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Peace, however, was being humbugged by Hanoi, who responded to American presentation of the issue before the United Nations Security Council by declaring that any resolution by that body would be considered null and void.
Nevertheless, the American official
position transcribed over and over in world mass communication
media remained as follows:
1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis
for peace in Southeast Asia.
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part
thereof.
3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre-conditions"
as the 17 nations put it.
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson
put it.
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business
at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points
which others might wish to propose.
7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia.
8. We do not desire to retain U. S. troops in South Vietnam after
peace is assured.
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South
Vietnamese a government of their own choice.
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined
by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral
if that be their option.
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic
reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace,
North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which
we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.
13. The President has said "The Viet Gong would not have
difficulty being represented and having their views represented
if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression.
I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the
bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there
has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side
as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.
Navy men seemed to understand these principles better than some
of their peers back home. As one Air Wing Commander put it, "Our
men seemed to know why we were fighting out there which is the
principal reason why our morale was so high." Another officer
said that he was sure that the closer a ship was to Vietnam the
higher was the morale of the crew.
Air
Operations
During the last days of the 37-day stand-down from air operations
over North Vietnam, Kitty Hawk and Ranger were at
Point Yankee, Ticonderoga was at Dixie, Enterprise
was in Hong Kong, and Hancock at Yokosuka.
When ROLLING THUNDER operations were resumed on the evening of
31 January, Navy carrier planes and the Air Force flew armed reconnaissance
missions along North Vietnamese lines of communication. The Navy
flew 74 sorties, destroying two bridges and one truck, and damaging
one truck, two ferry landings, one supply area, and two junks.
Five bridge approaches and one road were also cratered. Fifty-eight
USAF aircraft achieved similar strike damage, plus an attack against
a truck convoy. The weather, however, was bad, and some of the
Navy aircraft were diverted to STEEL TIGER targets.
During this first operation after the stand-down, there were three
aircraft lost: a USAF F-105, a Navy F-4B and an A-4E. Crews from
the two Navy aircraft were rescued, but the Air Force pilot was
lost.
The pattern of ROLLING THUNDER, STEEL TIGER, BARREL ROLL and in-country
strikes was not unlike other months. Over North Vietnam and Laos,
the aim remained to shut off the supply of men and materials to
South Vietnam, and in the South to hit any targets confronting
US and RVN ground forces.
On 4 February, Ticonderoga moved north to relieve Kitty
Hawk at Yankee station; and Enterprise, after 21 days
"off the line" moved to Dixie to commence in-country
operations in the South. During the next eight days, before going
up to Yankee, Enterprise flew nearly 1400 sorties, of which
almost 1100 were in combat. She was credited with the destruction
of 510 structures, 24 bunkers, 23 sampans, four gun-emplacements,
and one bridge. Also, 569 other structures were damaged, numerous
tunnels and trenches collapsed, other sampans and bunkers impaired,
plus accompanying secondary fires and explosions. Kitty Hawk,
reluctant to give way to the advantages of nuclear power, had
a 170 sortie-day just before departing for rest and recreation
at Subic. For one of her RA-SC's lost to AAA over North Vietnam,
the guns of Waddell (DDG-24) and Brinkley Bass (DD-887)
were brought to bear on shore targets interfering with the search
and rescue of the downed crew. This marked the first time that
shore bombardment by U.S. Navy ships had taken place in North
Vietnam. The SAR mission, however, was unsuccessful, and the crew
of two declared missing.
On 9 February, a Ticonderoga A-4C was damaged by an SA-2
in the vicinity of a position 20 miles southwest of Thanh Hoa.
In this case the wingman of this flight received a SAM warning
signal, but was unable to relay it to his leader in time for evasive
action. The missile exploded immediately behind the lead plane,
damaged the tail section, ruptured the fuselage in many places,
and set the aircraft on fire. Moments afterwards, another missile
exploded 700 feet behind the first one. The second aircraft in
the formation was undamaged, but the pilot in the lead plane,
although able to stay with his aircraft until over the sea, ejected
near the destroyer England (DLG-22) and was recovered.
