisting out boats because of rough water and swells. CENT Force, being more exposed to the sea, damaged a number of boats and consequently lost time in unloading. DIME Force suffered some damage to boats but little or no delay in unloading. Seamanship displayed was good throughout. It is noted that the time required for clearing the DIME assault waves was, generally, from thirty to forty-five minutes. In CENT area, the time required was greater. For future planning of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, time given to this operation should probably be an hour with a safety factor to allow for delays due to weather.

8. Forming up on Lines of Departure.

   Assault waves formed up first in the assigned transport rendezvous areas in full accordance

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with the landing plan of attack and were subsequently escorted, in most instances, by assigned AM's, PC's, and SC's, which acted as landing craft control vessels during the initial assault stages. The control vessels took charge of the assault LCVP's and LCA's at the transport rendezvous areas and escorted them to the designated respective lines of departure. From there, assault boat waves, as directed, proceeded on schedule to their assigned beaches, unloaded troops, retracted as soon as possible, and returned to make a follow-up troop carry as ordered. A distinctive characteristic of the initial attack was the manner in which an order, contained in the basic plan, was carried out. The basic plan expressly directed all forces to "Extend the timing of assault waves to avoid congestion on beaches." In general, this order was well carried out during the initial assault.

9. Landing of assault waves, DIME.

   H hour was planned for 0245. The first DIME wave arrived at their beaches about on schedule. Fires at inland targets, started by bombing prior to H hour, aided considerably in identifying the beaches. Initial opposition at Red and Green beaches was light; at Yellow it was heavy; on Blue beaches, light; and over Red 2 and Green 2, opposition was fairly heavy. The surf at the beaches was about three feet high, and together with a strong current and Force 4 Westerly winds, many landing craft coxswains were in serious difficulty with craft broaching on the beaches. The LCI(L)'s, carrying the three reserve Battalions, landed shortly after the LCVP's had gone in, beaching at about 0330. They discharged their troops and retracted without serious difficulty except for LCI(L) 220, which lost her stern anchor, suffered shell fire damage to her port screw, and subsequently broached on the beach.

10. Landing of assault waves, CENT.

    Delays in loading assault boats in CENT area prompted the Attack Force commander to order postponement of H hour to 0345 for that Force. The landings were generally unopposed, due to the pre-assault Cruiser and Destroyer shore bombardment. The 157th Regimental Combat Team landed on its assigned beaches, pushed promptly inland, and captured the designated initial objectives ahead of schedule. The 179th Regimental Combat Team, in general, landed on the correct beaches, but experienced delay in movement through the dune area immediately inland because of extensive mine fields. The 180th Regimental Combat Team gained its assigned D day objectives after completing a successful landing. The fact that this landing was not made on the correct beaches did cause some delay in marching and forming up.

11. Landing of assault waves, JOSS.

    In the JOSS area, initial attack waves, with a delay caused by bad weather, landed according to plan. All of the landings went forward successfully, and in spite of enemy counterfire on some beaches, and poor weather, Army forces were landed over the correct beaches according to the planned time-interval schedule. Although the attack groups anchored between H-20 minutes and H-90 minutes, it is believed that they were at a greater distance from the beach than the scheduled three and a half miles; thus, the assault LCVP's were required to make a considerable longer run than had been planned.

    The Commander JOSS Attack Force, in his Action Report, made the following comment: "The navigational phase of the operation could not have been improved upon. The H.M.S. Safari, the Bristol and the Patrol Craft assigned this mission deserve the highest praise. It was through their expert navigation...that all attack groups were able to attain their transport areas and land at the center of their respective beaches. This was supplemented by the scout boats at Yellow and Green beaches." While there was not much gunfire on Green, Yellow and Blue beaches, considerable artillery and MG fire was met during the landing on Red beach.

12. Non-congestion, assault waves.

    Assault boat waves, especially at beaches where due to causes beyond their control it had not been possible to keep to the scheduled H hour, managed to avoid congestion on beaches during the immediate assault by maintaining an adequate time spacing between waves. For future amphibious campaigns, where operationally practicable, some degree of flexibility in executing H hour requirements may be found desirable. In the event that the planned H hour cannot possibly be attained, it may become necessary to set a new H hour thereby altering the time, but not the relative schedule, of pre-assault naval gunfire and arrival of the initial assault boat waves at designated beaches. It may be found feasible to fire some form of aerial rocket or combination of rockets from the vicinity of the Task Force Flagship as a signal to indicate the new H-15 or H-30 minute time reference point to that Task Force. Immediate confirmation of this change by every means available would be an absolute requirement. Available methods of increasing the splendid degree of coordination of naval gunfire with the arrival of assault boat waves should be thoroughly investigated and tested in order to provide the utmost possible protection to the attacking forces.

13. Destruction of beach defenses.

    At CENT destroyers were employed to cover and support the landing. Preparatory fire was opened at about H-15. Each fire support destroyer was assigned an area of responsibility which was well covered by 5" projectiles. The fire was lifted just before the first wave landed.

    The effect of this close supporting fire was apparent as the 45th Division landed practically unopposed and was able to proceed with the establishment of its beachhead faster than planned.

    Pre-assault naval gunfire, where used, on pre-arranged targets and beaches, was extremely effective in destroying enemy beach defenses and constituted a definite factor in reducing the number of causalities and the amount of landing craft damage from enemy local action at the beach landing and unloading points. It is evident that the clearance and neutralization of beach defenses by naval gunfire is most vital to the success of the initial assault. Naval gunfire can efficiently aid in preventing enemy action from pinning the initial troop waves to the beaches on which they have landed.

14. Beach crossings.

    The CENT force landed initially on a very broad front and its stores, ammunition, and supplies were distributed initially along several miles of sandy beaches. Exits from these beaches were infrequent, difficult, and mined. Retraction was satisfactory, but breaking surf on outer bar caused a few LCVP's to broach. Several boats were lost on rocks off beaches Green 2 and Yellow 2 and casualties were sustained. Salvage was handicapped by shoal water where tugs could not operate.

    LCA's and LCVP's encountered little difficulty in the DIME area. In some eight out of 16 cases the LCI(L)'s used for the reserve battalions of the RCTs were able to beach far enough to permit safe debarkation of troops direct to land. In the other cases resort was had to auxiliary craft such as rubber boats and LCVP's for debarkation. As vehicles began to use the beaches, it was discovered that they were heavily mined, and bulldozers, DUKWs, and other vehicles were lost.

    In the JOSS assault area, the Green beaches proved to be the most hazardous, as had been expected. The narrow rocky entrance, the cross sea from NW, and the shallowness of the beach made it impossible to retract or to render assistance to those beached until succeeding waves had landed. Most of these boats were not broached but merely stuck in the sand. LST's had great difficulty unloading at Red beach due to the poor gradient and soft sand. On D day, due to the narrow approaches, LCT's were sent in five at a time to the right flank of Red beach. It was finally decided to unload all LST's at either Yellow or Blue beaches or in Licata harbor.

15. For the purpose of emphasis on certain important characteristics of the amphibious assault landing, from the naval viewpoint, some naval considerations involving night landings and dawn landings are here listed.
16. Night landing

    A night attack offers the advantages of:

    1. localizing the counter action.
    2. opportunity for a series of local tactical surprises at separated localities.
    3. providing protection of darkness for assault craft and troops that cannot be obtained in any other way.
    4. making effective small amounts of smoke laid down to screen the approach.
    5. enemy non-ability to light up the large water and landing areas involved through the use of flares and searchlights.
    6. increasing the effectiveness of deceptive feints at enemy coastal points not involved in the main assault.
17. Night landing

    A night attack offers the disadvantage of:

    1. difficult navigation and exact location of ships in assault areas.
    2. boats landing on other than correct beaches.
    3. difficulty in simultaneously placing assault troops on beaches at exactly H hour.
    4. prohibiting pre-assault visual signaling except through the use of special devices, which cannot be issued to landing craft.
    5. enemy parachute flares such as those employed by the German Air Force in CENT area whereby Allied vessels were plainly visible and the only defense was, in this instance, blind firing, using radar.
    6. intensifying the effect of poor weather conditions, notably fog, swell and high winds.
    7. nullifying vital phases of the plan of attack in the event of a delay in H hour beyond daylight.
    8. preventing rapid and accurate minesweeping of the approaches.

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18. Dawn landing

    Dawn landing advantages are:

    1. boats land at exact beaches.
    2. H hour is more easily kept.
    3. visual signaling is available.
    4. own airforce can more easily intercept enemy attacking planes.
    5. attack force can use more hours of darkness for approach, can thus carry out a longer approach, may thus come closer to achieving surprise.
    6. boat maneuvering and troop loading is made less difficult.
    7. naval gunfire can develop a real effectiveness.
    8. anti-aircraft defense of the ships offshore is improved.
    9. identification of own and enemy aircraft is less difficult.
19. Dawn landing.

    Dawn landing disadvantages:

    1. tactical surprise is lost at local beach landings.
    2. enemy land communications can function better and faster.
    3. enemy can deploy his forces faster and more effectively in daylight.
20. The dawn landing scheme of attack would necessitate control of own air forces by the Attack Force Commander in order to insure protection of the combat loaders and of the assault boat waves; in order to provide bombing attacks on call on designated assault beaches and enemy strong points; and to give freedom of action in the air over the Attack Force areas.
21. preventing rapid and accurate minesweeping of the approaches.

Section VI - D DAY: H HOUR: SURPRISE

1. The Appreciation of Force 141, (SSO 17/3(FINAL)), the document upon which the Highest Echelon Outline Plan was based stated:

"72. To ensure the success of the seaborne assaults, it will be necessary first to neutralize the beach defenses

a. Naval bombardment.
b. Air bombardment.
c. Action by airborne troops.

It is considered that the number of ships available and the fact that naval gun power is not designed for land bombardment make the use of (a) unsuitable. The primary role of the air forces will be the destruction of enemy air power and therefore (b) will not be available. Therefore it is essential that airborne troops be used to soften the defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made. This role is of greater importance than the early capture of the airfields."

"73. It is considered that this softening of the defenses is of such vital importance to the whole plan that all possible resources in transport aircraft must be made available to lift the maximum number of parachute troops.

2. After considerable discussion of the most suitable time for dropping paratroops, the following CONCLUSIONS are derived:

"76.

a. Airborne troops are necessary to neutralize the beach defenses, and their maximum employment is required.
b. Seaborne assaults should take place some two hours before first light.
c. Airborne troops should be landed preferably in the dark or at dusk in sufficient time and at such a place as to be able to complete their task before the seaborne assault takes place."

"81. To allow the airborne troops to make some use of some moon and to afford the approach to the coastline the cover of darkness, D day should be about 10 July, when the moon is in its second quarter".

3. From the above, the following repetitions are made for the purpose of further comment:
"To ensure success of the seaborne assaults, it will be necessary first to neutralize the beach defenses..."

--42--

"...naval gun power is not designed for land bombardment...use of [is] unsuitable."

"...it is essential that airborne troops be used to soften the defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made".

"...this softening of the defenses is of such vital importance to the whole plan..."

"Airborne troops are necessary to neutralize the beach defenses..."

4. From the above it will be noted that the softening of the beach defenses by paratroops was vital to the success of the seaborne assaults, and that the dropping of these troops on this mission determined the D day and H hour.
5. The D day was fixed as 10 July and H hour as 0245 i.e., "two hours before first light"
6. On 21 May 1943 the original Outline Plan was cancelled and a new Outline Plan (generally referred to as The "Montgomery" Plan) was issued. This new plan was not based on new information nor on a new appreciation; it called for a change in the locale of the American troops and eliminated the staggered time of assaults laid down in the old plan. The D day remained unchanged.
7. With the development of the Force 343 (7th Army) Plan, the mission of the paratroops now became

   "Land on night of D-l/D in area northeast of Gela."

   •  
     1. capture and secure high ground in that area
     2. disrupt communications and movement of reserves during the night, and
     3. be attached to 1st Infantry Division effective H plus one hour on D day
     4. assist 1st Infantry Division in capturing and securing airfield at Ponte Olivo.
8. Again quoting from the Appreciation:

   "Therefore it is essential that airborne troops be used to soften the defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made. This role is of greater importance than the early capture of the airfields."

9. Thus the mission of the paratroopers in the 7th Army Assault Plan was entirely unrelated to the "neutralization of beach defenses" - the single feature considered of "vital importance to the whole plan."

    

10. The D day and H hour remained unchanged: both of these were unsuitable from a naval viewpoint but had been accepted because the destruction of the beach defenses by the paratroops was "the vital part of the whole plan."
    The date, 10 July, occurred in the second quarter of the moon, on which date the following astronomical conditions obtained (all times Zone minus two):

    Date (July)	9/10	10/11
    Sunset	2023	2022
    Last light	2133	2132
    Moonrise	- -	- -
    Moonset	0031	0102
    First light	0439	0439
    Sunrise	0546	0547

11. It will [be] noted in the Appreciation that the selected date would "afford the approach to the coastline the cover of darkness." An examination of the Astronomical Data above will reveal no such darkness. On the contrary the assault forces were required to make the approach in a brilliant waxing moon which would not set until the vessels had hove-to in the Initial Transport Areas immediately under the coast defense guns of the enemy. These facts were well known to the naval planners who pointed out the fact that the moon phase selected was most unfavorable from naval considerations. The date, however, was not changed because it was reiterated that this phase was most favorable to dropping of the paratroops who were the only means available to "neutralize the beach defenses opposing the seaborne assaults" - "the most vital part of the whole plan."
12. The H hour (0245) had been fixed by the fact that it required the paratroops about three hours from dropping time to assemble and carry out their mission of softening the beach defenses."

