Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked QuestionsRelated Resources: Battle of
Midway: 4-7 June 1942
1. Early in June, near the island of Midway about 1,100 miles
to the westward of Pearl Harbor, units of our Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps joined action with a strong Japanese invasion fleet
which was approaching our Midway outpost. The voluminous reports
of the details of the battle of Midway have been studied and evaluated
so that this resume now becomes possible.
2. After the defeat of the Japanese in the Battle of the Coral
Sea between May 4th and May 8th, our shore-based reconnaissance
aircraft and submarines reported a general withdrawal of enemy
naval ships from the southwest Pacific toward Japan. Concentrations
of enemy naval units made it apparent that large scale offensive
operations were planned by the enemy, but the exact nature of
the plan of attack could only be guessed. The enemy had learned
in the Battle of the Coral Sea that the sea approaches to Australia
were strongly defended. It appeared logical, therefore, to assume
that the enemy's next thrust would come in some other area - possibly
Hawaii, Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, or even the Pacific Coast
of the United States. In accordance with this estimate, United
States naval surface forces were deployed in the area between
Midway and the Aleutian Islands. Bases in the outlying islands
and in Alaska were reinforced by long-range, shore-based aircraft.
Similar precautionary measures also were taken on the Pacific
Coast and in the vicinity of the Panama Canal.
3. At about 9 a. m., Jane 3, United States Navy patrol planes
reported a strong force of enemy ships about 700 miles off Midway,
proceeding eastward. Nine United States Army "Flying Fortresses"
[four-engine B-17 bombers] based on Midway immediately were ordered
to intercept and attack the approaching enemy. The Japanese force
was observed to be approaching in five columns and was composed
of many cruisers, transports, cargo vessels and other escort ships.
The Army bombers scored hits on one cruiser and one transport.
Both ships were severely damaged. and left burning. Some lesser
damage was done to other vessels in the formation. Later, during
the night, four Navy "Catalina" flying boats located
and attacked the same enemy group by moonlight. These four planes
scored two torpedo hits on large enemy ships, one of which is
believed to have sunk.
4. About dawn on June 4th, several groups of Army medium and heavy
bombers, and United States Marine Carps dive bombers and torpedo
planes took to the air from Midway to attack the approaching enemy.
The results of this attack were as follows:
(a) Four Army torpedo bombers attacked
two enemy aircraft carriers through a heavy screen of enemy fighter
protection and a curtain of antiaircraft fire. One torpedo hit
on a carrier is believed to have been made. Two of the four bombers
failed to return.
(b) Six Marine Corps torpedo planes
attacked the enemy force in the face of heavy odds. It is believed
this group secured one hit on an enemy ship. Only one of these
six planes returned to its base.
(c) Sixteen Marine Corps dive bombers
attacked and scored three hits on a carrier, which is believed
to have been the Soryu. Only half of the attacking planes
returned.
(d) Another group of 11 Marine Corps
dive bombers made a later attack on enemy ships and reported 2
bomb hits on an enemy battleship, which was left smoking and listing.
(e) A group of 16 United States
Army "Flying Fortresses" carried out high-level bombing
attacks, scoring 3 hits on enemy carriers. One carrier was left
smoking heavily.
5. Meanwhile, at 6:35 a. m. (Midway time, June 4th), shortly after
the Marine Corps planes had left Midway to carry out an attack
mission, the island, itself, was attacked by a large group of
carrier based enemy planes. They were engaged by a badly outnumbered
Marine Corps fighter force, which met the enemy in the air as
be arrived. These defending fighters, aided by anti- aircraft
batteries, shot down at least 40 of the enemy planes. Several
more were damaged. As the result of this fighter defense, the
material damage to shore installations, though serious, was not
disabling. No plane was caught grounded at Midway.
6. The Midway-based air forces had struck the approaching Japanese
fleet with their full strength, but the enemy did not appear to
have been checked. It was estimated that only about 10 enemy ships
had been damaged out of a total enemy force of approximately 80
ships then converging upon Midway.
7. It was learned later that our aerial attacks had caused the
enemy carrier force to change its course. They began a retirement
to the northwestward some time between 8:30 and 9:30 a. m., on
the morning of June 4th. Their complete change of course was not
observed by our shore- based planes because the change came after
the planes had delivered their attacks and while they were returning
to Midway to rearm.
8. Meanwhile, United States naval forces afloat were being brought
into position. Our carrier- based aircraft were launched and were
proceeding to the spot where the enemy's previous course and speed
would have placed him had he chosen to continue the assault, as
expected. Unaware of the enemy's change of course, one group of
carrier-based fighters and dive bombers searched along the reported
track to the southeast until shortage of gas forced them to abandon
the search and go in to Midway. Some were forced down at sea when
they ran out of gas. Most of those forced down were later rescued.
