Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations:
Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
Specialist in Naval Affairs
January 14, 2011
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy's current IW operations are those being carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the Navy's contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs) - individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006. The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations.
The Navy's riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy's SEALs (the Navy's Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The three current riverine squadrons were established in 2006-2007. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the establishment of a new reserve component riverine training squadron that is to complement the three existing active component riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron is intended to increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet combatant commander (COCOM) demands.
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and in January 2010 published a vision statement for irregular warfare.
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (GAO-10-794) discusses the APS.
The Navy's IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
|Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations||1|
|Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan||1|
|Individual Augmentees (IAs)||4|
|IW Initiatives in Navy Budget||5|
|Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations||9|
|Navy IW and CT Initiatives||10|
|Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement||10|
|Navy Irregular Warfare Office||11|
|Global Maritime Partnership||11|
|Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)||11|
|Potential Oversight Issues for Congress||14|
|Definition of Navy IW Activities||14|
|Navy IW Budget Priorities||14|
|Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets||14|
|Additional Oversight Questions||15|
|Legislative Activity for FY2012||16|
|Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011||17|
|Appendix B. Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement||21|
|Author Contact Information||29|
The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy's IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations1
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Among the most readily visible of the Navy's current IW operations are those being carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated on October 12, 2010, that:
... I want to be very clear, that we in the United States Navy, every Sailor, is fully committed to the operations and the fights that are being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It may come as a surprise to many that the United States Navy has 15,000 Sailors on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the Horn of Africa. That is 3,000 more Sailors that are serving that are on our ships in the Middle East. In fact, when you combined [sic] the 15,000 ashore and the roughly 12 or so thousand at sea, our presence in the Middle East is about the same as the United States Marine Corps. It has been that way for some time and it will continue along those lines. And even though the forces at sea may not be view[ed] as contributing toward the operations there and [sic: in fact] 30 percent of the fixed-wing aircraft that fly over our troops in Afghanistan are flying from the decks of the United States Navy aircraft carriers to support the ongoing operations there.2
The Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated in early 2010 that:
The Navy has 53,000 active and reserve sailors continually deployed in support of the contingency operations overseas serving as members of carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, Special Operating Forces, Seabee units, Marine forces, medical units, and as IAs [individual augmentees]. Our Sailors are fully engaged on the ground, in the air, and at sea in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the ground, our Navy has 12,300
active and reserve Sailors in Central Command supporting Navy, Joint Force and Combatant Commander requirements. Navy Commanders are leading six of the twelve U.S.-lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A significant portion of the combat air missions over Afghanistan are flown by naval air forces. Our elite teams of Navy SEALs [i.e., Sea-Air-Land special operations forces] are heavily engaged in combat operations, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoons are defusing Improvised Explosive Devices and landmines. Our SEABEE construction battalions are rebuilding schools andrestoring critical infrastructure. Navy sealift is delivering the majority of heavy war equipment to CENTCOM, while Navy logisticians are ensuring materiel arrives on time. Our Navy doctors are providing medical assistance in the field and at forward operating bases. Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine Corps personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling, airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders staffs. On the water, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Riverine forces are working closely with the Iraqi Navy to safeguard Iraqi infrastructure and provide maritime security in key waterways. Navy forces are also intercepting smugglers and insurgents and protecting Iraqi and partner nation oil and gas infrastructure. We know the sea lanes must remain open for the transit of oil, the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy, and our ships and sailor are making that happen.3
The Department of the Navy also stated:
On any given day there are approximately 12,300 Sailors ashore and another 9,800 afloat throughout the U.S. Central Command region conducting riverine operations, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, and other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the U. S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations, port and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations. Included in our globally sourced forces are 15,600 IAs serving in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the training pipeline or on station. As these operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces committed to them will likely evolve, thereby producing changes to the overall force posture of naval forces. Long after the significant land component presence is reduced, naval forces will remain forward...
Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide oversight for reconstruction efforts in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom...
We are refocusing this strategic capability more intensely in Afghanistan in an effort to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia including Taliban, al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narcoterrorists, and any other antigovernment elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our increased efforts to deter or defeat aggression and improve overall security and counter violent extremism and terrorist networks advance the interests of the U.S. and the security of the region. The FY 2010/FY 2011 contingency operations requests support the expansion of capabilities sufficient to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements.4
More specifically, the Navy states that operations performed by Navy personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan include the following:
close air support (CAS) and airborne reconnaissance operations, in which Navy aircraft account for 30% of all such missions;
expeditionary electronic warfare operations, including operations to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 75% of airborne electronic attack operations in Iraq, 100% of such operations in Afghanistan, and operations to counter insurgent and extremist network communications;
intelligence and signals intelligence operations, including operations to identify, map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF);
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, including defusing IEDs, clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution;
riverine warfare operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam;
maritime security operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S. infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms and pipelines;
medical and dental services in Iraq and Afghanistan provided by a total of more than 1,800 naval medical personnel;
logistics operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait, and providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms;
engineering and construction operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and equipping Iraqi engineers;
provincial reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
legal operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting Iraqis in drafting governing documents.