     

--43--

Under the Force 343 plan the paratroops were directed to inland objectives in a direction away from the "beach defenses against which seaborne assaults will be made."

13. Since the softening of the beach defenses prior to the landings was so vital to the success of the whole plan, naval planners then proposed the employment of naval gunfire against the beach defenses. This was not acceptable to the Army because it was stated "surprise" was to be achieved in the assault. This was voiced as a "Fundamental Principle of War" which, of course, it is not. It was pointed out that there are many factors militating against our carrying the attack to the enemy shores unexpectedly. A few of these were:
    1. The conquest of Tunisia placed our forces closer to Sicily than any other Axis territory.
    2. The recent Allied conquest of Pantellaria, and the Pelagic group of Islands.
    3. The increased tempo of Allied air attacks with most recent concentration on the air forces of Sicily and the communications of the Straits of Messina.
    4. The bombing by Allied aircraft of the R.D.F. stations on the Southeastern portion of Sicily. This would obviously direct the attention of the enemy that we desired to render ineffectual his observation facilities in that local area.
    5. The constant PRU flights made by Allied aircraft over the landing beaches during the months of June and early July. Tracking of these planes would give the enemy valuable information in his G-2 Estimate of the Situation. The presence of low-flying Allied aircraft engaged in taking oblique photographs of the selected landing beaches must become known to the enemy.
    6. The capture in Sicily of Allied reconnaissance personnel engaged in scrutinizing the beaches selected for landings.
    7. The redistribution of enemy E-boats and destroyers to strengthen the Sicilian force.
    8. The concentration of Allied landing craft in Tunisian ports.
    9. The constant aerial reconnaissance maintained by enemy aircraft over Allied ports and contiguous waters.
    10. The assault date (10 July) which was in the second quarter of the moon.

        This phase of the moon was unsuitable from the viewpoint of discovery of the approaching sea forces.

    11. The H hour required the sea forces to be on approach courses and within 25 miles of the coast at evening twilight where their presence could be detected by enemy shore-based radar, coastal patrol vessels, or enemy aircraft.
14. Since the H hour required that our transports be in the Initial Transport Areas in brilliant moonlight (H-3), the prospect seemed remote that the enemy would fail to observe this concentration of hostile shipping off his shores. It was apparent, moreover, that any illumination of our forces would alert the enemy and disclose our intentions. Further, heavy bombing and the dropping of paratroops having preceded H hour by some three hours, the preservation of surprise was illusory. Under the circumstances existing, it was the naval viewpoint that surprise on the assault beaches was not feasible. It was, in fact, not necessary providing a proper employment were made to exploit the means available to us so as to bring about the effect desired, viz: the rapid seizure of a beachhead.
15. The old-fashioned military concept that naval guns are unsuitable for shore bombardment needs revision. Modern naval guns in cruisers and destroyers are high angle guns capable of ranging on reverse slope targets far in the interior in support of seaborne landings. The firepower in the vessels assigned to gunfire support exceeded that of all the artillery landed in the 7th Army assault. Due to the mobility of these ships, it is possible to bring about a concentration of gunfire on a shore target with greater firepower than is possible with Army artillery which is distributed among the various divisions and hence deployed in various directions upon being landed. Thus there is available to the Army a mobile artillery concentration of tremendous power capable of being exploited to the advantage of the ground forces which require time for consolidation ashore before the full weight of the Army can be brought to bear against the enemy.
16. Initially the proper employment for this mobile artillery (naval gunfire) is neutralization of beach defenses and shore batteries threatening the landing. Where this employment was made prior to H hour, as in the CENT area, the enemy batteries were silenced and the beaches thoroughly devastated, and all opposition at the beaches obliterated, thus enabling the soldiers to step ashore without hindrance. The employment of naval gunfire in the annihilation of German tanks threatening the DIME forces on D plus one day is covered in another part of this report. This incident represents,

however, the effectiveness of naval gunfire against a fast moving target in the hinterland, well back from the beaches, and serves to illustrate the versatility and effectiveness of a weapon hitherto dismissed by military authorities as "unsuitable" for bombardment against shore objectives.

17. In the planning of future amphibious operations a deliberate study should be made of all factors influencing the landing in determining the D day and H hour. This study should examine the advantages and disadvantages of dawn, day, and night landing with due regard to the factors affecting all services participating in the operation. The soundness of this observation is self-evident.
18. Paratroop transport aircraft might well be grounded by weather conditions and yet this plan was stated to rest upon their employment for a definite mission. This mission was never executed. In the Western Task Force area the paratroops landed in a strong northwest wind causing many to land in regions remote from the dropping zone. It is questionable whether the effectiveness of the airborne troops was commensurate with the importance ascribed in the selection of the date, particularly in view of the mission assigned them in relation to the beach assaults.
19. In the selection of D day and H hour, the naval implications should be given more consideration by all the interested services. It should be recognized that while the assaulting troops are embarked in transports and craft they are virtually impotent as a fighting force. The troops must be safely landed in accordance with the Plan of Attack, deployed on shore, and be provided promptly with their arms, ammunition, and combat logistics before the Army can function as a fighting organization. It follows, therefore, that the selection of the D day and H hour unfavorable to the seaward assault from a naval viewpoint might well lead to disaster.

Section VII - CONTROL VESSELS.

1. The Commanders of DIME, CENT, and JOSS Forces assigned, in their operation plans, general tasks to control vessels, which tasks were in agreement with the Basic Plan and Standard Operating Procedure (AFAF). In each area the respective plans provided a primary and a secondary control vessel. Thus; the primary control vessel regulated the shoreward movement of the first and second boat waves, the secondary control vessel accompanied the third and fourth waves and the tertiary control vessel, where one was assigned, led in the fifth and sixth boat waves.
2. Task Force Commanders made assignment of control vessels as follows:

   JOSS:

   GAFFI	2 PC	2 SC
   GREEN	2 PC	2 SC
   SALSO	1 PC	3 SC
   FALCONARA	1 PC	3 SC

   DIME:

   SECTION I	2 PC	2 SC
   SECTION II	1 PC	3 SC
   SECTION III	2 PC	1 SC

   CENT:

   Leonard Wood	1 PC		1 AM
   Florence Nightingale	1 PC		1 AM
   Stanton	1 PC	1 SC	1 AM
   Thurston			1 AM

3. Task Force Commanders of DIME, CENT, and JOSS Attack Forces, in their reports agreed that control vessels, generally, took charge of assault boat waves as planned, escorted them in good order to the respective lines of departure and released them to the true beaches. The fact that some waves did not meet the assigned H hour did not materially interfere with suitable time-spacing between the arrivals of initial assault waves on designated beaches.
4. Control of landing ships, craft, and boats, after the initial assault, was not entirely satisfactory at all beaches. In some instances boat traffic was governed by a beachmaster who had no means of water transportation assigned to him. At beaches where an SC or LCI(L) acted as craft and boat traffic controller, the unloading of ships was greatly expedited.

5. In order to carry out the general tasks assigned by Standing Operating Procedure (AFAF), a landing craft control vessel, possessing the following features, should be made available.
   1. Gyro Compass
   2. Radar
   3. TBS or TBY
   4. Bull-horn or directional loud speaker
   5. Fathometer
   6. Light armor and armament
   7. Diesel engines
   8. Provision made for carrying smoke
   9. Signal bridge and flag hoist
6. There should be far greater emphasis placed upon the training of control vessels officers. In the ship to shore movement it should be made clear that control of the initial assault waves and traffic control of the unloading process is one of the most important operations in amphibious warfare. Second only to naval gunfire support, control vessels are vital to the success of a landing-operation. The larger the task force, the more important become the requirements of control vessels. Control vessels should be a permanent integral part of any amphibious force. They should be assembled for training along with the entire force during the earliest stages of training prior to an operation, in order that control vessel officers can become thoroughly indoctrinated in ship to shore assault and follow-up operations.
7. Western Naval Task Force Operation Plan No. 2-43 contained three assumptions which affected the dispositions, assignments and operation of control vessels: "(1) That the initial landing will take place during darkness. (2) That weather conditions will permit landing through the surf on designated beaches. (3) That false beaches will not preclude the landing ships and craft from landing on the true beaches."
8. This plan contained directives to the DIME, CENT, and JOSS Attack Forces to establish assigned Army Forces ashore near Gela, Scoglitti, and Licata, respectively, by simultaneous attacks on selected beaches at H hour on D day in accordance with plan of attack developed by Commanding General concerned.
9. The plan, furthermore, contained orders to all forces to: "(1) Extend timing of boat waves to avoid congestion on beaches; (2) clear landing ships and craft promptly in order to ensure prompt follow up; (3) to provide adequate escorts; (4) employ smoke to fullest extent for defense against enemy action and to screen own operations."
10. Approach Plan, Annex J to Operation Plan No. 2-43, contained directives to DIME, CENT, and JOSS Attack Forces, stating that, on arrival in the initial assigned transport area, subsequent movements were as directed by CTF 81, CTF 85, CTF 86, respectively.
11. Landing Operations Doctrine (FTP 167) defines the control group as follows: "The Control Group, consisting of vessels designated to guide and assist the movement from ship to shore, provide communication facilities with the boats and troops while enroute to the beach, and to assist in controlling the supporting naval gunfire. Certain vessels of this group may be utilized at convenient times to lay smoke screens, assist in furnishing fire support, etc."<
12. Standard Operating Procedure (AFAF) assigns the following general tasks to control vessels:
    1. Control the movement of landing craft from the boat rendezvous area of the assault transport to the beaches through the line of departure for beaches.
    2. Protect the landing craft from attack.
    3. Assist in control of naval gunfire.
    4. Act as fire support group if armament permits.
    5. Communication relay vessel to Boat Group Commanders and landing beaches.
13. It is noted that plans of Task Force Commanders did not contain uniform directives to control vessels nor were the directives, in all cases, in accord with Landing Operations Doctrine. I recommend that planning in future operations should give emphasized consideration to the further assignment of tasks to control vessel groups principally in connection with gunfire support of landing craft, assistance in the control of naval gunfire, and communications between Boat Group Commanders and landing beaches. These tasks should be performed by the landing craft control vessels to as great an extent as possible compatible with the primary and basic task, which is, "To control the movement of landing craft from the boat rendezvous area of the assault transport to the beaches through the line of departure for beaches."

Section VIII - TRANSPORTS Combat Loading:

1. The CENT transports, with the 45th Infantry Division embarked, were loaded in the United States. Loading was accomplished at Hampton Roads and the only reloading done in these ships was that incident to rehearsals held in late June.
2. The DIME transports, with the 1st Infantry Division embarked, were loaded at Algiers. Craft carrying heavy equipment of the CENT, DIME and KOOL Forces were loaded in Algerian ports and staged to Tunis. The JOSS craft were loaded at Bizerte. LCI's of all forces were staged to Sousse.
3. The greatest difficulty experienced in loading transports occurred at Algiers. Perhaps the foremost of these difficulties was the absence of an authoritative central agency with a complete knowledge of all loading plans, priorities, etc., and capable of rendering decisions. Thus at Algiers the following organizations attempted to exercise control:
   1. The 1st Infantry Division.
   2. The Mediterranean Base Section, ASF(SOS).
   3. The British Naval and Military Port Authorities.
   4. The 384th Port Battalion.

   None of these agencies had a complete and authoritative plan of what was to be loaded or where. The Transport Quartermasters' problems were made insurmountable as various units of organizations such as the Chemical Warfare Service, Signal Corps, Ordnance, Engineers, and other activities descended upon the ships to obtain space therein for their special equipment, no record of which was in the possession of the TQMs. During the loading of the ships many changes were made in the military loading plans; this seriously delayed the formulation and distribution of the Boat Employment Plans of the Transport Division Commanders.

4. Equipment definitely of garrison type, commissary gear, field kitchens and fuel, Bailey Bridging, barracks bags, administrative gear, and similar materials, obviously non-essential to the seizure of a beachhead, were crowded into the transports. Vertical loading was not adequately carried out to fully meet the demands from shore during the assault; this was particularly noticeable in the case of anti-tank weapons which were loaded in such manner as to be too inaccessible for prompt unloading upon call. All of these deficiencies are capable of correction.
5. Recommendations:
   1. That the G-4 section of the Army Division concerned keep a functioning loading and unloading office in the Flagship of the Naval Task Force Commander until all assault transports are unloaded.
   2. That this office have complete knowledge of the location of materials loaded and be constituted as the controlling authority insofar as matters of Army decision are concerned.
   3. The Combat Loading plans including those for troops be complete, receive the approval of the Naval Task Force Commander as well as the Army Commander concerned, and that once loading has commenced these plans are not to be changed without their specific approval in each case.
   4. That TQMs be regularly assigned to each APA, XAP, and AKA to ensure this officer has thorough knowledge of the ship's cargo spaces, etc., with particular reference to hazardous and inflammable materials.
   5. That pallet loading be studied with a view to wider use.

Debarkation and Unloading:

6. In order to provide additional boats, most ships carried four to six extra boats swung on the booms, griped in ready for lowering. Boats were preloaded as far as possible in order to save time. In other ships, where the booms were not carrying these extra boats, prompt steps were taken to hoist out nested boats as the ships made close approach to the Initial Transport Areas. Due to the heavy swell running, many ships experienced difficulty in controlling these lifts and, in some cases, it became necessary to lower and cast adrift these craft in the interest of speeding up the debarkation. After arrival in the assigned areas, sea conditions continued to hamper the unloading

of the assault waves due to the difficulty in handling heavy weights aboard ship and loading of waterborne boats. Several derangements of cargo handling gear occurred. The sea condition were most unfavorable in the CENT area and this factor, more than any other, contributed to the delay of the H hour in that force. Some ships reported that delays were introduced in loading the assault wave boats by the removal of slings from vehicles. This could have been eliminated by providing sufficient slings for each assault loaded vehicle, leaving the sling in the boat when the vehicle is lowered to the boat. A shortage of nets developed in some ships; each APA, XAP and AKA should be provided with 30 extra nets, thus permitting the nets to be left in the boats until the return of the boats from the beach.

