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The commencement of another year was
regarded by responsible Americans with a mixture of hope and concern
-- hope that the lull in the bombing of North Vietnam that had
started on Christmas Eve would evoke some reciprocal action on
the part of Hanoi to end the war, and concern for what might happen
otherwise.
In his State of the Union message, the President said that in
1965 there were 300 "private talks for peace in Vietnam with
friends and adversaries throughout the world," and that spokesmen
for the United States visited "more than 40 countries."
He said that our government talked to more than a hundred other
governments -- "all 113 that we have relations with, and
some that we don't" -- and to the United Nations. He said
that we seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination
or military alliance, but fight only for the "principle of
self-determination--that the people of South Vietnam should be
able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without
violence, without terror, and without fear." And then, finally
on this subject he continued: "We will meet at any conference
table, we will discuss any proposals -- four points or 14 or 40--
and we will consider the views of any group."
Reaction at home and abroad was generally favorable. Cassandras
didn't stop wringing their hands altogether, but there was less
pressing for fresh actions and more willingness to accept "marking
time." Almost all Far East papers joined in approving with
enthusiasm those sections of the message that dealt with Vietnam.
This included segments of the powerful Japanese press which in
past months had been hyper-critical. Specifically selected for
praise were the President's promises to persevere for peace, his
decision to continue for the present the pause in the bombing,
and his firm resolve to protect the independence of South Vietnam.
Tet, a religious holiday based on the lunar New Year, was a period
-- 21 to 23 January this year -- in which, by custom, hostilities
ceased. It was riot without violations, however, in which six
Americans, seven Koreans, and six South Vietnamese were killed;
and three score more were wounded. Included in these incidents
was the bombing of a BEQ in Saigon housing 85 American soldiers.
Tet did provide a "psywar" opportunity, however, to
drop ten million "Happy New Year" leaflets along a hundred
mile coast of North Vietnam, plus gifts and cards.
Nevertheless, there was nothing in the peace message nor the holiday
cease-fire to slow the thrust of the build-up of forces in South
Vietnam. By month's end there were 200,000 Army, Navy, Marines,
Air Force, and Coast Guard in the country and more to come. Of
these the Navy had over 9,000 ashore and the Marines more than
38,000, which together exceeded one fifth of the total.
Another 50,000 Bluejackets and Marines were offshore in 100 Seventh
Fleet ships. The Navy, to man new river forces, harbor defense
units, and other activities it was planning for, already had asked
for 4,000 more officers and men to fill new jobs.
It appeared that if it had to be a long drawn out war, there would
be no shortage of necessary forces. The President said in his
message to the Congress: "...Let me be absolutely clear:
the days may become months, and the months may become years, but
we will stay as long as aggression commands us to do battle."
During January there were five attack
carriers in WESTPAC with three of them continuously "on the
line." They were Ranger, Ticonderoga, Enterprise,
Hancock, and Kitty Hawk.
In spite of the month-long stand-down of air operations in NVN
terminating on 26 January, the tempo of operations was high with
Navy and Marine sorties amounting to nearly 9,000 as follows:
| North Vietnam | South Vietnam | Laos | |
| USN | 75 | 3,416 | 2,669 |
| USMC | 0 | 1,672 | 1,026 |
| USAF | 57 | 4,541 | 4,305 |
| VNAF | 0 | 2,473 | 0 |
| Date | Plane | CV | Lost | Reason | Pilot |
| 2 Jan | A4C | Enterprise | RVN | unknown | KIA |
| 3 Jan | A1H | Ticonderorga | RVN | AW | rescued |
| 14 Jan | A4C | Enterprise | RVN | controlled ejection | |
| 22 Jan | S2D | Hornet | At sea investigating radar contact | 2 & 2 Crew MIA | |
| 31 Jan | A4E | Ranger | NVN | rescued | |
| F4B | Kitty Hawk | NVN | rescued |
During January, Seventh
Fleet ships exhibited again their abilities to fire on a variety
of shore targets in any kind of weather and do it rapidly and
accurately. Answering the call were CAG's, CLG's, DD's, DDG's,
DE's, DER's, AV's, APD's, and WPB's, which together fired more
than 13,000 rounds at the enemy at an average rate of 441 rounds
per day.
Ellison fired the first gun of the new year in support
of forces ashore and was joined by Turner Joy, self-proclaimed
"fastest gun in the East," who was concluding her NGFS
missions which commenced on 23 September. Turner Joy reported
that the superior range with accuracy of the 5"/54 system
permitted coverage of targets not always available to other DD's.
