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Peter M. Swartz
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)


The subtitle is a wonderful phrase taken from the oral history of Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, one of the commanders of the U.S. Second Fleet and the NATO Strike Fleet, Atlantic, during the 1950s.2 His words capture nicely the theme of U.S. Navy policy and practice during those years, vis-à-vis its Mediterranean, North Atlantic Ocean, and NATO commitments:

The Navy knew very well what the game was; it had joined the team; and it would play to win. But to the extent that it could, the U.S. Navy meant to pitch: After all, it was they who almost always "brought the baseball."

This paper weaves together a few strands of the very rich story of the U.S. Navy's turn toward Europe during the first 10 years or so after World War II. In particular, it will discuss-and draw some conclusions regarding:

A Survey of the Field

The relationship of the early postwar Navy with Europe and with its European allies isn't a very popular subject. Naval historians have pretty much ignored it, save for the return of the U.S. Navy to the Mediterranean in 1946 and 1947; you won't find any other aspects discussed in the books written or updated during the past two decades or so by Lacy, Beach, Hooper, Miller, Hagan, or Howarth (although Robert Love comes close).4

The one recent book that seeks to describe all the world's Cold War naval developments, Bruce Watson's ambitious The Changing Face of the World's Navies: 1945 to the Present, likewise fails to discuss NATO at all, or the inter-relationships among the NATO navies.5 Writers on NATO history haven't done much better;6 nor have authors of books on NATO strategy and policy.7

There are, however, some recent exceptions. In 1988 came Michael Palmer's Origins of the Maritime Strategy, which touched for the first time on several aspects of the U.S. Navy's early postwar planning on Europe.8 Then came four works on the Navy and NATO: Bob Jordan's short Alliance Strategy and Navies9; Joel Sokolsky's more comprehensive Seapower in the Nuclear Age10; Eric Grove's little Battle for the Fiørds11; and Sean Maloney's Securing Command of the Sea.12


First, some important context:

As World War II was drawing to a close, the U.S. Navy had clearly emerged as the preeminent naval power on the globe. Navies were not the only military institutions in the world, however, and being top dog at sea did not necessarily mean world military preeminence. The U.S. Navy could not rest on its laurels. Asserting its relevance to deal with the emerging Soviet continental threat, and dogged by an Army Air Corps that thought it needed little help from another service, the U.S. Navy had to keep busy.

And keep busy it did. This is an important point. I would submit that the pace in the U.S. Navy in the first postwar decade was hectic-even frenetic-operationally, organizationally, and technically.

Operationally, the Navy was engaged all over the world: first to bring home the troops and to demobilize forces; then to deploy its greatly reduced fleet to the China Seas, the Mediterranean, and elsewhere, in the first operations of what came to be known as the Cold War. Then came Korea and the U.S. defense buildup; and then the routine deployment far forward of large multi-capable permanent fleets in Europe and Asia, and smaller squadrons elsewhere, especially in the Persian Gulf.

Politically and organizationally, the Navy was also busy. This was, after all, the era of the Pearl Harbor hearings, of defense unification, of the "Revolt of the Admirals," of violent swings in defense budget allocations, and of the change from the Democratic Truman Administration to the new Republican Eisenhower Administration.

In terms of hardware, the Navy was busier still. As Dr. Tom Hone has pointed out, the U.S. Navy had emerged from World War II with an enormous fleet that was "both victorious and largely obsolete," with much of its equipment still relatively new.13 The newest generation of German submarines, the deployment of jet aircraft, and-of course-the atomic bomb had shown that Admiral Ernest King's armada, vast as it was, would not be up to many of the military challenges of the postwar world order unless enormous technological and tactical changes were promptly instituted.

So the Navy was busy with new systems throughout this period-researching, developing, designing, testing, evaluating, justifying, procuring, building, and deploying them: New style carriers, revolutionary submarines, new destroyer types, jet aircraft and seaplanes, helicopters, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles, sonars and radars and fixed underwater arrays, new types of amphibious and logistic ships-an overwhelming torrent of new ideas, new machines, and new procedures.

There were not large numbers of ships being launched, however, but you have to look beyond the numbers.

Anyway, it was quite a time. And the officers who ran the Navy, the admirals, were trying to ride all these tigers simultaneously.

The picture I would paint of them at this point in history; beset by a plethora of bureaucratic and technological problems; an extraordinary operational self-confidence based not only on the great victory just achieved but also on the knowledge that they alone had developed the arts and sciences of naval warfare to unprecedented levels.

They were all-to use Tom Buell's apt description of Fleet Admiral Ernest King-"Masters of Seapower."14

This was an officer corps, however, whose members had been almost single-mindedly fixated for most of their naval careers on fighting and defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy in the vast Pacific.15

And now, with the Japanese defeated, and with everything else on their minds, they no longer had the luxury of focusing primarily on just one ocean or on how they would do things alone. They had to think about Europe too, and they had to think about allies. How did they do? Close examination shows that they did well.

The U.S. Navy Focus on Europe

The Navy turned to Europe quickly. There has been a certain amount written about the Navy's alleged "Pacific Orientation."16 War Plan Orange, the Asiatic Fleet, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam are usually cited as examples-thereby glossing over War Plan Black, the successive Mediterranean squadrons, World War I, the early Cold War, and the Maritime Strategy.

