Pearl Harbor Atttack
Reports
Pearl Harbor Atttack
ReportsSource: Wallin, Homer N. Pearl Harbor: Why, How,
Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal. (Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1968): 297-327.
Note: Some of these accounts are copies of enclosures attached
to the action reports of individual ships.
USS California
Chief Yeoman, S. R. Miller wrote as follows:
At about 1030, December 7, 1941, after the USS California
had been struck with torpedoes and bombs, a man reported to me
on the Flag Bridge that be had just escaped from Central Station
by the trunk leading into Flag Conn. This was reported to Ensign
McGrath on the signal bridge. Stover, C.E., C.Q.M., Campbell (initials
unknown), C.E.M., and I with Ensign McGrath entered Flag Conn
to investigate We obtained a Line and lowered Ensign McGrath through
the trunk to Central Station, which was then being flooded with
fuel oil coming from vents and various other places. The oil fumes
were so strong that we feared Ensign McGrath would be overcome
with the fumes before the trapped men could be rescued. At this
time the ship was burning fiercely and there was also danger of
the ship turning over as it was listing badly. Ensign McGrath
completed his investigation and returned up the trunk to Flag
Conn and reported that these men were in a compartment under Central
Station and might be rescued by cutting a hole through the deck
of Central Station. He reported that the deck of Central Station
would soon be flooded with oil and that when this occurred, it
would be too late to cut the hole through the deck.
A cutting torch was quickly obtained and volunteers called for.
The response of volunteers was so great among various men on the
boat deck that most of them had to be returned to their stations
fighting fires. Ensign McGrath, Campbell and the volunteer rescue
party entered Central Station through the trunk and proceeded
to cut an escape hole in the deck. Ensign McGrath and Campbell
were both nearly overcome by fumes before the job was completed.
The first who worked with the cutting torch was overcome by fumes
and had to be replaced with another experienced man. During the
time this hole was being cut, there was great danger of fire as
the fuel oil was gradually working its way close to where the
hole was being cut. In addition to this danger, there was danger
of the ship turning over as it was straining the mooring lines
badly. The hole in the deck was just cut in time before fuel oil
flooded Central Station.
It is considered that Ensign McGrath, Campbell, and the several
other men who assisted, accomplished saving the lives of these
trapped men at great risk of their own, and therefore distinguished
themselves in bravery and gallantry above and beyond the call
of duty.
Under the strain and shock of the attack, it is regretted that
the names of the other enlisted men were not obtained. They acquitted
themselves equally as well to the best traditions of the Naval
Service.
Lieutenant Commander H. E. Bernstein wrote as follows:
I was aboard ship with the Head of Department duty sitting in
my room half dressed, when the General Alarm was sounded. I ran
immediately to the quarterdeck and observed two torpedo planes
approaching the ship perpendicular to it at an altitude of less
than one hundred feet and as I moved aft, saw two torpedoes dropped
by these planes. I immediately gave orders that all ammunition
be broken out and upon receiving the report that some ready boxes
were locked, I gave orders that they be broken open.
The work of Commander Skillman in obtaining all available fire
fighting equipment ashore was most commendable, as a very large
supply including new extinguishers which were filled on the landing,
arrived.
There was no sign of panic or fear displayed by any of the men
on shore even when bombing planes were overhead and all continued
in their work of supplying fire fighting equipment.
Electrician Linn wrote as follows:
At 0750 I left my room and went to the Warrant Officer's mess
room for breakfast. I had just sat down when the word was passed
"All hands to General Quarters." I heard a distant rumble,
glanced out the port hole on the port side of the ship, and saw
a black airplane with rising sun insignias. I immediately went
to the main control room. Word was passed to set condition Zed,
and about ten minutes later a torpedo hit. We started lighting
off both engine rooms to get underway. About five minutes after
the torpedo hit the steam pressure slowly dropped to zero. We
received report that there was water in the fuel oil. Everything
possible was being done to clear lines of salt water and get fuel
oil. About 0830 we received another torpedo hit and shortly after
a report came in that a bomb hit had set a large fire forward.
The fire main pressure was boosted to well over 100 pounds,
Shortly after bomb hit we had steam pressure on one boiler and
furnished ship with light and power from after engine room. Forward
engine room had to abandon. After engine room reported main set
ready to come in on line. Steam pressure again dropped to about
100 pounds. We held off putting in after main set because of low
steam pressure. Orders came over J.V. phones to abandon ship.
Abandon ship orders belayed. Report that hatch or port thrust
buckling. Informed personnel to check logs and see that it was
secure, before abandoning that area. About 1000 [a.m.] ordered
to abandon ship which we did after dogging down [closing] all
hatches. I checked motor rooms for personnel and found them clear
of personnel and after dogging all hatches reported to topside.
