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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
USS Helena, Report of Pearl Harbor Attack
December 14, 1941.
The Commanding Officer.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet..
Brief Report of the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941.
(a) Your restricted dispatch 102102 of December.
(A) Copy of C.O. announcement to officers and crew by general
announcing system, dated December 11, 1941. [not included]
(B) Helena Mailgram140115 of December 1941.
(C) Medical Officer's Casualty List. [not included]
- The following brief report of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, is submitted in compliance with reference
(a). Considerable study has been made of this attack in an endeavor
to eliminate conflicting impressions, and arrive at concrete
conclusions, particularly with reference to times, numbers and
types of planes, damage inflicted to the enemy, punishment received,
etc. Statements have been collected from all key men and officers.
Heads of Departments have surveyed these reports, and, from these
and their own observations, have submitted a correlated report
representing their own department conclusions to the Commanding
Officer. This report is based on the Commanding Officer's own
observations and conclusions after a review of the reports submitted
by Department Heads. Evidently any report submitted at this time
will have to be augmented as a further and more complete study
- Offensive Measures Taken.
- Planes were observed over Ford Island at about 0757.
These were recognized as Japanese planes when at an altitude
of about 4000 feet. The Officer of the Deck as promptly notified
by C.A. FLOOD, S.M.1c, on watch on the signal bridge. This man
has had recent duty on the Asiatic Station, and identified the
character of the planes immediately. Ensign W.W. Jones, U.S.N.,
Officer of the Deck, without delay, turned on the general alarm
and passed word over the general announcing system, "Japanese
planes bombing Ford Island, Man all battle stations, break out
service ammunition". (This time is fairly accurately fixed
by the signalman in charge of watch, C.A. Flood, who was standing
by the "Prep" signal for 0800 colors. It is confirmed
by the Engineering log and also by H.F. Korloch, C.T.C., U.S.N.,
who had just relieved as gangway Security Watch; also by Ensign
J.J. Armstrong, U.S.N.R., and Ensign W.W. Jones, U.S.N., who
were in the process of relieving as O.O.D.). Helena guns
were in action about 0801.
- Ammunition was expended approximately as follows: Five inch
375 rounds; 1.1"/75 3000 rounds; .50 caliber 5000 rounds.
- Enclosure B outlines attacks, phases,
- Damage inflicted on the enemy. As outlined in Enclosure B.
- Own losses and damage.
- Direct Hit. One torpedo observed to be fired
by a torpedo plane flying low over the southern tip of Ford Island
was fired at the Helena at a range of about 500 yards.
This torpedo was fired about one minute after general quarters
had been sounded, and about one and one-half minutes after the
Japanese planes were sighted over Ford Island. Our crew were
running for their general quarters stations. This accounted for
a large loss of personnel by flash burns from the explosion and
from concussion in passageways. No guns were yet in action and
therefore no opposition to the Japanese plane. The torpedo struck
with a violent explosion on the starboard side at approximately
frame 75 about 18 feet below the water line.
- Near Hits by bombs. About four near misses from bombs
received from which there were a few fatal casualties and many
minor injuries to personnel.
- One strafing attack from which little damage was received.
This was due to the very early period of the engagement in which
the attack occurred. This attack was delivered just prior to
the torpedo hit noted above, and was about the time general quarters
were being sounded (0757), and for this reason the men had not
reached their exposed machine gun stations on the top side.
- The damage received, and measures taken to meet it is listed
by departments as follows:
- The major damage affecting the Gunnery installations were
to fire control and power wiring to both main battery and 5"
anti-aircraft battery. The major portion of wiring passing through
the engineering spaces flooded as a result of torpedo hit are
now unserviceable. Auxiliary power sources are available, and
in general only auxiliary fire control circuits are available.
Minor material damage was inflicted by bomb splinters and machine
- The initial torpedo hit put out of commission the turbo generator
then in use. Prompt action by the Engineers in starting and cutting
in the forward Diesel generator made power available to all gun
mounts within one or two minutes. Considerable difficulty was
experienced in attempts to maintain fire control circuits during
and subsequent to the action. On four occasions electrical fires
resulted in the Plotting Room and on another occasion in the
forward distribution room. These fires were quickly and efficiently
put out. During periods of actual firing power was always available
at the mounts.