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy states that its IW operations also include the following:
security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries
disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in recent years; and
counter-piracy operations, which have increased since 2008.5
as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those countries;
The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy's role in IW include the following:
enhancing regional awareness, which enables better planning, decision making, and operational agility;
building maritime partner capability and capacity, so as to deny sanctuaries to violent extremists; and
outcome-based application of force, so as to maintain continuous pressure on extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.
Admiral Roughead stated on October 12, 2010, that:
The multi-mission and irregular warfare capabilities we deliver in support of joint task forces in the Philippines and the horn of Africa, for example, directly support anti-terrorism efforts. Our counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have engendered unprecedented international cooperation at sea.
Our demonstrated ability to partner with other agencies in the U.S. government, as well as public and private international organizations, have proven crucial in most effectively building partner capacity in Africa, South America, and the Pacific Rim.
It is worth noting that the most recent Africa Partnership Station, an activity that is based on one of our amphibious ships in the most recent planning conference that was held in Naples, Italy, 25 nations came together to participate in that endeavor in preventative security and the rule of law. And since 2005, from our ships alone, we have treated over a half a million patients in Africa, Asia, Central and South America.
Across such day-to-day engagement efforts to counter irregular challenges, naval forces preserve both the option and the capability to deliver decisive force in the event instability becomes disorder, but with the cumulative weight of established local relationships and political legitimacy in our favor.6
Individual Augmentees (IAs)
Many of the Navy's contributions to irregular warfare operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)--individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The Department of the Navy stated in early 2009 that:
The Navy provides approximately 15,600 sailors in the form of IA's, including 3,800 personnel in the training pipeline, to fulfill the OCO mission requirements of the Combatant Commanders (COCOM). Approximately 8,500 of these IA's are funded in the baseline budget filling core missions such as maritime and port security, airlift support, and JTF/COCOM staff support. An additional 2,700 IA' s are funded in the baseline budget in support of adaptive core missions including Counter IED, Combat Support, Military Police, Base Operations, Intel and Medical. The overseas contingency request includes 4,400 over strength requirements for temporary Navy overseas IA missions such as civil affairs, provincial reconstruction, training teams, detainee operations and customs inspections. IAs are making a significant impact in more than 20 countries around the world. They are assigned individually, rather than as part of a traditional unit, to fill shortages or provide specialized knowledge or skill sets. IAs have been assigned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Djibouti, Liberia, Chad, Cuba, Bahrain, Qatar, Colombia, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Oman, Pakistan, Germany, Spain, Italy, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti. These IA's provide commanders with mission tailored, globally distributed forces. The Navy identifies both active and reserve service members with specific skill sets to fill IA roles, and the Marine Corps relies principally on activated reserve members to fill IA positions vacated by forward-deployed active component Marines.7
IW Initiatives in Navy Budget
Discussion in FY2011 Department of the Navy Budget Highlights Book
The Department of the Navy's FY2011 budget highlight books states:
The FY 2011 [Department of the Navy] budget is the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements and risks and is consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Enhancements in the area of Irregular Warfare (IW) are realized through increased support of Special Operations Forces and expanded capacity for littoral, brown water, and riverine missions.8
It also states:
The FY 2011 budget includes the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.9
It also states:
In keeping with the priorities of the Secretary of Defense, the FY 2011 budget continues to rebalance our investment programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars of today and the most-likely scenarios in the future, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.
The FY 2011 budget concentrates investment in platforms and systems that maintain the advantage against future threats and across the full spectrum of operations. Procurement of
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and capacity building reflect that shift. However, even as the Department begins to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current conflicts and other potential irregular campaigns, we still must contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries--from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads.10
It also states:
The Navy's shipbuilding budget represents the best balance between high-end, hybrid and irregular warfare capabilities. It funds a continuum of forces ranging from the covert Virginia class submarine, the multi-mission DDG-51 destroyer, the multi-role Landing Helicopter Assault Replacement (LHA(R)), to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHS V) with their greater access to littoral areas. This balance continues to pace future threat capabilities while fully supporting current irregular warfare operations and supporting maritime security and stability operations in the littorals.11
The book mentions the irregular warfare capabilities of the Navy's new P-8 aircraft,12 states that Department of the Navy research and development initiatives support both traditional and irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs,13 and states more generally that asymmetric and irregular warfare constitute one of 13 focus areas for the science and technology (S&T) portion of the Department of the Navy's research and development efforts.14
The book states the following regarding the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of the Department of the Navy's proposed FY2011 budget:
The current request includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair, as well as equipment replacement. These costs include aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field logistics, as well as IAs, activated reservists and other special pays. Navy is requesting funding for 4,400 IAs in the FY 2011 OCO request for service members filling non-traditional Navy missions such as provincial reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, training teams, customs inspections, counter IED, and combat support. Finally, both the FY 2010 and the FY 2011 full year requests reflect the initial shift in forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy requests $3.9 billion in FY 2010 for supplemental requirements and $18.5 billion for FY 2011 to support increased OPTEMPO for contingency operations. Since 2009, total funding trends reflect the Department's efforts to reduce reliance on supplemental appropriations and include OCO costs with the budget request. Figure 6 reflects the current status of FY 2009, FY 2010, and FY 2011 funding for OCO.