Both missile explosions, it was reported, were "orange in
color with black smoke."
On 11 February Enterprise moved north to relieve Ranger,
and Hancock assumed the in-country responsibilities of
Dixie. Kitty Hawk arrived back at Yankee on 17 February
from a rest in Subic and Hong Kong, relieving Ticonderoga
who joined Ranger in Subic.
Other losses in North Vietnam included an A-4E from Ticonderoga
which was shot down in an attack on boxcars with the pilot --
observed being led away by his captors -- listed as missing. Also
on 10 February a Ranger A-1H was lost in a dive bombing
mission in which the pilot was declared killed. Another loss in
which there were no survivors, involved an A-6A from Kitty
Hawk which struck the ground after a glide bombing attack.
And finally, Enterprise lost an F-4B over the Gulf of Tonkin,
and in this case also, the crew was not rescued.
In the final week of February, Ranger and Hancock
handled the air operations over North Vietnam, and Kitty Hawk,
back at Dixie, was flying 100 sorties a day in support of friendly
forces in the South. Enterprise was at Subic. On the 28th
a Ranger SH-3A rescued five survivors of a downed USAF
RB-66. In this case an A-1H pilot, also from Ranger- but
not forewarned of the crash - located the airmen in the water
by homing on a "beeper" from their emergency radio.
MIG activity increased in February over other months. On 3 February
a Marine F-4B reported sighting a MIG-17 and gave chase. He broke
off, however, near the Hanoi restricted zone and turned away.
The MIG-17 then pursued and fired at the F-4 but missed. On the
8th, a Marine F-4B made radar contact off the North Vietnam coast
east of Vinh, closed to 12 miles, but then lost his contact to
the west. Ten minutes latter, F-4B's again closed to eight miles
of their "bogey," only to lose contact. In neither of
the last two cases was visual identification achieved, which was
necessary to the existing rules of engagement.
More than 70 photo reconnaissance flights were made by Task Force
77 planes over North Vietnam and another 70 over Laos. RA-5C and
RF-8A aircraft from the carriers provided their coverage and were
augmented by the RA-3B detachment from Cubi Point.
The tempo of air operations in February showed no signs of slackening.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the Navy flew 8,147 sorties over North
Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos. Figure 3 illustrates the number
of sorties by plane. Losses amounted to three A-4's, one R-A5,
one A-6, one A-1 and one F-4 over North Vietnam and two A-1's
over Laos. All but the one A-4 shot down by SAM was lost to conventional
antiaircraft fire or causes unknown. Pilots interviewed attested
to more concern for the heavy and accurate AAA than for missiles.
They also admitted to being tired at times, but not "fatigued."
One Air Wing Commander said the morale of his men was the highest
he had ever known.
Nevertheless, due to a statement early in the month on the Walter
Cronkite TV News show that the Navy was short of attack pilots,
and that pilots flew combat missions over North Vietnam 28 days
out of every month, OSD requested the Navy make an explanation.
The following information was provided:
a. An individual pilot might fly as much as this, but this rate
is above normal and not continuing.
b. Pilots in TF 77 average 16-22 sorties per month.
c. The Navy has a limit of 150 combat sorties during a seven and
one-half month tour, and so far, no naval aviator has exceeded
this number.
d. The Navy has a pilot manning factor of 1.4 per aircraft for
attack planes. All squadrons have met this factor when initially
deployed, but losses, combat or operational, sometimes reduced
this level before replacements arrived.
e. The Navy is short of pilots, but the shortage is not critical.
The current requirement for attack pilots is being met. CINCPACFLT
has recommended an increase of the attack manning level to 1.7
per aircraft, but this, of course, will cause a shortage of attack
pilots in other areas of the Navy, both fleet and shore-based.
f. The Navy has received authorization to increase the output
of naval aviators from 1800 to 2200 per year, but it will take
one and one-half years for the impact of this increase to be felt.
