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7 June 1939
From: Harold C. Preble, Naval Architect
Portsmouth
Navy Yard,
U.S.S.
SQUALUS Survivor.
To: Lieutenant O.F. Naquin, U.S.N.,
Commanding
Officer, U.S.S. SQUALUS.
Subject: Statement in regard to the U.S.S. SQUALUS
Casualty.
1. On Monday, 22 May 1939, I left with the U.S.S. SQUALUS
which made three very satisfactory dives. The trim of the boat
on this day was excellent. The SQUALUS returned to Portsmouth
Harbor for anchorage.
2. On Tuesday morning, 23 May, the vessel got underway around
0730 for the diving area in the vicinity of White Island. As the
diving area was approached, the word was passed to rig ship for
diving. I went to the control room around 0800 and stayed in the
control room from then on. Lieutenant
W.T. Doyle, the Diving Officer, was in the control room upon
my arrival and remained there. The vessel's trial diving crew
were assembled at their diving stations. While in the control
room prior to the dive, I gave out the Trial Board Data Books
and other information to those who were to be on data stations.
3. The procedure for the day was to go through the first day's
work that would be undertaken on the first day of preliminary
trials. As the vessel was rigged for diving in the various compartments,
report was given to Lieutenant Doyle and he himself personally
checked these off on the "Rig for Diving" check-off
board. I personally noted that all H[igh].P[ressure]. banks were
charged to 3000 lbs. I also checked to see that at least two banks
were cut in and that on this block H.P. air forward and aft was
cut in, two supply connections to 600-lb blow manifold were open,
and H.P. air open to bow buoyancy and safety tank knocker valves.
600-lb blow manifold was rigged for blowing all tanks by means
of the master valve.
4. Lieutenant J.C. Nichols, coming from forward, personally reported
to Lieutenant Doyle that the vessel had been properly rigged for
diving forward. Lieutenant J.H. Patterson, coming from aft, also
reported to Lieutenant Doyle that the vessel was rigged for diving
aft. Lieutenant Doyle reported to Captain Naquin on the bridge
that the vessel was rigged for diving. Prior to this I had been
standing on the after side of the chart desk and upon Lieutenant
Doyle's reporting the ship ready for diving, I took my customary
diving station, which is standing by the after end of the chart
desk, leaning against the same, facing forward, with my left foot
on the bottom round of the ladder leading to the conning tower
and my right foot upon a tool box which I always have placed,
which gives me an elevated height to be able to see clearly the
kingston and vent and hull opening indicator boards and from this
elevated position I could also see the diving rudder indicators,
trim indicators, mamometer and Pitometer log indicator and shaft
revolution indicators. This dive was a 16-knot dive and at the
start of the dive all kingstons and main vents were closed and
pressure had been vented in the ballast tanks. Captain Naquin
requested that the diving message be sent out and when this had
been done, report was sent up to the bridge that diving message
had been sent and receipted for.
5. Shortly after this, word came from the Commanding Officer to
stand by to dive, this word being passed throughout the ship.
The following valves and openings showing "open" were:-
the conning tower hatch, Nos. 1 and 2 engine exhaust valves, Nos.
