U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1974-2005)

Image - various publication covers in a collage.

Why written?

What impact & why?

Author: Peter M. Swartz
Graphics: Karin B. Duggan

Image - various publication covers in a collage.

Outline

Introduction & overview

The documents

Conclusions

--2--


Tasking: "3/1 Strategy Workshop" Lockheed-Martin 14 April 2005

♦ To inform development of draft USN "3/1 Strategy" construct

♦ Look at:

♦ "The Maritime Strategy" (1982-9)

♦ ". . . From the Sea" (1992)

♦ "Forward . . . From the Sea" (1994)

♦ What were they?

♦ What prompted these initiatives?

♦ What was the Effect?

♦ Keys to Success?

♦ But . . . there were more

--3--


US Navy Strategy & Capstone Documents

♦ At least 16 "capstone" documents since 1972

♦ Some explicitly said they described USN "strategy"

♦ E.g.: "The Maritime Strategy," "3/1 Strategy" construct

♦ Others said they were something else, but contained important elements of strategy

♦ E.g.: "Navy Policy Book," "Fleet Response Plan"

♦ Most - ?even those labeled "strategy" - ?have occasioned debates as to whether or not they really were "strategies"

--4--


Our Approach

♦ Does not address these debates on nature of strategy

♦ Casts a wide net. Looks at concepts

♦ Strategy = using Means → in Ways → to achieve Ends

♦ But lines between policy & strategy, and between strategy & operations, can be fuzzy

♦ This presentation eschews definitional rigor in order to more clearly show context and sweep

--5--


16 Capstone Documents: 1974-2005

♦ "Missions of the Navy"  1974

♦ "NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy"  1976

♦ "THE MARITIME STRATEGY" '82 (S) '84 (S), '85 (S), '86 (U), '89 (S)

♦ "The Way Ahead"  1991

♦ "The Navy Policy Book"  1992

♦ ". . . FROM THE SEA"  1992

♦ "Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare"  1994

♦ "FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA "  1994

♦ "F . . . FTS: The Navy Operational Concept (NOC)"  1997

♦ "Anytime, Anywhere"  1997

♦ "Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept"  2000

♦ "Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision"  2002

♦ "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations"  2002

♦ "Sea Power 21"  2002

♦ "Fleet Response Plan"  2003

♦ "3/1 STRATEGY" construct draft 2005

--6--


Doesn't counts

♦ Unsigned efforts

♦ "NDP 3: Naval Operations"

♦ "Naval Operational Concept"

♦ ". . . Beyond the Sea"

♦ "Power and Influence . . . From the Sea"

♦ "2020 Vision"

♦ "Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century"

♦ "21st Century Navy"

♦ Annual Navy "Posture Statements"

♦ Annual "Vision/Presence/Power"

♦ Unofficial efforts

--7--


Disclaimers

♦ Several people contributed

♦ Judgments are my own

Not CNA's, not the Navy's, not contributors

♦ Some judgments are tentative

♦ Feel free to question & debate

--8--


Full Disclosure

♦ An author and spokesman for The Maritime Strategy

♦ Very minor contributor to Naval Warfare (NDP 1)

♦ Very minor contributor to Forward... From the Sea

♦ Help set climate for Fleet Response Plan

♦ Very minor contributor to The 3/1 Strategy construct draft

CNA "Scientific Analyst" to N5SP (RDML-SEL Martoglio) & staff

--9--


Approach

♦ Empower an educated, experienced analyst

♦ Literature search

♦ Draft initial strawman brief

♦ Circulate draft within a wide but, trusted network

♦ Improve data and analysis

♦ Co-opt potential rivals, collaborators, predecessors, dissenters

♦ Hound recalcitrants

♦ Impose simple, effective organization scheme and revisions

♦ Incessant murder boards and revisions

♦ Improve date and analysis

♦ Socialize approach, findings, conclusions

♦ Not unlike development of "The Maritime Strategy"

--10--


Contributors to this effort

♦ CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Joe Bouchard USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Linton Brooks USN (Ret)

♦ Dr. Greg Cox (CNA)

