Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked QuestionsRelated Resource: D-Day, the Normandy Invasion, 6 - 25 June 1944
This is a brief history of the demolition units which operated
in the Atlantic theatre, their early training, their organization
after basic training and advanced training, the difficulties they
encountered and the ultimate success in accomplishing their mission.
Their missions were unique in that they were assault demolition
in nature in contrast to the Pacific operations, which were reconnaissance,
and pre-assault demolition. Because they were the first demolition
units to operate in any theatre, many problems were met and lessons
learned which proved helpful in determining training and policy
in later operations. For these and many other reasons it will
be necessary to go back to the origin of the units, and briefly
follow them through the operations of the Atlantic theatre.
The Naval Combat Demolition Unit started in June of 1943 at Fort
Pierce, Florida. The first class arrived and assembled for training
the first week in July 1943. The personnel were drawn from three
sources, primarily because it was reasonably expected that men
from the Construction Battalions, the Bomb Disposal School and
the Mine Disposal School would already be familiar with explosives
and basic demolitions. The site was chosen because it offered
natural swimming beaches and desirable temperatures for year round
swimming. Too, it was at a base where demolitions could be carried
out and problems could be worked out with the rest of the Amphibious
Forces that were already in training at the base.
However, conditions were not as desirable there as they appeared.
In the first place, there was no training program set up; no one
had any idea as to what the mission might be. No one had the slightest
knowledge of what sort of obstacles might be encountered, what
pattern they might follow or the best method of destroying them,
nor the conditions under which demolition personnel might be called
on to work. No provisions had been made for the construction of
obstacles, supplying of explosives, housing for the men or training
facilities for the unit. Clothing, obstacles, training, program,
facilities and explosives were therefore non-existent, yet the
men were there and the training did go on. Until steps could be
taken to get all of these problems settled, the first class spent
from eight to twelve hours per day in physical training and rubber
boat drill and primacord knot tying. The heat, sand flies and
mosquitoes, food and living conditions were intolerable. From
this first class came four of the Naval Combat Demolition Units
that were the beginning of the demolition force of the Atlantic
Theatre. A Naval Combat Demolition Unit was arbitrarily set as
one officer and five men, primarily because it was determined
in training that the demolition personnel would work as a rubber
boat crew and that the number 6 would be the maximum number of
men that could be carried in one boat. Training and facilities
at Fort Pierce improved by leaps and bounds and consequently the
later units which were sent out were very well trained. These
better-trained units will be the ones referred to that joined
the units in England prior to the landings. All of the units that
operated in the Atlantic Theatre were Fort Pierce-trained.
The first unit sent from Fort Pierce arrived in England in November
of 1943, and became attached to Commander Naval Forces Europe
until such time as they could figure out who they were, what they
were sent for and what their job might be. Then, in December,
nine more units were sent over. They, too, found considerable
difficulty in getting established and were shipped from one end
of England to another without finding anyone who had been delegated
to the responsibility of housing and training the demolition units.
These arrived at Falmouth Corwall England on the evening of 23
December at 2000 and at 0900 they received word that they had
the OOD (Officer of the Day) watch for the next seven days and
that the men would assume collateral duties as directed by the
executive officer. In substance, the memorandum read as follows:
"1. In addition to your regular duties, you will perform such collateral duties as are assigned you by the executive officer or head of your department.
2. One of your collateral duties is that of Officer of the Day at King's Hotel according to the following schedule: (This listed seven officers for the next seven days, all of whom were Demolition Officers).
3. An additional collateral duty is that of hard master according to plan and schedule to be announced by verbal instructions of Officer in Charge."
The first thought of the demolition units after arrival was
to set up an advanced training program. While assuming collateral
duties, this was a difficult task. But they did fall into the
general work of the base, acting as hard masters and watch standers,
while assigning the men to various duties about the base. During
their spare time, the units kept busy picking up road obstacles,
road blocks, concrete masonry, etc., which had been placed as
counter-invasion measures at various points along the coast and
hauling them to a small, 200-yard wide beach some eight miles
from the Unit's offices. There was carried on an abbreviated training
program and a beneficial bit of work in demolition.
