Chapter VI. Logistics
A careful study was made of both the eastern and western beaches of Iwo Jim and plans were prepared for the landing on either side as the weather might dictate. It was apparent that the beaches and beach areas were of extremely soft and shifting sand, which, coupled with their steep gradient and high banks just inshore, indicated that considerable difficulty would be experienced in landing vehicles.
In anticipation of this trouble a large number of runner sleds were provided. In addition the shore party developed and tested a means of hinging marston matting and assembled it in 50-foot units "accordion pleated." Altogether more than 8 miles of this matting were prepared and loaded on sleds in such a manner as to make it available for quick use on the beaches. This proved to be a lifesaver and was responsible to a large degree for the early rapid supply of assault requirements.
At the beach our troubles began. Many of the LVT's and LVT(A)'s temporarily bogged down in the soft sand and were swamped by a steep, quick-breaking single line of breakers about 4 feet high. Some tanks stripped their tracks while trying to make a turn in this soft sand after debarkation from LSM's. LCVP's and LCM's, although beaching initially without difficulty, were swamped either by a large wave breaking over their sterns or by a heavy backwash of surf rushing in over their ramps. These boats broached and by the end of Dog-Day the beaches were almost completely blocked by various types of craft.
The ordinary salvage facilities provided by LCPR's were completely inadequate to take care of this situation and the subsequent clearing of the beaches was made extremely difficult by the fact that the surf quickly filled these boats with sand and also built a bar of sand around them. (See pictorial record pages 8 and 9.)
Having experienced difficulty in previous operations with small boats left in the area at night during the assault period, after parent ships had retired, a Small Craft Group was organized to administer and care for miscellaneous small craft. Boats left in the area by retiring ships were directed to the Small Craft Group Commander for securing and berthing and messing of crews, for which two LST(M)'s were available after Dog-Day. This system proved highly satisfactory and is recommended for future operations.
The evacuation of casualties during this operation showed a marked improvement over any previous operations of this group. Great care had been taken in thoroughly briefing all medical personnel involved before the operation commenced and in providing special medical equipment such as whole blood, which was used here for the first time. Four LST's were outfitted for use as casualty evacuation ships and a large medical staff placed on board. Shortly after How-Hour these vessels each launched one 3x12 barge and secured it alongside and moved to a position close to the control vessel off each regimental beach. Casualties coming from the beach, principally in DUKW's and LVT's, were taken aboard the barge and thence by crane to the LST where they were given early medical treatment and then evacuated to transports by LCVP's. During the operation these four vessels handled an approximate total of 6,136 casualties and unquestionably contributed materially to saving many lives. The Ozark (LCV 1) proved her worth in handling of casualties. Prior to the operation extra medical personnel had been placed aboard her and on her departure she evacuated a total of 407 casualties.
The lack of hospital facilities ashore was a source of constant concern because of the possibility of bad weather prohibiting embarkation of casualties. It is recommended that every effort be made, particularly in a situation such as this where no suitable harbor was available, to establish hospital facilities ashore at the earliest practicable time.
Transfer during darkness of casualties from the
evacuation control LST's to designated APA's created difficulties which require further solution. LCVP's used for this purpose in many instances had great difficulty in locating the vessel to which directed. Ships designated to receive casualties should display distinctive light groups for this purpose at all times except when danger of air raid or enemy gunfire exists. Transport Squadron Commanders must take positive steps to assure that evacuation control LST's are kept fully informed regarding the designation of ships allocated for receiving casualties. As a general rule night transfers should be reduced to a minimum.
There were a few instances reported of transports refusing to receive casualties from LCVP's after these craft were given orders by evacuation control officers of LST(H)'s to unload their casualties to these ships. Reasons given were that the transports were overtaxed or were not the ships designated as casualty receivers. This condition must not occur.
The boats returning from the beach during the early stages of the assault were found to be inadequate for the evacuation of casualties from the LST(H)'s to the transports, and it was necessary for the TransRon commanders to detail more boats to each LST(H) for this service.
It is recommended that TransDiv commanders maintain close liaison with their assigned LST(H)'s and assign additional LCVP's as circumstances require.
LSV Ozark, serving as an emergency hospital ship during the night and when transports left the objective, rendered invaluable service, and a greater number could well be used in future operations.
