U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010):
Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents

Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan

Image - various publication covers in a collage.

MISC D0026241.A2/Final
December 2011

CNA

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The principal author of this study thanks especially Karin Duggan for graphic assistance; Loretta Ebner for administrative assistance; Gregory Kaminski, Laurie Ann Lakatosh, and Rhea Stone for library assistance; and Dana Smith and Anwar Fry for production assistance. A full listing of substantive contributors can be found in Peter M. Swartz and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction and Background: Volume I, (D0026421.A1, December 2011). A full listing of all volumes in the CNA Navy Strategy series can be found on the inside back cover of this document.

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Image - signature.

Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr.
Director, Strategic Initiatives Group

Contents

CNO Admiral Vern Clark (2000-5)
     Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS
     Naval Power 21: A Naval Vision
     Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations
     Fleet Response Plan
2
5
31
42
57
CNO Admiral Michael Mullen (2005-7)
     Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM 08
     Naval Operations Concept 2006
     Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM 10
77
79
102
126
CNO Admiral Gary Roughead (2007-2011)
     The "trifecta"
     A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
     Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM 10 (Ch 1)
     Navy Strategic Guidance in Support of PR 11
     Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM 12
     Naval Operations Concept 2010
     Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare
     Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM 13
140
142
143
194
203
219
235
273
300
The Navy Strategic Planning Process 316
Companion references on USN 2000s documents 320

--1--


ADM Vern Clark (CNO Jul 2000-Jul 2005)

Jun 2002 Sea Power 21
       A "vision"; Included "Global CONOPs"

Oct 2002 Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision

Apr 2003 Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations

May 2003 Fleet Response Plan

       From "concept" to "plan"

Image - Admiral Vern Clark.

Surface warfare officer

Served an unusually long 5-year CNO tour

Served Presidents Clinton, Bush; SECDEFs Cohen, Rumsfeld; SECNAVs Danzig, England

Saw himself as "the joint guy" & a business manager
       1st CNO with an MBA; changed Navy business procedures
       Had been Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) & of Operations (DJ3) on Joint Staff; TRANSCOM DJ5, DJ8
       Candidate for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
       Sensitive to SECDEF, OSD concerns & direction
          E.g.: Transformation Roadmaps, Fleet Response Plan

Effected numerous internal Navy reorganizations & realignments

--2--


Improved relations with USMC (e.g.: NOCJO)

Advocated 375-ship Battle Force goal (2003)
        Then advocated range of 260-325 ships (2005)

In wake of 9/11 attacks, called repeatedly for "Maritime NORAD"
       His concept was global, however, & multinational

Signature programs:
       Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
       High-speed vessel (HSV) leases
       Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
       New USN riverine & civil affairs capabilities
       Optimal manning
       Fleet readiness for Operation Enduring Freedom & Operation Iraqi Freedom surges
       Fleet Response Plan
       Navy Enterprises
       OPNAV & fleet reorganizations & re-alignments

--3--


Saw POM as his strategy (as a service chief)

Initial concern for current readiness, not the future

No initial interest in promulgating a "glossy pub"
       "I didn't come to the job with the idea of publishing another "vision" document...But it became apparent that I needed something to build on my top-five priorities...to mobilize and focus our energies, and to provide a 'stake in the ground' for the future."
          Interview with Dr. Scott Truver, Mar 2003

Chose strategy-focused VADM John Morgan to be his last N3/N5 (2004)
       But did not approve any new Morgan-originated strategy-oriented documents

Directed at least 5 OPNAV offices working on USN vision, strategy and concepts simultaneously
       N00K & CNO Executive Panel (CAPTs Benkert, Clemente)
       N00Z (CAPT Pandolfe)
       OPNAV "Deep Blue" (RDMLs Sestak, Stavridis, Crowder, Mahon)
       N513 (CDR Dolan, CAPTs Dossel, Klepper, Mangold, CDR Nagy)
       N81 (RDML Sestak (2003-4)

Headed & at least partially staffed by the most well-educated and experienced leaders of the Navy's strategic planning community

Yet on his watch little was done to foster & sustain management & development of that community, which atrophied 8

--4--


Image - Publication covers.

Sea Power 21 w/Global CONOPs (2002)

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Clark & numerous other admirals (Jun 2002 & subsequently)
       NAVWARCOL speech & Transformation Roadmap
       UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings 9-article series; stand-alone 5-article medium-length pamphlet; on web
       Billed as a "vision"
       Principal target: Many, esp. USN officer corps
       Drafted principally in OPNAV N00Z (& N81: CONOPS)
       Threat to USN: Evolving regional challenges and transnational threats
       8-concept framework: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise, Global Concept of Operations
       Very influential within OPNAV, NWDC, ONR, etc.

--5--


Signed by:
       CNO ADM Vern Clark
          During 2nd year in office
       Individual admirals & a general signed amplifying portions

Image - CNO Admiral Vern Clark.

What it was
       Billed as a Navy "vision" document
       Subtitle: "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities"
       Included a "Concept of Operations" (CONOPs)
       NWC Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)
       Naval Transformation Roadmap (Jun 2002)
       UNCLAS 9-part US Naval Institute Proceedings series (Oct 02-Jan 04)
          48 pages (incl. 10-page overview article; 4-page CONOPS)
       Also stand-alone pamphlet (1st 5 parts only): 36 pages
       Posted on web
       President NAVWARCOL RADM Rempt "President's Forum" article, Naval War College Review (Spring 2003)

--6--


Why it was written (I)
       To codify, rationalize & publicize CNO ADM Clark's many key initiatives to grow & change the fleet
       CNO thought timing was right
          New administration elected and in place
          9/11 attacks had occurred
          2001 DOD QDR & Nuclear Posture Review completed
          Initial CNO goals for "current readiness" being achieved
       To flesh out CNO ADM Clark's 375-ship goal rationale

Why it was written (II)
       To re-energize sea and area control
       To advertise the Navy as a joint player, and as more than just an enabling force
       To bring USN & USMC together by elevating Sea Basing status & visibility, expanding ARG to include organic fire support ships (& thus capable of CLF command)

--7--


Context (I)
       2nd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
       Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
          Return to U.S. government deficit spending
          Oil price starting to climb again
       SECDEF Rumsfeld (2000-6)
       CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
       Failed Al Qaeda attack on USS Sullivans (1999)
       Al Qaeda attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) (2000)
       9-11 attacks on America & responses (2001)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Numerous post-9/11 US joint ops launched
          Noble Eagle (homeland defense)
          Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan)
             USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support

Context (II)
       NATO invoked Article 5 for 1st time, to assist US following Al Qaeda attack (2001)
       Customs & Border Patrol (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) (from Jan 2002)
       USS Greenville collision with Japanese fishing vessel (2001)
       SORT Treaty (2002)
       US withdrawal from US-Russian ABM Treaty (2002)
       SECDEF prohibited "glossy" publication of Navy & other service posture statements (2001)

--8--


Context (III)
       Taiwan elected 1st pro-independence president (2000)
          Rising cross-Strait tensions
       USN EP-3 collision with PLAN interceptor over South China Sea (Apr 2001)
       President Bush approved arms sales to Taiwan, incl/diesel submarines, Kidd-class DDGs, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft (Apr 2001)
       1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
       PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean began (2002)
       USN port calls to PRC resumed (Nov 2002)
       Occasional meetings under the US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (1998)

Context (IV)
       OSD push for military "Transformation"
          VADM (Ret) Art Cebrowski headed new OSD Office of Force Transformation (2001-5)
       Increased role of SECDEF & OSD
       Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
       New USN 375-ship Battle Force goal
       USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships & declining; 6 new ships authorized
       CNO Clark satisfied with progress made in 1st 2 yrs in increasing current readiness. Turn to future readiness

--9--


Context (V)
       Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) concept announced (2001)
          Evolved from "Streetfighter" concept (1999) Industry developing proposals (2002)
          For operations in the littorals
          Strong CNO ADM Clark support
       DOD canceled USN area-wide BMD program (2001)
       MDA created new Aegis BMD midcourse program (2002)
       CNA conference on Naval Forward Presence (2001)
       Continued USN-USMC differences on amphibious ops command & control, especially fire support
       NAVWARCOL Global War Games focused on Effects Based Operations (EBO) (1999, 2000, 2001)
       Last Global War Games until 2008

Context (VI)
       Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
       NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)
       Atlantic & Med no longer US focal theaters of war (2002)
          JFCOM lost geographic responsibilities,
          Atlantic Ocean divided among NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, & EUCOM
          Med combat-credible forward presence hub disappeared
       Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
          Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
          Participants included Sea Power 21 & CONOPS contributors
       OPNAV Dir. of Navy Staff elevated to 3 stars (Aug 2001)
       CNO Strategic Actions Group (OPNAV N00Z) created (2002)

--10--


Context (VII)
       OPNAV N513 (Strategic Concepts branch) temporarily short-manned following 9/11 Pentagon attack
          Had successfully argued vs. transfer from Pentagon to Crystal City
          Branch head CDR Bob Dolan & 4 action officers killed
       USN began JFMCC experiments & exercises
       USN began "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
       CNO ADM Clark post-9/11 calls for a "Maritime NORAD"
       NWDC placed under new Fleet Forces Command (2001), vice Naval War College
       Naval postgraduate School 2-year Strategic Planning masters' degree curriculum terminated (summer 2001)

Cited references
       The Maritime Strategy (1986)
       ...From the Sea (1992)
       Forward...From the Sea (1994)

Did not reference 2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
       But did reference QDR "1-4-2-1" force sizing construct

Placed Sea Power 21 in USN historical strategic conceptual context

--11--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       7th and last Clinton National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000)
       2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
       Nuclear Posture Review (2001)
          Added conventional weapons to strategic deterrent
          "New Triad"
       DoD Global Force Posture Review (underway)
       Joint Staff Operational Availability 2003 planning effort (underway in 2002)
       CJCS GEN Shalikashvili National Military Strategy (1997)
       CJCS Joint Vision 2020 (2000)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
       Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (2000)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13B, Personnel Tempo of Operations (Feb 2000)
       Naval Power 21 and NOCJO (being drafted)
       Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (1996-8)
       MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
       CMC Gen Jones, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov 2000)
       CMC Gen Jones Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov 2001)
       Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan (2002)

--12--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       NWDC, Network Centric Operations: A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations 2000 draft; never approved)
       Revised (2nd) USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (Jul 2002)
       SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, America's Air Force Vision 2020: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power (2000)
       Brig Gen David Deptula USAF, Effects-Based Operations (2001)
          Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret) & others
       Hart-Rudman Commission Reports (1999-2001)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       SACEUR/SACLANT Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept - The Maritime Dimension (Jul 2001)
       VADM Cebrowski & John Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan 1998)
       Alberts, Garstka & Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (1999)
       BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (2nd ed.) (1999)
       ADM William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (2000)
       CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), The Great Wall at Sea (2001)

--13--


Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       Michelle Flournoy, CAPT Sam Tangredi USN et al., Report of the NDU QDR 2001 Working Group (2000)
       NIC, Global Trends 2015 (Dec 2000)
       Daniel Whiteneck & Richard Weitz, Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability (CNA) (Sep 2001)
       Sherry Sontag & Chris Drew, Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (1998)
       Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999)
       John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
       Profs Looney, Schrady, Porch, Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage & Future Prospects (NPS Monterey) (Dec 2001)

How it was written (I)
       Conceptual roots in
          ...From the Sea, NSPG 2000
          CNO SSG products, 1996-2001
             Especially FORCEnet
       CNO saw a need for a forward-looking vision for future readiness beyond his "Goals" (2002)
          Current readiness goals well on the way to achievement

--14--


How it was written (II)
       Drafted in new CNO Strategic Actions Group (N-00Z) OPNAV office (Spring 2002)
          Global CONOPS drafted in OPNAV N81 (Spring 2002)
             Based on operational concepts germinated in OPNAV Deep Blue
       Personalities:
          ADM Vern Clark, CNO
          CAPT Frank Pandolfe, 1st N00Z Director (principal author)
          CDR Steve Richter, N81, (Global CONOPS)
          RDML Stavridis, OPNAV Deep Blue (ESG concept)
          Many others subsequently contributed

How it was written (III)
       Timing moved up to meet OSD Naval Transformation Roadmap tasking deadline (Jun 2002)
       CNO then decided to use in NAVWARCOL Current Strategy Forum speech (Jun 2002)
       "Global CONOPS" sometimes a stand-alone & sometimes subsumed under general introduction or under "Sea Strike"
       Extensively socialized through briefings to Navy flag officers & staffs (Spring-Summer 2002)

--15--


How it was written (IV)
       Series of 9 US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (2002-4)
          I. CNO ADM Vern Clark, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities" (Oct 2002)
             a. Overview, including Global CONOPS
          II. C3F VADM Michael Bucchi & OPNAV N8 VADM Michael G. Mullen, "Sea Shield: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance" (Nov 2002)
          III. C2F VADM Cutler Dawson & OPNAV N6/N7 VADM John Nathman, "Sea Strike: Projecting Persistent, Responsive, and Precise Power' (Dec 2002)

How it was written (V)
       Series of 9 US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (2002-4) (continued)
          IV. OPNAV N4 VADM Charles W. Moore & CG MCCDC LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr. USMC, "Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century" (Jan 2003)
          V. COMNAVNETWARCOM VADM Richard W. Mayo & OPNAV N6/N7 VADM John Nathman, "FORCEnet: Turning Information into Power," (Feb 2003)
          VI. OPNAV N8 VADM Mike G. Mullen, "Global Concept of Operations" (Apr 2003)

--16--


How it was written (VI)
       Series of 9 US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (2002-4) (concluded)
          VII. CNET VADM Alfred G. Harms, CHNAVPERS VADM Gerald L. Hoewing, & COMNAVRESFOR VADM John B. Totushek, "Sea Warrior: Maximizing Human Capital" (Jun 2003)
          VIII. CFFC/CLF ADM Robert J. Natter, "Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet" (Nov 2003)
          IX. VCNO ADM Michael G. Mullen, "Sea Enterprise: Resourcing Tomorrow's Fleet" (Jan 2004)
       President NAVWARCOL RADM Rempt "President's Forum" article, Naval War College Review (Spring 2003)

Outline
       Our vision
       Transformation for a violent era
       Sea Strike: Projecting precise and persistent offensive power
       Sea Shield: Projecting global defensive assurance
       Sea basing: Projecting joint operational independence
       FORCEnet: Enabling 21st century warfare
       Global Concept of Operations
       Achieving our vision
       Sea Trial: The process of innovation
       Sea Warrior: Investing in sailors
       Sea Enterprise: Resourcing tomorrow's fleet
       Our way ahead

--17--


Key ideas (I)
       A "clear vision," not a strategy; with a "Global CONOPS"
       Evolving regional challenges and transnational threats
       Unified battlespace"
       Advantages of sea-based forces throughout integrated sea-land-airspace-cyberspace
       Naval forces "fully integrated" in joint force
       Navy more than an "enabler"
       Growing importance of sea & area control
       Transformation; new cross-cutting categories to transcend platform communities & demonstrate change
       Re-label categories for USN force structure decisions

Key ideas (II)
       Tight accordance with "national military strategy," i.e.: SECDEF Rumsfeld 2001 QDR
       New emphasis on "global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers"
       Return to focus on global threats
       No longer just "regional challenges." De-emphasis of MCOs
       DoD "1-4-2-1 "force sizing construct
       Defend the homeland
       Deter adversaries in 4 critical forward regions
       Swiftly defeat 2 enemies at the same time in 2 of those regions
       Win one of those conflicts decisively

--18--


Sea Power 21 (2002)

Key ideas (I)
       3 "fundamental concepts," "operations, "capabilities"
          Sea Strike
          Sea Shield
             Includes forward-deployed ops for Homeland Defense
          Sea Basing
             USN accepts USMC label
             USN-USMC conceptual (& spelling) differences remain
       Enabler: FORCE Net
       Supporting organizational processes
          Sea Trial
          Sea Warrior
             Especially reductions in crew size
          Sea Enterprise
             Call for shared technologies & systems with other services
       Global CONOPs
          New distributed force packages

Image - Sea Power 21 slide.

--19--


Key ideas (II)
       4 "capability pillars" descend from 2 earlier frameworks
             ...From the Sea
             Command Control and Surveillance
             Battlespace Dominance
             Power Projection
             Force Sustainment
          NSPG 2000
             Knowledge superiority
             Battlespace control
             Battlespace attack
             Battlespace sustainment
          Sea Power 21
             FORCEnet
             Sea shield
             Sea strike
             Sea basing

Key ideas (III)
       Also mentioned
          "the continuum of warfare from the maritime domain - deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning wars"
       And a Turner variant: "enduring missions":
          Sea control
          Power projection
          Strategic deterrence
          Strategic sealift
          Forward presence
       Sea Power 21 overview article ended with the words: "anywhere, anytime"

--20--


Key ideas
       Implement 2nd QDR (2001) "1-4-2-1" planning construct
       Downgrade importance of forward "hubs"
       Increase global presence
       Widely disperse combat striking power
       Simultaneous responses to crises around the world
       New force packages
       Integrate new SSGNs & BMD ships into force
       USN accepted USMC-backed MPF(F) as important new capability
       375 ships; 37 tailored independent strike groups

Image - The Global CONOPS (with 375) Maximum Power Forward.

Recreated from a briefing: "Joint Global CONOPs for the Navy, CNA working group meeting," 12 Aug. 2002.

--21--


What was new?
       Sea Power 21
          Return to global approaches vice solely a set of regions
          New vocabulary applied to earlier frameworks
          Multiple signed articles by multiple flag officer authors
       Global CONOPS
          New force packages: CSGs, ESGs, TBMD SAGs, etc.
          Integration of new SSGNs into force
          Downgraded "hubs"
          No CSG in the Mediterranean
          More options for the President
          MPF included in Battle Force
       Littoral combat ships (LCS)
       Possible USMC command of some ESGs

Not addressed (I)
       Specific named regional & transnational threats & challenges
       Allies (Mentioned in Sea Power 21, but not in Global CONOPS
       Relationship to Marine Corps Strategy 21
       Priorities among concepts, force packages presented
       Globalization; world system
       Humanitarian assistance/disaster response ops
       Maritime security operations
       Coastal & riverine operations & capabilities

--22--


Not addressed (II)
       Piracy
       Counter-drug operations
       U.S. Merchant Marine
       Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
       Post-hostilities ops
       Surge capability & operations
       Protection of or attacks on commerce at sea
       Blockade operations
       Convoy operations

Was it a "CONOPS?"

What is a "CONOPS" (officially)?
       "Concept of operations: A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what a joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander's concept or CONOPS."
          Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (July 2001)

--23--


Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)
       CDR (Ret) Terry McKearney, "Comment and Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 2002)
       Norman Polmar, "Comment and Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 2003)
       VADM (Ret) Robert Dunn, "Comment and Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jun 2003)
       ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner, "Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?" Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)
       Peter Dombrowski & Andrew Ross, "Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?" Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)
       LCDR Jon Olson, "An Alternative Vision of Sea Power 21," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 2003)
       CDR (Ret) Jeff Huber, "Invasion of the Transformers," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 2003)
       RADM (Ret) Jerry Holland, "The Navy is More than Hauling Marines," US Naval Institute Proceedings (May 2004)
       Naval Studies Board, Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning (2005)
       Milan Vego, "Searching for a Strategy," Armed Forces Journal (Apr 2007)
       CAPT (Ret) Sam Tangredi, "Sea Basing: Concept, Issues, and Recommendations," Naval War College Review (Autumn 2011)

--24--


Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)
       Joe Overton, "Speaking of the Long War: Trawling for Historical Value in the Speeches of Navy Leadership, 2001-2011" (Paper delivered at USNA McMullen Naval History Symposium, 30 Sep 2011)
       Amund Lundesgaard, U.S. Navy Strategy and Force Structure after the Cold War (Nov 2011)
       CAPT Peter Haynes USN, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

Criticisms (I):
       Focus too tactical
          Should have been focused on "strategy" and/or "operational level of war"
          Deliberately created to preclude development of a new Navy strategy
       Mere programmatic repackaging & re-labeling
          Nothing new
       Not visionary or transformational enough
          Just incremental modernization
          Not joint enough:
             "Sea-" prefixes a step backwards
          Not congruent with DOD capabilities-based planning framework

--25--


Criticisms (II):
       Not sufficient emphasis on Sea Control as fundamental purpose of the Navy
       Dividing "sea control" conceptually among Sea Strike/Shield/Basing blurred understanding of the core mission of the Navy (ADM Turner)
       Making "Sea Basing" a pillar was an unwarranted concession to USMC
       Litany of programs & programmatic packages overshadowed the vision
       Scant attention paid to amphibious ships was deliberate and ill-advised

Criticisms:
       Merely a justification for 375 ships & the LCS
       375 ships an impossible goal; Not enough $ available
       Too focused on forward presence vice surge posture
       Constructed from flawed ship & force package counting schemes & comparisons
       "CSGs" and "ESGs" merely moved a few surface combatants and an SSN from each CVBG to each ARG "CSGs" and "ESGs" were constructs for training & workups only. Forward CCDRs & NCCs typically dispersed their assets in theater. CCDRs & NCCs had no need for ESGs, just separate ARG/MEUS & SAGs
       Surface Action Groups not particularly visionary; Reminiscent of Battleship SAGs of 1980s
       Too jargon-laden for comprehension & use
       Distorted Sea Basing concept by downplaying amphibs

--26--


Sea Power 21 influence (I):
       Wide within OPNAV & other USN headquarters
          Reflected in changed organizations & processes
       Far more influence on internal OPNAV, FFC, NWDC and ONR frameworks than as a statement of Navy vision

Sea Power 21 influence (II):
       "Capability Pillars" became the organizing template (2003-2010+) for:
             "Sea Shaping" pillar added in 2005
          CFFC assignment of numbered fleet commanders and NNWC as "operational agents" (OA) for Fleet warfighting CONOPS, concept development & experimentation (continuing as of 2010)
          NWDC concept development & experimentation
          ONR Future Naval Capability (FNC) technology development program aligned with "pillars" (2005 through 2010+e)

--27--


Sea Power 21 influence (III):
       Resource for flag speeches, testimony
       Cited in new CNO-CMC naval concepts
          Enhanced Networked Seabasing (2003)
          FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century (2005)
       Ideas & terminology used in annual Navy Program Guides (through 2007)
       Ideas & terminology used in annual Highlights of the Department of the Navy Budget (through May 2009)
       Helped increase DOTMLPF focus on Sea Shield (esp. missile defense), Sea Basing, FORCEnet
       Cited in ONR Naval S&T Strategic Plans (2007, 2009, 2011)

Why did it have the influence it did?
       Simple, catchy, easy-to-remember construct
       Relentless repetition in speeches, testimony, articles
       Interest, power & influence of CNO ADM Clark
       Continued support by successor ADM Mullen
          "Sea Power 21 is still germane and operative...I'm very supportive of Sea Power 21" (Oct 2005)
          "Sea Power 21 will remain the framework for our Navy's ongoing transformation" (Testimony, Mar 2006)
       Institutionalization of categories into OPNAV organizations & analytic processes
       As a single-service document, was of limited influence on subsequent bi-service & tri-service efforts

--28--


Global CONOPs influence
       OPNAVINST 3501.316A finally officially codified policy for composition, capabilities of CSGs, ESGs, SSGs (Sep 2007)
          Signed by CNO ADM Mullen just before his relief
          Lasted only 3 years
             OPNAVINST 3501.316B (Oct 2010) undid many of the changes
       CSG force packages endured in the fleet as of 2010
       ESG force packages abolished (2009)
          ESGs had not operated as units; Replaced by ARG/MEUs
          Term "ESG" still used for ARG/MEUs commanded by general/flag officers
       375-ship, 37-group Navy force goals lasted only a few years

Why did it have what influence it did? (I)
       Advocacy & repetition by CNO
       Published as a detailed US Naval Institute Proceedings article, but omitted from stand-alone pamphlet
          Discussed, however, in basic Sea Power 21 article text
          Article author was upwardly-mobile flag officer VADM Mullen
       Repeated & expanded upon in NOCJO
       Fleet became comfortable working up CSGs & ESGs

--29--


Why did it have what influence it did? (II)
       Forward deployment emphasis moderated by Fleet Response Plan focus on surge (2003)
       ESG concept dissipated as fleet ship numbers declined:
          MEUs deployed separately to Iraq, Afghanistan
          Surface combatants, submarines and individual amphibious ships deployed separately
          COCOM/NCC demand for ARG/MEUs, SAGs, not ESGs
       375-ship force level goal superseded by 260-325-range goal (2005) & 313-ship goal (2006)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Spurred SECNAV England drafting of Naval Power 21 (2002)
       Reflected heavily and expanded upon in NOCJO (2003)
       Cited in NOCJO, NSP ISO POM 08 (2006), & Naval Operations Concept (2006)
       "Capability Pillars" used in:
          NOCJO
          Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08
          Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)
       Global CONOPS reflected and fleshed out in NOCJO

--30--


Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision (2002)

Image - Cover: Naval Power 21...A Naval Vision.

Overview
       Signed by SECNAV England, CNO ADM Clark, CMC Gen Jones (Oct 2002)
       Billed as a "vision"
       Principal target audience: USN & USMC leadership
       Very short (6 pp). UNCLAS. Published on the web
       Drafted in new OPNAV "Deep Blue" office
       To counter threats from our nation's enemies
       Central theme: Navy-Marine Corps team
          USN-USMC TACAIR integration
       Brought together Sea Power 21, Global CONOPS, (& Marine Corps 21) concepts & initiatives
          Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet, Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise; 25% increase in size of the fleet goal
       Little lasting influence

--31--


Signed by:
       SECNAV Gordon R. England
       CNO ADM Vern Clark
          During 3rd year in office
       CMC Gen James L. Jones

Image - Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England, CNO Admiral Vern Clark and CMC General James L. Jones.

What it was
       Billed as a "Vision"
       Short (6 pages)
       UNCLAS
       Published on the web (Oct 2002)

--32--


Why it was written
       To assert visibility of new SECNAV England & his agenda of bringing USN & USMC closer together
       To bring USN Sea Power 21 & USMC Strategy 21 visions and concepts together in one overarching consensual document, endorsed by SECNAV
       To provide a conceptual basis for USN-USMC TACAIR integration - essentially a cost-saving measure
       Tie DON to Bush Administration & SECDEF Rumsfeld "transformation" agenda
       To call for increasing fleet size by 25%
       In wake of 9/11 attacks, to assert USN role in homeland security is primarily far forward, but also at home
       Principal target: USN & USMC leadership

Context (I)
       Late in 2nd year of Bush (R) administration (2001-9)
       Lackluster US economy pulling out of recession
          Oil price starting to climb again
          Return to U.S. government deficit spending
       SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
          SECNAV England (2001-06)
          CNO Clark (2000-05)

--33--


Context (II)
       Al Qaeda terrorist attack on USS Cole (DDG-67) (2000)
       9-11 attacks on America (2001)
          USN strategy office briefly decimated
       Numerous post-9/11 US joint ops launched
          Noble Eagle (homeland defense)
          Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Afghanistan)
             USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       PLAN-USN aircraft collision (2001)

Context (III)
       SECDEF Rumsfeld push for "transformation"
       2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
          310-ship Battle Force goal
          "1-4-2-1" force sizing construct
          Decline - but not demise - of "2 MCO" construct
          "Capabilities-based planning"
          "New triad," to include offensive precision-strike conventional weapons
       USN in 2002: 313 Battle Force ships & declining; 6 new ships authorized
       DON annual budgets rising modestly
          USN began JFMCC experiments (1999)

--34--


Context (IV)
       NOCJO being drafted
       OEF: Marine general commands USN-USMC TF
       SECDEF-directed integration of OPNAV & Secretariat
       Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
       OPNAV Deep Blue created (2001)
          For innovative concepts ISO current GWOT combat ops
       NAVNETWARCOM created (May 2002)

Cited references
       2nd (1st Bush administration) DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (2001)
       CMC Gen Jones, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare USMC capstone concept (Nov 2001)
       CMC Gen Jones, Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov 2000)
          Sea Power 21 (2002)

--35--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       MCDP 1 Warfighting (Jun 1997)
       MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Sep 2001)
       CJCS GEN Shelton Joint Vision 2020 (2000)
       Revised Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (2000)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan (2002)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       ADM William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (2000)
       SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, America's Air Force Vision 2020: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power (2000)
       Brig Gen Deptula USAF, Effects-Based Operations (2001)
          Rebuttals by LtGen Van Riper USMC (Ret)
       Profs Looney, Schrady, Porch, Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage & Future Prospects (NPS Monterey) (Dec 2001)
       Whiteneck & Weitz, Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability (CNA) (Sep 2001)

--36--


How it was written
       Drafted in new OPNAV N3/N5 Deep Blue shop
       Contributions by OPNAV N513
       Personalities: SECNAV England, RDML Jim Stavridis (Deep Blue), CAPT Will Dossel (N513)

Outline
       The naval vision
       Qualities that matter: What it takes to win
       People: The heart of the team
       Homeland security
       Projecting power and influence: Winning at sea and beyond
       Future naval capabilities: Transformational by design
       Sea enterprise: Capturing business efficiencies
       The future: An expanded naval force
       Organizing the force: A naval operational concept
       Refining the way ahead: Navy and Marine Corps strategies
       Conclusion: Charting the way ahead

--37--


Key ideas (I)
       "3/4/8" framework
       3 "fundamental pillars"
          We assure access; We fight and win; We are continually transforming to improve
       4 "fundamental qualities of naval forces"
          Decisiveness; Sustainability; Responsiveness; Agility
       7 Seapower 21 "concepts"
          Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, enabled by FORCEnet
          Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, Sea Enterprise

To counter threats from "our nation's enemies"
       Concept of "continually transforming"
       Focus on Navy-Marine Corps team
          Call for Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter integration
       Described Marine Corps Strategy 21
       "Homeland Security: We will engage potential adversaries and address threats to our security as far from the United States and our interests as possible...Additionally, in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue defense at home"

--38--


What was new?
       1st joint USN-USMC capstone document in 8 years
       SECNAV endorsement of Sea Power 21 framework
       Call for doubling number of strike groups & increasing fleet size by 25%
       Navy role in homeland security seen as primarily far forward but also at home

Not addressed (I)
       Nature of threats, beyond "our nation's enemies"
       "Global CONOPs" portion of Sea Power 21
       Priorities among concepts discussed Globalization, world system, world trade issues
       Maritime security operations
       Anti-terrorism, counter-drug, Anti-piracy operations
       Convoys, blockades

--39--


Not addressed (II)
       Sealift
       U.S. Merchant Marine
       Coastal & riverine capabilities and operations
       U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
       Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
       Surge

Subsequent analyses & critiques
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

--40--


Criticisms
       Document too disjointed
       "Never heard of it"
       Neither publicized nor used
       Never gained much traction beyond those directly involved in its development and promulgation

Influence:

Little, but...
       Cited in FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century (2005)
       Cited in ONR Naval S&T Strategic Plans (2007, 2009, 2011)

Why?
       Overwhelmed by Sea Power 21, Marine Corps 21, & Naval Transformation Roadmaps 2002 & 2003
       No strong SECNAV public push or follow-up effort to build consensus
       25% increase in fleet size never achieved

--41--


Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Minimal
       Recorded SECNAV push for more USN-USMC integration. Set stage for NOCJO & NOC
       Cited in NOCJO as "our transformational vision"

Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003)

Image - Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2003).