The U.S. Navy's geographic orientation, the record shows, is normally that of the country at large. The Navy sees itself as the nation's sea force. It's strategy since the time of Mahan has been to seize and maintain control of the sea, and once that is achieved-and often even when it is still in the balance-to project military power ashore from the sea.17

If the nation needs a force to control the sea and project power from it in the Pacific, the Navy goes there. If the nation needs such a force in the Atlantic, the Navy goes there. And if the nation needs such a force that is global, then the Navy goes there too.18

The Navy goes where the action is.

In the first year or so after World War II, it became evident that the action was in Europe. There was still action in Asia, of course. Dr. Edward J. Marolda, then-Lieutenant Commander now Rear Admiral Joseph Sestak, Commander James Auer, and all the Korean and Vietnam War chroniclers have told those stories well.19

But the main event after 1945 was the American contest with Russia. And the center of gravity of that great continental nation lay in Europe. The leaders of the Navy understood this. Admiral Robert Carney, for example, who spent three straight years fighting a war in the Pacific, noted that, "as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Logistics from 1946 to 1950, I dismissed the Pacific from my mind and turned myself toward Europe."20 Off to Europe the Navy went; fast.21

Now, how does one determine the "geographical orientation" of a service like the Navy anyway? Here the historian, unlike the polemicist, has to do some analysis. What do you analyze? There are several possible indicators; here I look at four: Flag officer assignments, capital ship assignments, fleet balance, and fleet exercises.22

Digging into all these indicators tells us that the Navy swung hard in the direction of Europe right after the war, but started swinging back again in the mid-1950s. These swings were well in keeping with the overall policy concerns of the nation.

First, it is necessary to look at the careers of the flag officers involved. The Navy sent some of is most important four-star admirals to Europe: Stark, Hewitt, Conolly, Carney, Fechteler, Wright, and Cassady. And to the North Atlantic: Mitscher, Blandy, Fechteler, and Wright (The lackluster Lynde D. McCormick is probably an exception, here).23

Turning to capital ship assignments, the pride of the fleet went to the North Atlantic and Europe throughout the first postwar decade. The three large aircraft carriers (CVBs)-Midway, Coral Sea, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt-were all Atlantic and Mediterranean deployers until Midway went to the Seventh Fleet in 1955.24 Even during the Korean War, they stayed in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, or in the yards.

The U.S. Navy kept most of the battleships in the Atlantic as well. From 1946 to 1958, when all four had been decommissioned, there was never a year when there were more Iowa-class battleships in the Pacific than the Atlantic. No more than one Iowa at a time ever served off Korea, while the Navy sent two every summer during the Korean War on cruises to Northern Europe.25

New ships usually went to the Atlantic, including the three CVBs and the first two new attack aircraft carriers (CVAs), Forrestal and Saratoga; the Salem-class gun cruisers; Boston, the first guided missile cruiser conversion; the first destroyer leaders Norfolk and Mitscher; the new Forrest Sherman-class destroyers; the command ship Northampton; the first five Dealey-class escorts; and nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus.

And the first Navy air-to-air guided missile fighter squadron was deployed in 1956-to the Mediterranean. This squadron was composed of F7U-3M Cutlass aircraft armed with Sparrow I missiles.26

Moreover, the newest and best ships and aircraft squadrons always got the best skippers, so the Navy's "comers" mostly were Atlantic and Mediterranean-oriented and experienced, along with the more senior admirals discussed above.27

Regarding overall fleet balance, the trend is also clear28 after examining the annual projections in the Navy's Basic Naval Establishment Plans (BNEPs). In 1946, 154 major combatants were projected for the Atlantic Fleet for 1947 and 165 were projected for the Pacific.

1946 was the turnaround year, however. The 1947 projection for 1948 was 142 for the Atlantic and 136 for the Pacific, and the Atlantic projections led thereafter. The 1957 projections for 1958 showed 231 for the Atlantic and 172 for the Pacific.29

Fleet exercises are my final indicator. At the end of the period being examined in Fiscal Year 1957, for example, the Atlantic Fleet conducted 33 national and international exercises; the Pacific Fleet 21. The Sixth Fleet carried out 28 such exercises, while the Seventh Fleet carried out only 11.30

The case should not be overstated; emphasis on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean never meant abandonment of the Pacific. But the fact remains that the Navy has not been an inherently Pacific-oriented outfit, as some claim, and that its central core value has been to achieve sea power and project power from the sea anywhere necessary, not to achieve regional preeminence in the Pacific.31

U.S. Navy Postwar Operations in Europe

Given that the U.S. Navy turned to Europe in the mid- and late 1940s and early and mid-1950s, what did it do there?

First the Navy stopped drawing things down in the Mediterranean after VE-Day and even started to build things up again. The little post-VE Day Mediterranean squadron of a cruiser and two destroyers became by the end of the 1940s the powerful Sixth Fleet, still in existence today.

Since others already have, there is no need to detail the postwar operations of the Sixth Fleet or the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean.32 Suffice to say that it was the centerpiece of U.S. naval power in Europe and the Atlantic.

But there were many other things that the U.S. Navy did; it participated in the occupation of Germany;33 it exploited captured German naval technology;34 it began deploying warships to the Arctic in 1946;35 its fleet units made major port visits in Scandinavia, starting in 1946; it sent large midshipman training cruise forces to Northern Europe in 1947, a practice it continued almost every summer for a decade;36 it sent U.S. naval vessels into the Baltic; and after 1952, its warships took part in multinational NATO Norwegian Sea exercises.37

All these activities merit in-depth study. This paper, however, is concerned with one particular U.S. Navy initiative in Northern Europe; the establishment and maintenance there of a permanent forward-deployed force, the Northern European Force.