Southeast
Asia Air Summary by Type Aircraft - USN Only
| A/C | No. of Sorties |
| A1 | 893 |
| A3 | 55 |
| A4 | 3572 |
| A6 | 155 |
| C1 | 27 |
| E1 | 101 |
| E2 | 73 |
| EA1 | 110 |
| EA3 | 108 |
| F4 | 1651 |
| F8 | 846 |
| KA3 | 262 |
| RA3 | 48 |
| RAS | 189 |
| RF8 | 57 |
MARKET
TIME
During February there was no indication of large scale infiltration
from the sea. Efforts were not relaxed, however, and when eight
new PCF's arrived in January, they were immediately started on
shakedown training with the six boats already in service there.
Nine more Coast Guard WPB's also arrived and comprised Division
13 at Cat Lo. This made a total of 26 Coast Guard cutters now
in Vietnam with a force of about 430 officers and men. Operating
in an area from about 60 miles northeast of the Saigon River mouth
to about 120 miles southwest, the WPB's operated as elements of
TU 115.1.6 and TU 115.1.7.
On 8 February, Hissem (DER-400) who had so carefully shadowed
the Chinese trawler described in January Highlights, detected
a junk flying a Thailand flag and acting suspiciously off the
tip of the Ca Mau peninsula. She continued to track her quarry
for two weeks as she moved northeast through the South China Sea.
No attempts at sea rendezvous with anyone were made, but she ultimately
ended up in Hong Kong where she was apprehended by marine police
for having on board large quantities of opium.
On 13 February, Pine Island (AV-12) discontinued seadrome
operations in Cam Ranh Bay. She would be succeeded by Salisbury
Sound (AV-13) early in March. In the meantime, P-2 aircraft
from Tan Son Nhut picked up MARKET TIME coverage on the southern
coastal surveillance track, and P-3 Orions from Sangley continued
their patrols along the northern coast,
On 14 February PCF-4 was lost to a booby trap. According
to reports, the Swift approached a bamboo pole about 250 yards
from shore near Rach Ghia in the northeast corner of the Gulf
of Siam to remove the VC flag that was attached to it. After exploding
several grenades near the base of the pole and noting no secondary
explosions, a crewman proceeded to cut the flag loose. During
the process a mine-type high-magnitude explosion occurred, sinking
the Swift and killing four crewmen and wounding two others. Viet
Cong fire harassed recovery efforts, but the boat was lifted Out
of the water and shipped to Subic. There, it was declared beyond
repair, but would be evaluated by BUSHIPS to determine the effect
of mining on an aluminum hull,
At the end of the month, during an air attack in the vicinity
of Dung Ho, north of Danang, a Marine F-4B was hit by anti-aircraft
fire, and the crew of two bailed out over the sea, On being informed
of the downed aircraft, USS Falgout (DER-324) and Coast
Guard units on MARKET TIME patrol proceeded to the area, Low clouds,
rain, and rough seas hampered the search, but both men were recovered
after about two hours in their rafts.
Junk count flights were conducted during February with the following
results:
| North of Vung Tau (Three Day Average) | 2643 |
| South of Vung Tau (Three Day Average) | 335 |
| Total Day average | 2978 |
| North of Vung Tau (Three Night Average) | 657 |
| South of Vung Tau (Three Night Average) | 374 |
| Total Night average | 1031 |
| January averages: | Day | 2550 |
| Night | 506 | |
| December averages | Day | 1200 |
| Night | 500 |
Map of Game Warden (CTF 116)
Plans, Bases And Units
Naval
Gunfire Support
Navy gunners fired
19,556 rounds in February in support of missions that ranged from
small besieged fronts to the amphibious operation DOUBLE EAGLE
and the U. S. Army's search and destroy mission, MASHER.
Oklahoma City (CLG-5) with COMSEVENTH Fleet embarked and
Barry (DD-933) started the month by firing 100 rounds in
support of DOUBLE EAGLE, and when Oklahoma City departed
for Yokosuka, she was replaced by Topeka (CLG-8).