--42--


Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Clark & CMC Gen Hagee (Apr 2003)
       Billed as an "Operating Concept"
       Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps
       Medium-length (23 pages). UNCLAS. Published on web
       Navy drafters: OPNAV N513 (Strategy Branch) & Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
       Amplified Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS concepts
       Elevated ready-force surge alongside forward presence Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
       Capabilities-based approach: To counter conventional & unconventional threats challenging US military superiority
       Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts
       Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
       Little influence in Navy. More in Marine Corps

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Vern Clark
          3rd year in office
       CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

Image - CNO Admiral Vern Clark and CMC General Michael W. Hagee.

--43--


What it was
       Billed as an "operating concept" & a "capstone concept"
       Tasked in Naval Power 21 (Oct 2002)        Signed April 2003
       UNCLAS. Published on web
       Medium-length: 23 pages
          Almost triple the length of 1997 Navy Operational Concept (8 pages)
       Explicitly superseded by Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (2006)

Why it was written
       To lay out vision for near-term and far-term naval capabilities and operations
       To lay out USN-USMC contributions to the joint force (including SOF), implementing "1-4-2-1" defense strategy & Joint Vision 2020
       As USN-USMC input to proposed Joint Operations Concepts
       To achieve USN-USMC consensus on USMC Sea Basing, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) & other USMC-originated concepts
       To expand upon & implement vision of Seapower 21
       Principal target: USN, USMC officer corps

--44--


Context (I)
       3rd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
       Modest US economic growth
          Oil price climbing
          Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
       SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
       SECNAV England (2001-2006)
       CNO ADM Clark (2000-05)
       Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on USS Cole (2000) & MV Limburg (2002)
       9-11 Al Qaeda attack on America
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       SECDEF Rumsfeld policy of spurring defense "transformation"

Context (II)
       OEF operational experience & lessons learned
          USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
          Continued subsequent heavy USN air support
       More post-9/11 joint ops launched
       Planning for, conducting Iraq invasion, occupation
          Invasion (Mar 20, 2003); Iraq occupied (Apr 2003)
          OIF appeared to have secured "defeat of Iraq"
             President Bush "Mission Accomplished" speech on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (1 May 2003)
          Continuing counter-insurgency & stabilization ops unforeseen
       Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea
       Desert Shield/Desert Storm strike & MPS experience assimilated
       CVNs as AFSBs routinized

--45--


Context (III)
       1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
       PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean (from 2002)
       USN port calls to PRC resumed (Nov 2002)
       Occasional meetings under the US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (1998)
       USJFCOM Millenium Challenge 2002 war game
          Crystallized US military conceptual debates
          LtGen USMC (Ret) Van Riper critique
       Container Security Initiative (from Jan 2002)
       Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (2003)
       Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
       375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
       USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships & declining; 5 new ships authorized

Context (IV)
       Fleet Forces Command created (2001)
       CNO Clark post-9/11 calls for a "Maritime NORAD"
       MV Westpac Express under MSC charter as HSV 4676 (2002); Swift HSV2 being leased (2003)
       New littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under development
       New "Hybrid Sailor" concept under development, to man LCSs
       USN "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
       Unofficial DC-area Navy Study Group (1992-2005)
          Convener: Dr. David Rosenberg
          Participants included NOCJO contributors

--46--


Cited references (I)
       1st Bush National Security Strategy (2002)
          Unilateral, pre-emptive strike; maintenance of US military superiority
       CJCS Shelton Joint Vision 2020 (2000)
       Naval Power 21 (2002)
       Sea Power 21 (2002-3)
       CMC Gen Jones Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Nov 2000)

Cited references (II)
       Naval Transformation Roadmap (2002)
       Family of USMC concepts
          CMC Gen Jones, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Marine Corps capstone concept (Nov 2001)
          Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) (1996)
          Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) (1997)
       USN-USMC Enhanced Networked Sea Basing concept draft

--47--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       NATO Strategic Concept of the Alliance (1999)
          Emphasis on crisis management
       SACEUR/SACLANT Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept - The Maritime Dimension (Jul 2001)
       National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002)
       2nd (1st Bush) QDR (2001)
          310-ship BF goal; "1-4-2-1" force sizing construct
       Joint Staff Operational Availability 2003 report (2002)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       SPG, CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (2000)
       Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001)
          Outlined 4 phases of joint operations
       NIC, Global Trends 2015 (Dec 2000)
       Large family of USMC warfighting concepts (from 1996)
       MCDP 1 Warfighting (Jun 1997)
       MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Sep 2001)
       Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan (2002)
       Revised USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2002)

--48--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, America's Air Force Vision 2020: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power (2000)
       US Army FM 3-0 Operations (2001)
       BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (2nd ed.) (1999)
       Kugler & Frost (eds.) The Global Century (2001)
          CDR Steve Benson chapter on USN & Globalization
       CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) Globalization and Maritime Power (2002)
       Col Bob Work USMC (Ret) Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better? (2002)
       CAPT Edward Smith USN, Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (2002)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13B, Personnel Tempo of Operations (Feb 2000)
       DoD Military Power of the PRC (2002)
          First Annual Report to Congress
       CAPT Bernard Cole (Ret), The Great Wall at Sea (2001)
       Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999)
       CAPT Wayne Hughes (Ret) Fleet Tactics & Coastal Combat (1999)
       Sherry Sontag & Chris Drew, Blind Man's Bluff (1998)

--49--


How it was written (I)
       SECNAV England tasked in Naval Power 21 (Oct 2001)
       Initial draft by OPNAV N513 & MCCDC (2002)
          CAPT Will Dossel, CAPT Tommy Klepper, CDR Tim Groelinger, CDR Paul Nagy (OPNAV N513)
          Col Art Corbett & staff (MCCDC)
          Col Corbett had been assigned (as Maj) to N513 (1994-5)
          N5/N51 oversight: VADM Green/RDML Wachendorf
          Contentious USN-USMC issues, esp. seabasing specificity
          Never got beyond 3-star level

How it was written (II)
       Effort resurrected by NWDC, MCCDC (2003)
          NWDC: CAPT Brian Barrington
          MCCDC: LtCol Mike Raimondo
          OPNAV N513 & HQMC PP&O contributed to end-game
          OPNAV oversight: VADM Kevin Green (N3/N5) & RDML Eric Olson (N51) (SEAL officer)
             SOF role highlighted

--50--


Outline
       Introduction
       Strategic environment
       Implications for the joint force
       FORCEnet: Enabling an integrated Navy and Marine Corps team
       Naval operations in the near and mid terms
       Naval operations in the far term
       The way ahead
       Conclusion

Key ideas (I)
       "How the Navy & Marine Corps will operate across the full range of military operations in the near, mid & far terms through 2020"
       NOCJO meets US "1-4-2-1" national defense strategy requirements
       Navy-Marine Corps Team seeks to do it all
          Elevated ready-force surge alongside forward presence
          Near-term, mid-term & long-term (to 2020) visions
          Meet conventional and unconventional threats
          Meet nation-state and non-state adversaries
       Priorities not discussed

--51--


Key ideas (II)
       Amplified Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS concepts
          Expanded discussion of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, FORCEnet
          Full discussion of Global CONOPS
             Endorsed new Global CONOPS force packages
             Did not refer to Global CONOPS by name, however
       Limited discussion of Sea Warrior & Sea Trial
       No discussion of Sea Enterprise
       Integrated USMC concepts of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) throughout

Key ideas (III)
       Tentative USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus
       Capabilities-based approach, vs. generic threats
          State & non-state actors
          Conventional & unconventional threats that challenge US military superiority
       Call for new, revised version of NDP 1, Naval Warfare (1994)
       Call for more integrated USN-USMC education, training, doctrine, experimentation, research & development
       Explicit relationships to joint & sister service concepts & operations, including Special Operations Forces (SOF)

--52--


Image - Chart: Flexible Response.

What was new?
       USN-USMC operating concept
       Rigorous look at near-term, mid-term, long-term
       Effort to specifically & comprehensively link to joint & sister service concepts, especially SOF
       Sea Basing elevated
       Surge elevated for 1st time since The Way Ahead (1991)

--53--


Not addressed
       Priorities among the concepts presented
       Specific conventional & unconventional threats
       Maritime security, anti-piracy operations, blockade, convoys
       Coastal & riverine capabilities & operations
       Globalization, world system
       U.S. Merchant Marine
       U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
       Non-governmental organizations
       Link to force level planning, programming, budgeting

Subsequent analyses & critiques
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 19892007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

--54--


Criticisms
       Unnecessary & unused        Overwhelming USMC influence
       Navy should have had it's own single-service NOC.
       USN-USMC Sea Basing consensus soon unraveled

Influence
       Little in Navy, except (small) concept development community
       More in USMC
       Helped spawn 2 CNO-CMC-signed concepts
          Enhanced Networked Seabasing operational concept (2003)
          FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century (2005)

--55--


Why this influence?
       Little USN interest in formal long-range concept development in general, & in conformance to joint concept development processes & definitions in particular
       Useful to small USN/USMC concept development groups, however
       Little CNO ADM Clark involvement or follow-through
       No USN fanfare. USMC cited sometimes
       Eclipsed in Navy by wide Sea Power 21 internal & external publicity, and use in USN POM development
       Published only on the web

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Minimal
       2003 NOCJO tasking to update 1994 NDP 1 largely ignored until 2010
       Futurist orientation & conformance to joint practices of NOCJO (2003) not continued in NOC (2006)
       Precedent considered valuable by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC. Superseded by NOC 2006

--56--


Fleet Response Plan (2003)

Fleet Response Plan Fleet Response Plan

Overview
       Put out by CNO ADM Clark, CFFC ADM Natter (Mar 2003)
       First a "concept"; then a "plan; then a "program"
       To increase & maintain USN surge capability, to meet short-notice demands for significant naval combat forces forward
       To change Navy culture from "deployment-centric" to "readiness-centric;" to enable "presence with a purpose"
       Advertised as tested in Summer Pulse 04
       Principal targets: DOD civilian leadership, USN officers. Later, USN enlisted & families
       Series of short internal USN directives (1 made into glossy); numerous external flag interviews/speeches/articles; web
       Initially conceived in OPNAV, esp. "Deep Blue" office
       Big internal USN influence, esp. waterfront; OSD impressed.
       Institutionalized: 2007; Specific goals evolved; Policy in 2010

--57--


Promulgated by:
       CNO ADM Vern Clark
          3rd year in office
       COMFLTFORCOM ADM Robert Natter

Image - CNO Admiral Vern Clark and COMFLTFORCOM Admiral Robert Natter.

What it was (I)
       Billed first as a "concept"; then as a "plan"; later - occasionally - a "program"
          Implementing OPNAVINST called it an "operational framework" (2006)
          2007 fleet implementing instruction contained a "vision"

--58--


What it was (II)
       Published in internal USN directives & external flag officer interviews, speeches & articles & on web
          CNO concept (Mar 2003)
             Short: 3 pages
          COMFLTFORCOM ADM Robert Natter, "Creating a Surge Ready Force," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Sep 2003)
             Short: 3 pages

What it was (III)
          Flag officer testimony, speeches, articles & interviews, e.g.:
          COMFLTFORCOM ADM William Fallon, "The Navy's New Operational Construct," The Hook (Spring 2004)
          "Surge Protectors: Submarines Prove Vital to the Navy's Fleet Response Plan," Undersea Warfare (Fall 2004)
       Institutionalized
          OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
          COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3000.15/COMPACFLTINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2007)
             Also published as booklet (51 pp)

--59--


Why it was written (I)
       US Navy concern that forward presence had waned as an effective argument within the US government for a robust US Navy
       To change Navy culture & practices to better link Navy to Bush Administration policies & priorities re: preventive war & anti-terrorism crisis response
       To respond to SECDEF & OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DoD components, post-9/11 (2003)
       To argue to SECDEF & OSD that more Navy force structure was usable to the nation - through surging forward on demand - beyond the fraction that was forward deployed
          To bolster arguments for follow-on to Nimitz-class CVN ("CVN-21")
          To satisfy CCDR plans and force requirements

Why it was written (II)
       To change a host of Navy policies, practices & procedures in order to ensure significant surge forces were ready
       To sustain these changes by creating new deliberate processes & changing Navy culture from "deployment-centric" to "readiness-centric"
       To forge a new internal Navy consensus regarding its deployment strategy and policies        "To give the President more options" & "presence with a purpose"
       Principal targets: DOD civilian & joint leadership, USN planners. Later, USN enlisted & families

--60--


Context (I)
       3rd year of Bush administration (2001-9)
       Modest US economic growth
          Oil price climbing
          Increasing U.S. government deficit spending
       Bush administration advocacy of "preventive wars'
          National Security Strategy of the United States (Sep 2002)
             "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves..."
             "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense"
       SECDEF Rumsfeld push for military transformation

Context (II)
       "9-11" Al Qaeda attacks on America (Sep 2001)
       OEF, OIF, Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, OEF Philippines, CJTF HOA all recently begun & ongoing
          USN OEF surge (2001)
             USN CVBGs provided majority of initial US air support
          USN OIF surge: 7 CVNs, 9 LHA/LHDs (2003)
          OIF appeared to have secured "defeat of Iraq"
             President Bush "Mission Accomplished" speech on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (1 May 2003)
       Continuing counter-insurgency & stabilization ops unforeseen
       Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on USS Cole (2000) & MV Limburg (2002)
       1st PLAN out-of-area global circumnavigation cruise (2002)
       Turkey refused US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
       Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (2003)

--61--


Context (III)
       CNO ADM Clark (2000-5)
          Priority to date: Improved readiness
       USN in 2003: 297 Battle Force ships & declining; 5 new ships authorized
       Increasing annual DON budgets
       375-ship Battle Force USN force goal
       Navy plans for follow-on to Nimitz-class CVNs
          Some push-back within Pentagon
       USN forces allocated to CCDRs through CJCS-run Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) (since 1991)
       USN began "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
       RADM John Morgan (senior SECNAV MA) initiative to reexamine "Principles of War" (2003)

Cited references
       Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP)
       CNO 2003 "Culture of Readiness" message
       Other previous CNO messages
       2007 CFFC/CPF FRP implementing instruction mis-cited 2006 Naval Operations Concept (as Naval Operating Concept)

--62--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13B, Personnel Tempo of Operations (Feb 2000)
       Dan Goure, "The Tyranny of Forward Presence," Naval War College Review (Summer 2001)
       Sea Power 21 (Jun 2002)
          No mention of surge
       National Security Strategy of the United States (Sep 2002)
          Advocacy of "preventive wars," implying surge capabilities

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2005, later 2006) impending
       DoD Global Defense Posture Review underway
       Post-OIF "Navy Reconstitution Plan" briefings
       Joint Staff Operational Availability 2003 report
       CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS

--63--


How it was written (I)
       SECDEF & OSD demand for more, faster surge capability from all DOD components, post-9/11 (2001) & Iraq War (2003) surges
          Joint Staff Operational Availability (OA) 2003 report
             Focus on service support for CCDR needs
             Emphasis on increasing strategic speed to implement 2 near-simultaneous MCOs
             "10-30-30" force sizing construct
                Seize the initiative within 10 days
                "Swiftly defeat" one enemy within 30 days
                Commence "swiftly defeat" operations vs. 2nd enemy in another theater 30 days later
             Adopted by OSD in Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)
       Catalyst: USD (P&R) Dr. David Chu remark:
          "There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a substantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the president on short notice, short of heroic measures"
       Enabler: Expanding USN carrier operating cycle (from about 1986)
          Origin: USN PERSTEMPO policy (6-month maximum deployments, etc.) (1986)
          GNFPP (1993), 3.0 CVBG TAR minimum rule, IMP maintenance, etc. contributed
          Gave appearance of increasing "slack time" in carrier schedules; provided increased surge potential

--64--


How it was written (III)
       Development methodology
          Concept incubated in OPNAV (Deep Blue)
          Later passed to CFFC for plan development & implementation
       Initial OPNAV role
          VADM Willy Moore (OPNAV N4) originated concept
          Initial concept papers and briefings drafted in new OPNAV Navy Operations Innovation Group ("Deep Blue")
             RDML Doug Crowder (Director, 2002-4)
             CAPT Joe Bouchard

How it was written (IV)
       CNO tasked Commander, Fleet Forces Command (ADM Robert Natter) to further develop concept, plan (Mar 2003)
          ADM Natter published FRP implementation plan (May 2003)
       Major internal and external relations effort to socialize FRP concepts and procedures (2003-7)
          Numerous flag officer interviews & articles
       Advertised as tested in Summer Pulse 04
          Near-simultaneous global forward deployment of 7 CSGs
          Included 2-CSG Majestic Eagle 2004 exercise of Morocco
       Institutionalized in 2007
          Comprehensive Fleet Forces Command/Pacific Fleet instruction

--65--


Outline (COMFLTFORCOM May 03 msg)
       FRP implementation
       Background
       Summary of FRP
          Create a culture of readiness
          Meet new readiness and surge thresholds
          Change maintenance, manning and training processes to support surge and deployment
          Lengthen inter-deployment cycle
       Key implementation milestones

Key ideas (I)
       Create USN "culture of readiness" to supplant "culture of deployment"
          Replace "D-minus" thinking with "R-plus" thinking
       Focus on output (strategic speed in support of CCDR plans)
       Increase USN capability to surge combat-ready CSGs & - later - other fleet elements, on short notice
       Elevate priority of USN short-notice surge capability, within the Navy
          Permanent combat-credible USN forward presence no longer the main peacetime goal

--66--


Key ideas (II)
       Capitalize on recently improved fleet readiness
       Change current USN training, maintenance, manning policies & practices
       Redesign and lengthen fleet Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) to increase ship, aircraft & personnel short-notice surge availability
          New phases, timelines, vocabulary, goals
       Not intended to cost more than GNFPP process

Key ideas (III)
       FRP could enable a new "Flexible Deployment Concept"
          Intermittent planned focused surges & pulses of varied duration to various locations in support of CCDR requirements and specific national priorities
             Would reduce - but not eliminate - combat-credible forward presence in permanent forward "hubs"
          Could reduce predictability of USN forward operations
          More options for the President, the SECDEF and the CCDRs
          More effective "presence with a purpose"

--67--


The FRP goal: An evolving metric
       2003-5: "6 & 2"
          6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 2 within 90 days
       2005-7: "6 & 1"
          6 CSGs deployable within 30 days; 1 within 90 days
       2007: "3+3+1"
          3 CSGs deployed; 3 deployable within 30 days; 1 in 90 days
       2007: "5 +1"
          USS John F. Kennedy decommissioned
       By 2010: "3+2+1"

Evolution
       Total USN carrier numbers declined from 12 to 11 (2004-2007)
          USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in commission but did not deploy (2004-2007)
          Planned to decline temporarily to 10 in 2012
       USN relaxation of PERSTEMPO deployment length rules (2007)
       FRP extended to ESGs (2007)
       By 2007, explicit FRP cycle goals promulgated for numerous USN ship, aircraft, unit types
          COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3000.15 (Aug 2007)

--68--


Key supporting graphics
       None in basic FRP documents (naval messages, instructions, etc.)
       But ubiquitous in internal Navy briefings on FRP
       Most important were depictions of carrier and other ship scheduling options
          E.g.: "Before FRP" and "After FRP"
       Actual "After FRP" example provided in following slide, for illustrative purposes

Image - Fleet Response Plan chart.

--69--


What was new?
       Emphasized surge and strategic speed
       "6 & 2" goal metric & "progressive readiness" concept
       Attempt to change USN culture: "R+" vice "D-" thinking
       Formalized training milestones
       Major OPNAV Deep Blue-orchestrated CHINFO campaign (Summer Pulse 04)
       Implications for changing USN deployment to a "Flexible Deployment Concept" (FDC)

Not addressed
       Most things not directly related to deployment policy & increased surge capability

Document - while arguing for a basic cultural change within the Navy - was narrowly focused on cultural & administrative changes necessary to improve USN readiness to surge
       Did not purport to be a comprehensive Navy policy or strategy statement

Only threat & policy driver mentioned was war on terrorism

--70--


Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)
       CNA studies
          K. Smith et al., Explorations of the Fleet Response Plan (CNA 2005)
       GAO reports
          Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan (Jun 2004)
          Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing (Nov 2005)
          Military Readiness: Navy is Making Progress Implementing its Fleet Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and Resource Needs (Feb 2008)
       RAND report
          Benjamin Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century (2005)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)
       U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings articles
          CDR Donald H. Braswell, "Carrier Strike Groups Need a Combat Surge Capability," (Sep 2004)
          LT B.W. Stone, "A Bridge Too Far" (Feb 2005)
          LCDR Keith Harrison, "Comment and Discussion" (Mar 2005)
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

--71--


Criticisms (I)
       Admiral Clark had unduly tried to "garrison the fleet"
       By the time the FRP was implemented, US government policies had already changed again regarding efficacy of launching "preventive wars" & the surges that could enable them
          US military encountered major difficulties in pacifying Iraq following successful surge & invasion; US enthusiasm for more such surge operations waned
       "Culture of readiness" never fully supplanted "culture of deployment"
       Original FRP metric goals were based on questionable baseline data, so had to be progressively scaled back
       Destabilized Sailor home life & reduced retention

Criticisms (II)
       "Flexible Deployment Concept" (FDC) never approved or implemented
       Joint, CCDR, & some Navy staff opposition to FDC as degrading combat-credible forward presence in permanent forward hubs, which they preferred
          Preferred "Presence is our Purpose" to "Presence with a Purpose"
       By 2010, continued forward operational demands & looming tightened budgets foreseen as potentially constraining - indeed, reversing - USN FRP implementation
          Poor USN surface combatant maintenance track records

--72--


Criticisms (III)
       Not really transformational
          Merely tweaked the carrier schedule
          Centrality of the two forward deployment hubs remained
       Focus on surge and strategic speed meant neglect of extended "Phase 0" and "Phase IV" operations
       Actually reduced air wing training, readiness, cohesion
       Actually increased Navy costs in several areas
          Looming tightened budgets seen as potentially constraining Navy capability to continue implementing FRP (2010)
       Actually reduced USN responsiveness to CCDR demands, until new PERSTEMPO rules instituted (2007)

Criticisms (IV)
       Not applicable beyond CSGs
       Continued national (GNFPP) forward presence requirements prevented true implementation
          Navy never asked to surge again for the remainder of the decade
       GNFPP surge response time goals were actually faster than FRP goals (although for fewer ships)
       Even more measures were needed to increase fleet surge responsiveness. FRP itself was not enough
       Fleet maintenance process changes actually driven by shipyard requirements & practices, not the need for surge

--73--


Influence (I):
       GW Bush-era SECDEF & OSD were impressed
          E.g.: Former SECDEF Rumsfeld cited ADM Clark & FRP favorably in his memoir (2011)
       Summer Pulse 2004 exercise may have influenced PRC & Taiwan
       Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on improving USN readiness to surge
       Ironically, helped enable extended forward deployments
       FRP still an on-going, established USN concept of fleet operations as of 2010
          But staffs discussing "FRP reset" (2010)

Influence (II):
       Great influence within USN
       In schoolhouses, on the waterfront, in shipyards, & at sea
       Fleet schedules altered
       Multiple-CSG exercises scheduled occasionally
          Summer Pulse 2004
          Valiant Shield 2006 and 2007
       Short-notice surges accepted as fact of life; USN culture shifted away from sole fixation on forward naval presence

--74--


Influence (III):


       Continued through CNOs ADM Mullen & ADM Roughead terms (but with changed metrics)
          FRP extended to ESGs in 2007
       Influenced 2007 USN PERSTEMPO rules changes
       Cited in DON FY 09 Budget Statement (Feb 2008)
       CNO ADM Roughead discussed FRP positively in Congressional testimony (Feb 2010)
       New internal USN consensus on value of surge readiness was indeed forged
       Flexible Deployment Concept yet to be endorsed, implemented as national policy

Why did it have the influence it did? (I)
       Responded to an important SECDEF demand quickly & - by all appearances - effectively
       Deployment readiness lay within CNO purview to change
          Deployment strategy driven by SECDEF, CCDRs, not Navy, however
       Heavy CNO ADM Clark endorsement & follow-through
       Continued public endorsement by succeeding CNOs

--75--


Why did it have the influence it did? (II)
       FRP fit DoD Operational Availability (OA) 2003 & SPG "10-30-30" increased strategic speed deployment strategy metric
       Post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) (later renamed Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)) supplemental defense funding funded many changes enabling FRP
       Assumption over succeeding years that there might be more "short-notice Iraqs"
          Increasingly debated, however, following Obama presidential election victory (2008)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       "Surge" concept discussed in Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (May 2006)
          Fleet Response Plan itself not mentioned
       Fleet Response Plan cited in Dec 2007 CNO ADM Roughead testimony on A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
          "Surge" mentioned only in passing in A Cooperative Strategy text itself (2007)
       "Surge" - but not Fleet Response Plan - defined and mentioned frequently in Naval Operations Concept (2010)
       But "surge" seldom mentioned, however, in NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)

--76--


ADM Michael Mullen (CNO Jul 2005-Sep 2007)

Apr 2006 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (S) & (U)

Sep 2006 Naval Operations Concept (U)

Sep 2007 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (S)

Image - Admiral Michael Mullen.

Surface warfare officer
       Served under President Bush; SECDEFs Rumsfeld & Gates; SECNAVs England, Winter
       Became CNO following tours as OPNAV N8 and VCNO then NATO Commander, Joint Force Naples & Commander, US Naval Forces Europe
          Considerable professional growth in each tour
          Oversaw Balkan, Iraq, Med operations for US, NATO
       As N8 & VCNO, had helped create, implement Seapower 21
          Had signed out three of its defining articles: On "Sea Shield," "Sea Enterprise," "Global CONOPS"

--77--


Embraced & expanded on VADM John Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) strategic planning vision for the Navy
       Kept & supported VADM Morgan as OPNAV N3/N5

After a year in office, signed out
       Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (NSP 08)
       Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (with CMC)

Signed out NSP ISO POM 10 in last week as CNO

Actively started & presided over development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Pushed for USMC & USCG participation & signatures

New USN Ship Battle Force goal: 313 ships

Signature initiatives:
       New maritime strategy
       "1000-Ship Navy"
       "Global Fleet Stations"
       Cost control to build 2 Virginia-class SSNs per year

Unexpectedly named CJCS before Cooperative Strategy drafting completed (2007)

--78--


Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Image - Cover: Navy Strategic Plans (April & may 2006).

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Mullen (Apr, May 2006)
       A "strategic plan." SECRET and UNCLAS versions
       Principal target: USN planners & programmers
       Mid-length (23/42 pp); distributed on UNCLAS, CLAS webs
       Drafted by OPNAV Strategy, Plans & Policy Director (N5SP)
       Effects-based & capabilities-based planning
       Used modified Sea Power 21 "pillars"
       Non-traditional missions not solely sub-sets of MCOs
       Emphasis throughout on programming for GWOT
       Risk is inherent
       "1000-ship navy" initiative
       Influence: Too late to affect POM 08 directly, but set stage for A Cooperative Strategy & NSP ISO POM 10

--79--


Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Michael Mullen
       During 1st year in office

Image - CNO Admiral Michael Mullen.