For advanced training it was felt that additional training was
needed in ship salvage, rocket disposal (i.e., for the unexploded
rockets which would be found on the beach), mine recognition,
and assault demolition practices of the British. Arrangements
were made and officers attended these courses and later taught
the men. In January, as a result of attendance at the British
equivalent of Naval Combat Demolition Unit known as COXE (Combined
Operations Experimental Establishment), much intelligence in the
form of pictures and literature pertaining to obstacles already
placed on the coast of France was obtained. Of all the obstacles
mentioned, the high priority was placed on Element "C"
or Belgian Gate. This obstacle is a lattice-faced steel gate propped
up on the landward side by steel bracings which are fourteen feet
long. The face of the obstacle is 10 feet high and 10 feet wide
and the whole structure is of six inch angle iron, one half inch
in thickness, welded and bolted together and having a gross weight
of about three tons. It could easily be rolled onto the beach
at low tide and was strong enough to withstand any surf action.
Large numbers had been discovered in back of the dune line along
the entire coast of France and it was expected that these might
be quickly placed on the beaches at a later date. Inasmuch as
this was an entirely new obstacle to the Naval Combat Demolition
Units, considerable time had been spent in the determination of
the best methods for its destruction.
After considerable difficulty in procurement of a priority for
steel, two bays of Element "C" were constructed and
placed on the aforesaid abbreviated beach. It was found by experimentation
on these that the best method of destruction would be by the use
of charges - 16 of them placed at sixteen vital points of the
structure - which upon detonation would completely collapse the
structure and leave no part of it extending above the surface
of the beach more than six inches. This proved very successful
in the few tests that were permitted. The greatest difficulty
in the process came in the attachment of the charges. From this
difficulty came research and design of the Hagensen Pack, a small
canvas sack, filled with 2 pounds of C2, which could be fitted
and secured to the angle iron regardless of its size or shape
by means of a line and V-slot hook of special design. Further
and complete experimentation by the group on this obstacle was
interrupted when orders from higher authority came and split the
units into three separate groups. One group departed for Fowey,
Devon England to join the Second Beach Battalion; the second group
went to the Sixth Beach Battalion at Swansea, Wales and the third
group to the Seventh Beach Battalion at Salcombe, Devon, England.
Each of these groups continued training on obstacles of any sort
when they were available and when satisfactory beaches could be
found. The group at Fowey continued research on the Hagensen pack
to determine its sensitivity, shrapnel effect, cutting effect
and stability, and investigated manufacturing facilities in the
event it would be adopted as a standard explosive for the Naval
Combat Demolition Units.
The group with the Sixth Battalion located at Swansea, Wales was
able to resurrect road blocks, posts and rails and place them
on the long flat beaches and practice dry-runs and time trials
which later provided important information for the writing of
the operational plan. Meanwhile, eight more Naval Combat Demolition
Units arrived from the United States to supplement the units already
in training. These were divided among the three groups.
By March the 25th of 1943, the Beach Battalions were ready to
go to the marshalling area to await orders to invade. In the absence
of official word as to what part the Naval Combat Demolition Units
would play and what craft would be assigned if they were to be
used, it was found necessary to submit to higher authority a letter
stating the capabilities of the enemy to place obstacles on the
beach in a comparatively short time and the capabilities of the
Naval Combat Demolition Units to destroy them either by daylight
assault or night pre-invasion demolition. This letter, together
with information of the tremendous increase in obstacles appearing
on the beaches of France led to immediate action by higher authority
to consolidate the units once more and establish a unified plan
of attack.
When it was determined that there would be increasingly larger
numbers of obstacles placed, that there was a 25 foot tide change
twice a day (which meant working in a tide that rose approximately
1 foot every eight minutes) and that the method of attack would
involve assault demolition, it became necessary to reinforce the
Naval Combat Demolition Units. Fort Pierce had sent all available
units, a total of sixteen Naval Combat Demolitions to England
by plane, depleting its supply. Personnel from three Army Combat
Engineers were therefore assigned for training by the Naval Combat
Demolition Units and all gathered at Appledore, England, where
model obstacles were being placed on the beaches for assault and
demolition practice. The program for the first time was designed
specifically to prepare the men and officers for the landings
and emphasized the techniques suggested and agreed upon the operational
plans by both the Army and Navy which had been submitted to higher
authority for approval. The program was hurriedly organized but
was excellently planned. Large areas of beach had obstacles, but
there was a definite lack of such obstacles as Element "C",
Tetrahedrons and hedgehogs, the three obstacles which were known
to exist on the beaches. Those that were placed were made of wood
and a very poor substitute, yet the placement of the charges was
the important practice that could be had.
