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CNO's Historical Narrative: The Naval Quarantine of Cuba
Cordon of Steel The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis by Curtis Utz. No. 1 in the series The U.S. Navy in the Modern World.
Extracts Relating to the Cuban
Missile Crisis from:
Annual
Report of the Secretary of Defense
Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Navy
Annual
Report of the Secretary of Defense: July 1, 1962, to June 30,
1963, extract.
The Cuban Crisis
The importance of maintaining an adequate, ready, and flexible
Defense establishment was clearly illustrated in the fall of 1962
when the Soviet Union moved ballistic missiles into Cuba.
Starting in late July 1962, evidence of increased Soviet military
assistance to Cuba accumulated. The presence of air defense missiles
was confirmed from pictures taken on August 29. A determination
that certain shipping crates noted on September 28 aboard Cuba-bound
ships contained IL-28 medium-range bombers was made on October
9. Conclusive proof of the presence of medium-range ballistic
missiles did not become available until the analysis of photographs
taken on October 14 was completed on the next day. Further photographic
evidence on the size and type of the Soviet buildup was obtained
during the following days as the high altitude air surveillance,
assigned to the Strategic Air Command on October 12, was greatly
increased by Presidential order.
This sudden clandestine introduction of clearly offensive weapons
of mass destruction constituted a direct threat to the peace and
security of the Western Hemisphere. It had to be countered quickly
and effectively. During the week of October 15, the President
and his civilian and military assistants canvassed the alternative
courses open to the United States. The conclusions reached, as
announced to the Nation by the President on October 22, called
for a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under
shipment to Cuba, increased close surveillance of Cuba, reinforcement
of our base at Guantanamo, and various diplomatic measures, including
the endorsement of the quarantine by the Organization of American
States. When this endorsement was given on October 23, the President
issued Proclamation 3504 establishing the quarantine effective
on October 24 and directed the Secretary of Defense to take appropriate
measures.
Military steps to meet the current emergency had been initiated
during the previous week. Better than normal security was maintained,
aided by the previous scheduling of routine amphibious and other
naval exercises in the Caribbean and Atlantic areas and by the
gradual buildup of air defenses in the southeastern United States
started early in the year. Nevertheless, rumors of increased military
activities began to circulate, but it was vital to the success
of our policy that maximum secrecy be maintained until our course
of action was firmly determined, our information on Soviet activities
as complete as possible, and our armed forces ready to carry out
their assignments.
Since it was not known what course the Soviet Union would choose
to follow, the armed forces had been ordered "to prepare
for any eventualities," and almost the entire Defense establishment
was placed on alert status.
In case the Soviet Union determined to unchain a nuclear attack,
our retaliatory forces were ready to counter. Starting on October
20, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) began dispersing its bombers
and placed all aircraft on an upgraded alert--ready to take off,
fully equipped, within 15 minutes. On October 22, the B-52 heavy
bombers started a massive airborne alert, involving 24- hour flights
and immediate replacement for every aircraft that landed. ICBM
(Intercontinental Ballistics Missile) crews assumed a comparable
alert status. POLARIS submarines went to sea to preassigned stations.
The tremendous nuclear firepower of the United States was deployed
to discourage any reckless challenge.
Our air defense forces, under the operational control of the North
American Defense Command (NORAD), were equally ready for any emergency.
Fighter interceptors and HAWK and NIKE- HERCULES missile battalions
were moved to the southeast to supplement local air defense forces.
After October 22, interceptor units were either on patrol missions
or on a 5-to-15-minute alert.
The general purpose forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force started
to organize for the emergency on October 16. The command organization,
as finally developed, called for the Commander in Chief, Atlantic
(CINCLANT), to provide the unified command. He also retained control
of all naval components involved in tactical operations, as the
Commander of the U.S. Fleet, Atlantic. The responsibility for
Army and Air Force components was assigned to the Continental
Army Command (CONARC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) under
the designation of Army Forces, Atlantic (ARLANT), and Air Forces,
Atlantic (AFLANT). The commander of the Army XVIII Airborne Corps
was designated Joint Task Force Commander to plan for any joint
operations that might become necessary. Over-all direction was
exercised by the President and the Secretary of Defense through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who named the Chief of Naval Operations
as their representative for the quarantine.