The Northern European Force

The Northern European Force has received virtually no attention in the literature, in contrast to its contemporaries, the Sixth Fleet and the B-29 bomber force deployed to British bases. But the Northern European Force merits attention.

Shortly after When World War II ended in Europe, the operating forces of the U.S. Navy in European waters consisted of a cruiser and two destroyers in the Mediterranean, and no combat vessels in Northern Europe.38

Within months of V-E Day, Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, the new overall U.S. Navy commander in Europe, traveled to Scandinavian and Northern European cities and concluded that a permanent U.S. Navy presence in European waters was needed, "to 'show the flag' for reasons of politics and sentiment."39 Admiral Hewitt's official command history notes that: "There was nothing extraordinary in such a proposal, which was in accord with all naval practice and tradition."40 Hewitt argued his case by letter to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the new Chief of Naval Operations, in November 1945; in person in Washington in December; and again by letter in January 1946.41

Fleet Admiral Nimitz agreed, and on January 26, 1946, he ordered the Atlantic Fleet commander to send a heavy cruiser and two destroyers for duty with the U.S. Twelfth Fleet in Europe. A brand new cruiser, Helena (CA 75), and two new destroyers, Glennon (DD-840) and Cone (DD 866), arrived in Southampton, England, on February 20.42

Admiral Hewitt now had a force in Northern Europe equal in size to the force he had in the Mediterranean. Moreover, each force was comparable in both concept of operations and composition to Squadron 40 (T), the Navy's pre-war force in Europe.43 Both forces were therefore traditional. The Navy had turned to Europe immediately following the war, but had done so in a time-honored way.

At the same time that the new postwar U.S. naval force was constituted in Northern Europe, however, events in Southern Europe overshadowed it. The arrival of the squadron in Southampton coincided with the celebrated decision in Washington to use the battleship Missouri to return the body of the recently deceased Turkish ambassador to Istanbul. Admiral Hewitt's three ships in England were ordered south, Admiral Hewitt riding Helena, and the squadron spent the spring of 1946 in the Mediterranean.

The story to this point has often been told by authors chronicling the origins of the Sixth Fleet.44 The three ships from England are considered among the progenitors of that famous fleet. But they were also progenitors of another, far less storied naval force-the Northern European Force.

For when Missouri and her entourage finally headed west through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Helena squadron turned to starboard and headed back north.45 The ships made port visits in the United Kingdom. They were joined by the new light cruiser Little Rock (CL-92), the less than three-year old light cruiser Houston (CL-81), and two more new destroyers. Helena herself sailed for the Pacific via Suez, but in the fall of 1946 Admiral Hewitt took his remaining six ships and visited ports in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France. The Northern European Force had been born.46

Initially, the force had one or two cruisers and two destroyers, working out of Plymouth, England.47 The cruiser was often tied up at nearby Torquay.48 From December 1946 to 1950 there was also a station ship, for logistics, home-ported in Plymouth.49 This was a not inconsiderable force in Northern Europe in the late 1940s. Even the Royal Navy Home Fleet, for example, in late 1947 had an operational cadre of only one cruiser, two large destroyers, half a dozen frigates, and twenty submarines.50

The strength of the Northern European Force peaked in mid-1950. The last station ship left without relief in July of that year (replenishment now was conducted principally at the American naval base in Bremerhaven, Germany).51 By 1953, the force had also lost the cruiser, and began to be referred to also as the Northern European Escort Group.52

The force continued its existence for over a decade, routinely visiting ports in Northern Europe, training (especially in antisubmarine warfare with ships of the Royal Navy at Londonderry), and participating in larger exercises.53 By 1952, it had also taken on an intelligence gathering mission. One of the destroyers was now equipped to function in support of what was termed the "Special Electronics Search Program."54

In February 1956, the two destroyers of the Escort Group returned to the United States upon completion of a normal tour. The ships originally intended to form the next group were sailed instead directly from the United States to the Mediterranean to augment the Sixth Fleet during the Suez Crisis of that year.55 They never saw Northern Europe and the force was subsequently disestablished.

The Northern European Force did its job quietly and well. It signaled to allies, neutrals, and Iron Curtain countries alike that the United states was not prepared to cede Northern European waters to the Soviets. It thus is a fine case study of naval presence, and of the continuity between pre-World War II and post-World War II U.S. naval operations in Europe. The Sixth Fleet-following the vision of Richard Conolly, Forrest Sherman, and other forward-looking admirals-had evolved into something radically new; a self-supporting forward deployed, multi-platform, combat-ready battle fleet. But the Northern European Force-conceived through the experience of Chester Nimitz, H. Kent Hewitt, and other historically-minded admirals-remained something very traditional; a small forward squadron of surface ships that showed the flag and conducted surveillance and training in European waters.56

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy

Following World War II, the U.S Navy did not act alone in European waters (nor for that matter, in most other places). Exhausted and battered by the World War II experience as they may have been, the European navies continued to carry out their national missions.

The U.S. Navy established close relations with most European navies during this early postwar period, but this paper discusses the U.S. Navy's relations with just the Royal Navy. Those relations were the most important, most complex, and often the most contentious of the U.S. Navy's bilateral relationships with its European counterparts.57

The officers of the Royal Navy had spent their pre-1939 careers consumed by the issue of maintaining parity with the U.S. Navy, and convinced of the superiority of the Royal Navy's naval warfare skills. But, by 1945 Britain's power had been considerably reduced. There was no type of ship in which they had close to the numbers the Americans had, and there was no area of sea warfare in which the Americans would defer to the prowess of the Royal Navy.