The training program at Appledore, England got underway on the
15th of April and ended on the 22nd or 23rd of May. During this
time the group maintained the three separate group divisions and
worked together; two of these were designated as Force "C"
and one as Force "U", the designations of the beaches
that were to be assaulted. Each group consisted of 11 gap assault
teams. Each team was made up of thirteen men; five Navy Naval
Combat Demolition Unit men plus five Army men, plus three seamen
sent from a pool in Scotland. Each of these groups was backed
up by 26 army men who were to reinforce or support the assault
group in later clearance of the beach, the entire group being
a gap assault team.
During the early stages of the training program, the officers
of each of the Naval Combat Demolition Units were taking care
of their units, procuring equipment and organizing the men. There
was noticeable need for a commanding officer or a senior officer
with the power to make decisions or with authority to procure
necessary items or determine policy. When a commanding officer
was requested, two Lieutenant Commanders were sent from the United
States to take command of the units. Their previous experience
in demolition work had been a two-week training course at Fort
Pierce, just prior to coming over. There was very little time
for them to become familiar with the problems and make the proper
decisions, but ever so much was accomplished by their presence
in obtaining the latest intelligence data and fitting the units
into the invasion plan.
After the training program, all units were removed to Salcombe,
Devon, England, including the Army men who were temporarily assigned
to the Navy for this operation. At Salcombe, most of the time
was spent in preparing 10,000 Hagensen C-2 packs, procuring gear
and making final preparations.
For the first time, the intelligence information was coming to
the units from naval sources. New obstacles, new patterns of placement,
and ever increasing numbers of obstacles were being reported,
as was predicted by the Naval Combat Demolition Units. By this
time, however, it was too late to change plans or to give special
training.
Repeated attempts to procure transportation via LST or the equivalent
for personnel and the tremendous amount of explosives at this
late date failed to produce results except for the Force "U".
All such ships were already assigned. Too, it was impossible to
procure the use of LCVP's or the equivalent. The only boats available
were the LCT(A)'s or LCT's and those were already assigned to
transport troops and equipment. But the teams were assigned as
additional load to these and plans began for loading and moving
to the French coast. One group, the Force "U" which
was to assault UTAH beach did manage to get the use of LCVP's
for D-Day.
On 1 June 1944, Group 3, the group which was to attack on UTAH
beach, left Salcombe for the marshalling area. On 3 June, the
remaining Naval Combat Demolition Units, those who were to attack
OMAHA beach, left for Portland, England for embarkation.
The operational plans submitted 31 May 1944, and the one rightfully
assumed to be followed, called for the departure from the United
Kingdom with one gap assault team per LCT(A). (This is the group
of 13 men, 1 officer and 26 additional Army personnel in reserve).
Sixteen such gap assault teams went aboard the PRINCESS MAUD,
a British liner. Loading of the personnel started at one o'clock
the next morning. Each LCT(A) had 52 men and 3 medium tanks aboard.
The additional men were the crew personnel for the tanks that
were being carried and, according to the operational plan, were
to land and assist the demolition units by giving support and
removing any obstacles not cleared in the initial assault. On
5 June, the officers of the OMAHA force were picked up from the
LCT(A)'s and taken aboard the U.S.S. ANCON, the flagship, and
there received their first and final briefing. Although this was
almost entirely unsatisfactory it did give the men a picture of
what was going to happen. The Army personnel aboard the LCT(A)'s
were able to give some additional information on intelligence
data because they had been in a marshalling area for weeks and
were presented with all the available information for perusal
and study. Prior to departure and after the officers returned
from the ANCON, an LCM was assigned to each LCT(A) and was to
be towed to the transport area where the Demolition gap team would
disembark onto them and proceed to the beach.
THE PLAN OF ASSAULT
The plan called for the sixteen gap assault teams to land at H-hour
plus three minutes, each clear an initial 50 yard gap, (each gap
was 200 yards from the adjacent one), widen and extend the gap
until it was continuous along the beach or joined the other gap.
This gap was to be clear from low tide up to the high tide mark,
or roughly would be a gap fifty yards wide and 400 yards in depth.