7. Much of the cargo gear now installed in combat-loaders was designed for discharge of cargo alongside a dock or in harbor waters - a condition not likely to be met during an amphibious operation. The extent to which weather conditions interfered with the unloading of the assault waves, indicates the necessity of a thorough study of the present facilities now available in these vessels for lowering and unloading boats. Special attention should be given to the strengthening of deck fittings, providing means of handling heavier steadying lines, installation of stronger boom guys, strengthening of boat cleats, as well as the strengthening of Welin davits to provide an adequate safety factor for rail loading.
8. In the DIME area, where sea conditions were moderate, all boats were lowered clear of the ships from 30 to 45 minutes after reaching the Initial Transport Area. In the CENT area, where weather conditions were more severe, this operation required from 30 minutes to 6 hours, though the average time was about 2 hours.
9. Owing to the stranding of boats incurred in the initial landings, fewer boats were available for subsequent unloading of the transports. This was foreseen and provided for in my plan by the automatic shift on D day of LCTs from the JOSS area as soon as these craft had unloaded in the assault flight. Twelve LCTs were thus made available to the DIME transports and fourteen to the CENT combat-loaders during the forenoon of D day. These LCTs proved to be invaluable in the unloading of APAs, XAPs and AKAs. Factors which recommend them to this task are: (a) ease of handling, (b) ease of loading vehicles and cargo, (c) good beaching qualities, (d) in some craft, double crews were aboard. Although LCTs enabled the unloading of the transports, and particularly the AKAs, to be greatly accelerated, these craft encountered serious difficulty in trying to unload expeditiously at the beach due to the inability of the shore party to handle the volume of stores and equipment thus placed on the shoreline. As a result, most LCTs were unloaded by the crew of the craft in order that the craft could stand clear of the beaches which were under almost constant daylight attack by enemy aircraft during the first three days of the assault. When unloading into LCTs, the "hatch crews" should be increased and at least 20 soldiers placed in each LCT to unload when the craft is beached.
10. Some LSTs, after discharging their initial lifts, were pressed into service to assist in unloading the combat-loaders. These LSTs thereby aided in expediting the departure of the assault transports, though it was recognized that the type is not suitable for this work. Not only does the structural arrangement of the LST render it unsuitable for receiving stores from a ship alongside, but the task of unloading the bulk stores after beaching places a tremendous burden upon the crew of the LST. These crews were taxed with this arduous job because of the unavailability of labor and transportation at beaches, and as long as the LSTs remained beached they were selected targets for enemy air attacks.
11. LCIs were employed to a limited extent in carrying troops from APAs and XAPs to shore. Although LCIs are suitable for such lifting of personnel, they are of little use in the transport of stores and equipment and should not be used for such employment except in an emergency.
12. LCMs, next to LCTs, are the most suitable type of craft for unloading combat-loaders. One LCM is considered to be the equivalent of five LCVPs. Each LCM should carry 4 to 6 soldiers on each trip to handle stores at the beach.
13. LCVPs make a small impression in the task of unloading numerous vehicles, and a vast quantity of ammunition, gasoline, and stores. Owing to the limited capacity of this boat, many trips are required to move any great quantity of supplies; thus prolonged operations require a large reserve of boat crews to meet the problem of operational fatigue. From a design viewpoint it is a reliable and rugged boat but, upon beaching, it must be promptly unloaded or broaching or swamping will quickly result. A large number of craft stranded while waiting to unload on beaches, though most boat crews unloaded the boats themselves. Many transports reported that their boats were ordered away from congested beaches and ordered to return to their ships without unloading.

Where this occurred ships placed working parties of bluejackets, taken from the ships' gun crews or engineers force, and sent them in with the boats to unload them; in the future at least 2 soldiers should be placed in each LCVP to help in unloading at the beach. Other boats, when ordered from congested beaches, ran along the shoreline until a suitable clear spot could be found where the boat was beached and unloaded. This, of course, resulted in some equipment and stores being landed in the wrong area.

14. DUKWs were loaded in LSTs and LCTs for the initial employment of augmenting ships boats in unloading the combat-loaders. After the first trip to shore, few DUKWs returned to the ships for further loading, having been diverted by the Army for employment on shore; this was particularly noticeable in the DIME area. Such diversion not only interrupted the unloading plan, but many DUKWs were lost or suffered accidents on shore which rendered them useless for further employment as seaborne carriers. These units are limited to a lift of about 8,000 pounds but, if available in adequate numbers and the transports are comparatively close to shore, a considerable quantity of stores can be moved in time. However, if the water haul from transports to shore is a long one, it is more satisfactory and rapid to employ LCTs rather than DUKWs, providing of course that the shore party promptly unloads the craft upon beaching. DUKWs were employed successfully in unloading LCTs through bulwark ports while unloading over the bow ramp was proceeding concurrently.
15. The size of the Army Unloading Details placed aboard combat-loaders should be increased, and particularly where the plan calls for use of LCTs in unloading. These troops should be assigned in sufficient numbers to provide relief crews in all holds in order that the unloading may continue around-the-clock. Unless great strides are made in ensuring prompt unloading of craft and boats at the beach, additional troops must be provided as working parties in the craft and boats. The fighting efficiencies of ships must not be weakened by the depletion of ships' gun crews or the engineer force to accomplish this task on shore. This is a problem deserving of close attention by the Army and one which must be met, even at the expense of some reduction in fighting troop lift.
16. Unloading was interrupted and seriously delayed by the numerous air raids and alerts which occurred day and night while the transports were in the assault area. The practice of calling all hands to General Quarters, when radar reports unidentified aircraft, appears to require modification. Some vessels established a Condition IV which provides sufficient officers to control and sufficient crew to fire all guns in the ship from ready boxes, thereby permitting uninterrupted unloading provided no alarm is sounded and guns are alerted over the control circuit only. When these ships were subjected to surprise attacks it was found that Condition IV met the attacks as effectively as could be done under Condition I. While transports are unloading in transport areas, this Condition IV should be standard doctrine even during air raids unless air attacks are in such strength or of such duration as to require implementation or replacement of gun crews stationed under Condition IV.
17. Summarizing, the principal causes of delay in unloading the combat-loaders were:
    1. unfavorable sea conditions;
    2. insufficient slings and cargo nets;
    3. derangements of cargo handling gear;
    4. stranding of boats on shore;
    5. shortage of boats and craft due to delay in unloading boats and craft at beaches;
    6. insufficient labor in the Shore Party to unload boats;
    7. too frequent General Quarters during alerts and air raids;

    All of the above, except (a), are capable of correction.

18. The loading of ships varied widely, the APAs carried from 52 to 120 vehicles, XAPs from 100 to 157 vehicles, and AKAs from 110 to 200 vehicles. The CENT combat-loaders carried 21 days maintenance for the troops embarked in the United States, the DIME assault vessels were loaded with 7 days maintenance for the troop units embarked. The actual tonnages of stores varied widely, ranging from about 450 to over 1000 tons in different ships. Pallet loading of some stores greatly facilitated cargo handling. Unloading target times of ships varied considerably and, in the actual unloading, due to delays incurred from various causes, the time required exceeded the estimates about 30f/r. The average number of boat trips per ship was about 275, this varying with the employment of different types of craft. AKAs will always lag behind APAs and XAPs, and hence must be favored in the allocation of boats and craft for unloading. In spite of the delays due to weather, enemy action, and other causes, the DIME combat-loaders were unloaded in an overall time of 60 hours, twelve of the CENT force in 63 hours, and the remaining seven vessels

at CENT in 88 hours. Due to the complete stoppage of all unloading for many hours caused by beach congestion, the actual time during which unloading operations were underway was less than the figures given herein. With vessels loaded only with essential assault weapons, equipment, and stores, in precise conformity with the standard procedure governing combat-loading, and discharging over properly organized beaches, it is estimated, neglecting enemy action, that a military force of two reinforced infantry divisions can be firmly placed ashore in 48 hours.

19. Recommendations:
    1. That a study be made of cargo handling gear of combat-loaders with a view to strengthening as required to meet stresses experienced in unloading in moderate weather at sea.
    2. That slings be placed on all vehicles to be unloaded in assault waves.
    3. That each vessel be provided with 30 extra nets.
    4. That where available LCTs be used to the fullest for the unloading of ships.
    5. That LSTs be not used to unload ships.
    6. That the size of the Unloading Details ("Hatch Crews") assigned by the Army be increased.
    7. That a standard Condition IV be adopted in combat-loaders which will enable unloading to proceed without interruption during alerts and air raids.

Boat Crews

20. In considering the large number of boats stranded or capsized in the initial assault waves, it must be recognized that the combination of the notorious characteristics of the beaches and the high cross-surf running required a greater skill on the part of boat coxswains than the majority of them possessed, for the most skillful surf-boatman would have found the problem of safely beaching the loaded craft a difficult one.
21. Training of boat crews is an ever-present requirement; it is indicated that training must emphasize night and bad weather landings of loaded boats, and training in retraction and salvage methods. Relief boat crews require as much training as regular crews; this is important.
22. More information should be given boat crews regarding what will take place in their area from time of arrival in Initial Transport Area until daylight. Boat crews should be repeatedly briefed on the ship-to-shore movement of the attack Plan, with full information regarding beaches, landmarks, silhouette and perspective views presented during boat approach to beach, etc. Boat Group Commanders and Boat Officers in the assault waves should be experienced officers of the highest available rank. The lines of organization of the boat division, group, and if necessary, flotillas, should be clearly drawn and the responsibility and authority of Commanders kept alive.
23. Boat discipline can stand improvement. There were cases of too hasty abandonment of boats which were in trouble at the beaches. Some of these crews remained on shore where they set up machine guns removed from abandoned boats.
24. In general the boat crews performed a Herculean job. Due to the early losses of boats, a heavy strain was placed thereafter upon those craft still operational. This became aggravated when boats were diverted to beaches remote from their own beaches. The fact that boat crews unloaded their own boats at the beaches, in order to effect retraction before becoming stranded, is indicative of the tremendous job accomplished by the transport organizations.

Smoke Laying

25. Transports were lax in the employment of smoke during air alerts and attacks. The suddenness of many of these enemy air attacks, which sometimes were delivered without warning, contributed to this situation. The proper employment of smoke by transports is discussed elsewhere in this report, under the title "Smoke." Greater attention should be given to smoke in future operations.

Section IX - LANDING CRAFT

1. With the capture of the Tunis-Bizerte area on May, steps were taken without delay to establish sites for advanced bases in that area from which all types of landing craft could base, undertake amphibious training of troops, and embark the required forces and equipment for the forthcoming operation. The devastation in this area, wrought by allied bombings and axis sabotage, was wide-spread. Sunken ships, demolished wharfs and quays, wrecked fuel storage facilities, and destruction of public utilities imposed an enormous job of salvage and repair to restore

these areas to a condition suitable for military purposes.

2. While reconstruction work progressed and base facilities were being installed, the 3rd Infantry Division was made available for shore to shore training and plans for the shore to shore movement had to be developed. The details of this training had to be created, for the landing craft were of new types, untried in battle, and no technique for their employment was known to exist. Few in the Army had even seen the landing craft, while in the Navy the limitations of the various types had been determined only through trials and experiments. It became necessary, therefore, to evolve a technique which would meet the requirements of an amphibious assault on hostile shores. Operational features, such as speed of beaching, best beaching trim, most suitable methods of debarking troops and vehicles, most effective procedure for retraction, loads vs draft for each type of craft, and similar details had to be determined during the training phase. As these elements became known they had to be correlated in order that they might form a basis for the formulation of attack plans. The known characteristics of the beaches in the Gulf of Gela, Sicily, required that some means be developed to bridge the gap between the grounded LST and the shore line. Extensive trials were held to determine the relative merits of Army treadway bridges vs Navy pontoon causeways on beaches having gradients comparable to those in Sicily selected for assault. As a result of these tests, a method of carrying the pontoon causeways to the scene of the invasion, and of erecting them on the enemy shores, had to be devised.
3. As a result of these well carried out investigations, ten LSTs were altered to provide for side-carrying of one complete causeway each. Another LST was converted into an auxiliary aircraft carrier for the transport and launching of the Army Cub spotting planes; still another was modified to carry the GCI equipment essential to the control of Fighter aircraft in the assault; others were provided with means for pumping fuel and water to shore tankage. Facilities were installed in some ships of this type to render them available as hospital ships for the evacuation of casualties. The most far-reaching innovation, however, was the utilization of the six-davit LST. Thirty-six LSTs were thus able to carry six LCVPs in davits, thereby permitting each craft of this type to embark one company of infantry for the initial assault in LCVPs, the ship later landing on the beaches to discharge the vehicle lift. This specially-fitted craft thus had a marked influence upon the development of the shore-to-shore technique.
4. Acceptable methods having been devised, it became necessary to develop detailed plans. Since no "assault scales" or "light scales" of equipment and vehicles had been developed by the Army for this type of movement, and since the loading of craft was limited by beaching draft, the lessons of troop training shaped the pattern of the military and naval plans.
5. Confronting the Commanders was also the task of developing an organization, a plan, and the vast facilities needed to meet the requirements of embarking 130,000 troops and loading 30,000 vehicles and 20,000 tons of ammunition and supplies in the 250 odd craft envisaged in the joint plans. Since such an undertaking had never before been attempted, there was no past experience upon which to draw guidance.
6. The establishment of a "Port of Embarkation" to meet this enormous task meant that the natural facilities of the Bizerte-Tunis area must be greatly augmented. The naval requirements of such a port include:
   1. Sites protected from the open sea.
   2. Minimum interference with normal port operation.
   3. Minimum restrictions on naval operations.
   4. Suitable hydrographic conditions for craft.
   5. Adequate berthing space for craft at loading points.
   6. Fuel and water lines at craft berths.
   7. Adequate lighting for night loading at loading points.

