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UNCLE JOE'S LAST ARMY
STALIN'S POST-WAR ARMY
AND ITS LESSONS FOR GORBACHEV'S
POST-COLD WAR ARMY AND RUSSIA' S POST-SOVIET ARMY
by
David C. Isby

"Roll on Uncle Joe's Army" was chalked by wartime British soldiers on their trucks and Bren carriers, expressing the hope that the Red Army's victories would shorten the war.

But, when these soldiers and their U.S. comrades finally put their uniforms away, the image of the genial pipe-smoking Uncle Joe was replaced, at least among governments, by a more realistic--and darker--view.1 A realistic view of Stalin's last army--one obviously very different from those of the 1920s and 1930s (pre and post Great Purge) and that of the Great Patriotic War--has taken much longer to emerge.

That this has been the case is not surprising. The art of watching Soviet military developments was in its infancy in the west in 1945-1953. The Soviet view of Stalin's post-war army was affected by changing views of both Stalin and the army. Only in the late 1980s did the Soviets themselves start to look at elements of the history of the army of this period in open sources in any sort of specificity. Even today, the Soviets have been willing to reveal relatively few details about their post-war army's force structure and mobilization. The changes in Soviet writing on national security policy means that what information has appeared must be sifted from what is a flood of sources by the standard of the "era of stagnation" while other, previously valuable sources have dried up. The Soviets are preoccupied with filling in the more pressing black spots in their history. Thus, there is still a need to look to western sources to fill in much of the detail.

The immediate post-war period presents lessons with direct applicability and relevance to the problems the Soviet military had to face in the late 1980s and 1990s, as Soviet military writers have explicitly stated.2 While there are certainly major differences, the post-war and the post-Cold War Soviet Army shared many of the same military problems.

Until the current crisis of governance renders all such considerations pointless, the post-Cold War Soviet army moved to adapt in many of the same ways its predecessor did. But even as central power became less relevant to the Soviet Union, the larger of the successor states, including Russia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine, will find that while they have tried to make a clear break with the past in ideological or economic terms, they will find strong elements of continuity in the nature of the armed forces they must organize. Ironically, it is likely that elements of the make-up of Stalin's army will live on long after the centralized communist power it was intended to protect is dead.

Post-War and Post-Cold War

The parallel between the two post-war eras is most apparent in the way the Soviets built down, which differed greatly from the post-war western Allies. While maintaining enough forces to effectively hold Europe hostage, Stalin did not present an immediate threat of war to the post-war world. He saw the need for a foundation to build military power to match his antagonists in the West in the middle-term future, telling Yugoslav Communists, in April 1945, "The war will soon be over. We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years, and then we'll have another go at it."3

As the Army demobilized in 1945-1948, the Soviets were also laying the foundations for subsequent build-ups, as early as soon as the 1948 Berlin crisis. The importance of this historical model became apparent to the Soviets when their first unilateral force structure reductions were first announced in 1988. Demobilization had come again. The Soviet Army had to learn how to become smaller.

Demobilization was driven in both cases by the necessity of giving up force structure to help restore a crippled--by war in one case, by the "era of stagnation" in the other--Soviet economy.4 In both cases, this had to be done without sacrificing research and development, because a revolution in military affairs was in progress.5 In the post-war years, it was the second revolution, that of nuclear weapons, that the Soviets had to meet. While Stalin's post-war down-playing of the U.S. nuclear capability and his insistence on the continued applicability of wartime military doctrine is well-known, so is his emphasis on creating Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as strategic defenses.6 The post-Cold War Soviet Army must participate in the third revolution in military affairs, that of high-lethality conventional weapons, but cannot do this without access to technology and the ability to produce it, both of which require an effective defense industrial base. This, in turn, needs investment, even if this must come at the expense of force structure, as happened to the post-war army.

Robert Conquest writes, "Expansionism was built into the Soviet system, and the war against Hitler had at the start been defensive out of necessity rather than principle."7 Despite Stalin's obvious commitment to aggrandizement, his army did much withdrawing, leaving Germany outside the Soviet zone, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia (not to return until 1968), Bulgaria, Korea, Iran, and Yugoslavia, among others. Even as late as 1950, there were suggestions that the Soviets might seriously consider abandoning East Germany in return for its neutralization.8 More important, Stalin's army had to rethink its strategic worldview quickly and effectively and implement changes in both force structure and operational planning based on both a changed world situation and changing internal priorities.

