
U. S. S. PETREL,
Manila Bay, May 4, 1898.
SIR: I respectfully report as follows concerning my share in
the action fought by the fleet under your command in Manila Bay,
off Cavite, on the morning of May 1, 1898.
The
ship had been partly cleared for action at Hongkong and on the
run to Manila. Went to quarters for action at 9.45 p. m. of April
30, and all preparations were completed. Hammocks were not piped
down, but men were allowed to sleep at their guns.
The
position of Petrel was fourth from head of column, astern
of Raleigh and ahead of Concord. We passed in through
Boco Grande, about 1 mile from El Fraile. All lights were masked
and only stern lights showing. At 11.10 a rocket and light were
shown from Corregidor Island, and just as the Raleigh and
Petrel came abreast El Fraile three shots were fired from
a shore battery on the rock, these being promptly replied to by
the Raleigh, Concord, and Boston. We steamed
slowly up the bay, and just as day was breaking, about 5 o=clock, the shore batteries
below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distinguish
signals from this vessel when flagship made signal to APrepare
for action,@ so signal
was repeated from the Baltimore. During time column was
forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing.
As flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavite
began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could
make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing.
The battery of this vessel began firing at 5.22 by the deck clock
at a range of 5,000 yards.
The
column circled three times from east to west in front of shore,
standing in a little nearer each time, the first time being 3,000
yards and the third time 1,800 yards. During these three rounds
this vessel expended ninety-two 6-inch common shells, eight-two
6-inch full charges, ten reduced charges, and two hundred and
fifty-three 3-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease
firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition.
The greater part of our great-gun fire was at the Reina Christina
and Castilla, the former steaming around the harbor and
the latter anchored about 500 yards off Sangley Point; but the
other and smaller vessels were fired at when opportunity offered.
Especially was the fire of the rapid-fire guns aimed at a yellow
launch, which was apparently a torpedo boat trying to turn our
flank. The navigator, Lieut. B. A. Fiske, was stationed in the
top with a stadimeter to determine the distance and report upon
the efficiency of the fire.
At
7.30 we ceased firing and withdrew from action in obedience to
a signal from flagship to fleet to that effect. The men were given
their breakfast. While withdrawing the enemy continued firing
until we were well out of range, and the batteries below Manila
were firing at intervals during breakfast. At 11, when the signal
was made to get under way, the Petrel followed Olympia
and stood well in. While steaming across the fire the signal was
hoisted for the Petrel to pass inside.
This
vessel left her station, passed outside of Baltimore, and
rounded Sangley Point about 500 yards outside of where Castilla
was burning. The fire was then directed at the Don Antonio
de Ulloa, and when it was found that she was sinking and deserted,
the ship passed farther inside and opened fire upon the ships
behind inner breakwater and whose masts were seen above government
buildings. During the firing on the Ulloa a white flag
with a Geneva cross was discovered in range with her, and I stood
in further so as to get it out of range. After the first two or
three shots fired through the public building at ships behind
the mole, the Spanish flag was, at 12.30 p.m., hauled down and
a white flag run up. The surrender was immediately signaled to
fleet and firing ceased.
In
obedience to a signal from flagship to destroy all shipping in
the harbor, Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whaleboat=s
crew of seven men, this whaleboat being the only one on the ship
which would float, and set fire to the Don Juan de Austria,
Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, General Lezo,
and Marques del Duero. Afterwards Ensign Fermier was sent
to set fire to the Velasco and El Correo. The Isla
de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria
were aground and full of water when they were fired. Their outboard
valves were opened and the ships allowed to fill. The breech plugs
of 4-inch guns had been taken off and could not be found. During
the night the magazines of the Don Juan de Austria blew
up. The Manila was not burned because the Spanish officers
begged that she be not destroyed because she was unarmed and a
coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske and Passed Assistant Engineer
Hall raised steam on the ship this morning, the 4th instant, and
brought her out. At the time she was aground. The Don Antonio
de Ulloa was sunk and the Reina Christina and Castilla
were burning in outer harbor.
Lieutenant
Fiske was sent ashore and brought off two tugboats, the Rapido
and Hercules, and three steam launches.
I
was anchored in Cavite harbor from 12.50 to 5.20 p. m., when I
got under way and returned to the fleet.
There
were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having been
struck only once just beneath hawse pipe by a piece of shell which
burst just as it sank, and threw a column of water over the forecastle.
After
the white flag was displayed, there was apparently the greatest
confusion in the arsenal. Parts of the crews of the various ships
were there, and all were armed and were constantly falling in
and moving about; yet there was no evidence of any desire to continue
the fighting, and instead of any resistance being offered to the
destruction of the ships, they were rather inclined to assist
with their advice and evinced a desire to surrender to the first
officer they met.
The
action of the ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended
during action, one hundred and thirteen 6-inch common shells,
three 6-inch armor-piercing shells, eight-two 6-inch full charges,
thirty-four 6-inch reduced charges and three hundred and thirteen
3-pounder ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads
swelled and made it very difficult to lock the breech plug. Nothing
would remedy this save shifting plugs, replacing hot plug by the
one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge of firing lock
jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedied by shifting
locks.