If the seaward band of the obstacles were Element "C",
ten of the support team personnel were to assist the Naval Combat
Demolition Unit Army gap assault team in the placement of the
charges. The remaining personnel were to continue to the succeeding
bands and begin clearance. When the tide, which was at low ebb
and just on the rise, necessitated stoppage of the work, a green
buoy was to be placed at the flanks of the gap thus far cleared
and two range markers of different lengths were to be placed at
the dune line in the center of the gaps so that ships could be
guided into the beach through the cleared gap. This method of
gap marking was inadequate but was a task which the gap assault
teams had to assume prior to leaving the United Kingdom when no
definite decision was made or direct assignment given to have
the gaps marked after they were blown. The sixteen teams were
to land as a wave, load the obstacles with explosives, mark the
gap extremities, and fire at will (but with a purple smoke signal
to indicate pulling of the fuse-lighter), and return inland across
the beach as far as the two-minute fuses would permit and take
cover in any manner possible. As the tide receded the units were
there to clear the remaining obstacles those not removed on the
initial assault and continue working until the entire beach was
cleared.
Preliminaries to the assault were to be as follows: there were
to be a total of 1000 to 1500 planes passing continuously over
the convoy en route to France. These would continue to their objectives,
the communications lines, the railroads, the bridges, the roads,
etc., deep inland from the beach. These planes were to keep a
continuous bombardment for twenty-four hours prior to H-hour.
Naval gunfire from Battleships, Cruisers, and Destroyers was to
begin an hour or so before H-hour, which was to be at 6:30, at
which time it was to be lifted to objectives above and beyond
the beach. Nine LCT(R)'s (Landing Craft Tank-Rockets) each carrying
1050 five inch British rockets were to saturate specific objectives
on OMAHA beach and beyond the beach at H-hour minus 15 minutes.
At approximately this same time, 32 DD tanks, regular medium tanks
with a collapsible canvas tub built around them to permit flotation,
sixteen to each half of OMAHA beach, were to be off-loaded at
about 500 yards and make their way into the beach firing at definite
objectives and targets of opportunity. Three hundred planes were
to pass over the beach in waves and drop their bombs in strings
starting the first at the water's edge up into the hill behind
the dune line. This was to be done prior to H-hour for at that
time there were to be two divisions of assault infantry landing
to silence any small arms fire that might remain after this saturation
of defenses. The gap assault teams, accompanied by two tanks and
one tank dozer per gap (a tank with a special blade attached to
the front of it) were to touch down at H-hour plus three minutes,
begin placing charges and complete their mission of clearing the
fifty yard gaps in twenty minutes. The tide was to be at low ebb
and just beginning to rise.
The plan as set forth in all probability would have worked out
successfully provided the timing of support for the demolition
units could have been followed. The original plan left no alternative
in case conditions of weather and sea slowed the operation.
Actually, what happened is as follows; the LCT(A)'s having the
preloaded LCM's in tow and the demolition gap assault teams aboard
started crossing the channel. During the previous 24 hours, the
weather had been excellent and the sea smooth; the weather now
had taken a change for the worse and the first five hours at sea
were extremely rough prompting the supreme Commander to order,
at midnight of the 5th of June, a postponement of the operation
for 24 hours. All ships had to return via the same rough route
to their original berths and await further orders. This forced
the personnel to suffer an extremely wet and cold ride of several
hundred miles. Conditions aboard the LCT(A)'s were definitely
poor; berthing and food facilities were inadequate and almost
impossible, with the men forced to sleep on decks which were for
the most part awash; one small stove and the utensils were inadequate
to prepare the food for the men. Conditions were crowded and the
sea was still extremely rough, as the LCT(A)'s got underway for
the second attempt to cross the channel. The LCM's began breaking
loose from the LCT(A)'s and others were breaking down and being
lost completely. The LCT(A)'s themselves in many cases were breaking
down or sinking on the way over. Many got lost in the convoy of
thousands of ships and on several occasions, Naval Combat Demolition
Units had to abandon the LCT(A)'s and board the LCM's and continue
under their own power the rest of the way with the convoy to the
transport area this completely without food or shelter from the
raging sea. Considerable difficulty was encountered in finding
the rendezvous area prior to the departure from the transport
area once it was reached. The LCM's destined to pick up the support
units on the PRINCESS MAUD, found considerable difficulty in locating
her to off-load the personnel. At this stage of the operation
the personnel were cold, wet and seasick and obviously were not
in the best physical condition to carry out their mission.
