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Dr. Gary E. Weir
Naval Historical Center


This brief study will examine the increase in the number of submarine shipyards in the United States and their mobilization through 1943. Augmenting the experienced and already available yards with two newcomers from the private sector, the U.S. Navy led the way in promoting the transformation of the interwar command technology for submarines into a part of the modern naval-industrial complex.1

As it is used here, the term "naval-industrial complex" (NIC) depends heavily upon Samuel Huntington's definition of the military-industrial complex.2 He characterized this elusive and often misunderstood component of western society and economy as "a large permanent military establishment supported by and linked to a variety of related industrial, labor, and geographical interests." This description provides an understandable conceptual framework. It also creates an environment for inquiry flexible enough to permit discussion of the different motives and goals of the participants and the changing roles of the Navy and industry which contributed to the evolution of the naval-industrial complex.

This analysis will not present a monolithic view of the naval-industrial complex or its antecedents. Rather than a single historical event or political-economic entity, this partnership between industry, science, and the Navy evolved as a network of individual relationships developing simultaneously. Each was based upon the historical timing and complexity of the particular vessel and technology involved. They were bonded together into a naval-industrial complex by the common motives of national defense, mutual growth, and profit. Historian William McNeill has described this relationship, in its often turbulent early stages, as a "command technology." At the turn of the century, industry built larger, faster, and more powerful ships in direct response to the special demands of naval leaders like Admiral Sir John Fisher, Great Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Chief of the German Imperial Naval office, and Admiral George Dewey, Chairman of the U. S. Navy's General Board.3 Instead of allowing the private sector to develop more effective engines of war in response to international market forces, these naval leaders now ordered specific weapons and technologies to support preferred naval strategies and policies. In developing these "command technologies", the armaments industries and the navies of the major western powers inaugurated a relationship which represented the first stage in the evolution of the naval-industrial complex.4

While a very mature and mutually profitable relationship between the Navy and industry certainly prevailed in surface ship construction as early as the 1880s, nothing comparable existed for submarines before the Great War. Absolutely dependent upon the private sector in 1914, by 1940 the Navy managed to reach a level of submarine design and construction expertise equal to that of its strongest prime contractor, the Electric Boat Company (EB). Its technical expertise and control over ship contracts placed the Navy Department in a position to control a mature command technology for submarines on the eve of Pearl Harbor.

At this juncture, the Navy initiated and financed a massive expansion program within the shipbuilding industry, assisted by other governmental agencies, such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This ambitious effort inaugurated an unprecedented degree of integration and cooperation between the Navy and its contractors supported by a national commitment to naval expansion absent during the 1920s.

The Roosevelt Administration also mobilized the scientific community. In June of 1940, the President authorized the creation of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) to sponsor and coordinate defense related scientific research and development. One year later, the, Organization for Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), under the direction of Vannevar Bush, assumed the role of parent organization to the NDRC.

During World War II, this blend of naval, industrial, and scientific resources gave birth to the naval-industrial complex for submarines.

Congressional Consent

The aggressive and threatening behavior of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany during the 1930s made another major world conflict a disturbing possibility. Although Americans exhibited a strong desire to avoid war, an increasing number of the nation's leaders realized the need for a stronger defense and more modern weapons. Japanese expansion in the Far East, German rearmament, Hitler's annexation of Austria, and the Panay Incident combined with the president's domestic popularity to provide him with the congressional support necessary to expand the fleet. Thus, during Franklin D. Roosevelt's first two terms in office, slowly increasing appropriations allowed the Navy to build submarines already authorized and to plan for future construction.

The authorization for this fleet expansion came from Congress in three stages. First, the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 had given the Navy the authority to bring the fleet up to the full complement allowed by the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This agreement permitted the submarine force only 52,700 tons of front line vessels. Signatories to the treaty could replace or overhaul any overage units as long as the basic tonnage limit was observed. As an authorization, this bill did not provide the cash to build additional vessels. But, it did give naval supporters confidence that Congress would not fail over the next few years to appropriate the necessary funds.