♦ CAPT Mike Dunaway USN (Ret)

♦ Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA)

♦ LCDR Neil Golightly USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Bradd Hayes USN (Ret)

♦ CDR Paul Nagy USN

♦ RADM Mike McDevitt USN (Ret) (CNA)

♦ CAPT Judy (Holden) Myers USN (Ret)

♦ Hon. Robin Pirie

♦ Dr. Bruce Powers

♦ Mr. Fred Rainbow

♦ LCDR Steve Recca USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Pat Roth USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT Brian Scott USN

♦ CAPT Larry Seaquist USN (Ret)

♦ RADM Joe Strasser USN (Ret)

♦ CAPT George Thibault USN (Ret)

♦ CDR Jim Tritten USN (Ret)

--11--


Why analyze these documents?

To provide context & perspective

♦ To help better understand why the USN is what it is today

♦ To help foster thinking about the USN of the future

♦ To help inform USN decisions on the formulation and promulgation of the draft 3/1 Strategy construct

--12--


Why CNA?

♦ Recent historical analyses:

♦ Evolution of USN policies:

♦ Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

♦ The Unified Command Plan (UCP) & USN componency

Especially NAVSOUTH

♦ Deployment strategies since 1775

♦ Homeland defense

♦ Riverine operations

♦ Pre-World War II transformations & experimentation

♦ USMC

♦ Roots of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)

♦ Cold War & post-Cold War amphibious lift requirements

Examples available (PASEP)

--13--


Situational Awareness on CNA

♦ CNA Corporation (CNAC)

♦ President: Hon. Bob Murray

♦ Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)

♦ The DON'S FFRDC

♦ President: Christine Fox

♦ Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)

♦ Director: RADM Mike McDevitt (Ret)

♦ International Affairs Group (IAG)

♦ Director: Dr. Eric Thompson

--14--


Can/should the USN have a strategy?

♦ Yes. It's the service's responsibility to:

♦ Describe & amplify on maritime aspects of national military strategy

♦ Recommend changes and professional judgments

♦ Others often don't agree

♦ Joint Staff, COCOMs, COCOM staffs

♦ Civilian & military defense specialists

♦ Believe services can have "visions," "policies," "doctrines," etc., but not strategies

♦ "Strategy" = domain of joint staffs

--15--


Kinds of Strategies

♦ Declaratory strategy

♦ Deployment strategy

♦ Planned employment strategy

♦ Actual employment strategy

♦ Force architecture strategy

♦ Personnel and training strategy

Issues:

♦ Which, if any, leads others?

♦ Alignment

--16--


Outline

♦ Introduction & overview

♦ The documents

♦ Too many to cover in detail

♦ Will show them all, but only discuss a few highlights

♦ Conclusions

--17--


USN Capstone Document Timeline

Image - Chart: USN Capstone Document timeline.

--18--


The 1970s

1974 "Missions of the Navy"

1976 "NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the US Navy"

Image - two publication covers. (left) Naval War College Review - March/April 1974 and (right) Strategic Concepts of the US Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A).

--19--


Missions of the Navy (1974)

Image - cover - Naval War College Review - March/April 1974.

--20--


Missions of the Navy (1974)

♦ Pres NWC VADM Turner signed

♦ Drafted by VADM Turner & CAPT George Thibault

♦ UNCLAS Naval War College Review article

♦ Milieu:

♦ Post-Vietnam; Outgoing CNO Zumwalt; Soviet naval buildup; downsizing; DON TOA now > DA or DAF

♦ Why written?

♦ To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does

♦ To tout cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)

♦ To inform force structure decisions

♦ Institutionalize Zumwalt-era thinking

--21--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ 4 Missions: Strategic deterrence; projection of power; sea control; naval presence

♦ USN officers should think deeply about their service

♦ Influence:

♦ Very wide. Cited throughout defense literature

♦ Why?

♦ Filled a conceptual void & need

♦ Widely adopted by Navy leadership

♦ Personality: Author widely regarded as USN's intellectual leader

♦ Adopted by academia (civilian & military)

--22--


NWP-1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1976)

Image - cover - Strategic Concepts of the US Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A).