Gorbachev's first withdrawal, from Afghanistan, was the hardest. For Soviets used to images of the red flag being raised over the Reichstag, the sight of Afghan guerrillas standing by the roadside and laughing at the retreating columns showed that this war was ending very differently from the one in 1945. The revolutions of 1989 then confronted the Soviets with having to begin to withdraw all their forward-deployed Groups of Forces. The Baltic states reclaimed their independence in 1991; once again the Soviet Army had to withdraw. Ukraine and Byelorussia were not far behind.

Both the post-war and post-Cold War Soviet army had to turn away from the previous form of their offensive orientation, either actual (that which carried them to Berlin) or potential (the theater offensive to the Channel that dominated a generation of thinking on both sides). In both periods, the Soviets had to adapt to a new, more mobilization-dependent concept of how they would function in the initial period of conflict.

The post-war Soviet Army remained an offensive force. That had been what it had aimed for since the late 1930s. The offensive had brought victory on the long road from Stalingrad to Berlin. The Soviet Army did not abandon these lessons, especially given Stalin's enshrining of wartime experience and his own leadership.

The center-periphery conflicts that both the post-war and the post-Cold War Soviet army faced a key difference. Those under Stalin never came close to threatening the existence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Army participated in the long anti-guerrilla conflicts in Ukraine and Lithuania in 1944-1954 but left the specialized internal security forces to carry the burden of pacification.9 Similarly, the Communists were able to prevail in the Polish Civil War of 1944-1949 without large-scale involvement of Soviet combat units.10 The post-cold war conflicts in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic republics--the manifestation of much deeper political struggles against rule from Moscow--involving the Soviet Army were, while more decisive, not as bloody as these desperate anti-Stalinist struggles. The ballot box brought the independence in 1991 that brave guerrillas had never touched in 1944-1954.

Finally, there was the political tension between the military--victorious post-war, discredited post-Cold war--and Moscow. Post-war, there was little effective challenge to Stalin from those in uniform, although the post-war troubles of Marshal Zhukov, even if mild from the author of the Great Purge, and those of many other Soviet military leaders who were not as fortunate, shows that the potential for such a challenge was not discounted.11 The post-Cold War army proved ineffective in its challenge to Moscow in the August 1991 abortive coup. But, as coup threats remain through the winter of 1991-1992, it is a dimension that, obviously, cannot be ignored. The successor governments must also each deal with their own armed forces.

Demobilization and Mobilization

Stalin's post-war army had to demobilize to permit both the allocation of resources to reconstruction at home and political consolidation in nations where it would remain. Stalin looked to mobilization and deployment potential--rather than standing force structure--as the prime indicator of the Soviet Army's effectiveness. Stalin insisted on the applicability of wartime lessons, and it was Soviet mobilization of manpower and industry that provided him the tools with which to fight even as the Germans destroyed his first strategic echelon in the summer of 1941.12

Even if the Soviet's 1945-1948 demobilization was neither as fast nor as dramatic as that of the western allies, it was still substantial, going from 60 armies, 198 corps, and 590 divisions to 30 armies, 64 corps, and 158 divisions.13 Over eight and a half million personnel were demobilized, leaving 2,874,000 in service.14 The number of military districts in the Soviet Union was also reduced.

This dramatic demobilization does not mean that the Soviets abandoned offensive action as the primary mode of operations. The Soviets invested in mobilization potential as they demobilized. They positioned a number of cadre formations forward, in their zone of occupation in Germany. They reduced the number of units but allowed for rapid expansion; many divisions became the component regiments of other divisions in 1945-1948, but had the potential to be reconstituted as a division on mobilization.15

The U.S. was aware that even in the throes of demobilization the Soviets were able to mobilize forces rapidly. A 1946 U.S. Army study projected a 1948 Soviet mobilization yielding ten armies and 84 divisions opposing Europe after five days of mobilization and 30 armies and 270 divisions after 30 days.16

The key interface between mobilization and war fighting for both the post-war and the post-cold war Soviet Army was the military district. Both periods have seen contraction in the number of military districts. From a total of 31 in 1945 down to 15 by the 1950s. In 1989, there were 16 when the post-Cold War reductions began, reduced to 13 by late 1991.