Recommend that medical personnel of landing force hospitals and garrison hospitals be temporarily detailed to this type of ship to augment their medical complement until such time as their services are required ashore.
From: Commanding General Expeditionary Troops (CTF-56)
Four of these ships had been given additional medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to prepare them to receive casualties and act as Evacuation Control Ships. They also had a few structural changes made and carried a pontoon barge for transferring casualties. One of the four had reefer boxes, a flake ice machine and the personnel assigned to operate the blood bank. It was stocked with whole blood and acted as a floating blood bank until the blood bank was established ashore on D-plus-8. All of these ships, however, brought LVT's to the target and were converted for casualty use after these were unloaded.
The design of these ships makes it difficult to care for casualties when empty and after being unloaded they were covered with dirt and grease. the illumination in the tank deck is very poor and the operating facilities are entirely inadequate. The medical personnel assigned to them was not sufficient to care for the very large number of casualties passing through them in spite of heroic effort on their part. On D-day from 0900 to 1530 there had been 1,230 casualties evacuated through these LST's. This was slightly more than three casualties per minute. After a few days and nights of this the medical officers and corpsmen were exhausted.
The barges alongside for transferring casualties were usually violently unstable. At times the barges would rise on the swell to the level of the LST deck and on one occasion the barges had to be cut loose. However, the transfer of casualties to transports from LVT's was equally difficult, if not impossible at times, and some means of transferring casualties from LVT's to LCVP's was needed since the LCVP's could be hoisted on the davits to the deck level of the transport and casualties brought aboard this way. LVT's and DUKW's cannot be hoisted in this manner. It is easier to handle casualties in a DUKW than in an LVT, apparently due to the ease of handling the DUKW in a seaway. It has more freeboard, steers easier, and is very roomy. One LST served one beach and evacuated casualties to its transport division or to the hospital ship. With the establishment of hospitals ashore the LST's were withdrawn and at that time more DUKW's were available to facilitate the movement of casualties seaward.
It is believed that the Evacuation Control LST's served a very useful purpose, but if they are used for the care of casualties they should not be used for anything else and must be adequately staffed and equipped for this very important job. They must also have several structural alterations to allow for easy passage of the casualties from the
tank deck to the operating rooms and should have permanent installations for the care of casualties on the tank deck.
Casualties among corpsmen were very high, especially among front line units. In moving about to care for the wounded, they were subject to intense enemy fire and frequently were shot down alongside the man they were caring for. For this operation, each division was assigned approximately 5 percent additional corpsmen before the operation; however, the losses among corpsmen in one Marine Division (4th Mar. Div.) were approximately 38 percent and a little less in the others so that there was need for additional replacements and medical companies were levied on to furnish these. In one division this was carried to such an extent that by D-plus-Eight-Day, one medical company had been reduced to three Medical Officers and a few Marines and was completely inoperative as an organization. This is contrary to established doctrine and greatly hinders the care of the wounded. The hospital sections of the medical companies must not be disrupted to furnish replacements for front line units or there will be no one to care for the wounded after they are evacuated from the front lines.
From: Commander Amphibious Group Two (CTF 53 and CTG 51.21)
The rough weather and treacherous beach conditions created a beach salvage problem which far exceeded the capacity of the usual organization set up to handle it.
As our operations progress toward the Japanese homeland, rough weather conditions will generally prevail and immediate steps should be taken to perfect and expand our beach salvage organization.
A special beach salvage group should be organized. Vessels of that group should include small tugs, YTB's, LCI types, and specially equipped LCM's carrying pumps, shallow water diving units, and underwater burning outfit. This organization would be augmented during the assault phase by LCP(L)'s or LCPR's provided by Transport Squadron Commanders for minor salvage work on their own beaches.
In addition to the above, each assault transport should provide a mobile repair unit capable of above-water welding and minor hell and engine repair to landing craft afloat.
In the rough sea conditions prevailing at Iwo Jima the LST's, LSM's, LCT's, and smaller craft suffered extensive damage while alongside larger vessels. All available fenders were soon carried away and makeshift fenders proved inadequate. Cane fenders themselves caused considerable damage because of their small pressure area. Mounting lugs for causeways and pontoon barges on the sides of LST's were a particular source of damage to vessels and smaller craft alongside. In future operations it is most important that each large ship and LST be provided with suitable fenders or smal camels.