To the Americans, the Royal Navy lagged far behind them in field after field of naval warfare. And they took a dim view of the British practice of assigning land-based maritime patrol aviation to the Royal Air Force.

A June 1946 letter from Admiral Raymond Spruance, the President of the Naval War College, to his old Pacific war boss Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Chief of Naval Operations, reflected the American attitude of intellectual superiority. With regard to the possibility of Royal Navy students attending the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, Spruance observed: "I judge, from what Captain Hummer told me yesterday of his recent course at Greenwich, that we would give far more here at Newport than our officers can possibly get there."58

Yet the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy had been close allies in war, and remained such afterward. Overt animosity was out of the question.59

For the first five years or so after the war, the two navies got on quite well, even without formal alliance ties.60 By 1951, however, despite having been officially declared comrades in arms with establishment of the NATO alliance, relations between the two navies had grown sour.

The reason was that each navy now perceived the other as a threat to its "essence," its "autonomy," and its "domain."61 Setting up the new NATO command structure, far from providing a framework for greater allied cohesion, had in fact created both a reason and an arena for trans-governmental naval rivalry.62

Although they operated well together at sea in Korea and in exercises, the U.S. Navy's and the Royal Navy's jockeying for position in the various headquarters in the early and mid-50s was as heated and as fractious as had been the U.S. Navy-U.S. Air Force contention of the late 1940s.

U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Concepts and Doctrine

Admiral Wellborn captured a central issue of the conflict in his oral history. He related:

There were the old Churchillians who felt that the British Empire would never go down, that they knew more about the management of world affairs than anybody else, and that it was perfectly normal for any kind of important international command to be in British hands.

Then there was always the American point of view of yes, we agree you know quite a lot about military affairs and the management of world affairs, but after all you don't provide much in the way of forces. Most of these are American, and, since we're providing most of the forces and know the idiosyncrasies of most of the forces, we think we'd better command.

For the same reason that the little boy who owns the baseball usually gets to pitch, the U.S. usually won those arguments.63

Admiral Wellborn went on to add that "my own personal view was that they were pretty good commanders."64

But this was hardly a sentiment universally shared by all of his fellow American admirals. Many felt that the Royal Navy no longer had the hardware or the concepts to wage war at sea effectively.65 The U.S. Navy staff even expressed that feeling in a "Top Secret" paper that Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke authored in 1953-1954 when Burke was Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy.66

The paper was entitled "United States/United Kingdom Differences of Opinion" and detailed 20 separate contentious issues, classified into four major categories: Higher Direction of the War, Command, Control of Specialized Operations, and Operational Doctrine. These issues ran the entire gamut of naval concerns, but one example will suffice:

The Employment of Carriers:

1. U.K. POSITION: Carriers should be employed primarily for air protection of shipping.

2. U.S. POSITION: Carriers should be employed in carrier task forces, whose primary mission is to exploit control of the seas.

3. DISCUSSION: The basic difference is one of experience; The U.S. Navy's experience during World War II in the Pacific and developments since that time, and the U.K. experience in the vicinity of the U.K. and in the Mediterranean in keeping open the lines of communication. As in the case of hunter-killer operations it is an offensive vs. a defensive concept.

There were 19 other such differences sketched out in the paper.

The battles over these issues were played out in hundreds of bilateral and NATO meetings all through the 1950s. The question in 1951 and 1952 of which navy's admiral would head the supreme allied naval command in the Atlantic finally had to be settled by the American president and the British prime minister.67

U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Technology

One area of cooperation always remained firm, however; the steady stream of naval technological innovation that flowed across the Atlantic, generally westward. U.S. Navy leaders appreciated British technological prowess and exploited that strength, even when budget problems prevented the Royal Navy from doing so.68

The U.S. Navy's most famous technical borrowings from the British during the first postwar decade related to carrier aviation: the angled flight deck; the steam catapult; the mirror landing system;69 Nylon crash barriers;70 the first ejection seats;71 the "probe-and-drogue" air refueling system;72 fin stabilizers;73 the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS);74 and air cushion vehicles.75 The first gas turbine designed to power a frigate was unveiled in October 1953 by Rolls-Royce of Great Britain. The U.S. Navy immediately bought two gas turbines for installation in an American hull.76

The flow wasn't all one way. The postwar Royal Navy and the industrial base that supported it may have been strong in many technologies but, in the words of Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Royal Navy:

Our close contacts with the United States Navy during the War had produced a shock in many technical fields, particularly those of propulsion machinery, anti-aircraft weapons and naval aircraft, and the techniques of replenishing ships with fuel and supplies while under way. It was clear too that we had a lot to learn about ship construction generally.77

Admiral Gretton could well have added submarine technology, especially nuclear propulsion.78

In sum, the British benefited from American technology as the Americans benefited from theirs, but the U.S. Navy got a very good deal; the British helped them bring better and better baseballs to the game!


There are some conclusions to be drawn from all of this. First, the U.S. Navy during the first postwar decade was a busy, exciting, multifaceted institution trying to cope with a new world environment-and largely succeeding. The Navy's leaders were quick to understand what was happening in Europe, quick to try to re-institute old operational patterns, and not slow to move beyond those patterns to new concepts of the use of naval power.

Second, the Navy was vital to the American presence in Europe in the early days of the Cold War, and in ways that have received little attention from historians or political scientists. The Navy was never principally an occupation force; in retrospect it was what we now call an "enabling force" upon which the subsequent redeployment of Army and Air Force units to Europe was based.

Third, the Navy's role in Europe shaped the Navy itself in many ways-its doctrine, organization, force structure, deployment patterns, systems development, even the career patterns and outlooks of its leaders.