What it was
       Billed as a "Strategic plan"
       Subtitle: "in support of Program Objective Memorandum 08"
          Although Navy POM 08 already submitted
       Included a CNO "vision"
       CNO ADM Mullen tasked 29 July 2005
       SECRET version April 2006
          Medium length (42 pages)
       UNCLAS version May 2006
          Shorter (23 pages)
       Navy-only. Not tri-service or bi-service
       Announced intent: Publish every 2 years
       Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

--80--


Why it was written (I)
       To build consensus around emerging new national security & naval concepts within the Navy, especially:
          Need for naval capabilities beyond conventional conflict
          Primarily for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) but also for Homeland Defense - especially Maritime Domain Awareness - & "1000-Ship Navy"
       To socialize the ideas concomitantly being developed by the Navy for a "new maritime strategy"

Why it was written (II)
       Provide N51-led, top-down strategic & policy guidance - including priorities - to USN staff elements responsible for building USN POM 08 submission (& PR-09, POM 10 submissions)
       Link higher-level guidance to Navy PPBE process
       Serve as capstone document for a new family of subordinate Navy strategic plans
       Start a repeatable new OPNAV staff process linking strategy to programs more tightly
       Principal target: USN leaders, planners, programmers & budgeters

--81--


Context (I)
       2nd term of G.W. Bush administration (2001-9)
          US economic growth slowing
          US Foreign trade soaring
          Oil price soaring
          U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
       SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)
       US voters re-endorsed Bush administration (2004)
       New CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
       New SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
       DPRK withdrew from NPT, restarted nuclear weapons program (2003)
       Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered
       President announced global partnership w/India (2005)
       US-Libya rapprochement
          Gaddafi renounces terror, WMD (2003)

Context (II)
       OEF, OIF, other operations ongoing
          US government focus on the Army, USMC & ground wars Rising levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
          Abu Ghraib Iraqi prison abuses aroused world vs. US (2004)
          Increased USN, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
          Declining US force levels in Iraq (since Nov 2005)
          Taliban reorganizing & reconstituting in Afghanistan (2004-6)
       Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
       ASG Islamic separatist terrorist attack on Philippine ferry (2004)
       Terrorist attack on USN Iraq oil terminal security force (2004)

--82--


Context (III)
       New DOD PPBE system introduced (2004)
       Global Defense Posture Review (2004)
          USN Europe base drawdown & Guam increase
          NAS Roosevelt Roads PR closed (2004)
       3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
          QDR 2001 "1-4-2-1" Force Planning Construct became 3-part separate but overlapping mission set ("Michelin Man Strategy")
             Homeland Defense
             War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
             Conventional Campaigns
          Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
             Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
             Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific. 60% of USN submarines to Pacific
          "Tailored deterrence" strategy
       SECDEF Rumsfeld backing off on pressure for "transformation," "strategic speed," "surge," & "regime change," in the wake of stalemates in Iraq & Afghanistan

Context (IV)
       Rise in pirate attacks worldwide
       Malacca Strait ISR measures instituted
          PACOM RMSI (aborted) (2003), MALSINDO (2004), Eyes-in-the-Sky (2005)
       Somali pirate Seabourn Spirit cruise ship attack (2005)
       USS Winston Churchill thwarted Somali coast pirate attack (Jan 2006)

--83--


Context (V)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Increased USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore in Iraq & Afghanistan, to relieve stress on ground forces
          Exponential rise in USN IA assignments, ISO OIF & OEF
       Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
       Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops ongoing
       Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)

Context (VI)
       7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster response ops yield favorable US policy outcomes & publicity (2004-5)
       USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
       Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
          Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
          USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
          Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
          Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity

--84--


Context (VII)
       PRC President Hu Jintao speech declaring "New Historical Missions of the PLA" (Dec 2004)
       PLA IRBM buildup across from Taiwan
       PLAN development of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
       PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
       PLAN launched 1st new Jin-class SSBN (2004)
       Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
       Occasional USN port visits to China
       Occasional meetings under the US-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) (1998)
       Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: Peace Mission 2005

Context (VIII)
       Increasing DON annual budgets; declining force levels
       USN Battle Force goal of 313 ships (Feb 2006)
       USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships & declining somewhat; only 4 new ships authorized
       USN concluding "Sea Swap" experiments, rotating crews to forward deployed destroyers (2002-6)
       Fleet Response Plan being implemented
          7-CSG Summer Pulse 2004 global deployment
       Fleet ASW Command established in Pacific (San Diego) (2004)
       ISMERLO activated in Norfolk (2004)
       NECC standup (including Riverine Group) (2005)

--85--


Context (IX)
       4 Kidd-class DDGs transferred to Taiwan (2005-6)
       Mine Warfare Command moved, subsumed under new Fleet Anti-Submarine & Mine Warfare Command (2006)
       High speed vessels being leased, planned by MSC
          Westpac Express (HSV-4676) chartered for USMC (2002)
          Swift (HSV-2) chartered (2003)
          Joint Venture (HSVX-1) chartered (2003-4)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          New "Hybrid Sailor" concept under development to man LCSs
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems

Context (X)
       New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)
       CNO Mullen "1000-ship Navy" concept floated (2005)
       USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
       USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) created (Feb 2006)
       Increased focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
       VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004-8)
          Plans to overhaul USN strategy
          Had stimulated "Principles of war" debates (w/Anthony McIvor)
          All N3/N5 offices re-designated (2004)
             N51 became N5SP; N513 became N5SC

--86--


Context (XI)
       Demise of unofficial Rosenberg-convened "Navy Study Group" (2003)
       Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences began (2005)
          Driver: RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP)
       JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy (2005-8)
          JHU/APL drivers: Duncan Brown, CAPT (Ret) Steve Richter
          Lockheed Martin driver: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris
          CNA drivers: RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt, CAPT (Ret) Peter Swartz
       CNO ADM Mullen announced development of a new maritime strategy
       CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of "Naval Operating Concept" (6 Jan 06)

Cited references (I)
       2nd Bush National Security Strategy (2006)
       National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
       SECDEF Rumsfeld National Defense Strategy (2005)
          New focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
          "we will create conditions for a favorable international system"
          Continued exhortations for transformation
       3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)

--87--


Cited references (II)
       CJCS Myers National Military Strategy (2004)
       National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006)
       Strategic Planning Guidance (Mar 2006), Joint Programming Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, Transformation Planning Guidance, JSCP
       "CNO Guidance for 2006"
       Sea Power 21 (2002)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy (Dec 2004)
       National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
       DoD Nuclear Posture Review (2001)
       DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
       National Military strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005)
       Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)
       Security Cooperation Guidance, OPLANS, CONPLANS, CCDR TSC Plans
       Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Version 2.0 (Aug 2005) and Joint Operating Concepts
       Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (2005)

--88--


Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       DOD, Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Sep 2004)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       Joint Global Force Management (GFM) Allocation Plan (superseded GNFPP) (2006)
       DOD annual reports Military Power of the PRC (2002+)
       DOD OFT, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach (2003)
       NIC, Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020 (2004)
       CGMCCDC & COMNWDC, Enhanced Networked Seabasing Operational Concept (2003)
       ONI, Worldwide Maritime Challenges (2004)
       CNO & CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb 2005)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       Naval Transformation Roadmap 2002 & 2003
       Bi-National Planning Group (US-Canada), Interim Report on CANUS Expanded Military Cooperation (Oct 2004)
       Former UNDERSECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
          CDR Steve Benson on "USN and Globalization", in Kugler & Frost (eds.) The Global Century (2001)
          CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) Globalization and Maritime Power (2002)
       RADM Morgan, D. McIvor, & SECNAV's "Action Team," "Rethinking the Principles of War" US Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 2003)
       VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (2005)
       Anthony McIvor (ed.), Rethinking the Principles of War (2005)

--89--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security (Summer 2003)
       Blake Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare (2003)
       Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (2003)
       Goldman Sachs, Dreaming with the BRICs (2003)
       The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)
       Col T.X. Hammes, Sling and the Stone (2004)
       Steven Budiansky, Air Power (2004)
          Argues for air support of ground forces
       Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004)
       Thomas P.M. Barnett, Pentagon's New Map (2004)
       Thomas P.M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action (2005)

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       CAPT Ed Smith (Ret) Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (2002)
       Booz Allen Hamilton, Energy Futures in Asia (Jan 2004)
          Asserted PRC Indian Ocean "string of pearls" basing policy
       CNA, Report to Congress Regarding Naval Force Architecture (Jan 2005)
          Congressionally mandated (2003)
       DOD OFT, Alternative Fleet Architecture Design (2005)
          Congressionally mandated (2003)
       CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-2006)
       CNA studies on PRC military
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (April 2005-2006)

--90--


How it was written (I)
       Intellectual foundation: "3/1 Strategy" construct (2004-5)
          Thesis: Navy stability, anti-terrorism, and homeland defense missions were no longer merely "lesser included cases" & subsets of Major Combat Operations (MCOs), but critical Navy mission sets in their own right, needing their own dedicated force structure
             Brainchild of VADM John Morgan (N3/N5 2004-8)
             Undergrad major in economics (UVA)
             Focus on strategy, globalization & functioning of global international economic and security system, post-OEF & OIF
          During tenure of CNO ADM Vern Clark
          Many workshops, briefings to US Navy, & Navy-affiliated audiences (including COMUSNAVEUR ADM Mullen) (from Nov 2004)
          Spawned new N81 "sea shaping" analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
          Progenitor of NSP, NOC, A Cooperative Strategy
          But never officially promulgated or endorsed by CNO Clark

How it was written (II)
       Intellectual foundation: "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)
          RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) "Bear Paw" graphic

Image - 'Bear Paw' graphic.

--91--


How it was written (III)
       Intellectual foundation: "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)
       Internal Navy pushback vs. "3/1 Strategy" briefs (20045)
          Commander Fleet Forces Command ADM John Nathman a key opponent
             ADM Nathman also looking to a post-OIF & OEF future, like VADM Morgan
             But saw increased US competition vs. high end competitors as main future USN challenge, not US leadership in globalization & maintenance of the world system
          Debates over 3/1 strategy content presaged future debates over content of Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), Naval Operations Concept (NOC), and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21)

How it was written (IV)
       New CNO ADM Mullen immediately tasked drafting a Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) (Jul 2005)
       Personalities: VADM John Morgan (N3/N5) & RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) conceived & drafted
          LCDR Joe Carrigan & LT Mark Lawrence supported
       National Strategy for Maritime Security signed by President Bush provided concepts (Sep 2005)
       RDML Martoglio vetted portions at 17th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Newport, esp. "1000-ship Navy" concept (Sep 2005)
       Differing Navy outlooks debated (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 2006)
          CNO ADM Mullen, "What I Believe: Eight Tenets That Guide My Vision for the 21st Century Navy"
          CFFC ADM John Nathman, "Shaping the Future"

--92--


How it was written (V)
       SECDEF Rumsfeld Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 (QDR) necessitated rewrite (Feb 2006)
       RDML-SEL Phil Cullom (Director, OPNAV Deep Blue) relieved RDML Martoglio as OPNAV N5SP (Mar 2006)
       Consensus-building among Navy senior flag officers
       Push-back from Commander, Fleet Forces Command ADM Nathman & his staff
       End-game:
          CNO-led flag officer off-site meeting at CNA (Apr 2006)
             NSP briefed by LCDR Audrey Snyder (N3/N5 SAG)
          Significant re-writes
          SECRET version signed by CNO ADM Mullen (Apr 2006)
          UNCLAS version signed by CNO ADM Mullen (May 2006)

Outline (UNCLAS version)
       Introduction
       Vision
       Objective
       Desired effects
       Assumptions
       Strategic landscape
       Higher-level guidance
       Force Planning & capability development
       Global Navy Concept: Distributed, networked operations
       Directed analytical studies
       Risk guidance
       Family of strategic plans
       Conclusion

--93--


Key ideas (I)
       Re-application of 2005 "3/1 Strategy" "Bear Paw" concepts
       Strategy should inform USN investments
       USN plays key roles in GWOT, SSO, & HD
       NSP links higher-level guidance to Navy program planning
       SECDEF has identified GWOT as "the Department's highest priority"
       Support for the Joint Force, Joint Force commanders, and Joint Force component commanders
       Details on US Coast Guard ops & relationships
       Continued to promote Sea Power 21 principles
       Laid out Sea Power 21 "pillars" (less "FORCEnet")
       Included new "Sea Shaping" pillar (N5SP lead) (2005)
       Effects-based & capabilities-based planning

Key ideas (II)
       The "international system"
       American vision of peaceful, productive movement of international commerce
       Deepened USN "cooperation with maritime forces of our strategic partners as well as emerging partner nations"
       Global Network of Maritime Nations/"1000 Ship Navy"
       There will be a forthcoming Navy Operating Concept
       Directed drafting of comprehensive family of USN strategic plans
       1st of a repeatable series of NSPs

--94--


Key ideas (III)
       3 CNO focus areas, with desired effects
          Keyed to 3 QDR 2006 "Michelin man" mission sets
          1. Global War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
             Global Maritime Domain Awareness
             Theater Security Cooperation
             Maritime portion of GWOT & additional capabilities to joint GWOT force
             Navy deterrence of transnational threats
          2. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense
             Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
             WMD interdiction
             Navy deterrence of future competitors
          3. Conventional Campaigns
             Project defense from Joint Seabase to support Joint Force
             Rapidly mass effects
             Surge capacity for 2 campaigns; sustain 1 to win decisively
             Deter regional threats through steady-state forward presence

Key ideas (IV)
       3 "maritime focus areas" for USN
          Text related almost exclusively to GWOT
          1. Western Pacific
             Particularly Southeast Asia
          2. Middle East and Southwest Asia
          3. Mediterranean
             NATO ability allows USN ops elsewhere
          Also briefly mentioned: South America, Gulf of Guinea, Swahili coast, Black Sea region
             NATO lead in western Africa

--95--


Key ideas (V)
       Threats to the US:
          "a few hostile or potentially hostile states - some armed with nuclear weapons"
          "terrorists, weapons proliferators, organized crime affiliates, drug traffickers, and cyber outlaws"
       4 SECDEF-identified challenges:
          Traditional - Irregular - Catastrophic - Disruptive
          from National Defense Strategy (2005)
       "There are unique capabilities that the Joint Force must develop that fall outside of the rubric of conventional warfighting capabilities"
       Joint interdependence & joint dependence

Key ideas (VI)
       313-ship Navy force goal
       Call for new small force packages
          Single amphibious ships acting as joint/coalition seabases
          SEAL teams, USMC, USCG, USN expeditionary security forces on independently operating surface combatants, SSNs, SSGNs
       "Global Navy Concept: Distributed, Networked Ops"
       Risk Guidance
          Risk is inherent (details in SECRET version)
       Navy Enterprise Model

--96--


Image - Fig 2: Defense Force Planning Construct from QDR 2006.

What was new?
       Explicit direction to OPNAV to program for needed non-conventional capabilities
       GWOT orientation of CNO focus areas
       Effects-based planning
       "1000-ship Navy"/"global maritime network" concept
          Built on CNO ADM Clark "Maritime NORAD" concept
       Adding "Sea Shaping" pillar to Sea Power 21 pillars
       Risk Guidance
       Tasked "Family of Strategic Plans"
       USN operates in "coastal and internal," "green to brown" water (1st non-NSW mention since 1978)
          Intent to publish every 2 years

--97--


Not addressed (in UNCLAS version)
       Mine warfare
       Maritime Security Operations
       Sealift
       Blockades, convoys
       Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
       Global Fleet Stations
       Globalization
       Preventing wars
       Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern Pacific Ocean; US offshore waters

Little discussion of conventional campaigns, compared to discussion of GWOT

Were they "strategic plans"?

What is a "strategic plan" (officially)?
       "A plan for the overall conduct of a war"
          Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

--98--


Subsequent analyses & critiques
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 19892007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

Criticisms (I)
       Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
       Came out too late to meaningfully affect POM 08
       Disagreements over Risk Guidance specifics
          Relationship to forthcoming "new maritime strategy" unclear
       Process seemed backwards
       Not officially circulated widely
       Looked too much like 2005 "3/1" Strategy construct
       Too focused on GWOT; not enough focus on conventional campaigns
       Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development

--99--


Criticisms (II)
       Did not encompass important emerging USN concepts (e.g., Global Fleet Stations)
       Directed family of strategic plans never drafted
       Cited forthcoming Navy Operating Concept never written
       Needed more on assurance, dissuasion, deterrence objectives
       CCDR priorities not well reflected

Influence
       Modest for POM-08; some influence on PR-09
       Effort considered valuable precedent, however. Kicked off a series of subsequent similar documents
       Cited in USN FY 08 budget highlights document
       Cited & used in OPNAVN6/Deputy DON CIO (Navy) Strategy document (Feb 2007)
       Cited throughout Naval Studies Board study The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror (2007)
       "Navy Strategic Plan series" mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development (Mar 2009)
       ONR Naval S&T Strategic Plans (Jan 2007 & Feb 2009)

--100--


Why did it have such influence as it had?
       Issued 6 months too late to influence POM meaningfully
          (But earlier drafts did have some influence)
       CNO support
       OPNAV consensus to continue effort & do better next time
       Buy-in by other OPNAV flag officers beyond N3/N5
       UNCLAS version allowed for widespread dissemination; SECRET version made for greater credibility within OPNAV

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Example proved useful
          CNO directed drafting of NSP ISO POM 10
          Similar subsequent documents drafted
       Began to build consensus around expanded "3/1 Strategy" construct ideas among Navy flag officers & staffs, to be revisited in
          Naval Operations Concept (Sep 2006)
          A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Oct 2007)
       Same themes re-visited in Naval Operations Concept 2006
          Same maritime "focus areas"
          Same message of importance of ability to conduct non-traditional missions

--101--


Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Image - Cover: Naval Operations Concept 2006.

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Mullen & CMC Gen Hagee (Sep 2006)
       A "naval operations concept" & "unified vision for the future"
       Principal targets: USN & USMC officers & enlisted
       Medium-length (36 pages) UNCLAS booklet
       Principal USN drafters & overall coordinator: OPNAV Deep Blue, then OPNAV Strategy, Plans & Policy Division (N5SP)
       To counter threats from diverse nations & non-state actors, across the spectrum of operations 13 Mission areas, 9 guiding principles
       9 Methods, 5 strategic objectives
       More influence at HQs than in the fleet
          Precedent seen as useful
          Some influence on A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

--102--


Signed by:
       CNO ADM Michael Mullen
          During 2nd year in office
       CMC Gen Michael W. Hagee

Image - CNO Admiral Michael Mullen and CMC General Michael W. Hagee.

What it was
       Billed as a "Naval Operations Concept" and a "unified vision for the future"
       Navy & Marine Corps
       UNCLAS, pocket-sized booklet for portability
          Medium-sized: 36 pages
          Half again as long as previous 2003 NOCJO (23 pages)
          More than four times the length of 1997 Navy Operational Concept (8 pages)
       Signed Sep 2006
       Superseded 2003 NOCJO
       (Superseded by 2010 NOC)

--103--


Why it was written (I)
       To continue socialization within USN & USMC of new emerging national security & naval strategic concepts
       To provide internal USN & USMC intellectual stimulus for evolving a new maritime strategy
       To strengthen USN-USMC operational relations
       To widen the focus of the USN and USMC to encompass the entire range of military operations
          Vice focusing mostly on major regional combat operations

Why it was written (II)
       To elevate visibility of naval missions for the Long War/GWOT & homeland defense
          E.g.: maritime security operations, security cooperation, counterinsurgency, ballistic missile defense, information ops
       To promote new Global Fleet Stations deployment concept
       To replace NOCJO (2003)
       "Written for a wide audience"
          Principally "to guide...Sailors & Marines"
          Also to promote public, joint, interagency & multinational understanding of Navy & Marine Corps operations & capabilities

--104--


Context: (I)
       2nd term of G.W. Bush (R) administration (2001-)
       US economic growth slowing
          US foreign trade soaring
          Oil price soaring
          U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
       SECDEF Rumsfeld (2001-6)

Context: (II)
       OIF & OEF continuing, intensifying
          US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
          High levels of insurgency, sectarian violence in Iraq (2003-6)
          Increased USN, coalition, Iraqi protection of oil terminals following insurgent small boat attack (2004)
          US military Abu Ghraib prisoner mistreatment publicized (2004)
          Decreasing US force levels in Iraq (from Nov 2005)
          US "Revolt of the Generals" (2006)
          Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (2006)
       Operations Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI ongoing

--105--


Context: (III)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Iranian nuclear enrichment program discovered (2003)
       DPRK developing nuclear weapons
       DPRK unsuccessful but highly publicized Taepo-dong 2 missile test (Jul 2006)

Context: (IV)
       PRC President Hu Jintao speech declaring "New Historical Missions of the PLA" (Dec 2004)
       PLA IRBM buildup across from Taiwan
       PLAN development of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
       PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
       PLAN launched 1st new Jin-class SSBN (2004)
       Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
       Occasional USN port visits to China
       Occasional meetings under the US-PRC Military Maritime Consulative Agreement (MMCA) (1998)
       Unprecedented large Russian-PRC land-sea-air East Asian exercise: Peace Mission 2005

--106--


Context (V)
       3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
          QDR 2001 "1-4-2-1" Force Planning Construct became 3-part separate but overlapping mission set ("Michelin Man Strategy")
             Homeland Defense
             War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
             Conventional Campaigns
          Pacific Ocean concerns, shifts
             Directed USN to increase Pacific force posture
             Goal of 11 CVNs: 6 in Pacific; 60% of USN submarines to Pacific
          "Tailored deterrence" strategy
          Call for conventional Trident SLBM

Context (VI)
       Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
       DoD "long war", Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue
       SECDEF Rumsfeld backing off on pressure for "transformation," "strategic speed," "surge," & "regime change," in the wake of stalemates in Iraq & Afghanistan

--107--


Context (VII)
       Demands of OEF, OIF tempered "transformation" & global "capabilities-based" defense planning policies
          Especially by USA & USMC
          Very high levels of sectarian violence in Iraq
          Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
          Need to increase "boots on the ground" troop strength, as well as all services' precision strike & information capabilities
          Push-back from Gens Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers
       1st PACOM Valiant Shield exercise: 3 CVBGs (Jun 2006)
          PLAN observers invited, attended

Context: (VIII)
       Turks refused US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
       Terrorists launched 2 missiles at USN amphibs visiting Aqaba, Jordan (2005)
       USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
       7th Fleet IO tsunami disaster response ops yielded favorable US policy outcomes & publicity (2004-05)
       USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
       Hezbollah land-based anti-ship missile attack on Israeli corvette off Lebanon (Jul 2006)

--108--


Context: (IX)
       Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.
       Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
          Somali pirate Seabourn Spirit cruise ship attack (2005)
          USS Winston Churchill thwarted Somali coast pirate attack (Jan 2006)
       MALSINDO Malacca Strait anti-piracy ops (from 2004)
          Negative reaction to possible USN anti-piracy initiatives in Strait

Context: (X)
       New DOD Global Force Management (GFM) system for allocating & assigning forces superseded GNFPP (2006)
          UCP assigned JFCOM as Single Joint Force Provider (SJFP)
       Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)
       Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
          Concerns raised globally over effect on marine mammals
          USN committed to environmental research (Aug 2005)
          Environmental groups sued to stop training (Oct 2005)
          Litigation ongoing in US courts; widespread publicity

--109--


Context: (XI)
       313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (Feb 2006)
       USN in 2006: 281 Battle Force ships & declining somewhat; only 4 new ships authorized
       Increasing DON annual budgets
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented (from 2003)
       Fleet Force Command (FFC) restyled USFF (2006)
       New USN ASW CONOPS approved (Dec 2004)

Context: (XII)
       USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
       CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)
       Robust USN Individual Augmentee (IA) program
       Cyber attacks on Naval War College computer systems
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          New Hybrid Sailor concept under development to man LCSs
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems
       High speed vessels being leased, planned by MSC
          Westpac Express (HSV-4676) chartered for USMC (2002)
          Swift (HSV-2) chartered (2003)
          Joint Venture (HSVX-1) chartered (2003-4)

--110--


Context (XIII)
       VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004- 8)
          Plans to overhaul USN strategy
       VADM Morgan "3/1 Strategy" draft construct (2005)
          MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
          Progenitor of NSPs, NOCs, new maritime strategy
          Spawned new N81 "sea shaping" analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
          Never officially promulgated or endorsed
       Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continue
       NAVWARCOL, JHU/APL, Lockheed Martin & CNA workshops on USN strategy continue

Cited references
       ...From the Sea (1992)
       Forward...From the Sea (1994)
       Sea Power 21 (2002)
       The 21st Century Marine Corps
       NOCJO (2002)
       National Defense Strategy (2005)
          Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
       National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
       Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC) (Mar 2006)
       2nd Bush National Security Strategy (2006)
       Navy Operating Concept
          (Anticipated; but never drafted)

--111--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy (Dec 2004)
       ;3rd (2nd Bush) QDR (2006)
       CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
       DOD OFT, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach (2003)
       National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
       DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
       DOD, Report to Congress: Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Sep 2004)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       CJCS Myers National Military Strategy (2004)
       National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
       CJCS Myers Joint Operations Concepts (2003)
          Ignored
       CJCS Myers Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (2005)
          Ignored
       Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) (2003)
       Joint Pub 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (8 Aug 2006)
       Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations (Sep 2006)
          Deleted term "MOOTW;" introduced 6 phases of jt ops
       Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (2005)
       Bi-National Planning Group (US-Canada), Interim Report on CANUS Expanded Military Cooperation (Oct 2004)

--112--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       CNO & CMC, FORCEnet Concept (Feb 2005)
       CGMCCDC & COMNWDC, Enhanced Networked Seabasing Operational Concept (2003)
       NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7 Seabasing (Aug 2006)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)
       Strategic Planning Guidance (Mar 2006), Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance
       Joint Global Force Management (GFM) Allocation Plan (2006) (superseded GNFPP)
       OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
       US Army FM 3-0 Operations (2001)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-6)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       SECAF Peters & CSAF Ryan, America's Air Force Vision: Global Vigilance, Reach & Power (1997)
       CAPT Ed Smith (Ret) Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (2002)
       The 9/11 Commission Report (2004)
       VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (2005)
       NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Apr 2004)
       BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (3rd ed.) (May 2004)
       CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture & seabasing (2002-6)
       NIC, Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020 (2004)

--113--


Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       LTC John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (2002)
       Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (2002)
       Col T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (2004)
       Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security (Summer 2003)
       Goldman Sachs, Dreaming with the BRICs (2003)
       Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (2003)
       Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004)
       Booz Allen Hamilton, Energy Futures in Asia (Jan 2004)
          Asserted PRC Indian Ocean "string of pearls" basing policy
       DoD annual reports Military Power of the PRC (2002+)

How it was written (I)
       USN-USMC Warfighter Talks identified need for "first principles" (VADM Morgan; LtGen Huly) (2005)
          VADM Morgan had been stimulating "Principles of War" debate
       New CNO ADM Mullen tasked drafting of "Naval Operating Concept" (6 Jan 06)
          Wanted to update NOCJO (2003)
          Wanted naval "guiding principles" and "operational methods"
       USMC published its own Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC) (Mar 2006)
       USN starting point: Chart of naval principles, missions, etc.

--114--


How it was written (II)
       VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Mattis (CG, MCCDC) oversaw
       OPNAV Deep Blue (RDML-SEL Phil Cullom) initially given Navy responsibility
       But CFFC ADM John Nathman felt it should have been his responsibility
       OPNAV Deep Blue - MCCDC/SIG core team formed
          Navy: CAPT Mark "Cyrus Vance, Deputy Director Deep Blue; CDRs Thomas Lalor & Thomas Disy
          USMC: Col Douglas King, LtCol (Ret) John Berry, Maj Kelly Houlgate
       Later, Navy responsibility shifted to OPNAV N51
          RDML-SEL Cullom & CDR Disy moved to N51

How it was written (III)
       Relationships during drafting
          Relatively smooth USN-USMC relations
          USFF participation & OPNAV - USFF friction
       Adapted missions identified in The Way Ahead (1991)
          USMC drafters saw as valuable precedent
       Discussed at CNO-led Navy flag officer off-site conference at CNA (Apr \ 2006) "
       Endgame: During and after Navy- Marine Corps Warfighter talks (Aug 2006)
       Signed & published (Sep 2006)
       Endorsed by new incoming CMC Gen Conway in his initial planning guidance

--115--


Outline
       Introduction
       Purpose
       National strategy & the security environment
       The operating environment and emerging strategic missions
       Description of the naval challenge
       Naval missions
       Guiding naval principles
       The foundation for naval operations
       Methods
       Desired outcomes and effects

Key ideas (I)
       Navy & Marine Corps operate across the entire spectrum of military operations
       Call for "more widely distributed forces" for "increased forward presence": disaggregated but aggregatable
          Not the message of the Fleet Response Plan (2003)
       Call for "tailored" and "adaptive force packages" & "alternative non-standard options"
       International security cooperation "Pre-emption" of non-traditional threats
       To counter a "diverse array of rising nations, failing states, and non-state actors"
       Global response to crises where access is difficult

--116--


Key ideas (II)
       Focus areas
       3 "longstanding" focus areas of naval operations
          Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, Western Pacific to Bay of Bengal
       3 "emerging" focus areas of naval operations
          Gulf of Guinea, East African littoral, Latin American waters
       (did not include Arctic, North Atlantic, North Pacific, or US offshore waters)
       Same areas as in Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)

Key ideas (III)
       Cited 4 challenges from SECDEF National Military Strategy (2005)
          Traditional - Irregular - Catastrophic - Disruptive
          Need for Diplomatic - Informational - Military - Economic (DIME) elements of US power
       Cited 3 guiding principles from National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
          Preserve freedom of the seas
          Facilitate & defend commerce
          Facilitate movement across US borders, screening out dangers
       Discussed & illustrated 2006 QDR "Michelin man" mission set construct
          Homeland defense
          War on Terror/Irregular Warfare
          Conventional Campaign(s)

--117--


Key ideas (IV)
       13 naval missions
       Forward Naval Presence*
       Crisis Response
       Expeditionary Power Projection*
       Maritime Security Operations
       Sea Control*
       Deterrence*
       Security Cooperation
       Civil-Military Operations
       Counterinsurgency
       Counterterrorism
       Counterproliferation
       Air & Missile Defense
       Information Operations

VADM Turner's 4 missions

Added 9 to Turner list
       But not "sealift"

Key ideas (V)
       9 "guiding" and "enduring" naval principles
          Agility
          Coordinated global influence
          Deployability & employability
          Interoperability
          Persistent presence
          Adaptive force packaging
          Precision
          Speed
          Unpredictability for our adversaries & reliability for our friends

--118--


Key ideas (VI)
       Also 4 "foundations," 9 "Methods" & "5 "strategic outcomes"
          "Foundations" include Global Awareness
          "Methods" include networked, distributed ops, & sea basing
       "The challenge for the Navy and Marine Corps today is to remain capable of traditional naval missions while simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct non-traditional missions"
       Same message as in Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006)
       Detailed coverage of US Coast Guard ops, relationships
       Written in a mix of present and future tense
       Assumed USN would write its own Navy Operating Concepts document as well

Key ideas (VII)
       Very extensive discussion of HA/DR ops, with vignettes, throughout

--119--


Image - Chart: Naval Operations Concept Construct.

What was new?
       "Maritime Security Operations" called out and described as a separate Navy mission area
       Mention of "globalization" as driving force in the world
       Mention of "hybrid form of conflict"
       "Global Fleet Stations" elaborated on as important aspect of Sea Basing
       Illustrative historical & notional vignettes
       Public acknowledgement that internal Navy-Marine Corps discourse "may become passionate," citing past "volcanic arguments"

--120--


Not addressed (I)
       "Transformation"
       Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
       Surge capabilities & operations, or Fleet Response Plan
       Seapower 21 & OPNAV program planning "Independent Capability Analysis & Assessment" (ICAA) framework and vocabulary

Not addressed (II)
       Mine warfare
       Convoys, blockades
       "Sealift "not listed as a naval mission or capability set, only in passing as a beneficiary of sea control
       U.S. Merchant Marine
       U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
       Requirement for USN & USMC to size its forces IAW naval missions mentioned only in passing

--121--


Subsequent analyses & critiques
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 19892007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

Criticisms (I)
       Relationship to new maritime strategy unclear
          Process seemed backwards
       Relationship to NDP 1 (1994) unclear
       Based on an existing USMC single-service operations concept, while companion USN single-service Navy Operating Concept not yet (and never would be) drafted
       Too many lists: Hard to remember, assimilate & use

--122--


Criticisms (II)
       Not a long-range "concept" in the joint meaning of the term. Too focused on the present and near-term, despite use of future tense throughout
          Abandoned 2002 "near-term, mid-term, long-term" NOCJO framework
          The future as described is just an extension of the present
       Minimal influence on joint & Navy operational doctrine
          No mention in Joint Pub 3-32 Command & Control for Joint Maritime Operations (Aug 2006 & Change 1 May 2008)
          No mention in NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the operational Level of War (Oct 2008 & Change 1 Aug 2010)

Influence
       Some in OPNAV; NAVWARCOL seminars & games
       Modest influence at USFF & in fleet
          CNO-CMC tasking to USFF & CMFC to develop NOC implementation plan ignored
          But "13 missions" construct repeated in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
       "Naval Operations Concept series" mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development (Mar 2009)
       Direction for USN to develop service "NOC- 'y'" ignored
       Marines used it to update their documents, develop new concepts (e.g.: SC MAGTF)
       Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike groups, and Other major deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)

--123--


Why did it have such influence as it had?
       Ostensibly for the fleet, but little USFF/fleet buy-in during development
       Linkages between NOC lists and fleet documents not obvious to fleet
       No visible major CNO involvement or follow-through
       Complexity of format hindered utility

Influence on subsequent capstone documents (I)
       NOC Mission Areas adopted in NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)
       Cited in CFFC/CPF Fleet Response Plan implementing instruction (but as Naval Operating Concept) (2007)
       Used by drafters of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)
          Especially idea of new missions beyond the "classic 4"
          Influenced NWC contributions

--124--


Influence on subsequent capstone documents (II)
       Precedent seen as useful by OPNAV, HQMC, MCCDC, HQ USCG
          Revised in 2008-10 as Naval Operations Concept (2010).
       Generated Jun 2007 revision of Marine Corps Operating Concept
       Cited in CMC operational employment concept The Long War (Jan 2008) & in USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)

Influence on other subsequent documents (I)
       Cited in ONR Naval S&T Strategic Plans (Jan 2007 & Feb 2009)
       Cited in OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 2007)
          Cited incorrectly as Naval Operating Concept 2006
       Cited as guidance in CFFC Global Fleet Station Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (Mar 2008)
       Cited in USFF 2008 Annual Plan

--125--


Influence on USMC documents
       Development of NOC mentioned in Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (1st ed., 2006)
       NOC generated Marine Corps Operating Concept 2nd ed. (Jun 2007)
       Cited in CMC operational employment concept The Long War (Jan 2008) & in USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (2007)

Image - Chart: Navay Strategic Plan.

--126--


Overview
       Signed by outgoing CNO ADM Mullen (Sep 2007)
       A "Navy strategic plan;" not tri-service or bi-service
       Long (75 pp) SECRET stand-alone pub. No UNCLAS version
       Drafted in OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (N5SC)
       Developed in tandem with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Designed to translate strategy into programmatic guidance
       Extensive strategic context analysis & risk guidance
       Revised by incoming CNO ADM Roughead within 2 months
       Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Michael Mullen
       Signed during his last week on the job, after 27 months in office

Image - CNO Admiral Michael Mullen.