--23--


NWP-1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1976)

♦ CNO (Holloway) signed

♦ Drafted in OP-60N (LCDR Joe Strasser)

♦ Published as standard Naval Warfare Publication

♦ Milieu:

♦ Post-Nixon, post-Zumwalt, down-sizing, carrier debates

♦ Creation of CVNs & CVBGs

♦ Why written?

♦ "Consolidation" of internal USN thinking, esp. Turner "missions"

♦ To emphasize warfare areas over platforms

♦ To try to inform force structure decisions

♦ Personality: CNO ADM Holloway

--24--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Warfare areas across platforms; carrier power & versatility; strategic concepts drive force requirements

♦ Refined Turner vocabulary (4 "functions" vice "missions")

♦ USMC 1/2 of 1 of 8 warfare areas

♦ Influence:

♦ Modest. Wide distribution within USN as NWP

♦ Why?

♦ USN "wary of doctrine." But war colleges used

--25--


The 1980s

♦ 1982 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Brief)

♦ 1984 "The Maritime strategy" (SECRET Pub)

♦ 1985 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Pub rev)

♦ 1985 "The Maritime Strategy" (UNCLAS brief)

♦ 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" (UNCLAS insert)

♦ 1989 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Pub rev)

Image - two Maritime Strategy covers.

--26--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

Image - two Maritime Strategy covers.

--27--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

♦ CNOs (Watkins, Trost) signed

♦ SN Lehman, CMC Kelley buy-in. USN lead. USMC support.

♦ Many influences. Drafted in OP-603. Widely vetted. UNCLAS version OP-00K (CAPT Brooks, CDR Harris)

♦ Key roles for Intell community, SSG, NWC Global War Games

♦ Published: Multi-media:

♦ SECRET, UNCLAS briefs, Pubs, Proceedings, journal article

♦ Constant revisions

--28--


♦ Milieu:

♦ Post-Carter Administration

♦ New Reagan Administration

♦ SECNAV Lehman

♦ increased USN budget

--29--


♦ Why written?

♦ Late-Carter USN perceived need to "get our act together"

♦ VCNO tasker: To try to inform force structure decisions

♦ Part of a larger USN "perception management" approach

♦ Personalities: Many: Lehman, Hayward, Watkins, Small, Moreau, etc.

♦ USN lead. USMC contributions

Supporting Amphibious Strategy

--30--


Key ideas:

♦ Consolidation & organization of existing USN views

♦ Peace, crises, war, war termination. Uncertainties

♦ Global, forward offensive ops vs SU (not just vs SN. 3 phases. Horizontal escalation)

♦ New agreed intell on SU

♦ Used NWP-1 warfare functions vocab: AAW, ASW, etc.

♦ USN officers should think deeply about their service

♦ Very joint (coordinated, not integrated); very allied

♦ Included "below-the-line" forces until last iteration

♦ Included uncertainties

--31--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

Was not:

♦ USN go-it-alone

♦ Blue-water, open ocean, sea control focused

--32--


♦ Influence: Significant

♦ Within the Navy; outside the Navy; overseas (allies & Soviets); academia; fleet exercises; Global War Games

♦ Why?

♦ Filled a need for clarity and consolidation of thinking

♦ Major push by SECNAV, Navy Flags, SSG

--33--


The 1990s

♦ 1991The Way Ahead

♦ 1992"The Navy Policy Book"

♦ 1992". . . From the Sea"

♦ 1994"Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare"

♦ 1994"Forward . . . From the Sea"

♦ 1997"F . . . FTS: The Navy Operational Concept (NOC)"

♦ 1997"Anytime, Anywhere"

♦ 2000 "Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept"

Image - various publication covers in a collage.

--34--


The Way Ahead (1991)

Image - cover - The Way Ahead.

--35--


The Way Ahead (1991)

♦ SN (Garrett), CNO (Kelso), CMC (Gray) signed

♦ Drafted in OP-G03 & HQMC PP + O

♦ UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

♦ Milieu:

♦ Fundamental change in world power relationships

♦ Cold War end. "Peace dividend"; Desert Storm in progress. Goldwater-Nichols law. Bush Aspen speech.