The operational control of the quarantine force was assigned to
the Commander of the Second Fleet, who organized Task Force 136
for this purpose. Effective deployment constituted a mammoth task
to be accomplished in minimum time. To prevent future difficulties,
plans had to be developed, ship captains briefed, supply ships
dispatched, and thousands of details checked. Other Navy and Marine
forces faced similar tough schedules. Marines, if not already
engaged in landing exercises, were loaded on amphibious ships
and ordered to sea. At Guantanamo, dependents were evacuated to
the United States on October 22, and Marine units were shipped
by air and sea to reinforce the base. Task Force 135, including
the carrier Enterprise, was sent to the south of Cuba,
ready to join in the defense of Guantanamo if needed. The carrier
Independence and the supporting ships of Carrier Division
Six stood by to provide additional support. Antisubmarine forces
were redeployed to cover the quarantine operations. An intensive
air surveillance of the Atlantic was initiated, keeping track
of the 2,000 commercial ships usually in the area; regular and
reserve Navy aircraft were joined in this search by SAC bombers.
Major elements of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) were designated
for use by ARLANT and placed in advanced alert status. Logistic
support for the more than 100,000 men involved was directed by
a newly established Peninsula Base Command. Preparatory steps
were taken to make possible the immediate callup of high priority
Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. Air support for the
ground forces was provided by the TAC, which moved hundreds of
tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and troop carrier aircraft to
the southeast. To make room for all these units, the bombers,
tankers, and other aircraft not required for the current operations
were ordered to other bases in the United States.
This massive movement of ships, aircraft, and troops, together
with their weapons and equipment, was carried out with unprecedented
speed. The forces alerted were ready for their assignment when
the President addressed the Nation on the evening of Monday, October
22. Low altitude reconnaissance flights started over Cuba on October
23. When the Quarantine Proclamation became effective at 10:00
a.m. (EDT) on October 24, air and surface units of the Atlantic
Fleet were at their designated stations. Whether or not other
units would be called upon to carry out their operational missions
remained an unanswered question throughout this week of maximum
danger.
Photographic intelligence continued to show a rapid buildup of
offensive weapons in Cuba. The construction of permanent sites
for intermediate-range ballistic missiles was noted, in addition
to the deployment of the mobile medium-range type. On the other
hand, the potentially dangerous confrontations inherent in the
quarantine failed to develop. On October 25, the first Soviet
ship, the tanker Bucharest, was intercepted without incident
and permitted to proceed after it was determined without boarding
that it carried oil and no prohibited material. On the same day
it was confirmed that other Cuba-bound Soviet ships, likely to
require closer inspection, had changed course, possibly to return
to their home ports. On October 26, the freighter Marucla,
flying the Lebanese flag but chartered by the Soviet Government,
was boarded and cleared after a brief inspection. Tension increased
on October 27, when a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Maj. Rudolf Anderson,
Jr., USAF, was destroyed. Later in the day, the Secretary of Defense
asked the Air Force to call 24 troop carrier squadrons and their
supporting units to active duty, involving about 14,000 Air Force
Reservists.
The break in the crisis came on Sunday, October 28, when the Soviet
Government finally agreed to dismantle its offensive weapons in
Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union subject to United Nations
verification. If this pledge were carried out, additional military
actions would become unnecessary. Quarantine measures and aerial
surveillance, however, remained in effect. They were suspended
temporarily only for 2 days, October 30 and 31, while the Secretary
General of the United Nations was trying unsuccessfully to reach
an agreement with the Cuban Prime Minister on verifying the removal
of offensive weapons. While decreased activity at the missile
sites was noted on October 29, it was not until November 2 that
it could be announced that the dismantling of the weapon systems
had definitely been started. During the following days, aerial
reconnaissance provided detailed information not only on the progress
made in this work but also on the transfer of the missile systems
to the Cuban ports and the loading of 42 missiles and their support
equipment on eight Soviet ships. These ships sailed between November
5 and 9, and a final visual check was made as each of them passed
the quarantine.
Still unresolved, however, was the future of 42 IL-28 medium-range
bombers. Their removal entailed further diplomatic negotiations
that were not concluded successfully until November 20. The return
of these bombers to the Soviet Union was checked as carefully
as that of the missiles. All of them left Cuba on December 5 and
6, loaded on three Soviet ships.
Concurrently with the Soviet commitment on the IL-28's, the United
States Government announced the end of the quarantine effective
at 6:45 p.m. (EDT), November 20, 1963. Fifty- five Cuba-bound
merchant ships had been checked during the 4-week quarantine;
none was found to carry any prohibited material. With the end
of the quarantine, the ships of Task Force 136 as well as those
of the more recently formed Inter-American Quarantine Force, composed
of Argentinian, Dominican, Venezuelan, and United States units,
returned to normal duties. The special alert activities of our
armed forces at home and abroad gradually were reduced, and the
units no longer required were returned to their permanent stations.