Unloading of assault shipping on Dog-Day and Dog-plus-One-Day was confined to LST's and LSM's, except for a floating reserve of LCVP's and LCM's maintained at each control vessel, loaded with ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. Surf conditions soon proved it useless to try landing supplies by small boats and by Dog-plus-One-Afternoon al unloading of transports was confined to LCT's and LSM's. APA's and AKA's were restricted to unloading "On Call" from Dog-plus-One to Dog-plus-Five. When shipping availability permits, APA's should carry ammunition, emergency rations, water, medical supplies, and vehicles only. All organizational gear should be loaded on the AKA's. Ordinarily the beach is never ready to receive on Dog-Day anything but this type of cargo. APA's loaded in this manner could completely unload immediately and retire from the area. As other types of supplies are needed and wanted on the beach the AKA's can supply it faster than the beach parties can handle.
The loading into LCT's and LSM's must be more carefully supervised by the commanding officers of transports. Many transports overloaded the smaller craft, or dumped the supplies into them giving no thought to the difficulties of unloading on the beach. In some cases large heavy boxes were loaded on top of an already overloaded LCT causing hours of delay on the beach in unloading.
The preloading of LST's again proved highly satisfactory, the only error being in loading of B rations. The preloaded supplies must be confined to supplies needed on the beach early in the operation.
LSM's should be preloaded with supplies in a
like manner as LST's to take advantage of the tonnage they can carry.
The loading of garrison assault units in assault troop shipping should be discontinued if practicable. Garrison assault units should be loaded in their own ships so they can be unloaded when needed without having to retain several partially loaded assault ships in the area.
Garrison echelons coming into hostile areas prior to the securing of the areas, must be prepared to start unloading immediately on arrival. They must be equipped to take care of themselves. Messing of unloading crews must be arranged for prior to departure. Rear echelons should see that ships of this class are properly prepared and fitted out before they sail. This is especially true when they are part of the assault shipping.
Two resupply ammunition ships had to be called into the area early in the operation. The first ship, Columbia Victory, arriving Dog-plus-Six. The ammunition needed was primarily mortar and artillery. The 155-mm. ammunition was all stowed in one hatch and the 105-mm stowed in two hatches, one of these being the same hatch as the 155-mm. The ammunition needed primarily by the troops being 155-mm. and 105-mm., it meant working only two hatches. This did not allow the ship to be worked at the required rate as if the different types of ammunition had been spread throughout the five hatches. The loading of the Joliet Victory was the same as the Columbia Victory, with all artillery ammunition in two hatches.
For future operations where the beaching of LST's is possible, it is recommended that LST's be loaded with about 1,000 tons of high priority ammunition. Experience has taught that only three or four types of ammunition is required by the troops in addition to the initial supply. If the LST's are not capable of beaching or unloading at a causeway, larger ships must be loaded so that all priority types of ammunition are available from all hatches.
The difficulty with pontoon barges and causeways have been discussed elsewhere. In future operations the following instructions should govern:
- They should not be launched in rough sea conditions.
- If any doubt exists, a few should be launched at a time until operating conditions are definitely determined.
- Procedure should be developed for assuring that engines are in operating condition prior to launching.
- A towing bridle should be provided. The sharp edges of pontoon sections quickly chafe through ordinary towing gear.
- All barges and causeways should have their numbers clearly painted on both sides and on the deck for identification in case of break-down and subsequent salvaging.
- Plans should prescribe a definite anchorage and beach area for these structures.
From: Commander Task Unit 53.4.2 (Commander LSM Group Fourteen)
On D-day the wind and sea were from the northeast; wind, force 6 knots; sea, slight swell; surf on the beach moderate. The LSM's carrying tanks experienced difficulty in landing their loads because the tanks bogged down off the end of the ramp, blocking the unloading. This necessitated many beachings. Also the wreckage on the beach, plus the marines pinned down at the water's edge left little space to land. These ships encountered severe mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. Later, when the shore party equipment LSM's landed, the beach was almost totally blocked with wrecked LCVP's, LVT's, LCM's, and tanks. These LSM's on first beachings landed only bulldozers and beach-matting; both items were sorely needed. It was impossible for wheeled vehicles to get any traction in the soft sand. Much of the shore party equipment was destroyed shortly after being landed.
