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Return to Frequently
Asked Questions page. Source: Chief of Naval Operations, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46 Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC.
Related Resource: Cuban
Missile Crisis, 1962
Glossary
Stand down and Conclusion
On Wednesday, 14 November, the final week of the naval
quarantine began and all major decisions and actions were being
taken at the diplomatic level. The one remaining bar to success
in obtaining the removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba concerned
the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers. However, U. S. negotiators
were confident that the USSR would acquiesce on this point.
For the next six days, quarantine forces continued to intercept,
trail, and photograph ships of special interest approaching Cuba.
Routine replacement and relief of surface units continued. However,
there was no stand down of contingency forces, which had reached
a peak of readiness for any eventuality. The first sign of relaxation
came on the 14th, when the JCS removed the worldwide communication
MINIMIZE order which had been issued on October 21. The restriction
remained, however, within the 15th Naval District and most of
the Western Atlantic. The Strategic Air Command, which had generated
an awesome nuclear deterrent capability, was authorized to reduce
its airborne alert to 1/8th, returning to a status held prior
to October 21. At 2400R on October 23 the Strategic Integrated
Operation Plan status was 844 aircraft and 337 missiles. At 1800R
on November 14 the status was 1,613 aircraft and 355 missiles.
While the U.S. and USSR negotiators parried on the IL-28 question
and tried to cope with Castro's intransigence, on Thursday, 15
November, five large-hatch Russian ships left Soviet ports and
were believed en route to Cuba. A covert aerial inspection using
a neutron sensor was ordered in an effort to detect the presence
of nuclear cargo.
Soviet submarine activity was nil, with only two possible contacts
reported on the morning of the 14th. Atkarsk was hailed
and photographed by W. A. Lee, and an aircraft photographed
Okhotsk. However, Theodor Korner had not been sighted.
Eight ships of the 5th MEB group were scheduled for 24-hour visits
to Jamaican ports from November 18-21.
By Friday, 15 November, Korner had not been sighted
since departing the Baltic on October 30. CINCLANTFLT canceled
a special aircraft search for her, but quarantine forces remained
alert for this ship during their routine patrols.
Atkarsk was transiting Providence Channel with McCaffery
trailing. No topside cargo was observed and air/surface photos
had been taken. Sellers intercepted Okhotsk at 2030E
and was trailing. She was expected to be inside the 500-mile quarantine
line by daylight 17 November and Sellers was to close for
hailing, visual observation, and photography when within the quarantine
area.
Up to this point in the quarantine operation, naval aircraft had
flown 30,000 flight hours in 9,000 sorties for a total distance
of six million miles. Sixty-eight squadrons composed of 19,000
personnel, and eight aircraft carriers, whose combined crews totaled
25,000 personnel, had participated in the action.
The 90 COMCRUDESLANT ships which were involved had steamed for
a total of 780,000 miles, and each of the carriers had covered
a 10,000-mile track. COMSERVLANT had provided logistic support
to an afloat population of 85,000 in 183 ships which were deployed
over a 2,100-mile front.
On the 16th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President
for a discus-ion on removal of the IL-28's and the military implications
of negotiating a no-invasion policy towards Cuba. Their stand
was that the IL-28's should be removed, preferably by negotiation,
otherwise by blockade or direct military action, if required.
They recommended that the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba
be made an immediate objective of negotiation with the USSR as
a condition for granting a no-invasion pledge. Also in this regard,
the JCS said that any such assurance to Castro should state U.
S. obligations under the Rio Pact and link the assurance to Cuban
good behavior and acceptance of aerial surveillance. The Chiefs
opposed the seeking of a means for long-term verification and
inspection against offensive weapons in Cuba in exchange for United
Nations inspection of the Caribbean and a nuclear-free zone in
Latin America.
Up to Saturday, 17 November, there had been no basic changes
in force posture. Naval units were still at sea and ready. The
Continental Air Defense Command's interceptor forces were at their
wartime dispersal bases at 1/3rd alert and still were substantially
augmented in the Southeast U.S., and particularly in Florida.
SAC aircraft remained dispersed with 1/8th airborne and a total
generated force of 1,456 planes and 355 missiles. Air forces committed
to CINCLANT operations plans were ready for a daylight response
for selective targets within Cuba within a two-to-twelve hour
timetable. Contingency invasion forces were ready on a seven-day
reaction basis, following an assault air strike. The commanders
of these forces reported that they could maintain their current
status of readiness for about 30 more days without adverse effects.