--127--


What it was
       Billed as a "Strategic plan"
       Subtitle: "in support of Program Objective Memorandum 10"
       2nd edition
          NSP ISO POM 08 (2006) considered useful precedent
          No "NSP ISO PR 09"
             Under Bush Administration programming policy, FY 2009 was "Program Review" year vice "POM" year. Required less programmatic detail
       SECRET stand-alone pub (26 Sep 2007)
          No UNCLAS version
       Lengthy (75 pages)
          Almost twice the length of NSP ISO POM 08 (SECRET: 42 pages)
       Navy (vice "sea services") focus
       Tasker: Earlier tasker for NSP ISO POM 08 had tasked biennial follow-on NSPs (2005)
       Superseded by NSP ISO POM 10 (CH 1) (Nov 2007)

Why it was written
       Provide strategic guidance to USN staff elements responsible for development of USN POM 2010, including
          Extensive strategic context (including classified intelligence); force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance; CNO ADM Mullen mission areas; & strategic initiatives
       Translate national strategic guidance into USN guidance
       Translate new concurrently drafted maritime strategy into a plan to inform Navy investments
       Continue to build consensus in Navy around new strategic ideas
       Continue, routinize & improve process begun with NSP ISO POM 08
          NSP the new "1st P" in USN PPBE process
       Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeteers

--128--


Context (I)
       Late in 2nd term of Bush administration (2001-9)
       Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (2007)
       New SECDEF Gates (Nov 2006-11)
       Outgoing CNO ADM Mullen (2005-7)
       New CNO ADM Roughead announced
       SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
       US foreign trade soaring
       U.S. economic growth slowing
          U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
          House prices falling; sub-prime mortgage financial crisis
       Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening

Context (II)
       OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
          OIF US forces "surge" underway (since Jan 2007)
             US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics (from Feb 2007)
             Less Iraqi internal violence, coalition casualties (from May 2007)
          Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland

--129--


Context (III)
       PRC developments
          PRC continued IRBM buildup opposite Taiwan; R&D on anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
          PRC-funded construction of Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean continued (from 2002)
          Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs & 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
          PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
          1st USN-PLAN SAREX held, under MMCA (Sep 2006)
          PLAN submarine approached USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) off Okinawa (Oct 2006)
          Routine PLAN port visits to US; USN port visits to PRC
          COMPACFLT ADM Roughead visited China (Nov 2006)
          PRC successfully tested ASAT weapon (Jan 2007)
          PLAN commander Wu visited Honolulu, DC (Apr 2007)

Context (IV)
       International concerns: Terrorism, North Korean & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Venezuela, Russia
          DPRK tested nuclear weapon (2006)
          Hezbollah land-based missile hit Israeli warship (2006)
          Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
          Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
          Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
          Russian aircraft approached USN exercises off Guam (2007)
          Worldwide pirate attacks fell off from 2003 peak
          Russian cyber attack on Estonia (2007)
       World food crisis (2007)
          Shortages, rising prices fueled unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean

--130--


Context (V)
       SFRC recommended Senate ratify LOS Treaty (Sep 2007)
          Strongly endorsed by administration, JCS, USN
       India, US agreed on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
       Panama began widening Panama Canal (Jul 2007)
       Stepped up USN, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including USN use of naval gunfire (since 2006)
       Declining USN force levels: increasing annual DON budgets
       313-ship Battle Force USN force level goal (2006)
       USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
       USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
       Heavy USN, coalition MSO ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, etc.

Context (VI)
       Fleet Response Plan being implemented (from 2003)
          3-CSG exercises: Valiant Shield 2006 & 2007
       New USN PERSTEMPO program (Jan 2007)
       High levels of sectarian violence in Iraq being countered by US "surge" & counterinsurgency (COIN) operations
       Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces
       MHQ with MOC concept under development
          To standardize C2 practices among fleets, globally
       CNO "Global Maritime Partnerships" (was "1000-Ship Navy"); "GFS;" and T-AH ops initiatives (2007)
       VADM Morgan was OPNAV N3/N5 (since 2004)
       USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)

--131--


Context (VII)
       Robust USN "Individual Augmentee" (IA) program continues, becomes more formalized
       NECC stood up. Riverine Squadron in Iraq
          USN conducted 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years (2007)
       Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
       Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP/later NSPP) pilot program under way. (Slight influence on NSP)
       Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)
       USAF Operation "Rex Redux" (Aug 2007)

Context (VIII)
       New Littoral combat ships (LCS) classes under construction
          Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
          Navy drastically restructured program (2007)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Significant, widely-publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems
       Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
       Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity

--132--


Cited references (I)
       A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)
       Naval Operations Concept (2006)
       Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2008
       2nd Bush National Security Strategy (2006)
       National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)

Cited references (II)
       National Defense Strategy (2005)
          Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
       CJCS Myers National Military Strategy (2004)
       3rd (2nd Bush) QDR Report (2006)
          Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
             6 CVNs; 60% of submarines to Pacific
       CNO Guidance for 2006
       CNO Guidance for 2007
       NIC, Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020 (2004)
       Intelligence reports
       CNA & RAND studies

--133--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy (Dec 2004)
       National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
       DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
       CPG, JSCP, OPLANS & CONPLANS
       SCG, CCDR TSC Plans
       CNA study "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change "(2007)
       Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       JT Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States revision (2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       VADM Morgan, RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy" (2005)
       CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations (2006)
       National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006)
       National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (2006)
       DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support (2005)
       CNO SSG XXVI Report on Cyber Warfare (2007)
       Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (2007)
       OPNAV N8 analyses
       CSAF Gen Moseley, U.S. Air Force Vision (2006)
       Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006-2008 (Oct 2006)

--134--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)
       CNO ADM Mullen Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (May 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 2007)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       CSBA reports re: naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
       Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal (Jan 2007)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

--135--


How it was written
       Jan 2005 tasker for NSP ISO POM 08 had directed that process be repeated "at least biennially"
       Personalities: VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RADM Cullom & RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
       CDR Nagy (N5SC) led OPNAV-wide development team. LCDR Stewart primary N5SC AO (LT Kawamura & Mr. Ballard supporting).
       Heavy OPNAV N81 input (CAPT John Yurchak; CDR Bryan Clark)
          To ensure "fit" with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
       New pilot OPNAV "Navy Adaptive Planning Process" ongoing. Some cross-walk.
       "New Maritime Strategy" development process ongoing

Outline
       Introduction
          Purpose & role; Vision;
       Strategic context
          Regional focus areas; Global focus areas; Wildcards; Future landscape
       POM-10 guidance
          Force planning guidance; CNO Navy mission areas; Risk guidance; Analytic guidance; Strategic initiatives
       Conclusion
       Annexes:
          Risk guidance matrix; Future naval force structure & strategic laydown; Navy shore investment strategy guidance; Navy adaptive planning process; Navy strategic plan timeline

--136--


Key ideas
       NSP translates new strategy into programmatic guidance for POM development
       Provide extensive strategic context
       Provide force planning & extensive risk & analytic guidance
       CNO mission areas
       Take strategic initiatives

What was new?
       First use of new Navy Adaptive (NAPP)
       Tie-in to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) and Naval Operations Concept (2006)
       Extensive classified assessment of strategic context confronting the Navy

--137--


Subsequent analyses & critiques
       None identified

Criticisms
       Reflected rather than drove Navy program planning
       Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       No real mechanism established to ensure OPNAV compliance
       Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
       Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only

--138--


Written to influence
       Navy POM 10
       Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008
       Draft SECDEF Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) for 2010-2015
       Draft SECDEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) for 2010-2015
       4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2009-2010
          New incoming administration

Influence
       Iterative development process influenced ongoing OPNAV POM 10 processes
       But CNO ADM Mullen-signed document immediately superseded by new CNO ADM Roughead-signed document

--139--


Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Provided core of NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1)
       Intended to set strategic context for upcoming Naval Operations Concept \ (NOC)

ADM Gary Roughead (CNO Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

       Oct 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Nov 2007 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)
       May 2009 Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11
       Oct 2009 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12
       May 2010 Naval Operations Concept
       Aug 2010 Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare
       Oct 2010 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13

Image - Admiral gary Roughead.

--140--


Surface warfare officer (SWO)
       3rd SWO CNO in a row

Appointed CNO when ADM Mullen unexpectedly named CJCS

Served under Presidents Bush, Obama; SECDEF Gates; SECNAVs Winter, Mabus

Previously COMPACFLT & COMUSFLTFORCOM
       Active in drafting of NOC, Navy Strategic Plans, & A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       At Seattle "Conversation with the Country" (Mar 2007)

Little significant prior OPNAV staff experience

Built upon CNO ADM Mullen initiatives
       New maritime strategy
          But put his own views in it
       313-ship Battle Force
          But seen as a "floor", not a goal
       Global maritime partnerships
          But abandonment of "1000-ship navy" terminology
       Diversity

Replaced VADM John Morgan as OPNAV N3/N5 with more operationally-oriented VADM Bruce Clingan

Engaged leading U.S. national security & economics academics on naval strategy, policy concepts -publicly & privately

--141--


Signature initiatives
       Navy information dominance ops, organizations, programs, careers
       International partnerships focus
       NAVWARCOL Title X wargaming revival
       New DDG-51s w/enhanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) & anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities
       Truncated DDG-1000 shipbuilding program
       SSBN(X) development initiation
       Unmanned systems development
       Reversed surface ship maintenance decline

"The Trifecta:" The 2006-7 sequence

"We knew we were doing the process in a backwards way."

"Now...We want the strategy to lead"
       VADM John Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5)
          Interview (15 Nov 2007

Image - Cover collage.

--142--

"The Trifecta:" The 2007-10 correction

"The "ends" would be...A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower ...The "ways" would be the...Naval Operations Concept ...And if there were a means, it would...be...a classified Navy Strategic Plan"
       RDML-SEL Mark Montgomery (OPNAV N513)
          DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)

Image - Cover collage.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

Image - Cover collage.

--143--


Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (Oct 2007)
       Principal stated target: American people & US Congress
       Short UNCLAS document (16 pages)
       OPNAV N3/N5SAG: USN drafters & overall coordinators
       Complex, lengthy, open development process
       Promulgated at US Naval War College International Seapower Symposium in Newport (Oct 2007)
       To counter potential threats of major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters
       Key ideas: US sea services essential to maintain global world political & economic system; need for cooperation & trust; war prevention as important as war winning; 6 strategic imperatives, 6 core capabilities, 3 implementation priorities
       Influential, esp. overseas; Major USN publicity campaigns

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          During 1st month in office
       CMC Gen James T. Conway
       COMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen

Image - CNO Admiral gary Roughead, CMC General james T. Conway and COMDT COGARD Admiral Thad Allen.

--144--


What it was
       Billed as a "strategy"
          UNCLAS
          "Sea Services" (vice USN) focus
          Multi-media promulgation
             Short booklet (16 pages) (Oct 2007)
             US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Nov 2007)
             Marine Corps Gazette article (Nov 2007)
             Naval War College Review article (Winter 2008)
             CNO testimony (Dec 2007, Feb 2008)
             Navy Program Guide 2009 chapter (Jun 2009)
             DVD, CD-ROM, web
             Brochures, posters
             Conferences, meetings, speeches, seminars, press releases
             "Conversations with the Country" & "Executive Seminars"
             Blogs

Why it was written (I)
       To promulgate the strategic "ends" of the Navy & the other sea services, to be used by others within those services to develop and publish' ways" & "means" needed to accomplish those ends.
          To provide a basis for subsequent arguments that the Navy should grow
       To shape subsequent Navy, joint, defense & national security policies, concepts, strategies, doctrines & documents, in both the current administration & the next ("shooting ahead of the duck")
       To tie the US Navy into a perceived new national security - & American public opinion - environment & policy era, reaching beyond conventional warfighting & current GWOT operations to encompass macroeconomics & "soft power" as well as warfighting

--145--


Why it was written (II)
       To influence many targets, "especially the American people & US congress"
       To demonstrate to both current & future Administration national security leadership - & US public & Congress - that Navy & other sea services were in vanguard of needed national security concept changes
       To highlight to America's leadership & people the special relationship of the nation's maritime forces to its position in the globalized international security & economic system, in the face of constant news reporting of ground operations in Iraq & Afghanistan
       To elevate visibility of - and resources devoted to - preventing wars, maintaining the global system, USN humanitarian assistance/disaster response & maritime security operations, & international cooperation

Why it was written (III)
       To win support for the US and US Navy among allies & partners; and to reinforce US international leadership
       To provide a framework within which future USN-PLAN cooperation could occur & expand
       To demonstrate US Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard solidarity, and highlight their participation in US government inter-agency processes & operations
       To codify thinking of CNO ADM Mullen and DCNO N3/N5 VADM Morgan, as expressed piecemeal in earlier documents & speeches
       To elevate visibility of Global Fleet Stations and other new distributed fleet deployment options
       To achieve a new internal USN consensus on USN rationale
       To change the Navy

--146--


Context (I)
       2nd G.W. Bush (R) administration term (2001-09) ending
       Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007) Expanding world economy
          Led by Asian economic expansion
       U.S. foreign trade soaring
       U.S. economic growth slowing
          U.S. government deficit spending high but declining
          Oil price still soaring
          House prices falling (from 2006)
          Subprime mortgage financial crisis (from Feb 2007)
          But stock market rising (until Oct 2007)
             Dow peaked at 14,164 (would fall to 6500 by Feb 2009)
          Low US inflation rate & falling unemployment rate
       Impending U.S. 2008 presidential election
       Climate change apparent, including in the Arctic
       World food crisis (2007)
          Shortages, rising prices fueling unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean

Context (II)
       New SECDEF Gates (since Nov 2006)
       U.S. defense budgets rising annually in real terms, & expected to continue to rise (or plateau)
       Terrorist & insurgent groups worldwide
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland Continued PRC military growth
          PLAN introduced new SSN & SSBN classes (2006-7)
       OIF & OEF ongoing
          US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
          Escalating Iraqi insurgency & sectarian violence (2004-7)
          "Revolt of the Generals" (2006)
          OIF US forces "surge" underway (from Feb 2007)
             US troop increase & changes in ops & tactics (COIN)
             Sectarian violence & casualties in Iraq deceasing (from May 2007)
          Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)

--147--


Context (III)
       US reporting on military affairs dominated by the ground wars in Afghanistan & Iraq
       Gallup polls showed (since 2000):
          Very high US public confidence in its military (annually)
          Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DOD services (2004)
          Low world-wide approval of US leadership performance
       Increasing public outcries re: USN sonar effects on marine mammal safety
       Well-publicized USN LCS construction overruns & delays
       Heavy USN operational schedule:
          Combat-credible forward presence in two hubs
          Combat and combat support in/off/over Iraq and Afghanistan
          Maritime security operations in Arabian Sea, Mediterranean, western Pacific, Caribbean, elsewhere
          Humanitarian assistance & disaster response ops
          Engagement globally with allies & partners

Context (IV)
       Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
       DoD "long war", Global War on Terror, partnerships, MDA, & SSTRO concepts predominate & in vogue.
       OEF, OIF caused tempering of "transformation" & global "capabilities-based" defense planning policies
          Especially by USA & USMC
          Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
          Need to increase "boots on the ground" troop strength, as well as all services' precision strike & information capabilities
          Push-back from Dunlap, Deptula, other USAF thinkers

--148--


Context (V)
       Turkish refusal of US military access to ports, air space, en route to OIF (Mar 2003)
       New joint Africa Command announced
       Russia suspended participation in CFE (2007)
       Russian Navy claimed Arctic seabed resources (Aug 2007)
       US-ROK agreement to shift command relationships (2007)
       Panama began widening Panama Canal (Jul 2007)
       India, US agreed on civil nuclear cooperation (Jul 2007)
       Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
       SFRC hearings on LOS ratification (Sep 2007)
          Administration, JCS, USN strongly supported ratification

Context (VI)
       Cyber attacks on Estonian gov't computer systems (2007)
       Regional powers gaining nuclear weapons
          DPRK nuclear tests (2006)
          Iran suspected of developing nuclear weapons
       Worldwide pirate attacks had fallen off from 2003 peak
          Attacks off Somalia continued to rise, however
             US-supported Ethiopians supporting Transitional Federal Government routed Islamist militias in Somalia. Islamist insurgency & regional warlordism continued, however
          Rise in attacks near Nigerian oil resources
       Russian aircraft approached USN exercise off Guam (2007)

--149--


Context (VII)
       Routine PLAN port visits to US; USN port visits to PRC
       1st USN-PLAN SAREX held, under MMCA (Sep 2006)
       PLAN submarine approached USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) off Okinawa (Oct 2006)
       COMPACFLT ADM Roughead visited China (Nov 2006)
       PRC successfully tested ASAT weapon (Jan 2007)
       PLAN commander Wu visited Honolulu, DC (Apr 2007)
       Russians delivered 8 more Kilo SSs, 2 more Sovremenny DDGs to PRC (2005-7)
       USCG-China Coast Guard (CCG) cooperation
          Combined North Pacific fisheries enforcement ops
          CCG shipriders & students on USCG cutters & schools
          North Pacific Coast Guard Forum membership

Context (VIII)
       CNOs ADMs Mullen (2005-7), Roughead (2007-2011)
       Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
       USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
       USN 313-ship Battle Force force level goal (Feb 2006)
       Number of USN carriers fell from 12 to 11
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented
          3-CSG exercises: Valiant Shield 2006 & 2007
       New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)

--150--


Context (IX)
       USN fleet homeport balance shifted toward Pacific (2007)
       Robust USN "Individual Augmentee" (IA) program continued, became more formalized
       "MHQ with MOC" concept under development
          To standardize fleet command and control practices
          To better integrate naval fleet command into joint command
       Congress refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007)

Context (X)
       USN conducted 1st riverine combat ops in 34 years
       Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ops on-going
       Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)
       USN BMD surveillance & tracking patrols in Sea of Japan (from 2004)
       Heavy USN, coalition Maritime Security Ops ongoing in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, Mediterranean, SE Asia, etc.
       Iran seized, detained RN/RM boat team in Gulf
       USN-led Pakistan earthquake disaster response ops (2005)
       Continued US, coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia, including occasional USN use of naval gunfire
       Hezbollah land-based anti-ship missile attack on Israeli corvette off Lebanon (Jul 2006)
       USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)

--151--


Context (XI)
       7th Fleet reactive IO tsunami disaster response ops success (2004-5) led to proactive USN HA deployments:
          T-AH & LHD HA ops ongoing in Pacific, LATAM
       CNO "Global Maritime Partnerships" (was "1000-Ship Navy") initiative formalized through State Dept. cable
          Pacific Partnership & Partnership of the Americas ops ongoing
       USN "Global Fleet Stations" concept floated (2006)
          2 pilot programs ongoing (Caribbean & Africa Partnership Station) (2007)
       USN NRL VXS-1 NP-3D flew 40 geological assessment missions over Afghanistan (2006)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
          Navy drastically restructured program (2007)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Significant, widely publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems 303

Context (XII)
       USN admirals picked for high joint command
          CJCS, CDR CENTCOM, CDR PACOM, CDR SOCCOM, CDR SOUTHCOM. Retired USN admiral is DNI
       USN FAO program revitalized, strengthened (Nov 2005)
       CNET created USN Center for Language, Regional Expertise & Culture (CLREC) at Pensacola (Feb 2006)
       FLTASWCOM & COMINEWARCOM merged to become Naval Mine & ASW Command (2006)

--152--


Context (XIII)
       Continued USN mid-frequency active sonar ASW training vs. quiet diesel submarines
       Environmental group litigation ongoing in US courts to stop training; widespread publicity
       USCG moved from DOT to new DHS (2003)
       Increasingly complex & important USN-USCG relationships, especially re: MDA
          Interagency Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) office established (1 Aug 2007)
       USAF Operation "Rex Redux" (Aug 2007)
       Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation

Context (XIV)
       VADM John Morgan, DCNO for Information, Plans & Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) (2004-8)
       Navy Global N5s/N39s Conferences continued
       VADM Morgan "3/1 Strategy" draft construct (2005)
          MSO & HA/DR NOT lesser included cases any more
          RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) "Bear Paw" graphic
          Spawned new N81 "sea shaping" analytical pillar for POM development (alongside Sea Power 21 pillars) (2005)
          Never officially promulgated or endorsed

--153--


Context (XV)
       VADM Morgan "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)
          RDML Charles Martoglio (N5SP) "Bear Paw" graphic

Image - Chart: What's Changed?

Context (XVI): USN-USMC issues
       USMC (& USCG) growing; USN shedding end strength
       Amphibious ship numbers & characteristics
       MPF(F) numbers & characteristics        JSF variants & numbers
       Sea basing: Concepts and programs
       Marines on non-amphibious ships
       Reduced USMC amphibious competency during OIF era
       Increased USN use of amphibious shipping in non-amphibious assault roles

--154--


Cited references
       2nd Bush National Security Strategy (2006)
       SECDEF Rumsfeld National Defense Strategy (2005)
          Focus on need for capabilities vs. Traditional but also Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive challenges
       CJCS Gen Myers National Military Strategy (2004)
       National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
       Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy (Dec 2004)
       National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006)
       Global Defense Posture Review (2004) 3rd (2nd Bush) QDR Report (2006)
          Directed USN to increase force posture in Pacific
             6 CVNs; 60% of submarines to Pacific
       Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)
       JSCP
       CNO Guidance for 2007
       Joint Pub 3-0 Joint Operations (2006)
       Joint Pub 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (8 Aug 2006)
       Joint Pub 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2007)

--155--


Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006)
       National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (2006)
       DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support (2005)
       DODDIR 3000.5: Military Support for SSTR Ops (Nov 2005)
       Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (2007)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       Joint Operating Concepts (Dec 2006)
          Deterrence Operations
          Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations
          Major Combat Operations
       VADM Morgan & RDML Martoglio "1000-Ship Navy" US Naval Institute Proceedings article (2005)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       Naval Operations Concept (2006)        C2F Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (Mar 2007)
       CFFC Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for maritime Command and Control (Sep 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) (Aug 2006)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)

--156--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       Coast Guard Pub 1 (2002)
       U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security & Stewardship (2007)
       MCDP 1 Warfighting (1997)
       NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7 Seabasing (Aug 2006)
       Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC) (2nd ed.) (Jun 2007)
       FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (2006)
          Set precedent for public & civilian expert drafting help
       CSAF Gen Moseley, U.S. Air Force Vision (2006)
       Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006-2008 (Oct 2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Apr 2004)
       BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine (3rd ed.) (May 2004)
       Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation (2006)
       Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (1999)
       Former Under SECNAV Jerry Hultin-sponsored globalization studies
          CDR Steve Benson on "USN and Globalization", in Kugler & Frost (eds.) The Global Century (2001)
          CAPT Sam Tangredi (ed.) Globalization and Maritime Power (2002)
       Iraq Study Group report (2006)

---157--


Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
       Peter Schwartz, Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (1991)
       NIC, Mapping the Global Future: Global Trends 2020 (2004)
       USJFCOM Joint Operational Environment (JOE) (2007)
       CSIS "Seven Futures" Project
       Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (2002)
       Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004)
       Ann-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004)
       CAPT E.A. Smith USN (Ret), Complexity, Networking and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations (2006)
       CSIS Commission on Smart Power report: A Smarter, More Secure America (2007)
       Robert D. Kaplan books & articles

Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
       Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," WSJ (Jan 2007)
       CSBA reports on naval transformation, fleet architecture, & seabasing (2002-7)
       CNA studies
          Responding to complex humanitarian disasters (several)
          Global Navy Effects study (2007)
          National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Apr 2007)
          Defining a Maritime Security Warfare Area (Sep 2007)
       National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board
          The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror (2007)
          Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint Force Access from the Sea (2005)
       CNO ADM Mullen Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (May 2007)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

--158--


How it was written (I)
       VADM John Morgan (N3/N5) conceived & directed
          Had already formulated several key concepts (2004-6)
          Created N3/N5 Special Actions Group (SAG): LCDR Audrey Snyder; LCDR Chris Sweeney
       CNO ADM Mullen initiated, fostered & championed
       Unprecedented well-funded, massive, lengthy, complex, open, inclusive set of development efforts
       Widespread, intensive publicity about the process
       "Competition of ideas"
       Always intended to be one of a "family" of documents, to include:
          "New maritime strategy" ("ends")
          Naval Operations Concept ("ways")
          Navy Strategic Plan ("means")

How it was written (II)
       Presaged by elements of:
          "3/1 Strategy Construct" (2005-6)
          Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 08 (2006)
          Naval Operations Concept (2006)
       CNO ADM Mullen announced new effort at Naval War College Current Strategy Forum in Newport (Jun 2006)
       CNO formally tasked OPNAV N3/N5 (Jul 2006)
          CNO handwritten note: "This is very high priority and should be given the time and the resources to complete with all due speed"
       Drafted & coordinated within Navy and among 3 services by N3/N5 Special Actions Group (SAG)

--159--


How it was written (III)
       At least 5 simultaneous, inter-connected tracks
          1. Core track: Tri-service drafting team in Washington; vetting of drafts through layers of senior leadership; service chief signatures
             Led by OPNAV N3/N5 SAG
             All other tracks took guidance from and/or fed this track to some degree throughout
          2. Naval War College identification and assessment of alternative environments & approaches
          3. VADM Morgan briefings to flag officers, & other idea-socialization efforts
          4. "Conversations with the country"
          5. Contributory conferences, workshops, articles
             Numerous organizations & individuals
       Levels of inter-connectedness among tracks varied

How it was written (IV)
       CDR Bryan McGrath (N3/N5 SAG) was principal USN drafter & internal Navy & tri-service coordinator throughout
          Led N3/N5 SAG reporting directly to VADM Morgan (2006-2007)
          Briefly subordinate in mid-evolution to CAPT Jamie Foggo
          Other SAG members: LCDR Audrey Snyder, LT John Ennis, CDR Paul Tortora, CAPT James Taylor, others.
       USMC principal drafter: Col Doug King USMC
          Other USMC drafters: Col Bob Dobson (Ret), LtCol John Berry (Ret), LtCol Kelly Houlgate
       USCG principal drafter: CAPT Sam Neill USCG
          Other USCG drafter: CDR John Caplis USCG

--160--


How it was written (V)
       3 phases of development (Aug 06 - Oct 07)
          Phase I (Aug 06-Jan 07):
          Phase II (Mar-Jun 07):
          Phase III (Jun-Oct 07)
       End-game (Oct 2007)
       Unusually large amount of Navy funding made available throughout for:
          Naval War College strategy development efforts ($1M)
          CNA, JHU-APL, other supporting efforts
          "Conversations with the Country"
          N3/N5 staff officer travel
          Publication & dissemination

How it was written (VI)
       Phase I (Aug 06-Jan 07): Major NAVWARCOL effort
          Deliberate tasking to NAVWARCOL & publicizing of same
             NAVWARCOL had spawned CAPT Mahan's strategy works
             PNWC RADM Jacob Shuford championed
             CNWS Dean CAPT "Barney" Rubel (Ret) managed & coordinated
             CNWS Strategic Research Department (SRD) Director Peter Dombrowski led effort
          Seminal "Strategic Foundations War Game" (Sep-Oct 2006)
          Scenario analyses, war-gaming, conferences & symposia
          5 grand strategy options identified, developed & debated
          Initial "Conversations with the Country"
          13 naval missions identified in Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2006 helped frame the discussion

--161--


How it was written (VII)
       Simultaneously, VADM Morgan made series of presentations on new globalized world security and economic environment - and role of the Navy - to senior Navy flag officers in several venues
       Tri-service 3-star Terms of Reference (TOR) signed (Oct 2006)
          Established 3-star tri-service EXCOM: VADM Morgan, LtGen Amos, RDML Nimmich
       Maritime Strategy Task Force (MSTF) established (O5/O6-level)

How it was written (VIII)
       Phase II (Mar-Jun 2007)
          Vetting & winnowing of grand strategy options by drafters, MSTF, EXCOM, tri-service 3/4-stars
          1 grand strategy option chosen as central organizing concept
             "Global System" option: Protection of the existing global system of trade & security
          Other options considered as central organizing concept & discarded (but some elements borrowed):
             "Primacy:" Focus solely on "Winning combat power forward"
             "Selective engagement:" Focus on war prevention
             "Cooperative strategy:" Securing the global commons as a key element in the health of the global system
             "Offshore balancing:" Forward deployment only in the Gulf; other USN forces to surge from CONUS as required
          More differences within Navy, among Navy flags, than between Navy, USMC, USCG

--162--


How it was written (IX)
       Phase III (Jun-Oct 2007)
          Tri-service drafting
          Vetting among 4-stars; re-drafting
       ADM Mullen announced as next CJCS; to leave CNO job very soon (Jun 2007)
       "Conversations with the Country" continuing
       Drafting team anticipated & prepared for counterarguments
       RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd new head of N3/N5 SAG (summer 2007)
          CDR McGrath continued as Deputy (until Feb 2008)

How it was written (X)
       End-game (Oct 2007)
          Change in CNO leadership (29 Sep 2007)
             ADM Roughead relieved ADM Mullen as CNO
             CNO Roughead end-game initiatives
                Strengthened "hard power," major combat operations wording
                Strengthened missile defense, sealift wording
                Made "enhance awareness" - including maritime domain awareness (MDA) & intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) - an "implementation priority"
          CNA analyses; re-drafting
          4-star agreement on ordering of capabilities & imperatives

--163--


How it was written (XI)
       SECNAV Winter, DON secretariat not briefed until endgame
          SECNAV criticisms: Saw "soft power" as over-emphasized
          Simultaneous (& deliberate) SECNAV "Great White Fleet" anniversary focus
             Stressed need for powerful forward Navy, Marine Corps combat forces for deterrence, warfighting, "hard power"
          Initiated studies analyzing A Cooperative Strategy's premises
          SECNAV views reflected in his formal remarks at International Seapower Symposium (2007), Current Strategy Forum (2008)

How it was written (XII)
       CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD signatures (Oct 2007)
       CNO-CMC-COMDT public unveiling at 18th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Naval War College (Oct 2007)
          Reiterated at 19th ISS (Oct 2009)

Image - Cover collage.

--164--


How it was written (XIII)
       The "Conversations with the Country" (Nov 2006-8)
          Face-to-face, non-electronic public outreach meetings
          Naval War College as OPNAV N3/N5's executive agent
             N3/N5 POC: RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd (head of N3/N5 SAG) (from 2007)
             NAVWARCOL POC: CAPT (Ret) John Jackson Tri-service participation, incl/flag officers
          Two rounds
             Seeking inputs (Nov 2006-Jun 2007)
             Sharing the published strategy (Nov 2007-Sep 2008)
          Small, focused groups: Three formats
             Larger-scale symposia
             Smaller-scale executive seminars
             Campus conversations
             Plus aggressive local supporting public relations efforts

How it was written (XIV)
       The "Conversations with the Country" (2006-8) (cont.)
          Subject of much discussion at 18th International Seapower Symposium (ISS) at Newport, led by CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD (Oct 2007)
          Concept - & name - later adopted for CJCS ADM Mullen outreach efforts (2010)

--165--


"Conversations with the country" (2006-8)

Image - Map of continental USA.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

How it was written (XV)
       Other simultaneous activities
       Often claimed to be integral to the strategy development process
       Probably more useful in creating a receptive climate for the final product, than in guiding the pens of the drafters
          New "Navy Adaptive Planning Process" (later "Navy Strategic Planning Process") ISO POM 12 getting underway
          Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-10 development ongoing
          Foreign defense industry, academic, interagency inputs sought
          Foreign navy inputs sought
             ISS 2005, US Naval Institute Proceedings solicitation, Navy staff talks, academic engagements abroad
          JHU/APL conferences (2005-7)
          Lockheed Martin conferences (2005-7)
             Origins of this publication
             Driver: CAPT (Ret) Robby Harris

--166--


How it was written (XVI): Semi-official documents
       NAVWARCOL President RADM Jacob Shuford "President's Forum" articles, Naval War College Review (Autumn 2006, Summer 2007, Winter 2008)
       CAPT James Foggo, "Mahan Lives! Developing A New Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century," Submarine Review (Jan 2007)
       CDR Bryan McGrath, "1,000-Ship Navy and Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jan 2007)

Image - Cover collage.