The entire port side of all LSM's have been structurally weakened with seams split and frames and longitudinals buckled, bent, and broken. All equipment on the port superstructure deck has been damaged or carried away. This includes the 50-caliber and 20-mm. machine guns, ventilators, wherrys, fire fighting equipment, gun tubs, davits, stanchions, life rafts, etc.
The port sides have been pushed in from 6 to 10 inches, buckling decks, breaking piping and wiring, damaging equipment, and springing the watertight doors so that they cannot be closed. Holes were punctured above and below the water line by submerged wreckage, broaching landing craft, and loose pontoon barges.
All propellers were bent or damaged; several stern anchors were lost. Cargo nets fouled the screws of over half the LSM's operating.
It is recommended that adequate camels 40 to 50 feet long and 4 feet wide be used in this type unloading. These would tend to spread the strain of impact over a large area and lessen the damage.
The bough fenders used by the transports smashed huge dents in the sides between the frames.
Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the need for efficient salvage operation and clearing the wreckage off the beaches. The loose causeways and pontoon barges were a deadly hazard and should be kept under control. Moreover, a great effort should be made to keep cargo nets and lines out of the water.
From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Fayette" (APA-43)
Palletized cargo, where it can be handled as planned in LCM's and LCVP's has distinct advantages. Unfortunately, several difficulties arose which made it necessary to break the vast majority of pallets on this ship before unloading them. The first difficulty was that the loading plans of the ship did not anticipate pallet loading so a certain amount of the pallets had to be broken in order to get all the cargo on board. The remaining pallets were stowed under and around the squares of the hatches where they could be reached by the cargo hook. The pallets that were loaded into LCM's were handled on the beach quickly and efficiently. However, only a small part of the bulk cargo was unloaded into LCM's. Most of it was loaded into an LST, an LSM, and an LCT. All the pallets loaded into these craft had to be broken and handled by cargo nets, resulting in delays and increased labor.
Cargo or "trip" tickets. The requirement that each net load of cargo be accompanied by a signed mimeographed form filled out in triplicate showing exactly what was in the net, was a source of constant delay and irritation. The plan was to retain one copy on board, deliver one copy to the control officer, and one to the beachmaster. The system finally broke down under its own weight. It is recommended that "trip tickets" be abolished in future operations.
The boat control system was so complex and rigid that boat coxswains had difficulty getting through to discharge their cargo even when all beach conditions were favorable. By the time the coxswain had delivered trip tickets and received orders from the various control officers to "wait" he was very nearly discouraged. When a ship has its own assigned beach, its own beachmaster, its own boat group commander, it is recommended that the boat group commander be allowed to send in his boats as they arrive and beach conditions permit. This is the system that has worked in an efficient, simple, and speedy manner in previous operations.
From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Talladega" (APA-208)
The "Hot Cargo" pool of LCVP's while considered an excellent scheme under suitable conditions, did not work out well in this operation due to the nature of the beach and bad surf conditions. A large proportion of cargo loaded into "Hot Cargo" boats had to be loaded back aboard ship and sent ashore in larger craft.
From: Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Sibley" (APA-206)
It was plainly evident that carrying life rafts over the side abreast No. 4 hatch or anywhere else below the main deck level is impractical when handling LSM's or LCT's alongside. These rafts have been removed and stowage found for them inboard clear of the side.
From: Commander Transport Division Forty-five
The value derived from submitting cargo unloading reports every 2 hours is questioned. With few LCT's and LSM's available and the impossibility of discharging cargo on the beaches using ship's boats, the transports often went hours without unloading. The cargo unloading reports in those cases did not change. It is believed that three cargo unloading reports a day would suffice to present an accurate picture. Any reduction in routine reports required will reduce the communication load and permit priority messages getting through more rapidly.