♦ CJCS Powell Base Force looming (450 ships)

--36--


Why written?

♦ "Need a new strategy" to explain USN force levels

♦ Example of The Maritime Strategy: need to supplant

♦ Personalities: GEN Gray had already turned from the Maritime Strategy years before

♦ USN-USMC equality in drafting

--37--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Maritime Strategy "on the shelf"

♦ "Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for . . . new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups"

♦ "The changes occurring in our security environment will require us to break out of these hubs."

♦ "The need for focused forward presence & credible surge capability?more than historical deployment patterns?will dictate peacetime employment of naval forces"

--38--


♦ Influence:

♦ Little. But "The Way Ahead" was "way ahead" of its time

♦ Why?

♦ Overtaken by NCA, CINC, BUR, GNFPP 3-hub forward presence demands

--39--


The Navy Policy Book (1992)

Image - cover - The Navy Policy Book.

--40--


The Navy Policy Book (1992)

♦ SN (Garrett), CNO (Kelso) signed

♦ Drafted in N00K

♦ UNCLAS. Published as a stand-alone document

♦ Milieu:

♦ Cold War, Desert Storm over. CJCS Powell & Base Force; "Tailhook" scandal roiling Navy & outside views of Navy

♦ Why written?

♦ CNO view: Post-Cold War world needs a Navy Policy, vice a naval strategy.

♦ Maritime strategy to remain "on the shelf", used if needed

♦ Provide common USN understanding of USN principles

♦ Ref A for Total Quality leadership (TQL) effort

♦ Personality: ADM Kelso dedicated to TQL

--41--


Key ideas:

♦ Nature of the Navy as an organization

♦ Included Strategic Principles , e.g.: deterrence, forward presence, force projection

♦ Professional Reading List, including books on strategy

♦ Influence: Little

♦ Why?

♦ SECNAV gone within months;

♦ TQL never took

--42--


Image - cover - ...From the Sea.

--43--


. . . From the Sea (1992)

♦ SN (O'Keefe), CNO (Kelso), CMC (Mundy) signed

♦ Committee (NFCPE) drafted, then VADM L. Smith (OP-06)

♦ UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

♦ Milieu:

♦ Post-Cold War, Desert-Storm, Goldwater-Nichols; VADM Owens: OPNAV reorg & new USN program vocabulary; "1/3-1/3-1/3" service budget share stability era begins

♦ Why Written?

♦ To demonstrate USN knows it has to change

♦ To align USN with CJCS Powell "Base Force"

♦ To try to inform Navy force structure

♦ Personalities: Several, VADM Smith, VADM Owens

♦ USMC very much a player (BGen Wilkerson)

--44--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Joint, littoral, enabling

♦ Expeditionary

♦ Times have changed; so has the Navy

♦ Focus on strike and power projection operations

♦ Downgrading of ASW and other sea control operations

♦ Mandated actions: NAVDOCCOM, COMUSNAVCENT, etc.

--45--


♦ Influence:

♦ Wide. Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

♦ Some civilian defense expert commentary

♦ Why?

♦ Ideas were right for the times

♦ Hangover from The Maritime Strategy

--46--


NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

Image - cover - Naval Warfare.

--47--


NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

♦ CNO (Kelso), CMC (Mundy) signed

♦ Drafted by Naval Doctrine Command (established 1993)

♦ UNCLAS. Glossy Naval Doctrine Publication

♦ Milieu:

♦ Jointness & doctrinal frenzy, CJCS Powell, new Joint Pub 1

♦ Why Written?

♦ Fill externally- and internally-felt need for Naval Doctrine

♦ Joint, Army influences

♦ To try to inform all other Naval & Navy doctrine

♦ Try to tie USN & USMC closer together

♦ USMC saw opportunity to sign USN up to USMC concepts

--48--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Doctrine matters to the USN

♦ Principles of War

♦ Maneuver warfare (USMC thrust)

♦ War, deterrence, presence, operations other than war

♦ Influence:

♦ Modest. Used in war colleges, other schools, modeling & simulation community

♦ No follow-on NDP 3 (Naval Operations)

♦ Why?