How it was written (XVII): NWC conference output
       NAVWARCOL/Enterra Solutions Maritime Strategy Geo-strategic Environment Workshop report (Aug 2006)
       NAVWARCOL Legal Experts Workshop on the Future Global Legal Order report (Oct-Nov 2006)
       NAVWARCOL Ruger Workshop, Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century (Nov 2006)
       NAVWARCOL Ruger Workshop, Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions (Nov 2007)
       NAVWARCOL CNWS, The Shipping Industry Perspective: Implementing the Strategy (Oct 2008)

Image - Cover collage.

--167--


How it was written (XVIII)
       CNA conferences
          "US Naval Strategy & Concepts" (Jun 2006)
          "The Future of Maritime Strategy" (Oct 2006)
          "Winning Big Wars vs. Shaping & Influence" (Jan 2007)
          "Implementing the New Maritime Strategy (Jan 2008)
       Drivers: RADM (Ret) Michael McDevitt; CAPT (Ret) Peter Swartz; Michael Gerson)

Image - Cover collage.

How it was written (XIX): Feeder articles
       Dr./CAPT Roger W. Barnett, "Strategic Culture and its Relationship to Naval Strategy," NWCR (Winter 2007)
       Dr. George Baer, "Notes toward New Maritime Strategy," NWCR (Spring 2007)
       CAPT Wayne Hughes, "A Bimodal Force for the National Maritime Strategy," NWCR (Spring 2007)
       Dr. Geoffrey Till, "New Directions in Maritime Strategy?" NWCR (Autumn 2007)

Image - Cover collage.

--168--


How it was written (XX): Semi-official documents
       IFPA, A New Maritime Strategy for Twenty-First Century National Security (Sep 2007)
       Orbis special issue "Global Security and Maritime Strategy" (Fall 2007)

Image - Cover collage.

How it was written (XXI): Official testimony
       Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen before the House Armed Services Committee (13 Dec 2007)

       Posture Statements by ADM Roughead, Gen Conway, & ADM Allen (Spring 2008)

Image - Posture statement.

--169--


How it was written (XXII): Foreign inputs sought & received
       "The Commanders Respond," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Mar 2007)
       NAVWARCOL, Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas (Aug 2008)

Image - Cover collage.

How it was written (XXIII)
       Formal CHINFO dissemination plan, products & dissemination
          CHINFO RDML Frank Thorp active oversight
          Assigned PAO: CDR "Cappy" Surette
          Targets:
             Congress/interagency
             "Thought leaders"
             Media
             Internal DOD, DON
             Direct-to-public (US, International)

--170--


How it was written (XXIV)
       Key issues debated & resolved during drafting & signing:
          Nature of the evolving international system
          Preferred end state & grand strategy for US
          Role of USN, USMC, USCG w/in that grand strategy
          Navy-only vs. two or three sea services
          Inclusion of a required force structure
          Ordering of the 6 "strategic imperatives"
          Identity of the enemy in the "war on terror"
          Calling out of China

How it was written (XXV)
       The key issue in the drafting
          "This tension between warfighting and everything else was the main feature of the internal debates surrounding the development of the Maritime Strategy"
             CDR Bryan McGrath USN (Ret)
Oct 2008

--171--


Measuring the effects of the strategy (2007-9)
       OPNAV: CNO conversation tools
          CNO VTCs with Navy component commanders
          Focus on measuring effectiveness of naval operations in support of individual "Strategic Imperatives"
             #5 "Foster & sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners"
             #6 "Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system."
          Discussions dealt more with measures of performance than measures of effects
       Naval War College effort in support of OPNAV N51
          Strategic Imperative #5
          Prof. Stephen Downes-Martin developed complex, rigorous measurement methodology, delivered to OPNAV N51
       Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) used analyses of past engagement operations to address #5
          Identified tactical-operational-strategic drivers; used assessments of operations to determine tactics; delivered to OPNAV N51
          Drs. Alan Brown, David Zvijac, Alison Vernon

Outline
       Introduction
       Challenges of a new era
       Maritime strategic concept
          Regionally concentrated, credible combat power
          Globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces
       Implementing the strategy
          Expanded core capabilities
             Forward presence; Deterrence; Sea control; Power projection; Maritime security; Humanitarian assistance & disaster response
          Implementation priorities
             Improve integration & interoperability; Enhance awareness; Prepare our people
       Conclusion

--172--


Key ideas (I)
       Core statement:
          "As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised on interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance"

Key ideas (II)
       Global system & globalization are vital influences
       "Major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters- all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity"
       USN-USMC-USCG cooperation
       Formal & informal sea service, joint, interagency, & international cooperation & building of trust
       War prevention as important as warfighting
          "Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively influence events, and ease the impact of disasters"
       "6-6-3" construct
          6 key tasks or strategic imperatives
          6 expanded core capabilities
          3 implementation priorities

--173--


Key ideas (III)
       6 key tasks/strategic imperatives
          Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power (Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean)
             Deter major power war
             Win our nation's wars
             Limit regional conflict
          Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces (especially Africa, Western Hemisphere)
             Contribute to homeland defense in depth
             Foster & sustain cooperative relationships
             Prevent or contain local disruptions
       (Tracked with NSP ISO POM 08 & NOC 2006, except Med omitted)

Key ideas (IV)
       6 expanded core cap
          Forward Presence
          Deterrence
          Sea Control
          Power projection
Maritime security
          Humanitarian assistance & disaster response
       Added 2 to Zumwalt/Turner "missions of the Navy" canon
          Re-ordered Turner's listing
       Subtracted 7 from NOC 2006 list of missions
       No inclusion of strategic sealift as core capability
          Often added to previous capstone document "missions" lists

--174--


Key ideas (V)
       3 implementation priorities
          Improve integration and interoperability
             Marines to be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions
             No geographic boundaries between USN & USCG homeland defense responsibilities
             Global Maritime Partnerships initiative
          Enhance awareness
             Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
             Expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability
          Prepare our people
             "Maritime forces will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today"
             New responsibilities & expertise for junior officers & commanders

Key ideas (VI)
       Call for "mission-tailored" & "adaptive force packages"
       "We will provide our people...With the training, education, and tools necessary to promote peace..."
       "As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the sea services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives"
       "Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, de-centralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways."
       In accompanying explanatory texts:
          Deliberate invocation of (& comparison to) The Maritime Strategy of 1980s
          Deliberate slighting of all other USN capstone documents since 1980s for not being styled "strategies"

--175--


Key ideas (VII)

       To "complement Sea Power 21" & influence next:
          Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) (drafting ongoing in 2007)
          Naval Operations Concept(NOC) (anticipated in 2008; published in 2010
          The next SECDEF National Defense Strategy (NDS)
          The next CJCS ADM Mullen National Military Strategy (NMS) (2011)
          The next Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) (2009)
          The next 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2009-2010)
             New incoming administration

Image - Maritime Strategic Imperatives chart.

--176--


What was new (I)
       1st ever capstone document signed by 3 service chiefs
          1st USN-USMC-USCG unified maritime strategy since 1980s
          One of only 4 capstone documents to comprehensively integrate USCG
          1st capstone document to cite USN-USCG National Fleet policy
       Complex, open, lengthy development process
          Included "competition of ideas" phase
          Extensive, structured flag officer involvement
          "Conversations with the country" & "executive seminars"
          Public solicitation of foreign input
          Unprecedented allocation of Navy $ & manpower for strategy development & socialization ($1M+)
          Widespread & intensive publicity about the process
          FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency set precedent (2006)

What was new? (II)
       Emphasis on the global system & globalization
          1st use of term global system in a USN capstone document
       Characterizing the world system as "multi-polar"
       Asserted that preventing wars as important to U.S. as winning wars
       Elevation of Maritime Security & Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response to core capabilities
       Emphasis on interagency action & DIME construct
       Navy as enabling force for humanitarian ops too
       Global Maritime Partnership initiative
       "1000-ship navy" initiative renamed
       Public DOD announcement & endorsement
       Massive & sustained CHINFO-led multi-media internal & external publicity campaign
       Use of blogs for dissemination

--177--


What was new? (III)
       Authoritative US government description of an "open, multi-polar world"
          Noticed by Chinese commentators
       Serious & massive initial attempt to rigorously measure effects
          ADM Roughead CNO Guidance 2008: "Develop comprehensive plan that accomplishes each implied task and tracks progress with measures of effectiveness"
          CNO approved two methodologies to be applied to each of the 6 "strategic imperatives" (Jun 2008)
             VTC Conversation tool (initiated Sep 2008)
                Monthly CNO-NCC dialogues on opportunities & impediments
             Systems Thinking Model
                Industry-proven methodology adapted by Naval War College (Prof. Downes-Martin)

Not addressed
       Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
       Many (but not all) naval warfare tasks
          Strike, amphibious, anti-air, anti-surface, electronic, mine warfare, underway replenishment not mentioned
          TBMD, ISR, MDA, TSC, sealift mentioned. ASW, IO implied.
       Cooperation with US Army & US Air Force by name
       U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry
       Arctic Ocean; Atlantic Ocean; North, Mid-, Eastern Pacific Ocean; Mediterranean Sea
       Convoy, blockade, riverine operations & capabilities
       China, Iraq, Afghanistan, "The Long War," Europe
        "Transformation"
       Seapower 21 framework or vocabulary
          Even though Seapower 21 remained central to OPNAV Independent Capability Analysis and Assessment) ICAA) program planning process & NWDC concept development

--178--


Scant mention
       No mention of Fleet Response Plan (or of importance of surge, except in passing)
       Strategic sealift not included as a "core capability"
       Coast Guard constabulary & law enforcement roles received slight treatment
       No substantive discussion of seabasing
       Little on naval coastal warfare
       Only one very general reference to links to force level planning, programming & budgeting

Comparing 2007 to 1970-74
       A Cooperative Strategy built on Zumwalt-Turner's "4 missions"
       Thrust of A Cooperative Strategy echoes ADMs Zumwalt & Turner views of 35 years before
          Zumwalt-Turner: Discussion of sea control & presence in reaction to VN War power projection focus
          A Cooperative Strategy: Discussion of sea control & presence in reaction to 1990s power projection focus
          Turner's "deterrence" & "warfighting" missions echoed in A Cooperative Strategy's "war prevention" and "war winning" discussion

--179--


Was it a "strategy"?
       What is "strategy" (officially)?
          "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives"
             Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008)
       What is "naval strategy" (officially)?
          "The use of naval forces (including naval aviation and Marine forces) to achieve naval objectives determined by national strategy, with the overall objective of controlling the seas and denying to an enemy the use of those sea areas important to enemy operations"
             NTRP 1 -02 Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Aug 2006)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (I)
       Christopher Castelli, "Navy Weighs Three Maritime Strategy Options, but Others May Emerge," Inside the Navy (Apr 2007)
       "Strategy 1," (CDR Bryan McGrath USN), "Maritime Strategy 2007," Steeljaw Scribe blog, http://steeljawscribe.com, Oct 2007
       Robert Kaplan, "The Navy's New Flat-Earth Strategy," The Atlantic (Oct 2007)
       Hon. John Lehman, "A Bravura Performance," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 2007)
       Hon. Seth Cropsey, "Don't Give Up the Ships: The Navy's Flawed New Strategy," The Weekly Standard (Nov 2007)
       CAPT Robert Rubel USN (Ret), "The New Maritime Strategy: The Rest of the Story," Naval War College Review (Spring 2008)

--180--


Subsequent analyses & critiques (II)
       CAPT (Ret) Jan van Tol & Col (Ret) Robert Work USMC, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: An Assessment, CSBA (Mar 2008)
       CDR John Eden, The New Maritime Strategy - A Chance for Greater Relevance? Army War College (Mar 2008)
       Also Geoffrey Till, Steve Carmel, CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes, RADM (Ret) Bill Pendley articles, Naval War College Review (Spring 2008)
       Hans Ulrich Kaeser, Abandon Ships: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation (CSIS) (Aug 2008)
       LtCol Frank Hoffman USMCR (Ret), From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century (CNAS) (Nov 2008)
       Global '08: U.S. Navy Title X War Game: "Implementing the Maritime Strategy," 4-8 August 2008, Game Report, U.S. Naval War College (Mar 2009)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (III)
       Chinese reactions (analysis & 3 texts), Naval War College Review (Autumn 2008)
       Jerome Burke et al., Assessment of Naval Core Capabilities (IDA, Jan 2009)
       Study for SECNAV OPPA & USD(I)
       CDR James Kraska JAGC USN, "Grasping 'The influence of Law on Sea Power'," Naval War College Review (Summer 2009)
       LT John Ennis, "Inside the New Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Dec 2009)
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead, "Inside QDR 2010: What Does It Mean?," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 2010)

--181--


Subsequent analyses & critiques (IV)
       Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenges to U.S. Maritime Security (2010)
       Andrew Erickson, "Chinese Views of America's New Maritime Strategy," in Erickson et al., China, The United States and 21st Century Sea Power (2010)
       Robert J. Carr, "The Mission is Warfighting, Not Relief," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Dec 2010)
       Milan Vego, "AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone" (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul 2011)

Subsequent analyses & critiques (V)
       Joe Overton, "Speaking of the Long War: Trawling for Historical Value in the Speeches of Navy Leadership, 2001-2011" (Paper delivered at USNA McMullen Naval History Symposium, 30 Sep 2011)
       Amund Lundesgaard, U.S. Navy Strategy and Force Structure after the Cold War (Nov 2011)
       CAPT Peter Haynes, "American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007" (Ph.D. dissertation: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (Dec 2011))

--182--


Criticisms (I)
       Not really a "strategy." More a "strategic concept."
          Not equivalent to 1980s' "Maritime Strategy"
       Accompanying explanatory narrative inaccurately slighted all USN strategic conceptual efforts since 1980s
       Especially ...From the Sea (1992)
       Not useful as "The Navy Story:"
          Advertised target audiences (US public, Congress) uninterested in strategy, and especially in peacetime ops
          Strategy too nuanced for Congress & US public
          Globalization & international seaborne trade do not resonate as themes with the American people, whose traditional comparatively low opinion of the benefits of international economic relationships actually declined after 2007
       Attributed an (inaccurate) integrated maritime coherence to 3 very separate entities - the Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard - which often do very dissimilar things

Criticisms (II)
       Not specific enough. Not enough detail. Not focused.
          Especially regarding Navy's future planning
       Emphasis on global system, world trade & the global commons as context" not accompanied by robust enough explanation as to what seriously threatens them
         Little current/foreseeable threat to global seaborne trade seen
       Failure to prioritize strategic imperatives, core capabilities, potential threats, US operations
       Not enough discussion as to exactly how maritime forces prevent wars
       Unadvisedly favored "soft" over "hard" maritime power
          Too much concentration on operations short of war
          Elevation of MSO & HA/DR operations as "core capabilities" unwarranted
          No mention of strike or amphibious assault or ASW ops
          No concomitant elevation of sealift, as often in the past

--183--


Criticisms (III)
       Not joint enough
          Not explicit on links to Army, Air Force strategies & operations
          Ignored USN-USAF strike integration achievements & potential
       Minimal influence on joint operational doctrine
          No mention in Joint Pub 3-32 Command & Control for Joint Maritime Operations (Change 1 May 2008)
       Little on USN role in meeting traditional, disruptive, irregular, catastrophic challenges
       Not enough on Navy roles in winning at irregular warfare, counter-insurgency & the war on terror - the current primary ongoing operations
       Emphasis on international cooperation creates too much dependence on others, makes it harder to justify US Navy force structure

Criticisms (IV)
       Sea control, sea basing, naval control & protection of shipping given too short shrift
       Not enough on protection of oceanic natural resources
       Development process too long, complex, wasteful of $
       Many of its tenets actually predated the so-called "development" process
          "Development" processes an elaborate sham; VADM Morgan already knew what he wanted to say (cf: "3-1 Strategy" draft; Morgan-Martoglio article)
       Too many other competing USN capstone documents
       Timing of publication was poor; Presidential election impending
       A vehicle to enhance ADM Mullen's chances to be considered as a prospective CJCS

--184--


Criticisms (V)
       "Conversations with the Country" flawed
          Few useful insights gleaned
          Too many audience members from Navy-oriented groups
          Many "conversations" actually "performances"
          Not enough audience was reached for effort made
             Blogging would have been more useful
       Neither the Cooperative Strategy's 6 "expanded core capabilities" nor its 6 "strategic imperatives" were as useful as Sea Power 21's "pillars", as organizing tools for OPNAV N8 program planners and analysts

Criticisms (VI)
       Linkage to force levels, programs, budgets never explicit
          The strategy did not discuss funding; but should have
          USN 313-ship force level goal developed prior to strategy
             Remained officially unchanged more than two years after A Cooperative Strategy was published
          2008-2010 USN building programs did not reflect the strategy
          USN Jul 2008 public arguments for truncating DDG-1000 program had no roots in the strategy
       Subsequent strategy programmatic implementation little in evidence
       Strategy should have - but did not - lead to changes in fleet design, balance, & training
          Some strategy drafters saw this as bad
          Some strategy opponents saw this as good
       Navy did not use strategy to argue explicitly for increased budget share 370

--185--


Criticisms (VII)
       PRC not identified as a challenge but:
          PRC capabilities implicitly figured in UNCLAS separate USN program justifications
          PRC routinely mentioned in SECDEF, CJCS documents
       Advocacy of global maritime partnerships rang hollow beside US Senate refusal to ratify UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
       No reference to international law as the foundation for the strategy, especially global maritime partnerships; or of the promotion of international law as a fundamental goal of the strategy

Criticisms (VIII)
       3 "implementation priorities" did not actually receive "priority"
          Improve integration and interoperability
          Enhance awareness
          Prepare our people
       Navy actually gave priority to other initiatives, e.g.:
          Ballistic missile defense
          Operations & programs to counter anti-access capabilities, especially anti-submarine warfare & Air-Sea Battle operational concept
          Maintaining combat-credible forward presence & operations in 2 hubs
          F-35C Lightning II aircraft deployment
          Cyber operations
       Few measures of effectiveness (MOE) pursued, & none for long
          In any event, tried to measure effectiveness of operations, not influence of the CS 21 document per se

--186--


Criticisms (IX)
       Whatever might have been its virtues in 2007, by 2010 the world and America's place in it had so changed as to render it obsolete and in need of replacement
          The strategy was published just as the US stock market peaked
          No sooner was it published than global trade - the centerpiece of globalization & the world economic system - temporarily collapsed, & China began to challenge the US for dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Iran & North Korea looked more troublesome.
          Strategy assumed rising or flat US defense budgets. As of 2010, this did not seem to be the case any longer.
          If enabling the fruits of globalization through ensuring peaceful global shipping & providing maritime security is so important to the US Navy, why hasn't it devoted significantly more resources to eradicating Somali piracy?

Influence (I)
       Immediate, strong, & continuing within US Navy
       Somewhat less influence within US Coast Guard
          USCG inclusion cited in arguing within DHS for USCG forward operating capabilities, e.g.: new National Security Cutter
          Contributed to new heavier USCG participation in International Seapower Symposium (ISS) & international regional naval for a
          Facilitated dialogs between foreign states' navies & coast guards
          But not mentioned in US Coast Guard Commandant's Direction 2011
       Less influence in USMC, e.g.:
          Not cited in Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd ed.) (Jun 2010)
       Informed subordinate USN command concepts, strategies, plans, briefings, operations, public affairs releases
       Little resonance in either SECNAV Winter or SECNAV Mabus Department of the Navy secretariats

--187--


Influence (II)
       Ideas & vocabulary informed USN preparations for 2008-9 QRM review & 2009-10 QDR
       Reinforced an ongoing increased USN DOTMLPF focus on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, and on international engagement
       Revived NAVWARCOL Title X Global War Game '08 (Aug 2008) designed to provide strategy implementation insights
          Subsequent annual Global War Games also linked to the strategy (Jul 2009, Oct 2010)
       Development process sparked reincarnation of old informal "Navy Study Group" as "Navy Strategy Discussion Group" (from 2008)
          Spearheaded by CAPTs (Ret) Robby Harris (Lockheed Martin); Peter Swartz (CNA) Dick Diamond (Raytheon)
          Included many authors & contributors to past & current Navy capstone strategy documents

Influence (III)
       CJCS ADM Mullen public citation & endorsement (2008)
       Influence on:
          Joint Staff 2008 National Military Strategy authors
          CSAF Gen Moseley
             The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force (Dec 2007)
                Air Staff ("Checkmate") - drafted strategy/vision
       Much positive feedback from foreign navies
          Salience of cooperation & defending world system themes noticed & appreciated
          German, Canadian other navies sought to emulate USN "Conversations with the Country"
          Open development process emulated by NATO in developing NATO Strategic Concept (2009-10)

--188--


Influence (IV)
       Obama Administration 2010-11 documents, especially QDR, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy echoed CS 21 themes and ideas
          E.g.: QDR priority objective "Prevent and deter conflict"
          Some argued that administration adopted CS 21 concepts
             Some argued that that had been an original CS 21 goal
          Others argued that CS 21 had adopted think tank/academia concepts that were later brought into Obama administration
          Others argued that it was CJCS ADM Mullen's thinking that influenced all three documents
          CNO ADM Roughead stated that QDR 2010 validated & confirmed tenets of CS 21
             E.g.: Congressional testimony (Feb 2010)
       Ideas on international system also reflected in The QDR in Perspective: The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (Jul 2010)

Influence (V)
       Scarcely cited by USN in public debates on DDG-1000 force levels (2007-8)
       Little immediate resonance on Capitol Hill, among the American people, or in the larger national security affairs expert community
          But congruent with views of Center for a New American Security (CNAS) analysts
          Also congruent with views of Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff
       Navy authors in Proceedings & elsewhere used A Cooperative Strategy as basic reference and departure point
       Congruent with new Navy recruiting slogan "America's Navy: A Global Force for Good" (announced Aug 2009)
       New emphasis on MSO & HADR not reflected in revised Surface Force Readiness Manual (2012)

--189--


Why did it have such influence? (I)
       Ideas in the strategy resonated with many political, naval & academic audiences, in US and overseas
       Concepts tracked with current USN ops & DOD & State Dept. initiatives, as well as some national security expert outside opinion
       Well-constructed & well-written document
       Visible & repeated public & internal Navy CNO ADM Mullen endorsement during development
       Visible & repeated CNO ADM Roughead public & internal Navy endorsement following publication, through 2011
       Well-publicized personal involvement by CNOs & senior flag officers in its development
       Widespread publicity before & after publication
       Massive & continuing CHINFO multi-media distribution & publicity campaign (2007-2010)
          But CHINFO sometimes garbled the meaning of each "core capability"

Why did it have such influence? (II)
       Development and dissemination processes exceedingly well-funded
       Involvement of many actors in its creation
          But disappointment among some at lack of real influence
       Complex, multi-actor development process well-orchestrated by VADM Morgan
          But also tainted for some by close association with VADM Morgan's reputation & views
       Calculated tie-in to successful USN Maritime Strategy effort of 1980s
       Calculated tie-in to Naval War College reputation as strategy font
       Capitol Hill typically not interested in nuances of military strategy, nor in peacetime operations. Focus usually on requirements for warfighting.
          Concerns that document did not address Navy force level, cost overrun, ship construction issues

--190--


Why did it have such influence? (III)
       USMC & USCG had their own sets of conceptual & doctrinal pubs. New maritime strategy did not fill the same need for them as for USN
       External influence limited by omnipresence of ground campaign issues in OEF & OIF in contemporary US defense policy-making
          Navy issues remained unknown to many
          Even when known, did not appear salient to some
       Played no formal role itself in OPNAV POM & budget development process
          Mediated through Navy Strategic Plans (NSPs) & Guidance (NSG)
          Unlike The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s
          No annual "Strategy CPAMs," where the strategy was discussed & debated by Sponsors and integrators alike, when kicking off each successive annual Navy POM build
       SECNAV Winter antipathy; subsequent appointment of vocal CS 21 critic Robert Work as Under Secretary of the Navy

Influence on subsequent Navy capstone documents
       Formed the conceptual basis for:
          Navy Strategic Plans (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011)
          Navy Strategic Guidance (2009)
          Naval Operations Concept (2010)
          NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

--191--


Influence on other Navy documents (I)
       "Executing the Maritime Strategy" became explicit theme of successive annual ADM Roughead CNO Guidance (CNOG) documents for 2007-2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
       Cited in:
          CNO & other flag officer speeches and testimony
             Mentioned in passing as "Maritime Strategy" in CNO ADM Greenert Posture Statement (Feb 2012)
          ONR Naval S & T Strategic Plans (Feb 2009 & Sep 2011)
          Navy Arctic Roadmap (Oct 2009)
          USN Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Jan 2010)
          Navy's Total Force Vision for the 21st Century (Jan 2010)
          Naval Aviation Vision (Jan 2010)
          Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
          NCIS Strategic Vision (Feb 2010)
          US Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
          Commander Submarine Forces, Undersea Warfighting (Jul 2011)

Influence on other Navy documents (II)
       VCNO PLANORDS kicking off OPNAV POM -builds
          Discussed in VCNO PLANORD for POM-10as providing context & priorities to guide POM 10 investment decisions (Jan 2008)
          Ignored in VCNO PLANORD for PR-11 (Jan 2009)
          Mentioned in passing in VCNO PLANORD for POM-12 (Nov 2009)
          Ignored in VCNO PLANORD for POM-13 (2010)
       Discussed in successive Highlights of the DON Budget for FYs 2009, 2010, 2011 (Feb 2008, Feb 2009, Feb 2010) (including excerpts)
       Formed front matter of annual Navy Program Guide (2008-2010+)
       Influenced SECDEF-mandated Navy Campaign Support Plan (CSP)
       Core capabilities listed in OPNAV mission statement
          OPNAVINST 5450.338, Mission, Functions, and Tasks of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Sep 2009)

--192--


Influence on other Navy documents (III)
       Cited in US Fleet Forces Annual Plan for 2008 & 2009
       Core capabilities outlined in Commander, US Fleet Forces Commander's Guidance (2010)
       Discussed in COMNWDC Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
       Mentioned as one of many possible sources for potential Navy CONOPS topics, in COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 5401.1A, Fleet Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development (Mar 2009)
       Referenced in USN-USMC-US Army Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities (Jun 2010)
       OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Oct 21, 2010)

Influence on other US government documents
       Cited in:
          CJCS Risk Assessment to Congress (2008)
          CMC operational employment concept The Long War (2008)
          CMC USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)
          SECDEF Robert Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
          Coast Guard Pub 1 (May 2009)
       Not cited in revised MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2011)

--193--


Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) (2007)

Image - Cover: Navy Strategic Plan.

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (Nov 2007)
       A "Navy strategic plan"
       Navy-only. Not bi-service or tri-service
       Principal target: DON programmers & budgeters
       Long (76 pp) SECRET stand-alone pub
       Modest CNO Roughead personal changes to CNO ADM Mullen NSP ISO POM 10, signed just weeks before
       Cog office: OPNAV N5SC (Strategy & Concepts Branch)
       Emphasis on NSP as the strategic source document for USN POM development

--194--


Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          Signed within his first two months on the job

Image - Admiral Roughead.

What it was
       New CNO ADM Roughead's revision of outgoing CNO ADM Mullen's (26 Sep 2007) NSP
       Billed as a "strategic plan"
       SECRET stand-alone pub (5 Nov 2007)
       Lengthy (76 pages)
          One page longer than CNO ADM Mullen 26 Sep edition
       Navy (vice "sea services") focus
       Continued (but revised) biennial series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08
       Supplemented by Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (May 2009)
       Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO PR 12 (Oct 2009)

--195--


Why it was written
       New CNO ADM Roughead desire to "make it his"
       To lay out relationship to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (published Oct 2007)
       Provide CNO ADM Roughead's specific guidance for POM 10 development
       Principal target: DON leaders, programmers & budgeters

Context (I)
       Last years of G.W. Bush administration 2nd term (20019)
       US foreign trade soaring
       US economy continuing to weaken
          U.S. government deficit spending high but decreasing
          Oil price still soaring
       SECDEF Gates (2006-11)
       SECNAV Winter (2006-9)
       New CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007- Sep 2011)
       Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification of UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (31 Oct 2007)

--196--


Context (II)
       OEF, OIF, PSI, other operations ongoing
          OIF US forces "surge" underway
          Iraq Violence continues to fall off
          Resurgence of violence in Afghanistan (from 2006)
       US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
       Maturing USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, to relieve stress on ground forces

Context (III)
       International concerns:
          Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
          North Korea agreed to disable nuclear facilities
          Pakistani political turmoil
             President Musharaf re-elected; former PM Bhutto returned; state of emergency declared
          Cyber attacks on Estonian government computer systems (2007)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       World food crisis (2007)
          Shortages, rising prices fueled unrest in Africa, Asia, Caribbean

--197--


Context (IV)
       Stepped-up USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
       QRM Review & 4th QDR impending
       New CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
       Declining USN force levels; increasing DON annual budgets
       USN in 2007: 279 Battle Force ships; 5 new ships authorized
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) being implemented (from 2003)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          Huge, widely-publicized cost overruns & delays
          Navy drastically restructured program (2007)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Significant, widely-publicized cost overruns, delays & construction problems

Cited references
       Same as for NSP ISO POM 10
       Added ADM Roughead CNO Guidance for 2007-2008 (CNOG)

--198--


Context: Other contemporary publications
       Same as for NSP ISO POM 10
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (2005-7)

How it was written
       Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RDML-SEL Donegan (N5SP) oversaw
       LCDR Stewart (N5SC) (had been primary AO for CNO ADM Mullen NSP ISO POM 10)
          N5SC assists: CDR Paul Nagy, LT Brian Kawamura, Mr. Philip Ballard
       N81 input to ensure "fit" with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
       New OPNAV "Navy Adaptive Planning Process" (NAPP) getting underway
       A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower development process completed & document published

--199--


Outline
       Introduction
          Purpose & role; Execution*; Vision/Mission*; Objectives; Imperatives
             * New CNO Admiral Roughead additions
       Strategic context
          Regional focus areas; Global focus areas; Wildcards; Future landscape
       POM-10 guidance
          Force planning guidance; CNO Navy mission areas; Risk guidance; Analytic guidance; Strategic initiatives
       Conclusion
       Annexes:
          Risk guidance matrix; Future naval force structure & strategic laydown; Navy shore investment strategy guidance; Navy adaptive planning process; Navy strategic plan timeline

Key ideas
       Same as NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)
       But...
          New execution guidance
          More explicit tie-ins to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
          Aligned objectives with CNO Roughead CNOG for 2007-2008
          New CNO ADM Roughead specific risk guidance direction

--200--


What was new?
       Modest changes to risk guidance
       New CNO ADM Roughead execution guidance

--201--


Subsequent analyses & critiques
       None identified

Criticisms
       Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Largely reflected, rather than drove, Navy program planning
       No real way of tracking OPNAV compliance
       No follow-through to ensure tasked studies ever initiated, completed
       Not linked clearly and tightly enough to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only

--202--


Influence:
       Modest
       "The NSP is the authoritative Navy reference for conduct and development of POM-10"
          VCNO POM-10 PLANORD (Jan 2008)
       Cited in USFF 2008 Annual Plan
       Cited in Office of Naval Research Naval S&T Strategic Plan (Feb 2009)
       Used by OPNAV N81 & ONR in POM 10 development

Why?
       Strong & visible new CNO ADM Roughead personal involvement & endorsement
       No monitoring or enforcement mechanism in place to ensure OPNAV use and compliance 405

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR-11 (2009)

Image - Cover:Navy Strategic Guidance.