From: Commanding Officer LCT(6) Group 48 (CTU 53.7.5)
The amount of underwater damage is best illustrated by the fact that before the assault was
over, each LCT had been drydocked in an LSD at least once, five of them twice. The causes were three: First, failure to remove pad-eyes welded on sides of LCT's to secure launching ways; second, submerged wrecks on beach; and third, collisions at beach with other craft. All three combined to produce an unusually large number of holes in voids, patching of which required the cutting away of whole sections of underwater plating. The first cause could easily be eliminated, either by countersinking the pad-eyes, making them removable, or by adding extra plating behind them. The second cause was a natural part of the operation, as was the third. Heavy surf caused ships to swing into one another while on the beach. Holes in the bottom were relatively few, but those in generator rooms caused much trouble. Vibration of generators created cracks in deck. Damage to shafts was not widespread, but there was much operational time lost due to fouled screws, arising from debris on beach. LCT(6) 1154 twice lost its starboard screw due to improper size of shaft. Due to necessity of continuing operations, no attempt to repair ships was made during the first 2 weeks except as ships became inoperable. Repair facilities were inadequate, but only because of the excessive amount of damage suffered. At the end of 2 weeks, extensive repairs were begun and are continuing.
From: Commanding General, Headquarters Fourth Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
The tactical loading of assault elements in LST's was necessarily different for the Iwo Jima operation than in previous ones in which the division had participated. For the Saipan operation, at least 8 LST's had been provided for each assault RCT, allowing 4 for each assault BLT in which 3 rifle companies, BLT support elements, and a proportional part of the LVT(A)'s were embarked. The LVT(A)'s were distributed equally throughout the 16 LST's assigned assault RCT's. Because of the limited number available to the division for the Iwo Jima operation, only 7 LST's could be allotted to each assault RCT while 5 were assigned to the artillery regiment. Each assault RCT in turn assigned 3 to each assault BLT and embarked LVT(A)'s of its Armored Amphibian Company in the remaining 1 (a hospital LST). This plan did not provide equitable distribution of personnel, LST's embarking assault companies being overloaded beyond the capacity limit assigned by higher echelon, particularly those carrying radar and pontoon barge personnel. LST's with armored amphibians were loaded to less than one-third capacity in personnel. It is believed that in the future assignment of LST's for an operation, consideration should be given to recommendations submitted by the division which bases its requirements on the tactical plan, involving the maintenance of tactical unity, rather than upon a mathematical solution arrived at by dividing the number of LVT's and LVT(A)'s to be lifted by the capacity of an LST.
From: Commander Amphibious Forces, United States Pacific Fleet (Commander Joint Expeditionary Forces)
IWO JIMA ASSAULT FORCES
|Unit||Officers||Enlisted||Short tons (including vehicles)||MT (including vehicles)||Number of vehicles|
|Fourth Marine Division:|
|Fifth Marine Division:|
|Third Marine Division:|
|Corps (and attached garrison):|
|Total assault force||4,369||76,249||84,790||229,014||7,311|
Measurement tons per man
|Fourth Marine Division||2.50|
|Fifth Marine Division||2.61|
|Third Marine Division||1.89|
The following articles will be stowed at the after end of the tank deck of each LST receiving this load:
