
SS192/S94/H2-10
28 May 1939
From: Commander Rescue Operations,
U.S.S. SQUALUS.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS (SS192) - Report of Rescue Operations.
Reference: (a) U.S.S. SQUALUS Operation Order 4-39 with Annex.
Inclosure: (A) Comdt. Navy Yard, Ports. Communication Files covering
Rescue Operations,
during 23-25 May 1939 inclusive. [not located]
(B) Extract from Diving Log, U.S.S. FALCON,
for period of 24-25 May 1939
inclusive.
(C) Officer Organization.
1. Attention is invited to the fact that the times used in Inclosure
(A) are zone plus five time, while those given in the remainder
of the report are zone plus four time (Daylight Saving Time).
The officer organization for the rescue operations is shown in
Inclosure (C).
2. On 23 May 1939 the U.S.S. SQUALUS was operating off the Isles
of Shoals in accordance with reference (a). On board the operating
engineer regularly furnished by the machinery contractor, as well
as two civilian representatives of the Navy Yard, who were assisting
in preparation for trials. In accordance with the usual practice,
the routine dive reports of the SQUALUS, which are the second
and third despatches of Inclosure (A) were on the Commandant's
desk for reference in order to keep in touch with operations.
At about 1040 the Commandant noted that the expected surfacing
report of the SQUALUS was then about one hour overdue. The Communication
Officer was notified and directed to try to raise the SQUALUS
by radio on the assumption that failure to receive a surfacing
report was due to inadvertence of some sort.
3. Failure to communicate with the SQUALUS naturally caused some
alarm. As it happened, the SCULPIN was due to leave the Yard for
Newport at 1130, and the Commandant personally directed her Commanding
Officer before she left to pass through the SQUALUS operating
areas, endeavor to make contact with her and report results. At
1155, after the SCULPIN had left, the Commandant further directed
her by despatch to make every effort to contact the SQUALUS and
remain in the area until successful.
4. The operating schedule of the FALCON was then consulted and
it was found that she was scheduled for upkeep at New London at
the time, whereupon the Commandant called Commander Submarine
Squadron TWO by telephone, informed him of the situation, and
warned him that the FALCON might be urgently needed. Commander
Submarine Squadron TWO stated that the FALCON would be sent to
the Isles of Shoals at once.
5. At 1241 a despatch was received from the SCULPIN to the effect
that a red smoke bomb had been sighted and that the SCULPIN was
proceeding to the vicinity. The Commandant immediately called
the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, informed him that
the SCULPIN was apparently down and in trouble, that he would
personally proceed to the area involved and would keep the Chief
of Naval Operations informed of developments. At the same time
Commandant, First Naval District, was informed of the situation
and requested to make the U.S.S. WANDANK available in the vicinity
of the Isles of Shoals. Before embarking on the PENACOOK (Yard
Tug) further messages were received from the SCULPIN that the
marker buoy from the SQUALUS had been sighted and that the position
was in Latitude 4253 N. Longitude 7037 W. This position was 4-3/4
miles to the westward from the reported diving position of the
SQUALUS and in nearly the opposite direction from her reported
diving course. This fact is pointed out in order to emphasize
the extreme value of the alert lookout kept by the SCULPIN, which
resulted in the sighting of the smoke bomb fired from the SQUALUS,
and undoubtedly saved a tremendous amount of time which would
otherwise have been expended in searching for the SQUALUS.
6. The Commandant, accompanied by Captain H.R. Greenlee, USN,
Commander A.I. McKee (CC), Lieutenant Commander F.A. Tusler (CC),
Lieutenant Commander E.L. Sackett, USN, and Lieutenant Commander
A.M. Morgan (CC), embarked on the U.S.S. PENACOOK at 1330 and
proceeded at best speed to the designated position, arriving alongside
the SCULPIN at 1513 and assumed the status of Rescue Officer.
The Rescue Officer directed the PENACOOK to drop one buoy 100
yards north of the designated position of the SQUALUS and another
100 yards south of it. He then embarked on the SCULPIN with other
officers accompanying him.
