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IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PRESS AND RADIO FEBRUARY 23, 1946
Adequate understanding of the circumstances under which the USS
Indianapolis was torpedoed and sunk, and in which delays
resulted in the rescue of her survivors, requires some preliminary
consideration of the overall situation in the Pacific at the time.
On April 1, 1945, following the recapture of the Philippines and
the capture of Iwo Jima, United States Forces landed on Okinawa.
Heavy fighting ashore on Okinawa continued until the 21st of June,
when organized resistance ceased.
The victory ashore on Okinawa was made possible only by the continued
support of all available units of the Pacific Fleet. Throughout
the spring and summer of 1945, the Fleet continued to control
the sea and air in the vicinity of Okinawa, but in so doing received
heavy damage. This damage was received principally by destroyers,
destroyer escorts, and other types of ships normally used for
escort purposes. These units, which formed screens for our forces
at sea and also for the forces ashore, were the principal targets
for Kamikaze attack. The extent of the damage sustained in these
types made it necessary to modify the escort procedures throughout
the Pacific, so that damaged escorts might be returned to the
navy yards for repair, and so that the escorts still available
could be used in the most exposed areas and on assignments where
they would contribute most to the overall safety of our forces,
more particularly to the safety of the ships off Japan and the
ships carrying troops.
The records of the period, from the beginning of the Okinawa operation
almost until the end of the war, show clearly the concern which
existed in this regard. Destroyers and destroyer escorts were
brought to the Central Pacific from the Atlantic and from the
North Pacific. Ships were sailed unescorted in the more remote
areas. Priority was given to the repair of escort types in our
navy yards and a determined effort was made to improve the escort
situation in preparation for the invasion of Japan during which
there could be anticipated a repetition of the conditions under
which such heavy damage to escorts was sustained off Okinawa.
During July we were engaged in consolidating our position at Okinawa
and in sustained attacks on Japan itself with both carrier task
forces and shore-based air forces in order to create the conditions
prerequisite for invasion. The Third Fleet was actively engaged
in attacking Honshu. The Twentieth Air Force was bombing Honshu.
Naval aircraft from the Ryukyus were ranging over the East China
Sea and along the coasts of Kyushu and Southern and Central Korea.
The Far East Air Force was moving its personnel and equipment
up from the Philippines to Okinawa and was increasing the weight
of its attack on Kyushu.
At the end of July the carrier task forces were delivering very
heavy attacks which destroyed many Japanese aircraft and which
practically completed the elimination of the Japanese fighting
ships in their home ports. Important conferences were going on
in Manila between the staffs of Fleet Admiral Nimitz and General
of the Army MacArthur in connection with plans for the invasion
and alternate plans for the occupation of Japan in case of an
early surrender. Extensive mine sweeping operations were in progress
in the East China Sea. Rescue operations for downed carrier pilots
and B-29 pilots were in progress south of Japan. There were approximately
700 fighting ships and about 400 merchant ships at sea in the
Western Pacific. Radio traffic in the Joint Communications Center
at Guam averaged 18,000 messages a day. The responsible officers
in the Pacific Fleet were devoting their time and energy to accelerating
the tempo of the campaign and to increasing the pressure on Japan
in order to bring the war to a conclusion, and specifically, to
pound the Japanese into submission without the necessity for a
costly invasion.
On May 1, 1945, the USS Indianapolis had entered the Navy
Yard, Mare Island, California, for overhaul. Her overhaul was
completed and she was reported ready for sea on July 16, 1945.
Although all preparations had been made to give the vessel a post-repair
shakedown period in San Diego, California, preparatory to her
rejoining the Fleet in the combat area, assignment to a mission
of greater importance necessitated the postponement of this period
of refresher training until a later date.
While in the Navy Yard, there had been a great number of changes
among the officers attached to the vessel and a turnover in her
enlisted complement in excess of 25 percent.
Every advantage was taken of opportunities to send both officers
and enlisted men to schools and other instruction, while in the
Navy Yard; and when reported ready for sea, the ship was well
organized and the training of personnel was progressing satisfactorily.
The Indianapolis proceeded unescorted at high speed from
San Francisco to Pearl Harbor, thence to Tinian, where special
cargo (atomic bomb parts) was landed. A great many passengers
were transported to Pearl Harbor and a lesser number beyond that
point. These factors interfered somewhat with the schedule of
training under way, but instruction was continued, general drills
were held daily and at least one battle problem was held during
this passage.
Upon completion of unloading at Tinian, the Indianapolis
was ordered by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to proceed
to Guam, to discharge certain personnel and to report to the Port
Director, Guam, for onward routing to Leyte, there to report for
duty by despatch to Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, U.S.N., who
was then off Okinawa.