|1||.30-caliber carbine, M1||90,000||30||30||3,030|
|2||.30-caliber ball (5 rounds)||61,500||41||61||4,592|
|3||.30-caliber ball (8 rounds)||72,296||59||88||6,372|
|4||.30-caliber tracer (8 rounds)||36,000||24||36||2,640|
|5||.30-caliber AP and tracer (belted 4-1)||152,000||152||134||12,160|
|7||.50-caliber AP and tracer (belted 2-2-1)||11,340||54||104||4,320|
|8||12-gauge No. 00 buckshot||1,500||3||3||198|
|9||37-mm. cannister M-2||140||7||15||714|
|10||37-mm. HE, N63 w/f BD, M58||260||13||27||1,183|
|11||37-mm. APC N51, w/tracer||260||13||30||1,300|
|12||60-mm. mortar, HE M49A2, w/f PD M52||2,872||359||438||18,237|
|13||75-mm. gun, HE, M48 (SC) A1||147||49||83||3,920|
|14||75-mm. gun, HE, M48 (NC) w/f PD M54||147||49||83||3,920|
|15||75-mm. gun, APC M61, M66 A and tracer||369||123||227||9,963|
|16||81-mm. mortar HE, M43A1, w/f PD, M52||490||82||158||5,986|
|17||81-mm. mortar, M56||392||196||208||8,310|
|18||Rocket AT, 2.36" M6-H3||200||10||33||1,270|
|19||Grenade, hand, frag. Mk. II w/f N10A3||1,625||65||82||3,705|
|20||Grenade, adapter, M1||1,008||21||36||922|
|21||Grenade, adapter, T-2||48||1||2||40|
|22||Grenade, hand illum.||200||8||10||463|
|23||Grenade, hand inc., frag||48||4||5||180|
|24||Grenade, rifle, AT M9A1||940||94||94||3,008|
|25||Cartridge, gren, carbine M61|
|Total cube and weight||1,769||90,921|
|Water (5-gallon cans) 4,000 gallons||800||720||44,000|
|Toilet paper--1 case (100 rolls)|
|Laundry soap--2 cases (120 bars)|
|Salt water soap--2 cases (40 bars)|
|Wire: 50 rolls, concertina||150||2,750|
|Distilled water (5-gallon can)||1||1||50|
|Rags (2 bales)||2||3||50|
2. The following articles will be secured to the main deck as far forward as possible on each LST receiving this load:
|Oil (SAE 50, detergent)||5||55||2,500|
|Oil (SAE 30, detergent)||1||11||500|
|Grease, No. 2 type (cane)||8||8||572|
|Rust preventative (drums)||2||22||1,000|
3. The following articles will receive special stowage in accordance with current safety regulations as directed by AdComPhibsPac.:
|1||2-inch mortar, M3 bomb smoke, M14M2||306||17||19||765|
|2||60-mm. mortar, illum. M83||320||40||49||2,032|
|3||60-mm. mortar, smoke, W.P. T6||144||18||22||914|
|4||60-mm. mortar, smoke, H.C. T8||136||17||21||864|
|5||75-mm. gun, smoke, W.P. Mk. II||74||25||44||2,019|
|6||81-mm. mortar, smoke, W.P. M57||99||33||56||1,650|
|7||Rocket AT, smoke W.P.||96||8||19||680|
|8||Grenade, smoke, H.C. M8||200||8||14||480|
|9||Grenade, smoke, W.P. M15||850||34||61||2,482|
|10||Grenade, rifle, smoke, W.P.||40||4||5||144|
|11||Grenade, hand, colored assorted||150||6||9||288|
|12||Grenade, colored t8E1 assorted||40||4||4||128|
|13||Grenade signal colored smoke assorted||100||(1)||(1)||(1)|
|14||Light signal Very--Green Star, Red Star, White Star||(2)||(2)||(2)||(2)|
|15||Signal ground assorted||144||3||7||276|
|16||Flare trip, M-48||(3)||(3)||(3)||(3)|
|17||Flare trip, M-49||250||10||18||590|
2. 1 box assorted in each of 3 LST's.
3. 121 per LST--packing not known.
|Day||Date||LST(H) 929||LST(H) 930||LST(H) 931||LST(H) 1033||Daily total|
SUMMARY OF NAVAL BATTLE CASUALTIES
|Transports, Group Able (53.1)||12||19||39|
|Beach parties, Group Able||0||3||1|
|Transports, Group Baker (53.2)||3||77||15|
|Beach parties, Group Baker||4||44||11|
|Transports, Reserve Group (51.1.1)||4||2||0|
|Beach parties, Reserve Group||0||0||0|
|Carriers and support carriers||25||87||362|
|DD's, APD's, and DMS's||31||55||9|
|Support planes (CTF 51, 24 planes)||13||4||13|
|Small craft groups||0||1||0|
|Mortar support groups||0||4||0|
|Pontoon barge and LCT group||0||1||0|
|Gunboat support group||17||58||0|
|Net and buoy unit||17||44||0|
|Seaplane base group (AV)||0||8||0|
|Ditched plane 46V609||0||6||0|
|D plus 1||20 Feb||264||1,562||481||3,055||1,894|