The second stage in the process of authorizing naval expansion came with the legislation popularly known as the Second Vinson Bill, named after Carl Vinson, the Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs. This measure passed the Congress on 17 May 1938 and authorized the president to exceed the construction limits of the 1934 Vinson-Trammel Act by twenty percent. This would allow the Navy to build nine submarines more than the forty-six permitted by the 1934 authorization.5

After the beginning of the war in Europe, two bills, passed in successive months in the summer of 1940, authorized the final stage of the American naval expansion program before Pearl Harbor. The Act of 14 June 1940 permitted an increase of 21,000 tons, or fourteen submarines. But on 19 July, Congress passed the most ambitious of the American naval bills. This measure, often called the Seventy Percent Expansion Act, permitted the Navy to add 70,000 tons of submarines to the fleet. This represented an additional forty-seven boats.6

That same summer, the Navy Department responded to increased demand by building upon the foundation of vast experience available at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Electric Boat. To amplify the Navy's effort at Portsmouth, the Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS) expanded the services at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and reintroduced the Cramp Shipbuilding Company of Philadelphia to submarine construction. Both of these yards would take technical direction from Portsmouth.

In the private sector, Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison reached an agreement with EB to enlarge dramatically the company's facilities in Groton, Connecticut and Bayonne, New Jersey. The Navy Department also drew Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company into the submarine business as a follow-yard for EB. To this core of five prime contractors the Navy Department gradually added a network of subcontractors from all over the country, supplying everything from diesel engines to periscope optical sets. Naval and private sector personnel collaborated more closely than ever before in adding these new yards to the Navy's industrial base. This promoted the technical and professional integration that formed the foundation of the NIC for submarines.

Electric Boat and Manitowoc

The plan to ex and Electric Boat's facilities at Groton and Bayonne marked the first stop toward this critical integration in the submarine industry. It also gave the Navy Department its first opportunity to exercise the powers granted by Franklin Roosevelt's proclamation of a limited national emergency after the outbreak of war in Europe. Negotiations began in the early summer of 1940. At a meeting held an 10 June, the Navy Department and EB agreed that the latter would receive $1,422,000 under contract Nod-1541 to improve its physical plant and purchase new tools to expedite delivery of the sixteen submarines currently on order. EB's main plant at Groton received $1,261,000, while the other $161,000 went toward improving the company's Electro-Dynamic motor plant at Bayonne.7

As the negotiations for plant expansion continued into the summer, the estimation of the company's needs grew with the increased naval construction authorizations of June and July. In a communication to BUSHIPS on 25 June, the Vice President of Electric Boat Company, Lawrence Y. Spear, estimated that the company would need about $ 1.5 million to accomplish the necessary plant extensions. Spear felt that if,

a negotiated contract is placed with us for thirteen submarines in addition to the three recently awarded us, additional plant facilities will be necessary to enable us to make the deliveries required by the Department.

EB's cost estimate for the project rose to $2,633,100 when the Navy Department funded twenty-five of the additional submarines authorized by the Seventy Percent Expansion Act of 19 July.8 In each case, upon receiving the Navy Department's assistance for plant expansion, EB agreed that

throughout the useful life of this facility, the Government will be given priority in the use thereof, and the facility will be preserved for National Defense purposes.9

After the United States entered the war both submarine orders and naval investment in EB increased. By the summer of 1942 BUSHIPS reestimated the cost of expanding the company's facilities at $4,650,000.10 In addition, during the year preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, Electric Boat committed $1 million of its own funds for capital improvements. As a result, the rate of construction rose from 9.15 submarines per year before the summer of 1940 to approximately 15 two years later.11

In January of 1942, the Navy Department authorized a further expansion of the company's facilities at a site formerly occupied by the old Groton Iron Works.12 The government quickly acquired this site, just one-half mile down Eastern Point Road from the main EB plant, after the local press reported that a Norwegian firm had expressed interest in the property.13 Under BUSHIPS contract Nobs-380, the bureau built a government-owned, and EB-operated shipyard at this location which became known as the "Victory Yard". In this case, an investment of $9,410,757 enabled EB to further increase its output by nine submarines each year.14