The wounded were being taken off the ship and others were being
brought to top side from third deck passage where they were overcome
with fuel oil fumes. All hands returned back aboard to fight fire
with aid of tugs from Navy Yard. Our attention was called to the
fact that five men were trapped in the center shaft alley. The
only possible way to save them was cutting through bulkhead in
center motor room. The water was running in center motor room
from vent trunk which leaked terribly. Water was up to main motor
bearings when five men from center thrust were pulled out. These
men were hurt in no way and required no medical attention. We
started putting pumps in various holds and commenced pumping but
the ship slowly settled at all times until it finally settled
on bottom.
Ensign E. R. Blair, Jr. had these comments on machine gun ammunition:
I was in an undressed state in the forward bunk room when General
Quarters sounded. The first torpedo struck as I left the bunkroom,
quickly followed by the second. Zed was already set on the main
deck hatches so that in order to get topside I opened the escape
hatch. In the boat deck Ensign Canfield was acting as starboard
battery officer and Ensign C. H. Hall as port battery officer
so I rushed up to sky control to man a director. Both directors
were inoperative. On the way to sky control I had noticed that
machine guns number 1 and number 2 were firing but were short
of ammunition. The ammunition that they were using was the 400
rounds of ready ammunition on that station.
I gathered a working party of about 10 men from the vicinity of
5 inch 51 caliber gun number 1 to bring up machine gun ammunition.
We opened the amidships forecastle hatch which led to the shaft
leading to the forward torpedo hold. We were under attack at the
time but the men paid no heed to the enemy planes and worked quickly
and eagerly. It was necessary to open five zed hatches including
the armored deck hatch to get to the .50 caliber ammunition, but
I believed that the need for the ammunition warranted the risk
involved.
Because of the previous torpedo hits I knew that it would be impossible
to get to the .50 caliber magazine via the third deck and the
opening of a similar number of zed hatches would be involved.
I broke out the belted ammunition, about 1600 rounds, distributed
it among eight men, 200 rounds to a ready box, one ready box to
a man. To each man I designated a station to which be was to take
his ammunition. It was exceedingly hard going for these men to
chink up the shaft with the ammunition. The ship was listing badly
and they could use only one hand to chink the vertical ladders
in the shaft. Every one of the men made it to the main deck. With
the remaining men I commenced belting up new ammunition. Shortly,
however, we were hit again. It felt exactly as the concussion
of a 5 inch/51 caliber feels when you are sitting in the pointers
seat. Two glass gauges broke and diesel oil ran out on the deck.
I closed the valves and thought that glass gauges on a battleship
should be done away with. There was a leak forward and we could
hear water running close at hand. I was determined to get as much
ammunition out as was possible and belt it above decks. Accordingly,
including two men who were on watch there, each man went topside
with all be could carry. A Gunners Mate remained with the men
and I instructed him to bring the clipping machine with him. He
had it half unfastened when I left. The clipping machine never
reached topside. When I went back for it thirty minutes later
the torpedo hole was completely flooded.
From the magazine I headed for the main top, noting as I went
that the main deck starboard side was a wreck; men were crawling
out of the starboard forecastle hatch in a dazed condition, some
badly burned. There was a neat bomb hole near 5 inch/51 caliber
gun three with smoke trickling out. There was no ammunition in
the maintop. I retraced my steps. On the main deck near the forecastle
hatch amidst smoke and debris was the ammunition scattered over
the deck with a dead man beside each ready box. Two ready boxes
that could be gotten to (there was fire all around) I sent to
guns numbered 1 and 2. I returned to the maintop hoping to find
the clipping machine and the boxes of loose ammunition brought
out last from the magazine. Two boxes were brought up by exhausted
seamen, one of which was Shelton, S1c, 6-S Div. We turned to belting
the ammunition by hand. After belting about 100 rounds "Abandon
Ship' was given. Reluctantly Ensign B. C. Hall and I left without
firing our belt.