A mobilization-dependent military is by no means an inherently defensive one, as exemplified by the Israeli Army. Even a Soviet force configured for defensive combat was expected to be able to shift over to offensive quickly and effectively. In the opening hours of the Russo-German War, orders were being given to Soviet formations to attack into Poland even as they were overwhelmed by the blitzkrieg.17 In the Second World War, the Soviet army had shown itself adept at moving from defensive to offensive posture. This was seen from 1941, but especially in the 1945 campaign against Japan. In that campaign, the first operational echelon that was pre-deployed in the east had been configured and deployed for defensive combat. This reflected Soviet policy since 1941. However, in the three months starting in May 1941, through mobilization and reinforcement, the forces in the Far East were transformed into the most effective offensive weapon Stalin was ever to use. The skill with which the army was able to go from the defensive to the offensive was as important to Gorbachev-era Soviets looking at their future as it had been to those restructuring the post-war Soviet military.

Stalin's post-war army could afford to be mobilization dependent because, unlike the post-1967 army, it did not have to run the risk of mobilization being pre-empted by a massive strike of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Stalin basically gave orders that the U.S. nuclear threat was not to be seen as countering any Soviet military capability.18 While the Soviet revelations on their intelligence successes have not made it evident, it is also possible that Stalin was personally aware of how limited U.S. strategic bombing capability was in the immediate post-war years.19 It may be that in the future, as Soviet or successor military forces re-orient themselves against primarily non-nuclear threats on their periphery, rather than a potentially nuclear conflict with NATO and the U.S., there will be more credibility to looking to mobilization-dependent solutions.

Doctrine and War Fighting

Post-war Stalinist military doctrine sought to answer the same fundamental questions as its successors. What will be the nature of any potential future conflict? How can all the capabilities (and by no means just the armed forces) of the Soviet state be best employed to win any such conflict?

Studies of Soviet doctrine in 1945-1953 have stressed the Stalinist emphasis on continuity and tendency to enshrine elements of wartime experience that reinforced the worst elements of the political system.20 The Soviet military--especially the General Staff--were able to reconcile this Stalinist burden with a coherent framework taken from wartime experience to fit their new strategic needs with existing doctrine.21

Post-war, the totality of Soviet force was seen as comprising two strategic echelons. This concept had been employed from before 1941 and continued to the present. It reflects the need for both a sufficient number of high-readiness (but high-cost) forces to wage the initial period of the war while retaining sufficient mobilization-based (low-cost) capability to sustain a protracted conflict without unacceptable economic costs in peacetime.22

Stalin placed great emphasis on the second strategic echelon, the "strategic rear." It comprised the industrial and personnel base for force generation, which included both mobilization and reconstitution. The strategic rear represented the combined effort of all of the Soviet state, not just the military. The importance of the strategic rear in post-war doctrine also served to justify Stalin's pre-war policies, building up industry through the five year plans and building national unity through terror and the slaughter or removal of potentially disruptive elements.23

The first strategic echelon, post-war, consisted of the forces that would be involved in the initial period of the war and provide the conditions for the strategic rear to mobilize. The first strategic echelon was further divided into three operational echelons.24

The rearmost third operational echelon was intended to mobilize and deploy low-readiness or nearly formed formations to reinforce forward-deployed forces.25 Its missions were carried out by the military districts that would command these forces in peacetime and generate and project them on mobilization.

The second operational echelon was the strategic reserve and consisted of higher-readiness formations, withdrawn from central Europe in 1945-1948, able to redeploy to forward areas. These forces could also be used for the large-scale field training exercises that massed troops along borders where this would provide leverage, including areas bordering Turkey (March 1946), Iran (August 1947, November 1948 and June 1951), Czechoslovakia (February 1948), Yugoslavia (August 1948 and September 1951) and Germany ("air exercises" during the Berlin airlift and August 1951).

These relatively high-readiness formations would have other roles as well, including an important role in force generation. According to General Georgy Lobov, an air division commander in the post-war years and in the Korean conflict: "When a crisis erupted in the Azerbaijani region close to Iran, Stalin ordered all jet fighter divisions to be deployed in the surrounding area of Moscow. Each division began to organize a new division out of itself, leaving behind a regiment each."26 This approach was not limited to the Air Force: it is what the Soviet ground forces in Germany had done during their demobilization.27

The forward of the three operational echelons consisted of the high-readiness formations, 29 divisions strong, organized in four groups of forces, including those in the Soviet zones in Germany and Austria. Designated armiia otpora ("blocking army"), the forces in Germany were to be ready within five days to meet immediate threats and repulse them while forces were mobilized and projected into the forward areas.28

The post-war Soviet Army saw its mission in the initial period of a war not as securing ultimate victory--it was only when doctrine finally came to grips with nuclear war fighting that this became important--but as making its possible for the full mobilization of all Soviet society to provide the means of ultimate victory, as in 1941-1945. The army was to play a role in this victory that was far broader than its initial defensive orientation would suggest.

