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to Frequently Asked Questions page. 
Return
to Frequently Asked Questions page. By Michael J. Crawford
Most of the analogies that I have seen drawn in the media between
the Barbary Wars of 200 years ago and the current war on terrorism
strike me as not valid.
Today's enemy uses random violence, and the fear of random violence,
as means to protest against and influence American foreign policy.
The world's nations, in general, condemn the terrorists' means
as contrary to the rules of civilized behavior and outside the
bounds of international law. Although the terrorists' goals are
political-principally to remove U.S. influence from Moslem countries-they
justify their extreme measures on religious grounds, a perversion
of the Mohammedan jihad, the struggle to establish the rule of
the Koran.
Two hundred years ago, the countries of the Barbary Coast, the
northwest coast of Africa on the Mediterranean Sea, demanded tribute
from other nations in return for safe use of the sea by their
ships. The Barbary Powers, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli,
declared war on nations that refused to sign treaties meeting
their tribute demands. The Barbary Powers sent out ships to capture
the seagoing commerce of their enemies and held their crews for
ransom or enslaved them. The Barbary corsairs, the sailors that
the Barbary Powers dispatched to prey on enemy commerce, were
neither terrorists nor pirates. They were commissioned privateers.
Even the United States Constitution recognizes the legitimate
use of privateering in warfare, providing Congress the authority
to issue letters of marque and reprisal.
The goals of the Barbary Powers were solely mercenary. They sought
to extort tribute, not to influence foreign policy. When Tripoli
declared war on the United States in 1801 it was because the United
States refused to pay the bashaw tribute, as they had been paying
Tunis and Algiers. The Tripolitan War was not a Moslem holy war.
Legitimate analogies can be drawn between the war with Tripoli
of 1801 to 1805 and the war on terrorism. These relate not to
the causes of the wars, but to the logistical and diplomatic requirements
for fighting them.
Today, the United States needs the cooperation of foreign countries
and allies in order to have bases outside Afghanistan from which
to launch attacks, and to which to return afterwards, as well
as for supply depots. Two hundred years ago, the United States
needed logistical bases so that their armed forces could operate
in the Mediterranean, thousands of miles from home. Use of British-held
Gibraltar as a logistical base was essential to U.S. operations
during the Barbary Wars. The loan of shallow-draft vessels from
the Kingdom of Sicily enabled the U.S. Navy to operate in shallow
waters to enforce a blockade of Tripolitan ports.
In Afghanistan, the United States tried to influence the ruling
Taliban to accede to political demands by supporting rival political
movements that want to overthrow the Taliban. During the Tripolitan
War, American leaders supported the ruling Bashaw's brother, a
rival for the throne, in an attempt to persuade the Bashaw to
negotiate.
During the War with Tripoli, the United States used the show of
force and diplomacy to dissuade the other Barbary Powers from
also declaring war against the United States. Today, the United
States works to dissuade other Moslem countries from coming to
the support of the Taliban regime.
In short, the similarities between the Tripolitan War and the
war on terrorism have little to do with the religion of the enemy,
and everything to do with the problems of waging a campaign in
a forbidding environment far from the United States' own borders.