   Military requirements include:

   1. Suitable concentration area for units within ten miles of loading points; facilities for initial waterproofing of vehicles.
   2. Suitable staging areas; facilities for final water-proofing of vehicles.
   3. Suitable assembly area to permit necessary vehicle segregation.
   4. Suitable loading areas with adequate road nets to each loading point.

   In meeting the above requirements new construction had to be held to a minimum due to shortages time, labor and material.

7. Through the co-operative efforts of Commander Landing Craft and Bases, Commanding General 3rd Infantry Division, Commanding General Eastern Base Section SOS, and Commanding Officer 1st Embarkation Group, EBS, the sites were selected, necessary facilities provided, and the tremendous loading job effectively and efficiently carried out.
8. Based on the experience gained in the launching of this, the first shore-to-shore assault, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the loading and unloading of these types of craft. In the preparation of the Army plan, it is necessary that TQMs exercise the same precise investigations as in loading combatant transports. It is necessary, therefore, that TQMs inspect the ships and craft to be loaded and that they spot location of stanchions, deck fittings, structural interferences, etc., which greatly affect the space available for loading. He must determine the characteristics of the craft, the dimensions of space available for loading, and the exact cubic dimensions and weight of each type of vehicle to be loaded. Templates of deck arrangements and vehicles must be prepared and a template-loading worked out in detail. Suitable clearances must be allowed in this template loading to provide for the actual placing of the vehicle under its own power in the position indicated. From the template preloading, a prestowage diagram must be produced by the TQM, showing the order of loading necessary to obtain the result so diagrammed. Thus loading numbers assigned to the specific vehicles are derived from the diagram which shows a definite space for each particular vehicle and the loading number in the assigned deck space. A list of vehicles must then be prepared showing the precise order of loading, the serial number, Army organization, etc. Similarly, personnel lists and supply lists must be prepared for each ship and craft. Such stowage plans must be passed on by the Navy to determine if the load affects the stability and seaworthiness of the craft and if beaching draft is exceeded.
9. Preparatory to loading it must be determined that waterproofing of vehicles has been completed in the staging area where vehicles have been segregated into craft loads; under no circumstances should waterproofing be deferred until vehicles are stowed in ships and craft. Troops should be transported from the concentration area to the assembly area by truck, and then marched to the craft at the loading points. In the assembly area vehicles should be arranged in the order of loading as shown in the prestowage diagram.
10. The following wrinkles and results are applicable to the specific type of craft:

    LST

    1. Loading
       1. The main deck also should be template loaded with a view to proper location of the maximum number of A.A. guns (up to 40mm caliber) to provide additional A.A. protection to the ship.
       2. In six-davit LSTs the TQMs should not plan to load forward of the elevator ramp (except on the elevator) nor aft of the after intake vents (except on the hatch); vehicles may be loaded on the elevator and light vehicles on the hatch. The capacity of the elevator is 10 tons, hence the heavy vehicles must be stowed in the tank deck.
       3. The space between the ladders at the after end of the tank deck is usually utilized for ships' stowage; it should not be included in the TQM diagram as available for Army gear.
       4. LSTs may be loaded forward of the point where the bulkhead narrows but tracked vehicles should be loaded to be discharged first, ahead of jeeps with trailers and other wheeled vehicles. If bulk stores are loaded they should be so stowed as to be discharged last.
       5. The personnel lift of the LST is dependent upon the dead-load carried and the duration of the voyage. Normally 180 bunks are available for Army personnel. A lift of about 350 may be carried if "hot bunks" are used; the maximum personnel lift is 500 but this should not be attempted except for short hauls because of limited messing and sanitation facilities available. The vehicle lift ranges from 40 to 110, depending on types and sizes of vehicles listed. Maximum stores capacity is 1600 measured tons or 1100 weight tons, but this must be reduced considerably if beaching draft of six feet forward and nine feet six inches aft is not to be exceeded.
       6. Loading times were:

          Personnel	---	1/2 to 11/2 hours.
          Vehicles	---	11/2 hours, if no trailers; 6 hours if a number of trailers.
          Stores	---	15 to 25 tons per hour.

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b. Unloading

1. Three methods of unloading LSTs were employed: (1) over naval pontoon causeways (2) into LCTs, and (3) into DUKWs.
2. The naval pontoon causeways were brought to the assault area either by side-carry in LSTs or under tow of tugs. Some difficulty was experienced in rigging the pontoons particularly in the CENT area where the surf was high on D day and where considerable shifting of beach sites occurred. Where a current sets along the beach, special care in placing pontoon anchors is indicated. Once pontoons were placed, LSTs were unloaded with dispatch, the average time to unload vehicles being about one hour. Barrage balloons must be placed over both ends of pontoon causeways sited at the beach; pontoons in use by LSTs are special targets for enemy aircraft. A DUKW, manned by the pontoon crew, should be part of the equipment of each LST fitted as a pontoon carrier.
3. Prior to the operation, sections of the bulwarks of LCTs were made portable to permit side loading from LSTs and unloading. In the operation LCTs were found to be very effective for rapid unloading of LSTs which were unable to either beach themselves, or for which no pontoon causeways were available. By this method two LCTs were placed athwart ships to the ramp of the LST to be unloaded. Vehicles were driven over the ramp across the first LCT and into the outboard LCT. When this craft was fully loaded, a third LCT was brought alongside in its place and the process continued.
4. DUKWs were employed to a limited extent in the unloading of stores from LSTs; the sole reason they were not more fully employed being that they were diverted by the Army once they reached shore with their first load. DUKWs are particularly suited to the job of carrying stores and their ability to enter the tank deck from sea offers great possibilities in future operations.
5. LSTs should be employed principally for carrying armor and vehicles; they are not suitable for transporting stores, particularly in such quantities as to increase the draft of the ships in assault forces beyond that favorable for beaching. In this operation LSTs loaded with from 600 to 1300 tons of bulk cargo were beached from six hours to two days, depending upon the availability of labor and transportation for unloading. It became necessary for the ships' personnel to be called away from their gun and other stations to unload these stores until sufficient Prisoners of War were captured and brought down to the beaches and engaged voluntarily in the labor of unloading beached craft. If in future operations LST are to be employed in carrying bulk cargo, these ships should have installed winches and booms or other mechanical means for discharging stores to boats and DUKWs alongside. It is unsound to load LSTs with stores to be unloaded over beaches; this practice extends inordinately the time of beaching, thus subjecting these immobilized ships to bombing and strafing attacks, and reduces the number of craft available for rapid follow-up movements.

LCT

a. Loading

1. Assault LCTs should be loaded in such manner that tanks and S.P. guns are able to fire during the approach; this requirement should be met even at the partial sacrifice of economy of space. LCTs may be loaded forward of the point where the bulkhead narrows.
2. No living space is available in LCTs and therefore the troop lift should be restricted to vehicle drivers, or about 35 men, who should be loaded at the latest possible hour. If the trip is of short duration and no vehicles are carried, as many as 105 men can be carried.
3. Vehicle capacity is 5 medium tanks or 9 2 1/2 ton trucks plus 2 jeeps. Scorpions are too wide for LCT(5)s. Stores capacity is 200 measured tons or 150 weight tons. Loading time varied from ten minutes to one hour, depending upon the types and numbers of vehicles being loaded, and upon the ability of the drivers concerned. Supplies may be loaded at the rate of 25 tons per hour.

b. Unloading

1. LCTs have ideal beaching qualities and performed well during the operation. The sea keeping qualities are poor and this craft has the disadvantage of a low speed for
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convoy employment. This operation tested the seagoing qualities of the craft severely and recommendations concerning strengthening of these hulls appear herein under "Material and Logistics."

2. The utility of the LCT in unloading LSTs and combat-loaded transports is covered elsewhere in this report. In contemplation of this special employment, the crews of most LCTs were doubled prior to the operation. In spite of these measures, the crews of these craft were subjected to severe operational demands throughout the Sicilian campaign.

LCI(L)

1. Loading
   1. These craft are solely personnel carriers. The capacity is 188 Army spaces. No vehicles or stores can be carried. Personnel should be loaded as near as practicable to the time of departure; loading time is about 20 minutes. Since this craft is designed to be beached, care must be taken not to have on board excessive amounts of provisions, fuel and water. It has good sea keeping qualities and adequate speed for convoy work.
2. Unloading
   1. Providing the proper beaching draft is maintained, this type of craft can be beached without difficulty on most beaches. Recommendations regarding alterations to LCI-(L)s are contained herein under "Material and Logistics" and in separate correspondence.
   2. LCI(L)s were found to be a very useful type of craft. They were useful in transporting personnel from APAs and XAPs to shore. They were utilized as Task Group Commanders' leaders (Regimental Headquarters Ships) though they were cramped by the quantity of communication equipment essential to this function.
   3. As Traffic Control Boats, the LCI(L) is very suitable. Owing to its weight, power, and shallow draft, the LCI(L) is eminently suited for use as a salvage vessel. Recommendations in this particular appear herein under "Beach Party."

Section X - SHORE PARTY Planning:

1. When the "Montgomery" Plan was adopted by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, the implications to the Western Task Force were clear. Not only were the beaches inferior for assault but the problem of maintenance reached serious proportions. It was recognized that the beaches south of the Gela River, and particularly those south of the Acate River, introduced unusual obstacles. These beaches were backed by soft sand dunes, with undulations reaching a height of from 40 to 80 feet, for a distance of one-half mile to one mile from the sea. Barren slopes and patches of thick shrub bordered the landward side of these vast dunes. Cart tracks running parallel to the beaches lay between the shore line and the nearest metalled road located from one to three miles from the sea. Exits from the beaches to the hinterland were non-existent.
2. The fact that many beaches were flanked by groups of rocks, and all beaches were bordered to seaward by bars or runnels, presaged difficulties in beaching boats and craft, and in preventing stranding unless unloading was accomplished with dispatch. The locale of the landings thus foretold the need for reinforced Shore Parties, with particular emphasis on road construction units to prepare exits from the beaches, increased motor vehicle transportation to move stores from beaches to inland dumps and to the advancing troops, and finally a greatly increased labor force to quickly unload boats and craft at the beaches. Representations were promptly made to the 7th Army (Force 343) to augment the strength of the Shore Parties in order to meet fully the conditions peculiar to the beaches selected for the landings by United States Forces.
3. The Shore Party organization adopted by the 7th Army consisted of:

   CENT Force	---	40th Combat Engineer Regiment (3 Bns)
   DIME Force	---	531st Engineer Shore Regiment
   JOSS Force	---	36th Combat Engineer Regiment (3 Bns)
   KOOL Force	---	540th Combat Engineer Regiment (2 Bns)

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4. The 36th and 540th had landed in North Africa as shore regiments in November 1942; the 40th had arrived in the theater with the 45th Infantry Division and lacked previous shore party experience.
5. The average strength of these Shore Parties (exclusive of the Navy Beach Battalions) was approximately 3900 officers and men. Although the composition varied in detail, the basic organization provided for a Shore Regiment, a Signal Company, an Ordnance Company (MM)(Q), an Ordnance Company (Amm), a Medical Battalion, a Quartermaster Battalion (DUKWs), and a Military Police Company. Augmentation was made for this operation by small detachments of service personnel, such as dump operating details of the various services, railway personnel, gasoline supply troops, and truck companies. The Shore Regiment consisted of slightly over 2,000 men, about 20% of whom were available for unloading boats on the beach.
6. The 7th Army plans governing the employment of Shore Parties provided:
   1. Prior to operations. 
      The Commanding Officer 1st Engineer Special Brigade is responsible for:
      1. The organization, training, and equipping of all beach groups incident to the operation until such time as these beach groups have been assigned to and joined the Sub-Task Forces.
      2. For the preparation of detailed plans for the operation of all beach groups (such plans to be coordinated with the indicated staff sections Force 343).
      3. Preparation of adequate plans to take over the operation of all supply activities at a date to be designated by the Commanding General, Force 343.
   2. During operations.
      1. Initially, beach groups will be under direct command of Sub-Task Force Commanders, and will remain under their command until such time as all supply activities are taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343.
      2. When supply activities are taken over by the Commanding General, Force 343, the Commander 1st Engineer Special Brigade will assume command of the beach groups and all non-divisional and non-corps service units thereto attached and such other service units as are necessary and may be attached by the Commanding General, Force 343; and will be responsible for the execution of all supply plans within the theater of operations and emanating from Force 343, including the operation of ports, if any."
7. Thus, the provisions for Shore Parties in the Assault Forces included one Engineer Shore Regiment and two Combat Engineer Regiments, with a Combat Engineer Regiment of two Battalions in the Floating Reserve - the latter to be landed through a prepared beach. Each of these Shore Parties was, during the assault, responsible to the Commander of the Infantry Division to which attached. Later, these Regiments passed to the Commander of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade who was charged with the execution of all supply plans of the 7th Army from the time the Army assumed control of the situation ashore.