--203--


Overview
       Full title: Navy Strategic Guidance in support of Program Review 2011
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (May 2009)
       "Navy strategic guidance"
          Vice "Navy strategic plan," since in support of a Program Review (PR), not a Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
       Principal targets:
          DON officers & civilians charged with developing PR 11
       Medium-length (33 pages); SECRET
       Navy-only
       Drafted in OPNAV Strategy Branch (N5SC)
       "Forward presence is the linchpin for maritime strategy implementation"
       Strategy-driven. Keyed to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          During 2nd year of his term

Image - Admiral Roughead.

--204--


What it was
       Full title: Navy Strategic Guidance ISO Program Review 2011
       Billed as "strategic guidance"
       A "strategy-based, threat-informed document that interprets CS-21 and draft NOC-09 principles for use in Navy program development...consistent with NSP-10 risk guidance.'
       Continued (but revised) 2-year series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08 (Apr-May 2006)
          Supplemented & updated 2nd (5 Nov 2007) edition of NSP ISO POM 10
       SECRET stand-alone pub; Navy (vice "sea services") focus
       Moderate length: 33 pp (cf. NSP ISO POM 10 CH 1: 76 pp)
       Tasked by: VCNO memo on CY 08/09 Navy strategic planning (Feb 2008)
       Document signed by CNO (8 May 2009)
       (Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 (Oct 2009)

Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (2009)
       Why it was written
       To enable strategy to drive programming better
       To continue to build internal USN consensus on ideas in A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower
       Why an NSG? Why a PR?
          NSPs originally planned for 2-year cycles
             NSPs ISO POM 08 & POM 10, but no NSP/G ISO PR 09
          But PR 11 was special
             Change of Administration (Jan 2009)
             QRM review & 4th QDR prep on-going
             NPR anticipated
          Accordingly, an NSG ISO PR 11 was tasked
             To compare NSP ISO POM 08 to actual POM 08 Budget Estimate Submission (BES) results
       CAPT Vic Addison (OPNAV N5SC) advocated NSG

--205--


Context (I)
       Drafted during presidential election campaign & last months of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2008-2009)
       Document signed during 4th month of new Obama (D) Administration
       Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (2007)
       Holdover SECDEF Gates (2006-11)
       Outgoing SECNAV Winter (2006-9); Acting SECNAV B.J. Penn (Mar-May 2009)
       CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

Context (II)
       U.S. & many other economies in deep financial crisis
          U.S. government budget deficit, unemployment rate soaring
          Price of oil at all-time high (2008), but then plummeted
          Dow Jones Industrial Average had peaked at 14,164 in Oct 2007; had dropped to 6500 by Feb 2009.
       Collapse of global trade and output
          Continued high growth by China, some others
          US foreign trade plummeting
       Recent world food crisis (2007-8)
          Shortages, rising prices had fueled unrest globally
       Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US government policy response to economic crisis
          $787 billion stimulus package signed (Feb 2009)
       Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit

--206--


Context (III)
       OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
          Rising Taliban insurgency, major US & coalition force level "surge" in Afghanistan
          OIF major US "post-surge" troop withdrawals from Iraq (from Oct 2008)
          Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
          US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
       US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
       Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

Context (IV)
       Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK \ nuclear facilities; DPRK bad faith
       Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
          Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
       Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
          Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
          India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
          Intensified Pakistani attacks on Taliban
       Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; Revived Navy squadron deployments to NORLANT, Pac, Med, Caribbean & Gulf of Aden (2007-2009)
       Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (2007-8)
       3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)

--207--


Context (V)
       PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan, esp. IRBMs
       Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
       PRC-funded Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean now operational (2008)
       New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
       Less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; improved relations ( Mar 2008)
          Opening of PRC-Taiwan air, sea, mail links (2008)
       PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)

Context (VI)
       US announced Taiwan arms sales, including Harpoon (Oct 2008)
       PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
       PLAN counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea (from Dec 2008)
          1st PLAN operational deployments outside Asia since 2002
          3rd Chinese long-range naval expeditions since 1433
       PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar 2009)
       PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
          PLAN's "coming out" as a modern navy
       USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)

--208--


Context (VII)
       India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
       India & US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating India's access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
       India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
       USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercise (Oct 2008)
       Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
       India agreed to buy 8 US P-81 multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)

Context (VIII)
       Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
          Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian anti-piracy deployments off Somalia (from Dec 2008)
          CTF 151 established
          Maersk Alabama USN counter-piracy operation success (Apr 2009)
             Press coverage very favorable to USN

--209--


Context (IX)
       USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
          1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
       PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
       USN force levels modestly increasing; DON annual budgets increasing
       USN in 2009: 285 Battle Force ships; 8 new ships authorized
       CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
       Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2008)
       Navy beginning to study follow-on SSBN
       Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

Context (X)
       Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008)
       Continuing USMC fire support issues
          USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
       US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
       USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
          Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007

--210--


Context (XI)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
          1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
             Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction, operational problems
       Navy Board of Inspection & Survey (INSURV) graded 2 surface combatants unfit for combat, due to poor material readiness (Apr 2008)
       Widespread adverse publicity

Context (XII)
       Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way
          New DNS VADM Harvey formed QDR Integration Group (QIG) under RDML Burke (Apr 2008)
          Demise of OPNAV N3/N5 "Deep Blue" (Mar 2008)
       OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established under N3/N5 (Jul 2008)
       OPNAV N3/N5 re-organization (Dec 2008)
          Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 (Concepts) & N513 (Strategy))
       Unofficial "Navy Study Group" reconvened (from May 2008)
       NAVWARCOL revived Global War Game series (2008)

--211--


Cited references
       DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Aug 2002)
       CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (2007)
       CNO Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 2010 (2007)
       SECDEF National Defense Strategy (2008)
       SECDEF Congressional testimony (Jan 2009)
       DOD FY2010 budget submission (2009)
       Draft CNO Naval Operations Concept 2009 (sic)
          Finally published in 2010
       Various footnoted CCDR, ONI, press reports

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       SECDEF Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) (May 2008)
       SECDEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (May 2008)
       National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 (Aug 2008)
          Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
       SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission (Dec 2008)
          USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
          USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

--212--


Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       CDI, Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress (Oct 2008)
       Included Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/roots in 1970s)
       National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, The "1,000-Ship Navy" - Maritime Security Partnerships (Nov 2008)
       National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025 (Nov 2008)
       CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Nov 2008)
       OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

Unified Command Plan revision (Dec 2008)

NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)

NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)

SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)

SECDEF Gates Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (Jan 2009)

CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance

CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)

CJCS ADM Mullen Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (CH 1) (Mar 2009)

SECAF Donley & CSAF Gen Schwartz, 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (Oct 2008)

--213--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       SECNAVINST 2052.1, Maritime Domain awareness in the Department of the Navy (Jan 2009)
       LtCol Frank Hoffman USMCR (Ret), From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century (CNAS) (Nov 2008)
       Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
       CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
       Bloggers: "Galrahn" (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
       Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One (CNA) (Mar 2009)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing (2008-9)

How it was written (I)
       Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Doug Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Robert Thomas (N5SP), CAPT Vic Addison (N5SC), later CAPT Mark Montgomery (N513)
       Drafted in OPNAV Strategy & Concepts branch (N5SC)
          Lead drafter: CAPT Vic Addison, with CDR Steve Kelley (helo aviator); Ms. Kristine Schenck (civilian contractor action officer)
       OPNAV N81 input to ensure "fit" with follow-on OPNAV POM processes
          Common N51-N81 capability taxonomy developed
       Coordination with OPNAV QDR cell (Mr. Bryan Clark) & OPNAV N80

--214--


How it was written (II)
       Drafting (Sep-Dec 2008
          N513/N81/QDR Integration Group (QIG)
       Key stakeholder coordination (Dec 2008-Jan 2009)
          N51SP/N81/N8F/QIG
       Flag officer coordination (Jan 2009)
          RDML and RADM level
          USFFC and NCCs
       Senior flag officer coordination (Jan 2009)
          VADM level
          N3/N5 final approval
       VADM Crowder (N3/N5) forwarded to CNO: 29 Jan 2009
          (N513 Drafting of NSP ISO POM 12 began: Feb 2009)
       End-game editing by CAPT Mark Montgomery (N513)
          To ensure conformity w/OSD guidance from ongoing QDR
       Not signed by CNO, however, until 8 May 2009

How it was written (III)
       OPNAV "Navy Strategic Planning Process" (NSPP) to inform NSP ISO POM 12 ongoing simultaneously
       Drafting of Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2009 ongoing simultaneously (from Dec 2007)
       Tri-service revision of NDP 1 Naval Warfare ongoing simultaneously (from Oct 2008)
       Drafting of NSP ISO POM 12 ongoing while NSG ISO PR 11 was awaiting CNO signature

--215--


Outline
       I. Introduction
          Purpose & overview
          Use of the document; & discussion
       II. Strategic Context and Capability Implications
          By geographic COCOM theater
          Strategic drivers, capability guidance, & risk guidance
       III. Strategic Concepts
          "Key success factors" identified in Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP)
          Proposed operational concepts
       IV. Analytic Priorities
          Studies to ensure firm analytic basis for NSP ISO POM 12

Key ideas
       Strategy should inform programming
       Laid out SECDEF and CNO priorities
       Clearly linked to tri-service Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)
          Used as framework the 6 strategic imperatives & 6 core capabilities
       Added 6 additional capabilities (from draft NOC 2009 & DOD Directive 5100.1 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Aug 2002)
       "Forward presence is the linchpin for maritime strategy implementation"
       USN should develop new (listed) concepts for the future, including operational concepts
       USN should conduct new (listed) studies to ensure firm analytic basis for development of NSP ISO POM 12

--216--


Image - Chart: CS-21 Strategic Imperatives.

What was new?
       Keyed to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Providing NSP-like guidance in a PR year
       Guidance for strategic and operational concept development
       6 "additional capabilities "(from draft NOC 2009 & DOD Directive 5100.1 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Aug 2002)
          Sea basing
          Cyber superiority
          Global awareness
          Space superiority
          Naval expeditionary logistics
          Maritime ballistic missile defense

--217--


Subsequent analyses & critiques
       None identified

Criticisms
       Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Unclear extent to which Navy programmers actually conformed to the guidance
       No mechanism cited to ensure compliance with direction to develop strategic concepts and studies
       Overly influenced in drafting by OPNAV N81 & program analyses, vice strategists & strategy
       Should have been Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy guidance, not Navy only

--218--


Influence:
       Limited, re: PR-11 development
       Very useful as "dry run" for drafting of NSP ISO POM 12

Why?

       Published too late in development cycle to appreciably affect PR-11 development
       Minimal mention in VCNO PLANORD for PR-11 (Jan 2009)
       But general agreement that process was useful, if timeliness could be improved

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (2009)

Image - Cover: navy Strategic Plan.

--219--


Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (Oct 2009)
       "Navy strategic plan"
       Principal targets:
          DON officers & civilians charged with developing POM-12
       Lengthy (76 pages) SECRET document
       Navy-only
       Drafted in OPNAV N513 (Strategy branch)
       Strategy-based
       Released in time to impact POM development
       Developed via defendable, repeatable & quantifiable strategic planning process

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          During 2nd year of his term

Image - Admiral Roughead.

--220--


What it was
       Billed as a "strategic plan"
       Continued series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)
       SECRET stand-alone pub
       Navy-only (vice "sea services") focus
       Lengthy (76 pages)
          Same length as NSP ISO POM-10 (Ch 1)
       Tasker: VCNO PLANORD (Jan 2008)
       Signed out by CNO ADM Roughead (9 Oct 2009)
       Superseded Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10: Ch 1 (Nov 2007) & Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (May 2009)
       (Superseded by Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 (Oct 2010))

Why it was written
       To ensure Navy programmatic decisions were balanced, well-informed, & aligned with Navy strategic objectives
       To provide CNO strategic guidance to OPNAV on his resource allocation priorities, for OPNAV staff development of POM-12
       Specifically, to provide a benchmark reference for development of POM-12 PLANORD, Front End Assessment (FEA), and Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs).
       To continue by-now routinized series of Navy Strategic Plans to guide Navy POM development
       To continue to build internal USN consensus on ideas in A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower
       Tasker: VCNO PLANORD for POM-12 (Jan 2008)

--221--


Context (I)
       Drafted during 1st 9 months of new Obama (D) Administration
       Democrat control of both houses of Congress (2007)
       SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
          Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
       Acting SECNAV Penn; then SECNAV Mabus (from Jun 2009)
       CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

Context (II)
       U.S. & world economies starting to pull out of deep financial crisis & recession
          U.S. government budget deficits, unemployment rate soaring
          Price of oil plummeted, then started to rise somewhat again
          U.S. foreign trade plummeting
       Recent world food crisis (2007-8)
          Shortages, rising prices had fueled unrest globally
       World trade & output had plummeted
       Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
       Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit

--222--


Context (III)
       OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
          Rising Taliban insurgency, major US & coalition force level "surge," OPTEMPO increase in Afghanistan
          Major US "post-surge" Iraq troop withdrawals in progress (from Oct 2008)
          Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
          US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
       US government focus on heavy Army, USMC engagement in ground wars
       Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

Context (IV)
       Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
       Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
          Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
          Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
       Pakistani political turmoil stabilized
          Newly elected civilian president (Sep 08)
          India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)
       Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med & Caribbean (2008)

--223--


Context (V)
       PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
       Less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; improved relations (2008)
       Opening of PRC-Taiwan air, sea, mail links (2008)
       US announced Taiwan arms sales, including Harpoon (Oct 2008)
       PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)

Context (VI)
       Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
       New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
          PRC launched 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)
       PLAN counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea (from Dec 2008)
          1st PLAN operational deployments outside Asia since 2002
          3rd Chinese long-range naval expeditions since 1433
       PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
       PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
          PLAN's "coming out" as a modern navy
       USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)

--224--


Context (VII)
       India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
       India, US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating Indian access to civilian nuclear fuel, technology (Oct 2008)
       India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
       USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercise (Oct 2008)
       Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
       India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
       India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)
       DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
          Incl/renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line

Context: (VIII)
       Intensified USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
       Somali civil war, insurgencies, Ethiopian occupation, warlordism continued
       Huge surge in number of pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden (2008)
       UN Security Council authorized foreign navy entry into Somali waters to repress piracy & armed robbery at sea (Jun 2008)
       COMUSNAVCENT declared Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) off Somalia (Aug 2008)
       NATO SNMG deployed to Somali, Gulf waters (Oct 08)
       Somali pirates captured supertanker, held for ransom (Nov 2008)
       International anti-pirate armada buildup off Somalia (Dec 2008)
          USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian
       COMUSNAVCENT created anti-Somali piracy CTF 151 (Jan 2009)
       Kenya agreement to try Somali pirates captured by US naval forces (Jan 2009)
       1st CTF 151 USN capture of pirates (Feb 2009)
       Maersk Alabama USN counter-piracy operation success (Apr 2009)
          Press coverage very favorable to USN

--225--


Context (IX)
       Congressionally-mandated 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way
       USN force levels modestly increasing; DON annual budgets increasing
       USN in 2009: 285 Battle Force ships; 8 new ships authorized
       CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
       USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
          1st USN CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
       PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
       Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
       Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)

Context (X)
       Navy Board of Inspection & Survey (INSURV) graded 2 surface combatants unfit for combat, due to poor material readiness (Apr 2008)
          Widespread adverse publicity
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes under construction
          Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
          1st LCS commissioned (Nov 2008)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned
          Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, & construction & operational problems
       Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
       Follow-on SSBN being studied
       Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

--226--


Context (XI)
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
          Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
       Continuing USMC fire support issues
          USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Joint expeditionary fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008)
       US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
       USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
       OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established under N3/N5 (Jul 2008)
       New OPNAV N3/N5 organization (Dec 2008)
          Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
       NAVWARCOL revived Global War Game series (2008)
       Unofficial Navy Study Group ongoing

Cited references
       CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (2007)
       Ongoing SECDEF Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
       SECDEF National Defense Strategy (2008)
       SECDEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (May 2008)
       SECDEF Gates, FY2011-2015 Guidance for Development of the Force Update (w/Jul 2009 update)
       SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
       Numerous footnoted CCDR, CNA, ONI, press references

--227--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       DoN PR-11 Budget Estimate Submission (BES)
       Draft NSG ISO PR 11 awaiting CNO signature while NSP ISO POM 12 simultaneously being drafted
       Naval Operations Concept 2010 draft
       NDP 1 Naval Warfare draft
       CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Nov 2008)
       Unified Command Plan revision (Dec 2008)
       SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission (Dec 2008)
          USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
          USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
       SECDEF Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report (Jan 2009)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
       CJCS ADM Mullen Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (CH 1) (Mar 2009)
       SECAF Donley & CSAF Gen Schwartz, 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (Oct 2008)
       OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)

--228--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       Col (Ret) Robert Work (CSBA), The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow's Fleet (Feb 2009)
       Global '08: U.S. Navy Title X War Game: "Implementing the Maritime Strategy, "4-8 August 2008, Game Report, U.S. Naval War College (Mar 2009)
       Christine Fox, Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future - Learning From the Past (CNA) (May 2009)
       Powering America's Defense Energy and the Risks to National Security (CNA) (May 2009)
       Andrew Krepinevich, "The Pentagon's Wasting Assets," Foreign Affairs (Jul/Aug 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
       CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
       Bloggers: "Galrahn" (Raymond Pritchett), "Commander Salamander," et al.
       Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One (CNA) (Mar 2009)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing

--229--


How it was written (I)
       Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Crowder (N3/N5), RDML Thomas (N5SP), CAPT Montgomery (N513) oversaw
       Core writing team
          N513 (lead): CDR Steve Kelley (Helo aviator; Ms Kristine Schenck (civilian contractor action officer)
          N81, N80, Navy QDR Integration Group (QIG)
       Robust OPNAV & NCC stakeholder participation
       Staffing rounds
          Drafting (Feb-Jul 2009)
             NSG ISO PR 11 awaiting CNO signature (Jan-May 2009)
          OPNAV & Fleet AO/Planner level coordination (Jul 2009)
          Draft capability risk guidance (Jul-Aug 2009)
          1-star-level coordination (Aug 2009)
          3-star-level coordination (Sep 2009)
       CNO review, changes & signature (Oct 2009)

How it was written (II)
       OPNAV "Navy Strategic Planning Process" (NSPP) to inform NSP ISO POM 12 being developed simultaneously
          But had marginal impact on NSP ISO POM 12
       Drafting of tri-service Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 ongoing simultaneously (from 2008)
       Tri-service revision of NDP 1 Naval Warfare ongoing simultaneously (from Oct 2008)
       Personal attention of CNO ADM Roughead
          Made inputs throughout, & made changes at endgame

--230--


How it was written (III)
       Built on lessons learned from previous NSP/NSG iterations (especially NSG ISO PR 11)
       Highly collaborative development process
          Included cross-functional Subject Matter Expert (SME) panel day-long workshops
       Based on traceable, defendable and repeatable methodologies aligned with current Navy strategy
       Robust Fleet, NAVWARCOL & CNA participation
       Benefitted from on-going CNO "Futures" process
          Managed for CNO by QDR Integration Group (QIG)

Outline
       Introduction
       Strategic context
       Capability risk guidance
       Analytic guidance
       Strategic concepts
       Appendices
          Linking strategy to capabilities
          Alternative futures planning process
          Risk guidance matrix
          Navy strategic planning timeline

--231--


Key ideas
       Organized according to typology in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       "Capability Risk Guidance"
          To provide strategic priorities for POM-12 build
          Linked to "strategic drivers," developed from Strategic Context
          Shaped by known OSD, Joint & CNO priorities
          3 categories: Accept, Maintain, Reduce Risk
          Focus on capabilities vice programs
          Directed efforts across DOTMLPF spectrum
          Fiscally informed

What was new?
       First Navy Strategic Plan to be truly based throughout on capabilities and strategic imperatives of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

--232--


Criticisms
       Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO & VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
       Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) did not impact NSP ISO POM 12 to the extent N51 had hoped
       Not used enough by OPNAV in developing POM-12
       Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only

Influence:
       Used by OPNAV N8 & other staffs in building POM-12
          NSP-12 priorities reflected in POM-12 Front End Assessment (FEA) & Integrated Program Assessment (IPA)
          Resource sponsor Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) referenced NSP-12
          Final POM-12 submission graded against NSP-12
       Generated internal staff controversies and debates
       Discussed in COMNWDC Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
       A main reference in & influence on U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
       Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Oct 21, 2010)

--233--


Why did it have such influence as it did?
       Timely release. Published early enough in the cycle to affect POM 12 development
       Benefitted from consensus built into collaborative drafting process
          Stakeholder participation throughout development process
       Well-known CNO support, attention and direction
       Built on lessons learned from previous NSP iterations
       Aligned with Administration and SECDEF priorities
       Benefited from earlier socialization of CS 21 concepts
       OPNAV N3/N5 ascertained degree to which Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) followed NSP guidance
       But had been mentioned only minimally in VCNO PLANORD for POM 12 (Nov 2009)
          Less than discussion of NSP ISO POM 10 in VCNO PLANORD for POM 10 (Jan 2008)

Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Used as baseline in developing Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 (2010)

--234--


Naval Operations Concept (2010)

Image - Cover: Naval Operations Concept 2010.

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (May 2010)
       Billed as a "naval operations concept"
       Principal target: Sailors, Marines & Coastguardsmen
       Very long (102 PP) UNCLAS book; very long drafting process
       USN-USMC-USCG staff drafting participation
       USN lead drafters & overall coordinators: OPNAV N513
       To counter range of nuclear, conventional, irregular challenges
       Key ideas: Sea as maneuver space; details of 6 core capabilities identified in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) (2007); described 'ways" Naval Service will achieve CS 21 "ends"; current operations concept (not an aspirational vision for the future); to inform development of service & joint concepts, plans, experimentation, operations

--235--


Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          During 3rd year of his term
       CMC Gen James Conway
       CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen
          Released on his last day in office

Image - (L-R) CNO Admiral Gary Roughead, CMC General James Conway, and CMDT COGARD Admiral Thad Allen.

What it was
       Billed as a "Naval Operations Concept"
       Subtitled: "Implementing the Maritime Strategy"
       "The Naval Service:" Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard
       Very lengthy UNCLAS book (102 pages)
          Much longer than all previous NOCs combined:
             *1997 NOC: 8 pp.
             *2003 NOCJO: 23 pp.
             *2006 NOC: 36 pp.
       Mostly a detailed, greatly-expanded treatment of the six "core capabilities" presented in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) in 2007
       Signed May 2010
       Superseded 2006 NOC (which CS 21 had rendered OBE)

--236--


Why it was written (I)
       To reinforce internal USN consensus re: ideas in A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower (CS 21)
          To discuss the "ways" to carry out CS 21 "ends"
       At least three major sets of disparate, contending, successive & cumulative pressures on drafters:
          1. Define and articulate "How we fight," for Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen
             Initially "How we fight"
             Then "How we operate"
             Then "How we operate & fight"
             Then "How we prevent and prevail"
          2. Address void in USN future concept development, for joint & Navy concept & doctrine development community
          3. Explain linkages between A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower & the Navy's force goal (the "means"), for Congress & defense policy analysts

Why it was written (II)
       To replace NOC (2006)
       Initially, to inform Navy positions for ongoing QRM review (2008-9); 4th QDR, NPR, BMDR (2009-10)
       Later, to align Naval Service concepts with Obama Administration QDR, NPR, BMDR, National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, draft National Military Strategy
       Set scene for a revision of Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare
       Continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
          1st time USCG included in a NOC
       Bring fleet operations concepts in line with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) & Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 (2009)
       Address some criticisms of CS 21
          E.g.: Lack of force structure discussion; ignoring Mediterranean Sea presence; sparse treatment of seabasing concept

--237--


Why it was written (III)
       To describe how US naval forces contributed to enhancing security, preventing conflict, prevailing in war
       As a vehicle to align how the Naval Service thinks about -and describes to others - who it is, what it believes, where it operates, what it provides to the nation
       To "tell the Navy story" to achieve better public appreciation of the relevance of what the Naval Service provides to the nation & the international community
       To articulate how the Naval Service was "rebalancing its force structure to address the blue, green & brown water threats potentially posed by very capable state adversaries, as well as the maritime security & irregular littoral challenges posed by state & non-state adversaries"
       To remind readers that Naval Service personnel were on the ground in the long war

Why it was written (IV)
       Central service motivations & messages
          USN:
             Navy is not simply for blue water ops
          USMC:
             Marine Corps is not a second land army
          USCG:
             Coast Guard is a vital operational partner of the other armed services
       Promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
       Ultimate main target audience: Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
          Unstated secondary target audience: The Congress

--238--


Context: (I)
       Drafting completed, document signed during 2nd year of new Obama (D) Administration
          Successive earlier drafts during 2008 presidential election campaign, last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-09), &1st year of Obama (D) administration (2009-10)
       Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007)
       US & world slowly pulling out of deep financial crisis & recession (from Jun 2009)
          Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
          High US unemployment rate
          U.S. foreign trade rising again
       Temporary growth fall-off of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
       Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
       U.S. government deficit spending highest since World War II
       Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
          Future cuts anticipated

Context: (II)
       SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
          Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
          Internal DOD "efficiencies" initiatives to cut Service overhead
       OEF & OIF continuing
          USMC, US Army still heavily engaged on the ground
          Rising Taliban insurgency & continuing big increase in US & coalition force levels, operations in Afghanistan (2009-10)
             Major US, allied "surge" of ground forces to Afghanistan
             Major increase in tempo of US, allied operations vs. Taliban
          OIF US "surge" in Iraq turned war around (2007-8)
             Increased US troop strength; changes in US ops & tactics
             Plummeting US force levels in Iraq (from Oct 2008)
             Decreased Iraqi sectarian violence & insurgency
             US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)

--239--


Context: (III)
       Increased worldwide approval of US leadership performance
       US Senate put off voting on UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ratification again, despite Senate Foreign Relations Committee Oct 07 vote to ratify (2007-8)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Northwest Passage north of Canada & Alaska opening
       Panama widening Panama Canal (from Jul 2007)

Context: (IV)
       Modest resurgence of Russian defense budgets, military deployments, exercises, overflights of USN (2007-9) (largest in 15 yrs)
          Russian Navy Arctic seabed resources claim (Aug 2007)
          Russian Navy squadron NORLANT, Pac, Med, Caribbean cruises (2008); Renovation of Tartus, Syria forward base
       Kosovo declared independence from Serbia (Feb 2008)
       Russian ground, air, naval, cyber forces attacked neighboring Georgia (Aug 2008)
       US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces - including SSBNs & SLBMs - signed (Apr 2010)
          Not yet ratified by US Senate
       US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for USN TLAM-N retirement (Apr 2010)

--240--


Context: (V)
       Buildup of Iranian Revolutionary Guard small fast naval missile combatant force
       COMUSNAVCENT public vow to keep open Strait of Hormuz (2008)
       Iranian ground & naval missile tests & publicity campaign (Jul 2008)
          Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
          Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
       Pakistani political turmoil & internal unrest
          Former PM Bhutto assassinated (Dec 07); President General Musharaf not re-elected (Mar 08); resigned (Aug 08); Bhutto widower Zardari elected President (Sep 08)
          Rise in terrorist bombings within Pakistan

Context: (VI)
       Escalating DPRK provocations
       DPRK declared its nuclear activities (Jun 2008); then agreed to halt them (Oct 2008)
       US dropped DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism
       New ROK gov't cooler towards DPRK (2008)
       DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
          Incl/renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line
       DPRK announced resumption of nuclear activities ROKN interception & firing on DPRKN warship crossing Northern Limit Line (Nov 2009)
       UN sanctions on DPRK allowing inspections at sea of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons (2009) DPRK torpedo sinking of ROKN corvette (Mar 2010)

--241--


Context: (VII)
       Increased PRC assertiveness in South, East China Seas
       PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
       Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
       PRC disapproved USN carrier, minesweeper Hong Kong port visits, despite brewing storm, crew family holiday arrangements (Nov 2007)
       PRC-funded Gwadar port, Pakistan on Indian Ocean operational (2008)
       Violent political unrest in Tibet region of PRC (Mar 2008)
       2 USN CSGs deployed east of Taiwan during Taiwan elections (Mar 2008)
       Independence Party defeated in Taiwan election; less stridently anti-PRC KMT regime elected; greatly improved cross-strait economic, transport relations (from Mar 2008)
       New PLAN amphibious ship class introduced (2008)
       PRC launch of 1st Venezuelan satellite (Oct 2008)

Context: (VIII)
       US announced Taiwan arms sales, incl/Harpoon (Oct 2008)
       PRC protested, suspended PVSTs, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
       PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea - & cooperation w/USN - now routine (from Dec 2008)
       PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
       PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
          PLAN's "coming out" as a modern navy
       USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)
       PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
       Continued China Coast Guard-USCG cooperation re: port security, fisheries enforcement, safety at sea, search & rescue

--242--


Context: (IX)
       India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
       India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
       Annual USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercises
       India-US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating India's access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
       Seaborne terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
       India agreed to buy 8 US P-8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
       India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)
       Global weapons innovation & proliferation among state and non-state actors

Context: (X)
       DoD "Long War", Global War on Terror, partnership, MDA, SSTRO, COIN concepts predominate, in vogue.
          But increasing DoD appreciation for high-end anti-access/area denial challenges beyond current fight (2010)
       Increased DoD attention to integration within US Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) policy, capabilities, ops
       Heavy USN, coalition MSO & HA/DR ops in Arabian Sea, Caribbean, SE Asia, African littoral, Haiti, etc.
       Also Noble Eagle, Active Endeavor, JTF GITMO, CJTF HOA, OEF Philippines, PSI
       Unfulfilled USN DR Bay of Bengal operation in wake of Myanmar cyclone (Jun 2008)
       Communist Cuba turned down unprecedented US humanitarian assistance offer in wake of two hurricanes (Sep 2008)

--243--


Context: (XI)
       Combatant commanders requesting US naval capabilities in both landward and seaward portions of their littorals
       OEF, OIF demands tempered "transformation" & global "capabilities-based" defense planning policies
          Especially by USA & USMC
          Increased search for specific threat-based solutions, e.g.: specific anti-IED, cultural & linguistic capabilities
          Need to increase "boots on the ground" troop strength, as well as all services' precision strike & information capabilities
          US "surge" & new tactics reduced level of sectarian violence in Iraq, allowing continued major US drawdown
          US "surge" of forces in Afghanistan (2009-10)
       Response to Haiti earthquake highlighted Naval Service disaster response roles (Jan 2010)

Context: (XII)
       USN force levels increasing
       DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated, as supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding dries up
       288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
       USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
          1st CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
          Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
       PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
       Africa Partnership Station (APS) ongoing. Included overt SSN ops. Planning for future GFS deployments
       USN NRL VXS-1 NP-3D flew 40 geological assessment missions over Afghanistan (2006)

--244--


Context: (XIII)
       Intensified USN & coalition anti-piracy ops off Somalia
          Somali civil war, insurgencies, Ethiopian occupation, warlordism continued
          Surge in number of pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden (2008)
          International anti-pirate armada buildup off Somalia (Dec 2008)
          Active USN-sponsored anti-piracy coalition CTF 151
          Pirates shifted op areas, began to deploy mother ships (2009-2010)
       3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)

Context: (XIV)
       USN redeployed Med sub tender to Pacific (2007)
       5 USN CSGs deployed forward simultaneously (Spring 2008)
       4th Fleet re-established (Apr 2008)
       AFRICOM & NAVFORAFRICA established (Oct 2008)
       Mercy, Peleliu humanitarian civil assistance (HCA) deployments; Operation Sea Angel II (2007)
       Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
       Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)
       Close USN-French Navy carrier & aircraft training cooperation
       Fleet-wide MOC implementation
       New USN PERSTEMPO Program (Jan 2007)