The position of Theodor Korner finally was established
at 31-30N, 29-30W. Atkarsk entered Havana, and Okhotsk
was being trailed by Sellers. A cargo of approximately
240 tons of steel was sighted and the ship was cooperative.
Three pilots reported a possible SAM missile launch from Cuba
at 1100R. The object first was noticed by a white trail of flame
at high altitude, described as extremely brilliant. The flame
became shorter and seemed to burn out with several red flashes.
The object was on a steady course and might have originated from
the Matanzas SA-2 site which was 50 miles distant from the reporting
aircraft. There had been no evidence of a deliberate attempt to
shoot down U. S. aircraft, although several reconnaissance planes
were over water in the vicinity at the time.
On Sunday, 18 November, the policy of canceling low-level
reconnaissance flights remained in effect. Although there had
been high-level flights since the 14th, the BLUE MOON sorties
were being canceled on a day-to-day basis. There was concern that
these cancellations were diplomatically unwise in view of Castro's
publicly announced intentions to shoot down U. S. surveillance
aircraft.
During the day, COMCARDIV 20 in Lake Champlain relieved
COMCARDIV 14 in Wasp as CTG 136.2. CINCLANT reported that
the Guatemalan frigate Burrunida, which was in overhaul
at a Miami shipyard, had been formally placed at the disposition
of the U.S. for quarantine use. Argentina also asked the U.S.
to submit a request for two P2V aircraft to support the operation.
These were the last two of many offers made by OAS nations prior
to the lifting of the quarantine.
Meanwhile, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Havana
radio had broadcast orders for all domestic aircraft to clear
Cuban skies. Concurrently, a notice to airmen was published forbidding
international flights into or over the island without 24-hour
advance notice. No reason was given for the order; however, it
was held likely that Castro intended to take action on his threat
to shoot down reconnaissance planes.
Okhotsk was being trailed by Rhodes and was expected
to arrive in Havana about 0800R the next day.
During the next two days, 19-20 November, quarantine operations
remained in effect while the final curtain was slowly being drawn
on the negotiations to secure removal of the IL-28's. On the 19th,
Castro announced that if the Soviet Union wished to remove the
aircraft he would not obstruct such a move. This was followed
by the USSR's agreement to return the planes to Russia and affect
the withdrawal within 30 days.
At 1800R, on the 20th, President Kennedy announced the accord
during a press conference. At 1945R the JCS sent the following
message:
"Lift quarantine effective immediately. Return LANTFLT ships
to home ports and normal operating areas at your discretion. Maintain
one CVA with air group in ready status in Mayport Caribbean area.
Instructions will be furnished later as to future movements and
disposition of PACFLT amphibious forces. Anticipate requirement
for sighting and photographing Soviet ships departing Cuban ports
with IL-28 aircraft.
As the order went out to dissolve the quarantine forces, more
than 63 ships of the mighty force which had clearly demonstrated
its capability to respond quickly to their country's needs had
an opportunity to be home for Thanksgiving. other ships followed,
many arriving during the following weekend.
Admiral Anderson pointed out that the entire operation had been
a magnificent testimonial not only to the senior leaders of our
Government, but also to those commandeers and commanding officers
at lower levels who were so quickly able to move - - -large numbers
of troops -- their ships -- many ships -- and their aircraft of
many types in position to carry out lengthy, tedious, and often
very sensitive operations with a high degree of leadership, professional
competence, courage, and diplomatic skill.
As the Cuban quarantine came to an end, preparations to implement
CINCLANT contingency plans were being partially relaxed with Atlantic
Fleet units returning to home ports and normal operating areas.
Admiral Anderson advised his Fleet Commanders to anticipate the
photographic surveillance by surface ships and helicopters of
Soviet merchant ships out loading IL-28's from Cuban ports.
He suggested that the tempo of operations in all areas be dropped
to essential minimum levels, and offered, "My grateful appreciation
to all for their fine work, long hours, patience, and perseverance.
Well done."
One hundred and eighty-three ships had taken an active part in
Cuban operations during the quarantine. The carriers Independence
and Enterprise had remained at sea for 36 and 32 consecutive
days, respectively, with their screening destroyers rotating for
short-in-port periods -- some of only one-day's duration
Our hunter/killer ASW forces had averaged 23 days at sea and had
processed submarine contacts for a total of 2,889 hours.
Participating Atlantic Fleet amphibious forces had spent from
l- to 26 days at sea, and logistics units had averaged 20 days
of steaming within a 30-day period.