Cunningham fired a mission while surrounded by friendly
fishermen in their junks. Reported Cunningham:
In curious contrast to the intense alertness of Cunningham's
crew at battle stations, was the impassive equanimity of hundreds
of nearby fishermen and women making their age-old living from
the sea...
Bache reported destroying or severely damaging six caves
that harbored VC troops who had previously been unscathed by three
days of air strikes. Eleven 5" rounds were fired directly
into the mouths of the caves from 500 to 600 yards off the beach.
Likewise, Chandler routed a VC company which had ambushed
a US infantry unit in the I Corps area. She did this on the anniversary
of the death of RADM Theodore S. Chandler, for whom the ship was
named. The ground spotter reported that surrounded US troops were
enabled to break free because of Chandler's action and
continue their pursuit of the VC.
During a mission fired by Hubbard, the cameras of ABC-TV
recorded the action for a Navy-At-War documentary. Sperry
fired a night illumination mission against a target that had over
and over again been used as an emplacement for mortars, machine
guns, and automatic weapons. Eversole, commenting on one
of her missions noted that "while the firing was going on...Vietnamese
children could be seen running and playing on the beach...oblivious
to the drama...around them." Rupertus once had to
close to less than a mile from her target and fire in waters as
shallow as 24 feet, in order to deliver the accuracy required.
Shelton, supporting an amphibious marine assault in the
Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), fired 175 rounds in close support
from a range as great as 17,000 yards. And the oldest active destroyer
in the Navy, Nicholas, just six months short of her 24th
birthday, effectively demonstrated to the VC that age was no bar
to pinpoint fire as she destroyed staging areas and supplies.
The action described above is only a sample of the NGFS effort
which has performed daily since May. In tribute CINCPAC said:
Naval gunfire has provided a...worthwhile effort in support of
forces ashore... The illumination, harassment, and destructive
fire have become essential in our continued actions against the
VC.
The
RVN Navy and Marines
A daily average of 14 patrol ships, deployed from Saigon, was
maintained during the month for coastal surveillance. The state
of their training and readiness for patrol was satisfactory, but
their effectiveness when on patrol was not. Advisors report that
some commanding officers are still lax in their patrol procedures,
waste time in port and at anchor, and feel it is unnecessary to
search junks diligently and continuously.
RVN junk readiness is considered by Navy advisors to be unsatisfactory.
The combination of personnel shortages, austere facilities, lack
of trained enginemen, lack of understanding of the rationale for
routine maintenance, and indifference of some commanding officers
to materiel condition, contribute to the poor state of readiness.
Lack of sensors on the junks and slow speed also limit the effectiveness
of the coastal forces.
In naval gunfire support the readiness of 18 ships capable of
firing is considered outstanding. Utilization is poor, however,
as few requests for this support have been made in areas other
than the Rung Sat Special Zone. An education program on the merits
of NGFS is continually in progress.
An average of two Ships and 35 boats were used on river patrol
during the month, as well as 29 River Assault Group (RAG) joint
operations. The effectiveness of the RAG's was considered excellent,
but the utilization of the river patrols only marginal.
Elements of the Marine Brigade conducted ground operations in
I and II CTZ, conducted a three day amphibious operation in the
Rung Sat Special Zone, and were maintained on search and clear
and static security missions within the Capital Military Region.
Except for the amphibious operation, contact with the VC was negative.
GAME
WARDEN
GAME WARDEN was planned
in December for operations in river mouths and estuaries of the
Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Objectives will be
to prevent VC infiltration, interdict traffic and supplies at
river crossings, and isolate the enemy in areas that are bounded
by rivers and canals. By this effort substantial Navy support
would be given to the Vietnamese Navy River Assault Groups.
Forces will be composed of 100 31-foot fiberglass River Patrol
Boats (PBR) , 20 landing craft (LCPL) based at eight locations
in the Delta, and three LST's anchored in principal river mouths.
Operations are planned to be similar to MARKET TIME, but with
the added hazard of continuous operations within weapon range
of river banks. In-country logistic support will come from two
major maintenance facilities at Nha Be and Can Tho, with minor
maintenance available at the six other bases plus support from
the three LST's.
Medical
and Dental Care
On 10 January, the
Danang station hospital was opened at the Naval Support Activity,
operating with 175 of its potential 400 bed capacity. On 31 January
Repose arrived off the coast of Danang with another 755
beds and completely modern equipment. In the rear, hospitals at
Yokosuka and Guam were expanded and an additional 1,087 bed unit
planned for the Philippines. Another hospital was approved for
Guam and a second hospital ship requested. Nevertheless, in spite
of this expanded protection for the wounded, CINCPAC was able
to announce that the casualty rate in Vietnam was lower than expected.