And fourth, the Navy was as active a player in international trans-governmental relations as it was in domestic bureaucratic politics. Its relations with the Royal Navy in particular were as significant to it as those with the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army.

Perhaps the most important thing these few examples do is to highlight the great richness of the American naval experience and the excitement still to be found in delving into little-researched aspects of its history. The U.S. Navy's postwar presence in Northern Europe was vital to its global success in the Cold War, and should receive the attention from historians that it truly deserves.79


1 This paper was originally delivered at a 1993 seminar held at the Naval Historical Center in Washington DC. It was subsequently updated somewhat in 2002.

2 Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, "Reminiscences" (Annapolis MD: U.S. Naval Institute Oral History, 1972), 334-335.

3 This paper weaves together a few sections from a much larger study of the subject that I have been undertaking as a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Columbia University.

4 James L. Lacy, Within Bounds: The Navy in Postwar American Security Policy (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1983); Captain Edward L. Beach, The United States Navy: 200 Years (New York: Henry Holt, 1986); Rear Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, United States Naval Power in a Changing World (New York: Praeger, 1988); Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy: A History (Revised and Updated) (New York: Quill, 1990); Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 1991); Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991 (New York: Random House, 1991); and Robert W. Love, Jr. History of the U.S. Navy: Volume II: 1942-1991 (Harrisburg PA: Stackpole, 1992)

5 Commander Bruce W. Watson. The Changing Face of the World's Navies: 1945 to the Present (London: Brassey's, 1991)

6 The Navy and SACLANT don't come up, for example, in Kaplan's NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston MA: Twayne, 1988), or William Park's Defending the West: A History of NATO (Boulder CO: Westview, 1986).

7 Robert Osgood's otherwise indispensable NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962) gives no space to naval matters, nor does Paul Stares in Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington DC: Brookings, 1991) or Robert Allen Wampler's very detailed two-volume dissertation on the first decade of NATO strategy, "Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948-1957" (Ph.D. dissertation: Harvard University, June 1991).

8 Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade "Contributions to Naval History . . .No. 1" (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, 1988). See page ix for the relationship between Palmer's research and the author's.

9 Robert Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies: The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension (New York: St. Martin's, 1990)

10 Joel Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO, 1949-80 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991). See Chapter 2 for the early period.

11 Eric Grove, with Graham Thompson, Battle for the Fiørds: NATO's Forward Maritime Strategy in Action (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute, 1991, Chapter 1.

12 Sean M. Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948-1954 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

13 Thomas C. Hone, "Force Planning Cycles: The Modern Navy as an Illustrative Case of a Frustrating Trend," Defense Analysis 9, no. 1 (1993): 32.

14 Thomas B. Buell, Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980)

15 The definitive work is Edward Miller's War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992)

16 See especially Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina, 1962) 76-80; Commander Harlan K. Ullman, "The Pacific and U.S. Naval Policy", Naval Forces 6, VI/1985, 36-48; and John Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe", International Security 11, Fall 1986, 33, fn.75

17 This view of U.S. Navy strategy is not without its critics. For comprehensive looks at the development of overall U.S. Navy strategy and policy in the early and mid-Cold War periods, see Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, Volume I 1945-1962 (New York: St. Martin's, 1993; and Lacy, Within Bounds. For the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy. For the 1950s and 1960s, see Richard E. Hegmann, "In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation: Brandeis University, 1991); and idem, "Reconsidering the Evolution of the U.S. Maritime Strategy 1955-1965," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (September 1991), 299-331. Also idem, "In Search of Strategy: The Navy and the Depths of the Maritime Strategy" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1991).

18 For an argument that the United States in fact represents the world's first and only truly global maritime security system, see Michael Vlahos, "Historical Continuities in Naval Power Projection", in Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.) Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Problems (Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1982), 64-92.

19 On U.S. Navy operations in and around China, see Edward J. Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1952" (Ph.D. dissertation: The George Washington University, 1990, and "Through a Long Glass: U.S. Naval Leaders and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1950", Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (December 1992) 528-547. For a study of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, see Lieutenant Commander Joseph A. Sestak, "The Seventh Fleet: A Study of Variance Between Policy Directives and Military Force Postures". (Ph.D. dissertation: Harvard University, August 1984). See also his "Righting the Atlantic Tilt", Proceedings 112 (January 1986) 64-71. On the U.S. Navy's efforts to rebuild the Japanese Navy, see Commander James Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 (New York: Praeger, 1973).

20 Interview, author with Admiral Carney, September 27, 1985. Admiral Carney later noted that "We turned to looking at Asia around the time of Dien Bien Phu"

21 On the Navy's turn toward Europe, see also Richard A. Best, Jr.'s "Cooperation of like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949. (New York: Greenwood, 1986), especially 94-96.

22 Other possible indicators include public declaratory statements of policy, employment intentions as outlined in war plans, and ship design characteristics. Detailed analysis of these indicators is beyond the scope of this paper, but a cursory review leads the author to believe it would prove congruent with his findings.

23 Looked at from another direction, from 1949 through 1955 the Navy chose three Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) in a row from the ranks of its Atlantic and European flag officers -- Admirals Sherman, Fechteler and Carney. In fact, between the firing of Admiral Denfeld in 1949 and the installation of Admiral Thomas Moorer in 1967, no former Pacific Fleet or Pacific numbered fleet commander made it to CNO, while five former Atlantic/European Fleet or numbered fleet commanders did. As stepping-stones to a fourth star, command of the Atlantic and Mediterranean's Second, Sixth and Eighth Fleets had a far better record than command of the Pacific's First and Seventh during the decade: About half of the Second, Sixth and Eighth Fleet commanders reached the rank of full Admiral, but only one Commander each from the two numbered fleets in the Pacific did so.