The
percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four
primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked
badly, causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction,
and delay in priming of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent.
The
action of no one can be censured, the conduct of each and every
officer and man being excellent. There was no confusion; I should
say less than at ordinary target practice.
The
loading was rapidly done and the firing was deliberate. Due to
your caution to commanding officers that no ammunition should
be wasted, Lieutenant Plunkett fired the forward 6-inch guns and
Ensign Fermier the after ones, and the work was thoroughly done.
Lieutenant Hughes stationed himself on the poop, as it was deemed
essential that he should not be with the commanding officer on
the bridge. He materially assisted Ensign Fermier by observing
fall of shot and tendering advice regarding pointing. I wish particularly
to call to your attention Lieutenant Hughes, his gallantry in
taking a boat=s crew
of seven men and in the face of a large armed force on shore setting
fire to the five ships before mentioned. He was aware that he
had the only boat in the ship which would float, until the steam
whaleboat could be prepared.
Lieutenant
Fiske stationed himself on the fore cross trees with stadimeter
to measure the range and report on the fall of shots. He also
took charge of the steam whaleboat to cover Lieutenant Hughes
in his operations in burning the ships.
Lieutenant
Wood had charge of the powder division, assisted in the after
part by Assistant Paymaster Seibels. There was at no time a halt
in the firing due to failure of the powder division.
Ensign
Montgomery was in charge of the signals and materially assisted
me on the bridge. He also directed the fire of the forward 3-pounder
when it was allowed to be fired. He also afforded assistance to
Lieutenant Plunkett by observing the fall of shots from the forward
6-inch guns.
I
desire also to mention the efficient service of the engines. In
order to maintain our position and to take advantage of every
opportunity, the engine telegraph was in constant use from full
speed to stop, and the engine never failed to respond in the quickest
time possible. This I consider to be due to the high state of
efficiency of that department and the whole credit is due to Passed
Assistant Engineer Hall.
I
can make no statement regarding the services of Passed Assistant
Surgeon Brownell, as the Petrel was most fortunate in having
no casualties.
I
inclose the report of the executive officer.
Very
respectfully,
E. P. WOOD,
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
Asiatic Station.
U. S. S. PETREL,
Off Cavite, Manila Bay, May 2, 1898.
SIR: In accordance with the requirements of article 525, U.
S. Navy Regulations, I have the honor to submit the following
report concerning the part taken by this vessel in the general
action fought yesterday off Cavite, in Manila Bay:
The
ship was gradually cleared for action, this work having been begun
in Hongkong, when the fore and foretopsail yards, fore trysail
gaff, ladders diving outfit, part of the running rigging, etc.,
were placed onboard the transport Nanshan, and completed the day
before the squadron entered Manila Bay. In the operation of preparing
the ship for action certain articles and material in the equipment
and construction departments were necessarily thrown overboard.
Among these may be mentioned all of the varnishes, inflammable
paints and oils, tar, turpentine, etc., lumber, two boats= strong backs, one turpentine
chest, one ice chest, one large hammock box, and carpenter=s bench, etc. During the
action the discharge of the after 6-inch guns shattered the gig
and first whaleboat and they were cut adrift, carrying with them
their outfits complete. These boats have been temporarily replaced
by two taken from the enemy.
No
description of the maneuvers during the action is included in
this report. As regards the Petrel, the first shot was
fired at 5.22 a.m. and the last one, before hauling off for breakfast,
was fired at 7.30 a. m. The times of beginning and finishing the
firing during the second part of the action were, respectively,
11.30 a. m. and 12.30 p. m., at which latter time the Spanish
flag on the arsenal sheers in Cavite was hauled down.
The
return of ammunition expended will be made by the ordnance officer;
but, approximately, about one-third of the entire supply on board
for the 6-inch guns was expended, including a large proportion
of common shell and full charges. So far as could be observed,
the fuses acted exceedingly well, all the shell bursting. Some
complaint was made by the officers commanding gun divisions that
the primers frequently failed, both electric and percussion.
The
bearing of all on board was satisfactory in the extreme, and I
can specially call attention to no one in this connection. With
little excitement, a quiet enthusiasm and the utmost steadiness
prevailed throughout the ship=s
company. The practice of the gun captains was excellent, being
both deliberate and precise.
After
the action was over, in obedience to your instructions, boat=s crews from this vessel
burned the following Spanish ships lying in Cavite harbor: the
protected cruisers, Don Juan de Austria, 1,160 tons; Isla
de Luzon, 1,050 tons; Isla de Cuba, 1,050 tons; the
gunboats General Lezo, 520 tons; Marques del Duero,
500 tons; El Correo, and one (not engined) name unknown.
On
rejoining the squadron the Petrel towed from Cavite to
the anchorage off Manila two small tugs---the Rapido and
Hercules---and three steam launches, which were this morning
turned over to the flagship.
No
casualties occurred on board. The vessel was not hit, save for
a scratch on the stem, and no repairs will be necessary. That
part of the equipment sacrificed in clearing for action should
be replaced.
Very
respectfully,
EDWD. M. HUGHES,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Executive Officer.
The COMMANDING OFFICER,
U. S. S. Petrel.
Source: Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.
23 July 1999