Execution of Plan:

8. That the 1st Engineer Brigade performed a magnificent achievement in the execution of Army Supply plans, after the establishment of the 7th Army ashore, is attested to by the supply statistics in the 7th Army's report on the Sicilian campaign. It is the assault phase of the operation, however, which most vitally affects the combat-loaded transports and it was in this phase that the grief occurred.
9. Smooth, efficient operation of the assault beaches was not accomplished until after the departure of the assault transports from the Gulf of Gela. Beginning on D day, from H hour onwards until D plus 3, beach conditions were chaotic. In the JOSS area the beach situation was rectified more promptly. Boats were arriving at all beaches in such numbers that unloading by the Shore Party was at no beach able to keep pace with the arrival of loaded boats. Many vehicles, upon being unloaded from craft, came to an end on enemy mine fields which had not been located and marked by the Shore Party prior to the arrival of motor equipment. The destruction of these vehicles, and the lack of suitable exits and proper markers to show safe routes for traffic through enemy mine fields, soon created widespread confusion as trucks became blocked on the beaches. DUKWs transiting the beach from seaward also came to grief on the beach minefields, due to

beach limits and safe landing points not being adequately marked so as to be seen from seaward by approaching craft. As boats continued to arrive on the beaches and awaited unloading by the Shore Party, the boats were soon swamped or stranded. Eventually the beaches became crowded with miscellaneous personnel standing around idle. In the absence of properly marked staging areas, troops were observed loitering about on the sand dunes awaiting instructions as to movement. Many boats retracted from the regular beaches and moved to the flanks where a clear beach space could be found, and there the boat crews unloaded their own boats. This led to scattering of Army equipment and stores, in some cases placing material on the beaches of adjacent divisions, thus rendering more difficult the task of supplying the advancing troops. Other boats, unable to obtain shore party personnel to unload them at assigned beaches, returned to their transports still loaded. This resulted in many ship commands taking men from gun crews and engineers force and placing them in the boats as working parties in order to unload boats on the beaches. Finally, the unloading situation became so critical that transports organized working parties from each ship and sent these parties ashore to unload boats and craft. Such parties varied in size from 40 to 100 officers and men. On some beaches these naval working parties were augmented by gangs of Prisoners of War which engaged voluntarily in this labor. In this manner were the combat-loaders and landing craft finally unloaded during the assault phase.

10. Dumps did not appear to be organized according to a predetermined plan. On some beaches there was a critical shortage of transportation, in spite of the thousands of vehicles being landed. Beach personnel migrated to the dumps in loaded vehicles thus depleting the party working the beaches. DUKWs were observed to move far inland well beyond beach dumps where they were diverted or came to grief through accident. Control of transportation on the beaches was totally lacking. There was a notable absence of Military Police on the beaches; these units had obviously moved inland with the troops.
11. Supplies were piled high on the beaches without any effort to accomplish segregation. Gasoline, ammunition, water, food, and assorted equipment were strewn about in a hopeless mass. No fire fighting equipment was in evidence anywhere. As enemy planes made frequent strafing attacks along these beaches, fires were of frequent occurrence.
12. The beach defenses were weak and ineffective. Barrage balloons were insufficient to cover the congested areas and anti-aircraft batteries were not only scarce and of small caliber, but lacked proper fire control.
13. At night the Shore Party personnel were not to be found; they either disappeared in fox holes and dumps, or withdrew to the hinterland. The numerous soldiers idling on beaches during the day made no effort to unload their own equipment out of boats and craft. The discipline on the beaches was of a low order.
14. As the locations of CENT beaches were shifted, the new beaches became as congested as the old. The Shore Parties became scattered and were uncertain of the location of the new beaches. Available man power was not utilized and idlers became numerous. Proper beach markers were not erected. Boats stranded after waiting hours on end to be unloaded. Labor and transportation facilities for handling cargo were lacking. Finally all unloading of the transports in the CENT area ceased until working parties sent from the ships could reach the shore and take over the job of unloading boats and craft.
15. In the DIME area the chaotic condition on D day was terminated on D plus one by the evacuation of those beaches due to the advance of the German tanks. Enemy shelling of these beaches resulted in the Engineer Regiment being called inland as support troops and the withdrawal seaward by boats of other beach personnel. The DIME beaches were at a standstill on D plus one, though some ships diverted boats to the beaches near the Acate River in order to continue unloading. As the enemy threat was overcome, the DIME situation gradually cleared up as naval working parties took over unloading of boats and craft. But the status of supplies landed was not known to the Shore Party, for on D plus 2 the following message was received from DIME Green Beach by the Transport Division Commander in the DIME area: "120955 Col. Massey QMC requests all ships operating this beach send non-perishable food supplies X Army hungry X signed Marler." This, in spite of the fact that practically all ships were completely unloaded and that hundreds of tons of food supplies were available either on Green Beach or those immediately adjacent.
16. The organization and operation of the beaches during the assault phase was one of the greatest difficulties in this operation, as it had been in the Moroccan Operation, last November. The recurring delay in getting boats unloaded after the first few hours of the assault was present

on all CENT and DIME beaches, and to a lesser extent on the JOSS beaches. This condition sets in at the critical period of a landing operation from about noon on D day to the night of D plus one. It is during this period when our troops have reached inland objectives and are well-engaged with the enemy, when the demands from our troops for ammunition and particular weapons and equipment is greatest, and when we are probably inferior to the enemy in artillery and possibly in infantry, providing he has carried out reconnaissance and has moved his reserves. He will exploit his air power on D day to the utmost and the beaches are the most favorable target the enemy can, and does, select. But it is at this critical period that boat crews and Shore Parties lag, when the beaches become congested, and when there is a grave danger of complete breakdown in the supply system.

Conclusions:

17. It is clear that adequate measures must be taken at once to improve the organization and training of our Shore Parties. Though amphibious operations in the Pacific have been on a much smaller scale than operations in this theater, the Action Reports received from that area relate the exact and precise shortcomings experienced in this theater. This cannot be coincidental; it is believed to be beyond happenstance to be basic, and hence readily recognized and amended.
18. Since the Allied Nations are, by the geography of the globe, committed to many amphibious operations, the need for Shore Party organizations will be continuous. It is suggested that the cornerstone of these Shore Parties be Shore Engineer Regiments and not Combat Engineers. The platoons for boat labor on beaches should be doubled in strength. These Beach Groups with complete equipment and personnel should undergo amphibious training with Infantry Divisions, and the Divisions should land over beaches their full equipment, personnel, and vehicles; and considerable quantity of supplies both day and night. This training should require actual removal of mines, barbed wire, construction of exits, building roads, placing markers, dispersal movement of stores to selected dumps, transportation control, etc. Such full scale exercises will complement the basic training, which provides the discipline and physical conditioning, of the personnel. Shore Party personnel should receive practical training in all types of boats and landing craft, and in working cargo on board ship and as winchmen. Only such training on full scale can bring the Shore Party personnel to a true realization of the magnitude of their tasks in actual operations on the enemy's shores, and prepare them for those tasks.
19. In landing on the enemy's shores it is essential that the equipment of the Shore Party be landed in early waves in order that they can begin preparation of the beaches, exits, dumps, etc., prior to the arrival of the motor vehicles. Mine detectors should be available to the Shore Party in adequate numbers, together with trained personnel, and, by mine removal, clear routes must be quickly prepared and marked. Trained traffic control personnel must erect proper sign-posts and control routing of traffic in both directions in safety and in such manner as to ensure proper dispersal to selected dumps.
20. During the planning phase the Shore Party, in conjunction with G-3 and G-4, should prepare complete plans giving location of various dumps, dispersal layout, anti-aircraft locations, road routes, marker and sign-post systems, vehicle crews, etc. The Shore Party should have full knowledge of the Ships' unloading plans and be provided with Priority Lists. Personnel of the Shore Party should be briefed in these plans and, during the Rehearsals of the Infantry Divisions, these plans should be rehearsed by the Shore Party personnel concerned. This will ensure centralized control of unloading and consolidation of beach dumps with due regard to the tactical and supply needs of the landing forces.
21. DUKWs should be used during the assault phase for the exclusive use of unloading ships and large landing craft; they should not be diverted during this employment, farther inland than the beach dumps. It is essential that an adequate number of vehicles be landed early for the use of the Shore Party in clearing beaches of supplies and in transporting stores to dumps. These vehicles should be provided with relief drivers in order that 24 hour operation can be assured, and these vehicles should not be diverted from their assigned employment except at the direction of the Shore Party Commander.
22. Markers, to indicate flanks of beaches and safe landing points and road exits, should be placed well back from the beach on the high dunes in order that they may be seen by DUKW drivers. Without such markers DUKWs have landed on the beach in the midst of enemy mine fields and without any idea of the clear paths and routes to the dumps. Beach marker lights were not set up promptly during darkness. It is believed essential that beach marking personnel go ashore in

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the second assault wave and that these vital colored markings be erected quickly to guide the waves enroute to the beaches.

23. Anti-aircraft defenses of beaches require reexamination. The 37mm anti-tank gun is inadequate. The large number of craft and boats immobile on the beaches, and the uninterrupted movement of supplies and weapons, demands that beach protection be greatly augmented during the assault phase of a landing. Six large caliber guns per battalion should be provided. It is essential that all guns on a division beach be centrally controlled in order to exercise fire discipline. An adequate air raid warning system is a necessity on each beach. Barrage balloons every 200 yards along the beach frontage and over gasoline and munitions dumps will break up strafing attacks. The scale of AA defenses now assigned to beaches is entirely inadequate in any theater where enemy aircraft may oppose the landing.

Section XI - BEACH PARTY

Operations:

1. The Beach Battalions were the weakest link in the naval organization and were faced with one of the most arduous and difficult tasks. During the assault phase of the operation the efficiency of the Beach Parties was no better than that of the Shore Parties of which they were a part. As the engineers of the Shore Parties became primarily involved in normal combat missions, with little concern for the operation of the beaches, the Beach Parties failed similarly in the prompt and full execution of their responsibilities.
2. There was no concerted effort made to carry out prompt hydrographic surveys at first light on D day. Many craft, such as LCS(S)s, were observed lying idle off beaches at that time and could have been pressed into service. In a few isolated cases some soundings off-shore were obtained by some craft but there is no evidence that the results obtained were made known to the Beachmasters concerned, nor that any use was made of the soundings obtained. Since thorough surveys were not promptly carried out by all the Beach Parties, there was a dearth of channel markers. This resulted in LCTs and LSTs standing in to beaches to unload without any guidance as to favorable or unfavorable sites, resulting in the grounding of some craft some distance from shore and causing delays in beaching. In view of the dependence upon the successful employment of pontoon causeways, the off-shore investigations should have been planned in detail and executed promptly with the break of dawn. Since the Beach Party is not provided a boat from which to carry out this off-shore work, Beachmasters have had to confiscate boats to do this work. In future operations the plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should specifically provide for the allocation of survey boats at each beach. Scout Boats, stationed off beaches as markers to the assault waves, could undertake this work beginning at dawn. Fathometer equipment in these boats makes them particularly suitable; additional ratings required and special equipment as buoys, pennants, anchors, lights, etc., might be carried in this boat without interference in its beach marking or scout duties carried out during darkness. If this is not feasible, special boats should be assigned by Transport Commanders to execute the survey at daybreak on D day.
3. Traffic control boats were conspicuous by their absence, except in the JOSS area. As boats and craft carrying equipment and stores followed the assault waves to the beaches, these movements landed without instruction from control vessels or Beach-masters. This led to congestion on beaches which was further aggravated by the absence or unwillingness of Shore Party labor to unload the boats and craft. Due to the sea then running, scores of these loaded boats quickly became swamped or stranded, thus rendering those landing points unavailable to other craft to follow. Some boats were at beaches for as long as 20 hours waiting to be unloaded by Shore Parties. Had Beachmasters carried out the Standard Operating Procedure by establishing Traffic Control Boats off the beaches, and directed the landing of craft and boats, many delays due to beach congestion could have been avoided. In the CENT and DIME areas, it appears that few Traffic Control Boats were provided by the transports. These boats should be specified in the plans of Naval Task Force Commanders and Transport Division Commanders. The Traffic Control Boat Officer must establish radio (TBY), bullhorn, and visual communication with the Beachmaster off whose beach he is operating. He must require boat movements in accordance with the orders of the Beachmaster. More training of Traffic Control Boat crews, and a closer liaison with Beach Parties, is indicated. Coordination between the Shore Party and Beach Party would have ensured that boats were landed when and where labor was available to handle the stores.
4. When unloading beaches were shifted by the Shore Party, it appears that the decision

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was not made known promptly to Beach Party personnel. Shore Party personnel became scattered over a long stretch of coast where they were left to shift for themselves; the lateral movement to and fro along the beaches caused the cessation of unloading until parties rejoined and reorganized at the new sites in some cases this did not transpire until the following day. Discipline, leadership, and control were absent. LSTs standing in to beaches to land received numerous conflicting orders, and these ships were required to move several times before they were allowed to unload at any specific beach. As pontoon causeways were shifted, no information was transmitted to the Commander of the LST group, and no effort to coordinate activities was displayed. This condition was forestalled in the JOSS area where CTF 86 placed three Group Commanders (from landing craft organization) ashore as Head Beachmasters and thus reduced the beaches and, boat control to order.