24 The career of each U.S. Navy's ship is summarized in the Dictionary of American Fighting Ships (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). See also Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1969) 599-601. Forrestal, lead ship of the first post-war class of super-carriers, deployed in 1957. She too went first to the Mediterranean. See Navy Times Nov 3, 1956, 2).

25 But the Iowas seldom went to the Mediterranean. After Missouri's famous 1946 journey, no U.S. Navy battleship entered that sea until 1955. See John C. Reilly, Jr., Operational Experience of Fast Battleships: World War II, Korea, Vietnam (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, 1987).

26 Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Navy: January 1 to June 30 1956 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1957), 168-9.

27 Virtually all commanding officers of Midway-class carriers (CVBs), for example, became admirals, and many went on to achieve very high rank. During the first postwar decade, when they operated exclusively in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the Midways were "the pride of the fleet, the premier commands to which senior aviator captains aspired -- 'admiral makers' for many of their skippers. Two of them, George W. Anderson of Franklin D. Roosevelt and David McDonald of Coral Sea, went on to become Chiefs of Naval Operations". Commander Thomas B. Grassey, "Retrospective: The Midway Class" (Proceedings 112, May 1986/Naval Review 1986, 186. Two CVB captains, Anderson and Aurelius B. Vosseler, became the chief U.S. naval advisors to SACEUR from 1950 to 1955. Several went on to high fleet command, as did the non-aviator commanding officers of the battleship Missouri. For a look at what these carrier skippers took away from their European experiences, see Vice Admiral J.J. Clark and Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier Admiral, (New York: David McKay, 1967) 258-267.

28 Declassified official Navy projected figures for Fiscal Years 1947 through 1950, and for 1954 and 1958 can be found in the Basic Naval Establishment Plans (BNEPs) for those years, in the Naval Historical Center Operational Archives (hereafter NHC, OA) in Washington DC, Command File Post 1 Jan 46. Projected assignments as of December 1945 are in Secretary of the Navy Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1945 (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1946) 6,10,14; and in Jane's Fighting Ships 1944-5, "Addenda to 1946", A22-A24. The fleet balance as of June 1948 is in Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy: Fiscal Year 1948 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 6. Figures for 1949 and projections for 1950 are in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1949-50, 339. Korean War-induced changes between June and October 1950 for carriers, battleships and cruisers are in James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations -- Korea (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 397.

29 Ship fleet assignments don't always tell you where a ship served since, during and after the Korean War, ships home-ported on the East Coast routinely deployed to Asia. This Atlantic Fleet contribution to war in the Pacific built up from one Atlantic Fleet battleship, one destroyer squadron and some amphibious ships in 1950 to a battleship, two destroyer squadrons, a carrier, a light carrier, the amphibious ships and a patrol squadron in 1953. NHC, OA, Atlantic Fleet Annual Reports 1 July 1950-30 June 1951, 15; and 1 July 1953-12 April 1954, 19.

30 Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Navy: January 1-June 30 1957 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1958) 184.

31 Within the Navy, however, there always was a Pacific-oriented corps of officers, but they seldom achieved dominance in the post-war era. Old Pacific hand Admiral Arthur Radford, who became Eisenhower's first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would appear to be an exception, but he was chosen in part to compensate for Eisenhower's own relative lack of familiarity with Far Eastern military matters. See also Edward J. Marolda, "The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1952" (Ph.D. dissertation: George Washington University, 1990; and Linda McClain, "The Role of Admiral William D. Leahy in U.S. Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Virginia, 1984), 375-377, 398, 460.

32 The most comprehensive treatment is Lieutenant Commander Philip A. Dur, "The Sixth Fleet: A Case Study of Institutionalized Naval Presence, 1946-1968." Ph.D. dissertation: Harvard University, 1975. On the Sixth Fleet's early years, see David J. Alvarez. Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943-1946. (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980); Guy Cane, "The Build-up of U.S. Naval Force in the Mediterranean as an Instrument of Cold War Policy," M.A. Thesis: The George Washington University, 1975; Midshipman Dennis M. Pricolo, "Naval Presence and Cold War Foreign Policy: A Study of the Decision to Station the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, 1945-1958." Trident Scholar Project Report: U.S. Naval Academy, 1978 (actually takes the story only through 1948); Edward J. Sheehy, The U.S. Navy, The Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945-1947. (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1992); and Stephen Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947, (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963). On the Sixth Fleet during the 1956 Suez crisis, see Thomas A. Bryson, "Mission of Mercy", Proceedings/Supplement March 1985, 89-96; Lieutenant Commander William B. Garrett "The U.S. Navy's Role in the 1956 Suez Crisis", Naval War College Review 22, March 1970, 66-78; Marshall Smelser, "The Amiable Armada: Operations of the United States Sixth Fleet During the Suez War", Unpublished ms, Navy Library, NHC, South Bend Indiana: University of Notre Dame, (undated); and Suez Crisis, 1956 (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1974) CRC 262.

33 On the history of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (the Navy's postwar command in Germany), see the appropriate sections in the CINCNELM Command Histories for the period, in OA, NHC. On the establishment of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, see FADM Ernest J. King, The U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945: Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy (Washington DC: United States Navy Department, 1946), 209. On the U.S. Navy base at Bremerhaven, see Paolo E. Coletta (ed), United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases Overseas (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 50-51. See also Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953, pp. 1, 23, 29, 32, 35, 41, 95, 149, 156, 175-176; and Chapter 17, "The Role of the Navy," in Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: MacMillan, 1947), 223-229.