7. The Commanding Officer, SCULPIN, reported that he had picked
up the marker buoy, which was the forward one of the SQUALUS,
and had held about two minutes conversation over the buoy telephone
with Lieutenant J.C. Nichols and Lieutenant O.F. Naquin, Commanding
Officer, SQUALUS, which was in substance as follows:
WILKIN: "What is your trouble?"
NICHOLS: "High induction open, crew's compartment, forward
and after engine rooms flooded. Not sure about after torpedo room
but could not establish communication with that compartment. Hold
the phone and I will put the Captain on."
(About thirty seconds' delay to get Lieutenant Naquin on the telephone.)
WILKIN: "How are things?"
NAQUIN: "Consider the best method to employ is to send diver
down as soon as possible to close high induction and then hook
on salvage lines to flooded compartments and free them of water
in attempt to bring her up; for the present consider that preferable
to sending personnel up with lungs."
At this point the marker buoy cable parted. Later investigation
by diver showed that a bight of the buoy cable had been caught
on some sharp obstruction over the side of the SQUALUS, and pulling
from the surface had caused it to part at that point, which was
about 240 feet from the buoy. The Commanding Officer, SCULPIN,
reported that he had located the SQUALUS with his supersonic equipment,
and that she was about 350 yards distant, bearing zero six six
degrees true.
8. The PENACOOK had been directed to start dragging for the SQUALUS
with grapnel after planting position buoys. It was shortly found
that the grapnels on board were not heavy enough to sink the line,
and one of the SCULPIN'S boat anchors was then substituted for
the grapnel. At 1720 the WANDANK arrived from Boston, and was
also directed to start dragging. At 1726 the U.S.C.G. No. 991
brought out from the Navy Yard two divers, two diver's tenders,
and two pipefitters, together with diving suits and equipment.
At 1745 the privately owned tug CHANDLER arrived, bringing Lieutenant
(jg) E.F. Slozsek (MC), USN, and three pharmacist's mates with
fifty blankets from the Portsmouth Naval Hospital. At 1817 U.S.C.G.
No. 158 reported for duty from Gloucester. At 1842 the CHANDLER
and U.S.C.G. No. 991 were sent back to the Navy Yard for more
diving equipment. At 1930 the PENACOOK reported hooking her drag
anchor on what was believed to be the SQUALUS, and buoyed the
line with a wooden grating. This buoy was on the line between
the two buoys previously laid by the PENACOOK. The U.S.C.G. No.
158 was directed to circle the vicinity of the grating during
the night, using her searchlight to keep watch for any SQUALUS
personnel who might come up during the night with lung equipment.
At 2145 the U.S.C.G. No. 409 arrived, bringing the following personnel
of the Experimental Diving Unit who had been sent by airplane
from Washington, D.C.:
Lieutenant Commander C.B. Momsen, USN.
Lieutenant O.D. Yarbrough (MC), USN.
Lieutenant A.R. Behnke (MC), USN.
C. Msmth. J.H. McDonald, USN (Diver).
At 2355 the Tug CHANDLER returned to Portsmouth.
9. No attempt was made to conduct diving operations during the
night of 23-24 May because of the extreme depth and the difficulty
of conducing such operations during darkness, and because of the
fact that the FALCON was expected to arrive in the early morning
in time to moor and conduct such operations with superior equipment
and highly trained personnel. The personnel in the forward compartments
of the SQUALUS appeared to be in no immediate danger. Satisfactory
communications had been established by 1345 with the SQUALUS after
being first heard at 1328, by tapping in Morse code with a hammer
on the hull of the SCULPIN and hearing similar messages from the
SQUALUS. Early messages indicated that 33 men were alive in the
forward part of the ship. Conditions were reported satisfactory,
but cold.