The routine procedure at Guam in July, 1945, in connection with
the issuing of routing instructions, was for the Commanding Officer
of the routed unit to receive his briefing from the Port Director
at the Naval Operating Base, Guam. Routing Officers and Operations
Officers were supplied with the information which it was believed
was necessary for them to accomplish their mission.
On July 27, Captain C.B. McVay, III, U.S.N., commanding officer
of the Indianapolis, visited the Office of the Port Director,
Guam in connection with his routing to Leyte. Later that day the
Navigator of the Indianapolis also visited the Port Director's
office to obtain the Routing Instructions and discuss their details.
Information of possible enemy submarines along the route was contained
in the routing instructions and was discussed with the Navigator.
The route over which the Indianapolis was to travel, which
was the only direct route between Guam and Leyte, and was the
route regularly assigned vessels making passage between these
islands, was considered within the acceptable risk limit for combatant
vessels. Circuitous routes were available from Guam to Leyte,
but no special apprehension was felt regarding the use of the
direct route by the Indianapolis and no other route was
considered.
The speed of advance of the Indianapolis (15.7 knots) was
set by Captain McVay and was based upon his desire to arrive off
the entrance to Leyte Gulf at daylight on July 31 in order to
conduct antiaircraft practice prior to his entering the Gulf.
To have arrived a day earlier would have required a speed of advance
of about 24 knots. No special consideration was given the possibility
of delaying the departure of the ship from Guam in order to enable
her to proceed in company with other vessels, since the route
assigned was not thought by the Port Director to be unduly hazardous.
Zigzagging was, by his routing instructions, left to the discretion
of Captain McVay. However, tactical orders then in force required
zigzagging in conditions of good visibility, in waters where enemy
submarines might be present.
The policy determination with regard to the escorting of vessels
in the Western Pacific was the function of the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet. This policy, which required the escorting of vessels
in some areas but dispensed with escorts for some classes of vessels
in others, which were less active, was largely dictated by the
limited availability of escort vessels. At the time of the sailing
of the Indianapolis, there was a shortage in this regard
and escorts were, as a rule, not given combatant vessels which
were capable of "taking care of themselves." The Indianapolis
was considered to be in this class and escort, if furnished her,
would have been at the expense of other requirements of greater
urgency.
At the time of her departure from Guam, the Indianapolis
was not at peak efficiency; but she was well organized; her personnel
were well disciplined and, in the main, well versed in the performance
of their routine duties. Training of personnel was continuing
and her visit to Leyte was being made in order to complete her
refresher training program.
Early in the morning, at 12:15 A.M., on July 30, while the Indianapolis
was steaming unescorted, and not zigzagging, at a speed of 17
knots through the water, under good conditions of visibility and
in a moderate sea, two heavy explosions occurred against her starboard
side forward, as a result of which explosions the ship capsized
and sank between 12:27 and 12:30 A.M., July 30. The ship sank
12 minutes after the torpedoes hit.
No enemy vessel was sighted either before the explosions occurred
or afterward. Watches were properly stood and good lookout was
kept, both visual and radar. Normal precautions were being taken
against enemy submarines. The lookouts were generally experienced
men and fully alert. The damage control party, though well organized,
was unable to function properly due to the heavy personnel casualties
forward, the rapid flooding and the intense fire which was started
in the forward section of the ship.
The communication set-up and provisions made for sending emergency
messages were in accordance with good practice and current instructions.
There is ample evidence that distress messages were keyed by radio
operators and possibly were actually transmitted on at least one
(500 k.c.) and possibly two frequencies. No evidence has been
developed that any distress message from the ship was received
by any ship, aircraft or shore station.
Orders to abandon ship were given by some officers locally, but
general word to that effect was not passed throughout the ship.
This was partly due to the disruption of all mechanical and electrical
means of communication. Word for all hands to go on deck was passed
through some of the lower deck compartments by the boatswain's
mate of the watch, but was heard by only a few of the survivors.
Many men stood by their abandon ship stations until they were
forced by the listing of the ship to enter the water. Much lifesaving
equipment went down with the ship.
The conduct of Captain McVay and of the other officers and men
of the ship was, in the face of this emergency, satisfactory.
Captain McVay did not order abandon ship when it was first suggested
by the First Lieutenant. Shortly thereafter, the Executive Officer
recommended abandoning ship. The Captain, approving this recommendation,
ordered the word to be passed to all hands to abandon ship.
While some life rafts and floater nets were available to those
in the water, many men had only their life jackets.