The FY 2011 OCO O&M request specifically provides the resources required to meet increased CENTCOM demand, to include a substantial increase in flight hours associated with the shift from OIF [Operational Iraqi Freedom--i.e., operations in Iraq] to OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom--i.e., operations in Afghanistan] and the increased Carrier
Strike Group presence that ensures there are no Air Tasking Order gaps; the Navy s FY 2010 OCO appropriation did not fully capture OEF execution requirements.
The supplemental request for FY 2010 and the full-year request for FY 2011 supports the deployment, operation and sustainment of two regimental combat teams, a division-level headquarters unit, Seabee battalions, aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, transportation of personnel and equipment into theater, and associated enabling forces to Afghanistan. The additional funding will support expansion into new areas of operation and establishment of a new command within the southern region of Afghanistan. Increased funding is also needed for service contracts supporting unmanned aerial systems (UAS) providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and additional in-theater maintenance. The amendment will also fund increased fuel costs in FY 2010.15
Longer List of Navy IW Budget Initiatives
The Navy states that a longer list of Navy budget initiatives for creating or expanding its IW capabilities includes the following, which are not necessarily listed in any particular order of priority:
shifting funding for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (or NECC--see "Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)" below) from the wartime operations part of the Navy's budget into the Navy's "base" budget (aka, the "regular" part of the Navy's budget);
delivering expanded counter-IED and EOD capabilities;
deploying riverine squadrons and maritime expeditionary support squadrons;
training Navy personnel in foreign languages, regional affairs, and cultures;
using the JFK Irregular Warfare Center at the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI) to provide intelligence support to joint IW/SOF operations;
ship operation and acquisition, including:
using ships (such as amphibious ships) as partnership stations, such as the Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) (see "Partnership Stations" below);
using ships (such as surface combatants and amphibious ships) for anti-piracy operations;
using hospital ships for humanitarian-assistance operations;
procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs);16
procuring Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), which are high-speed sealift ships;
ending procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers and restarting procurement of DDG-51 Aegis destroyers;17
- operating four Trident submarines that have been converted into cruise missile and SOF-support submarines (SSGNs);18
accelerating acquisition of the P-8 multi-mission aircraft (MMA), the Navy's intended successor to the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft;
accelerating acquisition of certain unmanned systems, including:
the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS--an unmanned aircraft that is to be flown form Navy aircraft carriers);
a sea-based, medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);
the small tactical unmanned aerial system (STUAS);
expanding the Navy's sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities;19and
expanding the Navy's cyber warfare operations force.
A separate list of Navy budgetary areas of emphasis for IW includes the following:
ships and aircraft;
persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;
language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC);
operations to build partnerships with other countries and to expand partner capacities;
tools for fusing information from various sources.
In addition, the Navy states that with regard to rapidly fielding IW new capabilities, specific current items of focus include the following:
the Center for IW and Armed Groups (CIWAG)--an 18-month pilot project at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, whose current grant funding expires in June 2010;
a large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for ISR operations;
Saber Focus--a land-based unmanned air system (UAS) that would be established in an overseas location and used for ISR to support IW operations;
the use of ship-based Scan Eagle UAVs on converted Trident SSGNs for ISR operations;
a surface ship- or submarine-based Maritime UAS that would be used for ISR operations and possibly signals intelligence operations;
a naval intelligence fusion tool (NIFT) that is to integrate national and tactical ISR sensors so as to create real-time, actionable intelligence and targeting recommendations;
a ship-based system called real time regional gateway (RTRG) for improved exploitation of signals intelligence to support IW operations; and
an expansion in the size of helicopter squadrons that directly support special operations forces (SOF).
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
Navy CT operations include the following:
Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1, 2008,20 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;21
operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are directed against terrorists;22
surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters--an activity that includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);23
working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)-a real-time understanding of activities on the world's oceans;
assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;24
protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;25
protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and
engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly in the area of MDA.