The Navy Department soon discovered that its investment in EB contributed to lower submarines costs. According to a BUSHIPS note to the Price Adjustment Board, the contract price for EB submarines dropped $150,000 per vessel between 12 June and 9 September 1940. Twenty-four months later, BUSHIPS and EB completed the facilities expansion initiated under Nod-1541 and Nobs-380.15 With new plant space, tools, and scores of boats on order, the Navy Department paid $345,000 less than the June 1940 price levels for each of the twenty-five submarines awarded to EB in 1942 under contract Nod-1513.16

As these events unfolded, BUSHIPS drew another private contractor into the submarine business as a support facility for EB. The Manitowoc Shipbuilding company of Manitowoc, Wisconsin entered into an agreement with the Navy in September of 1940 to build EB submarine designs under license. The bureau decided to pursue a very long production run with the Gato Class submarines, and the newcomer would provide the Navy with duplicates of the USS Growler (SS-215), which EB produced at Groton. Manitowoc would employ this submarine as a prototype for the SS-265/274 series, using EB patents, supervision, training, and special systems installation.17

Building submarines on the western shore of Lake Michigan inspired some interesting innovations in construction and delivery. In an effort to maintain year-round progress, Manitowoc built its submarines, in segments, inside heated construction sheds. The sections then traveled to the ways by "mechanical doodlebug", or tractor-mover. Here the yard force installed the machinery and welded the hull sections together. The company then slid the vessels sideways into the Manitowoc River, a waterway too narrow to permit the traditional stern-first launch. After each submarine passed acceptance trials in Lake Michigan, Manitowoc turned the vessel over to the Inland Waterways Corporation, which brought each boat down the Mississippi River to New Orleans on a barge from Lockport, Illinois.18

This arrangement initially placed a considerable burden on Electric Boat. The company agreed to "license Manitowoc under all patents owned or controlled by it [EB] which may be used in the construction of the said ten submarines." In addition to providing experts to supervise and assist in the construction at Manitowoc, EB negotiated with its Qt2 Class subcontractors on behalf of the Wisconsin firm for the purchase of some vital materials and systems. EB even carried insurance which protected the vessels after they reached New Orleans and began the final stage of their trip to Groton. Once the vessels arrived, EB had to install the periscopes and masts. All of these services were rendered for a sum equal to their cost, plus a fixed fee per vessel of $126,560.19

The advantage to this arrangement was its speed and simplicity. Secretary of the Navy Edison, and his successor Frank Knox, wanted to acquire a large number of submarines in the most cost-effective manner. They believed this plan would accomplish that purpose, while saving the money, the design and construction time, and the expense which new tools and equipment, spare parts, planning, and testing would normally consume.20

The Manitowoc agreement proved very successful in spite of some initial difficulty. Although Electric Boat cooperated with BUSHIPS as the plan unfolded, the company exhibited a degree of reluctance to extend to the new contractor all of the supervisory and technical assistance the agreement required.21 Although its directors negotiated for Manitowoc, Groton refused to place orders or guarantee that its private subcontractors would offer Manitowoc the same prices EB paid on long term projects. Electric Boat would negotiate with its regular subcontractors, but expected very few of them to sign a long term supply agreement without some new provisions for rising costs and prices.

These circumstances caused a certain degree of tension between the staff at Manitowoc, led by Mr. Charles West, president of the company, and the visiting experts sent by EB to give advice on submarine construction. According to observations made by Commander Armand Morgan, wartime director of the Submarine Section of BUSHIPS, Mr. West and his staff did not like the attitude of the EB advisors. At the time, Commander Morgan noted that,

neither Supship, Manitowoc (Comdr Weaver) nor Mr. West want EB Co. supervision. Mr. West has privately told me that he resents EB Co attitude of ownership.

