Halsey-Doolittle Raid on Japan, 18 April 1942
Conceived in January 1942 in the wake of the devastating Japanese surprise attack on Oahu, the “joint Army-Navy bombing project” was to bomb Japanese industrial centers, to inflict both “material and psychological” damage upon the enemy. Planners hoped that the former would include the destruction of specific targets “with ensuing confusion and retardation of production.” Those who planned the attacks on the Japanese homeland hoped to induce the enemy to recall “combat equipment from other theaters for home defense,” and incite a “fear complex in Japan.” Additionally, it was hoped that the prosecution of the raid would improve the United States’ relationships with its allies and receive a “favorable reaction [on the part] of the American people.”
Originally, the concept called for the use of USAAF bombers to be launched from, and recovered by, an aircraft carrier. Research disclosed the North American B-25 Mitchell to be “best suited to the purpose,” the Martin B-26 Marauder possessing unsuitable handling characteristics and the Douglas B-23 Dragon having too great a wingspan to be comfortably operated from a carrier deck. Tests off the aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-8) off Norfolk, and ashore at Norfolk soon proved that while a B-25 could take off with comparative ease, “landing back on again would be extremely difficult.”
The attack planners decided upon a carrier transporting the B-25s to a point east of Tokyo, whereupon she would launch one pathfinder to proceed ahead and drop incendiaries to blaze a trail for the other bombers that would follow. The planes would then proceed to either the east coast of China or to Vladivostok, USSR. Soviet reluctance to allow the use of Vladivostok as a terminus, and unwillingness to provoke Japan, however, compelled the selection of Chinese landing sites. At a secret conference at San Francisco, LTCOL James H. Doolittle, USAAF, who would lead the attack personally, met with VADM William F. Halsey, Jr., who would command the task force that would take him to the very gates of the empire. They agreed upon a launch point some 600 miles due east from Tokyo, but that if discovered TF 16 would launch planes at that point and retire.
With 24 planes, drawn from the 17th Bombardment Group, USAAF, prepared for the mission, with additional fuel tanks installed and “certain unnecessary equipment” having been removed, intensive training ensued beginning in early March 1942 with crews who had volunteered for a mission that would be “extremely hazardous, would require a high degree of skill and would be of great value to our defense effort.” They practiced intensive cross-country flying, night flying, and navigation, as well as “low altitude approaches to bombing targets, rapid bombing and evasive action.”
LT Henry L. Miller, USN, oversaw the carrier take-off practice at Eglin Field, Florida, work that elicited praise from LTCOL Doolittle for Miller’s “tact, skill and devotion to duty.” With everything stripped from the planes not deemed essential, Hornet loaded 16 B-25s (all that could be shipped) on board at Alameda (31 March-1 April 1942) and sailed to rendezvous with carrier Enterprise (CV-6), to form part of TF 16 (VADM Halsey).
The Japanese, monitoring U.S. Navy radio traffic, deduced that a carrier raid on the homeland was a possibility after 14 April 1942, and prepared accordingly. TF-16 approached to within 650 miles of Japan on 18 April 1942. Lacking radar, the Japanese “early warning” capability lay in parallel lines of guardboats, radio-equipped converted fishing trawlers, operating at prescribed intervals offshore. One of these little vessels, No.23 Nitto Maru, discovered the task force on the morning of 18 April 1942 and radioed a sighting report. Although VADM Halsey had agreed to take TF 16 within 400 miles of Japan to ensure maximum success, as LTCOL Doolittle had requested while en route, the admiral recognized the potential threat of Japanese land-based air (indeed 80 medium bombers had been massed in the Kanto area) to half of the U.S. Navy’s carrier force in the Pacific. The exigencies of war dictated that Halsey order Hornet to launch the 16 Mitchells earlier than planned.
The Japanese 26th Air Flotilla, expecting the Americans to approach within 200 miles of Japan, as they had done in the raids in February in the Marshalls and Gilberts, at Wake and at Marcus, launched 29 medium bombers, equipped with torpedoes, from Kisarazu, escorted by 24 carrier fighters equipped with long-range tanks, to find TF 16.
The unexpected employment of long-range U.S. Army bombers, however, took the Japanese by surprise. Taking a little over an hour to launch, Doolittle’s B-25s, carrying demolition and incendiary bombs, flew on and hit targets in Tokyo, Yokosuka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya, against negligible opposition; one B-25’s ordnance damaged the aircraft carrier Ryuho (being converted from the submarine depot ship Taigei) at Yokosuka and thus delayed her completion. Of the 16 B-25s, however, 15 crashed in occupied China, where the Japanese inflicted brutal reprisals against the Chinese populace in Chekiang province. One B-25 landed intact at Vladivostok, where the Soviets interned it and its crew.
That same day, in a series of actions often overlooked when compared to the B-25 raids, planes from Enterprise attacked Japanese guardboats (“picket” boats) encountered near TF 16, damaging the armed merchant cruiser Awata Maru and the guardboats Chokyu Maru, No.1 Iwate Maru, No.2 Asami Maru, Kaijin Maru, No.3 Chinyo Maru, Eikichi Maru, Kowa Maru, and No.21 Nanshin Maru. Guardboats No.23 Nitto Maru (the one that had transmitted the initial contact report) and Nagato Maru, also damaged by planes from Enterprise, were sunk by gunfire of the light cruiser Nashville (CL-43). Japanese antiaircraft fire damaged one Dauntless, which ditched near the disposition, a destroyer rescuing the crew. The next day (19 April 1942), No.21 Nanshin Maru, damaged by Enterprise planes on 18 April, was scuttled by gunfire of the light cruiser Kiso; No.1 Iwate Maru sank as the result of damage inflicted by Enterprise planes on 18 April. Japanese submarine I-74 rescued No.1 Iwate Maru’s crew and ultimately transferred them to Kiso on 22 April. The Halsey-Doolittle Raid had temporarily put that section of the Japanese Navy’s offshore warning network out of commission.
All told, in addition to the aforementioned air units from 26th Air Flotilla, the Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet deployed eleven boats from the 3rd and 8th Submarine Squadrons, in addition to two cruiser divisions, to intercept TF 16, while the First Air Fleet, returning from the Indian Ocean, formed around carriers Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu, on 18 April 1942 in the Bashi Channel, south of Formosa, received orders to engage the Americans. None of the considerable forces deployed to attack TF 16 are able to find the retiring force and bring it to battle. Search efforts continued, without success, until 24 April.
While the material damage inflicted by Doolittle’s raiders proved small, and the early-warning line would be restored by an infusion of vessels to replace the ones lost, the effect of the air raid on the Japanese capital itself was enormous. ADM Yamamoto Isoroku’s fear of a U.S. carrier strike against the homeland, deemed “unreasonable” by the Naval General Staff, had occurred unimpeded. The Halsey-Doolittle Raid dissolved the “residual doubts” harbored within the Naval General Staff whether or not a thrust against the important U.S. advanced naval base at Midway, an important element in ADM Yamamoto’s plan to draw out the hitherto unengaged U.S. carriers, should be attempted. The Japanese Army, hitherto reluctant about the enterprise, went along with the Navy’s plan.
Up to that point, the U.S. Navy’s carriers had operated in waters of their own choosing, uncontested by the Japanese, whose frustration has increased correspondingly with their inability to engage the Americans.
For further information and links to related resources, see: Battle of Midway Showcase.