♦ Saliency of doctrine in USN waxed briefly, then waned

♦ USN remained wary of doctrine

♦ USN-USMC differences remained

--49--


Forward . . . From The Sea (1994)

Image - cover - Forward . . . From The Sea.

--50--


Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

♦ SN (Dalton), CNO (Boorda), CMC (Mundy) signed

♦ Written in N51, with OLA impetus

♦ UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

♦ Milieu:

♦ Clinton Administration (Democrats) replaced Bush Administration (Republicans). Bottom-Up Review (BUR).

♦ Why written?

♦ To try to inform USN Force structure decisions

♦ Personalities: SECNAV Dalton, RADM Phil Dur (N51); CDR Joe Sestak (N513)

--51--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Maintain continuity with . . . From the Sea

♦ Even more emphasis on Combat-credible-forward-presence in 3 hubs = the centerpiece of USN operations

♦ More attention to sea control operations

♦ Influence:

♦ Widely cited; solidified Forward Presence as central USN tenet; Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

--52--


Forward . . . From The Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Forward . . . from the Sea The Navy Operational Concept  http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/tiavpalib/policy/fromsca/frManoc.html

The United States Navy

Forward . . . From the Sea
The Navy Operalional Concept

March 1997

Foreword by
Admiral Jay L. Johnson,
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps published . . . From the Sea in 1992 as our combined vision for the 21st century. Since then, we have been constantly checking our bearings to ensure we stay on course. We refined our direction in 1994 with Forward . . . From the Sea. These two documents continue to drive the on-going process of innovation that is rapidly transforming the Navy into a 21st century force.

I have expressed my vision for the Navy in four guiding stars: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork, and pride. This paper promulgates guidance on operational primacy - the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint or coalition mission and to prevail decisively over any foe that may oppose us. It directs how we operate Forward . . . From the Sea across the three components of the National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win.

This paper sets our direction for operational primacy in the next century. Emerging technology and innovative operational concepts are creating new opportunities for employing naval forces in support of national strategy. We will have an integral role in future joint operations, including those described in Joint Vision 2010. In the 21st century as today, the most important contributions we make to national security will exploit fully the advantages we gain from operating on, under, above and from the sea.

Introduction

The Navy's unique contributions to national security stem from the advantages of operating on, under, above and from the sea. This is the message of Forward . . . From the Sea. The primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crisis and war. That is what we do. This paper describes how we do it today, and how we will do it in the future.

The roles of America's armed forces are defined by the three components of the National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win. Although national policy changes as the strategic landscape evolves, there will be continued emphasis on using the armed forces across this spectrum. Operations in peacetime and crisis to maintain regional economic and political stability are traditional roles of the Navy-Marine Corps team. These roles are rooted in our fundamental ability to maneuver independently of political constraints and fight and win. A key operational advantage of forward-deployed naval forces is that we provide on-scene capabilities for executing simultaneously all three components of the National Military Strategy, and do so without infringing on any nation's sovereignty. This advantage exists because we operate in international waters. Our hallmark is forward-deployed forces with the highest possible readiness and capability to transition instantly from

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5/17/2002 4:33 PM

--53--


Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997)

♦ CNO (Johnson) signed

♦ Drafted by N513 (CAPT Bouchard), but widely vetted

♦ UNCLAS. Published on the web

♦ Milieu:

♦ 1997 QDR, increasing jointness, USN-USMC friction, increasing influence of network-minded flags (Tuttle, Clemins, Cebrowski), F/A-18E/F acquisition

--54--


Why written?

♦ To stimulate internal USN & USMC conceptual innovation

♦ USN wariness of NAVDOCCOM & NDP 1; lack of an NDP 3

♦ Personalities: CAPT Bouchard (N513); VADM Cebrowski (N6); CMC Gen Krulak; CNO Johnson

♦ Concern that USN Forward Presence focus was stale & increasingly counterproductive in joint, OSD arenas

--55--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Focused more on concepts than on strategy

♦ Peace-Crisis-War continuum

♦ FTS continues as USN capstone document

♦ Maneuver warfare

♦ Net Centric Warfare

♦ Influence:

♦ Little, but a launch platform for Net Centric Warfare.