34 Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 24, 28-29, 62-63, 76-77.

35 For an overview of this exploitation, see COMO H.A. Schade, "German Wartime Technical Developments," Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers 59 (February 1947): 77-97. On the exploitation of German atomic energy research, see RADM Albert G. Mumma, "The Alsos Mission," Naval History 3 (Summer 1989): 51-53. On the exploitation of German submarine design, see Dick L. Bloomquist, "Air-Independent Submarine Propulsion: A Historical Perspective from Walter to Stirling," Submarine Review (July 1993), 76-77; Antony Preston, Submarines: The History and Evolution of Underwater Fighting Vessels (London: Octopus, 1975), 105-106; Eberhard Roessler, The U-Boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 283; Erich Topp, The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander (Westport CT: Praeger, 1992),116-117; and Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington DC: U.S. Naval Historical Center, 1993), 71-78 and passim. On the exploitation of German submarine sonar, see RADM Roy S. Benson Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, 1984, 360; Lee E. Holt "The German Use of Sonic Listening," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 19 (July 1947), 678-681; and Weir, Forged in War, 130. On jet propulsion, see Robert Esposito, "The Navy's P-80/TO-1 Shooting Stars: Part One: Early Days of Naval Jet Aviation," The Hook 19 (Spring 1991), 21-22. On guided missiles, see Robert L. Scheina, "Search for a Mission (1945-1950)," 264, and Willis C. Barnes, "Korea and Vietnam (1950-1972)," 289, in Naval Engineering and American Sea Power, RADM Randolph W. King, ed. (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1989); also Isenberg, Shield of the Republic, Volume I, 656-659, and Weir, Forged in War, 227-231.

36 Michael Palmer mentions European "midshipmen" and "reservist" cruises in passing. See Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 21. Midshipman Dennis Pricolo noted the importance -- hitherto unnoticed -- of the Midshipman Training Cruise deployment to the Mediterranean in 1947. "Naval Presence and Cold War Foreign Policy," 124.

37 On the first such major NATO naval exercise, Exercise Mainbrace (September 1952), see Rear-Admiral H.E. Horan RN "Exercise Main-Brace", RAF Quarterly and Commonwealth Air Forces Journal 5 (January 1953), 33-39; CDR Harold Bradley Say USNR, "Mainbrace - Potential Becomes Reality", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 79 (January 1953), 75-81; and "Russia Can be Hit from Two Seas", U.S. News and World Report 33 (September 26, 1952), 13-15. For a critical (but parochial) view, see John F. Loosbrock, "Carriers to the Rescue?" Air Force, 35 December 1952), 16-21; and "There is no Easy Way Out -- A Second Look at Mainbrace", Air Force 36 (January 1953), 21-23.

38 Commander, US. Naval Forces in Europe Narrative, 1 September 1945-1 October 1946, Enclosure (1), 14.

39 Ibid, 80.

40 Ibid.

41 Richard K. Smith, Cold War Navy (Falls Church VA: Lulejian and Associates, March 1976) 5-4; NHC, OA, Command File Post 1 Jan 46, Narrative of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946, 14, 80.

42 Narrative Ibid, 81.

43 Squadron 40-T had normally been comprised of a new cruiser and two new destroyers. See Willard C. Frank, Jr. "Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Spanish Civil War, 1936", Naval War College Review, Spring 1994, 89; CAPT Edward E. Conrad USN (Ret), "An Ensign's First Ship", Shipmate, June 1993, 20-22; and Adam Siegel, "The Tip of the Spear: The U.S. Navy and the Spanish Civil War", Center for Naval Analyses, draft unpublished paper, 1993, 13 and passim.

44 In addition to the works already cited, see David J. Alvarez, "The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy," Balkan Studies 15 (1974): 225-236; Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," Political Science Quarterly 40 (Fall 1975): 451-475; Marx Leva "Barring the Door to the Med", Naval Institute Proceedings 113 (August 1987): 83-88; Stephen G. Xydis, "America, Britain and the USSR in the Greek Arena, 1944-1947," Political Science Quarterly 78 (December 1963): 581-596; and Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings 84 (August 1958): 41-50.

45 NHC, OA, Command File Post 1 Jan 46, Narrative of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946, 86.

46 Ibid, 87

47 Various cruisers were used, but principally Columbus (CA 74), CINCNELM flagship from September 1948 through October 1951, except for a December 1949-June 1950 overhaul in Boston MA. Nominally home-ported in Plymouth and assigned to the Northern European Force, not the Sixth Fleet, Columbus nevertheless spent much time in the Mediterranean. See also "Plymouth", All Hands, June 1951, 14-15.

48 Interview, Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, USN (Ret), June 14, 1993.

49 Mercury (AKS-20) until April 1947. Then Hamul (AD-20) until April 1949, when she was relieved by Mercury. Hamul was at Plymouth again until July 1950. See Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, August 1945 to March 1947, 18, NHC OA; CINCNELM Annual Report, 1 July 1948-30 July 1949, 2; and Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1968) 230.

50 Eric Grove, "The Royal Navy: the Fleet Comes Home", in Martin Edwards (ed) The Defense Equation (London: Brassey's, 1986) 84.

51 NHC, OA, CINCNELM Annual Report 14 June 1952 - July 1953, 2, and subsequent reports.

52 NHC, OA, CINCNELM Annual Report, 14 June 1952-1 July 1953 (p.5) and subsequent CINCNELM Annual Reports for the next three years show the Northern European Force as only comprising two destroyers.