Destroyers accepted targets that included cave hideouts, road
blocks, camp structures, choke points, machine-gun emplacements,
and sampans. Two destroyers, Orleck (DD-886) and Higbee
(DD-806) set new records for time on the line. Higbee had
a total of 34 consecutive days until she was relieved on 27 February,
and Orleck 28. The latter demonstrated her skill with white
phosphorous rounds on the 12th, damaging 95 structures and leaving
others burning in a VC assembly area.
Altogether, 14 destroyers plus Oklahoma City and Topeka
carried out gunfire missions during the month in all four Corps
areas. MARKET TIME ships, Vance and Finch, also
were able to depart from their customary role of patrol and respond
to a call for gunfire support.
Canberra (CAG-2) chopped to Seventh Fleet on 19 February
after CINCPAC Fleet's direction that a cruiser with eight inch
guns be maintained in WESTPAC at all times. By the end of the
month she was at work in Vietnam waters.
As mentioned earlier, shore bombardment of North Vietnam occurred
for the first time in February. This happened, however, only when
Waddell and Brinkley Bass returned fire which they
had first received from the shore.
CINCPACFLT estimated the expenditure of 5"/38, 5"/54,
6"/47, and 8"/55 ammunition would exceed 30,000 rounds
a month for the next six months.
Amphibious
Operations
Amphibious activity during the month centered on operation DOUBLE
EAGLE, initiated in January and continued until 16 February, in
southern Quang Ngai province. This involved both Third Marine
Amphibious Forces, based ashore at Danang, and Seventh Fleet ready
forces afloat. Not as spectacular as STARLIGHT, this operation
was highly successful over a longer run.
Four Marine Battalion Landing Teams, with a helicopter element
and a battery unit participated. The attack transport Paul
Revere was flagship, leading two other attach transports,
an attack cargo ship, 3 LST's, 2 LSD's, a helicopter carrier,
a cruiser, a destroyer, 2 auxiliaries, and the hospital ship Repose
(AH-16). Upon completion of the first phase of the operation,
retention of the Special Landing Force (BLT 2/3 and HMM 262) and
the Amphibious Ready Group (Valley Forge (LPH-8), Monticello
(LSD-35), and Montrose (APA-212) was requested until 28
February by MACV to provide continuing support for the second
phase.
Where amphibious assault features were incidental to what was
mainly a land-based drive, the quality and extent of Navy support
was judged particularly noteworthy. Battalion teams were landed,
backloaded, and moved as called for with exceptional mobility.
Helicopters flew 1353 combat sorties, lifting 3257 passengers
and 87.2 tons of cargo, and evacuated 97 casualties. Nearly two
hundred aircraft were serviced with 18,397 gallons of fuel and
246 gallons of oil. Other services, including delivery of 6,000
pounds of fresh fruit were provided. The total medical cases evacuated
to Repose were 304. Of these, 31 were gunshot wound cases,
23 shrapnel wounds, 5 traumatic amputations, 9 lacerations, and
234 miscellaneous disease cases. Among them, only one man died
of wounds and one of disease.
A Navy Beach-Jumper Unit detachment also participated. It operated
a loud-speaker public address system to advise local inhabitants
to cooperate with Marines, to avoid aiding the Viet Cong, and
to stay clear of combat areas. The efforts proved to be effective.
Consolidation of Beach-Jumper Unit and Naval Operational Support
Group activities and their relocation to Okinawa was implemented
to centralize command and training of those activities in the
Western Pacific. A conference at the Headquarters of the Commander
in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, defined classroom training requirements
for tactical deception courses.
Princeton (LPH-5), Pickaway (APA-222), and Alamo
(LSD-33), with Marine Battalion Team 1/5 embarked, relieved the
Amphibious Ready Group composed of the Valley Forge, Monticello,
and Montrose, with Battalion Landing Team 2/3 embarked.
In addition, units of Amphibious Squadron Three completed the
movement of BLT 1/5 headquarters and associated elements to the
Western Pacific.
Marines
In March 1965, the first American troops to land in South Vietnam
were about 500 Marines. In February 1966 there were 50,000.