Machine guns #1 and #2 were manned immediately after the enemy
dropped her first bombs on Ford Island. They fired at the first
planes which attacked this ship. Gun number 2, however, which
could bear on the torpedo planes attacking this ship, would fire
only one round without being given "immediate action"
or reloading by hand. This was due to a faulty setting of the
oil buffer. Gun number 1 with Price, S2c, 6-Div. firing, is credited
by all men at the guns, including Lieutenant (jg) Jakeman, with
the feat of bringing down the plane which attacked immediately
behind the plane which scored the bomb hit to starboard. The task
of getting ammunition to the .50 caliber machine guns was one
for the machine gunners themselves. That they didn't carry out
their job was due principally to the fact that they were stopped
by officers and put in the 5 inch/25 and 3 inch/30 ammunition
supply lines where they did heroic work. Another reason was that
Montgomery A.F., GM1c, who was in charge of the .50 caliber machine
gun ammunition supply, had been temporarily detached for patrol
duty ashore. The man next in charge after Montgomery, a GM3c did
not have the experience to cope with the situation.
Machine Gunners who should be mentioned for their heroic work
in ammunition supply line below decks and later in saving lives
at the risk of their own were Bell, GM3c, Doran, S1c, Nix, S1c,
and Cleveland, S1c, all of 6-P Division.
Ensign W. A. J. Lewis wrote as follows:
General Quarters was sounded and I proceeded at once to the Forward
Engine Room. The room was fully manned within a few minutes and
I, gave the order to set all condition on the Damage Control Fittings.
We had just shifted, F.O.[Fuel Oil?] suction to the starboard
battle tanker when we got the word from the oil king to make the
shift. I checked the light and power machines and found them operating
properly. I instructed the watch to watch all trips closely and
if anything tripped out to reset it and hold it in if necessary.
The first torpedo hit came just as I was reaching the engine room.
It knocked out about one half of the lights in the machine shop
and about one fourth of the lights in the engine room, No machinery
was tripped or put out of commission by this hit. An inspection
of the engine room showed that we had suffered no visible damage.
I ordered a main feed pump put on the line along with both main
fuel oil pumps. We had just started warming up the main plant
when we got reports that #1 boiler was getting water in its fuel
oil. Steam pressure dropped rapidly so we secured from warming
up main set, secured main circulator, and steam fuel oil pumps.
After the second torpedo hit, we began to get large quantities
of smoke down the ventilator blowers so we secured the ventilators.
Smoke still came down and word was received that gas was present.
We could detect nothing but powder gases so did not put on gas
masks. Later on the smoke became thicker so I directed some of
the men to put on their masks. They found a certain amount of
relief by doing so; mainly I think because it took certain irritating
particles out of the air and also because it protected the eyes.
The smoke seemed to be coming now from burning paint rather than
powder. The smoke began to take effect on the crew so I ordered
all hands except the talker on the upper level to go down to the
lower level where air was somewhat better. The forward part of
the engine room had become very hot and the metal in some places
was too hot to touch. This accounted for some of the paint fumes
as the paint had begun to blister. When the order came to abandon
ship, (we did not receive the first order) I directed the men
to leave these stations and go up after hatch. They did so but
for some reason they could not get the watertight door above the
hatch open. We then tried to open the forward hatch but the metal
in that area was so hot that it led us to believe that there was
a big fire just above us. We got all the fire extinguishers in
the engine room and all the extra clothes we could find to wrap
around ourselves and began to try to force the forward hatch.
At about this time we were assisted from above and the hatch was
opened. The fire was just forward of us so we proceeded aft and
came up on deck. By this time the ship had been abandoned but
the crew was rapidly returning to fight the fire in the midships
Section.
The conduct of the crew was excellent, There was no confusion
and each man manned his station and obeyed orders without question
or delay even at the time when all hands began to feel that we
were going to be trapped below there was no hysteria or excitement.
The Acting Engineer Officer, Lieutenant C. A. Peterson wrote as
follows:
I went to Main Control immediately when General Quarters was sounded.
As soon as communications were manned I ordered the after steam
lines warmed up, all boilers lighted off, and both main sets warmed
up and made ready for getting underway. Reports that General Quarters
was set were received from all engineering stations. Shortly thereafter
a heavy shock was felt and a report was received that a torpedo
had hit the ship. (These events all happened in very rapid succession,
and I am not sure of the sequence. I believe that the torpedo
hit before the reports of all stations had been received.) About
ten minutes after the torpedo hit the steam pressure started dropping.
Number 1 fireroom (which had been steaming for auxiliary) reported
water in the fuel oil. The forward fuel oil suction was at this
time, and had been for 10 or 15 minutes, on the starboard battle
tanks. I ordered a shift to the starboard loop and called the
oil king by phone for consultation. He informed me that he had
tried the starboard battle tanks, starboard loop, and engine room
bottoms, but had been unable to get any good oil. I ordered the
forward auxiliary fuel oil pump stopped and the fuel oil loop
opened all the way around in order to get fuel from an after suction
to #1 fireroom. I ordered all forward firerooms to run the water
from their burner connections to the bilges in order to clear
the line of water, I also ordered all after firerooms to light
off under natural draft using as many burners as possible. The
after boilers reported that the oil was too cold to burn. I ordered
them to keep trying and told emergency Boiler Control to get a
blow torch to heat the oil in the burner line to one of the after
boilers. The forward light and power machines had been tripped
out and the steam pressure rapidly dropped to zero. About this
time a second torpedo bit the ship. A report was received from
port thrust block room that it was filling with water rapidly.
