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On
the 25th of April, at 11 p.m., says Señor Montojo, I left
the bay of Manila for Subic with a squadron composed of the cruisers
Reina Cristina, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de
Cuba, Isla de Luzon, dispatch boat Marques del
Duero, and the wooden cruiser Castilla. This last could
merely be considered as a floating battery incapable of maneuvering,
on account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning,
being at Subic, I had a conference with Captain Del Rio, who,
though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting the completion
of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished.
In
the meanwhile the cruiser Castilla, even on this short
cruise, was making much water through the bearings of the propeller
and the opening astern. They worked day and night to stop these
leaks with cement, finally making the vessel nearly water-tight,
but absolutely impossible to use her engines.
One
the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the
entrance to the port of Subic. The Castilla was taken to
the northeast point of the island of Grande to defend the western
entrance, since the eastern entrance had already been closed with
the hulls of the San Quintin and two old merchant vessels
which were sunk there.
With
much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted
on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised
me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very
little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, under
the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery, Señor
Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-four
days after the commencement of the work.
I
was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy
of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.
The
entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of
the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack
of the Americans with its own resources, in 40 meters of water
and with little security. Our vessels could not only be destroyed,
but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that
the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time for more
preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish
consul at Hongkong a telegram which said:AEnemy=s squadron sailed at 2 p.
m. from the bay of Mira and according to reliable accounts they
sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to
Manila.@
This
telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find
my squadron and that the port of Subic had no defenses.
The
same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains,
and all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal,
thought that the situation was insupportable and that we should
go to the bay of Manila in order to accept there the battle under
less unfavorable conditions.
I
refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far
from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the
plaza, which doubtless would have been demolished on account of
its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should take
position in the bay of Cana Cao, in the least water possible,
in order to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point
Sangley and Ulloa.
I
immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most
strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn
the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power
of the enemy. I sent the Don Juan de Austria to Manila
to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the
water line of the Castilla (which could not move) against
the enemy=s shells and
torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with the vessels
of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila.
In
the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao
in 8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in
line of battle, the Christina, Castilla, Don
Juan de Austria, Don Juan de Ulloa, Luzon, Cuba,
and Marques del Duero ,while the transport Manila
was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and
Lezo were undergoing repairs.
At
7 p. m. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy=s squadron had entered the
port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from
there they sailed with course for Manila.
The
mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised
her captain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy
could not get into the entrance probably before midnight. As he
was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic he did not do so, and
then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near
as possible to Bacoor.
At
midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning
of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American
vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of
the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I notified
the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and
the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Señor Garcia Pana,
that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery
to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their
stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy.
This
is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance
of the American squadron in the bay of Manila.
The
squadron being disposed for action, adds Señor Montojo,
fires spread, and everything in proper place, we waited for the
enemy=s arrival.
All
the vessels having been painted dark gray color, had taken down
their masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles
and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to
slip instantly.
At
4 a. m. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4.45 the Austria
signaled the enemy=s
squadron, a few minutes after which they were recognized, with
some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6,000
meters distant; the flagship Olympia ahead, followed by
the Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord,
Helena, Petrel, and McCulloch, and the two
transports Zafiro and Nanshan.
The
force of these vessels, excepting transports that were noncombatant,
amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horsepower, 163 guns (many of
which were rapid fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average
velocity of about 17 miles. The power of our only five effective
ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horsepower,
76 guns (very short of rapid fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum
speed of 12 miles.
At
5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots
fell short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots
were not answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the
squadron.
This
battery only had two Ordonez guns of 15 centimeters mounted and
but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.
In
a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and
at 5.15 I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered
immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs
and the cable and started ahead with the engines, so as not to
be involved by the enemy.
The
Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles,
as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves
almost entirely to fight the Cristina, my flagship. As
short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the
forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four
rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which
wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. Jose Nunez took
the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation,
steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile another
shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews=
bags, which they were fortunately able to control.
The
enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim,
covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7.30 one
shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer
by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile another
shell exploded on the poop and put out of action 9 men. Another
destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign,
which were replaced immediately. A fresh shell exploded in the
officers= cabin, covering
the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being
treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern,
filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of
the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire,
I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning
to explode.
Amidships
several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack
and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out
of action 1 master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another
rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern
increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went
through the hull and exploded on the deck.
The
broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there
were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing
them, as the guns= crews
had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with
steering, all of whom were out of action.
The
ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled
with shot or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her
crew out of action, among whom were 7 officers, I gave the order
to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode,
making signal at the same time to the Cuba and Luzon
to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided
by others from the Duero and the arsenal.
I
abandoned the Cristina, directing beforehand to secure
her flag, and accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow,
I hoisted my flag on the cruiser Isla de Cuba.
After
having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroyed
her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the
rescue.
The
Ulloa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only
two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered
the water line, putting out of action her commander and half of
her remaining crew, those which were only remaining for the service
of the two guns stated.
The
Castilla, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery
useless, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly,
was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy=s
shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in good order,
which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado. The casualties
on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.
The
Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid
of the Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismounted,
and was slightly damaged in the hull. The Duero remained
with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimeters
and one of the redoubts.
At
8 o=clock in the morning,
the enemy=s squadron
having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to
us to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and
there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk
before they surrendered.
At
10.30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal
and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible
fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon
which we still had mounted.
There
remained the last recourse to sink our vessels, and we accomplished
this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing
pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech
plugs of the guns, and the signal codes.
After
which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de
Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to
telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and
results.
It
remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers,
quarter masters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivaled one another
in sustaining with honor the good name of the navy on this sad
day.
The
inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron,
the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners
and seamen gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional
machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews
of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part
of our vessels all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice
which we made for our country and to prevent the possibility of
the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the
conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior
enemy we were going to certain death and could expect a loss of
all our ships.
Our
casualties, including those of the arsenal amounted to 381 men
killed and wounded.
OFFICE OF THE STAFF OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE STATION AND SQUADRON OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, April 24, 1898.
It
having been resolved to go out with the squadron for the port
of Subic, not only for the defense of that important port but
also as a strategic harbor for operations which may occur, the
staff is placed in charge of the necessary orders from these headquarters.
As
commandant of the Cavite arsenal I have nothing to say to your
excellency concerning its defense, as the chief commander and
officers will know how to defend the interests of the nation,
trusting the valor, zeal, and intelligence of all those who, with
the slight and feeble resources upon which we can count, will
do everything possible to guard the honor of the flag and the
navy.
Go
on, sir, in the ordering and equipping as much as you think necessary
for the common purposes which concern our interest.
You
will use the telegraph to report to me all that you think important
for your affairs in all departments, as well as the cable to communicate
with the Government.
As
long as possible communicate by way of Paranaque and Malate and
also with the batteries of the coast by signals as well as by
boats.
If
you need merchant vessels to equip with torpedo tubes, which may
be effective in such vessels, you will also equip them, etc.
MONTOJO.
The COMMANDANT OF THE CAVITE ARSENAL.
April 25.---Copy.
SIGUILLY, Secretary.
Source: Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898.
23 July 1999