The construction of a dental facility at the Danang hospital was
expected to be completed in February. Another was planned for
Chu Lai, and a request made for dental trailers to serve the Mobile
Construction Battalions deployed in various areas of South Vietnam.
Civic
Action
Medical and dental care of the Vietnamese people have opened doors
of understanding and contributed measurably to the war effort.
One striking example of Navy civic action is the participation
with the other services in the Military Provincial Hospital Program.
The Navy team consists of three doctors, one Medical Service Corps
officer, and 12 enlisted technicians.
Children with cleft lips have received surgery by these teams
going into private hospitals, and children sick with illnesses
that normally might have killed them have been saved. Orthopedic
and neurosurgery have been provided on top of general surgery
along with the more routine dispensing of shots and pills.
Reaching the people through dental service has been another natural
civic action by Navy doctors and corpsmen, and doing it "after
hours" has been the norm rather than the exception. In one
case, an oral surgeon was spending twenty-five percent of his
time treating local inhabitants. Another, regularly provided care
for school children, an orphanage, and a refugee center. Still
another dentist regularly lectured to Vietnamese dental students
in Hue.
All of these actions added up to considerable involvement by Navy
men in ways that make this war different from others fought before
it. The best of it, however, is that most of the civic actions
cannot be documented. These are the ones that spring from the
heart and are performed quietly and unnoticed by modest young
men who are grateful for their blessings and wish to share them.
General
On New Year's night, numerous single page leaflets protesting
Us involvement in Vietnam were dropped on the Naval Base at Long
Beach by an unidentified aircraft. On one side were pictured the
charred bodies of a woman and a child. On the other was a strongly
worded message criticizing our involvement.
On 2 January an A4C from Enterprise was lost in South Vietnam
on an in-country strike. The pilot's body was reported by an A1
RESCAP to have been placed in an open area about 3/4 of a mile
away from the wrecked plane. Since it had the appearance of being
"booby-trapped," it was not recovered. Later information
revealed that the pilot had been badly wounded in the legs prior
to the crash and had lost his instruments. It has been recommended
therefore, that all possible means be taken to hurry up the incorporation
of appropriate armor plating on the A4.
The Soviets demonstrated their continued interest in the operations
of our Navy off Vietnam by increasing their specially equipped
trawlers in the South China Sea to two -- one each at Yankee and
Dixie Stations respectively, where they maintained a close watch
on US carrier operations. This activity was much in line with
the Soviet trawler activity off Guam where Polaris submarine departures
and B-52 takeoffs have been observed for a long time. Also, a
Russian out-of-area group with two "W" class submarines,
completed a deployment period in the Philippine Sea.
A survey of about 400 captured VC soldiers and defectors who were
interrogated the latter part of 1965, revealed a decline in morale
and a belief that Communist forces have lost the war. Puzzlement,
however, was also expressed by some villagers from contested areas
as to why friendly troops who seemed so powerful, did not remain
in the area that they had cleared of VC to keep them from coming
back.
A Rand Corporation study believes Communist China is pressing
the VC to abandon large-scale military action and repair their
political ties with the South Vietnamese people. Defense Minister
Lin Piao's speech of 2 September 1965 is interpreted by Rand experts
as a lecture to Hanoi and the VC on the nature and conduct of
a "people's war." Representatives of our government
have equated this speech with Hitler's Mein Kampf. A Columbia
University expert on China, however, has called it a rehash of
what Chinese Communist leaders have been saying since 1949 with
the cardinal point of the message being that the VC and other
communist revolutionaries throughout the world must make their
revolutions "on their own" and not count on Chinese
or other outside assistance.
Pilots report that the VC have returned to one of their old deception
tactics of lighting fires after dark several hundred meters from
actual encampments to entice our aviators to expend their ordnance
on these dummy positions. Similarly, lights have been placed on
roads to simulate trucks, but have in reality been flak traps.
COMUSMACV has described the VC as having a limited frogman capability.
A camp for 500 to 600 trainees with Chinese instructors has been
reported to exist near the Cambodian border. Also, swimmers in
other areas have been observed practicing diving techniques. It
is also claimed that frogmen, disguised as fishermen, may attempt
to destroy shipping by floating baskets filled with explosives
to their targets at night.
A member of the Indonesian Air Force Staff College reported a
CHICOM aircraft plant at Shenyang which produces 30 to 35 MIG-19
aircraft a month plus all spare parts. Presumably this MIG-19
is an improved model and approaches the performance of the MIG-21.