- Most casualties to personnel were caused by flash burns from
the torpedo explosion. Other casualties inflicted during the
Two men (trainer and number one loader) on mount I of the
1.1"/75 suffered powder burns from the blasts of the 5"
Two men (the pointer and one loader) of Mount I of the 1.1"/75
suffered injuries, the pointer from powder burns from the blast
of No. II 5" Mount, the loader, a flesh wound in the arm
by bomb splinter.
On Mount III of the 1.1"/75 the trainer was killed by
bomb splinter. The second loader suffered wound in shoulder from
machine gun bullet, the gunner's mate suffered minor wound on
face under left eye from glancing machine gun bullet.
On Mount IV of the 1.1"/75, the gunner's mate received
minor wounds upon arm, nose, and chest from bomb splinters.
Bomb splinters from near miss on starboard quarter inflicted
casualties as follows to men in vicinity of .50 caliber machine
guns aft: One gunners' mate second class killed, two seaman first
class wounded, one officer (Ensign P.V. Thompson, USN) wounded.
- Damage sustained:
- Compartments flooded due to torpedo hit at approximately
frame 75 starboard side below the armor belt.
Boiler room Boiler room B-1-1
Boiler operating space B-2
Boiler room B-3-1
Boiler room B-4
Port shaft alley
- Fuel tanks flooded by torpedo hit at approximately frame
75 starboard side below armor belt.
Diesel Fuel Tank
Reserve Feed Tanks
- Fuel oil seepage and fire hazard on third deck causing
securing of compartments frames 61-82
Ice Machine Room.
Provision Issue Room.
- Paint Locker A-203-1A Shock ruptured many cans of
paint causing fire hazard. Paint locker is secured until adequate
cleaning has been completed.
Smoke Screen Generator frame 150 Shock weakened
foundation and carried away air supply lines.
Sick Bay Area frames 39-49 third deck Flooded
to depth of about 6 inches with water due to open drains and
settling of the ship and lack of sufficient firemain pressure
on eductors of forward drains. This was corrected after the action.
- Distortion of midsection of the ship.
- Indications show force of explosion forced third deck up
in the vicinity of frame 75.
When docking, indications show keel forced down one foot in
vicinity of frame 75.
- Services to forward part of the ship (bow to frame 61) ruptured
in forward fire room:
- Fire main.
- High pressure air.
- Drainage main.
- Ventilation power.
Frame 61 Plotting Room leakage via armored cables.
Frame 61 Distribution Forward leakage via armored
Frame 82 Boiler room B-5-1 Starboard lower corner
showed buckled plates but not ruptured. Only leakage through
#1 shaft gland and one pipe flange.
- Numerous shrapnel and missile holes throughout the structure
above the water line on the starboard side.
Shock and blast carried away many fittings, light bulkheads
and deck lockers.
- Action taken:
- Flooded compartments, boiler rooms and fire rooms
bulkhead 61 in the Plotting Room was shored.
bulkhead 82 in boiler room B-5-1 was shored.
All hatches and watertight doors closed to flooded areas.
- Services forward:
- Jumper hose connection over flooded spaces provided fire
main pressure forward.
- Jumper power leads over flooded spaces provided ventilation
- Sick Bay Area drains closed and plugged flooded
area closed. Battle Dressing Station Forward moved to Wardroom.
- Isolated third deck area frames 61 to 82 because
of fire hazard. Oil seepage extended throughout third deck in
this area to about 4 inches. This was relieved by removal from
the ship of fuel oil forward and aft, and by removing ammunition,
thus decreasing the draft.
- Damage Control General Comment:
- The personnel of the C&R Department report that
upon hearing of the bombing of Ford Island they proceeded to
their general quarters stations and set condition afirm as soon
as possible. The time required for setting condition afirm was
8 minutes, approximately.
The torpedo hit placed out of commission power and fire main
pressure. Also apparently started fires on the third deck. The
fire was the explosion blast venting from the engine room via
engine room hatch, passage B-306-L, and hatches 81 port and starboard
to the second deck. The remainder of the blast was vented via
the boiler rooms and stack uptakes.
Repair parties entered passage B-306-L putting out small burning
particles. There was no general fire. The flooded compartments
were isolated and bulkheads were shored.