Published by the Soviets in 1989, the 1946-era war plans of Group of Soviet Occupation Forces Germany showed that they were intended to repulse an Allied offensive into the Soviet zone while forces from the second operational echelon came forward. This would bring up to full strength, cadre-strength formations in Germany as well as redeploying new formations.29

While there have been no other comparable detailed published primary sources on Soviet operational thinking in the post-war era, these plans certainly appear consistent with other elements of deployment and mobilization in 1945-1948. Exercises following a similar pattern were seen throughout the Stalinist era and after.30

This plan's appearance in print was significant for both its internal and external audiences. It was linked with the emergence of what the Soviets term their "defensive doctrine" under Gorbachev, and the invocation of a wider variety of historical models for Soviet military thinking on the nature of a potential future conflict. The 1987 shift in how the Soviets envisioned the initial period of a future war in Europe paralleled that seen in 1946 when translated into operational planning.

While the Soviets have not yet published their 1987-vintage war plans, an example of the move to a 1946-style approach can be seen in the operational mission of the 22nd Panzer Regiment of the crack East German 9th Panzer Division. Prior to 1987, its mission on mobilization was to join in the theater offensive, driving into West Germany, north of Hamburg.31 In 1987, the regiment's initial mission on mobilization shifted to defending a sector along the River Elbe. In both 1946 and 1987, however, the offensive would have taken place after mobilization. This reorientation in Soviet operational thinking was also seen in some open source writings.32

However, using the 1946 operational plans to characterize the post-war Soviet Army as "defensive" rather than offensive, one of the apparent objectives of the Soviet 1989 publication, is as misleading as using force levels to the same ends. The 1946 plans indeed did look at the initial period of the war being involved with parrying a potential enemy blow and providing time and space for mobilization. This initial period was determined from the start of mobilization rather than hostilities.

The 1946 plans certainly contrast with the threat that was the focus of almost all western thinking in the 1970s and 1980s: the "standing start" theater offensive to the Rhine, stressing the element of surprise and rapid maneuver to counter the nuclear threat. Rather, the mission of the "blocking army" of 1946 was to enable troops from throughout the first strategic echelon to mobilize and redeploy and the second strategic echelon to move onto a war footing. The "blocking army" could do this by fighting a defensive battle (as envisioned in the 1946 plans) or acting as a pre-hostilities covering force for redeployment, as the troops in the Far East did before the opening of the Soviet attack on Japan in 1945. The planning for mobilization and redeployment would be much the same in either circumstance once the correlation of forces had been changed by redeployment. The advance could be as powerful as that on Orel and Bryansk immediately after the defensive victory at Kursk in 1943. It is significant that Kursk was the battle offered by the Soviets in 1987 as a paradigm for the operational application of their new defensive doctrine on the battlefield.

The post-war Soviet Army was not intended--and not capable--of carrying out offensive operations in the initial period of war on the model of the army that emerged from the 1967-1982 Brezhnev-era build-up. It had a different, more mobilization-dependent, but still vital, model of offensive operations, which was seen as viable in the absence of a nuclear threat to the troops. Stalin was apparently able to devote a smaller percent of GNP to his force structure than was the case in the "era of stagnation."33 Smaller calls for conscript service made manpower available for reconstruction and reduced unrest in the republics; the latter goal also served by Stalin's retention of wartime "national" divisions serving in their home areas.

The post-war Soviet military appeared to have looked at offensive war fighting more seriously after 1948-1948 and with it the questions of moving from a peacetime to a wartime footing, including redeploying forces.34 This also reflected Stalin's personal perception of an increased threat from a less-acquiesent West.35 The Berlin crisis and the break with Yugoslavia made the need to assume an offensive after the initial period of a war and mobilization more important in operational thinking. This was reflected by a strengthening of the first operational echelon, and included bringing back up to strength in Germany two armies--3rd Guards and 4th Guards--that had been drawn down in the demobilization of 1945-1948.36

The Soviets also were able, as their political consolidation increased in Central Europe, to look to drawing on non-Soviet forces in a potential conflict. By 1948 the Hungarian army had been effectively integrated into the Soviet Army.37 Stalin-era plans for an invasion of Yugoslavia envisioned the Hungarian People's Army as having a major role.38 The Polish People's Army--in the last stages of the civil war carried out by internal security forces--was also in the throes of Sovietization.