This kind of friction was to be expected in an unusual relationship of this sort. Electric Boat took exception to the idea of aiding a possible postwar competitor, but, in the end, it fulfilled its contract obligations.22

On the strength of naval investment in the company's facilities and the promise of new contract awards, EB became a conduit for much of the material and many of the systems needed to build the company's Gato class designs. BUSHIPS permitted Manitowoc to purchase locally those items not peculiar to EB designs. But the Groton firm had to negotiate the procurement of unique materials and systems for all of the yards using EB Gato plans, billing the Navy Department at cost and absorbing most of the manpower and administrative charges. The considerable administrative cost represented an important reason for EB's lack of enthusiasm for its role in the Navy Department's plans for Manitowoc.23

Portsmouth, Mare Island, and Cramp

EB had its design, engineering, and construction capabilities expanded with the addition of Manitowoc as a follow-yard. In a like manner, the Navy extended the considerable material and human resources at Portsmouth, by duplicating the yard's designs at both Mare Island and Cramp Shipbuilding.

Between 1940 and 1943, the Navy Department commissioned an expansion of the facilities and workforce at Portsmouth, to insure that it could sustain its productive capacity as well as its role as the country's leading submarine builder.24 Employing 11,000 workers in 1941, the yard increased this number to 20,000 in two years. It operated around the clock on a three-shift system, seven days per week for the duration of the war. Under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, the yard added an emergency building basin and a new dry dock. In 1942, the Navy Department authorized a new steel shiphouse containing five building ways, and allowed Portsmouth to build an electrical manufacturing shop for the production of electrical boxes and switches.25

These measures, combined with the prewar design and construction capability of the yard, dramatically improved productivity at Portsmouth. As historian Richard Winslow observed, "from four subs in 1941, the Yard produced twelve in 1942, nineteen in 1943, thirty-two in 1944, and twelve through August 1945."26

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, experienced in submarine construction only as a follow-yard for Portsmouth during the interwar years, also experienced considerable growth. During the first year of the war in Europe, the yard's workforce grew to over 14,000. Before the end of the war, Mare Island built a wide variety of vessels, among them eighteen Portsmouth-designed submarines.

At Mare Island, the Navy Department initiated submarine construction under the emergency conditions of 1940 by extending existing contracts. To build copies of the SS-236 through 239 and the SS-281 and 282, the submarine planning force at Mare Island merely broadened the supply contracts for the USS Tinosa and Tullibee, SS-283 and 284. According to BUSHIPS, the

subject vessels are being constructed at the Navy Yard, Mare Island, and in order to obtain full advantage of the duplication in design, it is essential that identical equipment be furnished.

This practice continued into 1942 when Portsmouth supplied procurement services for Mare Island on the SS-285 through 291 according to an arrangement then in affect for the SS-228 through 239 and SS-275 through 284. In certain cases, to insure quick production and exact duplication, the Navy Department even negotiated with EB to procure equipment for Mare Island, as well as for Portsmouth and Cramp Shipbuilding.27

Under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm L. Friedell, Mare island instituted some creative planning and production practices before and during the war. In 1940, the yard administration divided its unified Planning and Production Departments into specialized offices according to ship type. Thus, the yard had a type superintendent for submarines, supported by engineering specialists and experienced workers.

In 1941, when the increased demand for ships strained the talents and capabilities of the yard's enlarged workforce to its limits, BUSHIPS and Mare Island embarked on a "farm-out" program. The yard employed hundreds of small contractors in California and six other western states. Under this program, independent, private foundries and factories supplied the yard with thousands of spare parts. The program became even more ambitious after an agreement signed on 2 December 1941 sent most of the work on Mare Island's destroyer escorts and landing craft to Denver. Private contractors in Colorado shipped the completed vessels, in sections, over the mountains to the yard for finishing and launching. This plan permitted Mare Island to keep the construction of its submarines and larger warships on schedule at home, while responding to other naval needs.28

The Navy Department also sponsored the resurrection of the Cramp Shipbuilding Company of Philadelphia. Although Cramp had a long-standing international reputation as a surface-ship producer, it also had limited experience with submarines. Between 1910 and 1914 it built the USS G-4 to Italian designs under contract to the American Laurenti, Company. After the Great War, the production of American warships declined dramatically and the results of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 insured that this trend would continue. These conditions forced one of the Navy's prime submarine contractors, the Lake Torpedo Boat Company, to close its doors in 1924. Cramp reluctantly withdrew from the shipbuilding business three years later. In 1940, at the insistence of the Navy Department, the New York firm of Harriman Ripley and Company agreed to convert the old Cramp facilities, unused for thirteen years, into a modern shipyard capable of building surface ships and submarines.29

Cramp served as one of BUSHIPS, rive prime submarine contractors during World War II. It performance in that role illustrated some of the problems inherent in rapid expansion for firms relatively new to the submarine industry. The successful construction of fourteen submarines at Cramp during World War II also demonstrated the facility with which the Navy Department and BUSHIPS integrated the new firm into a command technology rapidly becoming a naval-industrial complex for submarines.