3 and 4 engine exhaust valves, and ventilation valves. I had two
combination, double-action stop watches, one in each hand, and
held the same at eye level. We then got one blast on the diving
alarm, conning tower hatch indicator light went green, Nos. 3
and 4 engines were shut down in 5 seconds and Nos. 1 and 2 engines
were shut down in 7 seconds. Word came by telephone from each
engine room that engines were shut down and on top of this the
exhaust valves showed closed by lights going green. Engine air
inductions valve was closed in 9 seconds and showed green. With
the induction valve showing "shut," Lieutenant Doyle
held up two fingers to Campbell, C.T.M. of the boat, who gave
two blasts on the diving alarm, and at the same time Lieutenant
Doyle ordered pressure in the boat. Lieutenant Doyle reported
to the Captain that pressure was in the boat. Upon the first blast,
all kingstons were opened, safety tank vent, bow buoyancy vent,
and No. 1 main vent. Immediately following pressure in the boat,
Doyle ordered all vents open, both bow and stern planes were on
25 dive, and the boat assumed her customary down angle, hanging
up normally at 28-30 feet, and at 35 feet I remarked that we were
making our time as I had my records of previous dives in front
of me, glancing at them. At 35 feet our diving time was 38 or
39 seconds. At 50 feet, our diving time was 58 seconds flat by
my stop watch. Down angle was as usual 9º. The Commanding
Officer told Doyle to level off at 50 feet and he walked from
back of Doyle [word indistinct] the chart desk to man his periscope,
at the same time stating the time that he had taken on his watch
and complimenting Doyle upon the nice dive. Doyle at approximately
40 feet ordered closed safety tank vent and bow buoyancy vent.
At approximately 45 feet, had the rudders eased off and before
we reached 50 feet had ordered all vents closed. The ship was
leveling off as usual and I believe the maximum depth the boat
would have reached would have been around 70 feet. All during
this time the SQUALUS appeared to be acting perfectly,
following our previous dives and the dives of her sister ship,
the [U.S.S.] SCULPIN. At approximately 60 feet word came
by telephone that engine room was flooding and the Commanding
Officer ordered all tanks blown, and the ship for a short space
of time seemed to respond as usual. We immediately lost power
and main lights. The only lights we had were emergency lights.
Realizing that we needed more H.P. air than two banks, I knew
then that the only thing to do was to cut in another bank. I wedged
myself between the chart desk and the H.P. air manifold, sitting
on the desk, and took the handle for opening up H.P. air banks
and started cutting in another bank. While I was doing this I
felt a sudden terrific increase in pressure and while I was in
this position, trying to open this bank, I was struck on the back
with a volume of water coming in the ventilation line directly
over me, this volume of water driving my head and shoulders down.
This same volume of water knocked down the trim manifold man and
he, in turn, fell on me. While in this position I saw them close
the door into the after battery room. Water was then flowing through
this door. The man closing the starboard bulkhead ventilation
valve over the door to after battery seemed to be experiencing
considerable trouble in closing this valve as water continued
to come. Emergency lights went out when Gainor pulled the battery
switches. The vessel in going to the bottom assumed more of a
down angle by the stern and I should judge it to be approximately
45º. We struck the bottom easily and finally settled at 11º
up by the bow. A hydraulic line up over the steering gear spurted
a considerable amount of oil in the control room and after the
oil there was heard a hissing sound of air from the same line.
6. Throughout the time of this extreme emergency the officers
and men on the ship acted as if the same emergency arose on every
dive undertaken by the ship. There was absolutely no excitement.
Captain Naquin, his officers and men were very cool and I cannot
think of one single detail that was left undone. The Commanding
Officer, officers and men, from my observations while operating
with them, knew their ship very well. In my estimation, Gainor's
quickness in noting the high rate of discharge and his bravery
in entering the battery tank and pulling the switches to prevent
fire in the forward battery can by no means be overlooked.
7. The U.S.S. SQUALUS is the second boat of her class and
during our previous sea operations she had experienced practically
no difficulties. In fact, on our fifth dive we were making times
corresponding approximately to those of SCULPIN on the
Saturday prior to her preliminary trials. I believe this is due
to certain modifications made to the boat and training of the
ship's officers prior to our sea trials.
8. There was no communication aft after word came that engine
room was flooding. Captain Naquin immediately made a survey of
the entire situation. All bulkhead doors and ventilation valves
forward had been closed at sometime during this trouble. We were
in total darkness except for portable emergency lanterns and hand
flashlights. Every one in the control room and forward were O.K.