10. Operations on 24 May 1939 were as follows: At 0027 the U.S.C.G.
HARRIET LANE reported for duty. At 0205 the U.S.S. SEMMES stood
in and anchored close aboard, and Commander Submarine Squadron
TWO (Captain R.S. Edwards, USN) reported on board for duty. At
0235, in response to a request from the FALCON that the position
of the SQUALUS be cleared for a distance of at least 700 yards,
the SCULPIN got underway and shifted berth to a position with
Newburyport Aero Beacon bearing 241 degrees true, Wood Island
Light bearing 359 degrees true, and Boon Island Light bearing
023 degrees - 45 minutes true. The estimated bearing of SQUALUS
from this position was 040 degrees true, distance 1450 yards.
At 0415 Commander Allan R. McCann, USN, and 12 divers of the Experimental
Diving Unit arrived at the scene of operations. At 0425 the U.S.S.
FALCON arrived and commenced laying out four point moorings. Divers
from the FALCON were sent to the SCULPIN to familiarize themselves
with the layout and equipment to be found on SQUALUS, which is
a sister ship. At 0700 the Rescue Officer, Commander Submarine
Squadron TWO, other officers of the Navy Yard, and officers attached
to the Experimental Diving Unit embarked on the FALCON.
11. The FALCON was occupied unit 0840 in spotting herself between
the four anchors laid out, in an effort to obtain a position over
the SQUALUS. Due to wind and sea conditions, considerable difficulty
was experienced in obtaining the desired position, and at 0840
the WANDANK carried out an additional five-ton anchor on the port
beam of the FALCON and brought the line to the FALCON. However,
this expedient was not effective, and it was necessary to shift
the lines of the FALCON so that the wind and sea were brought
ahead instead of on the beam, after which the FALCON quickly swung
into position and was secured. At 1014, the first diver, Martin
C. Sibitzky, B.M. 1c, USN, was put over the side, reporting himself
on the deck of the SQUALUS at 1017. The descending line used was
the buoy line which had been attached to the drag anchor by the
PENACOOK, and this line was fortunately discovered by the diver
to be only about 6 feet aft of the forward torpedo room hatch,
leading over the port rail near the stub mast. At 1028 the rescue
chamber downhaul wire was shackled to the descending line and
lowered to the diver, who shackled it to the hatch at 1039, and
started coming up, being placed in the decompression chamber at
1124.
12. The extremely skillful work of this first diver resulted in
marked expedition of the whole rescue operation and contributed
greatly to its ultimate success. In addition to shackling on the
downhaul wire it was necessary for him to clear the bight of the
marker buoy line, which lay across the hatch, and was still fouled
somewhere over the side. Had this buoy line been allowed to remain,
it would have endangered rescue chamber operations by possibly
fouling the downhaul or preventing a tight seal on the hatch.
13. The rescue chamber was hoisted over the side for the first
rescue trip at 1130 and reported on the submarine at 1212. The
operator reported the SQUALUS to have a seven degree list and
to be down by the stern. At 1240 the chamber had been securely
attached to the submarine and the upper hatch opened. The lower
escape hatch was found closed. This lower hatch was opened and
contact established with the submarine crew at 1247. Provisions
and dehydrating material were delivered to the crew, the submarine
was ventilated through the chamber for several minutes, and seven
passengers taken on board. At 1256 the submarine hatch was closed,
and preparations made for the ascent. At 1342 the rescue chamber
reached the surface, the hatch was opened, and survivors evacuated.
14. The first three rescue trips of the rescue chamber were made
expeditiously, and equipment functioned as designed throughout
these trips. The times at which detailed operations of the chamber
were carried out are entered in Inclosure (B), together with the
names of the survivors removed on each trip. This was the first
occasion in which the rescue chamber has been used for other than
training purposes, and the results achieved have fully justified
the vision, faith, and hard work of those involved in the development
of the equipment.
15. The fourth trip of the rescue chamber proceeded apparently
according to schedule up to 2022, when during the ascent, with
the last survivors on board, the air motor which drives the downhaul
equipment stalled and could not be re-started. An attempt was
made to continue the ascent by controlling with the brake instead
of the motor, but at 155 feet depth the reel again jammed and
no further downhaul wire could be let out, even with the brake
released. A heavy strain was taken on the retriever wire with
the deck winch, but the chamber was apparently fouled, and could
not be broken loose without danger of parting the retrieving cable.