Correct maintenance routines for emergency equipment had been
in effect. The life- saving equipment was the best type developed
for surface ships and was identical with that supplied other vessels
of the Indianapolis class.
Numerous acts of heroism and leadership and display of fortitude
have been reported.
In the Headquarters of Commander Marianas on Guam and of the Commander
Philippine Sea Frontier on Leyte, operations plotting boards were
kept. On these boards was kept a graphic plot of the positions
at sea of all vessels in which the headquarters concerned was
interested. In the case of the Indianapolis, the departure
of the vessel from Guam on July 28 was recorded on the plotting
boards in each of these headquarters. Her estimated position was
plotted on each board daily. On July 31, the date on which the
vessel was scheduled to have arrived at Leyte, the Indianapolis
was removed from the board in the headquarters of Commander
Marianas and was recorded on the board at the headquarters of
Commander Philippine Sea Frontier as having arrived at Leyte.
This was the routine method of handling the plot of combatant
vessels. Since, in accordance with orders standard throughout
the Southwest Pacific Area, the Pacific Ocean Areas, and the Atlantic,
the arrival of combatant vessels was not reported, vessels of
this class were assumed to have arrived at their destinations
on the date and at approximately the time scheduled in the absence
of information to the contrary. However, since the Indianapolis
did not arrive, the responsible officers at the office of the
Port Director, Leyte, who knew of her non-arrival should have
instituted action to determine the reason.
Within 16 hours of the actual sinking of the Indianapolis,
there was in the Advance Headquarters of the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet an indication (from a single enemy source) to the
effect that the Japanese had sunk something (the nature of which
was unknown) in a position which was approximately the predicted
position of the Indianapolis at the time. Had this information
been evaluated as authentic, it is possible that the survivors
of the Indianapolis might have been located within 24 hours
of the time of the sinking of the ship and many additional lives
might have been saved.
In passing judgment on this intelligence matter, certain salient
features connected with this phase of the work of intelligence
personnel should be borne in mind. The person who was directly
responsible for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination
of intelligence, particularly that of high classification, was
the Combat Intelligence Officer who was charged with the general
supervision of the work of the Combat Intelligence Section. Evaluating
intelligence is not an exact science. It is at best an estimate;
frequently it is only an intelligent assumption. In the prosecution
of the Naval phase of the war in the Western Pacific, the work
of this Section has been outstanding. Information developed by
this Section made possible the successful execution of several
operations which were of such significance and importance at the
time as to have changed the entire course of the war against Japan.
Regrettable though it was, failure to evaluate accurately a report
made by a Japanese submarine did not necessarily have a bearing
on the prosecution of the war as a whole and was actually of only
local significance.
This failure in the evaluation of intelligence is attributable
in part to the exaggerated claims and false intelligence which
had characterized so many Japanese reports. It is a matter of
record that enemy reports of sinking of our combatant units were
constantly being made, whereas in fact, the units against which
these claims were made were then operating in an entirely different
area. Many of our units were several times reported to have been
sunk or damaged as a "feeler" on the part of the enemy.
Constant investigation of such enemy claims and the generally
resulting proof of their exaggeration or falsity had caused a
low evaluation to be placed on the type of intelligence representated
by the report that a vessel of undetermined size and classification
had been sunk in waters to the westward of Guam.
This intelligence was also in the hands of the Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet in Washington at about the same time, and
was passed by him to the Commander, Seventh Fleet in Manila. No
impression was created in the Headquarters of Commander, Seventh
Fleet that this intelligence involved the Indianapolis.
The Indianapolis was scheduled to have arrived at Leyte
at 11:00 A.M., July 31. It is probable that under normal conditions,
no concern as to her non-arrival would have been felt until she
was eight or nine hours overdue. Several additional hours would
have elapsed incident to the despatch traffic necessary to check
her movements so that, in all probability, search for her would
normally not have commenced until she would have been approximately
24 hours overdue. That would have been some time in the forenoon
of August 1. The survivors of the Indianapolis were actually
sighted at about 10:25 A.M., Leyte time on August 2, by a plane
on routine patrol.
A Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Advance Headquarters despatch
of July 26, in which CTF 95 (Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf,
U.S.N.) and CTG 95.7 (Rear Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N.),
were information addressees, contained the sailing orders of the
Indianapolis. It was ordered that the vessel upon its arrival
in Leyte report by despatch to CTF 95 for duty and directed CTG
95.7 to arrange ten days' training for the vessel in the Leyte
area. Neither Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander, Philippine Sea
Frontier nor any shore based commands in the Philippines were
included in the addressees of this despatch. This despatch was
received and understood by CTF 95 who was, at the time, at Okinawa.