This narrative can be most succinctly concluded by COMSECONDFLT's
remarks in his first weekly summary to CINCLANT after the quarantine's
end:
"Again the United States had turned to seapower to wield
the iron fist in a velvet glove and again the Navy and ships of
the Atlantic Fleet had shown this confidence was not misplaced."' [
Back ]
Lessons
Learned
Movement of forces which have organic lift capability was prompt
and logistic coordination was handled in a timely fashion. However,
where lift was not organic, there was approximately a 24 hour
delay between the decision to preposition forces and the time
when they actually began to move during the period 18-22 October.
The reason for the delay was inadequate preparation on the part
of J-4 transportation personnel to set up proper coordinating
procedures with MATS. CNO discovered that, for example, the urgency
was not recognized for the airlifting of ammunition and POL from
Albany, Ga., to Guantanamo to support the Marine battalion being
airlifted from the West Coast, even though the Marine Corps had
made the request direct to MATS with the highest precedence. It
was not until CNO intervened that MATS and other logistics support
activities were made cognizant of the necessity for the closest
coordination and assignment of appropriate priorities to MATS
lift requirements in support of the Cuban operations. [
Back ]
Communications
The choke in communications became readily apparent at the onset
of the operation. Much of the problem was internal to the Pentagon
in the Navy Communications Center. Even traffic of the highest
precedence took as much as three hours for distribution and delivery
to the action officer's desk (CNO) after receipt. The delay was
partially overcome by having advance thermofax-reproduced copies
made in the communications center and delivered directly to CNO.
Operational Immediate traffic required from 30 minutes to four
hours between transmission by the sender and receipt by OPNAV,
depending upon the circuits used. Priority traffic, in one glaring
instance, was 26 hours en route.
In order to respond immediately to the civilian secretariat and
the Department of Defense, it became necessary to install single
sideband receivers in Flag Plot to provide on-the-scene read-out
information. [ Back
]
Identification
of Ships from High Level Reconnaissance
Strategic Air Command reconnaissance aircraft sent FLASH messages
of sightings of merchant vessels. These reports did not indicate
the type of ship or its course and speed. It was frequently necessary
to wait until the planes returned, their photographs were developed,
and their pilots debriefed before it could be determined whether
or not the reported sighting was of a ship of interest.
In another operation of this type, reconnaissance pilots should
use the Recognition and Identification Guide for Shipping (RIG-1).
By referring to this booklet, FLASH reports could be sent with
proper ship identification information. [ Back ]
IL-28
Outloading
With the Soviet agreement to remove the 11-28's and the lifting
of the quarantine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared to recommend
relaxations in the readiness posture. On November 21, the JCS
solicited CINCLANT's opinions in this regard, particularly as
related to Cuban contingency reaction times and aerial reconnaissance.
Although the U.S. did not set any deadline by which the bomber
removal should be effected, Soviet negotiators said this would
be accomplished in about 30 days.
During this period, readiness posture was to be maintained within
reduced reaction times as a measure against Soviet reluctance
or bad faith. It also was necessary to continue aerial surveillance
to insure compliance with the agreement. Readiness to retaliate
against attack on reconnaissance aircraft also wag required.
On November 23, the JCS approved certain rules of engagement for
support of low-level BLUE MOON reconnaissance flights. The rules
provided combat air patrols for the flights in the event of aerial
interception, fighter strikes against surface anti-aircraft sites
firing upon the reconnaissance planes; and flak-suppression flights
along routes to be flown by the BLUE MOON aircraft. These
special rules were promulgated because it was anticipated that
weather for the next 30 days would necessitate reliance on low-level
reconnaissance missions and restrict intelligence collection by
the high-altitude BRASS KNOB U-2 flights.
While the JCS awaited CINCLANT stand-own recommendations, relaxation
began in other areas. On November 21 the Secretary of the Navy
rescinded the October 23 order which involuntarily extended the
periods of obligated service for naval personnel. The same day,
the Air Force authorized the release by November 28 of reservists
called into active service.
Although the quarantine had been lifted, CINCLANTFLT continued
to maintain a plot of merchant shipping to and from Cuba. There
had been no indication of a relaxation of Cuban military posture,
and on November 24, CINCLANT recommended further reinforcement
of Guantanamo. However, the JCS disapproved this recommendation,
which was based on CINCLANT's personal inspection of the base.
The Chiefs believed reinforcement was unnecessary, although they
held out that further build-up could be required in the event
Operations Plan 316-62 was ordered executed.