5. It appears that the CENT beaches in some areas were changed as frequently as eight times during the first two days of the assault. The reason for these changes was stated to be that the Shore Party commander was selecting sites where better exits from the beach existed. The preliminary study of these beaches during the planning stage of the operation had conclusively shown the absence of suitable exits and the necessity of construction of such exits and roads by the Shore Party. This command at that time pointed out this fact to the Army Command and had suggested an augmentation of the Road Construction troops assigned to the CENT area in order that this demand for exits might be met on D day.
6. Salvage operations of stranded boats were not undertaken promptly and, as more and more boats became stranded due to delays in unloading, the salvage soon grew beyond the capacity of the Beach Parties to handle with the limited facilities available. Some ships sent LCMs to the beach but most of these eventually stranded in attempting to retract other boats.
7. The boat salvage measures now in use are inadequate to cope with an operation involving hundreds of boats. Regardless of the salvage equipment placed ashore, the fact remains that most salvage activities must be carried out from seaward. The Beach Party, on each beach of one infantry battalion front, should be provided by the transports with one LCM carrying a bulldozer to be placed ashore. This LCM should carry experienced Boatswain's Mates, and be altered for salvage work at the shoreline. A large reinforced towing bit should be installed just aft of the boat coxswain's steering station, and a power anchor windlass should be located aft. Additional equipment should include two anchors, anchor lines, two handybillies, one stationary salvage pump with necessary hose, four 3¹/2" towing lines complete, eight ³/4" towing wire pendants, spare ramp cables, shackles, tools, etc. The crews of the salvage LCMs from the transports should train with the Beach Parties during pre-invasion exercises and rehearsals.
8. The plans of the Naval Task Force Commander should provide also for one LCI(L), especially fitted out with salvage equipment and trained personnel, to operate along the beaches of each Infantry Division after landing troops in first flight. This type of craft has the weight, power, and shallow draft needed to work close to the shore. These LCI(L)s should be provided with at least one 3" salvage pump with necessary hose, two portable pumps, a shallow water diving outfit, one complete welding outfit suitable for underwater welding, hawsers, towing pendants, line throwing guns, small pulling boats (as wherries) for running lines, etc. Fire fighting equipment should also be provided.
9. Each infantry division beach should be provided with a "Jaheemey" with a bulldozer as a prime mover. The "Jaheemey" should be completely rigged and assembled when loaded in an LCT for transportation to the beach. Beach Parties should be trained in its use. At the CENT beaches a "Jaheemey" was sent ashore disassembled without instructions for assembly or all the parts needed. Since the weight of the vehicle totals nine tons, and in the absence of lifting facilities on the beach, the assembly could not be accomplished by the Beach Party. If it is not practicable to provide a "Jaheemey" on shore, self-propelled tractor cranes should be provided to the Beach Party.
10. Beach Parties were provided with a complete set of plans and orders, yet they lacked a clear understanding of the unloading plans and apparently viewed the scene apathetically. The Beachmaster should be made fully conversant by the Army with the priority plans to ensure sufficient flexibility to permit some lateral mixing of supplies. Should any beach be closed down for any reason (as the DIME beaches due to enemy shelling on D plus one day), the Shore Party must be prepared to continue supply to the elements forward of that beach by operating through an adjacent one. This requires the closest cooperation between the Shore Party Commander and the Beach Party Commander. Unless such flexibility and understanding exists, efficient supply over the beaches cannot be brought about.

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11. Delays of several hours were reported on some beaches in evacuating causalities due to shortage of unloaded boats. Closer coordination should exist between the Army and Navy medical groups. Causalities should not be brought to the exposed beaches until boats are available to evacuate them at once. Positive land-line communications between the Army Casualty Station and the Beachmaster would ensure this. There appears to be an excess of medical personnel in Beach Battalions as now constituted; this should be studied with a view of reducing the numbers to actual service requirements.
12. The Standard Operating Procedure provides that the Commander of the Navy Beach Battalion shall be provided with a jeep to enable him to be mobile. Even this single vehicle was not provided during this operation. A tactical plan (such as the CENT plan), which provides for landings to be made on a wide front, extending over a distance of 15 miles, obviously spreads shore and beach activities thin. As beach locations were frequently shifted to utilize selected exits to the hinterland, and other beaches were contracted or closed, a great lateral migration took place up and down the shore line. Entirely devoid of transportation, the Navy Beach Companies were required to pack their equipment on their backs and hike from scene to scene. Special equipment, such as radio apparatus weighing 1500 pounds, was immobilized until space could be arranged in some passing army truck. These lateral shuttles not only created widespread confusion ashore during the first two days, but also produced fatigue, thus contributing to the delay in efficiently organizing the CENT beaches and expediting the unloading of transports. The equipment and gear of a Navy Beach Battalion weighs 60 tons and measures 12,000 cubic feet. No shore transportation is now provided to this organization. Once placed ashore it is now without mobility. A Beachmaster cannot properly perform his duties unless he is constantly covering his beach and is on the exact spot where trouble exists. Immediate steps should be taken to render Beach Battalions mobile by providing them with an adequate number of jeeps, trucks, and trailers. A suitable number of vehicles would be 12 jeeps and 10 two-and-one-half ton trucks with one ton trailers.
13. Due to the unsatisfactory conditions existing on most beaches during the assault phase, personnel of the Beach Battalions engaged in various pursuits in which they should not be employed. Some of these were: unloading boats, road building, loading trucks, trans-beach traffic control, labor in dumps, stevedore labor aboard merchant ships, gun crews on beach machine guns, shore patrol, guards on Prisoners of War, and Port Guards. While such aid as rendered was commendable, it is felt that Naval Beach Party personnel should not be diverted from assigned tasks unless dictated by an emergency.
14. This operation imposed upon the American forces the possibility of beach maintenance for at least 30 days. Although the plans provided for coastal movement westward of our military forces, with a view of opening ports as soon as possible, it was realized that some beach maintenance would have to continue just so long as the 7th Army supply lines were connected to the Gela beaches. In order to meet these conditions it was planned to use Beach Battalions on these beaches as long as necessary and until Advanced Base personnel took over their normal duties. In the execution of this plan the Beach Battalions operated briefly as follows:
    1. 1st Beach Battalion. 
       Landed on the CENT beaches on 10 July (D day). 
       On 20 July shifted to port of Porto Empedocle. 
       On 25 July sent detachment of 1 officer and 20 men to assist in port of Palermo. 
       On 27 July sailed for Tunisian port, arriving on 30 July.
    2. 2nd Beach Battalion. 
       Landed on JOSS beaches on 10 July (D day) and began operating port of Licata the same day. 
       On 17 July sent detachment to port of Porto Empedocle until relieved by 1st Beach Battalion on 20 July. 
       On 23 July sent one company to port of Palermo. 
       On 29 July sent detachment to port of Termini until relieved by Advance Base party on 18 August. 
       On 2 August sent small detachments to north coast of Sicily to participate in leap-frog landings until 14 August. On 20 August returned to North African port.
    3. 4th Beach Battalion. 
       Landed on DIME beaches on 10 July (D day). 
       Operated port and beaches of Gela until closed on 29 July.

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15. From the above it will be noted that these units were required to work on beaches for periods of weeks, a task for which they were neither trained nor equipped to do. This resulted in a high percentage of ineffectives, due principally to fever, malaria, and dysentery. Any future operation requiring Beach Battalions to remain ashore for protracted periods should be preceded by suitable field training with the army with emphasis on care of the person and field sanitation. The equipment of the battalions should then include tentage, bedding rolls, field kitchens, water-making equipment, etc. Cooks should be included in the complement. Special precautions should be taken to provide mosquito bars, insect repellents, flea powder, etc.
16. Beach Battalions should be relieved at the earliest possible date by Advanced Base organizations, whose responsibility it is to provide the naval administration of captured ports. The diversion of Beach Battalions to such employment as tabulated above, after these units had been exposed for a long period on assault beaches, is warranted only in emergencies. Beach Battalions should normally withdraw from the theater with the combat-loaded transports or as soon thereafter as the military maintenance situation permits.

Training:

17. The Beach Battalion training in the past has not been what it should be. These units have been inactive during the period between operations and their training has suffered there from. These units require more navy life. They might well be quartered on board ship until the troops arrive aboard for amphibious training. Intensive shipboard training of all ratings along predetermined lines will produce better seamen and instill in the personnel of the Beach Battalion the necessary naval background. When troops come aboard the transports for training, the Beach Battalion might well then move ashore for their field training with the Shore Party. This should be laid out to include such basic training of the soldier as clean and orderly living in the field, how to get along with little and make that little do, how to take care of arms, equipment, and clothing and the necessity for doing so. Physical fitness, military courtesy and discipline should be emphasized in this training which should include overhead firing and other battle courses. Beach Battalions should be trained with the Shore Party Engineers in defensive tactics of the rifle squad and platoon, detection, removal, and destruction of mines and booby traps, removal of wire and beach obstacles, and in swimming and life saving. As the amphibious training of the infantry division advances to assaults on beaches, the training of the Beach Battalions should advance to their basic tasks on the beaches and the development of teamwork with the Shore Party. Such a program of training would keep the Beach Battalions fully occupied and would forge them into a skillfully trained unit ready for combat. These units are seamen first, and they should be garbed in a distinctive uniform in order that they may be distinguished on the beach. Helmets should be painted and marked so as to identify them as members of the Beach Party.

Command:

18. Many of the failings of the past have been due to the lack of rank, experience, and personality of Beachmasters. Such officers become submerged in numbers and seniority of the Army ashore. They lack the necessary rank and assurance to stand up against the constant succession of conflicting requests, orders, instructions and commands received on the spot from higher ranking Army officers, who are interested in getting one particular task done, but have no immediate interest in the overall beach task. Many high ranking Army officers, not in the Shore Party, call upon the Beachmaster to subordinate his tasks in the behalf of this seniors peculiar interests, notwithstanding the capabilities and limitations of the Beach Party. Naval officers of suitable rank, experience, and quality can cope with such interferences and prevent diversion of effort. This need for improved quality and experience in the officers of the Beach Battalions is still existent. The best evidence of this fact is presented in the JOSS beaches where CTF 86 placed ashore on D day three Group Commanders of proven ability from his task force. These officers, Captains and Commanders, had the authority of their rank, experience, and personality, and were very effective in bringing the JOSS beaches from disorder to efficiency.
19. The Shore Party and Beach Party organizations constitute very important elements in all amphibious assaults. Failure of these parties fully to meet their assigned tasks, due to whatever cause, might well result in the failure of the assault forces to seize and hold a beachhead; the implications of such a dislodgement are so great that almost any action would be warranted to forestall its eventuality. That both the Army and Navy fully appreciate the difficulties that would attend such a reversal, there is no doubt. Nevertheless, there appears to be absent that complete understanding by both services of where and when the responsibilities of each begins and ends. This unfortunate

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circumstance is believed to be due to the imperfections and contradictions contained in the official publications which govern amphibious operations. The documents FM 31-5, FTP 155, and FTP 167 need revision at once. Much of these authorities is obsolete; the introduction of the air arm has brought with it further complications in command relationships. It would be helpful, however, if there existed a more thorough understanding that the Naval Commander has responsibility for the operation until the Landing Force is firmly established on shore, and that with him rests the authority commensurate with the responsibility.

Section XII - SMOKE

1. The employment of smoke for offensive and defensive purposes was incorporated in the naval plans but, in the execution of the plan, smoke was not employed to the fullest extent.
2. The most notable use of smoke during the operation was made in the JOSS area during the early hours of daylight on D day. The destroyer Woolsey placed a very effective smoke screen on the left flank of one of the beaches using 5"/38 white phosphorous projectiles, thus hiding the beach and craft from shore batteries firing from Licata. Scout Boats were also employed in laying a screen to envelop LSTs unloading into LCTs offshore.
3. Another occasion in the JOSS area took place about 0645 on D day when LCTs unloading tank units on Red Beach were placed under fire by enemy mortars and artillery. Distant targets were taken under fire by the cruiser Brooklyn and destroyer Buck, while the BritishLCG-4 moved close to shore to engage mortar positions within range of her armament. Meanwhile the destroyers Woolsey andNicholson laid a screen to cover the craft on the beach. The fire support silenced the threatening enemy batteries and the smoke screen was most effective in screening the beached craft.
4. In the CENT area LCS(S)s employed smoke rocket projectors and smoke pots to cover one landing but the necessity therefore has not been reported.
5. Due to the fact that the assault area was in a gulf, and to the further fact that shipping had to be moved close to shore as soon as possible to expedite the unloading operations, the timely detection of enemy aircraft by our radar was rendered most difficult. The practice of the enemy to make many attacks from landward through valleys rendered radar detection at such times virtually impossible. Many attacks made from seaward were near screening vessels and, in some cases, over the transport areas. Early detection of enemy flights would have permitted the Task Force Commanders to give the alert and direct smoke-laying operations.
6. If smoke will lie at existing wind conditions, a large transport area should be covered within fifteen minutes. Upon the receipt of orders to lay smoke, all ships must send all available boats in the water to an up-wind position to lay floats and to make smoke-laying runs on such reverse courses as required to give a screen over own vessel. The ships themselves should throw floats or pots to windward from the ship so as to obtain a smoke cloud near the ship before the screen produced by the ships' boats drifts to the ships' anchorage. In daytime both black and white smoke should be employed.
7. At night the screen should be begun in sufficient time to be effective by moonrise. During moonlight the screen must be maintained. During night attacks, smoke-laying boats should keep to windward of own transport; if boats circumnavigate own transport the flames of the smoke pot will serve to pin-point the ship as a target to the enemy. At dawn the screen must be thickened to ensure adequate coverage until sufficient daylight exists to ensure enemy aircraft being seen by own gunners.
8. All APAs, XAPs, AKAs, and their boats are equipped with smoke pots and smoke floats. All fuel oil burning vessels have funnel smoke available. Many ships have smoke generators. Merchant ships should also be equipped with smoke pots prior to sailing for the assault area.