Orders were given to abandon the station. After gyro reported
a short time later that the hatch from port thrust was bulging
and leaking and that station (after gyro) was ordered abandoned
and secured. Prior to this it had been necessary to allow the
Forward Torpedo Air Compressor crew and the Forward S. F. [Ship
Fitters?] Air Compressor crew to abandon their stations due to
heavy leakage of fuel oil into those spaces. Not long after the
second torpedo bit, a bomb hit was reported in the machinery passageway.
This turned out later to have been the bomb that exploded in A611s.
The forward engine room reported that they were getting a great
deal of smoke and had stopped their blowers, also that the bulkheads
and overhead were getting hot. Fuel not having been regained on
#1 fireroom, and since the fires had been successfully lighted
in #6 boiler, I ordered the main steam cut outs in the after engine
room closed to keep all the steam that we were about to get for
the after main set and after light and power machines. The fuel
oil loop had previously been isolated between the forward and
after engineering spaces, as the large amount of water being forced
out of the forward lines dropped the pressure aft. The forward
auxiliary fuel oil pump was started again and continued effort
was made to find good oil for the forward boilers. This had still
not been accomplished when the engine room was abandoned. Number
6 boiler came in on the line and about five minutes later number
5 boiler came in on the line. The after light and power machines
were started as soon as one boiler was on the line, and light
and power were restored to the ship. Numbers 3 and 4 bilge pumps
were put on the fire main. Shortly after this I got a call via
ships service telephone from emergency boiler control and was
asked, "Did you get the word in Main Control to abandon ship?"
By this time the after engine room and some of the firerooms had
gotten this word and started to abandon. I ordered them stopped
while I verified this order. Conn said that no such order had
been given. The men were ordered to return to their stations,
and they did so with such speed that none of the operations which
they had been engaged in were interfered with. That is, the boilers
continued to steam and the light and power machines to run. Shortly
after this the Chief Engineer came down to Main Control and assumed
charge. The after main set was ready to roll and word was requested
from Conn if it were intended to get underway. As I recall it
the answer was in the negative. A short time later word was received
from Conn to abandon ship. It was stated to be on the authority
of Commander Battle Force. Orders were accordingly given to all
stations which were abandoned in an orderly manner. Fires were
cut in the steaming boilers and the light and power machines slowed
down and stopped. All spaces leading from the engineering passageway
were checked and found to be abandoned. All watertight doors were
closed securely, and with the space abandoned the Chief Engineer
and I came topside. When we got to the quay Captain Smith was
directing everyone to, go back and fight the fire. After a slight
confusion due to this conflicting order, the crew started fighting
the fire in the casemates with buckets and portable fire extinguishers.
From the time that #6 boiler came on the line until the engineering
spaces were abandoned, the firemain pressure had been kept at
75 pounds or more continuously. The rapid stroke of the two pumps
on the line (I could hear them) indicated that they were pumping
large quantities of water.
Chief Electrician, R. W. Miller wrote as follows:
The morning of December 7, 1941, about 0750, while seated in the
W.O. [Warrant Officer] mess room at breakfast, I heard an unusual
rattle of machine gun fire and an explosion from the vicinity
of the Navy Yard Dry Dock. The General Alarm sounded and I seemed
to know without further thought that we had been attacked and
that it was not just another drill. A quick glance out the port
in the mess room verified this. There in full view and an easy
target was a gray plane on an opposite course paralleling our
heading at the mooring.
I ran to my room for my gas mask, etc. and then for the Central
Station, my battle station. On reaching the ladder to the Central
Station an explosion occurred seeming to come from forward; this
I took to be a torpedo. Condition Zed was immediately set around
the Central Station and plotting room area. Officers present in
plot were Lieutenant Purdy, Ensign Relley and Ensign Joys and
in Central Station Ensign Walker and myself. In short order we
had communications established with what was available. Some excitement
existed at the start but things soon quieted down to almost routine.