Bringing Cramp back to the shipbuilding business immediately placed the company in competition with other yards for factors of production scarce during wartime. The yard found it particularly difficult to recruit the skilled labor it needed. According to Captain James Bethea, who as a lieutenant commander served as one f the two senior inspection officers for the Supervisor of shipbuilding at Cramp,

the place was opened under the most adverse of conditions that you can think of. All of the competent labor had been hired by the Philadelphia Navy Yard, by New York Ship[building Company) across in Camden, and by Sun Ship[building Company] down the river a short way. It became very difficult to hire competent labor. The management in the yard was very, very lacking in know how, in discipline, and in knowledge of how to run an industrial establishment. . . The Navy further complicated the situation by putting in one of the most complex programs you can think of: building cruisers, submarines, and handling ship conversions. . . . I was exposed daily to how not to do so many things, it could not have been better experience for my career anywhere I wanted to go.30

Thus it was not surprising that materials and scheduling emerged as a major problem for Cramp in building the SS-292/303 and the SS-425/426. The importance of schedules and the pressure placed on the yards to deliver on time led many firms to overcompensate by demanding early delivery on all of the materials, systems, and tools needed to complete the vessels. Cramp reacted in this way during a debate in 1942 with the Kohler Company over the delivery of torpedo tubes. Naval authorities responded by agreeing to Kohler's request for a conference to resolve problems of timely delivery and production schedules, while rejecting its appeal for early consignment on all of the contract items. The latter request had caused Commander Armand Morgan of BUSHIPS' Submarine Section to comment that long-term delivery of material to Cramp should not cause delay.

This material as promised should not cause a delay in the completion of the vessels. Cramp's demands are unreasonable and unnecessary. Ports[mouth] builds a submarine from keel laying up to completion in less than nine months. Cramp wants the steel for the C. T. [conning tower] almost last thing put on, about 1 year before completion. I cannot recommend diverting material needed at producing yards to fulfill such a request.31

Of course, Cramp did not have the experience with submarines one found at Portsmouth. But, with the training of the interwar period behind them, the Navy Department and BUSHIPS had sufficient background in working with submarine contractors to satisfy Cramp's needs while effectively integrating the now company into the complex of technical and business relationships which produced fleet submarines.32

Of the five building yards producing the Navy's submarines during the war, EB did the job more cheaply than any of the others. On its contract for the SS-222/227 and SS-240/264, EB recorded a unit cost of $2,765,000. This was $284,500 less than Manitowoc and $846,250 less than Cramp. EB's considerable experience in submarine construction would account for these differences. Both Cramp and Manitowoc were relative newcomers. But the comparison holds when EB and Portsmouth were compared by the Price Adjustment Board in the spring of 1942. EBOS unit cost on the USS Bluefish (SS-222), to take a particularly interesting example, fell below the price of comparable projects at Portsmouth and Mare Island by about $1 million.33

This did not surprise the Navy Department. In 1938, the department had Lieutenant Commander Ralph E. McShane compare the cost of building ships at private yards and naval facilities. In his report, McShane predicted that the private yards would produce ships more cheaply. Not underestimating the capital risks borne by the private sector in doing business with the Navy, McShane cited, among other factors, higher government pay rates and liberal leave policies, as well as the burden of soliciting and administering the bidding for all submarine contracts as the primary reasons for the higher costs at the naval shipyards.34

Portsmouth compensated for its more expensive unit costs by building its vessels much faster than any other facility in the early months of the war. In the spring of 1942 it took EB an average of fourteen months to complete a submarine. Portsmouth did the job in nine and one-half months, while it took Mare Island twelve, and Cramp seventeen. Throughout the war Portsmouth compared well with EB in this aspect of submarine construction, actually building one more vessel than its Groton competitor by war's end. Portsmouth remained the Navy's premier submarine construction facility well into the postwar years.35


Between 1940 and 1943, the Navy Department, armed with congressional support, successfully directed a dramatic increase in both the submarine force and the industrial base for construction. This process demonstrated a renewed commitment to these vessels and marked the birth of the naval-industrial complex for submarines.