The first Marines came ashore at Danang when they were assigned
the single task of defending one overcrowded airfield. In February
1966 their responsibilities had expanded with the war and included
the security of four additional air facilities: the aluminum Marine
jet field at Chu Lai, the field at Phu Bai, and the large helicopter
field at Ky Ha and Marble Mountain. On these airfields, whose
complex stretched over more than 100 miles of heavily populated
coastline, were based over 500 U. S. aircraft.
During February, III MAF forces involved themselves in large scale
operations on every day of the month. In four out of five provinces
of I Corps, operations up to brigade size were conducted, and
one operation, in the final planning stages at the end of the
month, was scheduled to involve eight and one half battalions.
Operation DOUBLE EAGLE, Phase I, ended on 19 February with 312
enemy killed and 19 captured. It was followed by Phase II, when
intelligence sources indicated that large numbers of enemy troops
were concentrating west of Tam Ky, in Quang Tin Province, 25 miles
north of Chu Lai. Essentially the same forces that participated
in Phase I converged on this area utilizing helicopters and motor
transport. Nevertheless, contact was lighter than expected. Enemy
casualties resulted in 125 VC killed and 15 captured while Marines
suffered 4 killed and 121 wounded.
The following statistics on civic actions by III MAF, including
the attached Navy personnel, are offered for the months of January
and February:
| January | February | Total to 28 Feb. | |
| 51,413 | 70,891 | Persons given medical treatment | 325,014 |
| 22 | 9 | Persons given medical training | 157 |
| 26 | 63 | Construction Projects | 287 |
| 14,781 | 51,012 | Pounds of food distributed | 212,030 |
| 6,358 | 9,220 | Pounds of soap distributed | 62,201 |
| 8,543 | 6,208 | Pounds of clothing distributed | 148,817 |
| 87 | 56 | Critically ill civilians evacuated | 4,565 |
| 36 | 55 | English Language Classes in Progress | 173 |
| $907 | $916 | Cash donations | $21,130 |
| 22,638 | 14,113 | Persons fed | 54,903 |
| 2,887 | 2,250 | Students supported | 10,237 |
Mining
of Rivers and Harbors
The increased number of minings have been a matter of concern.
In December, the attempt to mine the Danish ship, Kina,
demonstrated that shipping to Saigon and other ports is indeed
vulnerable. This attempt at Kina, however, prompted immediate
steps:
a. The use of "O" type gear by the Vietnamese and a
daily mid-channel sweep to supplement their current efforts.
b. Initiation by the U. S. Navy to procure additional mine countermeasure
units in order to institute around-the-clock minesweeping.
c. Evaluation of anti-swimmer nets.
d. Evaluation of conditions on Long Tau River to determine the
number of MSB'S to be activated from semi-reserve status.
These steps proved prudent when the leader of a three-man cell
of a Viet Cong Naval Engineer Battalion surrendered and supplied
the following information:
He had joined the VC in April 1963 and deserted in the following
December, He lived a normal civilian existence until August 1965
when he joined the VC again as a "counter agent," and
was assigned to the Engineer Battalion in the RSSZ, with a mission
of attacking military ships traveling in the Lung Tau River. It
was this unit that planted the mine that was expected to sink
Kina.
In order to plant the mines, the width and depth of the river
were measured, and the flow of the current studied. Three floats
were then made from coconut tree trunks, attached to stones, and
planted in the positions that they thought the mines should be
placed. This was repeated many times over for three or four days.
Then, he said, they felt they knew where to best place the mines
for the greatest damage to Kina
In November, the defector connected the floats with electrical
wire that led to the shore. They were cut on two occasions by
minesweepers. When the decision was made to wire the mines again,
they were planted in the position of the floats immediately after
the minesweepers had passed on 1 December. It was one of these
mines that was exploded near to Kina the next day.
{indented in original}
The confirmation of the presence of this battalion of engineers
in the RSSZ caused acceleration of projects in progress and in
the establishment of harbor defense units.