In spite of all these difficulties, the gap assault teams had
an orderly departure from the transport area (this all being done
without radio communication, as radio silence was to be maintained
until H-hour), and touched down almost in a perfect wave at 0633
to 0635.
Almost without exception every LCM was subjected to mortar, machine
gun and French "88" barrages, as the ramp was dropped.
Those who were fortunate enough to get off without being hit started
to work immediately. It was clear that saturation of the beaches
by low flying bombers had not been accomplished on the beach or
above the dune line. No planes were seen going overhead nor were
bomb craters found on the beach in which Naval Combat Demolition
Units could seek shelter from their demolitions. There was Naval
Gunfire on the pillboxes, but due to the particular angle of placement
of these pillboxes at there opening, the gunfire was rather ineffective.
The massiveness of the pillboxes gave adequate protection to the
defending gun crews, who continually harassed and fired on the
demolition units as they frantically pressed on their work. There
was no evidence of unexploded rockets on the beach as were expected.
Inasmuch as the LCT(R)'s objectives were not clearly defined to
the demolition parties, they may have had objectives inland somewhere.
At any rate, the LCT(R)'s added little toward neutralizing the
small arms fire of the enemy entrenched along the beach who were
hindering the Naval Combat Demolition Units. Only three or four
of the 32 DD Tanks were seen in operation, and these were seen
in flames shortly after they left the beach to go over the dune
line. There were only six of the forty-eight medium tanks operating;
the others were either knocked out or blown up so added no assistance
to the Naval Combat Demolition Units. The infantry waves which
were to proceed the demolition party were arriving and tripping
through the primacord ring mains or taking cover behind the obstacles
making it impossible for the charges to be fired. Meanwhile, the
Naval Combat Demolition Units were under devastating enfilade
fire losing personnel by the score, but carrying on the best of
their ability.
The obstacles encountered were in three bands with three rows
of obstacles per band, in a somewhat consistent pattern, staggered
and on ten to fifteen foot centers. They extended from low tide
to high tide extremities and were completely dry when work began.
A most difficult gap area had several bays of element "C"
joined together or staggered, several rows of wooden ramps constructed
of 10 inch timber firmly jetted into the ground and reaching a
height of nine feet; post tetrahedrons of both concrete and steel
construction, and hedgehogs six feet in height of six inch angle-iron
one-half inch in thickness, welded and bolted together.
The least difficult gap area had the wooden ramps, stakes, rails
and hedgehogs in that order from seaward. All of the obstacles
had Teller Mines (42), box mines or anti-boat mines attached.
These contained only a pressure device and were primarily meant
to blow up the landing craft as they attempted to ram through
the obstacles. The gaps which were not completed, or which were
not adequately marked soon became filled with landing craft LCM's,
LCT's and LCI(I)'s all with gaping holes in the bulkheads.
In spite of the extreme difficulties, depleted personnel and powder,
the demolition units were able to clear eight complete gaps and
two partial gaps, all of which were clearly marked and capable
of receiving the succeeding waves bringing personnel and equipment.
The method of clearance on the assault phase accomplished by the
use of the two-pound Hagensen pack. Each man was carrying about
twenty of these two pound charges, safety fuse and detonator assemblies,
and continued working until the rising tide prevented further
clearance. Post assault clearance, i.e. after the tide receded,
was accomplished with tank dozers, caterpillar tractors, and salvage
explosives. The mechanical equipment used was commandeered from
the Rhino (Pontoon) Barges and any other available sources. The
Construction Battalion training which the Naval Combat Demolition
Units had had previously was of inestimable value in this work.
Removal of wrecked LCM's and LCVP's was accomplished by the use
of explosive hose and fifty-pound charges placed in the engine
rooms and detonated by electric firing. Complete clearance of
the beach was attained by D-day plus two on OMAHA beach.
Casualties on the OMAHA beach for Demolition personnel were 41
percent; 30 percent of the right flank group and 50 percent of
the left flank group. All casualties were the result of enemy
action and no casualties resulted from improper handling of explosives.
THE ASSAULT ON "UTAH BEACH"
With the exception of the training period at Fowey, England at
Pentowain Sands, the advanced training activities of Force "U"
parallels that of Force "O". Therefore, It will be well
to mention only this portion of the advanced training then pick
up again where the groups split at Salcombe, England for the actual
assault of the French coast.