These events were the product of a forty-year evolution. In the crucible of the interwar period, plagued by fiscal and technical trials, naval authorities defined the type of vessel and the strategy they wished to employ as well as the character of the naval-industrial relationship. In the years between 1940 and 1943, the Navy Department used its dominant position in the command technology for submarines to fashion a central core of building yards according to its preferred strategy and production planning. From this point on, anticipating the needs of the, submarine force became an integral part of the private sector's recipe for prosperity.

Under the very able direction of assistant secretary Charles Edison, the Navy Department utilized the design and construction expertise of Electric Boat Company and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard as a central core for this much expanded network of construction facilities. By 1940, Manitowoc entered the submarine business as a follow yard for EB. In the same way, Mare Island and Cramp took design direction and engineering advice from Portsmouth. Thus, before the war began, the United States had five shipyards building the standardized Gato Class fleet submarine, rather than just two.

In the process of enlarging American submarine construction capability, the Navy Department naturally encountered some fundamental difficulties. Cramp's anxiety over construction and delivery schedules, the resentment at Manitowoc over Electric Boat's "ownership" attitude, and the technical challenges of building submarines on the Great Lakes were, just a few. But, overcoming these complications demonstrated the flexibility of the relationship and the excellent management skills exhibited by the significant players in this drama, like Charles West of Manitowoc, Secretary Charles Edison, Admiral Samuel M. Robinson of BUSHIPS, and Lawrence Y. Spear of Electric Boat company.


1. This paper is derived from my forthcoming book entitled, Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (Naval Historical Center). This book is intended to complement an earlier work by the author entitled, Building American Submarines, 1914-1940 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1991), which traced the development of the early command technology for submarines in the United States before World War II. William McNeill's concept of command technology is used here to describe the early relationship between the Navy and industry which had not yet matured into the naval- industrial complex. W. McNeill, Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

2. S. Huntington, "The Defense Establishment: vested Interests and the Public Interest", in Omer L. Carey, ed., The Military Industrial Complex and U. S. Foreign Policy (Pullman, Washington: Washington State University Press, 1969), 562-584.

3. Von Tirpitz held this position from 1898 through 1916. Fisher was First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. The General Board advised successive American Secretaries of the Navy on the general characteristics for the vessels required by the Navy. For a recent analysis of the Royal Navy's response to technical innovation and its affect on strategy, see Jon Sumida, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology. and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

4. William H. McNeill The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), chapter 8.

5. For general information on the 1934 and 1938 legislation as well as the tonnage allowed and the numbers of vessels authorized, see George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1940), chapter 14. For the requirement that every other submarine be built at a navy yard, see Lewis Compton to Mayor T. S. Burgin of Quincy MA, 9 August 1937, box 7, Assistant SECNAV Alpha Files, RG-80, National Archives, Washington D. C. (NA).

6. The numbers of submarines were calculated by the author at an average displacement per boat of 1475 tons. For the pertinent sections of the legislation, see Naval History Division, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1964), 244.

7. BUC&R-BUENG Joint Memorandum entitled "Electric Boat Company., Groton, Conn.", 10 June 1940, box 403, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. By 1942, the total expenditure on the Electro-Dynamic Works at Bayonne amounted to $476,000. Electro-Dynamic Works, Bayonne to BUSHIPS, 27 January 1942, box 404, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. The initial arrangement gave EB title to those construction facilities and tools for which it paid fifty and one-half percent of the cost. The government was vested with those facilities for which it paid the whole price. For an example of the 100 percent Navy ownership contract see, BUSHIPS to Allis-Chalmers, I January 1942; BUSHIPS to Director of Purchases, OPN, 30 April 1941, box 113, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

8. SUPSHIPS to BUSHIPS, 6 August 1940; EB to SUPSHIPS, 5 August 1940, box 403, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WURC.