Repair parties assisted the wounded and the battle dressing
stations in whatever manner requested.
The men attempted to hook up the fire main to the dock but
were stopped because of the second attack. Later, they were unable
to locate plugs on the dock.
Gas Masks and protective clothing were issued to the crew
as soon as possible.
Power and fire main jumpers were placed. Compartments were
patrolled and void soundings taken continuously. The fire main
was out of use about 17 minutes.
Repair I assisted in sending 1.1" and .50 caliber ammunition
to forward guns from forward whip hoist.
In general the personnel of the repair parties conducted themselves
in an exemplary manner, being extremely versatile in carrying
out their own duties and assisting in whatever manner they could
other activities. The highest praise belongs to each and every
one for a duty well done.
- Damage repaired during and after action.
- Fire main forward of after boiler rooms.
This was partially restored by Repairs III and I running jumpers
between risers 3 and 6. Firemain pressure was restored to ice
machines on Monday, December 8, by running a jumper direct to
- Main Drain: The after section from #3 Fireroom throughout
the after part of the ship was restored by closing the after
out-out valve in the forward engineroom by its remote control
from the 2nd deck. Unfortunately, while the forward room was
flooding, and before the cutout valve was closed, the bilge suction
in the port shaft alley, being either partially or fully open
this cannot be determined allowed this room to
flood. later, however, when the situation in #3 fireroom (flooding,
through the gland of #1 shaft) was brought under control, the
port shaft alley was pumped and restored. It was necessary throughout
the period the Forward engineroom was flooded to keep #3 Fire
and Bilge pump on the bilges of #3 Fireroom.
- Electric Power and Lighting served by #2 Distribution
Board: As #2 Distribution Board was blown out by the torpedo
explosion all its power and lighting outlets went dead. jumpers
were run by the Electrical Division to restore essential circuits.
- Damage that can and must be repaired to make vessel seaworthy
- Remove propellers from #1 and #4 shafts. (To enable
vessel to proceed with #2 and #3 shafts without drag.) Propellers
are not damaged.
- Restore evaporator plant. This requires supply of auxiliary
steam for air ejectors and exhaust steam for heat. The electric
power has been temporarily restored by cutting in on #1 Distribution
- Restore main drain throughout ship. Damaged in #1 engine
- Restore fire main. Damaged in #1 engine room and possibly
in #2 boiler room.
- Port auxiliary steam line. (This may not be damaged, however.)
- Auxiliary exhaust line through forward engine room.
- High pressure air line through forward engine room.
- Leads from #2 Distribution Board and all electric leads running
on starboard side of #1 engine room are destroyed. It is essential
that as many as possible be restored to enable 5" and 6"
battery to be fired in the designed manner.
- Sound-power telephone circuits 2JZ, 2JV, 3JV. Temporary leads
may be used to restore these circuits.
- Damage that will require an extended period to repair.
- All machinery in #1 engine room.
- All machinery in #1 Boiler Operating space. (Salt water immersion
- All boilers in #1 and #2 Boiler Rooms. (Salt water immersion
damage). The extent of damage to #3 boiler may be larger than
merely salt water immersion damage due to its position relative
to the torpedo hit.
- #2 Distribution Board and #2 generator, and electrical leads
to and therefrom.
- Main steam and other steam and fresh water drain piping.
- All reserve feed bottoms and fuel-oil tanks on starboard
side and bottom. Some port side tanks may be damaged, the exact
status unknown at this time.
- Distinguished Conduct of Personnel.
- Every man and officer observed on this ship conducted
himself in a meritorious and exemplary manner. All were cool,
determined, resourceful, vigorous and individually and collectively
conducted themselves with no hint of confusion or hysteria and
with no thought of danger to themselves. To point out distinguished
conduct would require naming every person I observed. The following
quoted report of one Gunnery Division Officer is indicative of
"Subject: Distinguished action, report of.
1. Because every man of the 5th Division did his duty I feel
it impossible to mention or commend any single person without
a resulting injustice to the others. But in fairness it seems
nothing but proper to commend GREENWALD, R.D., Sea1c, U.S. Navy
who died at his station as trainer during the action. Other commendations
must include the entire roll call of the crew for the 5th Division.