The Political Impact of the Post-War Military

The political strength of the Soviet military had always been seen by Stalin as a potential counter to his own drive towards total and absolute power and authority. Post-war, as the Stalinist cult of personality bloomed, the need for increased political control had to be reconciled with the increased stature and power of the army and its commanders.

Much of this revolved around Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov. The most distinguished Soviet soldier of the war, he had received great favorable publicity, and recent Soviet history shows that he could even stand up to Stalin and get him to change his mind.39 While Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and viceroy of the Soviet zone in Germany in the immediate postwar era, he, along with a number of other senior combat commanders, were soon demoted and brought home to lesser posts.40 Some, with less popularity than Zhukov, suffered the full force of Stalinist repression.

Post-war high command went first and foremost to generals who were no threat to Stalin.41 Stalin moved to use the Party to consolidate his control over the military, while contributing to the final form of his power.42 The Party--in policies strongly identified with Andrei Zhdanov--glorified Stalin's role and down-played that of the military, and moved to re-instate rigid political and police controls over the military throughout the rest of his life.43 However, the military remained in control of its own sphere of expertise. Stalin wanted its ways, based on wartime victories, preserved, not smashed as in 1937.

In the post-war era, none of the potential successors to Stalin looked to establish a power base including the army because of the fear of bonapartism that this would invoke.44 This was well known, but it was only with recent Soviet writings that Zhukov's and other military leaders--those important because of their popular recognition and support and the cachet of battlefield victory--ongoing political involvement was seen, most dramatically in the role he played, along with Marshals Timoshenko and Moskalenko, in the downfall of Beria at the close of the Stalin era.45

In the downfall of Beria--the subject of recent revelations by Soviet writers--the military would have its political say in the end, affecting the transition of the regime, much as some of its leaders would try and do, with less violence and still less success, in August 1991.46

There are many differences between the military's political role in the post-war and Post-Cold War Soviet Union. The actual threat to Stalin's solidifying power was negligible. In times of instability, the military's role increased, as at the death of Stalin and the abortive August 1991 coup. There was little Stalinist about either the 1991 coup or its results. The violence once inherent in the system has diminished. But there were elements of the post-war experience to be seen anew.

The importance of well-known and combat-proven leaders was seen. Indeed, commanders of the airborne troops would not follow the orders of the plotters. General Boris "the Butcher" Gromov, then commander of the MVD Internal Security Troops and the most publicized Soviet general since Zhukov, was politically aligned with many of the plotters, but has since claimed that his orders were key in preventing bloodshed; he lost his command but avoided prosecution and re-surfaced as the deputy commander of the army in December 1991. Like Zhukov, he may have been too strong to bring to trial.

The army's political dimension is unlikely to be eclipsed, especially with the disappearance of Party control, in particular and of central power in general. But if the other institutions of Soviet central power disappear or weaken, the army is likely to remain stronger for a longer period of time. This reflects its cohesion, discipline, a greater economic autonomy. But by the end of 1991, it is increasingly uncertain whether there is any central state power that can be taken over by the army.

Old Lessons for New Armies

Comparisons between the post-war and Post-Cold War Soviet army are interesting but can be misleading. Even Gorbachev's critics, both internally and internationally, would not make too much, either personally or in terms of policies, of the comparisons between him and Stalin, whose mantle of centralized power by party and state he is likely to be the last inheritor.

The Soviet Army, with its emphasis on the use of history to provide viable models for decision-making, is certainly an institution that values continuity. The modern Soviet Army has many elements of continuity with its predecessors back to Tsarist times. It is not surprising that there should also be elements of Stalin's army in that of Gorbachev.

The same continuity is likely to be seen in the armies of successor nations to the Soviet Union. The armed forces of Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia will defend emerging democracies rather than totalitarian power. Yet they will have to do this with institutions inherited from the Soviets. Every soldier will carry a Kalashnikov, every general will be a graduate of the professional military education system for years to come. Many of the factors that the post-war Soviet army had to address--such as demobilization, doctrinal formulation, internal conflict and re-establishing political control--will have also to be addressed by post-Soviet armies.