9. EB to Supships, Groton, 14 Aug 1940 and 24 Jul 1940, Lewis Compton, Acting SECNAV to EB, 23 Sep 1940, box 1986, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC

10. When the work was completed in 1943, the total amount invested in Nod-1541 came to $4,991,250. EB to BUSHIPS, 3 February 1943, box 407, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

11. Captain N. L. Rawlings, USN, Liaison Officer for the Price Adjustment Board and Head of Shipbuilding for BUSHIPS to Price Adjustment Board, 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. An important factor in the production increase was the numbers of hours worked each day on the vessels at the yard. Before the summer of 1940, EB was using a 40 hour week. By 1942, around-the-clock shifts were in use.

12. EB to Supships, Groton, 14 Aug 1940 and 24 Jul 1940, Lewis Compton, Acting SECNAV to EB, 23 Sep 1940, box 1986, BUSHIPS Gencorr 1940-45, RG-19, WNRC. Liaison officer for the Price Adjustment Board, Captain N.L. Rawlings USN, Head of Shipbuilding Division, BUSHIPS to Price Adjustment Board, 12 Jun 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-45, RG-19, WNRC.

13. James Forrestal, Acting SECNAV to FDR, 2 January 1942; "Minutes of Conference", 31 December 1941; BUSHIPS TO SECNAV, 2 January 1941, box 403, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

14. Captain N. L. Rawlings, USN, Liaison officer for the Price Adjustment Board and Head of Shipbuilding for BUSHIPS to Price Adjustment Board, 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

15. Lieutenant R. B. Carothers, officer in Charge of Construction to BUSHIPS, 24 July 1943, box 407, BUSHIPS OENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

16. Captain N. Li- -Rawlings, USN, Liaison Officer for the Price Adjustment Board and Head of Shipbuilding for BUSHIPS to Price Adjustment Board, 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. EB to BUSHIRS, 18 August 1943, box 1988, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1943, RG-19, WNRC.

17. EB-Manitowoc Agreement, 14 Sep 1940; Manitowoc to Supships, Manitowoc, 2 and 22 Nov 1940, box 1986, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-45, RG-19, WNRC. Manitowoc decided in the autumn of 1941 to set aside private and Maritime Commission construction in order to concentrate on building the Navy's submarines. The reason given in the source cited below was the Navy Department's investment in Manitowoc since 1940, especially in terms of plant expansion and retooling. Manitowoc to BUSHIPS (Commander N. L. Rawlings) , 5 November 1941; SUPSHIPS, Manitowoc (Commander G. C. Weaver), 29 October 1941, box 704, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

18. SUPSHIPS, Manitowoc to Commandants, Mare Island and Portsmouth, 16 October 1941, box 703; Memorandum of a Conference in Captain Jones' Office at the Bureau of Ships, 9:30 am, 17 September, 1940; Manitowoc to BUC&R/BUENG, 22 May 1940, box 701, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. Captain G. C. Weaver, USN, SUPSHIPS, Manitowoc to BUSHIPS, 1 December 1943, box 1986, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. RADM William T. Nelson, USN (Ret), Fresh Water Submarines. the Manitowoc Story (Manitowoc, WI: Hoeffner Printing, 1986), chapters 2 and 3.

19. EB-Manitowoc Agreement, 14 Sep 1940, box 1986, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-45, RG-19, WNRC.

20. For a discussion of these motives see: BUSHIPS to Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, 23 May 1941, box 1987, BUSHIPS GENCORR, RG-19, WNRC.

21. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock of Chester Pennsylvania tried to enter the submarine market in 1933 but was forced out by EB. According to communications between Sun, the Navy JAG, and the Bureaus of C&R and ENG, the company had to raise its price beyond the acceptable range to the Navy in order to cover the costs of royalties on EB submarine patents. The bureaus were not in the position at the time to grant Sun a waiver of patent liability, given the importance of EB to the Navy's new plans for construction in the early 1930s. Sun Shipbuilding Co to JAG, #SS/L4-2 (350703-1)18 of Jul 1935; BUC&R and BUENG to JAG, #SS/L4-2 (350703-1) of 30 Jul 1935, box 4020, SECNAV GENCORR 1926-40, RG-80, NA.