♦ Why?

♦ Little internal Navy leadership support

--56--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

Image - cover - Anytime, Anywhere.

"Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright Nov. 1997 U.S. Naval Institute/ www.navalinstitute.org"

--57--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ CNO (Johnson) signed

♦ A "vision"

♦ Drafted in NOOK

♦ UNCLAS

♦ Milieu:

♦ Why written?

--58--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

♦ Key ideas:

♦ Continuity: " . . . From the Sea," "Forward . . . From the Sea" and "Navy Operational Concept"

♦ USN to influence events ashore

♦ VADM Turner's "4 Missions"

♦ "Win any conflict, anytime, anywhere"

♦ Shock and awe: Distributed precision strike

♦ Influence

♦ Picked-up in subsequent posture statements

♦ Cited by following CNO ADM Clark in Change of Command speech

♦ Not much else

--59--


Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II (2000)

Image - cover - Navy Strategic Planning Guidance.

--60--


Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept (2000)

♦ CNO (Johnson) and N3/N5 (Natter) signed

♦ UNCLAS. Drafted by N51

♦ Milieu:

♦ 8 years of Clinton Administration "engagement-enlargement;" Combat-credible-forward presence-in-3-hubs = accepted USN dogma; Kosovo air-only campaign; QDR 2001 looming

♦ Why written?

♦ Idea of concept-driven programs made sense

♦ Personalities: CAPTS Bouchard & Tangredi (earlier N513s); RDML Sestak (N51)

--61--


♦ Published as a stand-alone document

♦ Key ideas:

♦ Forward presence; Knowledge superiority; Inform force structure decisions

♦ Influence: Brief

♦ Why?

♦ CNO, N3/N5, N51 detached later that year

--62--


The 21st Century

♦ 2002 "Naval Power 21 A Naval Vision"

♦ 2002 "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations"

♦ 2002 "Sea Power 21"

♦ 2003 "Fleet Response Plan"

♦ 2005 "3/1 Strategy" draft construct

Image - various publication covers in a collage.

--63--


Naval Power 21 A Naval Vision (2002)

Image - cover - Naval Power 21.

--64--


Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision (2002)

♦ SN (England), CNO (Clark), CMC (Jones) signed

♦ Drafted in N3/N5 Deep Blue

♦ UNCLAS. Published on the web

♦ Milieu:

♦ New Bush administration; 9-11; transformation; QDR '01

♦ Why written?

♦ Bring USN & USMC visions together in one overarching document

♦ Personalities: SECNAV England, RDML Stavridis

--65--


♦ Key ideas

♦ Navy-Marine Team

♦ Influence: Little?

♦ Why?

♦ Overwhelmed by Sea Power 21 & MC 21

♦ No strong SECNAV public push

--66--


Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2002)

Image - Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.

--67--


Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2002)

♦ CNO (Clark), CMC (Hagee) signed

♦ Drafted by N513 & MCCDC

♦ UNCLAS. Published on web

♦ Milieu:

♦ New Bush administration; 9-11; transformation; QDR 2001

♦ Why written? To achieve USN-USMC consensus on Sea Basing & other concepts

--68--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ USMC narrower Sea Basing concept; USN broader view; jointness (USN-driven)

♦ Calls for new NDP 1, Naval Warfare

♦ Influence: Little

♦ Why?

♦ No USN fanfare. USMC cited sometimes

--69--


Sea Power 21 (2002)

Image - cover - Sea Power 21.

--70--


Sea Power 21 (2002)

♦ CNO (Clark) signed

♦ Drafted by N-00Z

♦ UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

♦ Milieu:

♦ New Bush administration; Post 9-11; transformation; QDR 2001

♦ Why written?