During the first week of 1966, seven communist bloc ships were
tracked in MARKET TIME patrol areas or lanes adjacent to them.
This is half the number that were observed in the previous four
week period. Also, eight Soviet merchant ships were either in
port at Haiphong or near to it. Four Soviet and three East European
ships were reported enroute to North Vietnam, and six Soviet and
four Polish merchantmen were scheduled for future voyages. A typical
cargo for North Vietnam -- aboard the Soviet ship Dmitriy Gulia
(11,287 GRT) -- was as follows: two 60' craft described as tow
boats, plus 7,250 tons of declared general cargo that included
92 tons of pontoons for two 27 ton bridges, two of 16 tons, and
two of 3 tons. Also, there were steel, tires, tubes, 15 five-ton
and 17 four and one half-ton trucks, 25 tractors, 4 bulldozers,
15 eight-ton oil tanks, electrodes, and condensed milk.
According to USDAO in Moscow, the Military Attaché from
Yugoslavia stated his opinion that Ho Chi Minh is a leader of
the pro-Soviet group desiring to end the war on the basis of neutralization
of Vietnam. This is opposite, of course, to the pro-Chinese group
who desire to continue the war.
Evidence from prisoners, defectors, and captured documents has
led to the confirmation of 13,953 communists infiltrating into
South Vietnam in 1965 and at least another 5,165 as probably having
done so. Most of the infiltrators traveled over the traditional
routes through Laos, but some claimed to have continued through
Cambodia. The majority were associated with regular North Vietnam
army units, but some replacements for VC units also came down
from the North. New infiltration strengths by the year follow
but with the understanding that 1965 totals will probably increase
as more evidence is uncovered:
| Category | 1959-60 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 |
| Confirmed | 1,800 | 4,118 | 5,362 | 4,726 | 9,316 | 13,953 |
| Probable | 2,782 | 2,117 | 7,495 | 3,180 | 3,108 | 5,165 |
| TOTALS | 4,582 | 6,235 | 12,857 | 7,906 | 12,424 | 19,118 |
From Independence
Command debrief of WESTPAC Deployment from 10 May 1965 to 13 December
1965:
1. Problems in coordinating Navy and Air Force strike activity
within the relatively small airspace of North Vietnam became acute
at times when Seventh Fleet and Second Air Division strike forces
had to share the airspace on the basis of a time arrangement.
This resulted in a narrow range of flexibility, less than the
best employment of forces on strikes, and inefficient peaks and
valleys in carrier deck activity. Finally, a geographic subdivision
of the airspace was agreed to which permitted continuous Navy
strike activity around the clock. In future joint operations,
such as in Vietnam, geographic subdivisions of an area would be
a better arrangement than trying to share the time.
2. In the complex electronic environment over North Vietnam, close
coordination between strike, CAP, and ELINT aircraft has become
a matter of survival. New procedures and equipment. now provide
SAM identification and warning, the defensive capability around
it, early warning of MIG activity, and degradation of enemy radar
control of AAA batteries. Continued development and training in
this area is urgently needed.
3. In spite of the growing SAM capability, the enemy's most potent
weapon against our strikes is his intense and accurate AAA, which
must be anticipated around every target of importance. His mobility
of AAA was demonstrated in shifts of concentration whenever we
developed a pattern of strike activity. He also showed his versatility
and discipline, even though his actions were sometimes puzzling.
For example, on one day in a heavily defended area, the sky was
black with flak, and the next day in the same location, there
was no reaction at all. Possibly, there were operational or logistic
reasons for these nulls, but as one pilot put it, there was also
the possibility "that the enemy just wanted us to think that
he had gone somewhere else, and hoped we would pass over tomorrow
with a larger force.
4. Ordnance and pyrotechnic design is needed to enable carriage
at 600 KIAS instead of 450-475 KIAS.
5. Reliability and operating improvements are required of both
mechanical and electrical fuses because of use on high performance
aircraft. The mechanical fuses used were of World War II vintage,
causing duds and extra hazardous conditions when any malfunction
took place due to "less than ample separation between the
weapon and aircraft before the weapon was fully armed."
Electrical fusing reliability and arming and delay times must
be improved to provide, for example, reasonable delay times which
do not risk casing ruptures before explosion.
6. One reason Shrike did not perform well was the enemy's excellent
electronic emission discipline and the use of two or more antennae.
Another is that missile ranges are so short that prospective targets
are obvious. The enemy ceased emitting when the attacker pointed
in his direction and radiated when he turned away. Shrike should
be modified to enable homing on a FAN SONG radar radiating into
a dummy load, and a 25 to 50 percent increase in range would be
desirable in both Bullpup models.