The downhaul equipment could not be moved either up or down, therefore
the decision was made to lower the chamber to the bottom and send
a diver down to unshackle or cut the downhaul wire to free the
chamber. The chamber was given negative buoyancy in order to lower
it to the boom. The diver (Squire) was put over at 2113 and reported
on the submarine at 2115. At 2118 he reported that he could not
unshackle the wire, and at 2122 reported that he had cut it. An
attempt was immediately made to heave up the chamber with the
winch, but the strain on the retriever was abnormally heavy and
at 2125, the retrieving wire stranded. The strain was quickly
taken off, and the chamber lowered to the bottom, in order to
prevent parting the retrieving cable entirely, as only one small
strand of the cable remained intact.
16. At 2149 a diver (Clayton) was put over for the purpose of
bending a new retrieving cable to the chamber. This diver became
involved in difficulties shortly after reaching the bottom, probably
due to entanglement in one of the lines, and had to be hauled
to the surface without accomplishing anything. At 2247 a second
diver (Duncan) was sent down to the chamber, who also became involved
in fouled lines and had such difficulties with lights that it
appeared hopeless to accomplish anything by this method. After
conference, a decision was reached that the best method of getting
the chamber up would be to adjust the buoyancy of the chamber
as nearly as possible to neutral on the negative side and then
haul in the frayed retrieving wire carefully by hand in order
not to part the remaining strand. In using this method, the danger
of acquiring positive buoyancy of the chamber, with resultant
swift ascent to the surface, and the possibility of its coming
up under the FALCON had to be accepted. However, as no alternative
appeared practicable, this method was decided upon at 2400.
17. Operations on 25 May 1939 followed. At 0004, in compliance
with instructions from the controlling officer, the main ballast
tank of the chamber was partially blown three times for periods
of 30 seconds, 15 seconds and 15 seconds respectively, and a light
strain taken by hand on the retrieving wire, with result that
after the last blowing, it was possible to lift the chamber without
much strain on the stranded retrieving wire. By the exercise of
excellent judgement, the chamber had been brought to exactly the
condition of buoyancy desired, so that it could be hauled in with
very little strain, this avoiding the imminent danger of parting
the one strand of the cable which was left, as well as the danger
of rapid ascent of the chamber out of control. After once being
started, the chamber came up easily, reaching the surface at 0023,
and the last known survivors were evacuated at 0025.
18. Rescue operations might reasonably have been considered complete
at this point. The Commanding Officer of the SQUALUS stated that
he was absolutely sure that all after compartments with the possible
exception of the after torpedo room, were flooded, and that in
the absence of any communications from that compartment, the indications
were that flooding was complete throughout the after part of the
vessel. All evidence obtainable from the surface pointed to the
same conclusion. However, in order that all possibilities of finding
further personnel on board the SQUALUS alive might be explored
and eliminated, it was decided to make a trip in the chamber to
the after torpedo room at the earliest practicable moment, and
determine definitely whether or not that compartment was also
flooded. Accordingly, After shifting moorings in order to place
the FALCON in a position more favorable to reach the after torpedo
room hatch and renewing the downhaul wire of the rescue chamber
and checking over the operating equipment of the reel, diving
operations were again resumed at 1341 in order to attach the downhaul
wire to the after torpedo room hatch. The first and second divers
sent down failed to attach the wire due to fouling of lines and
great depth of water, but the third diver was successful at 1602
and was back in the decompression chamber at 1657.
19. At 1719 the rescue chamber commenced descent, and at 1745
reached the submarine. It was necessary in this operation to equalize
the pressure in the chamber with that of the sea in order to enable
the submarine hatch to be opened without flooding the chamber.
This was done, and upon cracking the submarine hatch, water commenced
to flood into the chamber from the torpedo room, proving that
the after torpedo room was flooded. The submarine hatch was secured,
and the rescue chamber started up, using the usual decompression
schedule during the ascent because the operators had been subjected
to full sea pressure. At 2107 the rescue chamber was landed on
deck. Badders, W., C.M.M., U.S.N., was in charge of the chamber
in this operation, and Mihalowski, J., T.M.1c. was his assistant.