♦ CNO (belatedly) saw a need, beyond his "Goals"

♦ Response to SECDEF push for Transformation

♦ Personality: CNO ADM Clark

--71--


Key ideas:

♦ "A vision, not a strategy"

♦ Explicitly descends from "The Maritime Strategy"," . . . FTS" & "F . . . FTS"

♦ Transformation; new cross-cutting categories to transcend platform communities & demonstrate change

♦ Global CONOPS: Downgrade hubs; increase global presence; dispersed combat striking power; simultaneous response to crises around the world; new force packages; 375 ships

♦ Repackages the framework for Navy force structure decisions; New vocabulary

--72--


♦ Influence:

♦ Wide within OPNAV & other USN headquarters

♦ Resource for flag speeches, testimony

♦ Some criticisms

♦ Why?

♦ Relentless repetition

♦ Power & influence of CNO

--73--


Fleet Response Plan (2003)

♦ CNO (ADM Clark) and CFFC promulgated

♦ Drafted in N3/N5 Deep Blue

♦ Published in internal USN directives & external flag officer interviews, speeches & articles

♦ Milieu:

♦ New Bush administration; Post 9-11; OEF & OIF ongoing; transformation; Sea Power 21 (& Global CONOPS)

♦ Why written?

♦ SECDEF demand for greater surge capability from all DOD components

♦ Personality: CNO ADM Clark

--74--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ Increase USN capability to surge CSGs, ESGs, and other fleet elements

♦ Capitalize on improved fleet readiness

♦ Influence:

♦ Great within USN on the waterfront & at sea. Summer Pulse 04. SECDEF public approval.

♦ Flexible Deployment Concept yet to be endorsed, implemented as national policy

--75--


The draft "3/1Strategy" construct (2005)

Image - cover - Navy's 3/1 Strategy.

--76--


The draft "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)

♦ Not yet published. Widely briefed.

♦ Drafted in N5SP

♦ Milieu:

♦ Bush Administration, post-9/11, OIF, CNO Clark term end, QDR 05, GWOT, China concerns

♦ Why Written?

♦ USN perceives lack of strategy, despite welter of capstone documents

♦ Personalities:

♦ VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RDML-SEL Martoglio (N5SP), incoming CNO ADM Mullen

--77--


♦ Key ideas:

♦ USN does more than MCOs; "A Strategy to inform investments to achieve Sea Power 21 vision"

♦ New salience of Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) & "below-the-line" forces

♦ Coalition partner navies prominent

--78--


♦ Influence:

♦ TBD. Will it influence . . .

♦ Internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking?

♦ USN operations & training?

♦ USN force structure & investment decisions?

♦ Joint, OSD & coalition strategies, plans & policies?

--79--


Outline

♦ Introduction & overview

♦ The documents

♦ Conclusions

--80--


Conclusions

♦ USN has not lacked for capstone documents

♦ At least . . . over the full careers of current USN leadership

♦ Often theymatter

--81--


Why do they get written?

♦ To address changing world, country, USN

♦ To implement specific ideas of USN leaders (& drafters)

♦ Codification of current thinking

♦ Advocacy of new directions

♦ Response to higher authority

♦ To strengthen Budget arguments

--82--


Why do they get written?

♦ To unify Navy elements in a common conceptual framework

♦ To break down community & platform parochialism

♦ To try to influence internal Navy force structure decision

♦ To try to influence external policy debates & academia (sometimes)

♦ To demonstrate USN intellectual capability and/or positive responses to change

--83--


Some constant (or almost constant) themes

♦ USN operates (& should operate) globally, forward, offensively

♦ Encompasses both presence & surge

♦ Enabling force

♦ Sea control as enabler for power projection

♦ USN vital for peacetime, crisis response, war

♦ USN must have balanced fleet, for a variety of missions

♦ USN operates as part of joint (& coalition) military efforts

--84--


Constant (or almost constant) themes

♦ USN operations must transcend individual warfare specialties & platform communities

♦ USN has overarching concepts that drive it; not just sum of community desires for budget share & new equipment

♦ USN wants to be - & can be - entrusted with defining what it does & with managing its own destiny

♦ USN concepts & strategy drive (and should drive) USN program decisions

--85--


What constituted "success?"