--245--


Context: (XV)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
          1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
          1st LCS deployed (2010)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
       USN SM-3 shoot-down of errant satellite (Feb 08)
       Follow-on SSBN being developed
       Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

Context: (XVI)
       USN Georgia Black Sea HA ops (from Aug 2008)
       USN-USMC differences re: operational command relationships, especially in the Pacific
       USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); truncated DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Cancelled Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008); canceled MPF(F) (2010)
       USCG MFPU escorted USN SSBN port transits (from 2007)
       NECC elements often operating far from maritime environment, but increasingly integrated into fleet JTFEXs (2008)
       SECDEF-mandated USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort (2009-10)
       Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
          "Balisle Report" (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions

--246--


Context: (XVII)
       NSC Deputies Committee approved interagency Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) program, under OSD(P) oversight with USN core support (2008)
       1st USN Global Maritime Engagement Synchronization Conference (Feb 2008)
          Deployment scheduling for FY 2010
          Proactive vice reactive MSO/HCA ops
       Robust USN "Individual Augmentee" (IA) program continued, became more formalized
       Continued USN presence at highest command levels
          ADM Mullen as CJCS (2007-11)
          VADM McRaven as COMJSOC
          ADM Stavridis as CDRUSSOUTHCOM, then SACEUR/CDRUSEUCOM
          ADM Olson as CDRUSSOCOM (2007-11)
          ADM Winnefeld as CDRUSNORTHCOM
          But ADM Fallon resigned as CDRUSCENTCOM (Mar 2008)

Context: (XVIII)
       VADM John Morgan relieved by VADM Doug Crowder as OPNAV N3/N5 (Aug 2008), then VADM Bruce Clingan (Dec 2009)
          Morgan retired; had held position since 2004
          During 2008, focused on "Conversations with the Country" (& overseas) & impending retirement (Jun 2008)
          N3/N5B RADM Pete Daly acting N3/N5 for much of 2008 (thru Aug)
       OPNAV N3/N5 reorganized (Dec 2008)
          Strategy & Concepts branches split (new N511 & N513)
       Ongoing total rewrite and update of OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)

--247--


Context: (XIX)
       Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way during early drafting (2009)
       New OPNAV DNS VADM Harvey formed OPNAV QDR Integration Group (QIG) under RDML Burke (Apr 2008)
          Demise of OPNAV N3/N5 "Deep Blue" (Mar 2008)
          OPNAV QIG "joined at the hip" with counterpart USMC effort under BGen Schmidle
             Exemplary USN-USMC relationship
          OPNAV QIG later became core of new OPNAV Naval Warfare Integration Group (N00X) (Oct 2009)

Context: (XX)
       USN, joint concept generation & development changes
          Updated mandates to OPNAV/FFC/NWDC/NWC (Jun 2008)
          New CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009
          New CDRJFCOM Joint Operations Environment (JOE) (Mar 2010)
       CDRJFCOM Gen Mattis USMC decreed "Effects-Based Operations" and "Operational Net Assessment" concepts no longer to be used in JFCOM operations & products (Aug 2008)

--248--


Context: (XXI)
       USN Battle Force goal: 313-ship "floor"
       OPNAV NSPP under way, to influence NSPs
       OPNAV Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) established (Jul 2008)
       Naval War College UNCLAS multinational Title X "Global" War Games (Aug 2008, 2009)
          Explored possible alternative futures & executions of A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century
          Players included NOC 2010 drafters
       US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
       USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)
       Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)

Context: (XXII)
       Unofficial monthly Washington-area "Navy Strategy Discussion Group" ongoing (since May 2008)
       Views expressed from outside Navy that Navy is too entangled in joint concepts and strategies
          Former DUSN Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute
          CDR Bryan McGrath (Ret), Delex Systems
          Dr. Dan Goure, Lexington Institute

--249--


Context: (XXIII)
       Polled Americans rated USN as least important & least prestigious of 4 DoD services (2004-8)
       Some bad publicity
          Public, Congressional, Pentagon angst re: USN surface combatant shipbuilding requirements, oversight
             Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) construction overruns & delays (from Apr 2007)
             Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 program truncated (from Jul 2008)
          USS George Washington (CVN-73) fire (May 2008)
          USS Houston (SSN-713) radiation leak (through Jul 2008)
          Popular concerns re: USN sonar & marine mammals
          LATAM leftist leaders seized on 4th Fleet creation to whip up domestic fears of American imperialism & aggression (2008)
          Somalia piracy issues made USN appear toothless to some
          Resignation of COMUSCENTCOM ADM Fallon (Mar 2008)
          Surface force readiness problems (2008-10)

Cited references (I)
       National Security Strategy
       National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)
       Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan (2006)
       SECDEF Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2010)
       SECDEF Gates, National Defense Strategy
       Unified Command Plan (UCP)
       Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)
       Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF)
       Global Force Management Guidance (GFMG)
       Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)

--250--


Cited references (II)
       National Military Strategy
       Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
       Joint Operational Concepts (JOpsC)
       Joint Operations Concepts Development Process
       Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
       CNO-CMC, Naval Operations Concept (NOC) (2006)
       CNO-COMDT COGARD National Fleet policy (2006)
       DEPCFFC VADM Williams, Global Fleet Station Concept of Operations (GFS CONOPS) (2008)
       Numerous other publications cited in tables & footnotes

Cited references (III)
       CJCS ADM Mullen, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (2009)
       CNO-CMC-COMDT COGARD, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) (2007)

CS 21 had greatest influence on NOC 2010

--251--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (2007)
       NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
       UN Security Council resolutions on Somali piracy (2008)
       National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025 (Nov 2008)
       National Security Council & State Department Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) documents (2008)
       NSPD 66/HSPD 25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)
       USDP Flournoy, DODINST 3000.05, Stability Operations (Sep 2009)
       CJCS ADM Mullen, CJCS Guidance for 2009-10 (Dec 2009)
       SECDEF Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report (Feb 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report (Apr 2010)
       SECDEF Gates speech to Navy League of the United States "Sea Air Space Symposium" (3 May 2010)

--252--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       OSD/USTRANSCOM, DOD Mobility & Requirements Study 2016 (Feb 2010)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       CJCS ADM Mullen, Change 1 to Joint Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar 2009)
       Joint Pub 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations (Incorporating Change 1) (May 2008)
       COMUSJFCOM, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Feb 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       SECNAVINST 2052.1, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy (Jan 2009)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (Aug 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)
       OPNAVINST 5401.9, Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Feb 2010)
       COMNWDC, Tactical Commander's Handbook for Theater Security Cooperation (2009)
       NTTP 3-07.15, Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation (Feb 2010)

--253--


Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       CNO U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness (LREC) Strategy (Jan 2008)
       Navy Ethos (Nov 2008)
       CNO Guidance for 2010: Executing the Maritime Strategy (Sep 2009)
       USN Task Force Climate Change, US Navy Arctic Roadmap (Oct 2009)
       CNO ADM Roughead, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Jan 2010)
       Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
       USN Task Force Climate Change, US Navy Climate Change Road map (Apr 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
       C2F Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (Mar 2007)
       CFFC Report: Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers: An Enabling Concept for Maritime Command and Control (Sep 2007)

--254--


Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
       USMC operational employment concept The Long War: Send in the Marines (Jan 2008)
       USMC Vision & Strategy 2025 (Jun 2008)
       USMC Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea capstone operational concept (Jun 2008)
       CMC Gen Conway, A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations (Aug 2008)
       CMC Gen Conway, Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025 Implementation Planning Guidance (Dec 2008)
       CMC Gen Conway, USMC Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015 (Dec 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)
       MCCDC supporting concept papers
          Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century (Mar 2009)
          Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century (Mar 2009)
          Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations (Mar 2009)
       Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access...Proven Crisis Response (3rd edition (Jun 2010)
          Developed within USMC at same time as NOC 2010

--255--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
       DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (Apr 2008)
       U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security & Stewardship (2007)
       COMDT COGARD ADM Allen, Coast Guard Publication 1: U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian (May 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (X)
       USAF Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.4 (2005)
       SECAF Donley & CSAF Gen Schwartz, 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan (Oct 2008)
       COMNWDC & USAF Commander, Lemay Center, AOMSW: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.74 (Nov 2008)
       Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps Air-Sea Battle operational concept (under development 2009-10)

--256--


Context: Other contemporary publications (XI)
       NATO Strategic Concept (under development 200910)
       NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept (under development 2009-10)
       NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) (under development 2009-10)
       NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Change 1) (Jan 2008)
       Drafting in progress: Revisions to Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Military Strategy (NMF), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XII)
       LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (CETO) (Dec 2007)
       National Academy of Sciences Naval Studies Board reports
          National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces (2010)
          Maritime Security Partnerships (2008)
          U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (2008)
             Recommended deployment of conventional Trident II SLBMs
          The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror (2007)
       Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America's Strategic Posture (May 2009)

--257--


Context: Other contemporary publications (XIII)
       Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) reports
          A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era (2007)
          Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case for a Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System (2008)
          Charting a Course for Tomorrow's Fleet (2009)
          Why AirSea Battle? (Feb 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XIV)
       Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) studies
          W. Eugene Cobble, Henry H. Gaffney, & Dmitry Gorenberg, For the Record: All U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations, 1970-2000 (CNA) (Jun 2003); & updates to same
          NWDC & USN concept development study (2007)
          USN humanitarian assistance, engagement ops studies (2008)
          Deterrence & Influence: The Navy's Role in Preventing War (Mar 2009)
          Christine Fox, Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future - Learning From the Past (CNA) (May 2009)
          Powering America's Defense Energy and the Risks to National Security (CNA) (May 2009)
          Daniel Whiteneck, Neil Jenkins, Michael Price, Peter Swartz, Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (CNA) (Mar 2010)

--258--


Context: Other contemporary publications (XV)
       Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey) faculty-led studies
          John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (2008)
          CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes et al., The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet (Aug 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (XVI)
       Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
       CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
       Bloggers: "Galrahn" (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
       Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One (CNA) (Mar 2009)
       Peter M. Swartz with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009) (CNA) (Jan 2010)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing

--259--


How it was written (I)
       Lengthy gestation period (2 1/2-years) punctuated by periodic delays
       Delays due to:
          Evolving document objectives and target audiences
          Inter-service coordination on many issues needed at many levels
          Internal service process issues (e.g.: Timing vis-a-vis OPNAV POM development Force Structure Assessment (FSA) (2008))
          Changing views as to whether to include force level numbers and if so, what they should be (2008-9)
          Change of presidential administrations & administration concepts and reference documents (2008-10)
             Especially: Timing of NOC release in relation to Obama administration QDR timing
          Some specific issues required lengthy staffing:
             Navy-Marine Corps command & control
             Battle Force ship numbers, especially amphibious ships
       Most delays on Navy side, not USMC or USCG

How it was written (II)
       New CNO Roughead tasked in CNO Guidance (CNOG), Oct 2007
       Development began Dec 2007; drafting began Feb 2008
       VADM Morgan (OPNAV N3/N5) & LtGen Amos (DC, CD&I/CG, MCCDC) initially conceived & oversaw
       Complex development processes
          Writing Team, Core Working Group, Extended Working Group; routine OPNAV SITREPs to GO/FOs, Flag VTCs, etc.
          Flag Maritime Security Conference (MSC) precept developed & adopted
          Initial discussion series: USMC War Game "Expeditionary Warrior 2008: Seabasing" (as a drafting venue); Flag officer discussions; CNO-CMC-COMDT CG discussions

--260--


How it was written (III)
       Wide circulation of 10 formal drafts for comment
          2008: Drafts 1-5
          2009: Drafts 6-8
          2010: Drafts 9-11 (11 = publication)
       Dozens of iterative interim drafts
          E.g.: "ver. 9.4.1.1"

How it was written (IV)
       Navy overseers & coordinators:
          N3/N5 VADM John Morgan; then N3B/N5B RADM Peter Daly (Jan 2008); then VADM Doug Crowder (Aug 2008); then VADM Bruce Clingan (Dec 2009)
          N5SP/N51 RDML Kevin Donegan; then RDML Robert Thomas (Jul 2008); then RDML David Woods (Jan 2010)
       Drivers & drafters:
          USN: RDML-SEL Doug Venlet (N5SC); LCDR Mike Mosbruger, Mr. Philip Ballard; At end-game: Driver & editor: CAPT Mark Montgomery; Coordinator & drafter: CAPT John McLain
          USMC: Maj Hollis, Maj Maria McMillen (SIG), LtCol (Ret) John Berry, Col (Ret) Bob Dobson. Col (Ret) Doug King
          USCG: CAPT (Ret) Tim Teriberry; then CDR Mike Balding, LCDR Ben Strickland

--261--


How it was written (V)
       Successive & additive drafting guidance over time
          Targeting Sailors, Marines & Coastguardsmen: How to fight
          Targeting the joint & Navy concept development community: How naval long-range concepts were generated & developed
             Ultimate resolution: 2-page Annex
          Targeting Congress: Why USN needed 313 ships
             Ultimate resolution: Chapter on "Future Force Structure," describing most naval forces. No numbers.
       Continued CNO ADM Roughead interest, focus, guidance, involvement throughout

How it was written (VI)
       Continuous CFFC & COMPACFLT staff contributions; good OPNAV-FFC-PACFLT staff relationships during drafting, despite some contentious issues
          FFC staff contributor: CAPT (ret) Chris Melhuish
          PACFLT staff contributor: CDR (ret) Sue Merdinger
       Then-current draft discussed at Naval War College Global '08 Title X War Game (4-8 Aug 2008)
       "Conversations with the Country" ISO A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century ongoing (through 2008)
          OPNAV N3/N5 Coordinator: RDML-SEL Dan Cloyd (relieved CDR Bryan McGrath as head of N3/N5 SAG) (2007)
          But little impact on NOC draft

--262--


How it was written (VII)
       Service chiefs' decision not to include specific force level goal ship numbers (Apr 2009)
          To be included instead in separate new USN force structure plan, awaiting completion of ongoing QDR-directed warfighting campaign scenarios development
       CNA analysts "murder board" of current draft (Dec 2009)
       Numerous Navy leadership public comments & interviews on imminence and/or content of the NOC (2007-10)
          Duly reported in the trade press

How it was written (VIII)
       Cross-walking with other capstone documents
          Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 drafted & signed during NOC gestation (Sep 2008-May 2009)
          Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 drafted & signed during NOC gestation (May-Oct 2009)
          Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 drafted during NOC endgame (Apr-May 2010)
          NDP 1 Naval Warfare revision drafting ongoing during NOC 2010 gestation (from Oct 2008)
          NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (Change 1) being drafted (Published Aug 2010)

--263--


How it was written (IX)
       Home stretch: Spring 2010
          New N3/N5 VADM Bruce Clingan; new N51 RDML David Woods
          Obama Administration QDR, PPR, BMDR reports, FY 2011 budget request, 30-year shipbuilding plan published
          NSS, NDS, NMS, GEF, UCP, DPPG, Navy Climate Change Roadmap, NSP ISO POM 13 being drafted concurrently
          Two-star review (Jan 2010)
          3 & 4-star review (Jan 2010)
          CNA "greybeards" roundtable on NOC content & purpose (Jan 2010)
          CNO Executive Board (CEB) review (Feb 2010)
          International reviewers (naval attaches), as directed by CNO

How it was written (X)
       End-game: Spring 2010
          Extensive personal final inserts & rewrites by VADM Clingan (N3/N5)
          OPNAV N513 developed detailed strategic communications plan for NOC rollout
          NDP 1 Naval Warfare release delayed, to follow NOC publication
          Signed & released (May 2010)
             Document released on signatory COMDT COGARD ADM Allen's last day in office

--264--


Outline
       Introduction
       The Naval Service
       The overarching concept: The sea as maneuver space
       Forward Presence
       Maritime security
       Humanitarian assistance & disaster response
       Sea control
       Power projection
       Deterrence
       Future force structure
       Relationship of Naval Operations Concept 2010 to joint concept development and experimentation

Key ideas (I)
       The three U.S. "sea services" - the Naval Service - agree on a fundamental approach to operations
       To counter "a broad range of nuclear, conventional and irregular challenges."
       "state and non-state adversaries are likely to employ a hybrid of conventional & irregular methods to counter the US's advantage in conventional military operations"
       Introduced "the sea as maneuver space" as their overarching concept
          "Mobility and maneuverability constitute the Naval Service's primary operational attributes"
       Global system & globalization are important influences
          But less stress than in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

--265--


Key ideas (II)
       Elaborated in great detail upon the six core capabilities identified in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) (2007)
          Provides background, context, summary and "central idea" for each
       Repeated other CS 21 concepts, for emphasis
       Described the "ways" in which the Naval Service will achieve the "ends" outlined in CS 21
          1st explicit usage of ends-ways-means continuum in a Navy (NSPG) (1999)
       Used A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower ideas and construct, but more focus on USN power projection & overcoming opposing area denial & anti-access capabilities.
       Described a current operations concept; not a vision for the future. (Not "aspirational," as was NOC 2006)

Key ideas (III)
       To inform development of service and joint concepts, plans, experimentation and operations
       "Surge" operations specifically defined and referred to positively throughout the document
       Introduced "Expeditionary Strike Force" (ESF) force package:
          17 amphibious ships ISO one MEB Assault Echelon (AE)
          1 or more Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs)
          (Reminiscent of short-lived Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) concept of early 1992-4)
       Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) (but not Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs)) also described
       Navy "core values" mentioned

--266--


Table 1: Naval Forces Alignment with the Maritime Strategy

Core Capabilities

Naval Forces

Forward

Presence

Maritime

Security

HA/DR

Sea

Control

Power

Projection

Deterrence

Aircraft Carriers

X

X

X

X

X

Aircraft

X

X

X

X

X

X

Amphibious Ships

X

X

X

X

X

X

SSNs

X

X

X

X

X

SSGNs

X

X

X

X

SSBNs

X

X

Large Surface Combatants

X

X

X

X

X

Small Surface Combatants

X

X

X

Major Cutters

X

X

X

X

X

Patrol Craft

X

X

X

X

X

Combat Logistics Force

X

X

X

X

X

Hospital Ships

X

X

Maritime Prepositioning

X

X

X

JHSV

X

X

X

Command and Support

X

Icebreakers

X

X

X

X

X

What was new?
       CMDT COGARD signature on what was now a tri-service document and concept
          Previous NOCs were either USN-only or USN-USMC
       Lengthy.
          Previous NOCs had comprised 8, 23, 36 pages
       Term "Naval Service," encompassing USN, USMC & USCG
       First mention of convoy operations since 1994

--267--


Not addressed
       Specific threatening countries or non-state actors
       Specific numbers of ships and aircraft required to carry out CS 21 and NOC 2010
       The Navy's (considerable) sealift & prepositioning forces to enable & support U.S. Army power projection
       U.S. Army (barely mentioned, in passing)
       U.S. Air Force (not mentioned at all)
       Sustained operations inland
       Blockades
       USMC tactical aircraft as part of naval strike capabilities

Subsequent analyses & critiques
       DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)
       Milan Vego, "AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone" (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul 2011)
       Lt Col John Berry USMC (Ret), "Comment & Discussion" (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Sep 2011)

--268--


Criticisms (I)
       Took way too long to publish following Oct 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
          This allowed unjustified criticism of A Cooperative Strategy - for not discussing "ways" as well as "ends" - to flourish
       Not "Navy" enough.
          Reflected heavy USMC (& USCG) influence on USN thinking, alongside USMC 2007-10 publication of its own single-service family of concept documents
       Navy should have written it's own single-service NOC.
       Conversely, some saw the NOC as not "naval" enough - a listing of elements from three stovepipes rather than a truly integrated concept
       Should have included "means" - specific numbers of ships & aircraft required to carry out CS 21 & NOC 2010
       Should have discussed risks and trade-offs among means

Criticisms (II)
       Too simplistic & obvious
       "Doctrinal," not "conceptual," and therefore superfluous, given simultaneous NWDC revision of NDP-1. Should have been visionary and future-oriented, leaving NDP 1 to deal with "Who we are & how we fight" today
       Not joint enough; not enough on relationships with US Army & US Air Force
          Army barely mentioned. USN sealift, afloat prepositioning and JLOTS support for the Army not discussed
          Air Force not mentioned at all, although USAF aerial refueling and ISR support is implied
          No mention of concurrent ongoing USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development

--269--


Criticisms (III)
       Did not use Seapower 21 constructs or vocabulary, despite continued current use in OPNAV and elsewhere
       To much emphasis on Maritime Security Operations & Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
       Not sufficiently focused on the "current fight." No mention of sustained operations inland, despite USMC & USN ongoing participation in such ops in OIF & OEF
       USN does not routinely maintain 3 CVNs "forward deployed," as NOC states.
          Deployed: Yes. Forward deployed: No

Criticisms (IV)
       Disagreements on NOC treatment of "sea control"
       Little actual effect or influence. Not enough follow-through: Little publicity, use in flag officer speeches, etc.
       No real attempt to measure effects or effectiveness
       Minimal influence on actual Navy operational doctrine
          No mention in NWP 3-32 Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (Change 1 Aug 2010)

--270--


Influence
       Reinforced ongoing increased USN DOTMLPF focus on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, international engagement
       Preliminary drafts influenced many efforts (2008-10)
          N3IO Cyberspace strategy
          N11F Navy Integrated Information Framework
          NCIS Strategic Vision (2010)
          Chiefs of European navies (CHENs) discussions
       Modest influence in USMC
          No mention in Marine Corps Operating Concepts (3rd ed.) (Jun 2010), which was being drafted simultaneously

Why did it have the influence it did?
       Good initial name recognition: Development had been well-advertised in the defense trade press
       But little mention in Navy leadership speeches, testimony or elsewhere following publication
       Lived off and reinforced the influence of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       But overshadowed by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       USMC already had a full family of concept & doctrine publications

--271--


Influence on subsequent capstone documents
       Successive early drafts influenced
          Navy Strategic Guidance In Support of PR 11 (2009)
          Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 12 (2009)
          Naval Doctrine Pub 1 revision (2010)
       Final document influenced:
          Navy Strategic Plan in support of POM 13 (2010)

Influence on other Navy documents
       Discussed in COMNWDC Guide for Navy Concept Generation and Concept Development Program (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
       Influenced SECDEF-mandated Navy Campaign Support Plan (CSP)
       Cited in OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Oct 21, 2010)
       Cited in Office of Naval Research Naval S&T Strategic Plan (Sep 2011)

Cited in revised MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2011)

--272--


NDP 1 Naval Warfare (2010)

Image - Cover: Naval Warfare.

Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead, CMC Gen Conway, COMDT COGARD ADM Allen (Aug 2010)
       Billed as "doctrine." Principal targets:
          Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, Naval Service civilians
          Also senior US government & NGO civilian & military leaders
       Lengthy (54 pp.) UNCLAS book; very long drafting process
       USN-USMC-USCG staff drafting participation
       Navy drafting responsibility & overall coordination: Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
       To bridge joint policy & doctrine & detailed service TTP
       Key ideas: Levels of war; Operational art; range of military operations; 6 core capabilities; campaign phases; global maritime partnerships; maritime domain awareness; tied to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

--273--


Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          At end of 3rd year of his term (Aug 2010)
       CMC Gen James Conway
          Just before the end of his term (Jul 2010)
       CMDT COGARD ADM Thad Allen
          At the end of his term of office (May 2010)

Image - (L-R) CNO Admiral Gary Roughead, CMC General James Conway, and CMDT COGARD Admiral Thad Allen.

What it was
       Billed as "doctrine"
       UNCLAS stand-alone pub
       "Sea services" focus: USN, USMC, USCG
       Superseded 1st NDP-1 Naval Warfare (Mar 1994)
          Also superseded NDP-2, NDP-4, NDP-5, NDP-6
          Took 16 years to update
          Lengthy (54 pgs)
             1994 edition had had 76 pages; NOC 2010 had 102 pages
          Same format as 1994 edition
             But dropped final chapter ("Where We Are Headed: Into the 21st Century")
          Signed by 3 services chiefs (Mar-Aug 2010)
             1994 edition had only been signed by CNO and CMC

--274--


Why it was written
       Other services, allies requests for USN doctrine update
       To meet need for "how we fight" document aimed at Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen
       To reinforce internal USN consensus re: ideas in A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower
       To bring naval doctrine & TTP in line with A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) & agreed joint campaign phases doctrine
          Parts of NDP 1 (1994) out of date
       To continue close cooperation among the 3 sea services
          1st time USCG included in an NDP
       To promote mutual understanding between Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen & joint, interagency & international partners
       CNO & CFFC desire to enhance role of NWDC

Context (I)
       Drafted during presidential election campaign, last year of G.W. Bush (R) administration 2nd term (2001-2009), 1st months of Obama Administration
       More drafting, document signed in 2nd year of Obama (D) Administration
       Democrats controlled both houses of Congress (from 2007)
       SECDEF Gates (from 2006)
          Pressure to devote more budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
          Internal DOD "efficiencies" initiatives to cut Service overhead
       SECNAV Winter (2006-9); Acting SECNAV Penn; SECNAV Mabus (from Jun 2009)
       CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

--275--


Context (II)
       U.S. & world economies in deep financial crisis
          Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
          High US unemployment rate
          US foreign trade rising again
       Fall-off in growth of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
       Unprecedented immediate aggressive large-scale US gov't policy response to economic crisis
       U.S. government deficit spending highest since World War II
       Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
          Future cuts anticipated
          Increased world-wide approval of US leadership performance

Context (III)
       Issues: Terrorism, China, North Korea & Iran nuclear weapons & missiles, Pakistan, Venezuela, Russia, piracy, Arctic
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       Interminable international roller-coaster negotiations to disable DPRK nuclear facilities
       Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
       Pakistani political turmoil stabilized, but increasing domestic terrorism
       3 major submarine cable-cutting incidents (2008)

--276--


Context (IV)
       Russian military, naval, cyber attacks on Georgia; Navy squadron deployments to Pac, Med, Caribbean (2008)
       Russia, Iran, Qatar in gas cartel discussions (20078)
       US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces - including SSBNs & SLBMs - signed (Apr 2010)
          Not yet ratified by US Senate
       US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for USN TLAM-N retirement (Apr 2010)

Context: (V)
       Buildup of Iranian Revolutionary Guard small fast naval missile combatant force
       COMUSNAVCENT public vow to keep open Strait of Hormuz (2008)
       Iranian ground & naval missile tests & publicity campaign (Jul 2008)
          Iran put 1st domestically-made satellite into orbit (Feb 2009)
          Domestic unrest following presidential election (Jun-Aug 2009)
       Pakistani political turmoil & internal unrest
          Former PM Bhutto assassinated (Dec 07); President General Musharaf not re-elected (Mar 08); resigned (Aug 08); Bhutto widower Zardari elected President (Sep 08)
          India-Pak trade route reopened thru Kashmir (Oct 08)

--277--


Context (VI)
       Increased PRC assertiveness in South & East China Seas
       PRC increasing military posture opposite Taiwan
       Cross-strait political tensions low; economic cooperation increasing
       Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
       US announced Taiwan arms sales, incl/Harpoon (Oct 2008)
       PRC protested, suspended port visits, other US military ties (Oct 2008)
       PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea - & cooperation w/USN - now routine (from Dec 2008)

Context (VII)
       PLAN harassed USN ocean surveillance ships USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) & USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) in western Pacific international waters (Mar, May 2009)
       PLAN 60th anniversary Fleet Review (Apr 2009)
          PLAN's "coming out" as a modern navy
       USN CNO ADM Roughead visited PRC (Apr 2009)
       PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
       Continued China Coast Guard-USCG cooperation re: port security, fisheries enforcement, safety at sea, search & rescue

--278--


Context (VIII)
       India successfully tested SLBMs in Bay of Bengal (2008)
       India, US signed 2007 "123 Agreement" facilitating Indian access to civilian nuclear fuel & technology (Oct 2008)
       India launched satellite in moon orbit (Oct 2008)
       USN-Indian Navy Malabar exercise (Oct 2008)
       Major seaborne Pakistani-based Islamist terrorist assault on Mumbai, India (Nov 2008)
       India agreed to buy 8 US P8I multi-mission maritime aircraft (Dec 2008)
       India launched 1st SSN (Jul 2009)

Context: (IX)
       Escalating DPRK provocations
          DPRK declared its nuclear activities (Jun 2008); then agreed to halt them (Oct 2008)
          US dropped DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism
          New ROK gov't cooler towards DPRK (2008)
          DPRK renounced 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (Jan 2009)
             Incl/renouncing respect for Yellow Sea Northern Limit Line
          ROKN interception & firing on DPRKN warship crossing Northern Limit Line (Nov 2009)
       UN sanctions on DPRK allowing inspections at sea of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons (2009)

--279--


Context (X)
       OEF, OIF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other operations ongoing
          Rising Taliban insurgency; leveling off of US & coalition force levels in Afghanistan
             "Surge" of US ground forces to Afghanistan completing (2009-10)
             High US, allied combat OPTEMPO vs. Taliban
          Plummeting US troop force levels in Iraq (from Oct 2008)
          Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
          US-Iraq Security Agreement signed (Nov 2008)
       US Army, USMC still heavily engaged on the ground
       Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, relieving stress on ground forces

Context (XI)
       Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
          Stepped-up international USN, coalition, NATO, EU anti-piracy deployments off Somalia
          Pirates expanded areas of operations, used mother ships,
       Major HA op as part of JTF Unified Response IRT Haiti earthquake (Jan-Mar 2010)
          USN surged 12-ship CVN/LHA/LHD task force

--280--


Context (XII)
       USN force levels increasing
       DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated
       288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
       CNO ADM Roughead declared USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
       USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific (since 2007)
          1st USN CVN home-ported in Japan (2008)
       PACFLT Mid-Pacific Surface Combatant Operational Deployment Program (since 2008)
       Increasing USN BMD deployment requirements: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
       Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)

Context (XIII)
       New Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
          1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
          1st LCS deployed (2010)
       New San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
       Congress again refused to fund Navy nuclear Reliable Replacement Warhead (2007 & 2008)
       Follow-on SSBN being studied (end of decade)
       Northrop-Grumman X-47B N-UCAS unveiled (Dec 2008)

--281--


Context (XIV)
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
          Last multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
       Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
          "Balisle Report" (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions
       Continuing USMC fire support & other issues
          USN canceled ERGM development (May 2008); truncated DDG-1000 program (Jul 2008); Cancelled Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) (Oct 2008); canceled MPF(F) (2010)
       US Supreme Court lifted lower court restrictions on USN active mid-frequency sonar training (Nov 2008)
       USN settled worldwide environmental lawsuits (Dec 2008)

Context (XV)
       OPNAV N3/N5 reorganized (Dec 2008)
          Strategy & Concepts branch split (new N511 & N513)
       NAVWARCOL revived Global War Games (2008, 2009)
       Ongoing total rewrite and update of OPNAVINST 3501.316A Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 06, 2007)

--282--


Context: (XVI)
       Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review (QRM) & 4th Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) under way & completed
       SECDEF-mandated USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort: (2009-10)
       Unofficial monthly "Navy Study Group" ongoing (since May 2008)
       Views from outside Navy that Navy too entangled in joint concepts and strategies
          Former DUSN Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute
          CDR Bryan McGrath (Ret), Delex Systems
          Dr. Dan Goure, Lexington Institute

Cited references (I)
       National Security Act of 1947
       Title 10 & Title 14, U.S. Code
       A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Oct 2007)
       Department of the Navy Core Values (Jan 2008)
       Navy Ethos (Nov 2008)
       UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982)