Upon arriving at Central I had the compasses started, made preparations
to live up telegraphs, etc. for getting underway, and called the
forward and after distribution switch boards to see how they were
getting along and if everyone had reached his station. We seemed
to be well manned and all had responded to the G.A.[General Alarm]
instantly. About this time. 0810 or 0815, the ship had a port
list. Chief Yeoman Baldwin acted as D.C.O.[Damage Control Officer]
and ordered starboard voids to be flooded to counter our list.
In about 10 more minutes there was a terrific explosion almost
under our feet; we knew this to be a torpedo. The list increased
and Baldwin continued to counter flood.
Word came into Central for power for the hoists to get up ammunition.
I was asked if there wasn't some auxiliary power and told the
ammunition the only auxiliary power was to use the hand hoisting
gear. All lights were off but the auxiliary lights came on nicely.
About this time word came in that the port lower 5 inch handling
room was flooding. I left Central and went down to check to see
if any more ammunition could be sent up before the boys abandoned
this station. The water was about knee deep and pouring down the
hoist. I ordered the handling room abandoned and had hoist flaps
and the watertight door secured. The crew to this station went
up to plot and we secured the trunk to the forward distribution
room. Mr. Walker and myself were quite concerned with the list
which by now was 8, checked with Baldwin frequently to see that
all starboard voids were being flooded, and we were assured that
they were. This concern was amplified by the fact that we had
received a report that the Oklahoma was bottom side up.
Explosions were felt at intervals but no damage reports came in.
The fire alarm annunciator dropped from the magazines and started
dropping, indicating them to be either on fire or flooded and
the bell rang incessantly. I ordered the fire alarm bell to be
cut out to stop the noise. I called up the forward board and pleaded
with Ensign Gavin to see if be could get us power and was informed
that there was water in the fuel oil. I then called main control
to find out if they couldn't use the steering batteries for power
on the after distribution board. I called Ensign Gavin again to
contact the engine room for power and was informed it would be
on in a short while. About this time, 0830 or 0840, a crashing
explosion just overhead and to the starboard side led me to believe
that a 5 inch magazine had gone since the fire alarm drops had
indicated them on fire or flooded.
All equipment seemed to hang together nicely especially the ship's
service telephones. Anything that was secured held fine; only
a few loose things flew around a bit.
The telephone cabinet doors jumped out a little and we were all
jolted but no harm was done below. The overhead of Central Stations
started to drip fuel oil and water and we knew that the deck above
us was flooded. We put buckets under the leaks. Price, Chief Electrician's
Mate, called me in the room to look at the leaks. I found the
bulkhead between Main Radio and the IC [Internal Communications]
room buckled and the frames bent with some water squirting through
but it looked as though it would hold for awhile. Sweavey, CM
1C, at the after gyro called up and said the hatch to the port
thrust was bulging and so I ordered him out and told him to secure
the hatch to the third deck. Sweavey is missing and a fine boy
be was. The list had decreased some to about 6½ degrees
and then increased again. Word was received in Central that they
were dropping thermite bombs. Lights and power came on in Central
again around 0840 approximately. When the word to abandon ship
came we left through the Conning Tower tube. Things on top were
a mess. I got a life jacket and after reaching the float promptly,
fell in the oil being temporarily blinded. A truck picked me up
and carried me to the new BOQ where I received treatment for my
eyes and some dry clothes.
Gunner's Mate, Third Class, V. O. Jensen wrote as follows:
During the air raid Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Robert Scott
of the `A' Division was in waist deep water and fuel oil and refused
to leave his station after we had gotten word to abandon our compartment.
I called to him and told him everyone else had abandoned the compartment
but he insisted on staying; `As long as I can give these people
air, I'm sticking.' His station was on the Forward Air Compressor
by Main G.S.K. Things were blacking out for me so I was forced
to leave the compartment and I never saw him afterwards.
Ensign Champion wrote of a rescue party which freed five men from
the Center thrust Block Room.
After the engagement Sunday I was standing on the quarterdeck
organizing a patty to rescue five men trapped in Center thrust.
Campbell CEM, ran up to the men and said Ensign Gavin and several
other men were trapped in the forward distribution board and could
be rescued by cutting through the plotting room deck. Taking the
men I had with me, we went to the foundry and removed the acetylene
cutting outfit. We then proceeded to the conning tower. Ensign
McGrath was there and asked me to keep everybody out of Central
Station except a group of picked men. He then went down to Central
Station with several men including Campbell, CPM, and Rountree,
P1c. We lowered the cutting outfit down to them and then procured
a sledge hammer and some chisels which we also lowered to them.
Ensign McGrath shouted up that the fuel oil fumes were very bad.
We tried to rig a blower in the conning tower tube, but no power
was available. The trapped men were rescued just before Central
Station was flooded with fuel oil.
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