22. It should be mentioned here that Commander Morgan tended to be highly critical of EB's business practices. BUSHIPS to EB (route slip for the Morgan comment), 29 March 1943, box 406, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. See also the route slip on the following document related to price reductions initiated by EB in 1943, EB to BUSHIPS, 18 August 1943, box 1988, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1943, RG-19, WNRC

23. SUPSHIPS, Manitowoc to BUSHIPS, 10 Apr 1941; EB Purchasing Agent, F.B. Bently to the EB Representative at Manitowoc, Eric H. Ewertz, 25 Feb 1941; EB to Supships, Groton, 9 Feb 1942, box 1987, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-45, RG-19, WNRC.

24. From 1941 to August 1945 Portsmouth delivered seventy-nine submarines to the Navy. This exceeded EB’s total by one. R. E. Winslow III, Portsmouth-Built: Submarines of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (Portsmouth, Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985), 79. For the Pre World War II role of Portsmouth see also, Weir, Building American Submarines.

25. This facility was located in Somersworth, New Hampshire, some eighteen miles to the northwest of the yard.

26. Winslow, Portsmouth-Built, 79-91.

27. BUSHIPS to BUSANDA, 23 May 1941, box 1987; BUSHIPS to Portsmouth et. al., 6 January 1942, box 2105, BUSHIPS GENCORR'1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

28. Arnold S. Lott, Lieutenant Commander, USN, A Long Line of Ships: Mare Island's Century of Naval Activity in California (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1954), 207-216.

29. "Address to the Technology Club of Philadelphia" by Mr. Henry E. Rossell, President Cramp Shipbuilding Company, Philadelphia, 15 May 1945, box 133, Records of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, 1940-1947 (FORRESTAL, 1940-1947), RG-80, NA. This was the source used for the background information on Cramp.

30. Captain James Bethea, interview by Gary E. Weir, 4 March 1991, NHC Oral History, OA. (U)

31. Route Slip (signed AMM (515) 8/10/42), SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia to Inspector of Naval Material, Pittsburgh, 8 Aug 1942, box 2108, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

32. SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia to BUSHIPS, 15 April 1942; Cramp to SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia, 9 April 1942; Cramp to SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia, 10 August 1942; Kohler Letter of Intent to Cramp, 15 June 1942 (source of quote) ; SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia to Cramp, 6 June 1942, box 2122, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. Cramp to BUSHIPS, 30 October 1942; Cramp to SUPSHIPS, Philadelphia, 4 August 1942, box 2108, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. subcontract between Cramp Shipbuilding Co. and Kohler Co., 15 June 1942, box 2106, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

33. Price Adjustment Board to Liaison officer for the Price Adjustment Board, 'Captain N. L. Rawlings, USN, Head of Shipbuilding Division, BUSHIPS and reply, 18 May and 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC-

34. Captain N. L. Rawlings, USN, Liaison officer for the Price Adjustment Board and Head of shipbuilding for BUSHIPS to Price Adjustment Board, 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC. EB to BUSHIPS, 18 August 1943, box 1988, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1943, RG-19, WNRC. "The Problem of Comparing the Costs of Ships Built at Navy Yards with Ships Built at Private Yards", 1940 (written 1938), box 8, Assistant SECNAV Alpha Files, RG-80, NA. McShane did not underestimate the problem of comparing the two types of shipyards and the variety of very different determining factors affecting each in its own environment. A comparison could be made only in the most general terms, citing the most outstanding factors involved.

35. Price Adjustment Board to Liaison Officer for the Price Adjustment Board, Captain N. L. Rawlings, USN, Head of shipbuilding Division, BUSHIPS and reply, 18 May and 12 June 1942, box 405, BUSHIPS GENCORR 1940-1945, RG-19, WNRC.

11 July 2003