The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that:
While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.26
Navy IW and CT Initiatives
The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement
The Navy in January 2010 published a vision statement for irregular warfare, which states in part:
The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability. We will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular forces.27
The full text of the vision statement is reproduced in the Appendix B.
Navy Irregular Warfare Office
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the Navy's words, to "institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency]." The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.28
Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership, initially known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states that
There is no one nation that can provide a solution to maritime security problems alone. A global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners--good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.29
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime partnership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discusses the APS.30
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006. The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy
organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:
maritime civil affairs;
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or "Seabee");
maritime expeditionary security;
guard battalion; and
expeditionary combat readiness.
The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that:
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders, centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of a scalable, selfsustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of the new "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." NECC forces and capabilities are integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy's operational Irregular Warfare (IW) efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OIF and OEF. In the FY 2011 budget, NECC funding is increased to address increased requirements for NECC Global Force Management (GFM) presence, operational plans surge, and equipment life cycle sustainment.
NECC provides integrated active and reserve forces, highlighted by the seamlessly integrated operational forces of naval construction (Seabees), maritime expeditionary security (formerly coastal warfare), navy expeditionary logistics (Cargo Handling Battalions), and the remaining mission capabilities throughout the command.
NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and compliment joint and coalition capabilities.31
The Department of the Navy also stated that:
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of the Navy's ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips 51% of Sailors supporting NECC missions, including Naval construction and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM AOR as emphasis shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, as well as maritime expeditionary security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.32
The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy's SEALs (the Navy's Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The riverine force currently consists of three active-duty squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors. The Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three squadrons) at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The three current riverine squadrons were established in 2006-2007.
As mentioned earlier, the Department of the Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for "the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands."33 The Navy states that the creation of the fourth riverine squadron is to involve the realignment of 238 Full Time Support and Selected Reservist billets, and that the new squadron is to be the first-ever reserve component riverine training squadron within NECC34
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Definition of Navy IW Activities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include the following:
Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of Navy IW operations?
Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy IW operations?
Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare?
Should the Navy's CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What is the relationship between IW operations and CT operations?
Navy IW Budget Priorities
Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding Navy IW budget priorities include the following:
Is the Navy's list of IW budget items sufficiently organized and prioritized to support congressional understanding and oversight, or to permit Congress to know where any additional dollars available for Navy IW operations might best be added?
Should items such as expanding Navy sea-based BMD capabilities, procuring DDG-51 destroyers, and Navy cyber security operations be included in a list of Navy IW budgetary initiatives?
Are the Navy's current IW-oriented UAV/UAS programs sufficiently coordinated?
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets
A third oversight issue for Congress--an issue related to, but more general than the previous one--is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating
to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were made available.
Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to the Navy for programs that support the Navy's role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a strategic reserve for the United States in potential conventional inter-state conflicts.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such activities?
Are the Navy's steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW and CT funding?
Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?35
Additional Oversight Questions
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy's IW and CT activities pose some additional potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on such activities?
Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?36
Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?37
Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the Navy)?
Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?
Are the Navy's recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What other Navy organizational changes might be needed?
Legislative Activity for FY2012
The Administration is expected to submit its proposed FY2012 defense budget to Congress on or about February 14, 2011.
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322)
The FY2011 Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act (H.R. 3082/P.L. 111-322 of December 22, 2010), also known as the FY2011 continuing resolution, generally funds defense programs at FY2010 funding levels through March 4, 2011.
FY2011 DOD Appropriations Bill (S. 3800)
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-295 of September 16, 2010) on S. 3800, recommends a $30 million reduction in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN), account line item for combat support forces, with the reduction being for unjustified growth in funding for NECC (page 31, line 1C6C). The report also recommends transferring another $192.8 million requested for NECC in the same line item to Title IX of the bill, the title covering overseas deployments and other programs (page 31, line 1C6C, and pages 207-208, line 1C6C).
The report recommends a $4 million increase in the Procurement, Defense Wide account line item for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combatant Craft, with the increase to be used for riverine special operations craft (page 1231, line 79); a $5 million increase in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&EN) line item for aviation survivability, with the request to be used for "AMTC Research and Development Riverine Command Boat" (page 150, line 27); and a $7 million reduction in the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account line item for standard boats, with the reduction being for an unjustified request for riverine patrol boats (pages 222-223, line 25).
FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
House (H.R. 5136)
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends increasing the Navy's FY2011 request for operation and maintenance funding by $38.9 million for NECC integrated logistics overhaul and equipment reset. (Page 226, line 170)
The report states:
Like the Army, the Navy's next-to-deploy forces are reporting high levels of readiness, but this also comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces that experience fewer training opportunities as resources are prioritized toward meeting Global Force Management demands. Navy requirements to support non-standard missions and requests for individual augmentees continue to grow, reducing opportunities for Navy sailors and officers to train for core missions with a full complement of personnel. (Page 220)
The report also states:
The committee commends the Secretary of Defense for proposing to increase the authorized end strength of the active duty Army to 569,400 in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. The committee believes this effort will continue to assist the Army with managing of the force, increasing readiness and dwell time for soldiers. The committee also recognizes the Secretary's efforts to support an increase in the Air Force end strength in order to support its growth in Nuclear Enterprise, Irregular Warfare/Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, aircraft maintenance, acquisition, cyber warfare and medical fields, as well as the Navy's additional manpower requirements for 4,400 personnel to fill individual augmentees assigned to overseas contingency operations to execute non-traditional Navy missions, such as provisional reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs training, counter IED and combat support functions. However, the committee remains concerned that these increases may not be sufficient to meet both the increased operational tempo and the increasing support requirements that are being generated by a nation that has been at war for over eight years. (page 278)
Section 343 of H.R. 5136 as reported would extend by two years (from September 30, 2010, to September 30, 2012) authority to reimburse expenses for certain Navy mess operations. Regarding Section 343, the committee's report states:
Section 343--Extension of Authority To Reimburse Expenses for Certain Navy Mess Operations
This section would amend section 1014 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110^-17) by extending until September 30, 2012, the authority of the Navy to purchase meals on behalf of embarked members of non-governmental organizations, host and partner nations, joint services, and U.S. Government agencies and foreign national patients treated on Navy ships and their escorts during the Navy's execution of humanitarian and civic assistance missions. (Pages 274-275)
Senate (S. 3454)
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454), states, in a discussion of amphibious ships, that Marine air-ground task forces are in high demand for certain missions, including, among others, irregular warfare, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and security cooperation (page 38). The report states that the Navy's current 313-ship force structure plan
is based on a 2005 Force Structure Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan. (Page 40)
The report also states:
Mobile intelligence and tracking systems
The budget request included $ 117.9 million in PE 63114N [i.e., a line item in the Navy's research and development account] for advanced technologies for power projection. The Navy has a science and technology objective to develop data fusion and analysis
technologies for actionable intelligence generation to defeat adaptive irregular threats in complex environments. In support of that objective, the committee recommends an increase of $2.0 million for research on data processing and fusion technologies to support multiple simultaneous detections, tracking, identification, and targeting of asymmetric and mobile threats in combat operations. (Page 60)
The report also states:
Autonomous unmanned surface vehicle
The budget request included $45.9 million in PE 64755N [i.e., a line item in the Navy's research and development account] for ship self defense (detect and control) projects, but included no funding for the autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (AUSV) program. The AUSV program supports the U.S. Navy's anti-terrorism, force protection, and homeland defense missions. The AUSV can protect commercial harbors, coastal facilities such as commercial and military airports and nuclear power plants, inland waterways, and large lakes. The vessel will utilize a variety of advanced sensing and perimeter monitoring equipment for surveillance and detection of targets of interest. The committee recommends an increase of $5.7 million to continue this development. (Page 69)
The report also states:
West Africa maritime security initiative
The budget request includes $1,131.0 million for the Department of Defense's drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, of which more than $200.0 million will fund training activities for U.S. counternarcotics partners around the globe. The committee directs the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats and U.S. Africa Command to develop a West Africa maritime security initiative to include: (1) training in maritime domain awareness; (2) increasing the capacity of partners to patrol and enforce sovereignty in their own maritime space; and (3) improving the sustainatality of their respective organizations with responsibility for maritime law enforcement. (Pages 199-200)
Section 1011 of H.R. 5136 as reported would extend by five years (from September 30, 2010, to September 30, 2015) and clarify authority to reimburse expenses for certain Navy mess operations. Regarding Section 1011, the committee's report states:
Extension of authority for reimbursement of expenses for certain Navy mess operations (sec. 1011)
The committee recommends a provision that would extend section 1014 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110^-17), which authorizes the Department of Defense to fund from Navy operations and maintenance accounts the cost of meals on United States naval and naval auxiliary vessels for non-military personnel, through September 30, 2015, and would establish an annual limit of no more than $1.0 million.
In fiscal year 2009, the Department expended approximately $400,000 for meals sold to authorized personnel during U.S. civil-military operations, including Continuing Promise 2008/2009, African Partnership Station 2009, and Pacific Partnership Station 2009. The committee expects the Department's expenditures under this authority will increase in fiscal year 2010 due to Operation Unified Response/Joint Task Force-Haiti.