ENDNOTES

1. Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce. New York: Atheneum, 1987, 545.

2. For example, MG L.G. Ivashov, "History of the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces After the Great Patriotic War," Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, n.7, 1988, 94-96. Translated at JPRS-UMJ-89-001, Military Historical Journal , 12 Jan 1989, 53-55.

3. Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York: Viking, 1991, 278.

4.Dimitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York, Grove Weidenfield, 1991, 504.

5. Scott and Scott, 22.

6. William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986, 10-11.

7. Conquest, 278.

8. C.G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy Soviet Foreign Policy, Glasgow: The University Press, 128-29.

9. Frederic Smith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against Soviet Power," in Charles Moser, ed., Combat on Communist Territory, Chicago: Regenery, 1985.

10. Lucja Swiatokowski, The Imported Communist Revolution and the Civil War in Poland, 1944-1949. (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1982), 469, University Microfilms DE0082-11136.

11. Conquest, 272.

12. Thomas, 79-81.

13. Albert Z. Conner and Robert G. Poirer, "Soviet Ground Force Mobilization Potential: Lessons of the Past and Implications for the Future." Journal of Soviet Military Studies, v. 1, n. 2, Jun 1988, 211-30, 221-23.

14. A. A. Babakov, Vooruzhenniye Sily SSSR Posle Voyny (1945-1986) [The Armed Forces of the USSR After the War (1945-1986)], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987, 30.

15. Graham Turbiville, "Emerging Soviet Approaches to Mobilization," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991, 77-120, 90.

16. Quoted in Connor and Poirer, 227.

17. David M. Glantz, "A Collection of Combat Documents Covering the First Three Days of the Great Patriotic War," Journal of Soviet Military Studies, v. 4, n. 1, Mar 1991, 150-90.

18. Volkogonov, 531-32.

19. On the actual situation, see Harry R. Borowski, "Air Force Atomic Capability from V-J Day to the Berlin Blockade—Potential or Real? " Military Affairs, Oct 1980, 180-85.

20. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine, Boulder: Westview press, 19.

21. See generally Babkov, Chapter 1.

22. Turbiville, 78.

23. Thomas, 79-81.

24. Turbiville, 80.

25. M.A. Garelov, "Otkuda Ugrozy" ("Whence the Threat") Voenno-Istorichedia Zhurnal, Feb 1989, 20-28, 24-25.

26. Memoirs of Georgiy Lobov, Radio Moscow Korean language broadcast, 2 Sep 1991. Translated at FBIS-SOV-91-197, Soviet Union Daily Report, 10 Oct 1991, 12-13.

27. Turbiville, 81.

28. Garleov, 24.

29. Garelov, 20-22.

30. Zoltan D. Barany, "Soviet Control of the Hungarian Military Under Stalin," Journal of Strategic Studies, v. 14, n. 2, Jun 1991, 148-64.

31. Colonel Dale Stewart, "A Close Look at a T-72 Regiment," Armor, Jul-Aug 1991, 19-20.

32. For example, Colonel A.D. Rubler, "Establishment of Force Groups for Conducting a First Counteroffensive Operation," Voyennaya Mysl, n. 2, 1991, 20-25.

33. Joseph A. Martellaro, "The Post-WWII Soviet Economy: A Case of Butter and Guns," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, v. 15, n. 1, Spring 1987, 73-88, 74-75.

34. Babakov, 63-70, presents an early Gorbachev-era view of this.

35. Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security, Washington: Brookings Institution, 18-19.

36. Turbiville, 110.

37. Barany, 157.

38. Bela Kiraly, "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans Against Tito’s Yugoslavia," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective, New York: Brooklyn College Press, 273-88.

39. R.W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution, Bloomington and Indianopolis: Indiana University Press, 1989, 67-69, 103-109.

40. Thomas, 78-79.

41. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, 71.

42. Kolkowicz, 73.

43. Kolkowicz, 70.

44. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet National Security Decisionmaking," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, 23-73, 61.

45. Scott and Scott, 188.

46. James Hansen, "The Kremlin Follies of '53 . . . the Demise of Lavrenti Beria," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, v. 4, n. 1, spring 1990, 101-114; Klimchuk, "How Beriya was Tried and Executed," Soviet Soldier, n. 5, 1990, 58-59.


22 September 2003