Also on the 24th, Cuba began to demobilize its alerted militia
units, but the Castro regime was continuing its propaganda broadcasts
against the governments of other Latin American countries. Top
Cuban government leaders met to discuss a reply to the U.S. reconnaissance
activity.
On November 28th, the JCS appraised the Cuban situation
and forwarded their stand-down recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense. These included termination of the l/8th airborne alert,
the return of B-47 aircraft to home bases, except for those in
Florida, authorization for the various commands concerned to return
to DEFCON 5 status except where specific situations dictate otherwise,
the release of the Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units, and
the authority for the return to normal operations of U. S. naval
ships and air squadrons associated with the maritime quarantine.
All other forces, however, were being maintained at high readiness,
and military forces were capable of reacting on a 12-hour basis
for CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62 and on a 7-day basis for CINCLANT OpPlan
316-62, except that necessary shipping had not been accumulated.
In this new situation, the JCS saw the need for high and low-level
aerial reconnaissance over Cuba and over Soviet shipping in order
to ascertain whether the Soviet commitments were being ful filled.
At the same time, they recognized the needs of our forces and
the personnel hardships which high alert levels imposed.
In recognition of these facts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered
the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate with further
reduction to normal pre-Cuba posture prior to Christmas, contingent
on actual Soviet withdrawal of IL-28 aircraft from Cuba:
a. Overflight reconnaissance.
(1) High-level: Alert posture which would permit an average
of two U-2 flights per day cumulative from November 21 and not
more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.
(2) Low-level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert, and eight
aircraft on 24-hour alert; similar readiness for all aircraft
which were to support these reconnaissance missions.
b. Local reprisal strike aircraft: 24 hours following a
decision to execute.
c. Reimposition of the quarantine of Cuba: 72 hours.
d. Attack on SAM sites, IL-28's, and/or all air defenses
in Cuba: 48 hours.
e. Execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62: 72 hours.
f. Execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62: 18 days.
g. Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those
units needed to increase the air defense of the Southeastern United
States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this
region were under study.
h. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.
Relaxation of readiness posture to these levels was seen as permitting
the following actions to be taken:
a. CINCLANT and component headquarters could maintain their
activated communications net. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters
elements could be returned to home stations except for reduced
staffs maintained at Homestead AFB.
b. Air forces: The reaction times provided could permit
the return of all units, less those required for conduct of and
combat support to reconnaissance missions, to home bases and the
resumption of normal training. War-reserve material and selected
support and control personnel would remain at Florida bases.
c. Marine forces: All West Coast units less the 3rd LAAM
Battalion could be returned to home station- at once. The FMF
Atlantic units which presently were part of the recent Guantanamo
defense augmentation would remain as deployed with a goal of returning
to home stations by December 20. The 5th MEB shipping would be
utilized insofar as practicable in returning Marines to the West
Coast.
d. Army forces: All Army units could be returned to home
stations except those required to support CINCLANT and component
headquarters and the 159th Boat Battalion, which would remain
temporarily at Fort Lauderdale pending completion of studies to
determine a suitable location that would enable it to meet the
required reaction time.
e. Navy forces: One CVA Group was being retained temporarily
in the Guantanamo sea area to support the defense of Guantanamo
until December 20. A Carrier Task Group was also retained in the
Norfolk-Mayport area against the possible requirement for sighting
Soviet ships departing Cuban ports with IL-28 aircraft and to
support possible air-strikes under CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62.
The timely availability of shipping continued to be the critical
factor in establishing an adequate force ashore within the 18
day reaction time for CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62. To assure that this
reaction time could be met, the following actions were recommended:
a. COMSTS should be given authority to recall transports
without completion of voyages in process when the decision is
made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62.
b. COMSTS should be given authority to requisition ships
if the decision were made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT
OpPlan 316-62.
c. The recommissioning of the 11 LST's should be continued.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to review the situation on
a continuing basis in order to determine whether the criteria
could be relaxed to permit a continuing phase-own to an approximately
normal posture by about December 20. If the continued phase-down
were warranted, the remaining units were to be returned to home
stations, and dependents returned to Guantanamo prior to Christmas.
In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a reassessment
of the situation on a continuing basis in order to ascertain whether
the IL-28 withdrawal warranted continued relaxation to normal
readiness levels prior to Christmas.
The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS proposals, and CINCLANT
was requested to implement measures to accomplish the actions
recommended.