The committee recognizes the value of recent civil-military operations and humanitarian relief missions--executed by the USNS Comfort, USNS Mercy, and other vessels--and acknowledges the importance of building partnerships and fostering the positive image of America worldwide. The committee also understands that the participation of nongovernmental organizations and host and partner nations is vital to the successful execution of these missions. (Pages 187-188)
Final Version (H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383)
Section 1021 of H.R. 6523/P.L. 111-383 of January 7, 2011, extends section 1014 of the FY2009 defense authorization act (P.L. 110-417), which authorizes DOD to fund from Navy operations and maintenance accounts the cost of meals on U.S. naval and naval auxiliary vessels for nonmilitary personnel, through September 30, 2015, and establishes an annual limit of no more than $1.0 million.
Appendix B. Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement
This appendix reproduces the Navy's January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare.38
The U.S. Navy's
Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges
Our Navy has a history of confronting irregular challenges at sea, in the littorals, and on shore. In the face of significant shifts in the nature and character of the threats our nation faces, this Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges will guide our efforts to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and adversaries. We will focus on the full range of capabilities the Naval force can uniquely project, in and from the maritime domain, in countering irregular challenges associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism.
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower places as much emphasis on preventing wars as it does on winning wars, and is the cornerstone of our approach to confronting irregular challenges. The six capabilities of our Maritime Strategy, from winning the nation's wars to stabilizing regions with our partners, draws upon the cooperative and preventive capabilities of maritime and joint forces. Our Navy will realize the broadened and balanced capabilities directed in our Maritime Strategy and Defense guidance by making investments to ensure the agility, flexibility, and adaptability necessary to address the range of emergent challenges to our national security. We will enhance integration and interoperability with our traditional maritime partners, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, along with other joint, interagency, private and non-governmental organizations, and international partners in all stages of this effort.
This Vision emphasizes the importance of the maritime contribution to addressing irregular challenges in a dynamic and evolving global security environment. The steps we take now will ensure our Navy is prepared fully to work with partners to stabilize regions at risk, and when necessary, dissuade, deter, and defeat irregular actors who seek to undermine security, stability, and prosperity.
Admiral, U.S. Navy
I. The Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges--Pursuing a Capability Balance for 21st Century Operations
Recognizing the strategic impact of global threats associated with regional instability and insecurity, our Navy has instituted this Vision to guide efforts aimed at confronting irregular challenges. In today's interconnected and technically advanced world, terrorists and criminals prey upon unstable and failing regions and pose an increasing threat to our national interests. With three-quarters of the world's population, four-fifths of its capital cities, and almost all of its productive capacity located within 200 miles of a coastline, our Navy is uniquely positioned and suited to counter threats to stability, while operating in and from the maritime domain. This includes helping countries at risk build sustainable indigenous capacity to secure their resources, protect their populations, and stabilize their regions.
Our Navy must continue efforts to balance emphasis and investments between countering irregular threats and countering near peer forces to successfully meet today's and tomorrow's dynamic and interrelated security challenges. This Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy and sets a course toward increasing proficiency in supporting direct and Indirect approaches to dissuade and defeat irregular challenges - wherein states and non-state actors leverage uncontrolled or ungoverned space to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic methods against civilian populations and targets to achieve their objectives. We will confront irregular challenges by focusing on the following outcomes:
Increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, by securing and leveraging the maritime domain, with and in support of national and international partners.
Enhanced regional awareness of activities and dynamics to include a deeper understanding of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics and norms.
Increased regional partner capacity for maritime security and domain awareness.
Expanded coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners.
These outcomes support promoting regional security and stability, advancing the rule of law, promoting good governance and prosperity, and help partners better protect their people and resources. They will inhibit the spread of violent extremism and its associated terrorist, insurgent, and criminal activities.
The Navy will leverage its history of presence, international engagement, and security enforcement, and will ensure our sailors, platforms, and systems are ready to address the hybrid nature of 21st Century challenges. The Navy brings global scope, unique access, and a breadth of capabilities to confront irregular challenges. We will promote Cooperative Security to mitigate instability in regions with limited governance that give rise to irregular challenges. We will enhance proficiency and effectiveness in security force assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and other force applications necessary to support U.S. and partner counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense operations.
II. Opportunity: Leveraging the Maritime Domain to Confront Irregular Challenges
"Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores."
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Our Navy's inherent contribution to the irregular contest is our capacity and ability to leverage access to the maritime domain and cooperate with partner navies and security forces to dissuade, deter, and defeat irregular threats at sea and ashore. While often overlooked in the context of irregular challenges, the maritime domain enables proximate populations to partner and enhance their wealth and well-being, but also provides sanctuary and freedom of movement to criminals, terrorists, and insurgents. The maritime domain provides for over 90% of the flow of information, people, goods, and services that sustain and create opportunities for regional economic prosperity. This economic opportunity promotes stability and helps prevent vulnerable populations from turning to terrorist or criminal enterprises.
The maritime domain similarly provides irregular actors with operating space and the ability to conduct the illicit flow of information, weapons, money, technicians, and cadres upon which much of their income and effectiveness relies. As such they are able to use the maritime environment to exploit, disrupt, or destabilize regions or governments, and to affect the will of civilian populations through insurgency, terrorism, crime, and the proliferation of radical ideologies.