This was found out by means of telephones forward. There was no
water forward. Captain Naquin ordered Lieutenant Nichols to release
the marker buoy forward from the forward torpedo room. He then
ordered a recognition signal ejector fired. Captain Naquin told
those in the control room that we had nothing to worry about,
only just wait for time and help would be at hand. I told Captain
Naquin and those in the control room that in 5 hours we would
know that help was at hand above us and that in 35 hours we would
be on the surface and gave the following reasons:- I told them
that we were most fortunate in having Admiral Cole, who had been
head of submarines, as our Commandant, as I remembered distinctly
what he did at the time the [U.S.S.] POLLACK was delayed
from sending a surfacing message to the [Portsmouth Navy] Yard
due to a flooded radio trunk. I cited how he ran from the pump
well to berth 5 where the [U.S.S.] PIKE was berthed and
asked how quickly they could get underway, ordering them to be
ready for getting underway immediately. He had salvage equipment
moved aboard the PIKE and prior to doing this he had messages
already to be released at his command. I also told them that the
SCULPIN was in our neighborhood and she would be despatched
immediately to our diving area. I checked with Powell who had
recently been on the [U.S.S.] FALCON as to the length of
time it would take the FALCON to reach us. This check for
time was approximately 14 hours.
9. Captain Naquin ordered Momsen lungs passed back to the control
room from the torpedo room and ordered those forward to get their
lungs also. A Momsen lung was given each man and Captain Naquin
re-instructed his men in its use. He gave me personal instructions
in regard to the use of the same, as I had never used a lung before
although I knew the principles. After receiving the Momsen lungs
a few of us went forward to the torpedo room in order to more
nearly equalized those of us in each compartment. While in the
forward torpedo room Gainor asked that the valve in back of the
of the I.C. board for battery fresh water tanks be closed as he
feared that the battery fresh water tanks in the after compartment
would collapse, causing salt water to get into the forward system
and thereby rupture battery fresh water tanks in the forward battery
space to such an extent that salt water would be admitted to the
battery. As I passed through the battery space, I noted how warm
this compartment was. Captain Naquin told the men to make themselves
as comfortable as possible by lying down, not to exert any energy,
and to refrain from talking. In the forward torpedo room some
hours later, Lieutenant Nichols obtained dry mattress covers and
spread out soda lime in order that the CO2 in the compartment
would be absorbed. From time to time the soda lime was replenished
as necessary. During our stay in the forward torpedo room Captain
Naquin was always in touch with us. On several times during our
stay he came through to the forward torpedo room and made personal
inquiries about our condition and made cheery remarks which broke
the monotony of our waiting. The mere presence of our Captain
and his smile, seen by the aid of flashlight, certainly gave every
one a lift in spirits and confidence. While in the forward torpedo
room Lieutenant Nichols reinstructed us in the method of escape
by the use of the escape chamber. Oxygen was released as necessary.
10. True to prediction, we heard the propellers of the SCULPIN
overhead and it was my impression that she first circled the marker
buoy and then the sound of it being hauled onto the deck of the
SCULPIN. We then heard the voice of Captain Wilkin of our
sister ship, the SCULPIN on which I had previous duty.
Lieutenant Nichols told him our condition and of the 33 men accounted
for. During Nichols' conversation, Naquin came forward to talk
to Wilkin and during his conversation with Wilkin the buoy line
broke. I was much surprised that this line did not break before
because I know how difficult it is to maneuver a submarine on
the surface in a seaway.
11. I think that after this conversation the SCULPIN laid
a little off from us and charged batteries and air banks. I heard
the arrival of a ship and from the sound of her oscillator I believed
it to be the [U.S.S.] WANDANK, and later in the early morning
hours the arrival of the FALCON. I knew it was the FALCON
by the sound of her oscillator; also I knew that the FALCON
was anchoring directly over us because you could hear the boats
going back and forth which I presumed to be putting out port and
starboard anchors fore and aft. From then on we were in communication
by means of Morse code messages.
HAROLD C. PREBLE.
Source: USS Squalus file, World War II Command
File, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center
21
August 2000