The commanding officer of a different flight composed of fighters,
dive bombers, and torpedo planes made an accurate estimate of
the situation and concluded that the enemy was retreating. Fifteen
torpedo planes from this group, therefore, located the enemy to
the westward and proceeded to attack at once without protection
or assistance of any kind. Although some hits were reported by
radio from these airplanes and although some enemy fighters were
shot down, the total damage inflicted by this squadron in this
attack may never be known. None of these 15 planes returned. The
sole survivor of the 30 officers and men of this squadron was
Ensign G. H. Gay, Jr., U.S.N.R., who scored one torpedo hit on
an enemy carrier before he was shot down.
9. Other carrier-based groups of torpedo planes proceeded to press
the attack after the enemy had been located. In spite of heavy
losses during these attacks, the torpedo planes engaged the attention
of the enemy fighters and antiaircraft batteries to such a degree
that our dive bombers were able to drop bomb after bomb on the
enemy ships without serious interference. As the result, the Navy
dive bombers scored many hits and during this phase of the action
inflicted upon the enemy the following damage:
(a) The Kaga, Akagi,
and Soryu, aircraft carriers, were severely damaged. Gasoline
in planes caught on their flight decks ignited, starting fires
which burned until each carrier had sunk.
(b) Two battleships were hit. One
was left burning fiercely.
(c) One destroyer was hit and is
believed to have sunk
10. Shortly after this battle, a force of about 36 enemy planes
from the undamaged carrier Hiryu attacked the United States
Aircraft carrier Yorktown and her escorts. Eleven of 18
Japanese bombers in the group were shot down by our fighters before
their bombs were dropped. Seven got through our fighter protection.
Of these 7, one was disintegrated by a surface ship's antiaircraft
fire; a second dropped its bomb load into the sea and plunged
after it; while a third was torn to shreds by machine-gun fire
from United States fighter planes. Four enemy bombers escaped
after scoring three direct hits.
11. Shortly afterward, 12 to 15 enemy torpedo planes escorted
by fighters attacked the Yorktown. Between 4 and 7 of this
group were destroyed by our fighters and 3 were shot down by antiaircraft
fire before they could launch their torpedoes. Five succeeded
in launching torpedoes but all 5 were destroyed as they attempted
to escape. The Yorktown was hit during this assault and
put out of action. The damage caused a list which rendered her
flight deck useless for landings and takeoffs. Her aircraft, however,
continued the battle operating from other United States carriers.
12. While this attack on the Yorktown was in progress,
some of her own planes located the Japanese carrier Hiryu
in company with battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Our carrier
planes immediately launched an attack against this newly located
force. The Hiryu was hit repeatedly and left blazing from
stem to stern. She sank the following morning. Two of the enemy
battleships were pounded severely by bombs and the heavy cruiser
was damaged severely.
13. During the same afternoon (June 4th), a United States submarine
scored three torpedo hits on the smoking carrier Soryu
as the enemy was attempting to take it in tow. These hits caused
an outbreak of fresh flames which engulfed the carrier and forced
the crew to abandon ship. At about sunset heavy explosions and
huge billows of smoke were observed. The Soryu sank during
the night.
14. Just before sunset. (June 4th) United States Army bombers
delivered a heavy bomb attack on the severely crippled and burning
ships. Three hits were scored on a damaged carrier (probably the
Akagi); one hit was scored on a large ship; one hit on
a cruiser which was left burning; and one destroyer was damaged
and believed to have sunk,
15. The situation at sundown on June 4, was as follows:
(a) United States forces had gained
mastery of the air in the region of Midway.
(b) Two carriers, Kaga and
Akagi, had been hit by many bombs and torpedoes from Army
planes and carrier-based naval aircraft in the morning, and the
Akagi had been further damaged by Army aircraft in the
late afternoon, One of these two carriers was reported by Ensign
Gay to have been shelled and finished off by a Japanese cruiser.
Both enemy carriers sank or were sunk by the Japanese before morning.
(c) The Soryu had been hit
heavily by Marine Corps dive bombers, Army bombers, carrier- based
planes, and a submarine. She sank during the night.
(d) The Hiryu had been put
out of action by carrier aircraft after her own planes had damaged
the Yorktown. The Hiryu sank early the following
morning.
(e) Two enemy battleships had been
damaged, one severely.
(f) One enemy destroyer had been
sunk,
(g) One enemy transport and several
other ships had been damaged.
(h) The U. S. S. Yorktown.
had been put out of action.
16. Early in the morning of June 5th, an enemy submarine shelled
Midway briefly but caused no damage. Our shore batteries returned
the fire. At dawn our forces were marshalling their strength for
further assaults against the enemy fleets which by now had separated
into several groups, all in full retreat. Unfavorable flying weather
made search to the northwest of Midway difficult and hazardous
but a flight of United States Army "Flying Fortresses"
managed to contact an enemy contingent of battleships and cruisers
to the westward of Midway. They attacked, and scored a direct
hit on the damaged cruiser. Another bomb damaged the same cruiser's
steering gear. She was last observed listing badly and turning
in tight circles. This attack was followed quickly by a second
Army air force attack which scored a hit on the stern of a heavy
cruiser. Meanwhile, at about, noon (June 5th) United States Marine
Corps aircraft located the damaged enemy cruiser and delivered
one direct hit.