The Navy's global maritime access and sustained presence forward enable U.S. Government-wide partnerships with nations and their forces to provide security and training assistance. At sea and ashore, the Navy works with partners to secure vulnerable maritime approaches and maritime resources, while improving collective capabilities to counter emerging threats such as piracy, trafficking, and weapons proliferation. Partners can appreciate the Navy's dependable but impermanent presence, which requires neither a footprint ashore nor infringement on their sovereignty. Our partners in turn add capability and capacity to our own through their contributions of forces, technologies, and operating concepts, as well as the understanding and ability to navigate local political, ethnic, and cultural contexts.
Today, the Navy is globally engaged to confront irregular challenges In sustained joint and Interagency operations at sea and ashore. This includes support for counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency missions, development, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and maritime security capacity building with partner militaries. Some examples include:
Support for Joint Special Operations Task Force--Philippines which provides security force training, anti-terrorist forces, and delivered humanitarian relief and disaster response following storm induced flooding.
Contributions to Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa whose East African Maritime Center of Excellence, security capacity building, and interagency policy efforts are enhancing indigenous capacities to stabilize the region and counter threats of piracy.
Counter-piracy operations In the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa which remove financial support to terrorists ashore and reduce Instability and criminality at sea.
Training and equipping partners for maritime security and fisheries enforcement in the Gulf of Guinea that many of the region's countries depend for economic stability.
With coalition partners, the protection of oil platforms in the northern Arabian Gulf, that includes training for Iraqi naval personnel to assume this economically critical mission.
Expeditionary Training Teams and Global Fleet Stations (Africa, South America, Pacific) dedicated to security force training and assistance through multi-mission employment of amphibious ships, tactical aircraft, and helicopters.
The over 23,000 Navy personnel engaged In CENTCOM, with 14,000 ashore, conducting maritime security, river patrol, ordnance disposal, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and combat support operations, as well as providing non-naval augmentation for detainee affairs, security, and reconstruction.
The procurement and employment of evolving multi-mission platforms oriented to lower end operations against irregular challenges including: Littoral Combat Ship mission modules, Riverine squadrons tailored for security force assistance, persistent manned and unmanned surveillance platforms, and investments in training capacity for language, cultural, and hybrid mission sets.
The employment of multi-mission platforms able to work across the spectrum of conflict to include P-3 for surveillance against terrorists and insurgents, tactical aircraft for armed reconnaissance, and submarines and surface combatants in counter-drug operations.
The Navy will continue to pursue balanced approaches to confronting evolving irregular and conventional challenges by maximizing the multi-purpose effectiveness of our Navy's capabilities, personnel, and platforms. We will emphasize building partner capacity using dedicated training forces, periodic deployments and recurring exercises. In the end we will achieve the greatest effectiveness against the most likely 21st Century threats through an agile, flexible, and adaptable force.
These goals support the outcomes presented in this Vision:
Enhance and formalize interoperability with U.S. government, public and private organizations, allied maritime and land forces, and regional partners.
Build partner capacity by forming enduring, trust-based relationships, promoting shared interests in collective security, and providing training and resources to enhance indigenous security force capacity.
Improve our regional awareness and understanding of complex environments and challenges through intelligence and information systems, training, education, and more culturally adept approaches.
Achieve an improved understanding and ability to counter illicit and extremist actors as they leverage and maneuver in their maritime and shore environments.
Enhance and broaden the multi-mission capabilities and applications of today's force to maximize effectiveness in complex regions and scenarios.
Identify necessary and distinct shifts in emphasis and investment to confront irregular challenges, to include modifications to training, doctrine, and existing forces, and where necessary, new investments in processes, platforms, and systems.
In pursuing these goals for confronting irregular challenges the Navy will employ its broad capabilities to enable partners, improve maritime security, and conduct cooperative and decisive operations at sea and ashore. Specifically, we will operate to deny unregulated actors use of the maritime and littoral environment, assist in securing critical infrastructure to ensure the safe flow of resources, and apply a broad spectrum of maritime and overland capabilities to combat irregular threats while improving the lives of affected populations.
III. Implementing the Vision
Implementation will require a Navy-wide organizational approach. This effort demands changes in our thinking, our force and its preparation, and requires clear strategic communications within and outside the organization. We will comprehensively align our organizations, investments, procedures, doctrine, and training with the set of emerging approaches necessary to address these challenges.
Our Navy will pursue the outcomes and goals outlined in this Vision through these supporting implementation objectives.
Advance our Navy's doctrinal, strategic, and operational approaches to addressing irregular challenges.
Increase our Navy's application of related Defense and Joint strategic and operational guidance.