The Air Force Reserve units called to active duty were released
by the end of November, and the extension of tours of duty for
Navy personnel, ordered on October 24, was canceled. Only aerial
reconnaissance sorties were continued, since the on-site verification
of the removal of all offensive weapons, originally agreed upon
by the Soviet and the United States Governments, continued to
be opposed by Cuba.
The Cuban crisis demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces
to meet a sudden emergency. It also highlighted the importance
of maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment, including
not only retaliatory forces of overwhelming strength but also
adequately trained and equipped units in sufficient numbers for
lesser types of action. This military flexibility was a major
force in bringing about the removal of a dangerous threat to the
security of the United States. While our armed forces carried
out their assignments well, numerous lessons were learned, insuring
that any future emergency will be met with even greater efficiency.
The officers and men, both regular and reserve, who participated
in the Cuban operation and, above all, the Navy, Marine, and Air
Force pilots who collected the hard intelligence required for
a successful national policy rendered an outstanding service to
their country.
Source: Department of Defense. Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1963. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964):
4-8.
Annual Report of the Secretary of
the Navy: July 1, 1962, to June 30, 1963, extract.
Navy and Marine Corps Operations: Cuba
The Cuban crisis, which occurred in October-November 1962, was
both a major challenge to a variety of fleet units and a vital
demonstration of the Navy's ability to meet such challenges successfully.
A major activity carried on in support of this operation was the
location, inspection, and diversion of Cuba-bound merchant shipping
carrying certain excluded cargo. In accomplishing this task, naval
aircraft flew approximately 6,000,000 miles and fleet units steamed
approximately 780,000 miles, with each of the eight aircraft carriers
utilized in the operation steaming more than 10,000 miles.
During the crisis, Navy photographic units were particularly active,
monitoring the military activities of Cuban and Soviet forces.
A new Navy-developed aerial camera was used by both the Navy and
the Air Force in the highly effective photo-reconnaissance over
the island; and the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center provided
processing and photo-interpretation services that were vitally
important to the hour-by-hour evaluation of the military buildup.
The quarantine operation provided the most demanding test of the
Navy's Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities since World War
II. It was also the first large-scale test of our ASW capability
against modern submarines of the U.S.S.R.
In evident anticipation of possible United States reaction to
the emplacement of offensive missiles in Cuba, the U.S.S.R. deployed
a number of modern, conventionally powered submarines in the general
area. During subsequent operations six of these submarines were
photographed and identified by U.S. naval forces. So far as can
be determined, no Russian submarines committed to the Cuban operation
escaped detection and tracking. By tracking these submarines--and
by being capable of destroying them if necessary--the Navy denied
their effective use to the U.S.S.R.
The crisis also provided a particularly striking demonstration
of the responsiveness of Marine forces. Guantanamo was rapidly
reinforced by combat-ready units deploying simultaneously from
three different locations. Five thousand Marines, completely equipped
and ready to fight, were moved into position by sea and by air
in 48 hours to augment the Guantanamo garrison. The Caribbean
contingency force which is constantly deployed in that area for
such purposes landed a battalion by sea. A second battalion was
airlifted from Cherry Point, N.C., employing Navy and Marine transport
aircraft. A third battalion was airlifted from Camp Pendleton,
Calif., by Military Air Transport Service (MATS) aircraft. Appropriate
supporting arms accompanied these combat units. The rapid and
immediate introduction of these combat-ready forces into Guantanamo
assured the defense of that key base during the following days
and weeks of the crisis.
In similar fashion, a Marine air-ground amphibious striking force
was quickly assembled for offensive operations. Elements which
had been deployed to the Puerto Rico area for a training exercise
joined other combat units of the Marine division/wing team outloading
from the Cherry Point-Camp Lejeune complex on the east coast.
Additionally, a Marine expeditionary brigade of more than 10,000
troops embarked from west coast ports in less than 96 hours and
sailed to join the east coast division/wing team in the Caribbean
area. This Marine air-ground striking force was fully prepared
to execute its assigned missions at any time throughout the crisis
period. Its presence in the Caribbean area provided ample testimony
of United States intent to take any action required.
Finally, it should be stressed that the Cuban quarantine was undertaken
as a legal operation within the spirit of international law. The
Navy's role included both participation in the drafting of the
quarantine proclamation and in its legal implementation.
Source: Department of Defense. Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 1963. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964):
190-191.
28 August 2006