7. For night operations, greater quantities and improved reliability
of the MK-24 flare are necessary. A near 50 percent dud rate was
experienced with this flare. However, it is an excellent pyrotechnic
when it works; and the only one that should be used in an AAA
environment, because of the delay feature and the enemy's habit
of shooting out flares as well as leading the flares in an attempt
to hit the aircraft.
8. Over heavily defended areas, it is not prudent to send low
or medium altitude reconnaissance forces; and, therefore, strategic
high altitude aircraft or missiles must be tasked to do this job.
9. Camouflage paint, recently authorized for USAF aircraft in
Southeast Asia, would be beneficial for Navy aircraft in light
of increasing MIG activity.
10. As long as we continue to operate in a SAM or AAA environment
backed with excellent radar coverage, APR-23 or APR-23B and ALQ-51
are desired ECM equipment in each aircraft.
From VA 42 pilots of the A-6A Intruder airplane who were members
of Squadron VA 75 aboard Independence when she was deployed
off Vietnam:
1. The capability of the A-GA in bad weather consisting of total
darkness, fog, or heavy rain is outstanding. At no time when operating
in combat over Vietnam, were radar-significant targets totally
obscured. Although it is possible for heavy rain to obscure U
target, this did not happen to VA 75 in the monsoonal rains that
they experienced.
2. The aircraft's computer proved very reliable, and success in
navigating to targets using computer-derived, inertial, and Doppler
dampened information coupled with excellent search radar is enough
to substantiate the need for this system.
3. AMTI (automatic moving target indicator) in its present form
is considered to be unsuitable for the terrain in Vietnam. Here,
the roads are usually covered with heavy foliage and are very
winding, providing a combination that is difficult for radar pickup
and terminal tracking. More R&D work is needed in this field.
4. The track-radar used for terminal tracking and precise feedback
of information to the computer has proved unreliable. Even when
it was "up" on launch, the target was more often than
not reached with the track radar in a "down" condition.
This is important, because the A-6A, with its track-radar system
operating properly, has a CEP that few pilots can match visually.
5. Although not recognized as an "ECM bird," the ECM
capability of the Intruder is excellent, providing the pilot with
useful information on radar emitting sectors that he can analyze
according to the characteristics of the signal received. This
capability alone has saved more than one airplane that was able
to take evasive action because of the electronic information warning.
6. The A-6A, if it is to perform as advertised, requires considerable
system maintenance and should not routinely be scheduled for both
day and night operations. To succeed in its night role, the system
must be "peaked" during the day. More aircraft are entering
the Navy's inventory requiring mission priority analysis, and
this is true of the Intruder.
7. The war in Vietnam has proved the A-6A to be the best "Iron-Sight"
bomber in Navy inventory. It is aerodynamically stable, carries
a large payload and can range further than any other fighter-bomber
in the Navy or Air Force. For example, on missions deep in North
Vietnam (north of Hanoi) each A-6A carried 5 MK-84 (10,000 pounds)
over 300 miles to its target, returning to its ship over two hours
later. Then, it dogged in the pattern overhead while aircraft
that had already tanked once, landed due to a lower fuel state.
As a pathfinder, no major strike led by an A-6 failed to locate
the target on the first pass. In route-recce flights, an A-6 carrying
12 MK-81 bombs (3,000 pounds) and a four-shot ZUNI pod can double
cycle and provide a prolonged threat to VC activity, causing them
to "keep their heads down."
8. Finally, one squadron member warned against too much faith
in statistics alone. For example, "Sorties," he said,
"don't tell the truth about the A-6 as they might for some
other planes, because we double cycle and stay out twice as long.
Talk about the whole plane," he said, "the job it is
being asked to do; and talk down statistics which don't have proper
comparisons or reveal the whole truth."
Glossary
of Terms
BARREL ROLL - US air
operations to interdict infiltration routes in northeastern Laos.
CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone, of which there are four in South Vietnam.
RSSZ - Rung Sat Special Zone, a mangrove area southeast of Saigon
encompassing the main ship channels. Many VC inhabit this area.
SIGINT - An inclusive term for communications intelligence and
electronic intelligence.
SLF - Special (Marine) Landing Force.
STEEL TIGER - US air operations to interdict infiltration routes
in the eastern panhandle of Laos.
TIGER HOUND - A full-time combined US project team at the Second
Air Division TACC to oversee air interdiction operations in the
SE Laos Panhandle.
This document is part of the Vietnam Command Files, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
26 July 1999