Define the strategic and operational tenets and approaches for our Navy to apply across our general purpose and special operation forces.
Integrate the desired outcomes, priorities, and capabilities needed to confront irregular challenges into Navy's force development and management processes.
Organize, train, and equip our Navy to confront irregular challenges more effectively through balancing shifts in our investments and efforts.
Enhance our ability to address, refine, validate, and incorporate urgent and emerging requirements to confront irregular challenges in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
Identify the advocates and resource sponsors responsible for resource allocation and comprehensive program execution for existing and emerging Navy-unique and joint multi-mission capabilities to confront irregular challenges.
Introduce the necessary supporting training and education requirements, to include organizations, curricula, and processes across our manpower enterprise.
Institutionalize concepts, processes, and organizations for training and building the capacity of partners through dedicated assistance operations, regular exercises, and the deployments and visits of multi-mission ships and aircraft.
Emphasize interoperability and effectiveness for confronting irregular challenges across U.S. government, public, private, and international partners.
Leverage Navy's multi-mission capabilities with other services, interagency and coalitions to build partner security capacity.
Integrate and coordinate efforts with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard in support of the imperatives and approaches in the Maritime Strategy.
Support the development of joint, interagency, and international operational concepts and supporting CONOPS.
Support Defense efforts to integrate joint and interagency planning processes.
Ensure capabilities to confront irregular challenges are addressed and captured in U.S. Navy and Defense legal policy development.
Provide Combatant Commanders with applicable naval capabilities to support critical mission requirements outside the scope of Navy core mission areas.
Our Navy recognizes the importance of developing opportunities while being prepared to address irregular threats. Our general and special purpose forces are immediately applicable to the broad array of capabilities required to achieve regional security and stability. The Navy is uniquely positioned to assist emerging nations and fragile states, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular threats. We will build on our inherent strengths to lead and support national and international efforts.
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower places as much emphasis on preventing conflicts as on winning conflicts. This underscores the importance of securing and fostering long-term cooperative relationships based on mutual understanding and respect for each party's strategic interests, as well as increasing partners' ability to ensure their own security and stability. It recognizes the value of presence, of "being there," to maintain adequate levels of security and awareness across the maritime domain, and restrain the destabilizing activities of non-state actors. It makes clear our Navy will work alongside other U.S. services and agencies through a comprehensive government approach to advance international partnerships.
This Vision will guide and shape our Navy's actions, and will enhance our Navy's proficiency in capabilities to counter irregular challenges, now and in the future.
Author Contact Information
Specialist in Naval Affairs email@example.com, 7-7610
1. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on Navy IW activities and capabilities.
2. Text of address of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, at University of Chicago conference on terrorism and strategy, October 12, 2010, accessed October 22, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/101012-UofChicagoremarks%20FINAL.doc.
3. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-3 and 2-4.
4. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-1 to 2-3.
6. Text of address of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, at University of Chicago conference on terrorism and strategy, October 12, 2010, accessed October 22, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/101012-UofChicagoremarks%20FINAL.doc.
7. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-10.
8. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-1.
9. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
10. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-1.
11. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-2.
12. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 1-8, 5-11.
13. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-14.
14. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-31.
15. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-4 and 2-5.
16. For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17. For more on the ending of DDG-1000 procurement and the restart of DDG-51 procurement, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
18. For more on the converted Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
19. For more on the Navy's sea-based BMD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
20. Edmund Sanders, "U. S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6," Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Airstrike Klls Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda," Washington Post, May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, "Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia," New York Times, May 2, 2008.
22. SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. Press reports in July 2010 stated that U.S. forces in Afghanistan include a special unit called Task Force 373, comprised of Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force personnel, whose mission is "the deactivation of top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them." (Matthias, et al, "US Elite Unit Could Create Political Fallout For Berlin," Spiegel (Germany), July 26, 2010. See also G J. Chivers, et al, "Inside the Fog Of War: Reports From The Ground In Afghanistan," New York Times, July 26, 2010: 1.) For further discussion of the SEALs, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert and Doc Livingston.
23. For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin.
24. See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, "Navy's Maritime Domain Awareness System 'Up And Running'," Defense Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, "New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide," Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli.
25. For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.
26. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 2-2.
27. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, January 2010, p. 3.
28. Zachary M. Peterson, "New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall," Inside the Navy, September 1, 2008.
29. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-5.
30. Government Accountability Office, Defense Management[:] Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794, July 2010, 63 pp.
31. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 4-14 and 4-15.
32. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
33. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24.
34. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 3-7.
35. For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
36. For a discussion of the Navy's management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, "Fleet Forces Takes Charge of IA Program," [http://NavyTimes.com]NavyTimes.com , July 7, 2008.
37. For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, "The Navy's Not Serious About Riverine Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
38. Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, January 2010, 7 pp. (including the cover page).