Section XIII - BARRAGE BALLOONS

1. The plans provided for the employment of balloons in accordance with the procedure adopted by the Royal Navy as a result of three years of warfare in the Mediterranean. The successful employment of balloons by merchant shipping in the Mediterranean, where convoys were under constant attack by enemy aircraft, was further emphasized by the skillful use of this apparatus by RAF detachments in numerous ports of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania, and on the beaches

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where the North African campaign was being waged. Thus early in the planning stage of the Sicilian campaign it was recognized that lethal balloons were essential to the protection of the assault shipping and the assault beaches of the Western Task Forces.

2. Since this equipment comes under the cognizance of the Army, early requests were made of that service to obtain balloon units in this theater adequate to meet the assault requirements. Early requests upon the War Department from this theater produced replies to the effect that no barrage balloon units were available for the Sicilian operation; this information was disconcerting in view of scenes appearing in newspapers reaching this theater from the United States wherein photographs appeared of innumerable balloons over cities of the California coast and at military training centers on the Florida coast. Repeated requests were made for the equipment and steps were taken by the naval commands to install shipboard fittings in all assault transports then in the United States and North African waters. Merchant vessels scheduled to enter the assault area during the initial attack were also fitted out in the same manner.
3. In time, advice was received that three U.S. Army Barrage Balloon Batteries, the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th would be made available for the operation. With the passage of time and the non-arrival in this theater of designated Balloon Batteries, requests were made of the Royal Air Force to provide balloon detachments for use on the assault beaches. This resulted in the assignment of five RAF balloon detachments each consisting of one officer, 24 men, and 12 operational balloons.
4. After the arrival from the United States of the CENT combat-loaders in June, steps were taken to ensure that available balloon units were scheduled in the 7th Army Troop List in accordance with the needs of each Task Force. No control over the distribution or loading of these units was exercised by any naval command. On 23 June, the Commander, Western Task Force, was advised by the Army Commander that balloons were being assault loaded as follows:
   1. CENT (103 balloons, assault loaded)
      1. 103 CA AA Balloon Battery: 45 operational balloons
      2. 102nd Det. CA AA Balloon Battery: 46 operational balloons
      3. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 operational balloons
   2. DIME (36 balloons, assault loaded)
      1. 2 RAF Detachments: 24 operational balloons
      2. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 operational balloons (in assault craft)
   3. JOSS (57 balloons, assault loaded)
      1. 104th CA AA Balloon Battery: 45 operational balloons
      2. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 operational balloons
5. On 7 July, while at sea, it was learned that the actual distribution and loading of balloons in the ships and craft was as follows:
   1. CENT (52 balloons, assault loaded)>
      1. 103rd CA AA Balloon Battery. The 45 balloons of this unit were found to be loaded in the holds of the Leonard Wood,Susan B. Anthony, and James O'Hara. The equipment could not be made operational until unloaded from the ships and transferred to shore.
      2. 102nd CA AA Balloon Battery. This unit had 40 operational balloons distributed among the combat-loaders and immediately operational.
      3. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 balloons distributed among the combat-loaders and immediately operational.
   2. DIME (36 balloons, assault loaded)
      1. 2 RAF Detachments: 24 balloons distributed among the combat-loaders and immediately operational.
      2. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 balloons distributed among assault craft due in transport area on D day.
   3. JOSS (12) balloons, assault loaded)
      1. 104th CA AA Balloon Battery. This unit had arrived in North Africa without its equipment which was enroute to the theater in a slow convoy. This battery was not loaded in the assault shipping.
      2. 1 RAF Detachment: 12 operational balloons distributed in assault craft.

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Summarizing, the balloons available on D day were:

Force	Ship Defense			Beach Defense			Total
CENT		40			12			52
DIME		24			*12			36
JOSS		0			*12			12

* Loaded in assault craft; to be shifted to beach defense when craft are unloaded at beaches.

6. In order the balloon strength of the JOSS force might be augmented to provide additional protection to the large number of craft unloading over the beaches, and in order to provide for the protection of the port of Licata which was to be in our hands on D day, it was then proposed to the Army that the 103rd Battery be unloaded from CENT transports into LCTs and be diverted to JOSS. This shift was so ordered. It was then discovered that the equipment of the 103rd Battery was stowed in the transports deep in the holds under trucks and other material. In endeavoring to comply with the order that balloon equipment be discharged with dispatch, some of the ships suffered delays in overall unloading because of shifting cargo to gain access to the buried balloon equipment. This unit was finally discharged into LCTs but these craft apparently unloaded over the Gela-Scoglitti beaches since they did not arrive in the JOSS area.
7. The balloons over the assault shipping were flown at 1000 feet, the greatest height attainable, and were very effective as a deterrent to strafing attacks. On the beaches, however, the barrage was so thin that it was virtually ineffective. The extreme length of the beaches being used by our forces required balloons in far greater number than were provided. The CENT beaches extended initially over a distance of twelve miles; DIME six miles; JOSS two detached areas, each three miles long, separated by a distance of about four and one-half miles. Obviously twelve balloons over beaches of such lengths offered a token effort only. During the first three days of the assault, enemy aircraft exploited the weakness of our beach defenses by making almost constant sneak raids along the beaches where landing craft, boats, pontoon causeways, stores and personnel were subjected to bombing and machine gun fire. These attacks continued until our own aircraft began operating from Sicilian airfields and our air supremacy made such raids unprofitable for the enemy.
8. All APAs, XAPs AKAs, LSTs and merchant vessels taking part in amphibious assaults should have installed, as a permanent installation, masthead (or similar) fittings, deck winches, and related appurtenances. Each vessel should have aboard a Balloon Unit (consisting of trained personnel of the U.S. Navy) having sufficient lethal balloons and gas to ensure the maintenance of an effective barrage over all assault shipping.
9. If this shipboard unit is not a part of the ships' organization, and the Navy continues to be dependent upon the Army for balloon protection, I recommend that the attention of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army be invited to the necessity of providing for balloons in all theaters where U.S. forces are carrying out offensive amphibious operations.
10. Although dimensions of selected beaches will vary in different locales, and the organizational frontage employed in the assault will depend largely upon the military tactical plan being executed, it must be appreciated that early on D day there is invariably a shift in beach locations and an expansion in beach frontage as huge tonnages are being landed in the form of assault weapons, maintenance, and build up. Beaches where scores of landing ships, landing craft, and boats are immobile during unloading, and where pontoon causeways are rigged to ensure the landing of tanks, artillery, and vehicles, offer a most vulnerable target for enemy aircraft. With the inadequate scale of AA protection provided at assault beaches, the employment of balloon barrages becomes of even greater importance. Normally there should be a barrage balloon every 200 yards of beach frontage. Each pontoon causeway should have a balloon permanently over its seaward and shoreward end. Each LST should have over it its own balloon whether afloat or ashore.
11. It is not sufficient that Balloon Batteries be shown in a Troop List; these units actually must be embarked in ships and be fully operational to meet the needs of assault shipping and beaches. Balloon Batteries should not be eliminated from the Army Troop List on the pretext that such units are not "fighting troops". In point of fact the space required aboard ship for the equipment of this unit is comparatively insignificant when weighed against the utility of the unit. The usefulness of the unit more than compensates for the shipboard space occupied by it.

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12. Although balloons have been viewed heretofore as passive defense weapons suitable for defense of ports and convoys moving in coastal and restricted waters, the Sicilian operation has forcefully demonstrated that this weapon is an essential and vital arm in amphibious assault operations, and one which thus far has not been fully exploited by the American forces.

Section XIV - OPENING OF PORTS

1. Amphibious operations requiring the landing and maintenance of military forces consisting of several divisions make is almost obligatory that a port be captured at the earliest date possible. If no port is available, or the captured port is incapable of handling the vast tonnages needed by the invading forces, it then becomes necessary to organize beach maintenance, a difficult and costly project placing a heavy drain on the resources of both the Army and the Navy.
2. Under the original Outline Plan of the Theater Commander, the ports assigned to the United States were Palermo, Trapani, Marsala and Sciacca. The first-named was classified as a "major" port and the others as "minor" ports. Advice was received from the United States that base equipment for those ports was being shipped to the theater. It was known in this theater that Sciacca did not possess a port worthy of the name, and in our planning the port of Mazzara del Vallo and/or Porto Empedocle was substituted therefore.
3. When the original plan was cancelled and the "Montgomery Plan" was adopted, the American assaults were shifted to the Gulf of Gela. The ports of Palermo, Trapani and Marsala under this plan were not to become available until late in the military campaign. In the support of our military forces we were committed, therefore, to beach maintenance for at least thirty days, a situation which could be alleviated only by capture of such small ports as existed in the wake of the advance of our military forces. For this reason it was suggested to the Army that early movements toward coastal ports would greatly aid the Navy in ensuring the continued maintenance of the military forces. It was decided therefore to initially establish a Beach Party component from a Port Party at Gela, and a minor Port Party at Licata. As the Army made subsequent movements to the westward, it was planned to open the small harbor of Porto Empedocle, followed by the ports of Mazzara del Vallo, Marsala, Trapani, and Palermo as these fell to our military forces. As the Army advanced and the lines of communication were shifted in order to prevent over-extension, it was planned to abandon in succession the ports of Gela, Licata, Porto Empedocle, and Mazzara del Vallo. With the opening of Palermo, on D plus 12, it was found the ports of Marsala and Trapani were neither suitable nor necessary to the support of the 7th Army, and United States naval Port Parties were withdrawn.
4. It is essential, in the early planning stages of the operation, that the officers destined to be Port Directors be present and participate in the development of the naval administrative plans. Such officers should assist in the development of plans for opening of ports, including sweeping of channels to ports, assignment of salvage and harbor craft, port defense, and related subjects. This will ensure that the equipment and personnel, sent from the United States to the theater for Port Parties, are suitable for the ports under consideration, and will greatly facilitate the assembly of material and the training of Port Party personnel in the theater prior to the assault.
5. In the interest of standardization, procurement of materials, etc.. Port Parties are organized in the United States to provide for the occupation of bases and ports in theaters of war. Thus in the case of Sicily, equipment and stores were shipped to this theater for the ports enumerated in the second paragraph, the scale of the standardized unit being determined by an estimate of whether the port is "major" or "minor." It appears that in making this determination a thorough study of reliable port information was not the basis upon which the determination was made. As a result there has been shipped to this theater a vast amount of equipment which is not applicable to Sicilian ports and for which no useful purpose can be found. If sufficient time is available it would be conducive to efficiency and thrift if the planning for port requirements were performed as suggested above, and procurement and shipment of equipment to the theater were based upon the plans developed by planners on the scene of action.
6. When the military plans envisage the capture of ports on D day, or prior to the arrival of follow-up convoys, it is necessary that the Port Parties be embarked in the assault convoys, together with such equipment, appliances and stores as may be required by this organization to function efficiently until the arrival of later convoys bringing the remainder of the base equipment. The Army Troop Lists and Loading Plans must make provision for the loading of naval Port Parties in proper ship movements.

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7. Where ports are thus scheduled for capture before follow-up convoys reach the assault area, and prompt movement of our ships into captured ports for unloading is intended, it is most important that Army Troop Lists provide for necessary stevedore and dockside labor troops to be available concurrently with the entrance of our shipping into the ports. It is not a naval responsibility to employ naval personnel in the task of unloading merchant vessels.

Section XV - PORT SECURITY and COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

1. Four naval officers possessing special language qualifications and trained in counter-intelligence attended a one month course in combat counter-intelligence given by the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (C. I. C.) shortly before the invasion of Sicily. For the latter operation these officers were assigned to Commander Advanced Bases as Naval Port Security officers for duty with each Naval Port Organization. On D day they landed early, two at Gela and two at Licata. They immediately located fishermen familiar with the beach minefields, the condition of channels, and the booby-trapping of port installations. They also passed through the enemy lines and reached the Italian naval headquarters near Agrigento, where they captured documents, amended to 9 July, 1943, showing location of minefields off both Sicily and the Italian mainland. Two additional officers joined the original four after the assault.
2. After the assault and as ports were opened up, Licata, Porto Empedocle, and Palermo the Naval Port Security officers worked closely with the Army C. I. C. and did valuable work not only in port security proper, but also arranged for local pilots to return to work, supervised the reassembling and putting to sea of the local fishing fleet in order to ease the critical food situation, assisted in the interrogation of prisoners, and obtained local battle-order information.
3. I recommend that in future amphibious operations the specially qualified and trained Navy Combat Intelligence officers:
   1. Be landed in early waves attached to Naval Beach Party for local reconnaissance intelligence;
   2. Be provided with suitable transportation and portable radio in order that they may communicate intelligence directly to the Flagship.
   3. Be assigned to Advance Base Groups for the consolidation period after ports are captured in order to organize naval port security and to locate and seize with utmost speed documents and equipment of naval interest.

   The above assignments should be temporary so that the specialized services of these officers may be utilized in each succeeding operation for which they are qualified.

Section XVI - MAINTENANCE and BUILD UP

1. The plans provided for assault forces, landing on D day, to be:

   CENT:

   45th Inf. Div.

   DIME:

   1st Inf. Div. (less 1 RCT)
   1 Arm. Combat Command 82nd A.B. Div. (less 4 Bns.)
   2 Bns. Rangers

   JOSS:

   3rd Inf. Div.
   2nd Arm. Div. (less 1 Arm. CC)
   1 Bn. Rangers

   FLOATING RESERVE:

   KOOL
   1 RCT (1st Inf. Div.)
   1 Arm. CC (2nd Arm. Div

   GENERAL RESERVE (in North Africa):

   9th Inf. Div.