Also on November 28, preliminary analysis of reconnaissance
photographs taken three days before indicated that IL-28 and UIL-28
aircraft at San Julien airfield were being disassembled. Of the
13 planes which had been uncrated, six still were completely assembled,
the remaining seven had no engines, and the wings had been removed
from three.
For the next several days, reconnaissance photographs taken from
high-altitudes by U-2 aircraft showed continued disassembly of
the IL-28 bombers at San Julien. They also revealed that crated
IL-28's at Holguin had been removed between November 25 and 27;
their whereabouts were unknown. Also, during this period, CINCLANT
began to implement JCS policy for a gradually relaxation of readiness
posture. On November 30 elements of Amphibious Squadron
Three with personnel and equipment of the Second Battalion, First
Marines, were loading for departure from Guantanamo to arrive
in Panama between December 1-5.
The first of the IL-28's were reported outbound from Cuba on December
1. The Soviet freighter Okhotsk was sighted underway in
the Florida Straits with three fuselages on her weather deck.
In addition, reconnaissance photographs for the past few days
had revealed the outloading of missile erectors at Mariel.
From December 1 through December 3, operations were characterized
by further deployment of forces in execution of stand-down policy.
Analysis on December 3 of reconnaissance photographs taken three
days before indicated that all 13 of the previously assembled
I-28 aircraft at San Julien were being broken down and crated.
On December 5, the Soviet Union, through the Cuban negotiation
team at the United Nations, provided a list of the ships which
would be outloading the IL-28's and their shipping schedules.
The schedule listed 42 IL-28's to be shipped from Cuba on December
5, 6, and 7. Twelve were to be aboard the Okhotsk from
Nuevitas on the 5th; 15 in the Kasimov from Mariel on the
6th or 7th; and 15 in the Krasnograd from Mariel, also
on the 6th or 7th. Soviet negotiators said that the ship masters
would cooperate in close air and surface inspection as they had
during the removal of the missiles. However, the schedule not
withstanding, the Okhotsk had left Mariel on the 1st and
the Kasimov left at 1530R on the 5th from the same port.
A reconnaissance aircraft reported visual evidence of 15 IL-28's
aboard the second ship. The Okhotsk proceeded to Nuevitas
where she loaded II-28 crates and departed on the 5th. Photographs
showed four crates had been loaded aboard on the 3rd. An underway
surveillance report said that in addition to the previously reported
three fuselages on her deck, there were now 16 large crates. The
destroyers Blandy and Robertswere closing for further
alongside inspection. Eleven of the crates aboard the Kasimov
were open at the port end, revealing aircraft fuselages; four
canvas-covered fuselages also were visible on deck.
From December 2-5 reconnaissance photography revealed the
crating of IL-28's at San Julien airfield and crated aircraft
at Mariel port, plus fuselages. These photos were taken by U-2
high-level sorties because low-level missions had been suspended
for several days. These BLUE MOON flights were not to be resumed
without JCS authority and would not be reinstituted unless the
BRASS KNOB missions were unable to satisfy intelligence needs.
CINCLANT reported that as of the 5th, during the past three months,
there had been a significant decline in shipping to Cuba. The
decline was most marked in Soviet flag vessels, which had dropped
from 66 in September to 31 in November. The number of Soviet satellite
ships calling at Cuban ports had declined from 55 in September
to 39 in November. On the 5th, the day of the CINCLANT report,
there were 30 Bloc ships in Cuban ports - 18 of them Russian -
18 ships en route to Cuba, and 16 on their way out.
At 0900R on December 6, the CINCLANTFLT duty officer reported
to CNO Flag Plot that the third Soviet ship scheduled for outloading
the IL-28's had left port. The Krasnograd was underway
from Mariel at 0830R. At 0825R, an aircraft sighted 15 crates
aboard which could accommodate IL-28 fuselages. Apparently, the
last of the bombers were on their way home. However, alongside
inspection was yet to confirm this fact.
At 0930R on December 7, CINCLANTFLT reported a total of
42 IL-28 fuselages had been sighted and photographed aboard the
Soviet merchant ships Kasimov, Krasnograd, and Okhotsk.
The Okhotsk had been the last of the three to submit to
alongside inspection, during which the crew removed the ends of
nine crates on deck to reveal their contents.
Interpretation of high-level BRASS KNOB reconnaissance photographs
taken on December 5 and 6 revealed that there were no longer any
weapons classified as offensive by the President remaining on
Cuban soil. The naval quarantine had apparently accomplished U.S.
political objective and once again the U. S. Navy had proven itself
an effective instrument of national power. [Back ]
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