These men were fully aware of the great danger involved. If they
became incapacitated, there was no way in which they could be
rescued, as the chamber could not be entered from the outside.
Considering all facts, it is felt that these men accepted the
greatest personal risk of any during the entire rescue operations,
and performed their duties in accordance with the highest traditions
of the service.
20. Rescue operations were considered definitely at an end at
this stage, and salvage operations started."
21. In concluding this report of Rescue Operations, it is desired
to bring to the attention of the Department the efficiency displayed
by all agencies taking part. The promptness of action of the Navy
Department in getting personnel and material to the scene of the
disaster undoubtedly had much to do with the success of the operation.
During the operations, quick, thorough and efficient action was
displayed without exception by all hands. Many difficult and unforeseen
situations arose suddenly and were in all cases handled with a
great display of efficient initiative. There was never any undue
excitement or confusion.
22. The commander Rescue Operations, U.S.S. SQUALUS, desires to
invite the Department's particular attention to the following,
which are deemed worthy of the highest praise:
The
Commanding Officer of the SCULPIN, Lieutenant Warren D. Wilkin,
U.S.Navy, for his alertness in picking up the distress signal
of the SQUALUS and his efficient action in definitely locating
the wreck.
The
efficient action of the Boatswain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Portsmouth,
N.H., Chief Boatswain David L. Ullman, U.S. Navy, in placing the
marker buoys and in so promptly grappling the wreck, which enabled
the FALCON to moor in position to begin operations immediately
upon arrival.
The
prompt arrival of numerous vessels of the U.S. Coast Guard and
their inestimable usefulness and cooperation throughout the operations.
The
efficient work of the divers and rescue chamber operators throughout
the period of rescue, particularly Martin O. Sibitzky, B.M. 1c
of the FALCON, who secured the rescue chamber downhaul to the
forward torpedo room escape hatch and cleared the hatch in 22
minutes from the time he landed on the deck of the SQUALUS. This
was done at a depth of 220 feet of water at a temperature of 29
degrees.
The
exceptional coolness, judgment and initiative of Commander Allan
R. McCann, U.S. Navy, in handling what was probably the most trying
and difficult situation of the rescue period, viz: the fourth
and last trip up of the rescue chamber with survivors. Their outstanding
handling of this situation undoubtedly prevented severe bodily
injury to the occupants of the chamber and the possible damage
to the chamber, the FALCON, or both.
The
appearance and bearing of all SQUALUS officers and men as they
stepped out of the rescue chamber to the deck of the FALCON indicated
a high state of discipline and morale under the most trying conditions.
The
exceptionally courageous and efficient conduct of W. Badders,
CMM., U.S.N., and J. Mihalalowski, T.M. 1c, U.S.N., as described
in paragraph 19 of this report.
The
efficient administration of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, by the
Captain of the Yard, Captain William F. Amsden, U.S. Navy, and
by the Commandant's Aide, Lieutenant Commander John J. Curley,
Jr., U.S. Navy, during the conditions requiring the utmost energy
and tact.
The
generous response of the individuals from all walks of life throughout
the country.
C.W. COLE
Rear Admiral U.S.N.
| Commander | Rear Admiral C. W. Cole, USN |
| Aide | Captain H. R. Greenlee, USN |
| Aide | Captain R. S. Edwards, USN |
| Technical Aide | Commander A. I. McKee (CC), USN |
| Technical Aide | Commander A. R. McCann, USN |
| Technical Aide | Lieutenant Commander F. A. Tusler, USN |
| Aide (Recorder) | Lieutenant Commander R. L. Sackett, USN |
| Diving Officer | Lieutenant Commander C. B. Momsen, USN |
| Assistant Diving Officer | Lieutenant J. K. Morrison, USN |
| Medical Officers | Lieutenant O. D. Yarbrough (MC), USN |
| Lieutenant A. R. Behnke (MC), USN | |
| Lieutenant T. L. Willmon (MC), USN | |
| Technical Aide | Gunner W. P. Barron, USN |