53 See CINCNELM Annual Reports for the period

54 NHC OA, CINCNELM Annual Report 14 June 1952 - July 1953, 2, and subsequent reports.

55 NHC, OA, CINCNELM Annual Report 1 July 1955-1 May 1956 OA Encl 1 p. 6

56 For descriptions of Northern European Force cruises, see Captain Paul H. Grouleff, "Last Cruise of Wilkes Barre", Shipmate 53, November 1990, 19-22; and "Warships and Subs Back From Europe", Navy Times, June 5, 1954, 5.

57 On the postwar Royal Navy, the current definitive work is Eric Grove, From Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II. (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute, 1987). See also then-Commander William J. Crowe's "The Policy Roots of the Modern Royal Navy, 1946-1963" (Ph.D. dissertation: Princeton University, 1965), although Crowe curiously has little to say on U.S. Navy-Royal Navy relations.

58 Spruance to Nimitz, 19 June 1946, NHC OA, 00 Files, 1942-1947. Box 2 Folder 31.

59 Ibid. Spruance noted that the 1946 U.S. Navy strategic problems at the Naval War College included operations against "Russia in the North Pacific and the North Atlantic, both in high latitudes", "Great Britain as an opponent for a study of the mid-latitude Atlantic", and "the Indian Ocean briefly with a demonstrative problem of the British versus the Russians". He added -- with a touch of condescension, "I do not believe, however, that there is anything in the fact that we use the British as a possible opponent to study strategy in certain areas which would offend any sensible Englishman -- particularly, if the situation were explained to him".

60 The best published source to date covering postwar British-American naval relations is Best, "Cooperation of Like-Minded Peoples".

61 These are terms taken from the literature of political science. For a full treatment, see Morton Halperin with Arnold Kanter and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution,1974 )

62 For a detailed account of the Anglo-American controversies over the NATO command structure, see Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea.

63 Wellborn Oral History, 334-5.

64 Ibid.

65 This view had roots in the World War II experience, and earlier. See Robert Love's chapter "Ernest J. King" in Stephen Howarth's Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) for a discussion of King's contempt for the British as naval planners and operators.

66 OA NHC Burke Papers, Personal File, #51. The paper is undated, but is obviously from Burke's Op-30 tour, and -- from its place in the file -- was probably written in January 1954. Its format -- a series of short papers -- suggests that it was developed to prepare a U.S. Navy flag officer for an upcoming meeting with a Royal Navy leader.

67 On presidential and prime ministerial involvement, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); and Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961).

68 For an overview and status report on naval systems as of 1952, see "U.S. Navy Adopts Ideas Developed by British", Navy Times, December 13, 1952, 12. For a brief overview of postwar British accomplishments in military technology, see Roger Beaumont, "The British Armed Forces Since 1945", in Lewis H. Gann (ed), The Defense of Western Europe, (London: Croom Helm, 1987) 52-53.

69 See Ray Sturtivant, British Naval Aviation: The Fleet Air Arm, 1917-1990 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute, 1990), Chapter 30 "The Old Order Changeth"; Paul Beaver, The British Aircraft Carrier (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1983), Chapter 11 "The Post War Revolution"; and Brian Johnson, Fly Navy: The History of Naval Aviation, (New York: William Morrow, 1981), Chapter 5 "Into the Nuclear Age". On the U.S. Navy adoption of the angled deck, see Commander Harold L. Buell, "The Angled Deck Concept -- Savior of the Tailhook Navy," The Hook 15, (Fall 1987), 13-23. On adoption of the steam catapult, see Rear Admiral D.K. Weitzenfeld, "Colin Mitchell's Steam Catapult: The Heart of Modern Aircraft Carriers", Wings of Gold 10 (Summer 1985) 27-31. On the mirror landing system, see VADM Donald D. Engen, "'Roger Ball' -- How it Started," The Hook 15, Fall 1987, 24.

70 Commander Thomas B. Grassey, "Retrospective: The Midway Class", Proceedings 112, (May 1986), 186.

71 Captain Rosario Rausa, Pistons to Jets (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 7.

72 Brian Gardner, "When You Need a Buddy: The Development of Air Refueling in the United States Navy", The Hook (Fall 1983) 11-13; and Lt Col Dennis K. Ryan USAF, Air Force Air Refueling for Naval Operations: History, Practice, and Recommendations (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 1990), 8.

73 "'Guinea Pig' Destroyer to Install British Device to Reduce Rolling", Navy Times, September 17, 1955, 1; and "Fin Stabilizers Due to Guided Missile Ships", Navy Times, September 8, 1956, 4.

74 Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute, 1983), 143. See also Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991) 199.

75 Willis C. Barnes "Korea and Vietnam (1950-1972)" in Rear Admiral Randolph W. King (Ed), Naval Engineering and American Seapower (Baltimore MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1989), 301.

76 Desmond Wettern, Decline of British Seapower (London: Jane's, 1982), 84.

77 Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy (London: Cassell, 1968), 317

78 There is a respectable literature on this. See, for example, Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: Chapter Six, "Peroxide to Polaris"

79 I myself did not start out understanding this. And I learned it the hard way, through years of research. Most of that research was conducted with the superb assistance of the Naval Historical Center. Again, I thank them for their help, and I thank them for providing me with this forum today to share some of my findings with you. I hope others will now join in exploring this important era, and that some of the material in this paper has pointed the way.

22 September 2003