♦ Influence over USN programmatic decisions

♦ Usually stated as a goal; rarely achieved

♦ Legacy programs & OSD Guidance are primary program drivers

♦ Hard for Navy strategy/concepts/policy/doctrine to compete as influence

♦ Stimulate internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking

♦ Become lingua franca of USN policy- and decision-makers

♦ Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

--86--


What constituted "success?"

♦ USN gained reputation for intellectual thinking,

♦ Within DOD & externally

♦ USN retained/gained freedom to shape its own destiny

♦ Influence joint, DOD, national security, & allied policy & strategy

--87--


What were some ingredients for success?

♦ Became everyone's central Navy message

♦ Satisfied a real need by OPNAV

♦ Real buy-in by USN leadership

♦ Repetition & hard work

♦ CNO +/or SECNAV signature, + USMC buy-in

♦ Normally necessary, but not sufficient

♦ Choose specialists as drafters

♦ Tough internal criticism

--88--


What were some ingredients for success?

♦ Simplicity & power of core elements

♦ Aligned with what fleet was doing

♦ Continuity across CNO terms

♦ Planned or incessant ad hoc dissemination

♦ Wide multi-media distribution

♦ Built on what came before OR led/reflected changes

--89--


Secondary Consequences

♦ Strong influence on allied & coalition naval thinking

♦ Affects their support for USN

♦ Influence on civilian national security specialists & academia

♦ Reflected in education of next generation of policy works

♦ Influence on adversaries?

--90--


USN Officers as USN Strategists

♦ USN Strategic planning subspecialty is famously broken

♦ Yet . . . the system works

Q: Who developed the concepts and drafted the strategies?

A: Some examples (just the PhDs):

♦ CAPT Roger Barnett, PhD

♦ CAPT Joe Bouchard, PhD

♦ RADM Phil Dur, PhD

♦ CAPT Frank Pandolfe, PhD

♦ CAPT Joe Sestak, PhD

♦ CAPT Ed Smith, PhD

♦ CAPT Jim Stavridis, PhD

♦ LCDR Joe Strasser, PhD

♦ CAPT Sam Tangredi, PhD

♦ CDR Jim Tritten, PhD

♦ LCDR Stan Weeks, PhD

--91--


Service Budget Shares (1972-2006)

Image - chart - Service Budget Shares (1972-2006).

"Reprinted (with modifications) from Air Force Magazine: Journal of the Air Force Association with permission; Copyright May 2005, p65.

--92--


Further reading on "making USN Strategy"

♦ "The Maritime Strategy"

♦ Byron, Swartz, "Make the Word Become the Vision" (Proceedings Nov 92)

♦ Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy (2004)

 " . . . From the Sea"

♦ Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," Proceedings 1993)

♦ Owens, High Seas (1995)

♦ Smith, "What '. . . From the Sea' Didn't Say" (NWCR 1995)

♦ Meconis, "Main Aspects of the 'New U.S. Naval Strategy'" (1996)

♦ Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (2004)

♦ "Forward . . . From the Sea"; "NOC"

♦ Rhodes, "'. . . From the Sea' and Back Again," (NWCR 1999)

♦ Tangredi, "Who's Afraid of the NETF?, (Proceedings 1999)

--93--


Better analysis needed

♦ This was a brief initial assessment

♦ More rigorous analyses could prove helpful, e.g.:

♦ Assessing influence & impact of each on

♦ USN operations, plans & training recommendations & decisions

♦ By the President, SECDEF, CJCS, COCOMs

♦ By USN commanders

♦ USN force structure recommendations & decisions

♦ By the Congress, President, SECDEF, OSD

♦ By OPNAV

♦ One updated document (e.g.: '80s) vs several ('90s)

--94--


Why analyze these documents?

 To provide context & perspective

♦ To help better understand why the USN is what it is today

♦ To help foster thinking about the USN of the future

♦ To help inform USN decisions on the formulation and promulgation of the draft 3/1 Strategy construct

--95--


The End

Questions?

--96--