|D plus 2||21 Feb||426||2,116||355||3,969||919|
|D plus 3 and 4||22,23 Feb||870||4,711||670||6,251||2,282|
|D plus 5||24 Feb||1,021||5,284||537||6,845||594|
|D plus 6||25 Feb||1,195||6,006||549||7,750||905|
|D plus 7||26 Feb||1,347||6,791||484||8,622||872|
|D plus 8||27 Feb||1,556||7,984||586||10,126||1,504|
|D plus 9||28 Feb||1,616||8,418||575||10,661||535|
|D plus 10||1 Mar||1,845||9,150||599||11,595||934|
|D plus 11||2 Mar||2,005||9,780||545||12,333||738|
|D plus 12||3 Mar||2,278||10,632||541||13,451||1,118|
|D plus 13||4 Mar||2,468||10,556||631||13,655||204|
|D plus 14||5 Mar||2,620||10,753||546||13,919||264|
|D plus 15||6 Mar||2,715||11,054||452||14,221||302|
|D plus 16||7 Mar||2,869||11,505||430||14,804||583|
|D plus 17||8 Mar||3,055||12,251||435||15,741||937|
|D plus 18||9 Mar||3,191||12,723||445||16,359||618|
|D plus 19||10 Mar||3,315||13,203||421||18,204||581|
|D plus 20||11 Mar||3,488||13,785||419||17,692||752|
|D plus 21||12 Mar||3,653||14,130||421||18,204||512|
|D plus 22||13 Mar||3,765||14,403||434||18,629||398|
|D plus 23||14 Mar||3,878||14,750||434||19,062||460|
|D plus 24||15 Mar||4,112||15,102||437||19,653||591|
|D plus 25||16 Mar||4,206||15,290||423||19,928||275|
|D plus 26||17 Mar||4,305||15,474||417||20,196||268|
|D plus 27||18 Mar||4,357||15,511||397||20,265||69|
|D plus 28||19 Mar||4,403||15,598||391||20,392||127|
|D plus 29||20 Mar||4,457||15,677||359||20,493||101|
|D plus 30||21 Mar||4,503||15,732||353||20,538||95|
|D plus 31||22 Mar||4,540||15,820||336||20,696||108|
|D plus 32||23 Mar||4,590||15,954||301||20,845||149|
|D plus 33||24 Mar||4,590||15,954||301||20,845||0|
|D plus 34||25 Mar||4,590||15,954||301||20,845||0|
|D plus 35||26 Mar||4,590||15,969||301||20,860||15|
The Steep Beach Gradient, the Surf, and the Volcanic Sand Caused Numerous Small Craft To Broach--Note Flooding From backwash Over Ramp.
LST's and LSM's Are Force To Land Close Together Due to Wreckage and Lack of Exits Over Steep Terrace.
Though Broached, Prompt Action Saved the Supplies.
Unimproved Roads Impeded the Movement of Supplies.
Lack of Exits Caused Congestion of Supplies on Beaches.
Bulldozers Reduced the Terraces Making Exits to the Lateral Roads.
Preassembled Marston Matting and Runner Sleds were Laid on Roads and Beach Exits.
Handling Palletized 105-mm. Ammunition.
A General View of RED Beach Showing Matting on Roads.
Unloading of Pontoon Barge With an LVT.
Delivering Cargo on Runner Sleds--Note Casualty Evacuation station in Background.
Beach and Surf Conditions Wrecked Numerous barges. Uncollected Cargo Nets on the Beach Went Adrift and Fouled Propellers of Small Craft.
Dog-Day-Plus-Eleven. Opposites With the Same Fate.
The Marston Matting showed the Effects of Heavy Traffic but the Supplies Were Cleared From the Beaches.
LSD Renders Assistance to a Pontoon Barge.
LCT 1029 Broached on Dog-Day-Plus-Eleven and Eventually Had to Be Sunk at Sea.
Beach Scene, Beach YELLOW 2. Wrecked DUKW and AMTRACK--Jap Lugger, D-Plus-2-Day.
Beach Scene, Beaches GREEN, RED 1 and 2. Note Broached Pontoon Causeways, D-Plus-7-Day.
Slow Unloading--Each Carton of Rations Manhandled Twice. Apparently No Trucks or LVT's Loaded in the LSM, Being Used. Instead Roller Conveyors Are Used.
Little Space to Beach Among the Wreckage. Note the LSM Beach Mat in the Foreground. They Proved very Beneficial on D-Day.
Wrecked LVT's on YELLOW Beach, D-Plus-2-Day.
LST's Unloading. Note Marston Matting in Foreground, Beach RED 1, D-Plus-7-Day.
LST's and LSM's Unloading on GREEN and RED Beaches, Suribachi Mountain in Background, D-plus-5-Day.
View of Island Looking North. Unloading on Southeastern Beaches, D-plus-5-Day.
Dog-plus-Five Aerial View of Suribachi and the Transport Area.
The Southern Half of the East Beaches on the Afternoon of Dog-Plus-Five.