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2. The supply plan provided for the 45th Infantry Division, mounted in the United States, to land in the assault with 21 days maintenance and 10 units of fire. All other U.S. troops were mounted in North Africa and were to be provided with 21 days maintenance and 7 units of fire - these supplies to be carried in the assault, first and second follow-ups.
3. Due to the unavailability of ports in the region of the American assaults, plans were laid for beach maintenance for about 30 days. This administrative risk was lessened to a degree by a plan by which 1000 tons per day were to be landed through the ports of Syracusa beginning on D plus 14.
4. The rapid utilization of Sicilian airports was essential to the success of the military plan, and the logistic requirements of the air force were superimposed on those of the ground forces.
5. The tonnages involved in maintenance and build up were so vast that it required the following planned shipping movements:
   1. CENT Force:
      1. On D day, (in convoy NCF-1), the assault forces in 1 AGC, 7 APA, 6 XAP and 5 AKA, carrying 21 days maintenance plus 10 units of fire for troops mounted in the U.S. (approximately 10,900 tons) - less amounts carried in 1st Follow-up (convoy NCS-2).
      2. On D day, (in convoy TC-1) assault forces in 14 LST, 8 LCT, and 6 LCI(L), carrying 7 days maintenance plus 2 1/3 units of fire for CENT troops from North Africa (approximately 2400 tons).
      3. On D plus 4 (in Convoy NCS-2) 7 store ships loaded in U.S. ex-UGS-10, carrying remainder of 21 days maintenance plus 10 units of fire for 45th Inf. Div. plus vehicles and supplies.
      4. On D plus 4 (in convoy TC-2), 8 LST, 4 LCI(L), and 2 coasters. Craft carrying personnel and vehicles; coasters carrying 7 days maintenance plus 1 1/6 U. F. (approx. 3800 tons) for assault troops and 1st Follow-up for troops loaded in North Africa.
      5. On D plus 8 (in convoy TC-3), 6 LST, 3 LCI(L), and 2 coasters. Craft carrying personnel and vehicles; coasters 7 days maintenance plus 1 1/6 U. F. (approx. 3600 tons) for troops in assault, 1st and 2nd Follow-ups from North Africa.
      6. On D plus 14 (in convoy TC-4), 2 coasters, 7 days maintenance plus 3 1/3 U. F. (approx. 3600 tons) for troops in assault, 1st and 2nd Follow-ups from North Africa.
   2. DIME Force:
      1. On D day (in convoy NCF-1), the assault forces in 4 APA, 3 XAP, and 2 AKA, carrying 7 days maintenance plus 2 1/3 units of fire for assault troops, including 82 A. B. Div. (approx. 4700 tons).
      2. On D day (in convoy TD-1), assault forces in 16 LST and 19 LCI(L) carrying personnel and vehicles. H. Q. 7th Army 7 days maintenance plus 2 1/3 U. F.
      3. On D plus 4 (in convoy NCS-2) 10 store ships carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 7600 tons) plus 1 1/6 units of fire for DIME assault troops and 1st Follow-up, including 82 A. B. Div.
      4. On D plus 4 (in convoy TD-2), 10 LST, 12 LCI(L), carrying personnel and vehicles.
      5. On D plus 8 (in convoy NCS-3), 7 store ships and 1 tanker, carrying 14 days maintenance (approx. 12,800 tons) plus 2 1/3 U. F. for DIME troops in assault, 1st and 2nd Follow-ups, including 82 A. B. Div. Tanker carrying approximately 660 tons 100 octane gasoline.
      6. On D plus 8 (in convoy TD-3), 11 LST and 23 LCI(L), carrying personnel and vehicles.
      7. On D plus 14 (in convoy NCS-4), 1 tanker carrying approximately 660 tons 100 octane gasoline.
   3. KOOL Force:
      1. On D day (in convoy NCF-1) assault forces in 2 AP.
      2. On D day (in convoy TK-1) assault forces in 6 LST, 7 LCT, and 27 LCI(L), carrying personnel and vehicles and 21 days maintenance and 4 2/3 U. F. less amounts carried in 1st Follow-up (convoy NCS-1).
      3. On D plus 4 (in convoy NCS-1), 7 store ships carrying remainder 21 days maintenance (approx. 9700 tons) and 4 2/3U. F. for reserve (KOOL) forces.
      4. On D plus 4 (in convoy NCF-2) 4 troop ships, carrying remainder of KOOL Forces.
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   4. JOSS Force:
      1. On D day (in convoy TJ-1) assault forces in 2 LSI(S), 40 LST, 85 LCT, and 54 LCI(L), carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 6900 tons) plus 2 1/3 Units of Fire for JOSS Forces, personnel, and vehicles.
      2. On D plus 4 (in convoy TJ-2), 2 LSI(S), 22 LST, 28 LCT, 34 LCI(L), and 4 coasters. LSI carrying troops; craft carrying personnel and vehicles; coasters carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 7800 tons) plus 1 1/6 U. F. for JOSS assault and first Follow-up.
      3. On D plus 8 (in convoy TJ-3), 15 LST, 24 LCI(L), and 5 coasters. Craft carrying personnel and vehicles. Coasters carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 8600 tons) and 1 1/6 U. F. for troops in assault, 1st and 2nd Follow-up.
      4. On D plus 14 (in convoy TJ-4) 4 coasters carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 8600 tons) plus 2 1/3 U. F. for troops in assault, 1st and 2nd Follow-up.
      5. On D plus 25, 4 coasters carrying maintenance supplies (approx. 6000 tons) for JOSS troops.
      6. After the 2nd Follow-up craft convoys, all craft (U.S. and British) were placed in a pool for the build-up of Allied armies.
   5. RESERVE SUPPLIES:

      In addition to movements scheduled above in support of forces being maintained and built up through the southern beaches, the following additional movements were set up:

      1. To Syracusa on D plus 8, 1 AP carrying port depot parties, 2 store ships carrying 7 days maintenance (approx. 500 tons) for 2550 troops, and 2 LST carrying vehicles and personnel for depot parties.
      2. To Syracusa (or southern beaches) on D plus 14, 4 cargo ships, (ex-UGS-11) carrying Force 21 days maintenance supplies (approx. 22,000 tons) and 4 U. F., less amounts carried in 7 other ships in UGS-11 convoy.
      3. Held in North African ports to be called forward as required, 7 store ships (ex-UGS-11) carrying Force maintenance supplies.
      4. Due to arrive at Oran on D plus 22, 11 store ships (ex-UGS-12) carrying Force 21 days maintenance supplies and 4 U. F. To be held in port, and called forward as required. Maintenance convoys thereafter every ten days arriving direct from the United States. The number of ships in these convoys to be sent to ports for discharge to be based on acceptance due to rate of discharge and harbor clearance.

6. The Reserve supplies held for the 7th Army at the Eastern Base Section (Bizerte) available on call, included 15 days maintenance for 140,000 men, 31/2 units of fire, 25% combat vehicles, 10% General Purpose Vehicles, and 10% weapons. Other supplies for the 82nd Air Borne Division were located at Kairouan for movement by air.

Execution of Plan:

7. The assaults were carried out as planned. Licata was captured and opened to our craft on D day (10 July). On 16 July Porto Empedocle fell, and was opened at once to our craft. The total capacity of these two ports was insufficient to maintain the 7th Army and beach maintenance was continued. On 20 July the CENT beaches were closed, and on 24 July the beach personnel moved from the DIME beaches and Gela to occupy Palermo. The capture of that city on 22 July placed in our hands for the first time a port capable of accepting deep-draft vessels.
8. The tonnages unloaded over the assault beaches far exceeded any record hitherto attained in war. A brief summary follows:

   10-12 July incl.

   	Person'l	D/W Tons	Vehicles
   CENT	22,654	7,801	2,179
   DIME	23,161	3,351	1,485
   JOSS	20,470	6,614	3,752
   Total	66,285	17,766	7,416

   Note: DIME beaches closed on 11 July due to enemy counter-attack, and reopened the following day.

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9. After the departure of the combat-loaders, the CENT beaches handled as high as 1900 D/W tons per day, and the DIME beaches and Gela averaged about 2500 D/W tons per day. During the period 10-31 July, approximately 104,134 D/W tons were moved through beaches in southern Sicily. The greatest daily tonnage discharged on the southern shore was 6638 tons, on 18 July.
10. Palermo was opened to our shipping on 28 July (D plus 18) when 6 coasters from the D plus 14 convoy, carrying rations and gasoline loaded in North Africa, were diverted from the south coast of Sicily. Two of these coasters were routed onward to unload at Termini. Liberty ships of the UGS-11 convoy arrived off Palermo on 28 July and followed the six coasters to discharge points. Five other cargo ships of UGS-11 had been previously directed to the south coast for unloading. Thus essential supplies as food, gasoline and ammunition, which heretofore had to be trucked overland from the south coast, were brought directly to the troops. Palermo harbor was a wreck, when our forces entered the port, due to the heavy air bombardments which the harbor had so long endured. A total of 44 vessels, craft and barges were sunk in the channels and along the docks, reducing the capacity of the port to about 30 per cent of its value.
11. With the fall of Palermo the Army plan now provided-for the supplies to the eastward-moving troops to flow from two directions: from the southward through the Gela, Licata, Porto Empedocle areas forward to Nicosa; from the westward through Palermo forward to Cefalu, the terminus of the operating railroad at that time. On 3 August Torremuzzo Beach in the vicinity of San Stefano was opened and, during the following ten days, was used as a discharge point immediately in the rear of our advancing troops. Two Italian schooners, requisitioned by the Navy at Palermo, were loaded at that port and sailed to Torremuzzo Beach. For LSTs were loaded at south coast ports with rations, gasoline and ammunition and sailed westward around the island to San Stefano.
12. On 1 August five personnel ships and seven cargo ships carrying elements of the 9th Infantry Division arrived at Palermo. The arrival of the 9th Division in Palermo slowed the discharge of cargo to the point where the total tonnage of rations unloaded fell below ration tonnage consumed. This was remedied on 10 August by the arrival of an LST from North Africa which carried a cargo of 200,000 rations. These were discharged at San Stefano. As the 3rd Infantry Division advanced eastward, a new supply point was opened on 16 August at Brolo Beach. At this point urgent ammunition was delivered close to the front lines by an LST loaded on the south coast and sailed around the island. Another LST carrying 195,000 rations from North Africa unloaded at this point. A coaster was partially unloaded at this point also. Barcelona Beach was used as an unloading point as the 7th Army progressed toward Messina and the land supply lines became greatly extended. From Brolo, rations and gasoline were shuttled to the 3rd Division at Barcelona Beach by LCTs on 16 August and 17 August. This movement of essential supplies at a time when they were critically needed, and when roads were impassable to motor transport, hastened the close of the campaign. In this manner the Army requirements of artillery and mortar ammunition, rations, motor fuel, and other essential combat supplies were met. These coastal movements by sea served two purposes: they augmented the stocks of ammunition and rations being built up in Palermo from deep-draft vessels, and materially eased the strain on land transport. Road and rail transportation was greatly hampered by demolitions of bridges and cornice roads, minefields, and similar enemy action, while the terrain and long tortuous roads placed operational strain on trucks. Thus at times water transportation by craft was the only means available of ensuring prompt supply to the troops at the front by unloading immediately in the rear of our forces. Other landing ships and craft were engaged in lifting troops and equipment in execution of leap-frog landings on the North Coast.
13. With the fall of Messina on 17 August, enemy resistance collapsed and Sicily was fully occupied, though the build-up and maintenance continued. By 29 August the port of Palermo had been brought to 60 percent of its capacity as a result of salvage operations. During the period 28 July - 31 August, this port received 48 ships in addition to numerous landing craft. These ships comprised 5 personnel ships, 32 Liberty cargo ships and 11 coasters. During this period 120,706 deadweight tons were discharged at this port. The largest daily tonnage was 5,718 tons.
14. Although the plans provided for the employment of craft in the shore-to-shore assaults, and two follow-up movements to carry in the "tails" of the assault forces, in the execution of the plan the landing ships and craft were used for continuous ferrying and lightering service, until the island was fully reduced. The following is a summary of the trips made from Tunisian ports during this period (6-18 August):

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The total trips in craft by types from Tunisian ports during these six weeks were:

Other ships movements from Tunisian ports were:

Thus the grand total of all voyages of all types of ships and craft from Tunisian ports was 736, all voyages but 8 being made by landing ships and craft.

15. The breakdown of the loadings at ports is as follows:

    	TUNIS	BIZERTE	TOTAL
    Officers	2,860	5,123	7,983
    Enlisted Men	39,863	88,750	128,613
    Civilians	0	18	18
    Total personnel lift	42,723	93,891	136,614
    Vehicles	8,778	20,622	29,400
    Tanks	20	294	314
    Guns	76	658	734
    Ammunition, tons	3,181	3,738	6,919
    Stores, tons	3,488	10,201	13,689
    Airplanes, Cub	0	19	19
    Mail, bags	0	5,512	5,512
    Mules	0	304	304

    The Bizerte loading is further broken down into assault and follow-up totals, as follows:

    	ASSAULT	FOLLOW-UP	TOTAL
    Officers	1,475	3,648	5,123
    Enlisted men	25,564	63,186	88,750
    Civilians	5	13	18
    Total personnel	27,044	66,847	93,891
    Vehicles	3,500	17,122	20,622
    Tanks	230	64	294
    Guns	232	426	658
    Ammunition, tons Stores, tons	6,677	7,262	13,939
    Airplanes, Cub	3	16	19
    Mail, bags	0	5,512	5,512
    Mules	64	240	304

    The 658 guns are broken down, as follows:

    37mm	226
    40mm	114
    57mm	58
    75mm	8
    90mm	95
    105mm	103
    155mm	54
    Total	658