It was received in garbled form by CTG 95.7 who was in the Leyte
area. CTF 95 noted that the actual dates of departure from Guam
and of the arrival of the vessel in Leyte were not given. CTF
95.7 did not decode this despatch since the garbled address as
received did not include his command. CTG 95.7 was at sea conducting
training exercises at the time the Indianapolis was scheduled
to arrive in Leyte.
A Port Director, Guam despatch of July 28 included as an action
addressee CTG 95.7 and as an information addressee CTF 95. In
this despatch the routing of the Indianapolis was given,
including the date of her depature from Guam and the date of her
arrival in Leyte. This despatch was not received by CTF 95 who
was, therefore, still uninformed of the date on which the Indianapolis
should have been expected to report to him by despatch. The Port
Director, Tacloban, was an action addressee on this despatch.
The acting Port Director at Tacloban, Leyte, Lieutenant Commander
Jules C. Sancho, U.S.N.R., was not aware that the Indianapolis
had not arrived as was scheduled and that she should be considered
as being overdue. It, however, was his duty in his capacity as
Acting Port Director, to keep himself informed of such matters.
Lieutenant Stuart B. Gibson, U.S.N.R., the Operations Officer
under the Port Director, Tacloban, was the officer who was immediately
concerned with the movements of the Indianapolis. The non-arrival
of that vessel on schedule was known at once to Lieutenant Gibson
who not only failed to investigate the matter but made no immediate
report of the fact to his superiors.
While not excusing the failure of Lieutenant Commander Sancho
and Lieutenant Gibson to use the initiative and ordinary good
judgment in this connection which would have been expected of
naval officers, this dereliction may be related to the difficulties
of an organization which had been brought on by the exceedingly
rapid expansion of the Navy to meet its wartime requirements.
In view of the volume of shipping which was being handled by the
Port of Tacloban, it would have been desirable that the important
assignments of Acting Port Director and of Operations Officer
of the Port should have been given to more experienced officers.
In order to reduce the volume of radio traffic and increase security,
the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,
in a directive dated January 26, 1945, and the Commander, Seventh
Fleet, under whom the naval activities in the Philippines were
operated and administered, in an identical directive, made specific
provision that the arrival of combatant vessels was not to be
reported. In preparing this, as well as in the preparation of
all directives issued by their headquarters, these two commanders
were mindful of the fact that these instructions would be given
general dissemination and that officers who were relatively inexperienced
in naval matters would be charged with their exeuction. For this
reason, every attempt was made to insure that the wording was
clear, concise, and that the meaning could not be misinterpreted.
Although these directives were prepared with thought and care,
that they were subject to misinterpretation is shown by the inference
drawn by Lieutenant Gibson. It was not the intention to prohibit
in these directives the reporting of the non-arrival of combatant
ships. Non-arrivals were expected to be reported. However, no
mention of this was made in the letter and the inference was drawn
by this officer that since arrival reports were not to be made
for combatant ships, by the same token neither were reports of
non-arrivals to be made. This matter has since been clarified
in terms which cannot be misinterpreted.
Lieutenant Commander Sancho and Lieutenant Gibson were members
of the Philippine Sea Frontier organization. Bearing in mind the
lack of experience of these officers in naval matters, it was
incumbent upon their superior officers to exercise closer personal
supervision over the manner in which their duties were performed
than was actually the case. At the time of the loss of the Indianapolis,
the Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral James L.
Kauffman, U.S.N., was absent from his command since July 1, 1945,
on temporary duty status in the United States; Commodore N. C.
Gillette, U.S.N., was in temporary command; and the Operations
Officer of the Headquarters Staff, Captain A. M. Granum, U.S.N.,
was intensively occupied in diversion of shipping in typhoon areas
and operations. These facts do not, however, relieve these senior
officers of their responsiblility connected with the failure of
their subordinates to take appropriate action to ascertain the
whereabouts of the overdue Indianapolis. The junior officers
who were directly concerned with this failure were members of
the organization which was being administerd by these senior officers.
For this demonstrated weakness in the organization under their
control, brought on largely through their failure to give closer
personal attention to the work of these inexperienced juniors,
Commodore Gillette and Captain Granum have been held responsible.
CTF 95, at Okinawa, took no action to check on the arrival in
Leyte of the Indianapolis. It was known to this officer
that the Indianapolis was directed to report to him by
despatch upon her arrival in Leyte but, for reasons before mentioned,
he was not informed of her departure from Guam or of the date
of her scheduled arrival in Leyte, and hence assumed that the
ship was still at Guam or enroute.
Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier (Commodore N. C. Gillette,
U.S.N., Chief of Staff, Acting) was charged with the mission of
safeguarding and protecting shipping in the area under his cognizance.