Harbor
Defense
In February, representatives from CINCPACFLT, COMINPAC, COMIUWGRU
ONE, and CHNAVADGRP, visited the ports of Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha
Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Vung Tau, to obtain on-scene information
and study the peculiar requirements of each port. The present
organization at Danang, which includes radar and visual surveillance
of the harbor, a harbor entrance control post, and surveillance
by small boats, was considered adequate. At the other ports tentative
sites were selected for entrance control posts, and personnel
and material require ments were drawn up for each proposed installation.
It is planned that operational control of harbor defense forces
at each location will be exercised by CTF 115 in conjunction with
MARKET TIME forces in that sector. In addition to providing harbor
defense for the local military base or port commander, these harbor
defense forces can serve to extend MARKET TIME surveillance into
the internal waters of the harbor.
Mine countermeasures in the four ports were considered a contingent
requirement. The fact that there has been no VC attempt to mine
harbors to date does not preclude the existence of the threat.
An adaptation, however, of the techniques used in the rivers is
evaluated as remote. The greater the depth of the water, the less
restrictive is the pattern of ship movements and the relative
absence of VC controlled shore areas.
Introduction of visual and radar surveillance and boat patrols
should effectively deny the enemy the opportunity to place his
mines and also afford security to U. S controlled shipping against
attack by swimmers or small craft.
Logistics
In spite of headlines and hopes for giant cargo-carrying airplanes,
sealift accounts for 98 percent of all cargo to Vietnam. In fact,
since World War I, when sealift provided for 100 percent of the
needs of the soldiers overseas, only 2 percent has been taken
over by airplanes. Furthermore, more than half of the soldiers,
sailors, and marines sent to South Vietnam, and essentially all
of the bulk petroleum products used there -- including fuel for
airlift aircraft -- are transported in MSTS ships or ships that
MSTS charters from the Merchant Marine.
Complementing this logistics support which travels some 7,000
miles and more from California, is the Service Force, Pacific
Fleet which replenishes and serves Seventh Fleet and MARKET TIME
forces in Vietnam waters, and the Navy and Marine forces ashore.
During February Markab (AR-23), Dixie (AD-l4), Platte
(AO-24), and Vega (AF-59) arrived in WESTPAC, and Isle
Royale (AD-29), Bellatrix (AF-62), Neches (AO-47),
Opportune (ARS-41), Shakori (ATF-162), Molala
(ATF-106), Rehoboth (AGS-50), and Sunnadin (ATA-197)
departed.
During the nine month deployment of Neches, she steamed
over 63,000 miles, took 370 ships alongside and transferred to
them 31 million gallons of NSFO, 9 million gallons of JP-5, and
121 tons of bottled gas and lubricants. Neches also delivered
798 passengers, over 120 tons of fleet freight, and 12 tons of
mail to Seventh Fleet ships.
In 90 days of continuous sailing Elkhorn (AOG-7) pumped
over 10.3 million gallons of petroleum products in support of
the III MAF in the Danang/Chu Lai area and was commended by CG
III MAF for her part in Operation DOUBLE EAGLE.
On 5 and 9 February Sacramento (AOE-1) conducted vertical
replenishments of ammunition to Enterprise during flight
operations and delivered more than 500 short tons in this manner.
On the latter date she also delivered over a million gallons of
JP-5 in less than two hours. This kind of support is considered
a significant logistic contribution to the operation of a nuclear
task group. An AOE, of course, has not only more speed than an
AO, but carries more JP-5 and provides ammunition and provisions
as well.
On 26 February Mars (AFS-1) replenished Kitty Hawk
and achieved high transfer rates by combining the use of conventional
rigs and vertical replenishment. Of the total of 380 short tons
transferred, 107.4 S/T were delivered by two UH-46A Sea Knight
helos. The transfer rate for the combined UNREP/ VERTREP rate
was 147 S/T per hour.
A total of 433 UNREPS were conducted during February, 101 of them
being at night. The latter category is broken down as follows:
| AO/AOE | 73 |
| AE | 10 |
| AF/AFS | 17 |
| AKS | 1 |
This document is part of the Vietnam Command Files, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
26 July 1999