At Fowey, the group worked for a period of six weeks, with the
531st Engineers, who had seen combat in Sicily and Salerno. Of
particular interest to both the Army and Navy was the Element
"C" or Belgian Gate. As was previously mentioned, considerable
work and experimentation was made with the Hagensen (C-2 filled
canvas sack) pack by this group. All of the tests made were extensive
and severe yet the charge proved itself as being very reliable.
It got maximum power out of the explosive because it could be
placed so closely to the object being blasted, and had far less
shrapnel effect. Further experimentation was carried on using
this same charge on concrete, and reinforced concrete objects,
and on barbed wire. With such successes with the charge, it became
advisable to adopt it as one of the standard charges in Demolition.
After adoption however, it was necessary to get the charges produced
in large quantities. The tremendous shortage of material and labor
in the United Kingdom made it necessary to have them made at several
different places with the net result that a uniform product was
not always guaranteed. This led to the theory that it would be
better to have only parts, that is the hook and canvas sacks,
made and then to have the demolition personnel assemble and complete
the packs themselves. This was done at Salcombe, England and all
of it just prior to going across the Channel.
On June the 1st, this group left Salcombe, England for the marshalling
area and for the next three days briefing for the operation took
place. Maps, plans, photographs, etc., of the obstacles and defense
situations were studied and explained to the officers and men
of the force. On June the 3rd this group embarked on LST's and
moved in the huge convoy of several thousand craft across the
choppy Channel to the transport area, arriving at 0300 the morning
of D-day with ample time to off-load the personnel and rendezvous
properly before moving into the beach in a well-organized wave.
Essentially, the bombardment plan was the same as that for OMAHA
beach prior to H-hour, with the important exception that the Naval
gunfire would not be lifted by a predetermined time but by signal
set up on the beach telling them to do so. In this way, the assault
infantry were able to gather their forces along the 9 to 12 foot
seawall and charge en masse over the wall to silence enemy small
arms fire without fear of being hit by their own Naval fire. Too,
with the fire power on the defenses until they had gathered and
got ready they would have little trouble overpowering any resistance
that might develop. The actual assault plan was approximately
as follows: at H-hour, which was also 0630, the first wave of
infantry would come across the beach and assemble at the seawall
and await the signal for the gunfire to be lifted and for them
to charge over the wall. At 0635 another wave of infantry was
to join them and with this wave was to come the Naval Combat Demolition
Units. The Naval Combat Demolition Units were to start work immediately
and clear the fifty-yard gaps through the obstacles. All went
as planned and the Naval Combat Demolition Units effectively cleared
all of their gaps. At H-plus 12 the tanks and tank dozers came
in and assisted the demolition units in completely clearing the
beach. The personnel of the Army Engineers came in to lend assistance
to the Naval Combat Demolition Units at H plus 19 minutes or join
with the infantry, whichever was necessary at that time.
By H plus 2 hours, an incredibly short time for such a task, the
Naval Combat Demolition Units had joined their gaps so that there
was a cleared frontage of over 700 yards though which the subsequent
waves could off-load their personnel and supplies. The extremities
were clearly marked until receding tide when demolitions were
completed and no obstacle remained after the first day.
Obstacles encountered were scattered wooden ramps, eight unconnected
bays or sections of element "C", reinforced concrete
posts, concrete tetrahedrons and wooden posts. No mines were encountered
in connection with the beach obstacles. All obstacles were high
and dry on arrival. The intensity of enemy gunfire was not as
severe as that of OMAHA beach nor were the obstacles so thickly
patterned. The timing and execution of the operational plans were
much better, which accounts for better results. In spite of shellfire
from rockets, machine guns and "88"s, all hands worked
rapidly disregarding personal safety to complete their mission.
The essential difference in actual demolition operations was in
the fact that electric firing was used instead of safety fuse,
giving much better control in removal of the obstacles. The fact
that the men had a more pleasant trip across via LST and the fact
that they operated in faster, more maneuverable LCVP's probably
added to the efficiency with which they completed their task.
Casualties for the Demolition Gap Assault teams on UTAH beach
were six dead and eleven wounded. All were the result of enemy
action and not as a result of improper handling of explosives.