He maintained an Operations Board at his Headquarters at Tolosa,
Leyte, on which was kept a running record of the scheduled and
actual arrival and departure of vessels of all categories in the
area under his cognizance. His Headquarters had been given intelligence
of all submarine activity in the Philippine Sea and should have
been aware that the Indianapolis was overdue in Leyte,
but no investigation as to her whereabouts was instituted until
after her survivors were sighted.
Commander, Marianas, in Guam, felt no particular concern connected
with the arrival of the Indianapolis in Leyte. He assumed
that the Indianapolis had reached her destination. No action
was taken or required to be taken by that headquarters until the
survivors were sighted.
Aircraft patrols which daily covered a great part of the route
followed by the Indianapolis, and which were sighted daily
by the suriviors, failed to sight the oil slick or the survivors
for two days after the sinking. Discovery of the survivors by
aircraft patrol was largely accidental. Investigation revealed
that the planes were flying at altitudes which where considered
the optimum for searching the area for enemy craft by search radar
and visual lookout. Since, at this time and in this area, enemy
craft were almost certain to be submarines, this was, in effect,
an anti-submarine patrol. Planes were generally flying too high
to see the Indianapolis survivors.
At 11:25 A.M., August 2, while flying in his assigned sector on
a routine search mission, Lieutenant (junior grade) Wilbur C.
Gwinn, U.S.N.R., flying a twin engine landplane, sighted an oil
slick in position approximately 11-30 north, 133-30 east, approximately
250 miles north of Peleliu. He immediately changed course to investigate
and soon sighted a group of about 30 survivors. Dropping a life
raft and radio transmitter near the group Lieutenant (junior grade)
Gwinn radioed a report that alerted all commands in the area having
search and rescue forces under their control. All air and surface
units capable of rescue operations were ordered to the scene.
Upon receipt of the report, Lieutenant Commander George C. Atteberry,
U.S.N.R., took off from his base at Peleliu and arrived on the
scene at 2:15 P.M. Upon arrival, Lieutenant Commander Atteberry,
assisted by a Navy patrol seaplane which had been enroute to the
Philippines and had arrived in the area at 1:45 P.M., conducted
a further search, both planes dropping life rafts and rescue equipment
near survivors.
The first of the rescue forces hurrying to the scene to arrive
was a Navy CATALINA patrol seaplane. This plane landed in the
water about 5:05 P.M., to afford support to those not in life
rafts. Coached by Lieutenant Commander Atteberry, the CATALINA
seaplane picked up a total of 58 survivors. This plane was so
badly damaged on landing and in rescue operations that it could
not take off. However, all the rescued were given elementary first
aid and a few hours later transferred to a surface vessel.
Later in the afternoon, an Army rescue seaplane, a flight of seven
additional large Navy planes, and two Army heavy bombers arrived
in the area, conducted intensive searches and dropped large quantities
of life rafts and other rescue gear, to all personnel sighted.
During the night a majority of the available surface craft, consisting
of four destroyers, four destroyer escorts, three fast, light
transports, plus numerous patrol craft, arrived. Thorough and
methodical search and rescue operations were commenced. By night
powerful searchlights, flares, and star shells swept the area,
and by day, planes coached surface ships to every object sighted.
Before the search was abandoned on August 8th, the area within
a 100 mile radius of the center of the survivors group had been
so thoroughly searched that there was no possibility that a single
individual remaining afloat had been missed.
The following disciplinary action has been taken in connection
with the loss of the Indianapolis:
Captain Charles B. McVay, III, U.S.N., has been brought to trial
by General Court Martial. He was acquitted of failure to give
timely orders to abandon ship. He was found guilty of negligence
in not causing a zigzag to be steered. He was sentenced to lose
one hundred numbers in his temporary grade of Captain and also
in his permanent grade of Commander. The Court and also the Commander
in Chief, United States Fleet recommended clemency. The Secretary
of the Navy has approved these recommendations, remitted the sentence,
and restored Captain McVay to duty.
The Secretary of the Navy has given Commodore N.C. Gillette, U.S.N.,
a Letter of Reprimand, which will become part of his permanent
official record.
The Secretary of the Navy has given Captain A.M. Granum, U.S.N.,
a Letter of Reprimand, which will become part of his permanent
official record.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet has given Lieutenant Commander
Jules C. Sancho, U.S.N.R., a Letter of Admonition, which will
become part of his permanent official record.
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet has given Lieutenant Stuart
B. Gibson, U.S.N.R., a Letter of Reprimand, which will become
part of his permanent official record.
1 April 1999