17. In the afternoon of June. 5th, Army "Flying Fortresses"
attacked enemy cruisers again and scored three direct hits upon
one heavy cruiser. On the return trip, one of these planes was
lost; a second was forced down at sea 15 miles from Midway. All
except one of the crew of the second plane were rescued. A local
bad weather condition to the northwest of Midway hampered the
search operations of our carrier planes which were seeking the
enemy in that area. Throughout the night of June 5-6th, our aircraft
carriers steamed to the westward in pursuit of the enemy.
18. Early in the morning of June 6th a search by carrier aircraft
discovered two groups of enemy ships, each containing cruisers
and destroyers. Between 9:30 and 10 a. in,, our carrier planes
attacked one group which contained the heavy cruisers Mikuma
and Mogami and three destroyers. At least two bomb hits
were scored on each cruiser. One of the destroyers was sunk. The
attacks were carried on until 5:80 p. m. The. Mikuma was
sunk shortly after noon. The Mogami was gutted and subsequently
sunk. Another enemy cruiser and a destroyer also were hit during
these series of attacks
19. It was during this afternoon (June 6th) that the United States
destroyer Hammann was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine.
Most of her crew were rescued. The Hammann was the destroyer
announced as lost in Admiral Nimitz' Communique No. 4 (June 7th,
1942).
20. After June 6 repeated attempts were made to contact the remainder
of the Japanese invasion fleet but without success. It was on
June 9th, while one of these searches was being carried out by
a group of long-range Army medium bombers under the command of
Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker, U. S. A., that the plane carrying
General Tinker was forced down at sea and lost.
21. The following is a recapitulation of the damage inflicted
upon the enemy during the battle of Midway:
(a) Four Japanese aircraft carriers,
the Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu
were sunk.
(b) Three battleships were damaged
by bomb and torpedo hits, one severely.
(c) Two heavy cruisers, the Mogami
and the Mikuma were sunk. Three others were damaged, one
or two severely.
(d) One light cruiser was damaged.
(e) Three destroyers were sunk and
several others were damaged by bombs,
(f) At least three transports or
auxiliary ships were damaged, and one or more sunk.
(g) An estimated 275 Japanese aircraft
were destroyed or lost at sea through a lack of flight decks on
which to land.
(h) Approximately 4,800 Japanese
were killed or drowned
22. Our total personnel losses were 92 officers and 215 enlisted
men.
23. Our forces fought. under the command of Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz, U.S.N., Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Other
officers who hold important commands during the battle were Lt.
Gen. Delos C. Emmons, U.S.A., Commanding General, Hawaiian Department;
Maj. Gen. W. W. Hale, U.S.A., Head of the Bombing Command of the
Army Air Force in Hawaii, and Brig. Gen. Henry K. Pickett, U.S.M.C.,
Commander of U. S. Marine Corps forces in the Hawaiian area.
24. Among the officers who held important commands at the scene
of the action were Maj. Gem. C. L. Tinker, U.S.A., Commander of
the Army Air Force in Hawaii. General Tinker was lost in action.
Vice Admiral, then Rear Admiral, F. J. Fletcher, U.S.N., Rear
Admiral H. A. Spruance, U.S.N., Rear Admiral T. C. Kincaid, U.S.N.,
and Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U.S.N., had commands at sea throughout
the action. Capt. C. T. Simard, U.S.N., had command of the naval
air station at Midway. Col. Harold D. Shannon, U.S.M.C., was the
commanding officer of ground troops at Midway. Lt. Col. Ira L.
Kimes, U.S.M.C., was the commanding officer of the Marine Corps
aircraft at Midway. Lt. Col. W. C. Sweeney, Jr., U.S.A,, commanded
a formation of heavy Amy bombers.
25. The battle of Midway was a complex and widespread action involving
a number of engagements lasting more than three days and nights.
Even our active participants in the numerous attacks and counterattacks
are unable to give confidently an accurate account of the damage
inflicted by any one group in the many individual and unified
attacks of our Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel.
Source: Office of Naval Intelligence. O.N.I. Weekly. 3, no.46 (15 Nov. 1944): 3692-3699.
Note by Naval Historical Center Staff: This document was based on information available to the writer(s) at the time it was prepared. Such contemporary information was frequently incomplete and often inaccurate. Documents should be examined carefully and compared to other sources of information, such as other documents and later scholarly works, to determine accuracy. Documents can only tell us what the author thought happened, would happen, or ought to have happened. The facts and data provided by documents, however, reflect contemporary knowledge of events and are therefore essential to our understanding of the past.
11 May 2009