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Source: Utz, Curtis. Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1993.
In the fall of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came
as close as they ever would to global nuclear war. Hoping to correct
what he saw as a strategic imbalance with the United States, Soviet
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev began secretly deploying medium range
ballistic missiles (MRBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBM) to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Once operational, these nuclear-armed
weapons could have been used cities and military targets in most
of the continental United States. Before this happened, however,
U.S. intelligence discovered Khrushchev's brash maneuver. In what
became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy
and an alerted and aroused American government, armed forces,
and public compelled the Soviets to remove from Cuba not only
their missiles but all of their offensive weapons.
The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating
the critical importance of naval forces to the national defense.
The Navy's operations were in keeping with its strategic doctrine,
which is as valid today as it was in late 1962. The Navy, in cooperation
with the other U.S. armed forces and with America's allies, employed
military power in such a way that the president did not have to
resort to war to protect vital Western interests. Khrushchev realized
that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's
powerful Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines and the Air
Force's land-based nuclear delivery systems once these American
arms became fully operational. Naval forces under the U.S. Atlantic
Command, headed by Admiral Robert L. Dennison (CINCLANT), steamed
out to sea, intercepting not only merchant shipping en route to
Cuba, but Soviet submarines operating in the area as well. U.S.
destroyers and frigates, kept on station through underway replenishment
by oilers and stores ships, maintained a month-long naval "quarantine"
of the island of Cuba. Radar picket ships supported by Navy fighters
and airborne early warning planes assisted the U.S. Air Force's
Air Defense Command in preparing to defend American airspace from
Soviet and Cuban forces. Navy aerial photographic and patrol aircraft
played a vital part not only in observing the deployment of Soviet
offensive weapons into Cuba; but monitoring their withdrawal by
sea.
As the unified commander for the Caribbean, Admiral Dennison was
responsible for readying Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy assault
forces for a possible invasion of Cuba. He also served as the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The aircraft carriers,
destroyers, and Marine forces of the subordinate Second Fleet,
under Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, were poised to launch air,
naval gunfire, and amphibious strikes from the sea against Soviet
and Cuban forces ashore. With speed and efficiency, other fleet
units reinforced the Marine garrison at Guantanamo on Cuba's southeastern
tip and evacuated American civilians. Dennison also coordinated
the maritime support operations carried out by Canadian, British,
Argentine, and Venezuelan forces.
Khrushchev, faced with the armed might of the United States and
its allies, had little choice but to find some way out of the
difficult situation in which he had placed himself and his country.
President Kennedy did not press the advantage that the strength
of U.S. and allied naval and military forces gave him. Thus, the
Soviet leader was able to peacefully disengage his nation from
this most serious of Cold War confrontations.