- The functioning of all engineering personnel in reestablishing
electric and steam power, repair of damaged systems to prevent
further damage, the securing of machinery to prevent fire, the
rescue of injured personnel was in accordance with the high standards
of the United States Navy. Not a single instance of faltering
on any task as noted; on the other hand, many men performed tasks
other than their regular ones with skill and despatch.
Had not a single order been issued and very few had
to be, in fact, it is believed that every job would have
been carried out by someone who saw the need for the task. This
reveals the intelligent discipline that is standard throughout
the ship. The orders that were necessary to issue were those
that required timing, and they were carried out fully, quickly,
The Forward Boiler personnel on watch proved to be a typical
example of American courage and discipline. An explosion blew
out a fuel tank behind the steaming boiler; the personnel knew
not what it was but proceeded to put to rights a distorted situation
in the dark with guns firing, water pouring through a bulkhead,
and super-heater temperature alarms and horns blowing due to
short circuits. With all this they continued their work of securing
the fireroom with water up to their chests before abandoning.
After abandoning the room they dogged down the hatches and reported
to the Repair III party for further duties.
- Enclosure (A) represent the opinion of the Commanding Officer
at this time. it is anticipated that a supplementary letter will
be forwarded giving specific instances of heroism after opportunity
is offered to make a full and concise study in detail. Recommendations
at this time would be premature and would result in injustice
to many whose individual acts have not yet been uncovered.
- Other Items of Interest.
- The Commanding Officer was on board, and was on
the bridge within 2-3 minutes from the arrival of Japanese planes.
Most of the damage done to all ships was during the first few
minutes of the attack and before any offensive action was offered.
Once gun opposition was in full swing, Japanese planes were noted
to turn away from gun fire, or keep at a respectable altitude.
It was noted on this ship that subsequent bombs dropped at the
ship were off the bow or quarter, and not throughout the midship
section where the 1.1" battery and 5"/38 battery were
belching forth a continuous stream of fire. It was also noted
that planes headed directly toward the Helena turned from
her fire and diverted the attack to the Downes, Cassin,
and Shaw in drydock. On another occasion Japanese planes
were noted to try and wiggle out of Helena fire and dropped
their bombs wildly off the starboard bow, during the same wave
that bombed the Nevada as she was rounding 1010 pier on
her way out.
- (1) The importance of protective clothing against flash burns
was forcefully demonstrated.
(2) There is no reluctance of personnel to the use of steel helmets
since they have once been under fire.
(3) The vicinity of the signal bridge and pilot house is untenable
during full action of all A.A. batteries. 4. (4) The present
location and arrangement of the sky control station is almost
untenable during full action of all A.A. batteries.
(5) Splinter protection must be provided for exposed personnel.
(6) Present location of sky lookouts is unsuitable. They must
be centrally located in immediate vicinity of sky control officer.
(7) All hands now have a high respect for the 1.1"/75 battery
even though our installation as yet has no directors or power
control and even the cooling water must be pumped by hand.
(8) No time was wasted in waiting or going for magazine keys.
The locks were immediately broken on all magazines, ready locker,
and clipping rooms necessary for immediate ammunition supply.
Service ammunition was already at every gun (including turret
guns) within the few minutes required for the Gunnery Officer
to slip on a few clothes and reach his control station.
(9) Ammunition was broken out and delivered to other ships and
stations during and immediately after the engagement as follows:
to U.S.S. California 25000 rounds of .50 cal. (about 5000
rounds already belted and belting links furnished for remainder);
to U.S.S. California (later) one .50 Cal. belting machine;
to U.S.S. Cachalot 1000 .50 Cal. metallic belt links;
to U.S. Naval Air Station, 14 Naval District, 15000 rounds of
.30 Cal. and 10000 rounds of .45 Cal.; the guns on top of adjoining
buildings in Navy Yard several thousand rounds of either .50
caliber to .30 caliber.
(10) During the early part of the action men were requested by
the Oglala to assist them in servicing their forward gun.
Three men went and assisted until the vessel sank at which time
they jumped into the water and swam back to Helena and
continued their duties on board this vessel. Likewise two men
were requested and sent on board to handle their lines aft. These
also later swam back to the ship.