--283--


Cited references (II)
       Joint documents
       JP 1-02
       JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
       JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
       JP 3-0, Joint Operations
       JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction
       JP 3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations
       JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122 (series)
       Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Vols I-III)

Cited references (III)
       Navy Warfare Publications
          NWP 5-01, Navy Planning
          NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War
       Marine Corps Publications
          MCDP 5, Planning
          MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process
       Commandant of the Coast Guard Manual 3010.11 (series), Coast Guard Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual, Vol. I: Planning Doctrine and Policy

--284--


Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       Naval Operations Concept (May 2010)
       Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 (May 2009) & Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 (Oct 2009)
       President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (May 2010)
       NSC, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan (Dec 2008)
       NSPD-66/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy (Jan 2009)
       SECDEF Gates Foreign Affairs article (Jan-Feb 2009)
       SECDEF Quadrennial Roles & Missions Review Report (Feb 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       Unified Command Plan revision (Dec 2008)
       SECDEF TF on DOD Nuclear Weapons Mgmt, Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission (Dec 2008)
          USN commended re: nuclear mission commitment
          USN chided for neglect of TLAM-N funding
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
       CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environments (JOE) (Nov 2008; Feb 2010)
       OSD, Military Power of the PRC (Mar 2009)

--285--


Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       SECDEF Gates, Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (May 2008)
       SECDEF Gates, Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG) (Jul 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review report (QDR) (Feb 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) report (Feb 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report (Apr 2010)
       OSD/USTRANSCOM, DOD Mobility & Requirements Study 2016 (Feb 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       SECNAVINST 2052.1, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy (Jan 2009)
       OPNAVINST 3000.13C, Personnel Tempo of Operations Program (Jan 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3000.15, Fleet Response Plan (Aug 2007)
       OPNAVINST 3501.316A, Policy for Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and Other Major Deployable Elements (Sep 2007)
       CNO ADM Roughead, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Jan 2010)

--286--


Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       COMNWDC, Tactical Commander's Handbook for Theater Security Cooperation (2009)
       NTTP 3-07.15, Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation (Feb 2010)
       CMC Gen Conway, A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations (Aug 2008)
       MCCDC concepts & related documents
          Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century (Mar 2009)
          Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century (Mar 2009)
          Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations (Mar 2009)
          Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration (May 2009)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)
       Revised Coast Guard Publication 1: U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian (May 2009)
       CFFC, CG MCCDC, Commander, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities: Integrating Seabasing Capabilities into Exercises and Experiments (Jun 2010)

--287--


Context: Other contemporary publications (VII)
       Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) (2003)
       USAF Countersea Operations AFDD 2-1.4 (2005)
       COMNWDC & USAF Commander, Lemay Center, AOMSW: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare NTTP 3-20.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.74 (Nov 2008)
       Navy-Air Force-Marine Corps Air-Sea Battle operational concept (under development 2009-10)
       BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine (3rd ed.) (May 2004)
       Indian Maritime Doctrine (Aug 2009)
       Australian Maritime Doctrine (2000, Mar 2010 rev)

Context: Other contemporary publications (VIII)
       NATO Strategic Concept (under development 200910)
       NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept (under development 2009-10)
       NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) (under development 2009-10)
       NATO AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations (Change 1) (Jan 2008)
       Drafting in progress: Revisions to Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Military Strategy (NMF), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)

--288--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IX)
       LtCol (Ret) Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (CETO) (Dec 2007)
       CDI, Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for the New President and Congress (Oct 2008)
       Incl/Bill Lind recommendations on USN (w/roots in 1970s)
       National Academy of Sciences, Naval Studies Board, The "1,000-Ship Navy" - Maritime Security Partnerships (Nov 2008)
       NIC, Global Trends 2025 (Nov 2008)

Context: Other contemporary publications (X)
       Col Robert Work USMC (Ret) (CSBA), The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow's Fleet (Feb 2009)
       Global '08: U.S. Navy Title X War Game: "Implementing the Maritime Strategy, "4-8 August 2008, Game Report, U.S. Naval War College (Mar 2009
       Eric Labs, An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan (CBO) (May 2010)
       Christine Fox, Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future - Learning From the Past (CNA) (May 2009)
       Powering America's Defense Energy and the Risks to National Security (CNA) (May 2009)
       Andrew Krepinevich, "The Pentagon's Wasting Assets," Foreign Affairs (Jul/Aug 2009)

--289--


Context: Other contemporary publications (XI)
       CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes et al., The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet (Aug 2009)
       Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
       CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath on-line contributions
       Bloggers: "Galrahn" (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
       Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One (CNA) (Mar 2009)
       Peter M. Swartz with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009) (CNA) (Jan 2010)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing

How it was written (I)
       1st (1994) edition became increasingly outdated over the years
       But revision delayed due to:
          USMC-USN differences
          Low perceived priority by USN leadership
          Bureaucratic factors: NWDC vice OPNAV responsibility
          At end-game, OPNAV requirement to delay publication until after Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 published
       Various aborted NWDC draft revisions (e.g.: 2000, 2005)
       CNO & CMC tasked revision in Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) (2003)
          Little movement beyond NWDC internal efforts
       USMC balked at revision for years
          Not unhappy with heavily-USMC-influenced 1994 edition

--290--


How it was written (II)
       Tri-service signing of Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower & drafting of new Naval Operations Concept (NOC) provided positive climate for updating NDP 1 (2007-8)
       Breakthrough: USMC pushed for agreed Terms of Reference (TOR); USN agreed (2008)
       USN-USMC-USCG TOR finally signed at two/three-star level (Oct 2008)

How it was written (III)
       Service organizational leads:
          USN: NWDC
          USMC: MCCDC
          USCG: HQCG Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations
       Personalities:
       Oversight: COMNWDC RADM Carpenter; CGMCCDC LtGen Flynn; Asst COMDT COGARD for Plans & Policy RADM Salerno
          NWDC Doctrine Department head: Mr. Mark Werner
          MCCDC: Doctrine Division: LtCol (Ret) John Bass
          Lead NWDC drafter: CAPT Edward Long III USN (Ret)
             Northrop Grumman Maritime Mission Systems contractor
          Lead USMC drafter: Maj David Vickers USMC (Ret)
             MCCDC Multi-Service Doctrine Coordinator
          Lead USCG drafter: CAPT Dom DiIulio USCG (Ret)

--291--


How it was written (IV)
       Initial drafters' conference convened at NWDC (Dec 2008)
       1st draft released for service comment (Mar 2009)
       Writers' Conference at NWDC re-wrote & refined several sections of 1st draft (Jun 2009)
       Final draft released for service comment (Jul 2009)
       Adjudication conference at MCCDC (10 Nov 2009)
       Draft for signature delivered to 3 service headquarters, anticipating Mar 2010 signature & release (Feb 2010)
       Public release held in abeyance until tri-service Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 published (May 2010)

How it was written (V)
       Drafting of Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 ongoing simultaneously (2008-10)
       Drafting of Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 & Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 ongoing simultaneously (2009)
       OPNAV "Navy Strategic Planning Process" (NSPP) to inform NSP ISO POM 12 & NSP ISO POM 13 ongoing simultaneously (2008-10)
       OPNAV N51 in continuous dialog with NWDC to ensure NDP 1 alignment with other documents, especially NOC 2010
          N51 assigned NOC drafters as OPNAV NDP 1 POCs
             CAPT Doug Venlet, LCDR Mike Mosbruger
             Later CAPT John McLain

--292--


How it was written (VI)
       Endgame
       CMDT COGARD ADM Allen approved, signed NDP 1 (May 2010)
          Just before relief by ADM Papp
       CMC Gen Conway approved, signed NDP 1 (Jul 2010)
          3 months before relief by Gen Amos
       Continued internal OPNAV 3-star/4-star coordination (Jul-Aug 2010)
       CNO approved and signed NDP 1 (Aug 2010)
       NDP 1 actually published and distributed via Navy Doctrine Library System website (2 Sep 2010)
       Document officially backdated to Mar 2010

Outline
       Who we are - The nature of naval service
       What we do - Employment of naval forces
          Strategic document alignment
          Levels of war
          The national strategic setting
          The maritime strategy
       How we fight - The conduct of naval operations
          Core capabilities of naval forces
          The application of naval power
          Operational art
          Command and control
          Global maritime partnerships
          Maritime domain awareness
          Response options
          Phases of an operation or campaign
       Conclusion

--293--


Key ideas (I)
       12 principles of joint operations
       Core values
          Extensive discussion. 1st such discussion in a capstone document since Navy Policy Book (1992)
          Some naval history
       3 levels of war
       Constructs derived from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)
          6 strategic imperatives
          6 core capabilities
       Continued use of the term "The Naval Service" established in the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010

Key ideas (II)
       Rigorous attention paid to correct joint and Naval Service terminology
          Contrary to usual often sloppy Navy practice
          "Doctrine" defined and explained
          Document avowedly NOT a "Vision," "Concept," "CONOPS," "strategy," "policy," "resource allocation guidance or plan," etc.
          "Doctrine" seen as relevant and informing all of these, however
       "Command and control of naval forces reflects our operational environment and culture...Naval tactical commanders are expected to take initiative using the operational-level commander's guidance, which defines what needs to be done but not how to do it...Our C2 philosophy is derived from the characteristics and complexity of the maritime domain"

--294--


Key ideas (III)
       Sea control, power projection, deterrence & forward presence remain top priorities for the sea services, even as the priority of new core capabilities has been elevated
       The six core capabilities are used to carry out the six strategic imperatives enunciated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010
       Elaboration on the administrative and operational branches of the US military chain of command
          First such discussion in a capstone document since The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Key ideas (IV)
       Global system & globalization are important influences
       Trans-national threats identified
          Terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; other criminals
       National threats not identified
          Referred to as "those who wish us harm," "full range of maritime threats," "rogue governments,'' "challenges", "adversaries", "enemies, "opponents," aggressors," "anti-access/area-denial capabilities," "another great power" (to be deterred)

--295--


Image - Figure 2-1. Alignment and Consistency Chart.

What was new:
       Notional application of the 6 CS 21 naval core capabilities across the 6-phase joint campaign model continuum

--296--


Image - Fig. 3-2. National Application of Naval Core Capabilities Across the 6 Phase Campaign Model Continuum.

Very few elements of US defense & naval power ignored

Not addressed
       Detailed discussion of planning processes
          Presented in NWP 5-01
       Blockades
       Convoys

--297--


Contrast with NDP-1 Naval Warfare (1994)
       One NDP to take the place of the previous NDPs 1-6
       COMDT COGARD added as participant, signatory
       Similar appearance, format & outline
       Shorter: 54 pp vs. 74 pp.
       Added new sections on core values, chains of command
       Deleted pictures, vignettes, "attrition vs. maneuver" styles of warfare discussion, reading list, "Where we are headed" section
          Document deals solely with the present, not future
       Added 3 new principles of joint operations, IAW contemporary joint doctrine
       Term "the Naval Service" replaced "naval services"

Subsequent analyses & critiques
       DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)
       Milan Vego, "AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone" (US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul 2011)

--298--


Criticisms (I)
       Took way too long to publish
       Superfluous, given near-simultaneous OPNAV-led drafting of Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010
       Will have no more relevance to fleet operations than its 1994 predecessor did, given Navy's "doctrine aversion"
       Not enough follow-through: Little publicity, little use in flag officer speeches, etc.
       Should not have dropped "Where we are headed" section from 1994 predecessor
          Allowed document to more closely conform to joint views on what should constitute "doctrine," but left the Navy without an aspirational "concept" or "vision" statement, given current focus of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010

Criticisms (II)
       Disagreements over treatment of relationship between peacetime forward presence and sea control
       No discussion of sea denial operations
       No elaboration on major joint & naval operations

--299--


Influence:
       Basis for US Naval Academy and Naval ROTC NS 301 Naval Warfare courses
       Not cited in revised MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (2011)

Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-13 (2010)

Image - Cover: Navy Strategic Plan.

--300--


Overview
       Signed by CNO ADM Roughead (Oct 2010)
       "Navy strategic plan"
       Principal targets:
          DON officers & civilians charged with developing POM-13
       Short (19 pages), Navy-only, SECRET document
       Drafted in OPNAV Strategy Branch (N513)
       To guide the continued implementation of the ideas in A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower (2013-2020)
       Prioritized "strategic imperatives" from A Cooperative Strategy specifically defined to be relevant in the future security environment
       Provided specific "Capability Risk Guidance"

Signed by:
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead
          At start of 4th year of his term

Image - (L-R) CNO Admiral Gary Roughead.

--301--


What it was
       Billed as a "strategic plan"
       Continued series initiated with NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)
       SECRET stand-alone pub
       Navy-only (vice "sea services") focus
       Shortest-ever NSP/NSG (only 19 pages)
          E.g.: NSPs ISO POM 10 & 12 had 76 pp.
          8 pages of strategic context (cf. 15 pp in NSP ISO POM 12)
       No explicit tasker
       By now NSP was an established institution within OPNAV
       Originally planned as Navy Strategic Guidance (NSG) in support of Program Review (PR) 13
          But OSD altered DoD PPBE system again, changing PRs back to POMs
          So Navy changed NSG to NSP
       Signed out by CNO ADM Roughead (22 Oct 2010)
       Superseded Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM-12 (9 Oct 2009)

Why it was written (I)
       To provide strategic guidance on Navy resource allocation priorities required to execute A Cooperative Strategy for 1st Century Seapower (2007) in the coming decade (2013-2023)
       To increase OPNAV attention on closing gaps in USN capabilities where significant risk has developed over last several years
       To be applied by Navy planners, resource sponsors, and programmers in Navy internal POM-13 development processes

--302--


Why it was written (II)
       To link the "strategic imperatives" in A Cooperative Strategy to USN capabilities, providing a strategy-based framework for development of the Navy's POM 13
       Benchmark reference for OPNAV development of POM-13 Planning Order (PLANORD), Front End Assessment FEA), Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs), & Strategy-to-Program Assessments.
       Also to be used by a variety of planners for other internal Navy processes

Context (I)
       Drafted during 2nd year of Obama (D) Administration Democrats in control of both houses of Congress (from 2007)
          Mid-year elections approaching
       SECDEF Gates (since 2006)
          Pressure to devote adequate budget $ to current wars, irregular warfare
          Internal DOD "efficiencies" initiatives to cut Service overhead
          Drive to reduce "supplemental" or Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO) funding; move programs into base budget
       SECNAV Mabus (since Jun 2009)
       CNO ADM Roughead (Sep 2007-Sep 2011)

--303--


Context (II)
       US, world slowly pulling out of deep recession (frm Jun 2009)
          Fall-off in growth of world seaborne trade (2008-9)
          U.S. foreign trade rising again (2010)
          Oil prices rising, having plummeted from 2008 all-time peak
          Word food shortages, rising food prices sparking fears of global unrest (2010)
       Unprecedented US gov't policy response to economic crisis
       US public revulsion at soaring government deficit spending, high US unemployment rate
          Trillion dollar Federal government annual deficit
       Rising US defense budgets, but rate of growth slowing
          Future cuts anticipated
       Increased worldwide approval of US political leadership performance
          Concerns at possibly faltering economic leadership

Context (III)
       Continuing terrorist threat to US homeland
       OIF, OEF, PSI, Continuing Promise, other ops ongoing
          Continued Taliban insurgency, US allied combat ops in Afghanistan. US Army, USMC heavily engaged
          But US ground force troop level "surge" to Afghanistan completed (2009-10)
          All US combat troops withdrawn from Iraq (Aug 2010)
          OIF became Operation "New Dawn" (Sep 2010)
          Iraqi sectarian violence, insurgency continued to fall off
       Continuing & mature USN OEF & OIF contributions ashore, supporting & relieving stress on ground forces

--304--


Context (IV)
       Continued highly-publicized surge in Somali pirate attacks in Gulf of Aden
          Continued international USN, coalition, NATO, EU, Russian, PLAN anti-piracy deployments off Somalia
          Pirates deployed mother ships, shifted op areas farther to the east and south
       Terrorist suicide bombers attacked Japanese tanker in Strait of Hormuz (Jul 2010)
          Al Qaeda-linked group claimed responsibility

Context (V)
       Continued strained US-PRC relations
          PRC doing well economically, despite world economic crisis
          Continued PRC military posture increase opposite Taiwan
          Cross-strait political tensions low; economic cooperation increasing
          Continued PRC anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) R & D
          PLAN deployment of counter-piracy squadrons to Arabian Sea - & cooperation w/USN - now routine (from Dec 2008)
             Now included large amphibious ships as well as destroyers & frigates
          PRC protested US arms sales to Taiwan, cut US military ties (from Jan 2010)
          1st PLAN deployment of Peace Ark hospital ship, in IO (Sep 2010)
          Increased PRC assertiveness in South & East China Seas
             PRC statements: South China Sea is a "core national interest" (2010)
             Southeast Asian nations, US push-back, increased cooperation
             U.S. SECSTATE Clinton asserted US "national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea" (Jul 2010)
             PRC, Japan clash re: PRC fishing in Japan-claimed waters (Sep 2010)
          1st US-PRC maritime consultative talks held in over a year (Oct 2010)

--305--


Context (VI)
       Heightened DPRK-ROK/US tensions
          DPRK nuclear facilities development & missile testing
          ROKN naval forces intercepted DPRKN warship crossing maritime border, damaged it and forced it to return north (Nov 2009)
          DPRKN submarine torpedoed ROKN corvette with heavy loss of life (Mar 2010)
          Combined joint US-ROK exercises off Korea (2010)
          ROK agreed to participate in PSI ops (2010)
       PRC-Japan relations strained over Senkaku Islands claims, economic activities
       PRC-Vietnam relations strained over South China Sea claims, economic activities
       Major HA ops as part of JTF Unified Response IRT Haiti earthquake (Jan-Mar 2010); Pakistani flooding

Context (VII)
       US-Russia New START Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear forces - including SSBNs & SLBMs - signed (Apr 2010)
          US Senate did not ratify, however, until Dec 2010
       Iran threatening stability of Gulf region
          Strong US concerns that Iran may be developing nuclear weapons
          UN sanctions on Iran: Allowed inspections at sea of Iranian vessels suspected of carrying banned weapons (Jun 2010)
          Continued Revolutionary Guard small missile-equipped naval combatant buildup
       Pakistani political turmoil stabilized somewhat
       USN-Indian relations strong & improving
          Navy Malabar exercises continued
          CNA-NMF "Track II" discussions (2009-10)
       USN-Vietnam relations improving
          Port visits

--306--


Context (VIII)
       DON annual budgets increasing, but future cuts anticipated
       USN force levels increasing 288 USN Battle Force ships in 2010; 7 new ships authorized
       USN fleet balance in favor of Pacific
       CNO ADM Roughead continued to declare USN 313-ship Battle Force goal to be a "floor"
       Follow-on SSBN planned
       Increasing USN BMD deployments: NE Asia (2004); then Persian Gulf (2008); Eastern Med (2009)
       Expanded national requirement for sea-based BMD: Presidential announcement (Sep 2009)
       US Nuclear Posture Review called for retirement of USN TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles (Apr 2010)

Context (IX)
       New USN LCS classes being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns & delays
          1st two LCSs commissioned (Nov 2008 & 2010)
          1st LCS deployed (2010)
       New USN San Antonio-class LPDs being built, commissioned, deployed
          Navy coping with cost overruns, delays, construction & operational problems
       New USN & US Army JHSVs under construction
       Fleet Response Plan (FRP) still being implemented, but with increasing strain on fleet
          2-CSG CSF operating in Arabian Sea (Oct 2010)
          Last big multi-CSG exercise: Valiant Shield 2007
       Degraded USN surface force readiness identified, addressed
          "Balisle Report" (Feb) 2010 & subsequent corrective actions

--307--


Context: (X)
       SECDEF-mandated USN-USAF-USMC Air-Sea Battle operational concept development effort (ongoing since 2009)
       USMC concerns at losing their amphibious ops skills, due to OIF, OEF focus
       Obama Administration USCG budget cuts
       US Army still focused on Afghanistan, Iraq COIN ops
       NAVWARCOL revived Global War Game series (2008, 2009, 2010)
       Unofficial monthly "Navy Strategy Discussion Group" ongoing (since 2008)

Cited references (I)
       President Obama, National Security Strategy (May 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report (Feb 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Ballistic Missile Defense Review report (Feb 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Nuclear Posture Review report (Apr 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (May 2008)
       SECDEF Gates, Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG) (Jul 2010)

--308--


Cited references (II)
       CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century (Oct 2007)
       CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, Naval Operations Concept (May 2010)
       CNO ADM Roughead, The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Jan 2010)
       Several footnoted source documents, including DIA Joint Strategic Assessment, combatant commander theater security plans & testimony, CNA studies

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)
       SECDEF Gates, National Defense Strategy (Jun 2008)
       SECDEF Gates speech at Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo (May 2010)
       SECDEF Gates, Memorandum directing DOD "Efficiency Initiatives" (Aug 2010)
       Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (Aug 2010)
       CJCS Chairman's Risk Guidance
       CJCS ADM Mullen Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) (Jan 2009)
       CJCS ADM Mullen Joint Pub 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (CH 1) (Mar 2009)

--309--


Context: Other contemporary publications (II)
       Drafting in progress: Revisions to Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), Unified Command Plan (UCP), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), CJCS Guidance; National Security Space Strategy; NATO Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept, NATO Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS)
       Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011 (Feb 2010)
       CDRJFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE) (Mar 2010)
       USN Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
       CNO, CMC, COMDT COGARD, NDP 1: Naval Warfare (May 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
       COMUSFLTFORCOM ADM Harvey, CGMCCDC, Director US Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities (Jun 2010)
       ADM Gary Roughead, A Navy Energy Vision for the 21st Century (Oct 2010)
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead, "Remarks at University of Chicago Conference on Terrorism & Strategy" (12 Oct 2010)
          Endorsed a forward naval form of US "offshore balancing" strategy, to promote a "just & sustainable international order"
       CNO ADM Gary Roughead, Guidance for 2011: Executing the Maritime Strategy (18 Oct 2010)
       Securing the High Ground: Agile Combat Air Power: 2010 Combat Air Force Strategic Plan (Sep 2010)
       UK Strategic Defense & Security Review (19 Oct 2010)
       Major cuts in forces planned for RN (close USN partner)

--310--


Context: Other contemporary publications (IV)
       CAPT (Ret) Wayne Hughes et al., The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet (Aug 2009)
       CAPT Victor Addison, OPNAV Concepts Branch head (N511), 4 prize-winning Naval Institute Proceedings essays advocating new USN concepts & priorities (Jan-Oct 2010)
       Daniel Whiteneck, Neil Jenkins, Michael Price, Peter Swartz, The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (CNA) (Mar 2010)
       Eric Labs, An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan (CBO) (May 2010)
       CAPT Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (CSBA) (May 2010)

Context: Other contemporary publications (V)
       3rd USN-USCG National Fleet policy statement (2006)
       Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits and Defense: A Way Forward (Jun 2010)
       Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (QDRP), The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century (Jul 2010)
          Called for larger US defense budget, larger Navy, larger US force structure in Asia-Pacific
       Lawrence Korb & Laura Conley, Strong and Sustainable: How to Reduce Military spending While Keeping our Nation Safe (Sep 2010)
       Benjamin Friedman & Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint (Cato) (23 Sep 2010)

--311--


Context: Other contemporary publications (VI)
       Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articles
       CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath
          A Seapower Manifesto: The Value of Preponderant American Seapower (19 Oct 2010)
          On-line contributions
       Bloggers: "Galrahn" (Raymond Pritchett) et al.
       Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One (CNA) (Mar 2009)
       Peter M. Swartz with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009) (CNA) (Jan 2010)
       Earlier drafts of this briefing

How it was written (I)
       Personalities: CNO ADM Roughead, VADM Clingan (N3/N5), RDML Woods (N51), CAPT Montgomery, then CAPT Munsch (N513) oversaw
       OPNAV-wide core working group: N00X, N51, N80, N81)
       Principal drafter in N513: CDR Eric Fino (submariner)
       Used NSP ISO POM 12 as baseline
       Adapted NSP 12 NSPP-generated "Alternative Futures" for NSP ISO POM 13
       Staffing rounds
          Drafting began in January 2010
          Significant participation by Navy 3-star leadership, in "CNO Futures", "Small Group," CEB, 3-4 star symposium fora
       Personal attention of CNO ADM Roughead
          Made inputs throughout, & made changes at endgame
          Signed in Oct 2010

--312--


Outline
       Introduction
       Strategic context
       Capability risk guidance

Key ideas (I)
       An overview of the future security environment
       Prioritized "strategic imperatives" from A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007) specifically defined to be relevant in the future security environment
       "Capability Risk Guidance" for POM 13 (20132017)
       Not fiscally balanced

--313--


Key ideas (II)
       Organized according to typologies in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)
       Appreciated current, anticipated constraints on defense budgets
       Adjusted only those Navy mission capabilities where failure to make such an adjustment would incur unacceptable risk-to-mission/risk-to-force, or result in failure to accomplish one or more Cooperative Strategy "strategic imperatives"
       No adjustments to be made at expense of USN contributions to winning ongoing wars in Iraq & Afghanistan, or the campaign against Al Qaeda & transnational terrorist organizations

Subsequent analyses & critiques
       DOD Bloggers Roundtable (2 Jun 2010)

--314--


Criticisms
       Classification of document precluded wide distribution & understanding of its role in implementing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
       Only one among many OSD, joint, SECNAV, CNO and VCNO front-end guidance documents that strove to influence POM development
       Not fiscally balanced
       Should have been a Navy-Marine Corps Department of the Navy plan, not Navy only
          Little mention of USMC (even less than USAF)
       Not enough recommended areas of increased risk
       Promulgated - admittedly of necessity - prior to receipt of over-riding OSD guidance
       Subsequent administration & congressional actions rendered moot much 2010 planning for POM-13 629

Influence:
       Referenced (prior to publication) in U.S. Navy Climate Change Roadmap (Apr 2010)
       OPNAV N81 used to draft Front End Assessment (FEA) - the next step in Navy POM development process
       OPNAV N00X used as baseline for Strategy-to-Program Assessment
       Influenced SECDEF-mandated Navy Campaign Support Plan (CSP)
       Cited in Office of Naval Research Naval S&T Strategic Plan (Sep 2011)

--315--


Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (I)

OPNAV experimented with an NSPP (2006-2010)
       Originally "Navy Adaptive Planning Process (NAPP)"
          Also referred to as "Alternative Futures Planning Process"
       Contractor-assisted (Decision Strategies International (DSI))
       Navalized version of DSI proprietary "Adaptive Strategic Planning" (ASP) methodology

VCNO Strategic Planning memo formally directed establishment of process in CY 08/09 (Feb 2008)

Goal: Institutionalize within the Navy a repeatable and sustainable strategic planning system to manage future uncertainty and monitor the Navy's external environment

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (II)

Process steps (intended):
       Environmental assessment
       Identify trends and uncertainties
       Construct four alternative Navy future environments
       Derive key Navy success factors from the range of alternative futures
       Determine strategic options: Specific actions for the Navy to take to achieve capabilities inherent in the key success factors
       Organize these options in an NSP
       Resource those options
       Assess and monitor the process and the results

--316--


Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (III)

Image - Alternative Future Planning Process 2009 chart.

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (IV)

Initial advocates: OPNAV N8B (Jo Decker), N3/N5 (VADM Morgan), RDML Metcalf

Initial implementers: RDML Donegan (N5SP), CAPT John Lockwood USNR, LCDR (later CDR) Steven Kelley

4 annual iterations of the (elaborate) process, with wide Navy staff participation

OPNAV N51 published brochure Navigating an Uncertain Future: Navy Alternative Futures Process: Executive Summary (Mar 2010)

Draft OPNAVINST on NSPP drafted, circulated within OPNAV (2010) (never signed)

--317--


Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (V)

Designed to drive USN NSP & subsequent POM development

Track record:
       NSP ISO POM 08 did not mention (2006)
       CS 21 lead author CDR McGrath used then-NAPP methodology to "stress-test" central themes in the strategy
       NSP ISO POM 10 discussed intent & process in depth, but NAPP actually had minimal influence on the document (2007)
       NWC Global 08 War Game "Implementing the Maritime Strategy" used 4 NSPP-developed alternative futures (2008)
       NSG ISO PR 11 (2009)
          Used Key Success Factors (KSFs) culled from the process, but no mention of NSPP itself

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (VI)

Designed to drive USN NSP & subsequent POM development

Track record (continued):
       NSP ISO POM 12 (2009)
          Planned to be 1st true NSPP-driven NSP, but NSPP had marginal impact
          Much discussion in the document of "Alternative Futures Planning Process," identifying future trends & uncertainties
       NSP ISO POM 13 (2010)
          Drafters participated in - and helped run - the process, but no mention of NSPP or its elements in the final document

--318--


Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (VII)

Other NSPP influence:
       Chief of Supply Corps, The Supply Corps 2040 Strategic Vision Study (2009-10)
          Extensive use
          Adopted as strategy model for Navy Supply Corps officer development
          Also cited in Navy Supply Corps Strategic Guidance 2010
       Used by USN Task Force Energy
       Cited in COMNWDC Guide for Navy Concept Generation & Concept Development Program (Ver. 1.0, 10 Feb 2010)
       Mackenzie Eaglen & CDR (Ret) Bryan McGrath used NSPP scenario in Heritage Foundation "Backgrounder," (May 2011)

Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (VIII)

NSPP ignored in annual VCNO PLANORDS for POM development

Initial NSPP effort terminated (late 2010)

OPNAV N511 planned to scale down, transform, revive NSPP alternative futures effort, to impact development of Navy Strategic Plan In Support of POM 14 (NSP ISO POM 14) (late 2010)

--319--


Navy Strategic Planning Process (NSPP) (IX)

Some bottom lines:
       NSPP cost significant contractor dollars & staff officer manpower hours, across OPNAV & the fleet
       NSPP "alternative futures" product became only one among many inputs to Navy Strategic Plans/Guidance
       Navy Strategic Plans/Guidance were themselves only one among several inputs to OPNAV Navy POM development

2000s: Text & context of each document

Image - Hattendorf (ed.) U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1st decade of the 21st Century: Selected Documents (TBD).

Forthcoming (TBD)

Meanwhile, texts (of UNCLAS doc's only) available on web, in journals, & as stand-alone documents

--320--


2000s: Other analyses of each document

"The United States Navy Since President Ronald Reagan,"
       Kenneth Hagan & Michael T. McMaster
       In Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Australia) (2007)

US Navy Strategy and Force Structure After the Cold War
       Amund Lundesgaard
       Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (2011)

"American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy & the Emergence of Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007"
       CAPT Peter Haynes USN
       Ph.D. dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (2011)

Image - Cover collage.

--321--


CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context

Swartz, Peter M., U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider before you write one, (CQR D0020071.A1/Final, March 2009).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): A Brief Summary, (MISC D0026437.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts. Introduction, Background and Analyses, (MISC D0026421.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume I, (MISC D0026417.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume II, (MISC D0026417.A2/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026414.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026418.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1981-1990): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026415.A1, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1981-1990): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026419.A1/Final (December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026416.A2/Final, March 2012).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1991-2000): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026420.A2/Final, March 2012).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026241.A2/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026242.A2/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume I, (MISC D0026422.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume II, (MISC D0026423.A1/Final, December 2011).

Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009), (CAB D0020997.A5/2Rev, January 2010).

Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy - U.S. Air Force Relationships 1970-2010, (MISC D0024022.A4/1Rev, June 2011).

These documents supersede Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009), (MISC D0019819.A1/Final, February 2009.)

MISC D0026241.A2/Final

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