(11) The individual initiative and adaptability of our men was
truly amazing. In very numerous instances men were assigned duties
and tasks for which they had no previous instruction or training
and they performed them like veterans.
(12) On one occasion the Mount Captain of a 5" mount requested
the officers and men of the Oglala please clear the Bridge
because he desired to fire through it. This was done.
- The Torpedo explosion occurred about one minute after General
Quarters was sounded; men were, therefore, on their way to Battle
Stations. Many did not arrive; some were killed, and some were
injured. No. 3 boiler was auxiliary boiler, the forward engineroom
being used as auxiliary engineroom, the #2 generator as auxiliary
generator. When the torpedo hit the engine room all light and
power went off the ship. The men continued through the darkness
to their stations. They stand-by diesel watch, machinist mate
and electrician's mate, started #1 diesel and had it on the line
within one minute. The bus-tie from Boards 1 and 3 to Board 2
tripped automatically so power was restored to #1, 3, and 4 boards
by this generator. The crew of the after diesel (#2 diesel) started
their engine within another 2 minutes and the electric plant
"split" so that #1 engine was serving its board, and
#2 serving boards 3 and 4. This action was taken to prevent loss
of power aft due to fact that bus-tie connections between the
#1 and the 3 and 4 boards ran through the damaged, flooded engine
room. This action on the part of the electrical and diesel personnel
was in accordance with doctrine established in the past.
As steam power was entirely lost on the ship after the torpedo
hit, means had to be taken to light off the after boilers and
establish auxiliaries there. The most important auxiliary, of
course, being the Fire and Flushing pump to restore fire main
pressure. The After Boiler personnel had no lights due to a relay
on a lighting panel having tripped due to the explosion. Using
hand emergency lanterns they could find no sprayer plates in
the boiler space. Chief watertender Westbrook waded through about
two feet of oil, and through the pungent smoke of the explosion
that still lingered in the sealed-up, non-ventilated spaces of
the third deck to the Boiler Cleaning Station in the Ice Machine
room to obtain a supply. These he delivered to the After Boiler
personnel who then lighted off #6 boiler using natural ventilation.
As the explosion had thrown #1 shaft out of position wrecking
the shaft coupling in #3 fireroom and distorting the stuffing
gland between the flooded engineroom, the firing of #6 boiler
and the water level rise under the boiler resolved itself into
a race against time. The M Division Officer had opened all auxiliary
stops between boiler #6 and the after engineroom. When the boiler
pressure reached 50 PSI he cut in the Fire and Flushing pump
to supply the fire main. A short while later he started a Fire
and Bilge pump on the main drain to keep #3 fireroom bilge water
level below the boiler. Boilers 5, 7 and 8, were meanwhile, being
drained down to steaming level, and when drained, were lighted
While the after boilers were being readied for steaming, the
Forward Boiler Operating personnel were securing #3 boiler and
the Boiler Operating Space machinery.
Ensign Westphal, the B Division Officer, and chief watertender
Westbrook, were on their station in time to take charge of the
securing of the room. Before the room was secured, they were
up to their chests in water. Westbrook observed the time they
abandoned the room as exactly 0800. Water and oil were almost
to the third deck level in #2 fireroom by this time.
Forced draft blowers in the after boiler rooms were running
about 0830, and as steam pressure was raised to 500 PSI steps
were taken to get main machinery ready to get underway. #3 generator
was warmed up and, after considerable difficulty, was put on
the line. Feed water was getting low, and only bottoms B-954-W
and 955-W were found to be good. As these ran dry, make-up feed
water was taken from the dock.
The after engineroom machinery was tested out, engines 2 and
3 rolled 6 times in each direction, and then the Engineer Officer
went to the Bridge to report condition of readiness, which was,
to run at 10 knots for about 5 hours, at the end of which time
feed water would have been expended. He recommended that the
ship not get underway.
- Most of the casualties consisted of flash burns from high
explosive and occurred chiefly in the following compartments:
B-305-2L, B-306L, B-203-2L and B-204-1L. Other casualties occurred
in the forward boiler room operating spaces, firerooms No. 1
and No. 2 and in the forward engineroom where the torpedo struck.
Six wounds were caused by splinters and machine gun strafing,
two of which were fatal. Two fractured bones were treated. Of
the 100 casualties received; 50 injured were transferred to the
Naval Hospital, 26 were killed outright and sent to the morgue,
and 21 retained on board under treatment. Subsequently 5 hospital
cases have died bringing the total dead to date to 31. Civilian
workmen on the pier assisted in evacuating the injured.
- Settling of the ship caused flooding of sick bay by water
backing up through the drains of the isolation ward shower, venereal
treatment room and sick bay head. These were plugged and the
forward dressing station was transferred to the Wardroom.
- The Helena was moored at 1010 pier, berth two, port
side to dock, heading 210 true, with the Oglala secured
to the starboard side. The Oglala was later shifted to
a vacant berth astern of the Helena (about 0850).
[Mailgram reformatted with punctuation, lower case,
etc. for readibility]
Commanding Officer, USS Helena
Date 14 DEC 1941
Mailed at Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Air attack December seven in three general phase periods. Times
First phase 0757 to 0820. Second phase 0900 to 0940. Third
phase 1105 to 1115.
First phase: dive bombers about 12000 feet, diving from southerly
direction toward Ford Island and battleships west side of south
channel; about twelve to fifteen planes. Followed almost immediately
by torpedo planes in section of three attacking battleships and
cruisers, and by other group of about ten dive bombers attacking
Pennsylvania, dry docks, and cruisers east of south channel,
from south westerly direction. Followed shortly by two groups
of horizontal bombers; one group about twelve planes in tight
vee of vee at 15000 feet, course about 020 true; formation opened
out when AA burst close; observed to release bombs which fell
in ragged pattern in south channel and vicinity of battleships
west of south channel. Other group horizontal bombers, course
about 070 true, 14000 feet, passed over Helena; bomb drops
Observed light bombers and at least one fighter strafing during
torpedo attacks; second phase consisted two general attacks by
dive and glide bombers. First attack came from about 170 true
from Helena; at least three groups, five each, rather steep
dive--about 60 degree, in single file heading directly for Helena.
At about 4000 feet, leader, followed by about four, changed to
his left and headed for Nevada, then near floating dry
dock. Then about five continued toward Helena and four
very near misses observed by Helena, one on dock abreast
bridge, two close on starboard bow, and one close on starboard
quarter. Remainder believed to have attacked Pennsylvania,
destroyers, and Nevada. Second attack about ten glide bombing
from direction about 110 degrees true, dive angle thirty to forty
degrees, five in very loose vee toward Helena, of which
none reached release point for Helena. Two veered to left
smoking, and fell one near hospital, one beyond hospital; one
veered to his right and disappeared in direction about 060 degrees
true; two veered to left and attacked with remaining planes on
Pennsylvania, destroyers, and particularly Nevada,
on which at least two hits observed. During this period, one lone
torpedo plane flying parallel this vessel and headed directly
for dry dock caisson, under fire this vessel, exploded and disintegrated
in air on starboard quarter. Also during this period, group of
planes observed to bomb battleships across channel, approaching
from direction mountains to north.
Third phase: one group about six or eight horizontal bombers
passed over Helena, course about north 15000 feet; no bomb
drops observed. About same time, two or three light bombers, 1000
to 2000 feet, in direction of port quarter. One of latter fired
on by after 1.1" and machine guns. Within few minutes, group
of planes crossed from port quarter to starboard quarter at considerable
distance; fired on by our 5" for few rounds out of range;
identified as our Army P40 and ceased fire; no apparent results.
Seven planes on which this vessel fired believed destroyed
First phase -- one torpedo plane crossing stern after crossing
to west of Argonne, part fuselage blown off, caught fire
and fell to north in channel before dropping torpedo. Phase two
-- one torpedo plane headed toward caisson mentioned above. Two
dive bombers of first attack observed on fire; one fell near water
tower Ford Island, other far side Ford Island or possibly channel
beyond. Two glide bombers in second attack, as mentioned above,
and one plane passing along starboard side heading about toward
Shaw or Nevada burst in flames when abeam and fell
in direction slightly to right of Pennsylvania and well
/S/ C. S. RADFORD, ENS. AUTHENTICATED
__________________USN RADIO OFFICER
Source: Enclosure (E) to CINCPAC
action report Serial 0479 of 15 February 1942, World War II
the Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration,
8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740.